Japan

Last Updated: 28 October 2011

Mine Ban Policy

Japan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Japan is a former antipersonnel mine producer and importer. It ceased antipersonnel mine production in 1997 and production facilities were decommissioned by 31 March 1999. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically entered into force on 1 March 1999. On 27 April 2011, Japan submitted its 12th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.

Japan completed destruction of its stockpile of 985,089 antipersonnel mines on 8 February 2003. Japan initially retained 15,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes; by the end of 2010 this number had been reduced to 2,673.[1]

Japan attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2011, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011. Japan served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on Victim Assistance (1999–2001), Mine Clearance (2002–2004), Stockpile Destruction (2004–2006), and the General Status and Operation of the Convention (2007–2009).

Japan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

 



[1]Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2011.


Last Updated: 23 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Cluster Munitions status

State Party

National implementation legislation

Law 85 on the Prohibition of the Production of Cluster Munitions and the Regulation of their Possession, 2009

Stockpile destruction

Two-thirds of Japan’s cluster munitions were destroyed by the end of 2013 and the rest of the stockpile destruction is expected to be completed by end of 2015

Participation in Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings

Attended Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2014

Key developments

Provided an updated transparency report in April 2014, indicating significant stockpile destruction

Policy

Japan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 14 July 2009. It was among the first 30 ratifications to trigger the convention’s entry into force on 1 August 2010.

Japan’s national implementation legislation, Law No. 85 enacted on 17 July 2009, bans production and possession of cluster munitions and affirms Japan’s obligation to dispose of its stockpiled cluster munitions.[1] Japan has said that the use of cluster munitions is prohibited under the Explosive Control Act and other laws, while transfer is regulated by laws governing foreign exchange and trade.[2]

Japan submitted its initial Article 7 report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions in January 2011 and has provided annual updated reports since, most recently in April 2014.[3]

Japan participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and its position evolved significantly over time to allow it to join in the consensus adoption of the convention in Dublin in May 2008.[4]

Japan has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008. It has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties, including the convention’s Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013, where it made statements on stockpile destruction and cooperation and assistance. Japan has attended every intersessional meeting of the convention in Geneva, including in April 2014, where it made several interventions.

Japan has continued to promote universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions after stepping down as co-coordinator. At the UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2013, Japan called on states that are not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to accede “as soon as possible and join our collective efforts towards ending the suffering caused by these weapons.”[5]

Japan has condemned Syria’s cluster munition use on several occasions. At the UNGA First Committee in October 2013, Japan stated, “We are deeply concerned by the reported use of cluster munitions. The use of these weapons by any actor is entirely unacceptable, since they not only pose grave dangers and harm to civilians during and after conflicts, but can also leave a lasting socio-economic impact for many years or even decades.”[6] Japan has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s cluster munition use, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[7]

The Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) works in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Japan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Japan has provided its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. The government maintains that United States (US) military bases in Japan, being under US jurisdiction and control, are not on Japanese territory and that therefore the possession of cluster munitions by US forces does not violate the national law or the convention (see US cluster munitions in Japan section below).

Also, according to the government, Clause 4.4 of Law No. 85 allows Japanese nationals, both civilians and members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), to transport cluster munitions that are owned by the US.[8] In April 2013, a JSDF representative said that the JSDF had not been involved in any transportation of US cluster munitions.[9]

During the negotiations in May 2008, Japan was one of the strongest backers of a provision on “interoperability” or joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (Article 21). Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its views on the convention’s prohibition on assistance during joint military operations.[10]

In a June 2008 US State Department cable made public by Wikileaks in June 2011, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions, including but not limited to “Transportation and storage of US-owned CM [cluster munitions] by Japan Self Defense Forces or Japanese civilian personnel; Movement of additional CM into US military facilities and JSDF bases; and Stockpiling and handling of CM at civilian ports during contingencies.” The Japanese official reportedly confirmed that “Japanese civilian and Self Defense Forces personnel can transport CM [cluster munitions] in Japan as long as they do not take legal ownership of the CM” and “the United States can move CM into and out of Japan, and within Japan, as long as Japanese entities and personnel are not taking title to the CM.” [11]

A December 2008 US cable made public by Wikileaks in September 2011 states that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.” According to the cable, a senior Japanese official reportedly “explained that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) allows the United States to stockpile and store CM on JSDF bases, while Article 21.3 of the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions] allows JSDF personnel to handle U.S. CM and U.S. forces and JSDF to engage in bilateral operations and activities involving CM. The critical overlap of U.S. forces activities with the CCM implementing legislation that METI [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry] is drafting is the contracting of Japanese companies and nationals by U.S. forces to transport and handle CM in Japan.” The cable notes that Japan “is interpreting Article 21.4(a) to mean Japan is obligated to not allow U.S. forces to develop, produce or acquire CM in Japan.”[12]

Investment

On the prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions, Japan stated in June 2011 that “there is no clear agreement on financing of cluster munition production” and noted “it is up to each state party to determine with their private sector” concerning the question of disinvestment.[13] In 2009, the government said that it has not studied investment and loans by Japanese financial institutions to private firms producing cluster munitions, but said it would try to keep financial institutions informed of the convention and request that they carry out banking services in keeping with it.[14]

In 2010, Japan’s three largest banks said they would refrain from financing the manufacture of cluster munitions: Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, and Mizuho Bank.[15] According to the 2012 NGO report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” all three of these financial institutions remain involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions.[16]

In 2010, the Japanese Bankers Association said that it had instructed its members to stop financing the production of cluster munitions.[17] In January 2011, JCBL sent a questionnaire to 17 financial institutions reported to invest in cluster munition production. Two companies, Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities Co. Ltd. and Nippon Life Insurance Company, responded that they had halted investment in cluster munition producers. Nine companies said they maintained investments and six did not confirm or deny investing in cluster munition producers.[18]

Use, production, and transfer

Japan has not used cluster munitions, but it produced and imported the weapons in the past. Japan has declared that three private companies that formerly produced cluster munitions have been decommissioned: IHI Aerospace Co. Ltd. in Gunma prefecture, and Ishikawa Seisakusho Ltd. and Komatsu Ltd. in Ishikawa prefecture.[19]

Stockpiling

In the initial Article 7 report provided in January 2011, Japan declared a stockpile of 14,011 cluster munitions of four different types containing 2,029,393 explosive submunitions. No change in the number of stockpiled cluster munitions was reported in the 2012 and 2013 Article 7 reports, but the April 2014 report declares a significantly reduced stockpile of 4,481 cluster munitions and 599,603 submunitions, after destruction efforts.[20] This represents just under one-third of the original stockpile (32 percent of all munitions and 30 percent of submunitions).

Cluster munitions declared stockpiled by Japan (as of 31 December 2013)

Type of munition

Quantity of munitions (2013)

Quantity of munitions (2011)

Quantity of submunitions

(2013)

Quantity of submunitions (2011)

M26 rocket, each containing 644 M77 submunitions

432

2,232

278,208

1,437,408

M261 rocket, each containing nine M73 submunitions

2,175

7,329

19,575

65,961

Type-3 ICM projectile, each containing 64 self-destructing submunitions

556

2,702

35,584

172,928

CBU-87 bomb, each containing 202 BLU-97 submunitions

1,318

1,748

266,236

353,096

Total

4,481

14,011

599,603

2,029,393

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Japan is required to declare and destroy (or ensure the destruction of) all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2018.

In September 2013, Japan announced to states parties that the destruction of the stockpiled cluster munitions had started that month. It said the contract “calls for the destruction of all stockpiles to be completed by the end of 2015.”[21] Japan’s Ministry of Defense concluded the contract with private company Nammo Demil Division in August 2011 to destroy the stockpile at demilitarization facilities in Norway (Nammo NAD) and Germany (Nammo Buck).[22] 

According to the 2014 Article 7 report, Japan had destroyed 8,718 cluster munitions and 939,222 submunitions by the end of 2013, as shown by the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by Japan (as of 31 December 2013)

Type of munition

Quantity of munitions destroyed

Quantity of submunitions destroyed

M26 rocket, each containing 644 M77 submunitions

1,198

771,052

M261 rocket, each containing nine M73 submunitions

5,154

46,386

Type-3 ICM projectile, each containing 64 self-destructing submunitions

2,146

137,344

CBU-87 bomb, each containing 202 BLU-97 submunitions

220

44,440

Total

8,718

939,222

In 2014, Japan reported that a total of 4,481 cluster munitions with 599,603 submunitions still to be destroyed as of the end of 2013 in addition to another 602 M26 rockets and 210 CBU-87 bombs were handed over to the contractor for destruction.[23] This makes a remaining total of 5,293 cluster munitions left to be destroyed.

According to the 2014 Article 7 report, the M26 rockets were destroyed at Nammo’s facilities in Germany. The destruction process involved separation of the M77 submunitions, which were then incinerated at a facility equipped with contamination reduction devices.[24]

The other types of cluster munitions are being destroyed at Nammo’s facilities in Norway in a detonation chamber equipped with contamination clearance devices.[25] A further 812 cluster munitions have been transferred to the company undertaking destruction.[26]

In 2011, Japan reported that a total of JPY2.8 billion (approximately US$32 million) was budgeted in Japan’s 2011 fiscal year for the stockpile destruction.[27]

Retention

In its initial Article 7 report, Japan declared that it has no cluster munitions retained for training, development, or countermeasure purposes.[28] In September 2013, Japan affirmed that “we have no plan to retain any cluster munitions in accordance with Article 3.6” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[29]

US cluster munitions in Japan

The US stockpiles cluster munitions on its bases in Japan. In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the US had not disclosed information to the Japanese government about the type, number, function, and locations of the stockpiles.[30] Local media in Okinawa have reported that US forces in Japan have dropped cluster munitions on bombing ranges during training exercises.[31] In 2010, media reports published photographs of cluster bombs that appeared to be mounted on US fighter aircraft.[32] In the Diet (parliament), Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the government had sent an inquiry to the US military and the US responded that it does not disclose information on the details of its training program.[33] In June 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in media reports that it is not prohibited for the US to use or retain cluster munitions at US bases in Japan as the bases are not under Japan’s jurisdiction.[34]

In March 2013, media reported that US Forces at Kadena Air Base practiced use of cluster munitions at bombing ranges off the coast of Okinawa.[35]

In response to a parliamentary question in 2013, Japan’s Ministry of Defense stated that its Self-Defense Force was not involved in the transportation of US cluster munitions in 2012. The Ministry of Defense did not clarify if Japanese contractors were involved in transporting US cluster munitions, as it does not view this as an issue of concern.[36]

 



[1] Law No. 85 Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Cluster Munitions and the Regulation of their Possession. See Cabinet Legislation Bureau.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 March 2010.

[3] Various periods are covered by the Article 7 reports submitted on 27 January 2011 (for the period from 1 August 2010 to 25 January 2011), 14 May 2012 (for calendar year 2011), 30 April 2013 (for calendar year 2012), and April 2014 (for calendar year 2013).

[4] For details on Japan’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 100–102. It appears that the United States (US) exerted extensive pressure on Japan throughout the Oslo Process. In 2011, Wikileaks released 21 US Department of State reporting cables for the period from October 2006 to December 2008 that show how the US sought to influence Japan’s engagement in the Oslo Process. One cable dated 7 May 2007 (shortly after the launch of the Oslo Process) stated, “Japan feels compelled to participate in the Oslo process meetings in order to influence any ‘unrealistic’ proposals, maintain positive and growing relations with European nations, and to counter domestic public criticism that Japan is not acting.” See “Japan urges progress on cluster munitions in the CCW,” US Department of State cable 07TOKYO2004 dated 7 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011.

[5] Statement of Japan, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 29 October 2013.

[6] Ibid.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013. Japan voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[8] Response to questions in the Diet by Tetsuhiro Hosono, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Minute No. 20, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives, 24 June 2009.

[9] This statement information was provided verbally by the Ministry of Defense to a Diet parliamentarian. Email from Junko Utsumi, Coordinator, JCBL, 8 April 2013.

[10] At the 2011 intersessional meetings, Japan stated that the use of cluster munitions in joint military operations is “totally under control” and warned the meeting that “we should not discuss Article 21 here while the appropriate military officials are absent.” Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011. Notes by the CMC and Human Rights Watch (HRW).

[11]Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent US-Japan military operations,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO1748 dated 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011.

[12] In the meeting documented by the cable, Japanese officials reportedly proposed drafting “a new Joint Committee agreement that would say the United States will: 1) provide, and continually update, a list of transport companies and contractors to the GOJ; 2) agree to only use those entities to transport or handle CM outside U.S. bases; and 3) ensure the contractors carry documentation from U.S. forces indicating they are contracted to handle munitions.” According to the cable, the US responded, “Developing procedures specific to cluster munitions will greatly reduce the flexibility and could lead to security and operational compromises.” “Consultations with Japan on implementing the Oslo convention on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[13] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011. Notes by HRW.

[14] Response to questions in the Diet by Masamichi Kohno, Deputy Director-General, Planning and Coordination Bureau, Financial Services Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives, 24 June 2009; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 March 2010.

[15] The banks indicated they would deny any loans for or investments in production of cluster munitions. “Japan banks ban financing cluster arms,”Agence France-Presse, 30 July 2010; and “Megabanks Sumitomo Mitsui and Tokyo-Mitsubishi ban financing of cluster bomb production,” Mainichi Daily News, 30 July 2010.

[16] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” June 2012, pp. 18–22.

[17] The Japanese Bankers Association’s membership is comprised of banks, bank holding companies, and bankers associations in Japan. See Japanese Bankers Association statement, “Banking issues regarding the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 8 October 2010.

[18] JCBL Press release, “Seven Japanese financial institutions invest in cluster munition producers – Survey,” 7 April 2011.

[20] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2014. In addition, a total of 76 individual submunitions held by former cluster munition producer Hokkaido NOF Corporation Ltd. in Bibai, Hokkaido were destroyed in February 2011.

[21] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013. The 2011 announcement by Nammo stated that the stockpile destruction program would conclude by February 2015 at the latest. Nammo press release, “Nammo Awarded Contract to Demilitarize Cluster Munitions for Japan,” August 2011, www.nammo.com/News/Nammo-awarded-contract-to-demilitarize-Cluster-Munitions-for-Japan/.

[22] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.

[24] Japan reported the destruction of 771,052 M77 submunitions, but the total may be 771,512 as each M26 rocket contains 544 submunitions so a total of 1,198 rockets would contain a total of 771,512 submunitions. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2014.

[26] A total of 1800 M26 rockets, and 430 CBU-87 bombs were destroyed. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2014.

[27] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 January 2011. Average exchange rate for 2010: US$1=JPY87.78. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 6 January 2011.

[28] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, Section II, 27 January 2011. The annual updated reports indicate no change to the information provided in the initial report.

[29] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013.

[30] Response to questions in the Diet by Shintaro Ito, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 8 May 2009.

[31] The media reported in September and December 2007 that a US fighter plane took off from Kadena air base with cluster munitions and came back without them. The cluster munitions were reportedly dropped in a training area near the city of Naha, the capital of Okinawa, where most US bases in Japan are located. “F18 with cluster munitions,” Ryukyu Shinpo, 11 December 2007; and “A series of flights with cluster munitions and missiles, the Kadena base,” Ryukyu Shinpo, 13 December 2007.

[32] “US Fighters from outside of Kadena Air Base, Have they Dropped Cluster Bombs on the Training Area near Okinawa?,” Ryukyu Shinpo, 13 May 2010; and “Cluster Bombs were Carried Back in the Store House. Bombard Training shall be take [sic] place again from today?,” Ryukyu Shinpo, 19 July 2010.

[33] Response to questions in the Diet by Katsuya Okada, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors, 18 May 2010.

[34] “Cluster munitions in the US base not covered by the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Ryukyu Shinpo, 18 June 2010.

[36] Email from Junko Utsumi, JCBL, 8 April 2013.


Last Updated: 30 October 2013

Support for Mine Action

In 2012, Japan contributed ¥4,599,974,319 (US$57,629,345) in mine action funding to 21 countries as well as the ICRC, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the UN.[1] Japan contributed ¥1,259,459,985 ($15,778,752), representing 27% of its contributions, to Lao PDR: this included ¥886 million ($11.1 million) worth of equipment to the government for use in their mine action programs. Japan also made contributions through the UN Mine Action Service ranging from ¥259 million ($3.2 million) to ¥478 million ($6 million) to Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, and South Sudan.

Japan’s support to the DRC includes funding the national survey that will determine the full extent of the country’s landmine and cluster munition contamination problem. Japan’s only reported support for victim assistance was to the Humpty Dumpty Institute and Project RENEW in Vietnam for their Mushrooms with a Mission livelihood project.

Contributions by recipient: 2012[2]

Recipient

Sector

Amount (¥)

Amount ($)

Lao PDR

Clearance

1,259,459,985

15,778,752

Mali

Clearance

478,920,000

6,000,000

South Sudan

Clearance

399,100,000

5,000,000

Afghanistan

Clearance, risk education

390,187,299

4,888,340

DRC

Clearance

343,103,157

4,298,461

Mozambique

Clearance

341,832,981

4,282,548

Somalia

Clearance

319,280,000

4,000,000

Cambodia

Clearance

259,790,633

3,254,706

Libya

Clearance

145,859,875

1,827,360

Angola

Clearance

134,029,993

1,679,153

Sri Lanka

Clearance

127,558,347

1,598,075

Georgia

Clearance

78,696,214

985,921

Zimbabwe

Clearance

68,976,692

864,153

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Clearance

66,793,855

836,806

Palau

Clearance

59,855,980

749,887

ICRC

Clearance

26,606,720

333,334

Colombia

Various

23,637,416

296,134

Tajikistan

Clearance

19,010,969

238,173

Lebanon

Clearance

16,185,900

202,780

Vietnam

Victim assistance

9,812,752

122,936

Mauritania

Clearance

15,759,980

197,444

UNMAS

Various

7,207,746

90,300

Solomon Islands

Clearance

5,115,025

64,082

GICHD

Various

3,192,800

40,000

 

 

4,599,974,319

57,629,345

From 2008–2012, Japan’s contributions have ranged from ¥3.4 billion to ¥5.3 billion. The role the exchange rate plays with Japan’s contribution is well illustrated when comparing the years 2008 and 2012.

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[3]

Year

Amount (¥)

Amount ($)

2012

4,599,974,319

57,629,345

2011

3,425,586,258

42,981,007

2010

4,110,662,879

46,829,151

2009

4,502,340,000

48,060,845

2008

5,318,480,480

51,440,956

Total

21,957,043,936

246,941,304

 

 



[1] Average exchange rate for 2012: ¥79.82=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[3] See Landmine Monitor reports 2008–2011; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Japan: Support for Mine Action,” 19 September 2012.