Korea, South

Last Updated: 25 November 2013

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State not party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Abstained on Resolution 67/32 in December 2012, as in previous years

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Bangkok Symposium on Enhancing Cooperation and Assistance

Policy

The Republic of Korea—South Korea—has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It continues to insist on the military necessity of antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging their negative humanitarian impact.

On 3 December 2012, South Korea abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has in previous years. South Korea has stated for many years that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula prohibits it from acceding to the treaty.[1]

South Korea has never sent an observer delegation to a meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, including in 2012. Its last attendance at an intersessional Standing Committee meeting was 2008. However, South Korea did attend the Bangkok Symposium on Enhancing Cooperation & Assistance in June 2013 in Bangkok.

In April 2011, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein, the Special Envoy on Universalization for the Mine Ban Treaty, visited South Korea where he met with the Deputy Minister for Policy of the Ministry of National Defense, the Deputy Minister of Multilateral and Global Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of the High Court of the Korean Armed Forces to explore ways that South Korea may wish to engage in the work of the treaty.[2]

Laws proposing compensation for civilian mine victims within the country and to allow for mine clearance by civilian organizations, pending before the National Assembly in 2012, did not pass prior to dissolution of the assembly and national elections.[3] The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines / Peace Sharing Association (KCBL/PSA) has been championing the act for compensation for civilian landmine victims. Both acts were resubmitted to the new National Assembly in January 2013.

In June 2013, Jong-soo Kim, a civilian landmine victim, and Jai-kook Cho, the Coordinator of KCBL/PSA, made presentations to the National Assembly during a public hearing regarding the Act for Compensation for Civilian Mine Victims. Representatives of the military and the government legal services branch also made presentations regarding the proposed act. As of 9 September, the Act for Compensation for Civilian Mine Victims was still pending in the Committee on National Defense within the National Assembly. Despite widespread support among legislators, the Ministry of Law and Justice opposed the Act due to the retroactive character of the legislation, which conflicts with the existing general national compensation law. As a result, the Office of the Prime Minister has launched an investigation into the situation of civilian mine victims in order to make a compromise with the Ministry of Law and Justice on the proposed act.

As of 9 September, the draft of the Act on Demining Business by Private Organizations was also pending in the Committee on National Defense in the National Assembly. The draft was submitted to the National Assembly by the Ministry of National Defense in its former session and by a parliamentarian in the current session. A hearing on the act is scheduled for November 2013. The Act on Demining Business by Private Organizations is expected to be influenced by the debating process of the draft of the Act for Compensation for Civilian Mine Victims.[4]

In May 2013, KCBL/PSA organized a two-day exhibition at the Gangwon Provincial Administration Office, presenting the situation of mine victims within the province and calling on the national assembly to pass a compensation act for victims. The provincial governor, assembly members, and officials attended the exhibition. In March 2013, KCBL/PSA organized a one-month exhibition held at the Palais de Seoul gallery which included 153 works of art created by 20 artists, sculptors, and photographers on the theme of “peace sharing for civilian landmine victims.” In April 2013, KCBL/PSA held a two-day exhibition in the main lobby of the National Assembly. The exhibition focused attention on the need for the proposed Act for Compensation for Civilian Mine Victims, which is currently before the National Assembly for consideration.[5]

South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. On 30 March 2012, South Korea submitted its annual CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report.[6]

In March 2012, ICBL Youth Ambassador Song Kosal urged South Korean authorities to join the Mine Ban Treaty during his visit to South Korea to receive the 2012 Tji Hak-soon Justice and Peace Award.[7]

Use, production, and transfer

South Korea informed the Monitor that it did not engage in any new use of antipersonnel mines, including replacing mines in existing minefields.[8] South Korea has previously maintained that it has not used mines in many years.

South Korea reported to the Monitor that it did not use, import, export, or purchase antipersonnel mines from foreign companies during 2011 or early 2012.[9]

However, production of mines has continued. In 2011, a private South Korean company, Hanwha Corporation, produced 4,000 KM74 antipersonnel mines.[10] In 2007, the Hanwha Corporation produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, as well as an unknown number of Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[11]

In both 2012 and 2011, Foreign Ministry officials stated that the government commissioned the development of remotely-controlled mines which will replace antipersonnel mines and that the newly developed mines will meet the requirements set out in the Amended Protocol II to the CCW.[12]

South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of the moratorium on the export of AP [antipersonnel] mines since 1997.”[13]

Stockpiling

In 2012, South Korean officials declined to reveal to the Monitor the size of South Korea’s stockpile and the types of mines stockpiled.[14] In 2011, South Korean officials stated that information regarding its stockpile was classified.[15] However, South Korea said in 2006 and 2008 that its stockpile consisted of 407,800 antipersonnel mines.[16] In the past, the government stated that it held a stockpile of about 2 million antipersonnel mines.[17]

South Korea told the Monitor in 2012 that it did not destroy any stockpiled mines during 2011.[18] However, South Korea reported in 2011 that it had destroyed 18,464 antipersonnel mines (5,132 M14; 12,086 M16; and 1,246 M18) in the ammunition units where they were stored during 2010. The date(s) of the destruction and reason for this action were not specified.[19]

The United States (US) military keeps a substantial number of remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US held 40,000 GATOR, 10,000 Volcano, and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.[20]

For many years, the US military also stockpiled about 1.1 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in any future war in Korea, with about half the total kept in South Korea and half in the continental US.[21] Most of the US-owned mines located in South Korea have been part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K). On 30 December 2005, the US enacted a law authorizing the sale of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program would be terminated, which occurred at the end of 2008.[22] In June 2009, the South Korean government told the Monitor, “AP [antipersonnel] mines were not included in the list of items for sale or transfer in the WRSA-K negotiations, and therefore, no AP-mines were bought or obtained.”[23] In June 2011, a Foreign Ministry official stated that South Korea safeguards a stockpile of antipersonnel mines that belongs to the US military on its territory as part of the WRSA-K program. These mines are planned to be gradually transferred out of South Korea.[24] In June 2012, a Foreign Ministry official stated that the antipersonnel mines are in ammunition storage within Secure Areas of the US Forces Korea.[25]

The law ending the program states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”[26] Moreover, US policy has prohibited the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea since 2010. According to documents released under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Monitor in 2013, the WRSA-K stockpile included 480,267 M-14 antipersonnel mines and 83,319 M-16 antipersonnel mines.[27] The US has previously destroyed all non-self-destructing mines not dedicated for potential use in Korea.

 



[1] For example, in 2009 South Korea said that “due to the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula, we cannot but to place priority on security concerns, and are unable to accede to the Ottawa Convention at this point.” Republic of Korea, “Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.53,” 64th Session, UNGA First Committee, New York, 29 October 2009.

[2] Statement by His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein of Jordan, Special Envoy on the Universalization of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, 1 December 2011, www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/11msp/what-will-happen/day-5-thursday-1-december/.

[3] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Korea, South: Mine Ban Policy,” 28 October 2013.

[4] Emails from Jai Kook Cho, Coordinator, KCBL/PSA, 19 and 27 September 2013.

[5] Ibid., 27 September 2013.

[6] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 30 March 2012. The report only contains mine clearance information.

[7] “Award winners urge landmine ban, Cambodian campaigners say government must sign international treaties,” UCANEWS, 14 March 2012, www.ucanews.com/news/award-winners-urge-landmine-ban/45133.

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, 4 April 2012.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. The KM74 mine is a copy of the US M74 self-destructing mine.

[11] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 876. South Korea began producing remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in 2006. South Korea has produced two types of Claymore mines, designated KM18A1 and K440. South Korean officials have stated that the country only produces the devices in command-detonated mode, which are lawful under the Mine Ban Treaty, and not with tripwires, which would be prohibited.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, 4 April 2012; and email from Chi-won Jung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 16 June 2008.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, 4 April 2012.

[15] Email from Chi-won Jung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[17] In May 2005, South Korea stated that “there are about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are buried,” and the government estimated one million buried mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. The Monitor reported that the stockpile includes 960,000 M14 mines that were made detectable before July 1999 in order to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II, and that South Korea also holds unknown numbers of self-destructing mines, including, apparently, more than 31,000 US ADAM artillery-delivered mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 544.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, 4 April 2012.

[19] Email from Chi-won Jung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[20] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 25 May 2005.

[22] Public Law 109–159, “An Act to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies, Korea,” 30 December 2005, p. 119, Stat. 2955–2956.

[23] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, 9 June 2009.

[24] Email from Chi-won Jung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 June 2011.

[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, 4 April 2012.

[26] Public Law 109–159, “An Act to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies, Korea,” 30 December 2005, Section 1(c)(2).

[27] Email from Adrienne M. Santos, Freedom of Information Act Analyst, for Suzanne Council on behalf of, Paul Jacobsmeyer, Chief, Freedom of Information Act Division, US Department of Defense OSD/JS FOIA Office, 24 June 2013.


Last Updated: 23 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Policy

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Korea has expressed support for the humanitarian objectives of the convention, but has stated that “the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula” means that it is “unable to take an active stance on the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of all cluster munitions.”[1] It has said, “We value the intent of the [convention], but considering the current relations between the North and the South, we can’t sign it.”[2] South Korea has also described cluster munitions as legitimate weapons that are “efficient…in deterring enemy attacks.”[3]

South Korea has long expressed its preference for cluster munitions to be regulated by the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[4] In November 2013, South Korea stated that the CCW “has provided an effective and practical forum to lead crucial discussions on way[s] to duly regulate weapons such as mines and cluster munitions which remain employed by States Parties for security reasons.”[5] South Korea has not indicated if its policy on banning cluster munitions will be reviewed following the 2011 failure by the CCW to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions, which ended its deliberations on cluster munitions and has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole multilateral instrument that specifically addresses the weapons.

South Korea did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[6] South Korea did attend the convention’s Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer and made a statement.

South Korea has not participated in any meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008.

South Korea has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[7]

South Korea, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, endorsed Security Council Resolution 2155 on 27 May 2014, which expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[8]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use

In April 2012, South Korea confirmed that it has not used cluster munitions.[9]

Production

South Korea produces rockets, bombs, and projectiles containing submunitions and has licensed the production of artillery projectiles containing submunitions in Pakistan. South Korea has also exported cluster munitions. It has imported and licensed the production of cluster munitions from the United States (US). It is thought to possess a significant stockpile of cluster munitions.

In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense said that “South Korea stopped production of old types of cluster munitions,” and the “cluster munitions currently in production have a high level of reliability and most are equipped with [self-destruct] mechanisms.”[10] According to a US diplomatic cable dated May 2007, a senior Ministry of National Defense official informed the US that “more than 90 percent” of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions were of the non-self-destructing kind and “the cost of retrofitting them would be prohibitive.”[11] In August 2008, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a directive requiring that it only acquire cluster munitions with self-deactivation devices and a 1% or lower failure rate, and recommending “the development of alternative weapon systems which could potentially replace cluster munitions in the long run.”[12]

Two companies in South Korea, Hanwha and Poongsan, produce cluster munitions.[13] Hanwha has acknowledged that it has produced M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[14] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that Hanwha produced 42,800 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) extended-range (base bleed) 155mm artillery projectiles in 2011.[15]

Poongsan has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DPICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DPICM K305.[16] In 2009, Poongsan listed among its products the following two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DPICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions, and K310 DPICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[17] Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in November 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm extended-range (base bleed) DPICM projectiles in Pakistan.[18]

The US concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of DPICM submunitions for multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets.[19]

According to the 2012 NGO report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” at least 22 Korean financial entities are involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions.[20]

Transfers

South Korea has imported a variety of cluster munitions from the US. It is known to possess M26 rockets, M26A1 extended-range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers. Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended-range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS-1 missiles, and 111 ATACMS missiles.[21] South Korea also stockpiles several artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1) imported from the US.[22] In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 of each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[23] Jane’s Information Group lists it as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[24]

On 1 June 2012, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible sale of 367 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons to South Korea at an estimated cost of US$325 million including associated parts, equipment, and logistical support.[25] The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans sensor-fuzed weapons. US law bans the export of nearly all US cluster munitions, but permits the export of the CBU-105 version of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon, since this variant meets a 99% submunition reliability criteria. In May 2014, the US Defense Department confirmed a contract to be completed by December 2016 for US company Textron Defense Systems to construct 361 cluster bomb units for foreign military sale to South Korea.[26]

In 2008, Hanwha apparently exported an unknown quantity of M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan.[27]

Stockpile

The current size and content of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In 2005, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it “maintains stockpiles of old types of cluster munitions with a high failure rate” and stated, “There are currently no plans to upgrade these holdings…Equipping old types of submunitions with [self-destruct] mechanisms is not considered feasible due to technical and financial problems.”[28] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that it had destroyed 27 cluster munitions during the previous year.[29]

 



[1] Statement of South Korea, UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 11 October 2009.

[2] “Facing military confrontation, South Korea clings to cluster munitions,” Mainichi Daily News, 8 December 2008. For more details on South Korea’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 217–219.

[3] Statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 14 December 2008.

[4] Statement of South Korea, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011.

[5] Statement of South Korea, CCW 2013 Meeting of States Parties, 14 November 2013.

[6] In September 2011, Wikileaks released a United States (US) Department of State cable from January 2007 that stated that South Korea apparently considered participating in the first meeting of the Oslo Process as an observer, because it was reportedly concerned that the cluster munition “issue will be co-opted just as the landmine issue was in the Ottawa process.” “ROKG supportive of US position on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 07SEOUL219 dated 23 January 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011. In September 2011, Wikileaks released five US Department of State cables from 2007 that showed that South Korean officials discussed the Oslo Process on several occasions with officials from the US government. In February 2007, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official reportedly told US officials that the South Korean government decided against attending the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions in February 2007 because of its “understanding that the United Kingdom and the United States would not attend.” “ROKG will not attend Oslo CM conference,” US Department of State cable 07SEOUL374 dated 7 February 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[7]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013. The Republic of Korea voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has never used cluster munitions. See statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 7 July 2008.

[10] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[11] The Ministry of National Defense reportedly informed the US that “the ROK military was not in a position to dismantle its current CM stockpiles, prohibit CM production or development, or replace their stockpiles with effective alternative weapon systems for at least the next 20 years.” “ROKG supports USG cluster munitions policy,” US Department of State cable07SEOUL1329 dated 7 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.

[12] Statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee, New York, 11 October 2009. See also statement of South Korea, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008; and statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee, New York, 30 October 2008.

[13] Both companies were excluded from investment under the Norwegian Petroleum Fund’s ethical guidelines for producing cluster munitions, Poongsan in December 2006 and Hanwha in January 2008. For more details on production by these companies, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[14] Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation on exclusion of the companies Rheinmetall AG and Hanwha Corp.,” 15 May 2007.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The response also stated that Hanwha produced 6,150 227mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) during the year.

[16] Letter from Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation of 6 September 2006,” 6 September 2006.

[18] “Pakistan Ordnance Factory and S. Korean Firm Sign Ammunition Pact,” Asia Pulse (Karachi), 24 November 2006.

[19] Notification to Congress pursuant to Section 36 (c) and (d) of the Arms Export Control Act, Transmittal No. DTC 132–00, 4 April 2001.

[20] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” June 2012, pp.18−22.

[21] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Notifications to Congress of Pending U.S. Arms Transfers,” “Foreign Military Sales,” “Direct Commercial Sales,” and “Excess Defense Articles” databases. M26 rockets each contain 644 submunitions, and there are six rockets to a pod. M26A1 rockets have 518 submunitions each. ATACMS-1 missiles have 950 submunitions each.

[22] M483A1 shells have 88 submunitions, whereas M864 have 72 submunitions.

[23] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Republic of Korea - F-15E/K Aircraft Munitions and Avionics,” Press release, 15 February 2001. It also provided 45 AGM-54 joint stand-off weapons (JSOW) bombs, but it is not known if these were the version with submunitions.

[24] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 841. CBU-87 bombs have 202 submunitions, and Rockeye cluster bombs have 247 submunitions.

[25] The agreement requires “a statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea that the cluster munitions and cluster munitions technology will be used only against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.” This statement is required by the US law that bans the export of cluster munitions other than sensor-fuzed weapons. “Republic of Korea – CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” DSCA News Release No. 12-23, 4 June 2012.

[26] South Korea Buying GPS-Guided WCMD Cluster Bombs,” Defense Industry Daily, 29 May 2014.

[27] See HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[28] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The question asked if any old or unstable cluster munitions had been destroyed during the year.


Last Updated: 20 January 2015

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

The Korean War left mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in southern Korea, and because of a security threat, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) laid barrier minefields along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north.

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. In May 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover an area of about 3km2 in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.[1]

A report by the National Defense Committee in 2010 said South Korea had about 1,100 “planned” mined areas covering 20km2 and some 209 unconfirmed or suspected mined areas covering 97.82km2.[2]

Mine Action Program

There is no national mine action authority or mine action center in South Korea. Demining is conducted by the South Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of the DMZ and CCZ and has concentrated mostly on demining military bases in rear areas.

In November 2013, the Ministry of Defense said it had submitted a bill on landmines to the parliament to allow civilian organizations to remove mines laid during the Korean War to facilitate ongoing military clearance. “The bill is aimed at making legal grounds and a process to allow both the military and civilians to remove mines so as to protect lives and the property of people,” the ministry said in a press release.[3]

(file last updated in August 2014)

 



[1]  Response to the Monitor by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.

[2] Kim Chang-Hoon, “Find One Million: War With Landmines,” Korea Times, 3 June 2010.

[3]S. Korea pushes to allow civilians to remove land mines,” Yonhap (news agency), 14 November 2013.


Last Updated: 12 September 2014

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2013

Unknown, estimates from 500–3,000

Casualties in 2013

0 (2012: 3)

2013 casualties by outcome

0 (2012: 3 injured)

In 2013, the Monitor did not identify any new mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). In 2012, one civilian antipersonnel mine casualty was identified in the province of Gyeonggi,[1] as well as two military casualties on a military base on Baekryeong Island.[2]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties is unknown, but the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance stated in March 2009 that there were at least 500 civilian survivors.[3] In 2009, the media reported that there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties; the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) estimated there were 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.[4] The Monitor identified 72 mine casualties between 1999 and 2013 (eight killed, 64 injured). At least 22 of these casualties were military personnel, including one American soldier injured in 2001. Figures are likely incomplete as there is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.[5]

Victim Assistance

There have been at least 112 survivors identified in South Korea, though reasonable estimates indicate that the number is between 1,000 and 2,000, with both civilian and military survivors.[6]

No efforts were identified to assess the needs of mine/ERW victims in 2013. Following the mine victim survey conducted in 2011 by the Korean Peace Sharing Association (PSA) in Gangwon and Gyeonggi provinces, there were plans to conduct a similar survey in Gyeonggi province, also bordering the Demilitarized Zone, in 2013. However, these plans were stalled due to the unwillingness of provincial authorities to participate until the National Assembly passes the compensation law for mine victims.[7]

Using the results of the 2011 mine victim survey, the PSA/KCBL provided basic assistance to 64 identified mine victims in Gangwon-do province with funding from CitiBank.[8] In 2013, PSA/KCBL continued to provide assistance to affected communities of the most impacted areas.[9] In addition, in 2013 the organization focused on advocacy and awareness-raising on the issue of antipersonnel mines, as well as the difficulties faced by survivors.[10]

Victim assistance coordination

South Korea has no victim assistance coordination; the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (MIHWAF) is the lead ministry responsible for persons with disabilities.[11]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

While South Korea has a national healthcare system, mine victims are frequently not eligible for assistance due to the fact that their disability is considered conflict-related and/or self-inflicted.[12] Soldiers injured on duty, including those injured by mines, receive free medical services and a monthly pension that depends on the degree of disability—estimated, for example, to be about US$1,000 for a partial limb amputation.[13] Civilian mine survivors can apply for government compensation through the Ministry of National Defense Special Compensation Commission, but few claims have been successful.[14] Through to the end of 2013 the government operated rehabilitation hospitals in six regions, plus a national rehabilitation research center to increase opportunities and access for persons with disabilities.[15]

The PSA needs assessment found that 88% of victims identified in Gangwon province (survivors and the family members of people killed by mines) did not seek compensation following the mine incident, in most cases because they were not aware that a state compensation program existed. Others did not seek compensation, either because they lacked money for legal assistance or because they feared reporting their incident to the government.[16]

In 2012, the Law for Removal of Mines and Reparation for Mine Victims was introduced for consideration by the Korean National Assembly for the fourth time since 2003.[17] If approved, it would provide financial compensation to mine victims for loss of income as a result of disability or loss of life (awarded to surviving family members) and would provide subsidies for medical care for survivors.[18] KCBL successfully lobbied parliamentary members to submit the Special Support Law for Civilian Landmine Victims, which proposes to increase the application “grace period” from one to three years. In January 2013, the bill was reintroduced to the parliament.[19] In July 2014, the bill came up for review by the plenary assembly of the parliament but as of the end of the month it had not been adopted.[20]

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, or the provision of other state services. In 2013, the government effectively enforced the law, although many local government ordinances and regulations still directly discriminate against people with disabilities, according to a media report.[21] In 2009, an act was adopted with the aim of preventing discrimination against persons with disabilities and providing remedies for those suffering from such discrimination.[22]

South Korea ratified the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 11 December 2008.

 



[1] Emails from Kyungran Han, Secretary-General, Peace Sharing Association (PSA), Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL), 8 and 11 March 2013.

[2] “Mine explosion at Baekryeong Island…Two Marines Injured,” MBC-TV, 31 October 2012.

[3] Emails from Kim Ki-Ho, CEO, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 and 23 March 2009.

[4]In South Korea, landmines remain a threat,” Los Angeles Times, 23 December 2009, accessed 15 August 2014; and ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999), accessed 9 May 2012.

[5] Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.

[6] It is not known if the 112 people who were injured by landmines recently identified through a casualty survey are still living, as many incidents occurred as many as 60 years ago. Emails from Lee Ji-sun, PSA, 18 April 2012; and from Nankyung Kim, PSA, 14 August 2014; and ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999), accessed 9 May 2012.

[7] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor Report notes from meeting with PSA/KCBL, and CMC campaign member, Weapons Zero (WZ South Korea), 23 February 2013; and email from Kyungran Han, PSA, 8 and 11 March 2013.

[8] Email from Kyungran Han, PSA, 8 March 2012. The assistance consisted primarily of warm clothing and food.

[9] Email from Nankyung Kim, PSA, 14 August 2014.

[10] Ibid.

[11] MIHWAF, “Policy for Persons with Disabilities,” accessed 15 August 2014.

[12] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor Report from Field Mission to South Korea, 25 March 2012.

[13] Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 March 2009.

[14]In South Korea, landmines remain a threat,” Los Angeles Times, 23 December 2009, accessed 15 August 2014.

[15] United States (US) Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Republic of Korea,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014, p. 20.

[16] Email from Lee Ji-sun, PSA, 18 April 2012.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Draft text of Bill “Law for Removal of Mines and Reparation for Mine Victims,” English translation, undated, provided via email by Lee Ji-sun, PSA, 18 April 2012; and email from Nankyung Kim, PSA, 14 August 2014.

[19] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor Report notes from meeting with PSA/KCBL, and CMC campaign member, WZ South Korea, 23 February 2013; and emails from Kyungran Han, PSA, 8 and 11 March 2013.

[20] Emails from Jae Kook Cho, founder of the KCBL, 4 July 2014; and from Nankyung Kim, PSA, 14 August 2014; and “Border ‘Mine-Victim Assistance Act’ reviewed” (in Korean), News1 Korea, 17 July 2014, accessed 15 August 2014.

[21] US Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Republic of Korea,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014, p. 20.

[22] MIHWAF, “Policy for Persons with Disabilities,” accessed 15 August 2014.


Last Updated: 07 October 2013

Support for Mine Action

In 2012, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) contributed US$220,000 in mine action funding through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) and ITF (International Trust Fund) Enhancing Human Security. South Korea’s contributions to the VTF went towards support to Afghanistan and Lebanon. Its contributions through the ITF went to Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the Occupied Territory of Palestine (OPT), as well as to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for regional mine action coordination in Central Asia.

In 2012, demining was conducted by the South Korean army in five unconfirmed minefields in the civilian control zone and Seoul. South Korea reported a budget of $1,185,983 in 2012 while removing 78 antipersonnel mines over 98,600m².[1] South Korea reported a budget of $1,818,181 in 2011.[2]

Contributions by recipient: 2012[3]

Recipient

Sector

Amount ($)

Azerbaijan, BiH, OPT, Central Asia

Victim assistance, risk education

120,000

Afghanistan

Clearance

50,000

Lebanon

Clearance

50,000

Total

 

220,000

South Korea’s 2012 contribution was a decrease of $70,000 on its support for mine action from 2011, largely as a result of discontinuing its contribution to Libya through the VTF. Since 2009, South Korea has contributed $960,000 to mine action.

Summary of contributions: 2009–2012[4]

Year

Amount ($)

2012

220,000

2011

290,000

2010

260,000

2009

190,000

Total

960,000

 



[3] Eugen Secareanu, Resource Mobilisation Unit, United Nations Mine Action Service, 3 May 2013; and ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2012,” Slovenia, 2013, p. 36.

[4] See Landmine Monitor reports 2009–2011; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Korea, South: Support for Mine Action,” 10 September 2012.