Last Updated: 29 November 2014

Mine Ban Policy

Mine ban policy overview

Mine Ban Treaty status

State not party

Pro-mine ban UNGA voting record

Voted for Resolution 68/30 in December 2013, the first time Libya has voted for a pro-ban resolution

Participation in Mine Ban Treaty meetings

Participated in the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013, the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in April 2014, and the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014

Key events

No new mine use recorded since the 2011 conflict


The State of Libya has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Government officials did not make any statements in 2013 or the first half of 2014 on Libya joining the Mine Ban Treaty.[1] Previously, in October 2011, two Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials informed the ICBL that there was support for joining the Mine Ban Treaty, but the matter must wait until the new government is established and for the legislative body to consider accession.[2] Libya’s signature of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty on 9 July 2013 indicates that the government is ready to join international treaties.

On 5 December 2013, Libya voted for UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 supporting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the first time that Libya had voted in support of a pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution, after consistently abstaining from the annual resolution since 1998. The change came after outreach by the ICBL, including Human Rights Watch (HRW).[3]

Prior to being removed from office in 2011, the government of Muammar Gaddafi showed interest in the Mine Ban Treaty but made no effort to join it; Libyan officials often criticized the treaty and called for it to be revised.[4] On 28 April 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC), then the opposition authority in Libya, issued a statement formally pledging that “no forces under the command and control of the [NTC] will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines.” The statement also said that “any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”[5]

Despite not joining the Mine Ban Treaty, Libya has participated as an observer in many of the treaty’s Meeting of States Parties as well as the first and third Review Conferences.[6] Libya did not make any statements at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013 or the Third Review Conference in June 2014. It has also regularly attended intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the treaty in Geneva, but was not present at those held in April 2014.

Libya is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production, trade, and stockpiling

Prior to 2011, Libya consistently stated that it had never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and that it no longer stockpiled the weapon.[7] Yet abundant evidence has emerged showing how, under Gaddafi’s leadership, Libya accumulated a stockpile of hundreds of thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and used tens of thousands of mines during the 2011 conflict.

As the Gaddafi government progressively lost control of the country in 2011, massive weapon depots containing landmines and other munitions were abandoned by government forces and left unsecured.[8] Local and international mine action organizations have worked with Libyan authorities and the UN since mid-2011 to collect and destroy abandoned ordnance, but it is unclear how many landmines were removed by anti-government rebels, civilians, and others.

In April 2014, reports emerged showing the use in Syria of a notable Chinese-made Type 84 scatterable antivehicle mine that was first reported used in 2011 in Libya, but it was not possible to ascertain if the mines used in Syria were from the same stocks used in Libya.[9]

The post-Gaddafi government in Libya began to destroy the landmine stocks in early 2012, but no information is available on the numbers or types of landmines destroyed and it is not clear if systematic stockpile destruction efforts are being undertaken as of October 2014.[10]


There has been no evidence of antipersonnel mine use by government forces since the 2011 conflict.

In September 2014, however, reports emerged alleging new use of antipersonnel mines at Tripoli International Airport, which saw fighting in July-August between the Zintan alliance of militia groups and forces of the Libya Dawn Alliance.[11] A HRW investigation found that antipersonnel mines were likely laid in 2014 and not earlier, but could not determine the party responsible for the use.[12] On October 29, HRW spoke by telephone with the commander of the Misrata Revolutionaries engineering unit within the Libya Dawn Alliance which has been responsible for clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance in Tripoli since August. The commander said that on August 24, the day of the airport takeover, his unit had discovered a mined area of the airport.[13] He said a pickup truck mounted with anti-aircraft weapons entered the “old airport area” and detonated a mine, killing one fighter from the Misrata Umm al-Maarek brigade, Mohamed Abubaker Ali, and wounding several others.

Previous use

HRW confirmed the use of five types of mines in six separate locations by pro-Gaddafi forces during the 2011 conflict, first in the east of the country, then in the Nafusa mountain range in the northwest, and finally around Tripoli and coastal towns in the west. This includes its low-metal content antipersonnel mines that are particularly challenging for detection and clearance efforts, such as the Brazilian T-AB-1 mine.[14] Three types of mines were also found abandoned at three other locations.

Mine types identified in Libya during the 2011 conflict



Country of production

Location used/User




Used by government forces in Ajdabiya, Khusha, Misrata, and al-Qawalish (three separate locations)




Used by government forces in Ajdabiya, and al-Qawalis; abandoned stockpiles in Tripoli




Used by government forces in Misrata




Abandoned stockpiles in Benghazi



Former Czechoslovakia

Abandoned stockpiles in Benghazi

PRB-M3 and




Used by rebels in Ajdabiya; abandoned in storage in Benghazi




Abandoned stockpiles in Ajdabiya and Tripoli




Abandoned stockpiles in Tripoli

Prior to 2011, Libya last used antipersonnel mines during its 1980–1987 war with Chad. Libya is contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance from World War II, as well as from wars with Egypt (1977) and Chad (1980–1987). Minefields are said to exist in desert, port, and urban areas; however, no nationwide survey has ever been conducted. Some facilities are protected by minefields, such as an ammunition storage area outside of Ajdabiya that HRW confirmed is partially surrounded by a minefield marked solely by a deteriorating fence.


[1] In February 2012, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Special Envoy, Prince Mired Raad Al Hussein of Jordan, discussed Libya’s Mine Ban Treaty accession with the interim prime minister, who Prince Mired described as “extremely forthcoming and interested” in the matter. Statement by Special Envoy on Universalization, Prince Mired of Jordan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 21 May 2012.

[2] ICBL meeting with El-Mahdi El-Maghreby, Director, International Organizations, and Salaheddin El Mesalati, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Libya, in New York, 18 October 2011.

[3] See, for example, HRW, Letter to Ambassador Ibrahim O. Dabbashi of Libya, 8 October 2014.

[4] For example, in September 2010 Libya stated: “anti-personnel mines are a weapon that the vulnerable States use to defend their territories against invading forces. The powerful States do not even need to use them since they possess arsenals of advanced Weapons. In this framework, the [Mine Ban Treaty] should be amended, taking into account the interests of the small States. The legislators of this convention should have made the States concerned committed to compensate those affected by mines planted in their lands and to provide legal and political assurances for the protection of small States due to the lack of possession of neither defensive nor offensive weapons.” Statement by Musa Abdussalam Kousa, Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UNGA General Debate, New York, 28 September 2010.

[5] HRW Press Release, “Libya: Rebels Pledge Not to Use Landmines,” 29 April 2011.

[6] It was absent from the Meetings of States Parties held in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011, and the Second Review Conference in 2009.

[7] Interview with Col. Ali Alahrash, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 March 2004.

[8] This included the 60-bunker Hight Razma facility near Benghazi, a 35-bunker facility near Ajdabiya, and a smaller facility near Tobruk. In September 2011, HRW visited in a Khamis Brigade base in the Salahadin neighborhood of Tripoli that included a farm compound holding approximately 15,000 antipersonnel mines and a nearby storage facility housing more than 100,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011; and HRW, “Libya: Secure Unguarded Arms Depots,” 9 September 2011.

[9] Mark Hiznay, “Remotely Delivered Antivehicle Mines Spotted in Syria,” Monitor Blog, 25 April 2014. In Libya, the remotely delivered “parachute mines” were delivered by surface-fired 122mm Grad rockets into the port area of the city of Misrata by Gaddafi forces on 5 May 2011. The markings on the mines indicated a 2009 manufacture date. These mines are equipped with a sensitive magnetic-influence fuze, which also functions as an inherent anti-disturbance feature, as well as a self-destruct mechanism that can be set for a period of four hours to three days. These characteristics pose special problems as the mines sit on the ground and complicate clearance efforts. The magnetic-influence fuze explodes the mine when it detects a change in its immediate magnetic environment, such as a vehicle passing over it or a person approaching the mine who is wearing or carrying a sufficient amount of ferrous metal, like military equipment or a camera. Additionally, given the sensitivity of the fuze, any change in orientation or movement of the mine may cause the fuze to function.

[10] HRW, “Libya: Secure Unguarded Arms Depots,” 9 September 2011. In March 2012, HRW witnessed the destruction of Type-72SP antivehicle landmines.

[11] Video footage reportedly filmed in September at Tripoli International Airport by Alnabaa—a private Libyan satellite TV network—and by Al Jazeera shows the clearance of at least 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines and at least one PRB M3 antivehicle mine. Reports by both TV networks alleged that the mines were laid by the Zintani-led forces, which controlled the airport from 2011 until August 2014.

[12] HRW, “Evidence of New Landmine Use in Tripoli,” 5 November 2014. The Zintan alliance of militia groups, a coalition of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan, controlled Tripoli Airport from the end of the 2011 until August 24, when Libya Dawn Alliance of militias from the coastal city of Misrata seized control, after five weeks of intense fighting. At the time of fighting, a Zintani force known as the Airport Security Katiba was controlling Tripoli Airport and its vicinity.

[13] The commander informed HRW that his unit has found and cleared approximately 600 landmines since August 24, mostly T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines, from the Tripoli International airport compound.

[14] Brazil has declared in its Article 7 reports that production and exports of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines ceased in 1989, even before Brazil joined the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. There is no export record of the shipments, because arms export records are not held for longer than 10 years. An internal investigation was opened into the origins and transfer of the T-AB-1 mines to Libya. HRW meeting with Brazilian delegation to intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

Last Updated: 12 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy


Libya has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Libya is not believed to be taking any immediate steps to accede to the convention. Previously, in September 2012, it informed States Parties that Libya is “committed” to promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions and making it universal.[1] The Monitor is not aware of any statements with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions by the General National Congress that has governed Libya since July 2012.[2]

Under the former government of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya participated in three regional conferences held during the 2007–2008 Oslo Process that developed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but attended the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 only as an observer and did not join in the consensus adoption of the convention.[3] Libya did not attend the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008.

Libya participated as an observer in the convention’s Meeting of States Parties in 2010, 2012, and the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Libya attended the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva once, in April 2013. Libya participated in a regional conference on cluster munitions in Pretoria, South Africa in 2010 and in Lomé, Togo in 2013.

Libya has voted in favor of recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[4]

Libya is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Handicap International (HI) hosted a two-day training on the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions for interested Libyan civil society organizations in Tripoli in May 2013.[5]

Libya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Libya is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

The former Libyan regime possessed a stockpile of cluster munitions. The current disposition of this stockpile is not known, including information about the types, quantities, and degree of central government control.

In the past, Jane’s Information Group listed Libya as possessing KMGU dispensers (which deploy submunitions) and RBK-500 aerial cluster bombs, presumably of Soviet/Russian origin.[6] It also possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[7] From the 2011 conflict, it is now also known that Libya had stockpiled RBK 250-PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, MAT-120 mortar bombs containing submunitions, and an unidentified type of rocket-delivered cluster munition with dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.

In June 2011, Spain confirmed that it had transferred a total of 1,055 MAT-120 cluster munitions containing 22,155 submunitions to Libya in 2006 and 2008.[8]


During the 2011 conflict, government forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi used three different types of cluster munitions at locations including Ajabiya, Misrata, and in the Nafusa Mountains near Jadu and Zintan.[9] DPICM-type submunitions were also ejected from ammunition storage bunkers at a military depot near the town of Mizdah, which was attacked by NATO aircraft 56 times between April and July 2011.[10]

There has been no evidence of cluster munition use in Libya by countries that were involved in the NATO military action, including by the United States (US) and other states that have not yet joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In its formal response to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, NATO confirmed that it did not use cluster munitions in the Libya operation.[11]

Previously, Libyan forces used air-delivered cluster munitions, likely RBK-series cluster bombs of Soviet/Russian origin containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions, at various locations during its intervention in Chad during the 1986–1987 conflict.[12]

On 25 March 1986, US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk20 Rockeye cluster bombs; on the night of 14–15 April 1986, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on the airfield at Benina.[13] On 27 November 2009, a commercial oil company survey crew in Libya found remnants of a German World War II-era “butterfly bomb” (an early version of a cluster bomb) and an explosive ordnance disposal expert subsequently identified six more such cluster munition remnants.[14]


[1] Statement of Libya, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012. Notes by the CMC.

[2] Libya signed the Arms Trade Treaty on 9 July 2013.

[3] At the Livingstone Conference on Cluster Munitions in April 2008, Libya endorsed the Livingstone Declaration, which called on African states to support the negotiation of a “total and immediate” prohibition on cluster munitions. At the Kampala Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2008, Libya endorsed the Kampala Action Plan, which called on all African states to sign and ratify the convention as soon as possible. For more details on Libya’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 220–221.

[4]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013. Libya voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[6] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 842.

[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 320. Libya has demonstrated that it possesses at least one type of 122mm rocket. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and The New York Times also documented the use by government forces of Type-84A scatterable antivehicle mines (made in China) delivered by 122mm rockets into the port area of Misrata on the night of 14–15 April 2011.

[8] The transfer took place before Spain instituted a moratorium on export of cluster munitions and prior to its adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Statement of Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 29 June 2011. In the statement, Spain confirmed information provided to the New York Times by the Deputy Director General for Foreign Trade of Defense Materials and Dual Use Goods, Ramon Muro Martinez, that: “One license to Lybia [sic] consisting of 5 cluster munitions for demonstration was issued in August 2006. The export took place in October 2006. There were two more licenses issued in December 2007 with a total amount of 1,050 cluster munitions. They were sent in March 2008.” C.J. Chivers, “Following Up, Part 2. Down the Rabbit Hole: Arms Exports and Qaddafi’s Cluster Bombs,” The New York Times – At War Blog, 22 June 2011.

[9] See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Libya: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 17 December 2012.

[10] Statement of HRW, Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, 25 April 2012.

[11] NATO letter to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 15 February 2011. Cited in UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 168, Para 638.

[12] Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 48.

[13] Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War: 1975–1986, An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1988), p. 423.

[14] Daily report by Jan-Ole Robertz, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Advisor, Countermine Libya, 27 November 2009.

Last Updated: 29 October 2014

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

The State of Libya is contaminated with mines, cluster munition remnants, and a wide array of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of internal and international armed conflict in 2011 during the overthrow of Colonel Muammur Qaddafi, earlier conflicts with neighboring countries, and subsequent fighting between Libyan militias.


Libya has contamination from mines left by the desert battles of World War II and from conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980−1987, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. During Colonel Qaddafi’s four decades in power, mines were also emplaced around a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.[1]

Mines were used by both sides in the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Qaddafi’s overthrow. The only reported instance of antivehicle mine use by rebels was in Ajdabiya, while pro-government elements laid mines in a number of locations including Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains. Antipersonnel mines were used by government forces in Ajdabiya, Khusha, Misrata, and al-Qawalish.[2] The most commonly used antipersonnel mine type was the low-metal content Brazilian T-AB1 mine, but evidence has also been found of Belgian NR 413 stake and bounding fragmentation mines (PRB NR 442).[3]

After fierce fighting between rival militias in Tripoli in July and August 2014, the UN warned that “land mines reportedly used in the airport area and unexploded ordnance are now a major hazard for civilians, especially children.”[4]

Other explosive remnants of war

Libya emerged from the conflict with extensive contamination by a wide array of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO), although the precise extent is unknown. Heavy contamination by UXO or AXO has been reported around towns that became battle grounds between pro- and anti-Qaddafi forces stretching from the western Nafusa mountains to Zintan (southwest of Tripoli); in and around Misrata, Zlitan, and Bani Walid to the east and south east of Tripoli; Sirte, Ras Lanuf, and Brega along the coast of the Gulf of Sidra and further east near the town of Ajdabiya; as well as Benghazi and Tobruk near the border with Egypt.[5] Fierce fighting between militias in and around Tripoli in 2014 has caused further UXO contamination.[6]

International organizations have reported encountering air-dropped bombs of up to 3,000kg, 107mm (Radima), 122mm (GRAD), and 130mm rockets; surface-to-air missiles; sea mines and torpedoes as well as rocket-propelled grenades; a variety of mortar, tank, and artillery shells; and small arms and anti-aircraft ammunition.[7]

NATO said its forces used 7,642 air-to-surface weapons during its seven-month air operation lasting until the end of October 2011[8] and in 2012 gave the UN detailed coordinates of 313 sites of possible UXO, including strikes by aircraft (303), helicopters (six), and naval warships (four), although it failed to provide details of the specific ordnance used or fuzing mechanisms and render-safe procedures.[9] Additional contamination resulted from air strikes on ammunition storage areas, scattering UXO over surrounding areas, and from sabotage by retreating pro-Qaddafi forces.[10]

Libya’s transitional authorities and demining organizations also faced a challenge securing thousands of tons of ordnance and weapons abandoned by the Qaddafi regime in 47 ammunition storage areas (ASAs), many of them severely damaged and an easy target for looters.[11] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) concluded that the “vast” hazard presented by uncontrolled ammunition, weapons, and explosive remnants of war in Libya will require “concerted efforts for decades to come and significant financial support ranging in the hundreds of millions of US [United States] dollars.” The danger they pose was underscored by an explosion in three of 20 bunkers of an ASA at Brak Al-Chati in southern Libya in November 2013 which killed over 40 people and injured many others.[12]

Mine Action Program

Under the Qaddafi regime, the Ministry of Defense and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each had responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Ministry of Defense reportedly cleared areas serving either a military or civilian development purpose. The Civil Protection Unit is said to have carried out clearance in affected communities.[13]

Since the change of regime, mine action has felt the effects of wider political turmoil reflected in competing claims for a role in the sector by multiple institutions. The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC), reportedly in existence as early as May 2011,[14] was mandated by the Minister of Defense in December 2011 to coordinate mine action, to support efforts in controlling ammunition storage areas, and to decommission weapons, while the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army has jurisdiction over arms and ammunition and a role coordinating a range of operations.[15] A Ministry of Defense decree of December 2013 specified that LMAC would be responsible for supervising the work of international organizations in mine action, for survey of mined areas, and for information management.[16]

LMAC opened an office in Tripoli in 2012 and became the main focal point for humanitarian demining NGOs but with limited authority outside Tripoli as a result of the breakdown of centralized government that followed the change of regime.[17] A new director, Colonel Mohammad Turjoman, was appointed in December 2013 and took up his position early in 2014, subsequently renaming the center LibMAC. In April 2014, LibMAC closed temporarily as a result of internal staff disputes.[18]

Other institutions claiming a role in mine action include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Programme for Demining and Rehabilitation of Lands, which was set up in 2004 and revived by the ministry after the change of regime, and the Ministry of Interior’s National Safety Authority which supports explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and activities to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[19]

An UNMAS Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT) became operational in April 2011 and provided initial coordination for international NGOs, liaising closely with the Army Chief of General Staff,[20] resulting in tension with LMAC. In July 2012, UNMAS became integrated into the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section. In August 2013, UNMAS assigned an operations officer and a quality assurance officer to LMAC to develop data management, tasking, and quality assurance capacity.[21] UNDP has been working with national authorities to draft a law to provide a framework for mine action.[22] It also has a capacity-building mandate overlapping with the UNMAS mandate under Security Council Resolution 2095, “creating a confusion for national counterparts.”[23]

Since 2011, clearance operations have been conducted by international NGOs, including DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group, Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Santa Barbara Foundation, as well as by commercial operators Mechem and Ukroboronservices. National NGOs included Free Fields, Salama, and No Mines No War.[24] Due to lack of funding from January 2014, Norwegian People’s Aid closed its mine action program in Libya in late 2013.

Strategic planning

A draft National Strategic Plan states that “the strategic goal of the Government and its development partners over the 2011–2021 period is to reduce the humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by landmines/unexploded ordnance to the point where a residual amount of contamination remains that poses no significant impact on the population or infrastructure, and where capacity remains to take account of the needs of future development.” The UN noted that the objective of the program is to develop and modernize national structures to implement a national mine action program.[25] As of April 2014, the plan awaited government approval.[26]

Land Release

Libya for the moment lacks an active program for clearing landmines. International and national organizations working with LibMAC are focused on EOD and small arms and ammunition storage. Some mine clearance has occurred in the course of technical survey or clearing battle area tasks, but most operators did not report details. In mine action there is no active program of accreditation, planning, survey, tasking, information management, or quality assurance.[27]

UNDP observed in 2013 that “humanitarian mine action stakeholders in Libya have been thwarted in their attempts to effect the sound implementation of mine action in country due to a void in established governance within the sector. The resultant lack of confidence and the delays in recognizing a properly mandated National Mine Action Authority with the necessary resources and capacity by the government has only compounded the issue.”[28]

HI worked for most of the year with 26 EOD staff in four teams in Sirte, clearing a total of 848,000m2 contaminated with cluster munitions and also clearing a military barracks in Sirte’s airport. When those tasks ended, HI downsized to 10 technicians, moving to Misrata towards the end of the year clearing an ammunition storage area.[29] DCA, with three five-man teams, also worked in the vicinity of Misrata clearing agricultural areas, and in Tripoli clearing tasks that included electricity substations, farmland, and inhabited areas that were the scene of clashes between militias in 2013.[30]

Battle area clearance in 2013

Name of operator

No. of battle areas released

Total size of battle area released by clearance (m2)

No. of UXO destroyed

No. of U-SUBs destroyed

No. of APMs destroyed

No. of AVMs destroyed















Note: APM = antipersonnel mine; AVM = antivehicle mine; U-SUB = unexploded submunition; UXO = unexploded ordnance other than unexploded submunitions

* One area completed, one ongoing

** Includes 848,000m2 of cluster munitions contaminated land

Support for Mine Action

DCA said it expected funding for clearance operations to end in 2014 with the expiry of two-year funding worth €1.498 million from the Dutch government and €1.4 million from the European Union.[31] HI similarly reported that two-year funding from the Dutch government would end in mid-2014, but believed funding it received from Germany would increase in 2014 over previous years’ support.[32]


[1] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011.

[2] Ibid.; and email from Jenny Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, ICRC, Tripoli, 22 February 2012.

[3] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, Communications Officer, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT), Tripoli, 20 March 2012; HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,” 19 July 2011; Colin King, “Landmines in Libya,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011; and C. J. Chivers, “Land Mines Descend on Misrata’s Port, Endangering Libyan City’s Supply Route,” New York Times, 6 May 2011.

[5] HRW, “Government Use of Landmines Confirmed,” 31 March 2011; and HRW, “Landmines in Libya: Technical Briefing Note,”19 July 2011.

[7] See for example, JMACT, Weekly Report #3, 6 June 2011; “Libya fails to secure arms depots,” HRW, 9 September 2011; and email from Nina Seecharan, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 5 March 2012.

[8] HRW, “Unacknowledged deaths,” 14 May 2012, p. 6. NATO reported that bombs of 500lb or less accounted for 82% of the ordnance used, 500 to 1,000lb bombs for over 7%, and 1,000 to 2,000lbs for about 10%.

[9] C. J. Chivers, “List of Unexploded Arms in Libya Is Seen as Limited,” The New York Times, 25 June 2012.

[10] JMACT, Weekly Report #3, 6 June 2011.

[11] Interview with Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director, HRW, Geneva, 4 January 2012; and Adrian King, “Conflict in Libya and the Future Risk to the Demining Community,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011.

[12] “2013 Portfolio of Humanitarian Mine Action Arms and Ammunition Management Projects,” UNMAS, 8 July 2013, p. 5; “UN Experts Assist in Aftermath of Brak Al-Chati Ammunition Explosion,” UNSMIL, 5 December 2013.

[13] Interview with Dr. Taher Siala, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Tripoli, 12 May 2005.

[14] Andy Smith, “UNMAS in Libya – another critical failure,” Landmines and Humanitarian Action, updated July 2012.

[15] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012; interview with Max Dyck, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012; and email from Stephen Bryant, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Libya, 23 July 2012.

[16] Unofficial translation of Ministry of Defense Decree 409/2013, 3 December 2013.

[17] Telephone interview with Tripoli-based international mine action stakeholder requesting anonymity, 30 July 2012.

[18] Telephone interview with Tripoli-based mine action stakeholder, 30 May 2014.

[19] Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Libya, 20 July 2013.

[20] Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012; and interview with Max Dyck, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012.

[21] Email from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS, Libya, 20 July 2013.

[22] Interview with Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP (Libya), in Geneva, 2 April 2014.

[24] Emails from Jenny Reeves, Capacity Building Advisor, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 April 2014; and from Diek Engelbrecht, UNMAS, Libya, 20 July 2013.

[26] Interview with Stephen Bryant, UNDP, in Geneva, 2 April 2014.

[27] Telephone interview with Tripoli-based mine action stakeholder, 30 May 2014.

[29] Email from Cat Smith, Head of Mission − Libya, HI, 15 June 2014.

[30] Email from Knut Furunes, Program Manager, DCA, 29 May 2014.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Email from Cat Smith, HI, 15 June 2014.

Last Updated: 24 November 2014

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2013

Unknown, many thousands

Casualties in 2013

59 (2012: 66)

2013 casualties by outcome

2 killed; 57 injured (2011: 14 killed; 52 injured)

2013 casualties by device type

54 explosive remnants of war (ERW); 1 antipersonnel mine; 1 unknown mine; 3 unknown device

In 2013, there were at least 59 mine/ERW casualties in the State of Libya.[1] Children made up 63% (26 of 41) of all civilian casualties,[2] an increase compared to the percentage of child casualties (36%) in 2012. Most child casualties were boys (22); there were four girl casualties in 2013. Men were 52% (30 of 58) of all civilian casualties in cases in which the age was known, a slight decrease compared to 2012 (58%). Two casualties were women. Intentional engagement with ERW was the leading cause of casualties among civilians where the age and gender were known.[3] In 2013, 80% of all casualties recorded occurred in the province of Misrata.[4]

Most casualties for whom civilian or military status was known were civilians.[5] There were no military casualties reported in 2013. There were two casualties confirmed among deminers in 2013, an increase compared to 2012 when no military or deminer casualties were identified.

At 59, the total number of casualties identified for 2013 is a significant decrease compared with the 222 casualties in 2011 and similar to the 66 casualties in 2012.[6] This may be, in part, due to the lack of availability of casualty data to the Monitor. However, it also corresponds with the findings of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the ICRC that there were fewer people being injured by mines/ERW since 2012, as compared with 2011, in the midst of armed conflict.[7]

The total number of casualties in Libya is not known; all available estimates predate the 2011 conflict, when many new casualties occurred. The Libyan Demining Association (LDA) and the Libyan Civil Defense Department had registered 1,852 mine casualties by the end of 2006.[8] Previous estimates were approximately 12,000, with the Libyan police reporting 11,845 casualties between 1940 and 1995 (6,749 killed; 5,096 injured) and the Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies reporting 12,258 (3,874 killed; 8,384 injured) between 1952 and 1975.[9]

Cluster munition casualties

The number of cluster munition casualties in Libya is not known. There were no casualties from cluster submunitions identified in 2013.

There was no available information on casualties during the cluster munition strikes that occurred in 2011. Media reports identified four casualties from unexploded submunitions between April and June 2011: three in Ajdabiya in the Al Wahat district and one in Misrata.[10] However, it was not possible to distinguish the devices that caused these casualties from other types of ERW. Two of the four reported submunition casualties, boys 10 and 15 years old injured in Ajdabiya, were also later reported to have been injured by a hand grenade.[11] The explosive device type of the remaining two casualties could not be confirmed and were recorded as ERW casualties by the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC).[12]

Victim Assistance

Libya is responsible for survivors of landmines and other types of ERW. The total number of survivors is unknown. Outdated estimates ranged from 5,000 to 8,000 survivors through 1995.[13]

Victim assistance since 1999[14]

Throughout the period since 1999, mine/ERW survivors were able to receive free medical care through the reasonably well-developed Libyan healthcare system. Between 2000 and 2008, Italy provided support through building renovations, training, and planning to the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center, the only physical rehabilitation center in the country. However, during the period, the center was unable to operate at full capacity due to a lack of qualified staff, materials, and a data management system. When Italy withdrew support in 2008, the center stopped producing prosthetics and orthotics.

There was no information available from the new Libyan government on economic and social inclusion initiatives or psychological support to survivors during the period. At several Meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Libya called on countries who had used mines in Libya to “provide…assistance to the victims, and to rehabilitate them.”[15]

All victim assistance, but especially emergency and ongoing medical care, was disrupted by the armed conflict that started in February 2011. The availability of medical care decreased in 2011 as thousands of foreign medical professionals working in Libya returned to their countries of origin, and power cuts, lack of funding, and a lack of medical supplies prevented the remaining medical professionals from responding to the increased demand for emergency care from mine/ERW survivors and other victims of the conflict.[16] International organizations responded to this disruption and assisted hospitals to resume care provided to the increasing numbers of new mine/ERW survivors. In August 2011, the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center resumed production of prosthetics and orthotics.[17]

Victim assistance in 2013

By 2013, there were three prosthetics and orthotics service providers and two rehabilitation centers in the country. In 2013, the University of Misrata worked to set up, within the compound of the University hospital, a small physical rehabilitation center for disabled people in the area, with the support of the ICRC.[18] Other organizations limited some activities or withdrew from the country.

No victim assistance coordination or planning was possible in 2013; national and international efforts remained focused on providing immediate relief to the large numbers of war-wounded, including mine/ERW survivors, and rebuilding the health sector.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2013, the government was not able to differentiate the needs of mine/ERW survivors from the needs of all conflict victims in the country.[19] However, the ICRC assisted the LibMAC in collecting and sharing weapon contamination data and in establishing a casualty data management system.[20] By the end of 2013, a total of 228 mine/ERW casualties which had occurred in recent years had been recorded.[21]

Victim assistance coordination[22]

Government coordinating body/focal point

Ministry of Health and Ministry of Culture and Civil Society (MCCS)

Coordinating mechanism




On 1 December 2011, the LibMAC was established within the Ministry of Defense to manage all mine action activities in the country.[23] Responsibility for victim assistance lay with the Ministry of Health and the MCCS.[24] The Ministry of Social Affairs was primarily responsible for physical rehabilitation in Libya, although the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Martyrs, Missing and War Wounded were also active in the field of physical rehabilitation.[25] There was no national plan for victim assistance in 2013.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[26]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2013

Ministry of Social Affairs


Managed Benghazi Rehabilitation Center

Ongoing rehabilitation services

Ministry of Health


Managed Janzour Rehabilitation Centre in Tripoli

Ongoing basic rehabilitation services


International NGO

Healthcare and physical rehabilitation at Nalut Hospital, Nafusa mountains

No longer working in Libya

Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)

International NGO

Mental healthcare for violence-affected people

In August, opened a mental health center in Tripoli targeting people suffering from physical and mental health problems related to violence

International Medical Corps (IMC)

International NGO

Primary healthcare, psychological support and mental healthcare, strengthening physical rehabilitation


Human Study e.V.

International NGO

Enhancing the capacities of the Libyan rehabilitation sector

Organized a series of workshops in Tripoli for clinical rehabilitation workers


International Organization

War surgery training, evacuation of mine/ERW survivors and other war wounded, strengthening physical rehabilitation; providing emergency and first-level care training for members of the ICRC National Society, emergency service and hospital staff, and civil defense personnel

Worked with the Tripoli University to set up a physical rehabilitation undergraduate course; cooperated with Misrata University and associations of weapon-wounded people to set up an orthopedic workshop

Emergency and ongoing medical care

Following World Health Organization (WHO)-supported consultations with the Ministry of Health and other stakeholders in 2011 on rebuilding the healthcare system, the Ministry of Health assumed leadership for its reconstruction throughout 2013 with a focus on ensuring basic medical care, including mental health, throughout the country including rural and remote areas.[27]

In 2013, the ICRC continued to provide medical equipment and supplies to treat the injuries of mine/ERW survivors and other victims of the armed conflict.[28] People wounded during clashes received emergency care at five ICRC-supported hospitals. Some victims, as in Benghazi, Derna, and Tripoli were administered first aid from Libyan Red Crescent Society volunteers using ICRC-donated materials.[29] The ICRC also assisted in the renovation and expansion of a health clinic at Zliten, near Misrata, which improved access to healthcare for people affected by the ongoing violence in the area.[30]

In 2013, the ICRC continued to provide training to address traumatic war injuries, such as those caused by mines/ERW, to doctors and medical personnel.[31] The ICRC provided direct support to hospitals and first aid stations; some 270 people, including Libyan Red Crescent Society volunteers, scouts, emergency services personnel, civil defense staff, and nurses, strengthened first-level care provision, while 55 doctors and surgeons from across Libya upgraded their skills in emergency room trauma management. Eighty-seven surgeons and anesthetists received war-surgery training.[32]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

After ceasing direct assistance to the Benghazi Rehabilitation Center in 2012,[33] the ICRC worked closely with Misrata University and the associations of weapon-wounded people in 2013 to set up an orthopedic workshop for disabled people in and around Misrata, an area with a high number of war-wounded people.[34] A building was constructed within the compound of the university and two ICRC specialists were assigned to work in Misrata to support the opening of the center in 2014.[35] Also in 2013, the IMC continued to support rehabilitation centers in Libya both through the provision of equipment, as well as in-depth training for physiotherapists and nurses.[36] Merlin, an international organization, no longer provided rehabilitation services to mine/ERW and other war victims in Nefusa mountains.[37]

In line with a 2012 agreement, Tripoli University and the ICRC worked during 2013 to set up a physical rehabilitation undergraduate course with a view to expand the number of trained professionals. The lack of a location, the late arrival of the budget from the university, and various administrative constraints hampered the progress of this project in 2013. However, it was expected that the program would start in 2014.[38] In 2013 the NGO Human Study e.V. organized a series of workshops in Tripoli for 20 clinical Libyan rehabilitation workers with a view to enhancing capacities of the Libyan rehabilitation sector in order to provide comprehensive assistance to people with disabilities.[39]

Economic inclusion

There was no information available on economic inclusion initiatives for mine/ERW survivors in 2013.

Psychological support

In August 2013, MSF opened a mental health center in Tripoli to help people suffering from physical and mental health problems related to violence. The center treated people who have been affected by any form of violence, be it physical, psychological, sexual, or conflict-related. The team also trained doctors from the Ministry of Health and established a referral system from basic healthcare facilities and from Libyan and international NGOs.[40] IMC continued its mental health and psychosocial support program in Benghazi, Misrata, and Sirte to increase access to war trauma counseling and develop long-term mental health capacity in the country.[41]

Laws and policies

The 2011 Constitutional Declaration addresses the rights of persons with disabilities and requires the state to provide monetary and other types of social assistance, but does not explicitly prohibit discrimination. In 2013, the government did not effectively enforce these provisions due to administrative incapacity. Few public buildings were accessible to persons with disabilities, resulting in restricted access to employment, education, and healthcare.[42]

Libya signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 1 May 2008.


[1] Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by: emails from Cat Smith, Head of Mission Handicap International (HI), Libya, 12 June 2014; from Adullatif Abu Jarida, IMSMA Officer, Libya Mine Action Center (LibMAC), 3 June 2014; and from Brenda Floors, Community Liaison Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 25 June 2014; and media monitoring 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013.

[2] The age of one casualty was unknown.

[3] The majority of data provided to the Monitor contained sufficient detail regarding incidents to determine both the activity at the time and the action that initiated the explosion.

[4] Forty-seven casualties occurred in Misrata, 10 in Sirte, and two in Jabal Nafusa.

[5] There were 15 casualties for which the civil status was not known.

[6] Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by: emails from Benoit Darrieux, HI, 11 April 2013; from Jennifer Reeves, ICRC, 16 July 2012; from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LibMAC, 17 June 2012; from Alexandra Arango, MAG, 20 March 2012; from Teresa Tavares, HI, 16 March 2012; and from Jonas Herzog, Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT), 8 March 2012; and media monitoring 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2011. UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Project Results: Libya, 2013; ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 166; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, p. 152.

[7] UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Project Results: Libya, 2013; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 166.

[8] Prior to February 2011, the LDA had been part of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF) and was known as the Anti-Mines Association.

[9] Ahmed Besharah, “World War II mines planted in Libya and its socio-economic impact,” Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies, Tripoli, 1995, p. 153.

[10] UNICEF, “Libya: Protecting children from unexploded ordnance,” Misrata, 6 June 2011; Ruth Sherlock, “Unlucky camel finds Libya’s largest minefield,” Al Jazeera, 28 June 2011; email from James Wheeler, Photographer, 10 August 2011; and UNICEF, “UNICEF Situation Report # 19 - Sub-regional Libya crisis,” 29 June 2011.

[11] UNICEF, “Libya: Protecting children from unexploded ordnance,” Misrata, 6 June 2011.

[12] Casualty data provided via emails from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LMAC, 17 June 2012; and from Jennifer Reeves, ICRC, 16 July 2012.

[13] Ahmed Besharah, “World War II mines planted in Libya and its socio-economic impact,” Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies, Tripoli, 1995, p. 153.

[14] See previous Libya country profiles available on the Monitor website.

[15] Statement of Libya, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 18 November 2007; and statement of Libya, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.

[16]Overstretched health service needs sustained support,” IRIN News (Benghazi), 1 September 2011; and WHO, “Libya Crisis Update,” August 2011.

[17] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014.

[18] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, pp. 165 and 167.

[19] Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LMAC, 17 June 2012.

[20] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 166.

[21] Ibid.; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, p. 152.

[22] ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014.

[23] UNMAS, “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” undated.

[24] Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, LMAC, 17 June 2012.

[25] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014.

[26] Following the start of conflict in February 2011, numerous international organizations began providing humanitarian relief to the Libyan population. The organizations listed here are those whose response included a focus on the care and rehabilitation of injuries from explosive weapons such as mines and ERW. Merlin, “Where we work,” undated; Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), “International Activity Report 2013 – Libya,” 31 December 2013; MSF, “Libya,” undated; International Medical Corps (IMC), “Libya: ongoing response,” undated; Human Study e.V., “Where we work: Libya” undated; ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, pp. 164–169; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014.

[28] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 165.

[29] Ibid., p. 167.

[30] Ibid., p. 166.

[31] Ibid., p. 167; ICRC, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, p. 152; ICRC, “Annual Report 2011,” Geneva, May 2012, pp. 138–140; and Overstretched health service needs sustained support,” IRIN News (Benghazi), 1 September 2011.

[32] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 167.

[33] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, pp. 25 and 37.

[34] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 167.

[35] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014.

[36] IMC, Libya: ongoing response,” undated.

[37] Merlin, “Where we work,” undated.

[38] ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 167; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, September 2014.

[39] Human Study e.V., “Where we work: Libya,” undated.

[40] MSF, “International Activity Report 2013 – Libya,” 31 December 2013; and MSF, “Libya,” undated.

[42] United States Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014.

Last Updated: 22 November 2013

Support for Mine Action

Unsecured and damaged ammunition, easily accessible weapons material, and explosive remnants of war (ERW), exacerbated by the 2011 armed conflict, continue to pose a considerable threat to the State of Libya and international security. The extent and scope of the problem has yet to be determined.[1]

In response to the problem, Libya received US$20.7 million in international assistance from 14 donors.[2] The European Union (EU) and the Netherlands provided $11.3 million. In 2011, Libya similarly received $19 million.[3]

The United States (US) did not support mine action in Libya in 2012, but since 2011 has provided approximately $40 million in assistance to locate and secure Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and other weapons.[4] In an interview with Michael P. Moore from Landmines in Africa, Major General Walter D. Givhan, the US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs, and Operations, said, “In Libya, the US government prioritized securing MANPADS over landmines and while some of the funds made available for MANPADS destruction also covered landmine destruction and removal, the intent was to eliminate the MANPADS. This is understandable from a national security and national interest perspective: the United States is not going to be threatened by landmines in the ground in Libya, but US airplanes flying in Libyan airspace could be targeted by MANPADS in Libya.”[5] The US did not disaggregate its funding to Libya regarding MANPADS and landmines.

The Libyan Ministry of War Wounded, Martyrs and Missing Persons and the Ministry of Health contributed $1,307,058 and $150,172 respectively to the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security to provide for rehabilitation of 25 amputees at the University Rehabilitation Institute (URI) in Ljubljana, and for the URI to assess rehabilitation capacity in Tripoli and Benghazi.[6]

In July 2013, the UN reported that of the 10 humanitarian mine action projects valued at $10 million, only one was fully funded for the year, four were partially funded, and five had not received any funding resulting in a shortfall of $5.4 million. In addition, two victim assistance projects valued at $530,000 had not been funded as of July 2013.[7]

International contributions: 2012[8]















Clearance, risk education





















































[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Robert Gerschner, Unit for Arms Control and Disarmament in the framework of the UN, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria, 26 February 2013; Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013; email from Carolin J. Thielking, European Union Mine Action Focal Point, Division for WMD, Conventional Weapons and Space, European External Action Service, 15 May 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire from Adam Ravnkilde, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 May 2013; Japan, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Amended Protocol II, 28 March 2013; “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” p. 39; Germany, CCW, Amended Protocol II, Form B, 22 March 2013; and Italy Financial Tracking System, Reliefweb,

[3] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Libya: Support for Mine Action,” 19 September 2012.

[4] US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington, DC, August 2013, p. 3.

[5] Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Givhan, Landmines in Africa, 19 November 2012.

[6] ITF, “Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2012,” Slovenia, 2013, p. 36.

[8] Average exchange rate for 2012: €1=US$1.2859; DKK5.7922=US$1; NOK5.8181=US$1; SEK6.7721=US$1; CHF0.9377=US$1; C$0.9995=US$1; and ¥79.82=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.