Peru

Last Updated: 31 October 2011

Mine Ban Policy

Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures

Law No. 28824 enacted on 22 July 2006

Transparency reporting

16 May 2011

Policy

The Republic of Peru signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 17 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Peru enacted domestic legislation to penalize violations of the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 July 2006.[1]

On 16 May 2011, Peru submitted its 12th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, for the period from March 2010 to March 2011.

Peru attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011.

Peru served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in 2010, and as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operations of the Convention in 2011.

Peru is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and retention

Peru is a former producer of antipersonnel mines.[2] The Ministry of Defense has stated that Peru has never exported antipersonnel mines.[3] Peru used antipersonnel mines around its electricity towers and public infrastructure during and after the internal conflict of 1980–1992.[4]

Peru destroyed its stockpile of 338,356 antipersonnel mines between 1999 and December 2001.[5]

In May 2011, Peru reported that it retained 2,040 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, which is 2,050 fewer mines than previously reported.[6] In April 2010, Peru reported a total of 4,090 mines: 2,060 antipersonnel mines for training purposes and 2,030 mines retained for training that had been transferred for use “in the education and training of military personnel in basic and new techniques for demining.”[7] In 2009, Peru reported a total of 4,047 mines retained for training purposes.[8]  Peru did not report in any detail on the intended purpose and actual use of its retained mines.

Use

Since early 2007, remnants of the non-state armed group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps.”[9] Victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

In November 2010, local media reported that police had found 25 mines or explosive booby traps that it attributed to the Shining Path.[10] In June 2010, media reported that a Peruvian soldier lost his leg after stepping on a mine while on patrol near the perimeter of the Cerro San Judas army base.[11]

In October 2009, El Comercio reported that Staff Sergeant Sanchez EP Ipushima Euler was killed by a mine laid by the Shining Path.[12] Minister of Defense Rafael Rey reportedly stated that the mine was laid by the Peruvian Army.[13] Rey later clarified that an investigation into the incident had found the soldier was killed by an IED planted by the “narcoterrorists” (Shining Path).[14] In December 2009, Peru’s Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Néstor Popolizio confirmed that there had been no mine use by Peru.[15]

 



[1] Law No. 28824 imposes penal sanctions of five to eight years imprisonment. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2007; and statement of Peru, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 21 September 2006. The text can be found in the Boletín oficial de normas legales (Official Bulletin of Legal Norms) of the legal newspaper El Peruano, www.gacetajuridica.com.pe.

[2] The police produced the DEXA mine until production facilities were closed in 1994, while the navy produced the CICITEC MG-MAP-304 and the CICITEC MGP-30 mines until production facilities were closed in 1997. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form H, 2 May 2005; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, April 2003.

[3] Telephone interview with Gen. Raúl O’Connor, Director, Information Office, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000. 

[4] Peru has denied mine-laying during the 1995 border conflict with Ecuador. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 May 2004.

[5] Two destructions of a total of 11,784 antipersonnel mines between March 2000 and March 2001 are sometimes not included in Peru’s destruction totals. Peru destroyed the bulk of its stockpile, 321,730 mines, between 30 May and 13 September 2001. Peru declared stockpile destruction complete in September 2001, but then destroyed a further 926 mines in December 2001 that it had intended to retain for training. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 658.

[6] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 16 May 2011. The mines held by the army are: 676 CICITEC (MGP), 600 M18-A1 Claymore, 500 PMA-3, 209 PMB-6N, and 30 POMZ-2M, while the Security Division (División de Seguridad, DIVSECOM) has 25 MAP-87.

[7] The mines transferred for training purposes are: 500 PMD6, 99 CICITEC (MGP), 100 M35C/ESC M5, 525 M-409, 291 PMA-6N, 470 PMNZ-2M (probably POMZ-2M), and 45 MAP-87. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2010.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2009. Peru reported a total of 4,047 mines retained for training purposes: 775 CICITEC (MGP), 600 M18-A1 Claymore, 525 M409, 500 PMA-3, 500 PMB-6N (possibly PMD-6M), 500 PMD-6, 500 POMZ-2M, 100 M35 C/ESP M5, and 47 CICITEC mines. All are held by the army, except the 47 CICITEC mines, which are held by INPE.

[9] One article cited use of “explosive traps” in 24 attacks. “Las minas artesanales y trampas explosivas. Asesinos silenciosos en el Alto Huallaga” (“Artisanal mines and explosive traps. Silence murders in the Alto Huallaga”), InfoRegion (Lima), 28 October 2008, www.inforegion.pe. In the past decade, the only other reports of use of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like devices by Shining Path came in June and July 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 657. There were isolated reports of incidents involving explosive devices in subsequent years. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 476; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 588.

[10] “Ataque senderista contra campamento del Corah al norte de Tocache mata a un policía y hiere a otro” (“Shining Path attack against Corah camp north of Tocache kills a policeman and wounds another”), IDL-Reporteros, 6 November 2010, idl-reporteros.pe.

[11] Miguel Gutiérrez R., “Mina que mató a sargento fue colocada por las FFAA” (“Mine that killed sergeant was placed by the armed forces”), La República (Lima), 15 October 2009, larepublica.pe.

[12] “Muere sargento EP en Vizcatán al pisar mina senderista” (“EP sergeant dies after stepping on Shining Path mine”), El Comercio (Lima), 13 October 2009, elcomercio.pe.

[13] Original text: “Desgraciadamente fue una mina nuestra. Toda esa zona está minada para evitar ataques externos, y (Euler Sánchez ) no tuvo la precaución de ir por los lugares que estaban indicados. Pisó una mina nuestra; eso le ocasionó la muerte.” Miguel Gutiérrez R., “Mina que mató a sargento fue colocada por las FFAA” (“Mine that killed sergeant was placed by the armed forces”), La República (Lima), 15 October 2009, larepublica.pe.

[14] Letter from Rafael Rey, Minister of Defense, to the ICBL, 27 November 2009.

[15] He also said the Ministry of Defense had sent instructions to ensure the armed forces have the right information on legal obligations and international commitments, and that the Ministry of Defense had checked the stockpile of retained mines and none were missing. Notes from ICBL meeting with Néstor Popolizio Bardales, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations, and Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Cartagena, 3 December 2009.


Last Updated: 12 August 2014

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Cluster Munitions status

State Party

National implementation legislation

Declared ratification law under national implementation measures

Stockpile destruction

Declared a stockpile of 675 cluster munitions and 86,200 submunitions, which it committed to destroy by the 2021 deadline

Participation in Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings

Attended intersessional meetings in Geneva in April 2014

Key developments

Provided initial transparency report in August 2013 and an update in May 2014

Policy

The Republic of Peru signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 26 September 2012, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 March 2013.

Under national implementation measures, Peru has declared its ratification law as well as a 10 June 2011 directive on the standardization of weapon disposal procedures.[1] It is not known if Peru will enact specific legislation to enforce the provisions of the convention.

Peru submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 1 August 2013 and provided an annual updated report on 7 May 2014.[2] As one of the small core group of nations that took responsibility for the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Peru hosted an international conference on cluster munitions in Lima in May 2007.[3]

Peru has continued to engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, except the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Peru has attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including in April 2014. Peru attended a regional workshop on cluster munitions in Santiago, Chile in December 2013.

Peru has voted in favor of recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian’s government’s use of cluster munitions, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[4]

Peru is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, and transfer

Peru is not known to have ever used, produced, or exported cluster munitions.

Stockpiling and destruction

In the initial Article 7 report provided in August 2013, Peru declared a stockpile of 675 cluster munitions of three types and 86,200 submunitions, as listed in the following table.[5]

Cluster munitions stockpiled by Peru (August 2013)[6]

Quantity and type of munitions

Quantity and type of submunitions

388 RBK-250-275 bombs

58,200 AO-1Sch (150 submunitions in each bomb)

198 RBK-500 bombs

11,800 AO-RT (60 submunitions in each)

90 BME-330 NA

16,200 (180 submunitions in each)

675

86,200

Previously, in May 2007, Peru’s Minister of Defense publicly disclosed that the Peruvian Air Force possesses stocks of BME-330 cluster bombs of Spanish origin and RBK-500 cluster bombs of Russian/Soviet origin as well as CB-470 cluster bombs of South African origin.[7]

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Peru is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible but not later than 1 March 2021.

In April 2014, Peru expressed its commitment to destroy the stockpile by the deadline provided by the convention and said it has requested international cooperation and assistance from countries that have undergone a similar process, as well as support from regional and international organizations and NGOs.[8] Peru stated that it is studying the resource needs for the planned destruction of the stockpiled cluster munitions.

In the 2013 Article 7 report, Peru states that it is committed to begin the process of stockpile destruction, in accordance with existing national regulations and lists the Peruvian Air Force as the institution responsible for the stockpiled cluster munitions and their destruction.[9]

Retention

In the 2013 Article 7 report, Peru declared no cluster munitions or submunitions retained for training.[10] Previously, it expressed its intent to retain cluster munitions for the purposes of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, but said it had not yet identified the number of cluster munitions or submunitions to be retained.[11]

 



[1] Resolución Legislativa que aprueba la Convención sobre Municiones en Racimo (Legislative Resolution approving the Convention on Cluster Munitions), No. 29843, 15 March 2012. On 25 April 2012, Decree 021-2012 approving ratification was signed and published in the official journal El Peruano the next day. Decree No. 021-2012-RE, 26 April 2012; “Ref. 464960,” El Peruano, 26 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 August 2013.

[2] The initial report covers the period from March to August 2013, while the updated report provided on 7 May 2014 is for calendar year 2013.

[3] For details on Peru’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 142–144.

[4]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013.. Peru voted in favor of a similar resolution on 15 May 2013.

[5] Peru declares that the stockpile is “Vencida por tiempo límite de vida” which translates as “expired” and states that there is “no information on the batch numbers for the submunitions.” The “AO-1C4” submunitions contained in the RBK-250-275 bombs appear to be RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh submunitions as Peru reports the standard total of 150 submunitions in each bomb. See Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, August 2013.

[7] Ángel Páez, “Peru se suma a iniciativa mundial para prohibir y destruir las ‘bombas de racimo’” (“Peru joins global initiative to ban and destroy the ‘cluster bombs’”), La República.pe, 29 May 2007. In May 2007 a member of the national media showed Human Rights Watch photographs of these cluster munitions. See also Ángel Páez, “Se eliminarán las bombas de racimo” (“Cluster bombs will be eliminated”), La República.pe, 29 May 2007.

[8] Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2014.

[11] Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012.


Last Updated: 25 August 2014

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: POOR[1]

Performance Indicator

Score

Problem understood

5

Target date for completion of clearance

4

Targeted clearance

6

Efficient clearance

4

National funding of program

6

Timely clearance

4

Land release system

5

National mine action standards

7

Reporting on progress

4

Improving performance

4

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE

4.9

Mine contamination in the Republic of Peru is the result of internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, and a brief conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 over a longstanding border dispute.[2] During this conflict, part of the two states’ common border was mined, affecting four departments in Peru: Amazonas, Cajamarca, Piura, and Tumbes. The most heavily mined section was an area known as “Cordillera del Cóndor” (the sparsely populated Amazonas department), which was at the center of the conflict.[3] In April 2014, Peru reported remaining contamination was 438,254m2(0.4km2) across 135 mined areas and containing 10,313 recorded mines.[4]

In February 2012, Peru suffered further mine contamination along its border with Chile following mine displacement caused by torrential rains and floods in the Arica-Parinacota region in northern Chile. The floods caused mines laid in the 1970s to surface near the main highway linking Arica (Chile) with Tacna (Peru) in an area called Quebrada de Escritos.[5] Peru and Chile commissioned Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to clear the mines,[6] which it completed in December 2012, destroying some 300 mines in the process.[7]

Mine Action Program

Chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peru’s national mine action authority, the interministerial Executive Council of the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS) is responsible for setting strategy and priorities in addition to plan and budget approval.[8] CONTRAMINAS is responsible for overall management and day-to-day coordination of mine action activities.

At the end of 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded its program of technical and financial assistance to Peru’s mine action operations, which it initiated in May 2001 through its Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas en América del Sur, MARMINAS).[9] The OAS has continued to support a victim assistance project, which was due also to close in late 2014.[10] RONCO Consulting concluded its work with CONTRAMINAS in March 2013.

In April 2013, under the Binational Cooperation Program established in 2000 Peru and Ecuador issued a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining with a view to unifying the demining procedures of both countries in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[11] In December 2013, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit conducted its first demining exercise in Morona Santiago in Ecuador. A second exercise was planned to be conducted in Peru during the course of 2014.[12]

In 2013, Peru reported demining capacity of some 150 deminers, five explosive ordnance disposal personnel, six mine detection dogs, and one mechanical excavator.[13] As of March 2014, transfer of demining units from the specialized unit of the national police under the Security Division of CONTRAMINAS (División de Seguridad, DIVSECOM), planned for 2012, had not yet occurred, although it was due to occur “very soon.”[14]

Regarding additional mined areas identified in 2012, Peru noted that clearance would require “a substantial increase in the resources of the Peruvian State to provide greater capabilities to humanitarian demining process in order to comply with the obligations assumed before the Convention and finish the cleanup and destruction of mines in the territory national before March 1, 2017.”[15]

Land Release

Clearance on the border areas with Ecuador has been under the responsibility of the Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining Army of Peru.[16] As of April 2014, Peru reported that a total of 107,304m2 had been cleared since 2007 in the Cordillera del Cóndor with the destruction of 8,718 mines.[17]

Mine clearance in border area in 2009–13 (m2)[18]

Year

Area cleared

Mines destroyed

2013

16,017

2,391

2012

13,791

4,021

2011

46,572

1,495

2010

24,927

133

2009

1,833

44

Total

103,140

8,084

Mine clearance in 2013

Peru reported clearance of 16,017m2 in the Cenepa river area in 2013, with the destruction of 2,391 antipersonnel mines. Clearance occurred during 11 work periods of 20 days each.[19] This represents an increase of 2,226m2 from the 13,791m2 cleared in 2012[20] when the exceptionally low output was attributed to the high elevation of the river area that had required building a new camp, transport of equipment, and construction of bridges and heliports for demining.[21] The small increase in mined area cleared may be attributable to an increase in deminer capacity from 60 in June 2013[22] to the 150 reported in March 2014, in addition to use of (as yet unexplained) new mechanical and manual demining techniques.[23]

Demining in the Cordillera del Condor has been described as a challenging endeavor due to its topography as a mountainous jungle prone to heavy rain for much of the year, and reaching heights of 2,900m which means that it is only accessible by a two-hour helicopter flight.[24]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2008), Peru is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2017.

On 29 February 2012, Peru’s Minister of Defense, Alberto Otárola, said the border with Ecuador “would be free of landmines by 2016.” He continued, “I think in 2016 or 2017 we can say that our borders will be free of mines, as all the boundaries of democratic countries that respect the right to life of its citizens, must be.”[25] In May 2012, at the Intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Peru said they would clear all remaining mined areas “as quickly as possible.”[26] In 2014, the Coordinator General of CONTRAMINAS stated: “We are still working according to our deadline.”[27]

It is unclear, however, if Peru can indeed meet its Article 5 deadline in 2017.[28] The 48 mined areas found to be in Peruvian territory rather than in Ecuador in 2012 increased significantly the area and number of mines to clear. In combination with Peru’s low clearance rate in recent years, whether Peru can clear the remaining areas by 2017 with current capacity is seriously in doubt.

It its statement to the Standing Committee meeting on mine clearance in April 2014, Peru stated that the additional mined area meant that Peru needs a “substantial increase in resources” to expand demining capacity in order to comply with its Article 5 clearance obligations by the March 2017 deadline.[29] CONTRAMINAS reports having reviewed its operational plans in light of the additional mined areas from Ecuador and created a new draft national plan.[30] As noted above, the content of the plan has not yet been disclosed publicly.

Support for Mine Action

Peru contributed the equivalent of US$1.6 million to its own national mine action program in 2013, less than in 2012. In addition, the US Department of State allocated $1 million to Peru for the period October 2012–April 2013.

Peru estimated a budget of $26 million would be needed to complete clearance in its revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request in 2008, of which $17.8 million would be provided by its national budget in 2008–2017 with the remaining $8 million to be sought from external sources. To date, Peru has raised $22 million of the projected total needed. These figures, however, do not take into account the need for increased resources due to additional mined areas identified. Peru has not provided a projection of the extra financial resources needed to complete clearance, nor indicated how it intends to raise those funds.

Recommendations

·         Peru should urgently increase its national clearance capacity, specifically by deploying police demining units to the border areas with Ecuador as soon as possible.

·         Peru should share with States Parties its revised national clearance plan to account for the 48 additional mined areas inherited from Ecuador.

·         Peru should inform states of its exact needs for assistance and resource shortfall, and provide a clear plan on how Peru intends to raise the additional funding needed.

 



[1] See “Mine Action Program Performance” for more information on performance indicators.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2009.

[4] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, General Coordinator, Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), 21 April 2014.

[5] Manuel Vigo, “Peru–Chile border closed due to landmines,” PeruThisWeek.com, 20 February 2012.

[6] Manuel Vigo, “Peru asks Chile to remove landmines from border,” PeruThisWeek.com, 28 May 2012; and email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 20 June 2012.

[7] Manuel Vigo, Peru-Chile border cleared of landmines, Norwegian NGO says,” PeruThisWeek.com, 20 December 2012.

[8] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, 20 July 2009.

[9] Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, OAS, Washington, 18 March 2014.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Statement of Ecuador, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 11 April 2014.

[12] Ibid.; and email from Léon Aviles, Minister, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 9 May 2014.

[13] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 March 2014.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2013.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 June 2013; and presentations of Peru at the National Directors and UN Advisors Meeting, Geneva, 21 March 2012, and 21 June 2013.

[19] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2013.

[20] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 June 2013.

[21] Ibid., 26 June 2013.

[22] Ibid., 18 June 2013.

[23] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2013.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Manuel Vigo, “Peru and Ecuador agree to clear border landmines by 2016,” PeruThisWeek.com, 29 February 2012.

[26] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 22 May 2012.

[27] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 March 2014.

[28] Ibid., 21 June 2013.

[29] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2013.

[30] Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 March 2014.


Last Updated: 11 September 2014

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Peru is responsible for a significant number of survivors of landmines, including survivors of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Peru has made a commitment to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2013

460 (62 killed; 398 injured)

Casualties in 2013

0 (2012: 4)

2013 casualties by outcome

0 (2012: 1 killed, 3 injured)

No new casualties were identified in Peru in 2013.[1] In 2012, in the region of the River Apurímac, River Ene valley, and Mantaro (VRAEM), one incident involving a victim-activated IED, also referred to as a “homemade mine,” caused four casualties among the soldiers from the antipersonnel mine deactivation unit of the Peruvian army.[2]

Since 2007, when the last confirmed casualty caused by factory-made mines was recorded,[3] most casualties identified have been caused by victim-activated IEDs, in areas of coca cultivation.[4]

In 2013, a Peruvian citizen was injured by a landmine when crossing the border to enter Chile.[5] In 2012, a Peruvian was killed while crossing the border from Peru to Chile when his car hit an antivehicle mine.[6]

The total number of mine/IED and ERW casualties identified in Peru since 1991 is 460 (62 people killed and 398 injured).[7]

Victim Assistance

As of the end of 2013, there were 398 mine/ERW survivors in Peru.[8]

Victim assistance in 2013

In 2013, some efforts were made to increase access to physical rehabilitation and to register mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in government social programs such as medical insurance and pensions. However, access to services remained difficult for survivors throughout the year because most were living in extremely remote and rural areas. In December 2012, with the approval of the General Law on Persons with Disabilities, Peru started the adaptation of national legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Implementing regulations of the disability law were passed in April 2014.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2013, the Peruvian Center for Mine Action (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonales, CONTRAMINAS) maintained regular communication with landmine survivors and conducted workshops and discussions, in order to verify and update information on mine/ERW survivors and their needs. During the year, CONTRAMINAS visited the regions of Junin, Huancavelica, and Tacna to update information about survivors already registered and to identify any other mine survivors who remained unregistered.[9]

Victim assistance coordination[10]

Government coordinating body/focal point

CONTRAMINAS

Coordinating mechanism

Victim Assistance Consultative Committee: led by CONTRAMINAS, including representatives from CONADIS, INR, NGOs, and survivor associations

Plan

National victim assistance work plan

CONTRAMINAS held several bilateral victim assistance coordination meetings which included other government ministries and relevant actors such as the European Union and the Organization of American States (OAS), the National Disability Council (CONADIS), victim assistance service providers such as the National Institute of Rehabilitation (Instituto Nacional de Rehabilitación, INR) and the Polus Center, as well as survivor associations.[11]

In April 2013, CONTRAMINAS and CONADIS co-hosted a national victim assistance meeting with support from the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit. The meeting brought together mine victims, persons with disabilities, and their representative organizations, along with government and NGO participants from rural and remote areas of Peru to ensure the explicit inclusion of mine victims and their perspectives in Peru’s Plan for Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.[12] Three regional meetings were held in Tacna, Junín, and Huancavelica bringing together survivors, local authorities, and representatives of CONTRAMINAS.[13]

In 2013, CONTRAMINAS and the Polus Center continued implementing Peru’s national victim assistance work plan, developed in 2010.[14] The plan’s objectives include providing individualized support for socio-economic reintegration for all registered survivors and strengthening local healthcare and rehabilitation facilities in mine affected areas.[15]

Peru provided updates on victim assistance and disability policy at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013.[16] Peru provided information on progress in victim assistance through its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.[17]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Survivors and other persons with disabilities participated in the national victim assistance meeting in April 2013 and in regional victim assistance meetings.[18] The Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields (Asociación de Víctimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados, AVISCAM) has been inactive since 2012.[19]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

As in previous years, medical facilities and the country’s main rehabilitation center were centralized in the capital, while most survivors were based in rural communities. The time and expense of traveling to these services prevented most survivors from accessing them.[20] The national Transportation Development Plan included consideration of the needs of persons with disabilities and actions to gradually address these needs. The National Rehabilitation Institute and other hospitals had begun implementing some actions from the plan as of early 2014.[21]

CONTRAMINAS continued to assist survivors in securing medical assistance and in applying for national health insurance and/or disability pensions.[22] Many survivors found the application process for national health insurance and pensions to be complicated and the coverage itself very limited.[23]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

In January 2013, the INR officially opened the newly built national rehabilitation center offering comprehensive rehabilitation services, including prosthetics, occupational therapy, and psychological support. The construction of new facilities was financed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with a national contribution from Peru. The National Rehabilitation Institute offers a comprehensive rehabilitation program including physical and psychological care. However, the new center located in Lima remained inaccessible to most survivors living in rural, remote areas.

CONTRAMINAS, with support from the OAS and the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), facilitated access to rehabilitation services for mine survivors at the INR, National Institute of Ophthalmology and Hospital Daniel A. Carrión de Huancayo.[24]

In early 2013, the Polus Center began a multi-year training course at the INR to increase the staff capacity through periodic modular trainings.[25] The ICRC SFD continued to support the training of staff at the INR to improve the quality of physical rehabilitation in Peru.[26]

Economic Inclusion

Through May 2013, CONTRAMINAS continued to work jointly with the Polus Center in the implementation socio-economic inclusion projects for civilian and military victims. These include education and training and/or micro-finance to start small businesses. By May, 108 civilian victims had received support for income-generating projects, approximately one-third of all registered survivors.[27] In the first quarter of 2013, CONTRAMINAS and the Polus Center monitored the results of the economic inclusion projects and found that 98% were successful.[28]

The Polus Center strengthened the capacity of the regional employment center in Junin, providing equipment, tools, and materials for vocational training courses. It also provided training to the center in adapting courses and occupational counseling for persons with disabilities and established a quota of 15% of its spaces for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[29]

Laws and Policies

In April 2014 the implementing regulations for the national Law for Persons with Disabilities were approved.[30] The law establishes budgetary requirements and quotas for various government ministries to ensure the promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities.[31] It mandates that all public spaces must be accessible, though few efforts were made in 2013 to remove barriers to access.[32]

The pilot program Accessible Tumbes (Tumbes Accessible), launched by CONADIS in 2012, aims to improve the lives of persons with disabilities by providing a regional census, visiting them, assessing their needs and the obstacles they face in accessing services, as well as providing immediate attention as needed.[33] The outcomes of the pilot program are to be used to develop regional disability policies.[34] In early 2014, the program was replicated in the regions of Huánuco and Piura. [35]

Peru ratified the CRPD on 30 January 2008.

 



[1] Monitor analysis of media reports 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Wilyam Lúcar, Coordinator, and Javier Santillán, Victim Assistance Officer, Peruvian Center for Mine Action (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonales, CONTRAMINAS), 17 April 2013; and María Elena Hidalgo, “Éstas son las minas caseras con las que Sendero mata a oficiales” (“These are the homemade mines with which the Shining Path kill officials”), Diario la República, 16 June 2012.

[3] Monitor analysis of media reports in 2007; interviews with Carlos Estrada, President, and Bruno Celiz, Secretary, the Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields (Asociación de Víctimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados, AVISCAM), Lima, 6 and 19 March 2007; emails from Jorge Liza, Coordinator, Security Division (División de Seguridad, DIVSECOM), 3 March 2007; and from Carlos Estrada, AVISCAM, 6 March 2007; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Form J, April 2007, and April 2008; response to Monitor questionnaire by Jorge Liza, DIVSECOM, 31 March 2008; and “Lanzan campaña para prevención de minas artesanales” (“Launch of campaign to warn against homemade mines”), Info Región (Lima), 6 December 2007.

[4] See previous editions of the Monitor on the Monitor website.

[5] Because this incident occurred on Chilean territory, it has not been included in the casualty total for Peru. See the Monitor’s 2014 profile on Chile for more details. “Peruano herido por mina en frontera con Chile se recupera en hospital de Arica” (“Peruvian wounded by a mine on the border with Chile recovers in Arica hospital”), El Comercio, 17 August 2013, accessed on 16 June 2014.

[6]Chile-Peru landmine blast kills at least one in car,” BBC News, 27 May 2012, accessed on 6 June 2012.

[7] This total includes 339 mine casualties recorded through 2013 by CONTRAMINAS; 107 ERW casualties identified through 2008; and 14 casualties caused by IEDs identified between 2009 and 2013 by the Monitor through media monitoring. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014; and email 8 August 2014; presentation by Dr. Juan Daniel Guillén Cabrejos, Director, INR, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008; and Monitor analysis of media reports January 2009 to December 2013.

[8] This figure includes 284 survivors of landmines, 107 survivors of ERW as reported in June 2008, and seven IED survivors reported in the media from 2009–2013. It was not known if any of the 107 survivors of ERW had since died from natural causes as of the end of 2013. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014; email from Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 8 August 2014; presentation by Dr. Juan Daniel Guillén Cabrejos, INR, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008; and Monitor analysis of media reports January 2009 to December 2013.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[10] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Wilyam Lúcar and Javier Santillán, CONTRAMINAS, 17 April 2013.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Carola Hunter, Polus Center, 24 March 2011; and Theresa E. Kane, “Victim Assistance in Peru,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.1, Summer 2011.

[16] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2013.

[18] Response to Monitor questionnaire Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[19] Interview with Ana Maria Watson, Director, Institute for Security and Human Rights, Lima, 24 April 2013.

[20] Monitor field visit to Peru, 23–26 April 2013.

[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[22] Telephone interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 12 April 2012; and response to Monitor questionnaire Javier Edgar Santillán Galdós, CONTRAMINAS, 14 February 2014.

[23] Interview with Santiago Castellón, Polus Center, Lima, 24 April 2013.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2013–March 2014), Form J, 6 May 2014; and ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2013,” June 2014, p. 43.

[25] Interview with Fernando Alejandro Urcia Fernández, National Institute for Rehabilitation, Lima, 24 April 2013.

[26] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2013,” June 2014, p. 43.

[28] Projects were considered successful if businesses were still operational and there had been some improvement in the quality of life of the beneficiary as a result of an increase in income and in their interactions with the community. Interview with Santiago Castellón, Polus Center, Lima, 24 April 2013.

[29] Interview with Santiago Castellón, Polus Center, Lima, 24 April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2013–March 2014), Form J, 6 May 2014.

[30]Reglamentation of the Law 29973 is approved,” April 2014, accessed 8 August 2014.

[31] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Session on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[32] United States Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Peru,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2014.

[33] CONADIS, “Tumbes Accessible,” accessed 8 August 2014.

[34] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2013.

[35] CONADIS, “Tumbes Accessible,” accessed 8 August 2014.


Last Updated: 22 November 2013

Support for Mine Action

In 2012, Norway, Belgium, a regional development bank Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF),[1] and the United States (US) contributed a combined total of US$2,025,490 to mine action activities in the Republic of Peru, of which $1,009,379 was allocated to clearance activities and $1,016,111 dedicated to victim assistance. In 2012, the US also allocated $800,000 for victim assistance in Peru.[2]

The CAF contributed $500,000 to Peru’s mine action program in both 2011 and 2012.

The government of Peru contributed $2 million in 2012 to the mine action program.[3]

International contributions: 2012[4]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount

($)

US

Clearance, victim assistance

$1,000,000

1,000,000

CAF

Clearance

$500,000

500,000

Norway

Clearance

NOK1,800,000

309,379

Belgium

Victim assistance

€168,062

216,111

Total

 

 

2,025,490

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[5]

Year

National contributions ($)

International contributions ($)

Total contributions ($)

2012

2,000,000

2,025,490

4,025,490

2011

2,465,128

1,996,894

4,462,022

2010

2,403,928

2,534,825

4,938,753

2009

1,468,842

2,705,807

4,174,649

2008

960,911

1,262,902

2,223,813

Total

9,298,809

10,525,918

19,824,727

 

 



[1] CAF is a financial institution established in 1970 that fosters sustainable development and regional integration in Latin America. Its headquarters are in Caracas, Venezuela.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, Organization of American States, 24 April 2013; Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 2012; email from Michael Lundquist, Executive Director, POLUS Center, 7 September 2012; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington DC, August 2013; and Belgium, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Protocol V, Form F, 8 April 2013.

[3] Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 2012.

[4] Average exchange rate for 2012: €1=US$1.2859; NOK5.8181=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[5] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Peru: Support for Mine Action,” 19 September 2012.