Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 2009, a Russian diplomat reiterated that Russia has not been able to accede due to the military utility of antipersonnel mines, the lack of viable alternatives, and the financial difficulties in destroying its large stockpile within four years.[1]

However, Russia has also expressed support for the treaty’s humanitarian objectives.[2] In June 2009, a Russian official said that Russia is committed to the objective of a mine-free world, but stressed that any prohibition must take into account national security considerations. According to the official, Russia’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is dependent on “solving a number of technical, financial and other tasks” related to implementation.[3] In December 2010, Russia said it “did not exclude the possibility of joining the treaty in the future,” but that this required an incremental approach.[4]

Russia attended as an observer the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November–December 2010, where it made a statement for the first time at an annual meeting for the Mine Ban Treaty. A Geneva-based disarmament diplomat delivered a statement during the session on universalization that largely mirrored the policy points noted above. The statement also emphasized that Russia was open to work with civil society and NGOs on the mine issue, giving as an example the deputy foreign minister’s letter delivered to the ICBL at the beginning of the meeting.[5] However, Russia did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the treaty in Geneva in June 2011 and May 2012, and the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Phnom Penh in November-December 2011.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on mines.[6] It submitted its most recent national annual report as required by Article 13 on 15 March 2012 covering the period from 2011 to 2012. Russia is also a party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Russia reports that in order to comply with Amended Protocol II, a “National System of Technical Requirements for Landmines including antipersonnel and other than antipersonnel ones was elaborated and adopted; planned disposal of obsolete landmines is underway; new, more effective types of detection and demining tools are developed and commissioned. Marking of mine fields at the national boarder of the Russian Federation is fulfilled in full compliance with Paragraph 1 of the RF Federal Law #158FZ of December 7, 2004, ‘On Ratification of Amended Protocol II.…’”[7]

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines stopped in 1997.[8] Russia has been conducting research on new mines, modifications to existing mines, and alternatives to mines since at least 1997.[9]

Russia has had a moratorium since 1 December 1994 on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russian officials have stated, most recently in June 2009, that it is still being observed.[10] Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since 1994. Antipersonnel mines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 29 mine-affected countries.[11] In the first few months of 2012, the Syrian army planted landmines of Soviet/Russian origin, including PMN-2 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 antivehicle mines, along its borders with Lebanon and Turkey.[12]

In November 2004 Russia released official information for the first time on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov cited a figure of 26.5 million. The minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015.[13] At the Tenth Mine Ban Treaty Meeting of States Parties, Russia declared that it has destroyed 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[14] In 2010 only, more than 464,000 antipersonnel mines that did not meet international requirements were also destroyed.[15]

Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel mine stockpiles, such as 18,200 in Tajikistan and an unknown number in Georgia (Abkhazia).[16]

Use

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.[17] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop flows of weapons, drugs, and terrorists, and maintained that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[18]

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to the Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly-laid mines and existing defensive minefields.[19] In 2010, the Monitor ceased identifying Russia as a user of antipersonnel mines. This was the first time since the inception of the Monitor in 1999 that Russia has not been listed as a user. There have been no reported instances of mines use through October 2012.

The Russian domestic media regularly reports stories of bombings and attacks against state structures conducted by insurgent, separatist, or criminal groups in the Caucasus regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and other locations. While many reports referred to “landmines,” it appears that in most cases armed groups used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), time-delay bombs, or antivehicle mines, according to available information in media reports. The Monitor has not conclusively identified specific instances of new use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups in Russia since 2007.[20]

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia has rarely commented on why it has not joined the ban convention. In its last statement related to the matter in November 2011, Russia argued that cluster munitions play “a very substantive role” and “cannot be abandoned yet” due to their “defensive role.” In Russia’s view, “cluster munitions still preserve their status of non-prohibited weapon.”[1]

Since the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted in 2008, Russia has conceded on several occasions that cluster munitions cause serious humanitarian harm, but it has still argued that technical improvements to the weapon, coupled with their “appropriate application,” can reduce the humanitarian risks associated with their use.[2]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[3] The initiative failed in November 2011, effectively ending the CCW’s deliberations on cluster munitions and leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole multilateral instrument specifically dedicated to the weapons.

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention was opened for signature in 2008, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that cluster munitions were “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia…We are against unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions.”[5]

Since 2008, Russia has shown some interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2011, but did not attend those held in 2012 or 2013. Russia attended intersessional meetings of the convention in Geneva in 2012, but not those held in April 2013 or 2014. Russia did not make any statements at these meetings.

In its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia endorsed a resolution on 27 May 2014 that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[6]

On 4 July 2013, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the government of Ukraine of using cluster munitions against civilians.[7] On 25 July 2014, a senior commander of the Russian General Staff expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were using cluster munitions in civilian areas.[8]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Use

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German Armed Forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[9] Russian forces also used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[10]

Russia most recently used cluster munitions in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), Russian cluster munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians and injured 46 more. Clearance personnel have found Russian air-dropped AO-2.5 RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 submunitions, delivered by RBK aerial bombs and Uragan ground rockets, respectively. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[11] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[12]

The Netherlands has sought accountability and investigation into the death of Dutch journalist Stan Storimans, who was killed by a Russian cluster munition strike in Georgia in August 2008.[13] In July 2013, however, President Vladimir Putin stated that Russian authorities do not intend to conduct an investigation.[14]

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, a number of states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[15]

According to international technical reference materials, the following Russian companies are associated with the production of cluster munitions: Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs), Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles), and Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).[16]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 35 states, including 25 that are not yet States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions:[17] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia,[18] Guinea, India,[19] Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[20] Libya,[21] Mongolia, Poland,[22] Romania, Slovakia, Syria,[23] Turkmenistan, Ukraine,[24] Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[25] In addition, Russian cluster munitions have been identified in Sudan, although the government of Sudan has denied having a stockpile.[26] Of the 11 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, all except Guinea-Bissau and Iraq have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities: Bulgaria,[27] Côte d’Ivoire,[28] Croatia,[29] Czech Republic,[30] Hungary,[31] the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia),[32] Moldova,[33] Mozambique,[34] and Peru.[35]

RBK series bombs containing a variety of submunition types appear to account for the majority of cluster munitions used by the Syrian government, particularly RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs and RBK-250 AO-1SCh cluster bombs. The munitions appear to be old stock, manufactured at Soviet state munitions factories in the 1970s and early 1980s.[36] In October 2012, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, denied that “Russian-made” cluster bombs were being used in Syria, stating there was “no confirmation” of use and noting it was “difficult” to establish where the cluster munitions came from.[37]

The types of cluster munitions produced in the USSR or Russia that have been declared by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are detailed in the following table:

Types and quantities of Soviet/Russian cluster munitions in declared stockpiles[38]

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large stockpile” of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has said that the disposal of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions types would be time-consuming and result in “a significant financial expenditure,” comparable to the US$2.2 billion that the US has estimated it will cost to destroy its stockpile.[39] At the Fourth CCW Review Conference in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the US, which has a reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[40]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[41] The following chart is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[42]

Note: FAE=fuel air explosive; HE/AT=high explosive antitank; SFW=sensor-fuzed weapon

Contamination and Impact

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–6 and 1999–2009), and minor conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mine contamination affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mine-affected, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.[3]

As of 2011, according to UNICEF, 3,132 civilians, including 772 children, had been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was conducted by a local NGO partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 2011 due to lack of funding.[4]

Cluster munitions were used extensively by Russian Federation forces in Chechnya during the 1994–1996 and the 1999–2009 wars.[5] The extent of residual contamination from cluster munition remnants is unknown. Russia is also heavily affected by ERW from World War II in many areas but the extent is not known. In 2011, Russia’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency report recorded clearance in 2010 in Amur, Kirov, and Penza regions as well as in Chechnya and around the city of Ulyanov.[6] In the North Caucasus, ERW are also said to be a significant problem in Dagestan, especially in Botlikh, Buynaksk, and Novolaksky districts.[7]

Alleged use of mines in Crimea in 2014

On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that “Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea.”[8] The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent minefield laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson Province, Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in a field and “Danger Mines” warning signs.[9]

Members of the local population have informed Ukrainian partners of ICBL that Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson Province have laid minefields, but it was not possible to confirm the reports, including if any mines laid were antipersonnel or antivehicle.[10] On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported that Russian military had mined areas around the main gas line into Crimea, but this allegation was not independently verified.[11] Russia has denied all use of antipersonnel mines, suggesting only trip flares (also known as signal mines) have been used.[12]

Mine Action Program

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units (Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks, EMERCOM).[13]

In 2012, the head of the armed forces’ engineers, Lieutenant–General Yuri Stavitsky, reportedly announced that the Federal Ministry of Defense had sent military engineers to Chechnya to undertake clearance of about 0.5km² of farmland. He said a special battalion of deminers employing contract servicemen was undergoing training for deployment in Russia’s southern military district, including Chechnya.[14]

In May 2010, a representative of the Chechen branch of Russia’s MES claimed that 2.47km² of land had been cleared during the past five years, and that 5,143 explosive devices and 21 air-dropped bombs had been “neutralized.”[15]On 4 November 2010, the Chechen government announced on its website that the Russian Federal Government had allocated RUB2.26 billion (some €55 million) to demine agricultural areas in Chechnya.[16]

Land Release

Russia has continued to clear ordnance left over from World War II from its territory but has shown insufficient commitment to clearing mines and ERW from Chechnya and other affected areas in the North Caucasus.

In 2014, Russia’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II report stated that more than 400,000 mines and explosive items were found and destroyed in 2013, claiming that clearance had been conducted over an area of more than 84,000 hectares. This huge area of demining (840km²) is not plausible, at least as far as mine clearance is concerned.[17]

In March 2014, the engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense started a new phase of clearance in Chechnya. The engineering unit planned to clear 8,000 hectares of contaminated land in Achkhoy-Martan and Grozny districts, and in the highlands of Shatoy and Vedeno districts. In 2013, the same unit demined more than 2,000 hectares of agricultural lands, destroying over 1,700 explosive items.[18]

Casualties

Casualties Overview

In 2013, 25 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2013 were male. The great majority (23) were military or police security personnel. No child casualties were recorded among civilians. All casualties took place in either Chechnya (16) or Ingushetia (nine).

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown. Casualties from explosives, particularly those involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), have occurred regularly in Russia due to insurgent use in the North Caucasus and criminal activities throughout the country. Most reported incidents were clearly caused by command-detonated devices. However, in many cases, the types of explosive items involved could not be identified.

Casualty reporting in Chechnya over time has been more consistent than the rest of the Russian Federation. However, in 2010 the NGO Voice of the Mountains (Laman Az, VoM), which had been supported by UNICEF, ceased its active surveillance of explosive incidents due to a lack of funding.[1]

Under an agreement signed in early 2012 between the ICRC and the Russian Red Cross, the VoM casualty database served as the basis for tracking mine/ERW survivors. Members of the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross were subsequently trained to collect and manage data on mine incidents and the needs of the survivors. As of end of 2013, some 1000 mine/ERW casualties had been visited and their data has been collected. The database is managed by the Russian Red Cross Chechen branch coordinator with the assistance of the ICRC.[2]

As of the end of 2013, there were at least 3,169 civilian mine/ERW casualties (736 killed; 2,432 injured; 1 unknown), including 783 children, since 1994. UNICEF data demonstrated a steady decline in annual casualties in Chechnya from a peak of 713 in the year 2000.[3]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[4]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known, but is in the thousands. Most mine survivors in the Russian Federation are war veterans from the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the South Caucasus, or are civilian casualties in Chechnya. At least 2,414 civilians have been injured by mines/ERW in Chechnya since 1994.[5]

There is no victim assistance coordination in Russia, specifically not in Chechnya which is the most mine/ERW-affected area. The Ministry of Health and Social Development is responsible for programs and benefits for persons with disabilities.

 In 2013, the ICRC and the Russian Red Cross continued to identify and collect data on the needs of mine/ERW survivors with a view to facilitate support of survivors in Chechnya in cooperation with the ICRC, national authorities, or other international and national organizations.[6]

In 2013, the ICRC continued to provide micro-economic grants to support income generating projects, based on data collected under the agreement between the ICRC and the Russian Red Cross. Throughout 2013, 126 mine/ERW survivors and their families in Chechnya received support through this program.[7]

Mine/ERW survivors in most of Russia are provided with the same services as other persons with disabilities or, in the case of military casualties, as disabled veterans from post-World War II conflicts.[8]

In 2013, the authorities took steps to enhance the availability and quality of emergency medical care in the Russian northern Caucasus regions. Physicians, nurses and ambulance workers bolstered their ability to treat those in need, including weapon-wounded or mine/ERW victims, through advanced training, several sessions of which were organized by a local training center supported by the ICRC.[9]

Numerous war veterans’ groups and associations of disabled war veterans in many regions of Russia advocated for improved benefits and implementation of legislation. They also provided services, including physical rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration activities.[10] Civilians with disabilities were entitled to free prostheses and mobility devices as well as free transportation to the place of treatment or rehabilitation in the available network of institutions.[11]

Several laws prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, transportation, access to healthcare, and the provision of state services or guarantee their rights to equal treatment, but these laws were generally not enforced. Persons with disabilities continued to face discrimination and denial of equal access to education, employment, and social institutions. Legislation on the protection of persons with disabilities requires that buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities, but the law was not enforced and in practice many buildings were not accessible. In March 2011, Russia adopted the State Program on Accessible Environment for 2011–2015 to provide access to services in healthcare, culture, transport, and information. During 2013, the program continued under the supervision of the newly formed Ministry of Labor and Social Development.[12]

Russia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 25 September 2012.