Commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Policy

The Republic of Senegal signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 3 August 2011. The convention entered into force for Senegal on 1 February 2012.

In April 2014, Senegal reported that “it is not necessary to put in place legislation or regulation because Senegal is not a country affected by cluster munitions.”[1] Senegal has declared its ratification legislation under national implementation measures.[2] Previously, in 2012 and 2013, government officials indicated that Senegal planned to enact specific legislation to enforce the provisions of the ban convention in domestic law.[3]

Senegal provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 October 2012 and submitted an annual updated report on 2 April 2014.[4]

Senegal actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and sought a total and immediate ban on cluster munitions with no exceptions.[5]

Senegal has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties to the convention, including the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Senegal has attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including those held in April 2014. It participated in regional meetings on the convention held in Ghana in 2012 and Togo in 2013.

In September 2013, Senegal reiterated its commitment to fully promote universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and called on all states which had not yet done so to accede to the convention “so that the fight against cluster munitions has universal impact.”[6]

Senegal has voted in favor of recent UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the Syrian government’s cluster munition use, including Resolution 68/182 on 18 December 2013, which expressed “outrage” at Syria’s “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights…including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.”[7]

Senegal is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Senegal has expressed its views on a number of important issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of the convention. In 2012, Senegal stated its view that assistance with acts prohibited under the convention during joint military operations with states not party is prohibited by the convention. Senegal said that its commitment to humanitarian disarmament prevents it from participating in any military operations using cluster munitions.[8]

In 2011, Senegal stated that it considers foreign stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions a violation of the convention. On the issue of investment in cluster munition production, Senegal expressed its view that investment in cluster munitions would similarly be prohibited by the convention.[9]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Senegal has never used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[10] It does not retain cluster munitions for training or research purposes.[11]

Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: VERY POOR[1]

Mines

The Republic of Senegal is affected by mines and other explosive ordnance as a result of fighting between the Senegalese Armed Forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Contaminated areas are located in the Casamance region of Senegal between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

An Emergency Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) in 2005–2006 had estimated that 11km² of land and 63km of tracks/paths were mine-affected across 149 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 93 “localities.”[2] In 2008, Senegal acknowledged that the ELIS “might have overestimated the number of affected areas.”[3] At the same time, however, it was not possible to visit certain suspected areas during the ELIS.[4] Subsequently, 11 SHAs were identified in 2011 in Gouraf in Ziguinchor region that were not included in the ELIS.[5]

Senegal has yet to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of contamination, although in December 2013 Senegal reported that confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covered an estimated 333,415m² in four departments: Goudomp (149,537m²), Oussouye (112,000m²), Ziguinchor (53,478m²), and Bignona (18,400m²).[6] Survey was said to be required in 296 localities covering an estimated area of 1.4km².

Following the abduction of 12 deminers in May 2013, Senegal ordered a halt to all survey and clearance activities, which lasted eight months. In November 2013, clearance activities resumed, and Mechem, operating as a humanitarian demining operator with funds administered by UNDP, was tasked to clear sections of the main trunk road, the RN6, and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6.[7] Senegal has cited its politico-security situation to justify the deployment of its clearance assets in these areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.[8]

The task orders have been criticized as they related to areas without credible risk of mine contamination and requests from operators to conduct surveys prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.[9] According to Handicap International (HI), as of November 2013—when task orders were given—only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.[10]

From November 2013 to April 2014, HI identified in Sindone and in Kaour two previously unreported SHAs near the RN6. Seven suspected paths and five suspected polygons were found in the department crossed by the RN6 in Southern Casamance (between the Casamance river and Guinea-Bissau).[11]

In contrast, recent reports indicate that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases.[12] But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed—as they are under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces—they have not been cleared or considered as a priority for demining operations.[13] Some areas were confirmed as contaminated by non-technical survey (NTS) and are recorded in the IMSMA database, such as the village of Djirack. Others remain as either SHAs, or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed reports, by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.[14]

HI carried out clearance around military installations in 2007–2012 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese Armed Forces. Between November 2013 and April 2014, HI conducted NTS in Adeane, Djibanar, and Kaour communities. The seven military bases located in these communities were surveyed and no evidence of mines was found. Only one abandoned military base in a deserted village was identified as an SHA.[15]

In 2013, Mechem’s clearance operations in the Mpack military site resulted in destruction of all the mines found that year during all clearance operations.[16]

As of March 2014, Senegal had identified a total of more than 800 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties.[17]

Cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war

Internal armed conflict has also resulted in a problem with ERW. In a voluntary Article 10 annual report, submitted prior to becoming a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW, Senegal noted that ERW were mainly found in the Casamance region.[18] There is no evidence of any problem with cluster munition remnants.

Mine Action Program

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the National Mine Action Authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS). Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor.

Sporadic technical assistance, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor, has been provided to the program by UNDP since June 2008. In May 2012, Senegal said that “slowness in the procedures of certain partners” had “significantly delayed the initiation and conduct of projects.”[19] In 2014, Senegal requested UNDP to provide assistance for resource mobilization and an advisor was due to be appointed by mid-April 2014.[20]

HI remained the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012 when new clearance capacities were brought with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

In 2013, Mechem teams were in the department of Ziguinchor while NPA was operating in the departments of Goudomp and Oussouye.[21] HI was conducting NTS in the departments of Kolda and Ziguinchor.[22] In total, during the year, Senegal’s mine action program had at least four survey teams, 18 manual deminers, 11 mine detection dogs, and one mechanical team with Digger D3 flail.[23]

In 2014, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of “government-imposed limitations on demining activities,” which prevented NPA from deploying demining resources where the necessary work could be done safely and from undertaking NTS in areas believed to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed.[24] This withdrawal resulted in the loss of funding from Norway, Germany, and the European Union (EU).[25]

Strategic planning

Senegal’s national mine action strategy for 2007–2015 set clearance of contaminated areas as a key objective, though without providing a clear work plan with annual benchmarks or a specific timeline. It also lists prioritization criteria for clearance operations.[26]

A revised strategic mine action plan was adopted by the National Commission in November 2009.[27] In March 2012, Senegal reported that a demining plan had been validated and was being implemented in the framework of funding provided by the European Commission, but without providing details.[28]

Land Release

During the past five years, Senegal cleared a total of only 0.52km², with 90% of this clearance conducted in 2012 and 2013.  

Five-year summary of land release

According to Senegal, in 2013 Mechem and NPA together released 11 suspected mined areas covering 0.24km², about the same as in 2012, destroying 136 antipersonnel mines in the process.[29] The mines were found in Kampada 2 and Kampada 3 sites (located in Mpack, near the border with Guinea-Bissau).[30]

Mine clearance in 2013[31]

As of March 2014, Mechem was still conducting clearance operations on the RN6. Clearance in the quarries of Adéane, Baghagha, Diagnon, Kanema, Sindone, and Tabacoumba identified no mines.[32] HI was deployed in the regions of Kolda, Sedhiou, and Ziguinchor to conduct NTS.[33]

Safety of demining personnel

With the arrival of Mechem and NPA teams, clearance operations progressed rapidly and neared MFDC controlled-areas, increasing the risk that the MFDC would attempt to stop clearance operations. In March 2013, Geneva Call and APRAN-SDP organized a meeting between the MFDC Kassolol faction and CNAMS in Sao Domingos, Guinea Bissau, in order to avoid incidents and establish a dialogue between both stakeholders.[34] However, following the meeting the MFDC called publicly for a halt on humanitarian demining on the grounds that clearance teams had reached a “red line beyond which operators’ safety could not be guaranteed.”[35] Armed men subsequently kidnapped 12 deminers working for Mechem on 3 May 2013 in the village of Kaïllou (Nyassia); all were released safely, although nine were held for 70 days. Prior to their release, another meeting hosted by Geneva Call was organized in Guinea-Bissau, in July 2013, to break the deadlock and find a solution to the crisis.[36] The government responded by ordering a halt to all survey and clearance activities, a suspension that lasted until November 2013.[37] To help ensure guarantee deminers’ safety, Senegal assigned a national contact committee to meet MFDC leaders and discuss, among different topics, areas to be cleared; whenever an agreement is reached, CNAMS claims to issue task orders for the agreed areas.[38]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and in accordance with the seven-year extension request granted in 2008, Senegal is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2016.

In granting the extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that Senegal “does not yet have a clear knowledge of size and location of areas that will actually warrant mine clearance.” It further observed that “the commitment made by Senegal to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure may result in implementation that proceeds much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested and in a more cost-effective manner.”[39]

At the Second Review Conference, Senegal expressed the hope it would fulfill its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continued.[40] Senegal previously stated its intention not to seek a second extension period except for “truly exceptional circumstances.”[41] Concerns remain, however, that Senegal will fail to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.

In December 2013, at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Senegal declared it was planning to accelerate demining operations in order to be able to complete clearance by March 2016. Senegal also explained that its ability to meet its deadline depends on security conditions.[42] In April 2014, the CNAMS director informed the Monitor that Senegal has the technical capacity to clear its territory in a timely manner, noting, though, that security issues and lack of funding could affect its ability to meet its deadline. Senegal will only be able to assess its capacity to meet its Article 5 deadline by the end of 2014.[43]

By April 2014, however, Senegal’s clearance capacities were considerably limited. HI was only carrying out NTS, risk education, and victim assistance, and was seeking funds to restart its technical survey (TS) and clearance operations, Mechem’s funding was likely to run out by June 2014, and NPA had closed its program.[44] NPA’s withdrawal prompted Norway, Germany, and the EU to end their financial support to the program.

In addition, following abduction of Mechem’s deminers in 2013, Senegal announced that all demining operations would first be approved by the MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.[45] As of April 2014, operators were not allowed to participate in those meetings, and communication and information-sharing mechanisms between CNAMS, demining operators, and the Senegalese Armed Forces seemed to be lacking.[46] As a consequence, the slow pace of demining, as well as Senegal’s reluctance to clear its military bases make it doubtful that Senegal will be able to complete clearance by 2016.[47]

Support for Mine Action

In 2013, Senegal received US$2.4 million in international assistance from five donors. More than 80% ($2 million) of international contributions were earmarked for clearance.

Since 2009, Senegal has contributed more than US$1.5 million, or 15% of its total mine action budget. In June 2013, Senegal reported it would double its national contribution to $460,000 per year starting in 2013.[48] However, Senegal reported contributing CFA325 million (US$650,000)[49] to its mine action program in 2013, compared with $230,000 in 2012, an increase of 65%. No details of expenditure have been given.

Recommendations

·         CNAMS should direct TS and clearance resources to areas where credible evidence of a mine threat has already been established.

·         To determine such evidence, CNAMS should systematically conduct NTS to ensure time and resources are not wasted.

·         Senegal should clarify how it plans to meet its Article 5 obligations in time. Elaborating, in a collaborative manner with all stakeholders, a revised work-plan that takes into account recent developments would be an important step forward.

Action points based on findings

·         Re-dedicate funding to the Kenya Psychiatric Center and Ziguinchor Regional Hospital (CRAO) rehabilitation center to ensure the availability of mental health services for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims.

·         Ensure the sustainability of physical rehabilitation for mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities in the Casamance region.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Senegal is responsible for a significant number of survivors of landmines and ERW who are in need. Senegal has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

In 2013, the Monitor identified eight mine/ERW casualties in Senegal.[1] Of these eight mine/ERW casualties, six were recorded by the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre national d’action antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS); the remaining two were reported in the media and by Handicap International (HI).[2] There were six civilian casualties reported in 2013, including one woman and her child who died when their cart rolled over a mine. In January 2014, one single incident resulted in four child casualties.[3]

Nearly all casualties in 2013 occurred in the north of Casamance, near the border with Gambia.

The eight casualties identified for 2013 represented a significant decrease from the 24 casualties reported in 2012. The rise in the annual casualty rates recorded in 2011 and 2012 was explained by the increase in mine casualties among combatants. In 2013, just two of the eight casualties were among combatants, indicating a changing dynamic in the conflict situation in the Casamance. Fluctuations in the security situation in Casamance have resulted in variable annual mine casualty rates in Senegal over the last several years.[4] Following an intensification of violence since 2011, violence decreased throughout 2013, explaining the decline in casualties among combatants in 2013.[5] The number of civilian casualties has remained at similar levels in recent years.[6]

In 2013, the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association sénégalaise des victimes de mines, ASVM) also reported that continued mine risk education efforts in the Casamance region prevented even more significant numbers of civilian casualties during the year.[7]

The Monitor identified at least 832 casualties (180 killed; 639 injured; 13 unknown) between 1988 and the end of 2013.[8] This included 576 civilian casualties and 243 military casualties.[9] As of April 2014, CNAMS registered a total of 814 casualties (179 killed; 635 injured) of which 578 were civilians and 236 were military.[10] Since 2005, all reported casualties have been caused by mines.[11]

Victim Assistance

By the end of 2013, there were at least 639 mine/ERW survivors in Senegal, including 431 civilians and 208 military survivors.

Victim assistance since 1999[12]

Most mine/ERW survivors in Senegal live in the Casamance region where services are much more limited than elsewhere in the country. Senegal has reported on several occasions that it is committed to victim assistance, but at the same time has acknowledged that needs were not being met due to a lack of resources. The government relied on international and national NGOs, including the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association sénégalaise des victimes de mines, ASVM) and HI to implement activities. Years of conflict and continued intermittent violence devastated infrastructure and prevented access to services.

Throughout 2013, emergency medical care was limited and response times depended on the location of the incident; the army provided assistance. NGOs continued to consider evacuation of injured victims as one of the biggest challenges in accessing appropriate emergency medical care.[13] Follow-up medical care was only available in the two regional hospitals, which had sufficient capacity but had equipment that only worked intermittently and experienced shortages of supplies. These two hospitals and their satellite centers also provided physical rehabilitation. Improvements in the availability of free follow-up medical care and physical rehabilitation were noted at the CRAO in 2013.[14]

Psychosocial support had been provided by the Kenya Psychiatric Center (Centre psychiatrique de Kenya) and ASVM, with the support of the CNAMS. However, financial support from CNAMS to the center to offer their services outside Ziguinchor was not provided in 2012[15] and this support was not reinstated in 2013.[16] The center was the only facility providing psychological support to mine survivors and other persons with disabilities for all regions of Casamance. In 2013, access to these services remained an issue as transportation in the region continued to be difficult.

Throughout the period, efforts were made for economic reintegration and education opportunities for survivors, but overall this assistance remained inadequate because there were few programs targeting survivors and they had difficulties accessing broader programs for all vulnerable groups. While different activities and services targeting survivors were implemented every year, the question of sustainability and the long-term social and economic inclusion of victims had yet to be tackled by authorities.[17] Military survivors received separate services provided exclusively by the Ministry of Armed Forces, which were mostly free of charge and superior to those offered to civilians, but still had gaps.[18]

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2013, the CNAMS hired a consultant to work on the mid-term evaluation of the implementation of the National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2010–2014 (Plan d’action national pour l’assistance aux victimes, PANAV). This work included an assessment of victims and their needs. The results were to inform the revision of the PANAV or the drafting of a new action plan after 2014.[19]

During 2013, ASVM conducted a survey to identify mine/ERW victims survivors and assess their needs. All the data gathered was collected in a database which, in turn, informed the development of local action plans and adaptation of activities and services provided by the ASVM and its partners to better respond to the expressed needs of survivors.[20] In 2013, HI also conducted non-technical surveys in connection with its mine risk education activities.[21] These surveys targeted survivors, the families of victims, and affected communities and allowed HI to localize areas suspected to be mined, to identify mine/ERW victims, and to assess their needs, and to evaluate the impact of mines/ERW on the civilian population.[22] However, at least one organization noted that there was a lack of governmental coordination on data collection at the national level, which prevented the effective use of this data to address the needs of victims in Senegal.[23]

Victim assistance coordination[24]

In 2013, CNAMS held meetings of the CRC every three months.[25] The CRC, established in 2011, brings together CNAMS with local and international organizations working in the region under the chairmanship of the governor of the Casamance region.[26] However, the focus of the CRC is on mine action more broadly; international and national organizations noted that while victim assistance was discussed and debated during these meetings, no coordination meetings were organized in 2013 that focused specifically on victim assistance.[27] Regular coordination meetings took place in 2013 between representatives of CNAMS and of ASVM.[28]

Senegal’s PANAV included a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating progress in its implementation, though no reports had been made available that compared victim assistance progress against PANAV through the end of 2013. CNAMS launched a mid-term evaluation of the PANAV and its impact in 2013.[29] The results of this evaluation had yet to be finalized and made public as of May 2014.[30]

Senegal provided updates on mine casualties and on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013.[31] Senegal included an update on casualties and victim assistance in Form I of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for the 2013 calendar year.[32]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Mine/ERW survivors were involved through ASVM and international organizations in the design of victim assistance programming.[33] In 2013, survivors participated in national and regional victim assistance coordination meetings through ASVM.[34]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2013[35]

In 2013, there was increased availability of victim assistance services with efforts, largely by international and national organizations, to take into account the individual needs of survivors in different parts of Casamance.[36] Although the security situation in the northern part of Casamance improved throughout 2013, access to all services for survivors in this geographic area, as well as transportation, remained an issue. A number of initiatives focused on ensuring physical accessibility of schools[37] and other buildings.[38]

In 2013, CNAMS announced, in accordance with a new Social Orientation Law passed in 2012, the launching of a process to provide all victims with a “Card of equality of chances” (“Carte d’égalité des chances”) aimed at providing free medical care to all persons with disabilities.[39] CNAMS also signed agreements with four hospitals in Bigona, Oussouye, Goudomp, and Ziguinchor, as well as with two pharmacies (in Ziguinchor and Kolda), to ensure access to health services and medicine free of charge for victims.[40]

No new prosthetics were produced in the Casamance region in 2013. As of the end of 2012, CRAO, the only public provider of rehabilitation services in the region, ceased producing prosthetics following the transfer of one technician and the death of another, leaving the center with no trained technician. Meetings between the regional government, CNAMS and the ICRC SFD did not identify a solution to replace the technicians.[41] As a result, ICRC SFD’s partnership in Senegal was put on hold pending a renewed commitment from the authorities concerned.[42]

Funds that had been provided by the CNAMS to the CRAO rehabilitation center in 2012 to finance survivors’ physical rehabilitation and other medical services continued to be used in 2013. CRAO expressed concerns as this financial contribution has not been renewed in 2013 and was not expected to be in 2014.[43]

The Kenya Psychiatric Center continued providing psychological support to mine survivors in 2013. However, because of lack of funding by CNAMS since November 2011, services that were formerly provided through outreach visits in rural areas were not available in 2013. To address this issue, the center, in collaboration with ASVM, worked to create and train community groups in rural parts of Casamance to facilitate peer psychological support for survivors living in those areas.[44] The center continued therapy sessions through art for mine/ERW victims.[45]

During the period, the CAOSP of Ziguinchor continued to provide mine/ERW victims with educational and career advice specifically targeted and adapted to their needs. In addition, in 2013, the CNAMS funded activities to provide psychological support to student victims of mine/ERW in parallel to the CAOSP’s ongoing activities.[46]

A new project was established by HI focusing on access to HIV/AIDS care for persons with disabilities and mine/ERW victims.[47]

At least one organization noted an increased focus by both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders on age and gender specific issues.[48]

Senegalese law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to healthcare, and the provision of other state services. The government did not enforce these provisions adequately in 2013. The law also mandates accessibility for persons with disabilities, but there remained a lack of infrastructure to assist them.[49]

Senegal ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 7 September 2010. Through to the end of 2013, national implementation mechanisms had not yet been approved.[50]

In 2012, the Republic of Senegal received US$5.7 million in international assistance from three donors. The European Union (EU) awarded MECHEM a €4 million ($5.1 million) contract to clear mines in the Casamance region. Norway contributed NOK3 million ($515,632) to Norwegian People’s Aid and Switzerland provided CHF55,000 ($58,654) to Geneva Call.[1] The government of Senegal contributed $230,000 to its mine action program, as it has done since 2008. In June 2013, Senegal reported it would double its national contribution to $460,000 per year starting in 2013.[2]

International contributions: 2012[3]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[4]