Mine ban policy overview

Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 13 October 2003, and became a State Party on 1 April 2004.[1]

Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law by Presidential Decree #51 on 31 March 2010, which includes penalties for violations.[2] Chapter four enforces its Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including the prohibition on antipersonnel mine use and stockpiling, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, victim assistance, and transparency reporting.[3]

Sudan submitted its eleventh Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in April 2014.[4]

Sudan has participated in every Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty ever held, including the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013. It has attended all of the treaty’s Review Conferences, including the Third Review Conference held in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014. Sudan has also participated in every intersessional Standing Committee meeting of the treaty held in Geneva since 1999, including those held in May 2013 and April 2014.

In 2006–2007, Sudan served as co-chair of the treaty’s Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration.

Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981, but has not ratified it.

Production and transfer

Sudan has declared that it “never produced” antipersonnel mines.[5] It has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[6]

Use

There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, but there have been several allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in Sudan since 2010, including in 2013 and the first half of 2014 that the Monitor has been unable to confirm.

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that in the southern part of the country antipersonnel mines are available for use, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and statements the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations, which it has denied responsibility for.

In 2011, reports emerged of new mine-laying in the Republic of Sudan’s South Kordofan state in the Nuba Mountains near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the northern branch of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) now called SPLM-N.[7] UN reports stated that both the SAF and the SPLM-N were reported to have laid antipersonnel mines in strategic areas of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state.[8]

In February 2014, the ICRC issued a statement condemning the use of antipersonnel mines by any actor and calling on all parties to abide by international law, after a Sudanese Red Crescent Society volunteer and other civilians were killed and injured in a landmine explosion involving a vehicle near Abu Jubaiha in South Kordofan.[9]

In August 2013, the South Kordofan state secretary for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Engineer al-Rehema Ismail Fedail, reportedly accused the government of Sudan of planting landmines in North and South Kordofan states, identifying several newly-mined locations including Um ‘Djamena, southern al-Dabekr, southern Abu Zabad, and al-Tamjoyah, in addition to al-Dashol and Abu Janok areas.[10]

During 2012, several mine use allegations in South Kordofan were reported by international media outlets and NGOs.[11] The ICBL has expressed “grave concern” at allegations of antipersonnel mine use by armed forces of the Republic of the Sudan in Southern Kordofan and urged the government of Sudan to clarify whether its forces used antipersonnel mines.[12] It has called on Sudan to clarify if it has new contamination resulting from antipersonnel mine use and urged the government to allow international NGOs to continue mine action operations across the country.[13]

In 2012, Sudan acknowledged the use allegations and committed to conduct an investigation and “declare the findings” in its next annual Article 7 report.[14] However, the Article 7 reports provided in April 2013 and April 2014 contain no new information with respect to the use allegation in South Kordofan state.

On 29 August 2013, a delegation of the SPLM-N, comprised of Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Alhilu and Secretary General Yasir Arman, signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, thereby agreeing to prohibit the use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, to cooperate in humanitarian mine action activities, and to destroy its stockpiles. Upon signing, Alhilu pledged to destroy all antipersonnel mines in SPLM-N possession as soon as possible, which he said were captured during military operations.[15]

The SPLM-N is the third armed opposition group from Sudan to pledge non-use of antipersonnel mines, after JEM in April 2012 and the SPLM/A in 2001.[16]

Stockpiling and destruction

Sudan reported completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied.[17] At the Second Review Conference in 2009, Sudan stated that a total of 10,656 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed (possibly a typographical error from the 10,566 mentioned above).[18] However, Sudan declared in April 2012 that a total of 13,371 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in Khartoum in 2007.[19] It did not include the total number of previously destroyed mines in its 2013 and 2014 reports.[20]

In 2009, Sudan reported the discovery of arms caches including antipersonnel mines at various locations of southern Sudan that were subsequently destroyed in Blue Nile state in 2008.[21]

Mines retained for training purposes

In its April 2014 Article 7 report, Sudan stated that it is retaining a total of 1,938 mines, the same amount reported since 2009, when it reported a reduction in the number of mines retained for training from 4,997 to 1,938 mines.[22] Sudan has not disclosed the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, an obligation since 2004 as agreed by States Parties at Mine Ban Treaty Review Conferences.

 

Policy

The Republic of Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In an April 2014 meeting with the CMC, a government representative said that Sudan is willing join the convention under certain geopolitical circumstances, namely “if bordering countries follow suit.”[1] Previously, in 2012, an official said that the government of Sudan was consulting internally as well as with neighboring countries on the matter of joining the convention.[2]

Sudan has expressed its intent to join the ban convention since 2010.[3] In September 2012, Sudan informed States Parties of its “renewed” commitment to the convention and respect for the ban on cluster munitions.[4]

Sudan participated in the Oslo Process that produced the convention and joined the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[5] At the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008, Sudan stated its intent to sign as soon as possible after logistical and national measures had been completed.[6]

Sudan has continued to engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, despite not joining. It has participated as an observer in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, except for the Fourth Meeting of State Parties in Lusaka, Zambia in September 2013. Sudan attended the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011 and 2012 but was not present at those held in 2013 or April 2014.

Sudan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981 but is not party as it never ratified.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has no indications of any past production or export of cluster munitions by Sudan. In April 2014, a Sudan Mine Action Office representative reiterated that Sudan doesn’t produce, use, or stockpile cluster munitions.[7]

However, it appears that in the past Sudan imported cluster munitions from a number of countries. Recent allegations of use and contamination from cluster munition remnants indicate that Sudan has used and may still stockpile the weapons.

In February 2014, a report by a UN Panel of Experts published photographs taken in March 2013 that show several RBK-500 cluster bombs lying in the open alongside other weapons at El Fasher airport in North Darfur state, where Sudan’s armed forces maintain a forward operating base immediately adjacent to the civilian flight operations. According to the report, “the Panel has evidence of previous use of cluster munitions in Darfur. Render-safe operations have taken place on such munitions as recently as 2012. The Panel does not, however, have evidence of the exact dates of use of the munitions. It continues to investigate.” The panel said it had “observed fluctuating stock levels at the ammunition storage area, indicative of the routine use (for either operations or training) and resupply of ammunition into Darfur by the national armed forces” and warned of a “real explosive risk” if the storage facility at the airport continues to be used to store weapons.[8]

Jane’s Information Group also reports that KMGU dispensers, which deploy submunitions, are in service with the country’s air force.[9] Sudan also possesses Grad, Egyptian-produced Sakr, and Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[10]

Use

Sudan’s military has repeatedly denied using and stockpiling cluster munitions, but recent allegations of use and contamination of cluster munition remnants indicate that it has used and may still stockpile the weapons.[11] In May 2012, an unnamed Sudanese military spokesperson reportedly said, “We don’t use cluster munitions in South Kordofan, we have no ties to such weapons. There is no need to use these kind of weapons to begin with, the fighting is in open space, the renegades don’t have concrete fortifications.”[12]

Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 reported two allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in the first half of 2012 in Troji and Ongolo in Southern Kordofan, a state bordering South Sudan that has seen fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army North (SPLM-N) and the Sudan Armed Forces since mid-2011:

·         An independent journalist found dud explosive submunitions in Troji identified as Chinese Type-81 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) that local residents said were used by the government of Sudan in an attack on the town on 29 February 2012.[13] The Monitor was not able to independently confirm when the cluster munitions were used or by whom.

·         The Independent newspaper in the United Kingdom published photos on 24 May 2012 showing a failed cluster munition in the settlement of Ongolo that residents said had been dropped from a government aircraft on 15 April 2012.[14] The weapon was identified as a Soviet-made RBK-500 cluster bomb containing AO-2.5RT explosive submunitions, but it was not possible to independently confirm new use of cluster munitions or who was responsible for the use.[15]

The incidents resulted in increased international attention, including calls by the CMC and others for Sudan to investigate the allegations, but Sudanese officials offered denials in a number of venues.[16]

The Monitor has not been able to independently confirm a report by a network of citizen journalists that two cluster bombs were dropped from aircraft on the village of Lado in Southern Kordofan on 18 April 2013.[17]

Numerous independent sources have documented the presence of cluster munitions remnants that indicate Sudanese government forces sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan between 1995 and 2000, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.[18] Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings in Yei in October 2006. Additionally, clearance personnel in Sudan have identified a variety of submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-produced M42 and Mk-118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5.[19]

 

Contamination and Impact

Mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in the Republic of the Sudan is primarily the result of more than 20 years of civil war that ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 which ultimately led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.[1] Recent armed violence, including the use of antivehicle mines in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the Abyei region, has added to existing ERW contamination.[2]

Mines

As of May 2013, 257 suspected hazardous and contaminated areas covering 38km² remained in 10 of the 18 states that comprise Sudan. The 10 states are: Blue Nile, Central/East/North/South/West Darfur, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan. Almost 80% of the suspected and confirmed contaminated areas are located in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Kassala; both Blue Nile and South Kordofan are inaccessible because of ongoing conflict. Of the 10 states, only Blue Nile, Kassala, and South Kordofan have confirmed mined areas, totaling 63.[3]

Contamination in Sudan as of May 2013[4]

Note: A minefield is an area contaminated with antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines with a clearly defined polygon. The polygon of minefields is developed as a result of technical survey. SHA refers to an area suspected of having a mine/ERW hazard. An SHA can be identified by an impact survey, other form of national survey, or a claim of presence of explosive hazards. A dangerous area refers to an area suspected to contain mines/ERW that is reported as a result of mine accident/ERW investigation by mine risk education teams, local population, or military personnel.[5]

Additionally, non-state armed groups operating in White Nile state (Sudan) and Upper Nile state (South Sudan) have been accused of using landmines in these states. Landmines in the border states threaten the lives of pastoralists, farmers, and traders who regularly cross the border as they practice their livelihoods.[6]

Cluster munition remnants

In June 2011, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) reported there were nine remaining areas thought to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions, while 81 areas had been released.[7] In April 2012, Sudan’s Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva stated it had never used cluster munitions.[8] The National Mine Action Center (NMAC) has not provided updated information on the reported nine open areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants.

No. of cluster munition-contaminated areas in Sudan as of June 2011[9]

In May 2012, a cluster bomb was reportedly discovered in the village of Angolo in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan.[10] The government of Sudan has denied using cluster munitions in South Kordofan.[11]

Other explosive remnants of war

In the Darfur region, ERW pose a serious threat to civilians, to peacekeepers from the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and to the delivery of humanitarian aid. ERW in Darfur includes air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and rifle projectiles, mortars, and grenades.[12]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

In 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement set out the legal framework to establish UNMAO to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance (QA) of all mine action activities in Sudan, including support to the development of NMAC through June 2011.[13]

The NMAA was established by Presidential Decree No. 299 on 24 December 2005. Following the decree, the National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed and then approved by the High National Mine Action Committee and passed by the council of ministers of the Government of National Unity on 6 August 2006.[14]

On 9 January 2011, South Sudan voted for independence.[15] As a result, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) ended when South Sudan became a recognized State in July 2011, which also resulted in the closing of UNMAO.

Since then, NMAC coordinates all mine clearance activities, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies.[16] At the request of the government of Sudan, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has continued providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC.[17] UNMAS technical advisors assist in risk education, victim assistance, survey and clearance operations, data and information management, and resource mobilization. UNMAS focuses on coordination, and technical advice and assistance to the national mine action authorities, UN entities, and partners. UNMAS serves as the UN focal point and cluster/sector lead while facilitating resource mobilization and support to implementation. UNMAS support in Sudan is received through the Voluntary Trust Fund.[18]

In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities. ODO comprises 13 international staff and 38 national staff, while there are 15 international staff and 73 national staff working for TDI. There are sub-offices in North, South, and West Darfur states. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed between the Sudanese government and the formerly-armed rebel group known as the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), created the states of Zallingei and El Daen in Darfur in March 2012, raising the number of states in Darfur to five. Subsequently, ODO established offices in Zallingei and El Daen. UNAMID contracted TDI in 2012 to assess, survey, mark/identify, and clear contaminated areas with six multi-tasking clearance teams in all five states in Darfur. TDI replaced Mine Tech International. The extent of TDI activities is dependent on the availability of security forces and on receiving permission from the government of Sudan and from the UN Special Representative for Political Affairs.[19] Darfur mine action is funded completely through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.

In 2011, fighting in Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan over the disputed border area caused the complete destruction of the town of Abyei and surrounding villages, the displacement of over 100,000 people, and additional mine and UXO contamination.[20] In response, the UN Security Council authorized a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) “to monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudan Armed Forces, Sudan People’s Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei area” just prior to South Sudan formally declaring its independence from Sudan in July 2011. UNISFA was also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and provide security to the oil industry’s infrastructure in coordination with the local police. The resolution, however, did not include a mandate for peacekeepers to conduct mine clearance operations, as did the UNMIS mandate that ended in July 2011.[21] In November 2012, Security Council Resolution 2075 expanded the UNMAS role to include identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. UNMAS enables the work of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism along the 2,100km international border between South Sudan and Sudan. It also provides training to UN and national observers and facilitates access on the ground by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.[22] In May 2013, the UN Security Council increased the number of peacekeepers in Abyei and noted concern in the resolution that a residual landmine and ERW problem in Abyei hampered the return of displaced people.[23]

In 2011, fighting began in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states amid disputes over oil exports and payments, border demarcation, and citizenship rights. International access to the two states is very limited.[24]

Two international mine clearance NGOs have closed down their operations because they faced substantial government administrative restrictions that impeded their operations.[25] Dan Church Aid (DCA) closed its operations in 2012.[26] In June 2012, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provide humanitarian aid to leave Kassala, Gadaref, and Red Seastates in eastern Sudan.[27] Following months of negotiations with the HAC and donors, MAG decided to close its operations in Sudan and left in early 2013.[28]

In May 2013, there were three national operators comprising 11 clearance teams, including nine teams from National Demining Units, one team from FPDO, and one team from JASMAR that NMAC planned to deploy to the eastern states where MAG and other international NGOs were ordered to stop working. NMAC also planned to deploy national teams to South Kordofan and Blue Nile stateswhen security improved.[29]

Land Release

In 2012, Sudan cleared some 0.55km² of mined areas and 0.62km² of battle area.[30] This pales in comparison to the 2010–2011 period when annual land release averaged 25km². The low output is attributed to the loss of funding from assessed peacekeeping funds when the mandate for UNMIS ended in July 2011 at South Sudan’s independence and in 2012 when MAG and DCA closed their operations as described above.[31]

In May 2013, Sudan reported it had released 7.4km² of contaminated area since January: 6.3km² (84%) released through survey; 672,050m² through battle area clearance (BAC); 242,565m² cancelled by technical survey; and 202,211m² of mined area released through clearance. Most of the land release occurred in Kassala state.[32]

In June 2013, Sudan reported they planned to cancel 14.3km² through non-technical survey and release 23.7km² through technical survey and clearance by 2019.[33]

Five-year summary of land release[34]

Mine clearance in 2012[35]

Sudan cleared more than 0.55km² of mined areas in 2012, with the destruction of 451 antipersonnel mines and 87 antivehicle mines. Clearance has not been disaggregated between the different operators.

Since 2005, in Darfur, the ODO has achieved the following:[36]

1.      3,955 UXOs destroyed, as well as four antipersonnel and four antivehicle mines;

2.      3,051km² general mine assessment surveyed;

3.      21,149km of road assessment;

4.      438,618km² of sub-surface BAC;

5.      559km² of surface BAC and visual search; and

6.      1,621 villages assessed.

In Abyei, UNMAS has achieved the following:

·         assessed over 10 million square meters in Abyei and 25 nearby villages;

·         recovered over 838 ERW items;

·         surveyed more than 309km of roads;

·         verified and cleared 32km of road while assessing another 229km of routes used by UNISFA;

·         constructed and marked helicopter landing sites in Todach, Tajalei, and Noong; and

·         cleared the site of the 20 March 2012 mine incident which destroyed a UNISFA truck near Tajalei.[37]

Mine clearance has had a major impact on Sudan. It has opened land for farming and animal grazing as well as 30,000km of roads connecting towns and cities, allowing commerce to flourish. Development has followed mine clearance as houses, schools, and hospitals have been constructed.[38]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014.

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011, Sudan stated it was in a good position to be mine impact free by April 2014 and to clear the remaining 295 hazardous areas by the deadline if funding, approximately US$68 million, was available.[39] At the meetings in May 2012, Sudan said it needed funding to support 30 clearance teams “soon” to meet its Article 5 deadline, or it would have to request an extension.[40] In March 2013, Sudan submitted a request to extend its deadline until 2019, citing instability and lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile as the primary reason.[41]

It is also understood by stakeholders that the primary reason that Sudan did not meet its 10-year deadline is that, for most of those years, clearing mined roads and areas in what is now South Sudan was the priority under the CPA. Although Sudan benefited from the presence of UNMIS and from assessed funds for mine action from the peacekeeping operations, most of the money was spent clearing mines in present-day South Sudan.[42]

The government of Sudan has pledged $1.3 million per year for equipment, mine clearance, and NMAC operations in 2013.[43] The main risk involves access and security in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, as well as new unknown contamination in these two states as the result of conflict since 2011. Sudan plans to clear all the contaminated areas in the other states before 2016 when it is planned to begin clearance in Kordofan and Blue Nile.[44]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2012

NMAA does not distinguish between clearance of different types of ERW in its reporting and so is unable to confirm how much land was cleared of cluster munition remnants in 2011 or 2012, or how many submunitions were destroyed.

Battle area clearance in 2012

In 2012, Sudan conducted 0.62km² of BAC, most of it in Kassala and Red Sea states.[45]

Quality management[46]

NMAC is responsible for prioritizing, tasking, and post-clearance quality assurance (QA). QA teams are an integral part of the monitoring, accreditation, and license testing for all operators. They are based in sub-offices in Kassala, Damazeen, Kadugli, and Khartoum.

The QA teams are responsible for monitoring all humanitarian demining operations in the states they cover. Post-clearance monitoring includes sampling based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and National Mine Action Standards (NMAS). QA teams conduct a yearly inspection to ensure that each operator’s standard operating procedures, equipment, employee insurance, and employment contracts are up to date and in accordance with NMAS and in compliance with IMAS.

 

Action points based on findings

·         Ensure that mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and others with similar needs have access to psychosocial support and economic inclusion opportunities, following the end of international funding for these programs.

·         Sustain the improved coordination and availability of services for ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities made possible through the victim assistance program in Darfur.

·         Dedicate resources to the approval and full implementation of the revised disability policy and new policies and programs to promote the inclusion of persons with disabilities across a range of government programs.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Sudan is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. Sudan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Casualties Overview

In 2013, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) recorded 30 mine/ERW casualties in Sudan; all but two were civilians.[1] The majority (59%) of civilian casualties for which the age was known were children (16 of 27); most of these (13) were boys.[2] Two-thirds of child casualties occurred in Darfur. Among adult civilian casualties, women made up more than half (six of 11).

One-third of all civilian casualties in 2013 (nine of 28) were internally displaced persons (IDPs), with most of these (six) occurring in Darfur. More than half (17 of 30) of all casualties in 2013 occurred in Darfur, including all five casualties recorded from unexploded submunitions; three of the five casualties were children injured in two separate incidents. The remaining casualties occurred in Blue Nile (nine) and Kassala (four), two states bordering South Sudan. There were no casualties among deminers in 2013, a significant decrease compared with the five casualties among deminers in 2012.

The 30 mine/ERW reported casualties in 2013 were a significant decrease compared to the numbers reported in 2012 (108) and in 2011 (122).[3] The casualty figures for 2011 and 2012 were the highest annual figures ever registered in Sudan; the elevated casualty rates in those years were attributed to armed conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states that increased population movement and the related laying of new mines and increased ERW contamination.[4]

NMAC registered 1,913 mine/ERW casualties for the period from 2002 to the end of 2013.[5]

Cluster munition casualties

In 2013, there were five cluster submunition casualties in two separate incidents, both in Western Darfur.[6] There were a total of 35 casualties from cluster munitions in Sudan through the end of 2013, 23 of which occurred in 2009 or before.[7]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 1,349 mine/ERW survivors in Sudan at the end of 2013.[8]

Victim assistance since 1999[9]

Assistance for landmine survivors in Sudan has been irregular and insufficient to address the size of the problem since 1999, in large part due to years of conflict that have seriously damaged infrastructure. However, in that time there have been some improvements in physical rehabilitation and, until 2012, in economic inclusion.

With support from the ICRC, the National Authority for Prosthetic and Orthotics (NAPO) grew Sudan’s rehabilitation capacity from a single rehabilitation center, in Khartoum, to a total of six satellite centers and mobile units by 2009. However, reduced funding to NAPO from 2007 to 2010 decreased the supply of raw materials, created long waiting periods, and contributed to the closing of one center, in Kadugli, by the end of 2010. While rehabilitation services were free for mine/ERW survivors, a lack of funding and insufficient raw materials meant that waiting periods were long, while the cost of transportation and accommodation made the cost of accessing services prohibitive.

In 1999, there were few to no economic inclusion initiatives or psychosocial support available for mine survivors. The situation improved significantly with increased international funding for victim assistance from 2007–2012. These programs were implemented by national organizations and coordinated by NMAC, with support from the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO), within the framework of the National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007–2011. In June 2011, UNMAO completed the handover of its victim assistance program to NMAC.

Following the handover, funding for economic inclusion programs and psychosocial support for survivors and other persons with similar needs began to decline causing the closure of several such programs; these programs were not replaced by other programs. At the same time, from 2011 through 2013 poor security conditions in Sudan’s southern states and the Darfur region prevented survivors from accessing those services that were available.

From 2011 through 2013, the establishment of a victim assistance program as part of the African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur in 2012 increased information available about the needs of ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities and increased their economic inclusion opportunities.

The establishment of the National Disability Council (NDC) in 2010 increased opportunities for the coordination of victim assistance and disability issues at national and state levels.

Victim assistance in 2013

Outside of Darfur, as a result of a decline in funding, there was a further decrease in the availability of psychosocial support and economic inclusion reaching mine/ERW survivors and others with similar needs. The NMAC no longer coordinated victim assistance programs in Sudan, with the exception of programs in Darfur targeting ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities. Advances were made in the introduction of inclusive disability policies across several different government ministries such as health, education, environment, employment, media, and culture, among others. The 2009 Disability Act had been revised to align it with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and was under legislative review by the end of 2013.

Assessing victim assistance needs

In 2013, NMAC coordinated the ongoing collection on information on the needs of mine/ERW survivors that was gathered by service providers during the implementation of victim assistance projects. Such data was shared widely with the Victim Assistance Working Group (VAWG) members, relevant government authorities, disability stakeholders, and donors; it was also shared on a monthly basis through the NDC’s information platform. Information was used to link survivors with available services, to inform the development of government policies and proposal writing, and to raise awareness.[10]

In Darfur, a regional disability and casualty surveillance mechanism was established in early 2013 by NMAC and the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO). Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities was carried out through the mechanism, which was implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Health.[11]

In 2013, two studies on the situation of persons with disabilities were underway in Sudan. The NDC conducted a situational analysis on children with disabilities, with support from UNICEF. Alazhari University launched a study on the status of persons with disabilities, with support from UNESCO and in coordination with the NDC.[12]

Victim assistance coordination[13]

In 2013, NMAC continued to convene monthly meetings of the VAWG to share information on progress in implementing ongoing projects, to exchange information on experiences and best practices, to prioritize needs and mobilize resources, and to discuss issues such as the CRPD, data collection, physical rehabilitation, and socioeconomic reintegration.[14] The VAWG included relevant government ministries and some 20 NGOs, including disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), involved in implementing victim assistance and disability projects.[15]

NMAC and the Ordnance Disposal Office, in coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs, jointly convened monthly meetings of the VACWG in Darfur. These meetings served as the main forum where all actors working in victim assistance and disability met to share information and experiences.[16]

The National Strategic Framework of Victim Assistance and the Victim Assistance Multi-Year Plan 2007–2011 had expired by 2012. Steps were taken in 2013 to develop a new victim assistance plan, but as of February 2014 no new plan had yet been developed.[17] Sudan noted that the Victim Assistance Work Plan was also in need of revision.[18]

In 2013, the NDC continued to hold monthly meetings of its seven committees; the number of specialized working groups was increased from 13 to 14.[19] The Victim Assistance department of NMAC, as well as other members of the VAWG, were active members of the NDC and participated in regular coordination meetings in 2013.[20] Progress made toward the implementation of the plan included: 1) the revision of the 2009 disability act in line with the CRPD and its submission to the Sudan legislative approval process; and 2) steps taken to introduce inclusive policies, strategies, and plans across a range of government ministries in accordance with ministerial decrees calling for the design of inclusive policies for persons with disabilities.[21]

By the end of 2013, as projected in the Five Year Strategic Disability Plan 2012–2016, State Disability Councils were established in 17 of 18 states; the council for the remaining state (newly created in 2013) was in the process of being established as of April 2014. During 2013, the implementation of the Disability Plan was monitored through five meetings in which representatives of the Sudan Council of Ministers, the National Assembly, the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, Sudanese Disability Unions, and other NGOs participated.[22]

Sudan provided comprehensive updates on progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2013 and through the completion of Form J of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar year 2013. Both oral and written reporting provided information on victim assistance implementation, capacity-building of local organizations, including DPOs, and on efforts to coordinate victim assistance and disability efforts.[23]

Participation and inclusion in victim assistance

Towards the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan, the Ministry of Social Welfare issued a decree in 2010 recommending the involvement of all mine/ERW survivors associations in all decisions and activities related to victim assistance policies and plans.[24] Survivors, their representative organizations, and DPOs were included as members of the VAWG and the VACWG in Darfur.[25]

In 2013, government authorities and international organizations provided training to strengthen the capacity of DPOs. In Darfur, the ODO conducted two training sessions with persons with disabilities on how to run effective NGOs, the rights of persons with disabilities, and the inclusion of ERW survivors.[26] In Darfur, survivors and other persons with disabilities were involved in the provision of psychosocial support and income-generating projects.[27]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[28]

Emergency and continuing medical care

No significant changes to the accessibility or availability of medical care were reported in 2013. No information was available about efforts to address obstacles that survivors faced as reported in recent years such as the lack of medical facilities in mine-affected areas with a capacity to address the emergency medical needs of mine survivors, the lack of affordable healthcare for civilian survivors, and the failure of the National Health Insurance System to cover a number of disability-related claims.[29]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

In 2013, the number of mine/ERW survivors who received prosthetics through ICRC-supported NAPO rehabilitation centers increased by about a third compared to those of those who had received similar support in 2012. In 2013, overall prosthetics production increased by a quarter in NAPO rehabilitation centers.[30] Monthly outreach visits by the NAPO mobile rehabilitation workshop to rural areas and the development of the Elfasher Prosthetics repair center in North Darfur increased access to rehabilitation services for survivors living far from existing rehabilitation centers.[31] However, ongoing security risks in Darfur and the southern states of Sudan along with a lack of public transport continued to hamper access to physical rehabilitation for many survivors and other persons with disabilities.[32]

Economic inclusion

In 2013, the availability of economic inclusion programs targeting mine/ERW survivors outside of Darfur was further reduced, resulting in the closure of the two programs remaining from the six that had been operating in 2010. This was due to the continued decline in funding available for victim assistance through the NMAC, a decline that had begun in 2011.[33] In Darfur, two new programs targeting ERW victims, but inclusive of all persons with disabilities, continued to provide economic inclusion opportunities in 2013.[34]

Psychological support and social inclusion

With support from the ODO, in 2013 FSD began carrying out peer support visits with ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in Darfur to provide psychosocial support. During the year, a peer support training workshop was held in Khartoum for persons with disabilities.[35]

In 2013, the Ministry of Education established a special education department and began developing a national strategy for the education of children with disabilities. Some children with disabilities attended public schools and some specialized schools existed for children with disabilities but these schools lacked resources; appropriate facilities to educate children with disabilities in rural areas were rare.[36]

Laws and Policies

The NDC, in cooperation with Sudanese Standards and Metrology Organization, designed a draft building code to improve physical accessibility for persons with disabilities.[37] As of April 2014, the code was under review by a technical committee before being approved as law.[38]

Draft revisions to the 2009 disability act aligned the law to the CRPD, but approval into law was pending as of April 2014.[39] Existing legislation was not implemented effectively and many public officials lacked awareness of the law and the rights of persons with disabilities more generally.[40]

Sudan ratified the CRPD on 24 April 2009.

 

In 2012, three donors and the Common Humanitarian Fund contributed US$4.7 million for clearance operations in the Republic of the Sudan, a decline of approximately $1.3 million from 2011.[1]

The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is the sole source of funding for mine action in Darfur. In 2012, through assessed peacekeeping funds, UNAMID received $10.1 million for mine action.[2] Since 2008, it has received almost $53 million for mine action. The funding from UNAMID is by the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) for capacity development, operations, and to contract The Development Initiative (TDI) for survey and Explosive Ordnance Disposal.[3] ODO comprises 13 international staff and 38 national staff, while TDI has 15 international staff and 73 national staff. There are sub-offices in North, South, and West Darfur states.[4]

In 2011, the government of Sudan contributed $1.3 million to mine action, similar to their support in 2010 and 2011.[5] Sudan has committed $6 million to mine action for 2013.[6]

International contributions: 2012[7]

Since 2007, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has authorized the appropriation of annual mine action budgets for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) operating in Sudan, and the African Union/UN Hybrid operation (UNAMID) in Darfur. From 2007 until July 2011, the assessed budgets for UNMIS and UNAMID mine action were more than $190 million, including some 80% of the Sudan Mine Action Program over the five-year period. In 2011, the UNGA authorized $25.1 million for UNMIS and $10.3 million for UNAMID, representing 82% of the total mine action budget in Sudan.[8]

Some of the funds from the assessed peacekeeping budgets were used to contract commercial companies for landmine clearance and battle area clearance. With the end of the UNMIS mission in July 2011, funds were no longer available to contract commercial companies in the northern states in Sudan, excluding Darfur. The contracting of commercial companies has continued in South Sudan under the UN Mission in South Sudan.[9]

Summary of contributions (assessed peacekeeping funds for mine action): 2008–2011[10]

Since July 2011, Sudan has not received any funding through assessed peacekeeping funds as the UNMIS mandate ended with independence for South Sudan. Additionally, in 2013 international assistance appears to be much less after Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DanChurchAid both closed their mine action programs in Sudan after the government of Sudan restricted their travel.[11]

Summary of contributions (includes South Sudan): 2008–2012[12]