Last Updated: 17 December 2012

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

Angola is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), which may include cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002.


Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 indicated millions of mines littering one-third of the country’s land.[1] It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a better assessment of contamination in each of the country’s 18 provinces—all of which were contaminated—was achieved.[2]

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola’s 557 comunas (districts) covering approximately 1,025km2. These impacted communities represent 8% of the 23,504 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people, or 17% of the population.[3] Since the LIS ended in 2007 the number of SHAs has gradually decreased as a result of clearance and additional technical and non-technical surveying. In March 2009, the national database managed by the National Intersectorial Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) showed that 998 SHAs from the LIS—30% of the total—had been canceled by non-technical survey (NTS) or released through technical survey or clearance.[4]

In December 2010, CNIDAH reported 2,515 SHAs remained covering an estimated 923km2.[5] The numbers were further updated in January 2011 when CNIDAH and the Survey Action Center (SAC) convened a workshop in Washington, DC to clean up the database, and concluded 2,242 SHAs remained, impacting 1,400 communities. An associated update of the estimate of contaminated area was not provided at the time.[6]

At the end of 2011, CNIDAH reported a further reduction in the number of SHAs with 2,017 SHAs in all 18 provinces, of which 85% were either low impact or did not impact the community where the SHA was located. The 2,017 SHAs cover an estimated 793km2.[7] However, as an illustration of the long running problems with the national database, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust report different figures than CNIDAH for the remaining SHAs in their operational areas. NPA has completed NTS in Kwanza Sul and reports there are 179 SHAs covering 50km2 remaining; in Uige, where surveying is ongoing as of September 2012, there were 144 SHAs covering 79km2 for a total of 323 SHAs and 129km2, compared to 258 SHAs and 226km2 reported by CNIDAH for the same provinces in its Article 5 Extension Request.[8] HALO Trust reports their database indicates there are 166 SHAs remaining in Bié province rather than the 246 reported by CNIDAH. HALO and CNIDAH planned to hold a joint workshop on the database discrepancies between them in November 2012.[9]It is planned that the ongoing national Non-Technical Survey and the Mapping Project described in Angola’s Article 5 Extension Request will clarify the extent of the contamination throughout Angola by 2016.[10]

Suspect hazardous areas as of 31 December 2011


SHAs remaining

Contaminated area (km2)




Kuando Kubango












Lunda Sul









Kwanza Sul









Lunda Norte









Kwanza Norte















Cluster munition remnants

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by unexploded submunitions is unclear. As of March 2012, only HALO had reported finding unexploded submunitions since February 2008.[11] In April 2011, NPA reported that the impact of cluster munition remnants was “very low” in Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.[12] HALO and the National Institute for Demining (INAD) claim, however, that unexploded submunitions remain to be cleared in Kuando Kubango.[13]

At least two types of cluster munitions have been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. According to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH as of February 2008, NPA had reported clearing 13 unexploded submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kwanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 unexploded submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO reported clearing 230 unexploded submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.[14]

Other explosive remnants of war

Angola is significantly contaminated with ERW across all 18 provinces. Demining operators expend considerable assets on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks. The Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) reported finding 65,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 2011 and more than 2.4 million since 1996.[15]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators


Situation on 1 January 2012

National Mine Action Authority


Mine action center


International demining operators

DanChurchAid (DCA), HALO, MAG, NPA, and Stiftung Menschen gegen Minen (MgM)

National demining operators


National survey operators

Clube de Jovens, Apacominas, ODAH, Cassanje Desminagem e Ajuda Humanitaria, and Angola Livre de Minas

National commercial demining operators


International risk education operators


National risk education operators


Angola has two mine action management structures. CNIDAH serves as the de facto national mine action authority. It reports to the Council of Ministers, or in effect to the president of Angola. Since 2002, CNIDAH has been responsible for the coordination of mine action in the country. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies.[16] CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province), under the vice-governor of the province, determine annual priorities based on demining NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.[17] The annual operating budget for CNIDAH is approximately US$15 million.[18]

In an internal review of the 2006–2011 Strategic Plan, CNIDAH found that it failed to execute half of its planned activities for 2011. CNIDAH blamed lack of funding for the failure.[19] For example, CNIDAH has cited the Minister of Finance’s failure to transfer funds budgeted for the survey to them as one of the impediments in beginning the ongoing NTS in 2011.[20] CNIDAH priorities in 2012 and beyond, however, include further training for its managers, a new strategic plan, better internal collaboration, and the creation of a special fund to allow CNIDAH to engage national NGOs more rapidly.[21]

The other mine action body is the CED, established in 2005 to manage Angola’s national development plan. It is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS).[22] The 2011 CED budget for demining was approximately $45 million, or more than three times that of CNIDAH’s approximately $15 million budget.[23]


Demining assets of the government of Angola under CED are considerable. At the end of 2011, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), the Military Office of the President (CMPR), INAD, and the Police Border Guard of Angola (PGFA) had 53 manual demining brigades and two mechanical brigades, comprising a total of more than 3,200 personnel. Mechanical assets included 20 Bozena-5 remote control flail machines, 12 Hitachi flails, six Minewolfs, four Casspir armoured vehicles, and 1 Komatsu demining machine.[24]

Government of Angola Mine Clearance Operators[25]

Government of Angola Operator

Manual Brigades

Mechanical Brigades


Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)




Military Office of the President (CMPR)




National Demining Institute (INAD)




Police Border Guard of Angola (PGFA)








Under CNIDAH there are 77 registered commercial demining companies, 16 national NGOs, and five international NGOs. In 2011, 55 commercial demining companies were accredited, although only nine were contracted by CNIDAH or the CED to conduct clearance. The commercial companies engaged in demining in 2011 were the Sociedade de Seguranca e Desminagem (SEDITA), ICL, VDS, KUBUILA, SINCARPE, TNT, Spod, OJK, EUCLESMAR, and Cassamba TELESERVIC. Angolan Mine Action Professionals Association (APACOMINAS) is the national NGO and the international NGOs are DanChurchAid (DCA), HALO, MAG, Menschen gegen Minen (MgM), and NPA.[26]

UNDP support to mine action in Angola ended in December 2011.[27]

Mine action information management

The lack of a functioning national mine action database is one of the most protracted problems in the mine action program in Angola. The problem has two aspects. One is the database at CNIDAH does not match the NGOs’ own records even though the database is largely based on their records. The other problem, and arguably the more severe one, is the lack of standardized reporting between CNIDAH and the CED.

All stakeholders have put considerable time and resources into building sustainable capacity at the CNIDAH database unit. In August 2010, HALO, DCA, INAD, MAG, MgM, and NPA provided a list of 2,000 completed tasks to CNIDAH in an effort to match the database with the demining operators’ own records. Through this process it was discovered that only around 1,000 of the tasks were recorded in the database and the NGOs had reported canceling nearly as many SHAs as they had cleared.[28]In January 2011, at a workshop in Washington DC, the Survey Action Center (SAC) and CNIDAH identified 1,056 SHAs associated with 588 impacted communities from the LIS that should be considered cleared or canceled. This represented one-third of the total originally identified in the LIS. Based on this database clean-up in January 2011, 1,400 impacted communities and 2,242 SHAs remained from the LIS.[29]

The CED, with INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces, the border police and commercial companies, as its operators, use a different reporting format than the NGOs under CNIDAH, making it impossible for Angola to present an accurate picture of its landmine problem and an adequate plan to address it. Angola identified an action plan in its March 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request to correct the database problem by training the CED operators in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and converting old records to IMSMA.[30] A more fundamental problem that also needs correction is that CED uses both the metric and the imperial system of measurement (inches and feet) in its reporting.[31]

Unless CNIDAH is able to manage the database correctly, it is questionable whether the Non-Technical Survey and Mapping Project, the two key activities in the extension request, can be properly documented. In March 2012, Angola reported that 2,017 SHAs remained while in June, in response to a question from the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance regarding the database, CNIDAH said while inconsistencies still remained in the database, they were fewer.[32]  


Angola is the only major mine action program in the world that has not been formally evaluated since its inception.

Land Release

CNIDAH has variously reported that in 2003–2011, 40 different operators cleared between 240km2 and 454km2 of mined area, roads, bridges, railways, airports and other infrastructure.[33] In addition 12,933km of roads have been verified free from mines, allowing access throughout the country. According to CNIDAH, all the main roads of the country have been cleared with only some secondary and tertiary roads remaining.[34]

More than 1,200 SHAs have been released through clearance or survey since the completion of the LIS in 2007. The NGOs—HALO, MAG, NPA, DanChurchAid, and MgM—are largely responsible for this reduction. These NGOs combined have cleared or cancelled over 300 SHAs in 2011.[35]

MAG in Moxico province has re-surveyed 188 of the 290 impacted communities and 323 of the 522 SHAs that had been identified during the LIS. From the survey, MAG has cancelled 28 SHAs, which is approximately 10% of the SHAs re-surveyed, a far smaller cancellation rate than re-surveys in other countries where an LIS had been conducted and released 94km2 of land. MAG also reported its NTS team identified 18 new impacted communities with 38 previously unrecorded SHAs. Additionally, according to MAG, refugees returning from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have resettled in newly created villages, which may result in identifying new impacted communities and SHAs.[36] In contrast HALO canceled more than 75% of the SHAs in Huila during re-surveying[37]; NPA, in Uige, cancelled 81% of the SHAs and reduced the estimated contaminated area from 82km2 to 5km2.[38] DCA has cancelled 45% of the SHAs it has re-surveyed in Moxico.[39]

In 2011, four international demining operators cleared 4km2 of mined area. The amount of battle area clearance (BAC) conducted in 2011 remained low as very few areas remain that require major BAC. In 2011, HALO completed two BAC tasks and NPA completed one.[40]CED does not report its tasks by methodology but the 65,000 UXO found by CED indicate BAC may have been conducted.[41]

Survey in 2011

General and Non-Technical Survey

The follow-up to the LIS is the “Levantamento e actualização dos dados de areas suspeitas de contaminação com minas terrestres” (“Survey and update of data concerning suspect hazardous areas”), commonly referred to as LIS II, although CNIDAH has indicated a more accurate description is “general survey.”[42] Most stakeholders believe the LIS overestimated the landmine problem by a wide margin; however, based solely on the size of SHAs, it is clear from the CED demining teams that the LIS failed to capture any of the mine contamination associated with the country’s infrastructure and that the LIS missed many mined areas (because most infrastructure was too far from the communities to have impacted their daily lives).[43]A combination of the ongoing NTS and standardizing the now-incompatible report formats used by CNIDAH and CED may result in a more accurate picture of mine contamination in Angola, which judged by the results in the past ten years indicate mine contamination has been severe.

CNIDAH describes the “general survey” as one that will both identify new SHAs in all 18 provinces and confirm (or discredit) those already in the database. The remaining 2,017 SHAs as of June 2012 will be visited to confirm whether it is a mined area and, if so, whether the contaminated area as estimated during the LIS can be reduced. CNIDAH, in fact, describes the survey methodology as a “municipality approach” where 186 municipalities will be visited.[44]

Both national and international NGOs will conduct the survey under CNIDAH supervision. In 2011, CNIDAH trained the national NGOs Clube de Jovens da Huila, Apacominas, ODAH, Saving Association of People (ASASP), and Angola Livre de Minas to conduct NTS.[45] DCA, MAG, and MgM each have one team dedicated to the survey in Moxico and Kuando Kubango provinces.[46]

The survey teams use community-based survey methodology similar to that of a typical LIS. Data is collected based on interviews in the community using two forms provided by CNIDAH. One form is used for communities being revisited and the other for new SHAs. Each visit consists of four main activities:

1) Identify an appropriate number of key informants for a group interview.

2) Produce a sketch map of the area, the suspected areas and document any accidents.

3) Record the responses in the questionnaire.

4) Based on the information collected, visit the SHA and produce a sketch map of the area and document any accidents. The survey teams also record the geographic coordinates of the SHA using a global positioning system from a safe point of observation.

In an unusual approach to the survey, CNIDAH has not asked the NTS teams to estimate the size of the SHAs they identify. Instead, CNIDAH has created a separate mapping project whereby trained technicians will visit each SHA after the NTS teams have identified them and conduct polygon mapping. CNIDAH estimates the cost of this separate activity to be $5.4 million, and combined with the estimated $2.7 million for the NTS, it will require more than $8 million to complete the survey and map the SHAs, more than the $6.8 million the LIS cost.[47]

In June 2012, CNIDAH reported they were engaged in discussions with HALO and NPA on whether the 10 provinces where they have long operated need to be surveyed again or if the re-survey results from the two NGOs can be considered as the latest data for the provinces.[48] In 2011, HALO deployed three “combined” teams which handled survey, mine risk education (MRE), and EOD; these teams worked across the provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo and Kuando Kubango.[49] HALO is already on record saying it will not participate in the LIS II as part of its EC contract because, in the original LIS, HALO carried out a full non-technical “polygon” survey of all the SHAs it identified.[50] The findings from HALO’s polygon surveys in the LIS are said to be well documented. According to HALO, CNIDAH and the European Commission have already acknowledged that it would not be necessary for HALO to re-survey in the four provinces. Instead, HALO will continue its regular resurvey of all confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) to update information prior to clearance.[51] According to CNIDAH, the Young Technicians Club of Huila, trained in 2010, will be deployed for the purpose of rechecking data provided by HALO in Huila.[52]

As of August 2012, it had not yet been determined whether the mapping teams need to survey the 10 provinces where HALO and NPA have long operated and re-surveyed. The other provinces will be covered by national NGOs. CNIDAH planned to complete the survey in 2013.[53]

The government of Angola will cover an estimated $2.7 million needed for equipment, vehicles, operational and administrative costs of the five national operators, and the cost of monitoring by CNIDAH during the survey.[54] Although it is expected the survey will identify some new SHAs, it is also expected the survey will reduce the overall contaminated area that was estimated to be 793km2 as of December 2011.[55]

In June 2012, CNIDAH released a small sample of results showing 250 communities had been visited and 36 SHAs were cancelled while eight new SHAs were identified.[56] CNIDAH did not report how many SHAs already in the database in the 250 communities had been confirmed.

Mine clearance in 2011

Mine clearance operators in Angola include the international NGOs DCA (Moxico), HALO (Bie, Huambo, Benguela, Huila, Kuando Kubango), MAG (Moxico), MgM (Kuando Kubango), NPA (Malange, Uige), and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), commercial companies, and INAD, which operate in all 18 provinces. In 2011, four NGO operators cleared approximately the same amount of land as in 2010.[57]

Clearance in Angola is divided into priority clearance for development under CED and humanitarian demining under CNIDAH. The two types of clearance sometimes overlap but inconsistent reporting formats used by CED and the NGOs under CNIDAH make the extent of the overlap unclear.

Priorities of the state entities are determined by the government of Angola’s national plan to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Thus, most of the clearance work targets roads, bridges, ports, airports, water sources, electric towers, and land for the laying of fiber optic cables and constructing housing. Humanitarian demining by the NGOs and supported by international donors (at an ever-decreasing level) uses the LIS as its baseline. While much of the land cleared by demining NGOs is then used for farming and housing, the progress made based on the LIS has been the sole measurement of Angola meeting its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations and is the basis of Angola’s Article 5 deadline extension request. Even though reports from INAD and CED since 2006 indicate thousands of landmines have been found and hundreds of square kilometers of contaminated area have been cleared, this effort has not reduced the amount of contaminated area from the baseline established by the LIS. One of the limitations of the LIS in Angola was that as a community-based survey, infrastructure not associated with a local community was not assessed, with the exception of making an estimate of the extent of mine-affected primary and secondary roads.

This lack of coordination between development demining and humanitarian demining occurs in all 18 provinces. The ongoing NTS and the conversion of the state clearance records into IMSMA is an attempt to put all known mined areas and results into one database at CNIDAH. Both CNIDAH and CED have said the state entities will be conducting more humanitarian demining in the future and are an integral part of the extension request.[58]

Still, one of the main problems with the parallel demining structures is that the two institutions use different reporting formats. CNIDAH and the NGOs use IMSMA to record tasks, while operators under CED led by INAD record tasking information in another format, making it impossible to enter any of the CED completed tasks into the national database. One of the aims of a three-year EC project described below is to train mine clearance operators working under CED to use IMSMA and send their reports to CNIDAH.

CED demining in 2011

INAD, the FAA, the border police and commercial companies clear mines in support of Angola’s national development plans in order to re-build the infrastructure damaged by the conflict that ended in 2002. CED’s priorities include demining in support of efforts to build or rehabilitate airports, railways, bridges, hydroelectric power, schools, hospitals, roads, and communications, highlighted by the clearing of land to lay fiber optic cables. Much of the demining by INAD, the commercial companies, and the FAA involves verifying land as not being contaminated rather than actually clearing contaminated land of mines.[59]

In 2011, CED reported clearing 40.23km2 in 17 provinces. There was no mine action in Namibe where the LIS had identified three SHAs. CED also verified 36.91km of roads, and 12.61km of powerlines.

CED clearance of mined area results in 2011[60]


Area cleared (km2)

AP mines found

AV mines found

INAD, FAA, Border police, commercial companies




CED verification of infrastructure in 2011[61]

Electrical wires verified (km)

Roads verified (km)



Demining by commercial companies in 2011

The CED reported commercial demining companies cleared approximately 6.6km2 and verified hundreds of kilometers of roads area in eight provinces. CED did not disaggregate clearance from verification or report the number of mines found.[62]

NGO demining in 2011

In 2011, four international NGOs cleared almost 4.4km2 of mined area and found 4,135 antipersonnel mines, 1,167 antivehicle mines, and 6,878 items of UXO, a similar output to 2010. MgM cleared 2.29km of road while verifying 19.2km. During road clearance, MgM found two antipersonnel mines and four antivehicle mines.[63]

NGO mine clearance in 2011[64]


No. of mined areas released

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines found

AV mines found

No. of UXO found































Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013.

On 31 March 2012, Angola submitted an extension request for five years through 1 January 2018 in order to complete a general survey and a mapping certification and confirmation project as well as to train state organizations led by INAD and the FAA, and to train commercial demining companies in IMSMA. This is planned to result in an updated, and robust, national database and a more accurate assessment of the remaining mine problem.[65] In response to a question from the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance about shortening the extension period in June 2012, CNIDAH replied they could not shorten the period, partly due to the uncertainty of when the mapping project could begin.[66]

At the end of the proposed extension period, Angola plans to submit another extension request based on the ongoing surveys and clearance, but has stated that it already predicts it will need more than ten years beyond 2018.[67]

The Angola Mine Action Program has had numerous disappointments since 2002 when CNIDAH was established, none more so than the state of its mine action database. The extension request is extremely ambitious, in that in addition to survey, mapping and conversion of several years of data to IMSMA, it foresees adding a projected 300km2 of new completion records in 2013–2018. Angola’s record in mine action raises doubts that they can accomplish what they plan to do within five years.

Battle area clearance in 2011

The amount of BAC conducted in 2011 remained low, as in previous years.[68] In 2011, only HALO and NPA conducted BAC. NPA reported one task of 80,000m2 where just one item of UXO was found.[69]According to HALO, BAC is limited to areas covered by a large concentration of ammunition that pose a threat to the population. In such situations, HALO temporarily re-deploys mine clearance teams to conduct BAC. In 2011, HALO conducted BAC in Kuando Kubango and Huila provinces, clearing 670,000m2 and finding 36,653 ERW, mostly ammunition, weighing approximately 95 tons.[70]

CED reported state operators found 65,000 UXO in 2011, with 19,000 in Luanda, 12,500 in Kunene, and 12,000 in Zaire, comprising most of the UXO.[71] However, CED did not provide sufficient detail regarding these large numbers. For example, in Luanda province CED reported it cleared 126,985m2 at the Cacuaco race track; 150,000m2 in area related to the oil industry; 9,240m2 at the premises of the presidential guard and 2,807m2 at the Grafanil military training area. Since there were no battles in Luanda during the long conflict, the origin of the 19,127 ERW found in Luanda is unclear. Similarly, in the province of Zaire, where eight demining tasks covering 443,658m2 of land and 67km of road occurred, mostly for the purpose of new housing, 12,000 items of UXO were found.[72]

Battle area clearance in 2011[73]


Area cleared (km2)

UXO destroyed










Clearance of cluster munition contaminated area[74]

Since 1994, only a very few cluster bomb strikes have been identified by HALO, which has therefore concluded that the impact of submunitions is minimal in Angola. Clearing submunitions has been mainly EOD call-out/spot tasks.

More typical is the destruction of old or unserviceable cluster munitions identified by HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which have already been earmarked for subsequent disposal by the FAA. Since 2005, HALO WAD teams have destroyed a total of 7,273 submunitions, but only seven in 2011.

Roving clearance/explosive ordnance disposal in 2011

HALO, MAG, and NPA have EOD teams attached to their survey component. DCA does not have dedicated EOD teams and assigns mine clearance to spot clearance call-outs as needed. In 2011, spot clearance in Moxico province resulted in 168 items found.[75] CED did not report having dedicated EOD teams in 2011.

Roving clearance/explosive ordnance disposal in 2011


UXO destroyed











Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Program[76]

Since 2005, HALO Trust has been destroying unwanted stockpiles of weapons and ammunition held by the FAA with funding from the US Department of State. HALO has been the main implementing partner for the Angolan Disarmament Campaign, which was launched in December 2008. The government of Angola extended the campaign through 2012 with the possibility of a further extension.

In 2011, HALO deployed three mobile WAD teams and destroyed 21,733 ERW, seven submunitions, 15 aircraft bombs, 31 guided missiles, and 269 landmines found in various storage areas as well as a large quantity of small arms ammunition. In addition, the HALO WAD teams destroyed 420 heavy weapons systems (e.g. BM-81 rocket launchers), released to them by the Angolan Air Force.[77]

Quality management

Each international demining operator and INAD has its own internal quality management system. After a clearance task has been completed, CNIDAH is responsible for quality control (QC). CNIDAH admits there is lack of a funding for QC/quality assurance, which limits what CNIDAH can do. In 2011, eight CNIDAH teams conducted 53 QC visits and certified 528 kilometers of road 47km2 of cleared area.[78]

 Safety of demining personnel

In an incident during a mine clearance task in Menongue, Kuando Kubango, a HALO deminer, suffered an amputation of his right hand. He has been fitted with a prosthetic hand and has received a full insurance payment.[79]

The other NGO operators, CNIDAH, and CED, did not report any accidents during demining in 2011.

Risk Education

CNIDAH is responsible for the management, coordination, and monitoring of mine/ERW risk education (RE). UNICEF phased out RE at the end of 2008 because it was no longer a national program priority and casualties had been reduced.[80]

In 2011, the government of Angola failed to authorize spending for RE, creating a funding shortage for national NGOs, the main implementers of RE, and resulting in no formal RE program. According to CNIDAH, the government failed to include RE in its budget appropriation to CNIDAH, which considers it an oversight on the part of the government rather than a policy decision. The lack of funding also left CNIDAH’s RE non-functional, though a complete new staff and head had been hired.[81] In its internal evaluation of its 2006–2011 Mine Action Strategy, CNIDAH attributed the increase in casualties in 2011 to the lack of RE.[82]

CNIDAH’s expected RE funding to be re-instated for 2012.[83] Aside from RE linked with demining sites, there appears to be no active RE program in Angola. CNIDAH officials in Benguela and Kuando Kubango confirmed to the Monitor there was no RE being conducted in their provinces.[84]

CED reported its state operators in 2011 conducted RE in 12 provinces for 4,904 men, 7,608 women and 14,012 children.[85] HALO provided 412 RE sessions for 37,800 beneficiaries.[86]MAG community liaison personnel routinely conduct risk education in all the villages they visit. MAG also trains school teachers in RE in Moxico province.[87]

The Angolan Red Cross conducted a survey in 2010 on the knowledge of the risk of mines among the local population. The findings were surprising for a country considered one of the most mine-affected in the world. The survey found older Angolans knew very little about mines and returnees from Zambia and other neighboring countries were unaware of the risk. The Red Cross concluded there was a continuing need for RE in Huila.[88]


[1] Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 151.

[2] Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007.

[3]SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 24; and Article deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, p. 16.

[4] Email from Mohammad Qasim, then-Acting Chief Technical Advisor and Information Management Advisor, UNDP/CNIDAH, 27 April 2009.

[5] CNIDAH, “Demining Project to Complete Article 5 Obligations,” December 2010, provided to the Monitor in Luanda, June 2011.

[6] SAC, “Planning and information management: CNIDAH and operators work to ensure the national database reflects all work done in Angola,” February 2011, provided to the Monitor by UNDP.

[7] CNIDAH, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, undated, p. 23; and CNIDAH, “Evaluation of 2006-2011 Mine Action Strategic Plan,” (internal), undated, p. 43.

[8] Email from Fredrik Holmegaard, Operations Manager, NPA, Angola, 4 September 2004.

[9] Email from Calvin Ruysen, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 5 September 2012.

[10] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, Annex Table 6 “Remain Suspect Areas based on CNIDAH Database.” The number of SHAs in the table in the Extension Request sum up to 2,017 and not 2,116.

[11] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Ken O’Connell, Technical Director, MgM, 24 May 2012; from Johan P. Botha, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 28 February 2012; from Fatmire Uka, Operations Manager, DCA, 27 February 2012; from Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 3 May 2012; and from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 1 March 2011.

[13] Interviews with Jose Antonio, Site Manager, Kuando Kubango, HALO; and with Coxe Sucama, Director, INAD, in Menongue, 24 June 2011.

[14] Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008.

[15] Executive Deming Commission (CED), “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, pp. 28, 30.

[16] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012; and CNIDAH, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, undated.

[17] Interview with Adriano Goncalves, Senior Officer, Mine Action, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 23 June 2011.

[18] Interview with Dr. Rita de Jesus, Head, Planning Department, Luanda, 13 June 2011.

[19] CNIDAH, “Evaluation of 2006–2011 Mine Action Strategic Plan,” (internal), undated, p. 20.

[20] Interview with Adriano Goncalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 23 June 2011.

[21] CNIDAH, “Evaluation of 2006–2011 Mine Action Strategic Plan,” (internal), undated, pp. 20–21.

[23] 2011 Angola National Budget. The 2011 budget line for CED is 4,246,689,947 KWZ ($45.4 million) and for CNIDAH 1.328.375.554 KWZ ($14.2 million). Average exchange rate for 2011: AOA93.5273 = US$1. Oanda,

[24] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, p. 4.

[25] Ibid.

[26] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, p. 5; and CNIDAH, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, undated.

[27] Email from Susete Ferreira, Programme Officer, UNDP, Luanda, 28 February 2012.

[28] SAC, “Planning and information management: CNIDAH and operators work to ensure the national database reflects all work done in Angola,” February 2011, p. 1.

[29] Ibid., p. 2.

[30] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, pp. 6–7.

[31] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, pp. 6–26. Some results are reported in square feet and others in square meters.

[33] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, p. 25 Tables and statements throughout the report are inconsistent to arrive at a single figure. One table indicates 454km2 has been cleared from SHAs identified in the LIS, but this may also include area cancelled by survey since the LIS. Another table indicated 239.5km2 of infrastructure may have been cleared since 2003.

[35] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by HALO, MAG, and NPA, February–March 2011 in February-May 2012.

[36] Email from Marie Mohlerova, Programme Officer, MAG, 21 August 2012. Ethiopia, for example, cancelled more than 90% of the SHAs during re-surveying.

[37] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[38] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 3 May 2012.

[39] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fatmire Uka, DCA, 27 February 2012.

[40] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 3 May 2012; and from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[41] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, p. 28.

[45] Ibid., Question 2, p. 1.

[46] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Ken O’Connell, MgM, 24 May 2012; from Johan P. Botha, MAG, 28 February 2012; and from Fatmire Uka, DCA, 27 February 2012.

[47] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, pp. 36–37; and SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 185.

[48] Response from CNIDAH to Questions posed by the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 29 June 2012, Question 3, p. 2. During the LIS, HALO Trust surveyed Benguela, Huambo, Bie and Kuando Kubango provinces and since the LIS re-surveyed Huila province which the NGO, INTERSOS had originally surveyed. For the LIS, NPA surveyed Uige, Zaire, Malange, Kwanza Norte and Kwanza Sul.

[49] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO, 8 April 2012.

[50] Email from Gerhard Zank, then-Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO, 13 August 2011.

[51] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 13 August 2011.

[52] CNIDAH, “Evaluation of 2006–2011 Mine Action Strategic Plan,” (internal), undated, p. 6.

[53] Interview with Adriano Goncalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 23 June 2011; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, p. 8.

[57] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, pp. 6–26.

[58] Based on interviews with Adriano Goncalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 23 June 2011; Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 22 May 2012; CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012; CNIDAH, “Evaluation of 2006–2011 Mine Action Strategic Plan,” (internal), undated; and Monitor’s analysis of available data.

[59] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, p. 2.

[60] Ibid., p. 30.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid., pp. 6–26.

[63] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Ken O’Connell, MgM, 24 May 2012.

[64] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Johan P. Botha, MAG, 28 February 2012; from Fatmire Uka, DCA, 27 February 2012; from Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 3 May 2012; and from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[67] Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 23 May 2012.

[68] Emails from Rory Forbes, HALO, 22 February 2010; Ken O’Connell, MgM, 8 March 2010; Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 18 February 2010; Fatmire Uka, DCA, 17 February 2010; and Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 5 March 2010; and response to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[69] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 3 May 2012.

[70] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[71] CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, p. 28.

[72] Ibid., pp. 15, 20.

[73] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012; and from Fredrik Holmegaard, NPA, 3 May 2012.

[74] “HALO Trust WAD Angola Monthly Report Consolidated Statistics: May 2011,” provided to the Monitor in Angola, June 2011; and Response to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[75] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Fatmire Uka, DCA, 27 February 2012.

[76] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Interview with Manuel Buta, CNIDAH, Angola, 13 June 2011; CNIDAH, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, undated; and CED, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, pp. 18, 27.

[79] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[80] Interview with Carlos Seixas, Project Assistant, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

[81] CNIDAH, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, undated, p. 18.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, Angola, 13 June 2011; and CNIDAH, “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, undated, pp. 15–16.

[84] Interviews with Isabel Massela, CNIDAH Provincial Officer, Kuando Kubango, 24 June 2011; and Renato Raimundo, Clube de Jovens, Lubango, 22 June 2011.

[85] Executive Deming Commission (CED), “2011 Annual Report,” Luanda, January 2012, p. 39.

[86] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 8 April 2012.

[87] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Johan P. Botha, MAG, 28 February 2012.

[88] Interview with Jorge Lombe, CNIDAH, Huila; and Tito Canjamba, CNIDAH Quality Control Officer responsible for Huila, Namibe, and Cunene provinces, in Lubango (Huila province), 22 June 2011.