Afghanistan

Last Updated: 28 November 2013

Mine Action

Contamination and Impact

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains one of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, and the United States (US)-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[1]

Afghanistan’s 2012 Article 5 extension request, based on data as of the end of November 2011, estimated total contamination at 617km². By the end of 2012, cancellation through survey and clearance had reduced that figure by 9% to 558.6km².[2]

Remaining contamination as of end of 2012[3]

Type of contamination

Number of hazards

Area

Population affected

Antipersonnel mine

3,497

270,658,116

579,109

Antivehicle mine

1,230

253,284,227

246,330

ERW

159

34,692,778

668,479

Total

4,886

558,635,121

1,493,918

Mines

Afghanistan is affected by a wide array of mine types, but mostly by Iranian, Pakistani, and Soviet antipersonnel mines and much smaller numbers of antivehicle mines, including Italian minimum-metal mines. Areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines account for almost half the total ERW-contaminated area and impact around 70% of Afghanistan’s total mine/ERW affected population. Antivehicle mines pose another distinct problem. Although far fewer in number, mined areas containing only antivehicle mines are spread across some 253km² and the minimum metal content of many of these mines further complicates detection.

While estimates of mine contamination have fluctuated sharply in recent years as a result of survey and the addition of previously unreported hazards to the database, they have appeared to be on a steadily downward trajectory in the past two years. At the start of 2013, Afghanistan estimated that it had 270.7km² affected by antipersonnel mines out of total ERW contamination of 558.6km², which also included 253.3km² affected by antivehicle mines, and a further 34.7km² by other forms of ordnance, including 7.6km² by cluster munition remnants. Survey in 2012 added 204 hazards totaling 15.4km² of mine and battle area hazards to the database, but also resulted in cancellation of 258 suspected hazards totaling 19.6km. As a result of clearance and survey, the extent of mine contamination was nearly 12% less at the end of 2012 than a year earlier and total ERW contamination was down 9%.

Mine contamination

As of end year

Antipersonnel Mines

Antivehicle Mines

Total

2011

306.81

253.90

560.71

2012

270.66

253.28

523.94

Data from the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) shows that 10 provinces account for 87% of all ERW contamination.[4] Almost one-third of the area affected by antipersonnel mine contamination and a quarter of antivehicle mine contamination is in the central region around the capital, Kabul. The northeast and south also have extensive antipersonnel mine-affected areas, and the southern areas are the most heavily affected by antivehicle mines. But more than half the affected districts (126 out of 234) have less than 10 hazards. Twenty-eight districts have only one hazard, while 28 others have more than 50 hazards. A little over half the ERW hazards are in areas ranked as insecure and 44% in areas where the UN deems the security threat low or minimal, but 84% of the highest impact hazards are in areas ranked as highly or extremely insecure.[5]

Cluster munitions

Soviet forces used cluster munitions during the decade-long war of resistance to the Soviet-backed government, and US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster munitions, containing some 248,056 submunitions, between October 2001 and early 2002.[6] Afghanistan reported 22 remaining submunition hazards, covering a total of 7.64km², in the assessment of all ERW contamination submitted for its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request.[7] These are contaminated with US BLU 97 submunitions and block access to grazing and agricultural land.[8] Submunition contamination appears to be more widespread, however, as some demining operators say they continue to find submunition remnants on demining tasks.[9]

Improvised explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war

Afghanistan contends with a wide range of ERW, including unexploded aircraft bombs, artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and grenades, as well as some abandoned explosive ordnance. Random items of UXO are scattered over much of the country and will continue to be found for decades, but concentrated contamination recorded as battlefield areas now account for only about 5% of total contamination.

Most of the contamination dates back to the period of Soviet occupation and the ensuing civil war, but the UN reported an increase in casualties attributed to ordnance left by the conflict of recent years. US Air Force sorties involving weapons releases dropped slightly in 2012 to 4,092 (from 5,102 in 2010 and 5,411 in 2011),[10] but the UN also expressed concern over casualties resulting from “ISAF’s inconsistent clearing and documentation practices regarding clearance of unexploded ordnance from military bases and firing ranges.” The UN noted that international and Afghan forces did not take steps to mark, or to notify MACCA or the government of, areas where military operations had resulted in release of duds or UXO. The UN said that casualties among children collecting scrap metal on former military bases appeared to be rising and identified clearance of military firing ranges as a matter “of particular urgency.”[11]

The biggest threat to the population, however, comes from use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by anti-government elements. The UN recorded 782 IED incidents in 2012 (3% more than the previous year), killing 868 civilians and injuring 1,663. Most incidents appeared not to have been targeted at the military, and more than one-third were identified as involving pressure-plate, victim-activated devices placed on roads routinely used by civilians. These caused a total of 993 casualties in 2012 (393 deaths and 520 injuries), compared with 141 casualties (74 deaths and 67 injuries) in the previous year. Most pressure plate IEDs had a 20–25kg explosive charge, double the charge in most antivehicle mines, with many capable of being activated by the weight of a child.[12] In the first half of 2013, IEDs caused 1,360 civilian casualties, one-third more than in the same period of 2012, including 443 people and 917 injured, although the UN reported casualties resulting from victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs dropped 24% in the first half of the year.[13]

Afghanistan’s extension request identified about 5km² affected by IEDs, but the UN noted that “the impact of IEDs on the lives of Afghan children, women and men extends well beyond the immediate threat to their right to life. Legacy IEDs—planted but undetonated IEDs—in community spaces hindered access to health and education, and created an environment of insecurity with civilians living under the constant threat of death, maiming, serious injury and destruction of property.”[14]

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

Body

Situation on 1 January 2012

National Mine Action Focal Point

Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) / Department of Mine Clearance (DMC)

Mine action center

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)

International demining operators

NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

Commercial: EOD Technology (EODT), G4S, RELYANT, RONCO Corporation, Sterling International

National demining operators

NGO: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)

Commercial: Afghan Campaign for Landmines (ACL), Afghan Greenfield Demining (AGD), Asda Brothers Demining Company, Country Mine Clearance Company (CMCC), Hemayat Brothers Demining International (HDI), Kabul Mine Clearance Company (KMCC), Kardan Demining Group, Kawoon Demining Co. (KDC), Koshan Mine Action, Nasir Mine Clearance Co., National Demining Support Services (NDSS), Nejat Demining Co., Storm Afghanistan Demining Co. (ADC), Starlight Afghan Demining Co. (SADC), Standfard Demining Co., Salam Mine Clearance Co. (SMCC), Titan Demining Group (TDG), and Wahdat Demining Co. (WDC)

International risk education operators

Association for Aid and Relief Japan, DDG, Handicap international (HI), Mobile Mini Circus for Children

National risk education operators

Government: Ministry of Education

NGO: Afghan Red Crescent Society, OMAR

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by MACCA.[15] Since 2001, this has been a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management, supported by an UNMAS project office.[16]

As of January 2013, MACCA had a total staff of 199, reduced from 339 a year earlier as a result of cuts, particularly in the staffing of area mine action centers (AMACs) which are now named MACCA regional offices. By March 2013, the number of international support staff providing technical support to MACCA—administering donor funds provided for clearance and coordination through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) and monitoring and evaluating project implementation—had fallen to four from eight a year earlier.[17]

MACCA’s restructuring is taking place within the context of a broader transition of mine action from the UN to the government. Until 2008, Afghanistan had “entrusted interim responsibility” for coordinating mine action to the UN.[18] From 2008 onwards, a government Interministerial Board assigned the lead role in mine action to the DMC, a department of the ANDMA that reports to the Office of the Second Vice-President.[19] The DMC moved its offices into MACCA’s Kabul headquarters in May 2008 and, as of March 2012, had 13 civil servants occupying posts partnering MACCA staff.[20] But by 2012 the aim had changed to “absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.”[21] Discussions continued among key stakeholders on the best formula for future management of mine action in 2012 and the first half of 2013.[22]

Afghanistan’s clearance plan for the 10 years to March 2023 is set down in the Article 5 deadline Extension Request it submitted in March 2012 and revised in August 2012. The request provides for clearing all antivehicle mines and battlefield areas as well as antipersonnel mines. It consolidates the 4,442 remaining mine and ERW hazards into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization. Projects will be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.[23]

The request envisaged that 94 of the projects will be tackled in the first two years, underlining how clearance is heavily frontloaded in the initial years of the extension period but is subject to review every six months to take account of prevailing circumstances.[24] According to its clearance milestones, almost three-quarters (72%) of antipersonnel mine hazards covering 55% of the areas affected by such mines will be cleared by 2015 (the third year of the extension period), together with 52% of antivehicle mine hazards covering almost one-third of the areas affected by antivehicle mines, and 85% of battlefield hazards covering 73% of such affected land.[25]

The MAPA program for the Afghan year 1392 (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014), prepared by MACCA and implementing partners (IPs), targeted clearance of 712 hazards covering a total of 78.09km², including 483 antipersonnel hazards over 24km², 195 antivehicle mine hazards covering 43.7km², and 34 ERW hazards covering 10.4km². If fulfilled, the plan would result in 17 districts becoming mine-free, but achieving those targets depended on receiving funding at the levels projected by IPsin the process of preparing the plan. By the end of March 2013, 42 of the 57 projects planned for the year had been fully funded, but delays in delivery of funds by the US, by far the biggest single donor of mine action in Afghanistan, appeared likely to impact implementation.[26]

Land Release

MACCA reports that humanitarian and commercial operators released a total of 147.86km² in 2012, but although mined area clearance conducted mainly by humanitarian operators rose by 9% to 77.15km, battle area clearance (BAC) was less than half the 2011 level.[27]

Five-year summary of clearance[28]

Year

Mined area cleared (km2)

Battle area cleared (km2)

2012

77.15

 51.89

2011

68.04

113.11

2010

64.76

105.31

2009

52.59

104.33

2008

47.42

128.38

Total

309.96

503.02

Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national NGOs and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: ATC, DAFA, MCPA, MDC, and OMAR; the most active international NGOs are DDG and HALO. In the past two years, FSD established a small operation near the border with Tajikistan.[29]

Survey in 2012

Starting in May 2012, MACCA coordinated three operators conducting the “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey” (MEIFCS) as proposed in Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request, but as a result of funding constraints, operators worked with a total of 34 survey teams in 2012 (HALO 17 teams, MCPA 12 teams, and DDG five teams) instead of the 58 planned.[30] MEIFCS had allowed for 5% more communities than those listed in the official gazetteer, but surveyors encountered far more unlisted communities. Survey teams were also cross-trained for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and, in the course of 2012, destroyed 3,674 items of UXO.[31]

HALO reported it visited 4,336 villages in 2012 and completed the survey of all communities in 22 districts, of which 14 have since been declared mine- and ERW-impact free. In the process, HALO identified 9.29km² of new hazard and canceled 11.71km² for a net decrease of 2.41km². HALO’s survey-EOD teams destroyed 719 UXO items and 8,825 items of stray ammunition.[32] MCPA said its teams surveyed 270 hazards, covering a total of 17.2km², resulting in a net decrease in the hazardous-area estimate of 56,367m². The teams also destroyed 67 UXO items.[33]

Overall, MACCA reported that in 2012, MEIFCS completed survey of 71 districts identifying 208 new hazards covering a total of 15.4km², and canceling 258 hazards covering 19.6km², a net reduction of 4.2km².[34] By May 2013, however, the large number of communities encountered by survey teams that were not listed in the gazetteer, together with a funding shortfall, meant that the survey was behind schedule in terms of the number of districts surveyed. The MEIFCS survey, like mine action in general, also faced challenges from widespread insecurity. By May 2013, survey teams had visited, or were working in, all the secure districts. MACCA reported IPs had not put forward plans for survey in 115 out of a total of 400 districts because of lack of funding or lack of security, and said it was exploring other options for collecting data from these areas such as working through Community Development Councils, local leaders, and other NGOs.[35]

Mine clearance in 2012

Although the area cleared of mines in 2012 rose by more than a quarter over the previous year’s result, the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed dropped by more than half, reflecting the fact that most dense mine belts have already been cleared and operators are shifting to less densely-mined hazards. At the same time, clearance of antivehicle mines, emplaced in smaller quantities and often scattered across large areas, rose more than 10 times, according to MACCA data.[36]

Productivity in 2013, however, appears likely to be hit by funding constraints and staff cuts affecting national and international IPs alike. HALO, Afghanistan’s biggest operator, cut capacity by 25% when it laid off almost 1,000 staff in 2012—mostly in the second half of the year—after Canada’s Department for Aid and International Trade withdrew most of its funding for mine clearance in Afghanistan and other donors, notably the US Department of State, reduced support.[37] DDG, the other international humanitarian operator, lost more than one-third of its capacity after cuts in funding from Denmark, Sweden, and Japan, ending the year with some 900 personnel including 666 deminers, 40 surveyors, and four mechanical teams.[38]

Afghan IPs also sustained major capacity cuts. OMAR reported losing approximately one-third of its capacity in 2012, standing down more than 540 personnel in 28 manual demining teams and a mechanical unit.[39] MCPA ended 2012 with more personnel than a year earlier, but said that it expected a 60% cut in 2013[40]; ATC reported that as of April 2013 it did not have any projects funded through the VTF in hand.[41]

The plan for clearance set out in Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension request divides remaining contamination into 314 projects, encompassing 5,661 known hazards. In 2012, seven demining NGOs were awarded a total of 29 contracts funded through the VTF and worth $39.48 million, providing for clearance of 612 hazards in 14 provinces, covering an area of 20.42km². Of these, operators completed 19 contracts.[42] IPs find that donors increasingly support projects with a focus on community development and social-economic security, but 22 National Priority Programs presented to donors at a meeting in Tokyo, in July 2012, where they pledged $16 billion over four years, made no reference to mine action.

Among donors that continued funding, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) committed to five years of financial support, starting in April 2013, for demining in Herat province by HALO which is expected to make the province mine-impact free. HALO set up a livelihood survey team in 2012 to conduct pre- and post-clearance impact assessments. HALO also sought to attract support for reintegration of former insurgents through employment in mine action as well as for a weapons and ammunition disposal program on which it employed more than 150 staff in 2012.[43]

Mined area clearance 2012

Operator

Area cleared

(km²)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

AGD

0.19

710

13

1,826

ATC

9.10

2,229

100

1,859

DAFA

5.46

1,073

87

1,142

DDG

2.85

2,122

8

1,893

EODT

10.21

0

0

22

FSD

0.12

2,281

0

17

G4S

0.04

0

0

0

HDI

0.10

0

0

3

HALO

20.26

5,811

184

2,869

MCPA

8.54

2,187

253

20

MDC

14.14

1,766

212

909

OMAR

6.14

2,327

144

5,751

Total

77.15

20,506

1,001

16,311

Against a background of widespread insurgency and violent criminality, Afghan IPscontinued to support community-based demining (CBD) in areas where insecurity is too great to operate their core capacity, though the CBD support was on a smaller scale than in the previous year. IPs operated 160 CBD teams in Afghan year 1391 (2012–13)—only seven teams less than the previous year—clearing a total of 14.53km². CBD operations cost US$11.5 million in 2012, about 14% of mine action expenditure, and less than half the $24.57 million (close to 20% of the mine action budget) in 2011.[44]

DAFA reported that it has stood down most of its core capacity and worked mainly with community-based teams, particularly in the heavily-conflicted southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand; in agreement with local community elders in those provinces, it conducted demining and clearance of old IEDs in Kajaki and Musa Qala.[45] DAFA and MDC cleared a total of 1.4km² of land contaminated by old or abandoned IEDs, destroying 106 devices together with around 25 UXO items.[46]

EODT, also working in Kandahar, reported significant improvements in productivity, implementing a two-year, $25 million contract funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which called for clearance of 25.27km² of high and medium priority hazards by 20 October 2013. After a difficult start in 2011 plagued by security, personnel, and equipment problems that left the program behind schedule, operations accelerated in 2012. Working with close to 900 Afghan personnel in CBD teams supported by mine detection dogs and mechanical assets, the program cleared a mixture of antipersonnel mine and antivehicle mine tasks, covering a total of 7.24km². Although security challenges continued (evident in the kidnapping of nine deminers—returned soon after—and the theft of two vehicles and equipment in April 2013 as well as the presence of IEDs in some areas), productivity increased sufficiently to put the operation on course to meet the October 2013 deadline.[47] It was not immediately clear if the UAE intended to finance additional demining in Kandahar or other provinces.

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted last year, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 March 2023.

Afghanistan’s extension request, prepared in consultation with IPs, provided for clearing the entirety of its ERW contamination, including 4,151 antipersonnel minefields covering 306.81km2, 1,319 antivehicle minefields covering 253.9km2, and 191 ERW-contaminated areas covering 56.27km2.[48] Although among the most comprehensive requests yet submitted, the ICBL concluded that the work plan represents a best-case scenario, and faced a range of challenges, including donor support, security, and political uncertainties.[49]

The funding challenges became particularly evident in 2013. Despite rising productivity in 2012, the program embarked on the first year of implementing the extension request with the equivalent of about 20km² of clearance unfunded. As a result, many IPs were working with lower levels of manpower than in the previous year and with less capacity than was called for in the request’s workplan.[50]

Clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2012

MACCA reported no clearance of cluster munitions in 2012 because no operations were conducted on the 22 hazards identified as contaminated with submunition remnants. IPs, however, report tackling submunitions on demining and BAC tasks, although some operators only record them as UXO. HALO, for example, reported clearing 21 submunitions in the course of mined area clearance, 80 submunitions in the course of BAC, and a further 236 items in spot-EOD tasks. Additionally, HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Destruction teams destroyed a total of 734 cluster munitions, including 635 submunitions along with other ammunition 600 metres from the end of, and directly in the flight path of, Kabul International Airport’s main runway.[51]

Compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Afghanistan is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022.

MACCA estimates submunitions contaminate a total of 7.64km².[52] This does not take account of the cluster munition remnants found by operators on other tasks. MACCA has not recorded clearance of cluster munitions separately from other types of UXO. However, Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 extension request provides for clearance of all ERW, including submunitions, by 2020.[53]

Battle area clearance in 2012

With battlefields accounting for only around 5% of the remaining contamination identified in Afghanistan, the number of BAC tasks and the amount of clearance is falling. Humanitarian operators cleared 36.17km² in 2012, little more than 40% of the BAC they conducted the previous year.[54] HALO, which accounted for more than half of all battle area cleared in 2012, reduced the number of its BAC teams by half to three in 2012 and also halved the area it cleared, while the items it destroyed were only a quarter of the previous year’s.[55]

Battle area clearance 2012

Operator

Area cleared

(km²)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

AGD

0.25

2

0

1,158

ATC

2.36

0

0

29,206

DAFA

0.21

3

0

10,496

Dyncorps

0.04

0

0

760

DDG

1.98

0

0

2,645

EODT

0.21

2

0

0

FSD

0

0

0

1

HALO[56]

19.03

8

0

28,862

MCPA

2.64

0

0

2,817

MDC

0.56

1

0

8,119

SADC

0.04

0

0

0

Sterling

0.09

0

0

38

Total

27.41

16

0

84,102

Commercial companies in past years received contracts to clear or verify land required for airfields, military camps, and police bases, in addition to a variety of tasks related more to infrastructure. With the draw-down of international forces, the amount of such work has declined and the area checked by commercial companies in 2012 dropped 20% from the previous year to 24.47km².

However, Sterling Global Operations announced in February 2013 that it had won a $30 million, 12 month contract to clear mines, UXO, and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) at the US’s Bagram airbase and other bases, as well as “civilian access areas”.[57]

Areas Checked by Commercial Companies 2012

Name of operator

Total size of the suspected area check

No. of UXO destroyed

No. of APMs destroyed

No. of AVMs destroyed

ACL

596,893

33

0

0

ADC

143,800

0

0

0

AMDC

662,358

93

0

1

CMCC

27,680

0

0

0

EODT

5,025,990

18,074

7

0

G4S

5,893,803

63

0

0

KDC

101,545

0

0

0

KMCC

2,928,169

30

2

0

NDSS

23,388

0

0

0

OMAR Int

12,029

0

0

0

RELYANT

588,127

1,354

0

0

RONCO

2,873,472

3,104

6

0

SADC

3,350,436

34

0

0

SDC

348,924

0

0

0

SDG

213,649

0

0

0

Sterling International

85,000

38

0

0

SMCC

35,340

0

0

0

TDC

333,193

0

0

0

TDG

1,014,308

103

0

0

United Asia Demining Company (UADC)

128,410

0

0

0

WDC

82,050

0

0

0

Total

24,468,564

22,926

15

1

AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle

Seven EOD and weapons disposal teams previously managed by Dyncorps (until March 2011), and later by Sterling International, came under the management of OMAR in April 2013 after it won a one-year, $1.1 million contract following a competitive bidding process. OMAR reported that teams based in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Parwan, and Panjshir would continue emergency call-outs by local communities and security forces, but with total manpower reduced from 100 to around 80 personnel.[58]

Quality management

IPs all have internal quality assurance (QA)/quality control mechanisms. MACCA has conducted external QA through a seven-person unit in Kabul and 40 staff located in the seven regional AMAC offices monitoring the work of IPs through site visits. MACCA reduced its staffing of AMACs in 2012, resulting in less on-site visits and more emphasis being placed on monitoring and evaluation of IPs’ standards and operations through quarterly reviews of each project, and through procedures for renewing accreditation. MACCA has also developed a separate standard for investigating incidents.[59]

The Afghan Institute of Management Training and Enhancement of Indigenous Capacities (AIMTEIC), an Afghan consulting firm, was contracted to undertake external monitoring of IPs conducted in three phases between October 2012 and March 2013. AIMTEIC reviewed headquarter operations of seven IPs and a total of 68 demining teams. AIMTEIC found the IPs’ internal quality mangement functioning well, but raised a range of operational issues; for example, AIMTEIC observed that some IPs had not followed operational plans well and that one IP used mine detection dogs on steeply sloping land. The IPs said they found AIMTEIC’s review of headquarter operations satisfactory but expressed some criticism of its assessment of field operations.[60]

Safety of demining personnel

According to MACCA data, three deminers were killed and 13 injured during demining incidents in 2012, including three people injured in a single incident.

Insurgency and criminality posed a continuing threat. Six deminers were killed and 10 injured in 53 security incidents in 2012, which also saw 20 staff abducted and the destruction or loss of vehicles, radios, and other equipment. All abducted staff were later released, mainly through the intervention of local community elders.[61] Armed elements abducted 11 MDC deminers and seized three vehicles in May 2013, moving them into Pakistan pending the outcome of negotiations for their release.[62] Some IPs also reported interruptions to operations as a result of security incidents or IED attacks in the vicinity of clearance tasks and contend with the presence of IED detonations on roads in their operating areas.

Another risk of operating in an environment of conflict was also apparent with the death of a community-based deminer working for the Emirates Mine Clearance Program Afghanistan (EMCPA) in the Panjawi district of Kandahar in June 2013 who was hit by two missiles fired by international forces, apparently after mistakenly being identified as engaged in planting IEDs.[63]

 



[1] “Explosive remnants of war and mines other than anti-personnel mines,” Landmine Action, London, March 2005, p. 14.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty, Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 August 2012, p. 24; and email from Edwin Faigmane, Senior Programme Officer, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[3] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[4] The 10 provinces are Kabul, Logar, Baglan, Parwan, Wardak (Central region), Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar (South), Herat (West), and Nangahar (East). Integrated Operating Framework, MACCA, April 2013, pp. 24−25.

[5] Integrated Operating Framework, MACCA, April 2013, pp. 20−21, 29, 36.

[6] Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, “Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice,” Mines Action Canada, May 2009, p. 27.

[8] Email from MACCA, 16 August 2012; and statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva 15 April 2013.

[9] Interviews with MACCA IPs, Kabul, 15−23 May 2013.

[10]Combined Forces Air Power Component Commander 2007−2012 Airpower Statistics,” US Air Force Central Command, as of 31 December 2012.

[11]Afghanistan, Mid-Year Report 2013, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Kabul, 31 July 2013, pp. 57−58.

[12]Afghanistan, Annual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” UNAMA, Kabul, 19 February 2013, pp. 3–44, 16–20.

[14]Afghanistan, Annual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” UNAMA, Kabul, 19 February 2013, pp. 3–44, 16–20.

[15] Established in 1989 as the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), in 2009 it was renamed MACCA. For details of the history and structure of mine action in Afghanistan, see Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2012, pp. 50−68.

[16] Interviews with Alan MacDonald, Program Director, MACCA, in Geneva, 23 March 2012; and with Abigail Hartley, Program Manager, UNMAS, Kabul, 7 May 2012.

[17] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[18] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form A.

[19] Email from MACCA, 16 August 2011; and interview with Abdul Haq Rahim, Director, DMC, Kabul, 26 May 2008.

[20] Email from MACCA, 23 March 2012.

[22] Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Director, MACCA; and with Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, in Geneva, 5 December 2012, and Kabul, 19 May 2013.

[23] Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request of 29 March 2012 puts 336 hazards covering 69.09km in rank (priority) 1, including 233 minefields, covering 31.8km2; 650 hazards covering 96.81km2 in rank 2; and 925 hazards covering 98.54km2 in rank 3.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2012, p. 181; and interview with Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, 7 May 2012.

[26] Integrated Operational Framework, MACCA, April 2013, p.40.

[27] Emails from MACCA, 23 March and 4 August 2013.

[28] Data supplied annually by MACCA. Data for 2012 provided by email from MACCA, 11 March 2013. BAC data includes area reported by MACCA as “checked by commercial companies,” a reference to area verification that did not result in removal of any hazard from MACCA’s database. In 2012, humanitarian IPs cleared 27.42km, down from 82.54km in 2011, and commercial companies checked 51.89km in 2012 compared with 30.55km in 2011.

[29] Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.

[31] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[32] Emails from Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO, Kabul, 17 March 2013; and from Dave True, HALO Afghanistan Expatriate Officer, 15 September 2013.

[33] Email from Haji Attiqullah, Director, MCPA, Kabul, 16 May 2013.

[34] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[35] Interview with Abdul Qudous Ziaeel, MACCA, Kabul, 23 May 2013; and email from Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, Kabul, 17 September 2013.

[36] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[37] Interview with Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 22 May 2013; and email, 17 March 2013.

[38] Email from John Morse, Programme Manager, DDG, Kabul, 14 May 2013.

[39] Interview with Zekriya Payab, Deputy Director, OMAR, in Kabul, May 2013; and email, 1 July 2013.

[40] Interview with Haji Attiqullah, MCPA, Kabul; and email, 16 May 2013.

[41] Interview with Kefayatulah Eblagh, Director, ATC, in Kabul, 22 May 2013.

[42] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[43] Interview with Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 22 May 2013; and email, 17 March 2013.

[44] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[45] Interview with Mohammad Daud Farahi, Executive Manager of Plan and Operations, DAFA, Kabul, 18 May 2013.

[46] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[47] EODT, “EMCPA presentation,” May 2013; and interview with David Edwards, Operations Manager, Emirates Mine Clearance Program Afghanistan (EMCPA), Kabul 5 May 2013.

[49] ICBL Critique on Afghanistan Article 5 Extension Request, undated but March 2012.

[50] Interview with Mohammed Sediq Rashid, MACCA, and with Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, Kabul, 19 May 2013; and interviews with IPs, Kabul, 15−24 May 2013.

[51] Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 17 March 2013; and “HALO Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Task: Kabul International Airport 02−05 December 2012,” received by email from HALO, Kabul, 7 August 2013.

[53] Ibid., p. 194.

[54] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[55] Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 17 March 2013.

[56] HALO distinguishes between UXO and stray ammunition, referring to items that have not been fired. Its total of UXO destroyed in 2012 includes 28,439 items of stray ammunition. Email from Dave True, HALO, 15 September 2013. MACCA database reported HALO BAC cleared 28,982 UXO items. Email from David True, HALO, 15 September 2013.

[57] Press release, “Sterling Global Operations awarded Afghanistan-wide demining and battle area clearance contract,” Sterling Global Operations, Lenoir City, USA, 5 February 2013.

[58] Interviews with Zekria Payab, OMAR, Kabul, 22 May 2013; and with Graham Middleton, CWD Project Manager, Sterling International Group, Kabul, 21 May 2013.

[59] Interview with MACCA, Kabul, 7 and 9 May 2012; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2012, pp. 104−112.

[60] Email from Ajmal Safi, MACCA, 12 June 2013.

[61] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, Kabul, 11 March 2013.

[62] Interview with Mohammad Shohab Hakimi, Director, MDC, Kabul, 16 May 2013.