Korea, South

Last Updated: 07 October 2013

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Korea did not make any statements on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2012 or the first half of 2013. In 2009, an official said, “The Republic of Korea fully recognizes the need to reduce humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions,” but “due to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, my government is unable to take an active stance on the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of all cluster munitions.”[1] In December 2008, South Korea stated, “We value the intent of the [convention], but considering the current relations between the North and the South, we can’t sign it.”[2] South Korea has also described cluster munitions as legitimate weapons that are “efficient…in deterring enemy attacks.”[3]

South Korea has previously expressed support for a Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) protocol on cluster munitions “that strikes the right balance between humanitarian considerations and legitimate security needs.”[4] It is not known if South Korea is reviewing its position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions following the November 2011 failure of the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference to conclude the draft protocol on cluster munitions.

South Korea did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] South Korea did attend the convention’s Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008 as an observer and made a statement.

South Korea has not participated in any meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2008.

A local peace group called “Weapon Zero Team” has undertaken several actions to call on the South Korean government to ban cluster munitions.[6]

South Korea is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In April 2012, South Korea confirmed that it has not used cluster munitions.[7] It produces rockets, bombs, and projectiles containing submunitions and has licensed the production of artillery projectiles containing submunitions in Pakistan. South Korea has also exported cluster munitions. It has imported and licensed the production of cluster munitions from the United States (US). It is thought to possess a significant stockpile of cluster munitions.

Production

In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense said that “South Korea stopped production of old types of cluster munitions,” and the “cluster munitions currently in production have a high level of reliability and most are equipped with [self-destruct] mechanisms.”[8] According to a US diplomatic cable dated May 2007, a senior Ministry of National Defense official informed the US that “more than 90 percent” of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions were of the non-self-destructing kind and “the cost of retrofitting them would be prohibitive.”[9] In August 2008, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a directive requiring that it only acquire cluster munitions with self-deactivation devices and a 1% or lower failure rate, and recommending “the development of alternative weapon systems which could potentially replace cluster munitions in the long run.”[10]

Two companies in South Korea, Hanwha and Poongsan, produce cluster munitions.[11] Hanwha has acknowledged that it has produced M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets for the Hydra-70 air-to-ground rocket system, as well as KCBU-58B cluster bombs.[12] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that Hanwha produced 42,800 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) extended-range (base bleed) 155mm artillery projectiles in 2011.[13]

Poongsan’s website has advertised a 155mm projectile containing 88 submunitions designated DPICM TP, and another 155mm projectile with submunitions designated DPICM K305.[14] In April 2009, Poongsan listed among its products the following two types of 155mm artillery projectiles that contain submunitions: K308 DPICM TP, containing 88 K224 submunitions, and K310 DPICM B/B, containing 49 K221 submunitions.[15]

Poongsan entered into a licensed production agreement with Pakistan Ordnance Factories in November 2004 to co-produce K310 155mm extended-range (base bleed) DPICM projectiles in Pakistan at Wah Cantonment. While the ammunition is primarily being produced for Pakistan’s army, the two firms will also co-market the projectiles to export customers.[16]

The US concluded a licensing agreement with South Korea in 2001 for production of DPICM submunitions for multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets.[17]

According to the 2012 NGO report “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” at least 22 Korean financial entities are involved in investments in manufacturers of cluster munitions. Hanwha receives funds from at least 16 Korean financial entities, including six US financial entities, one in the United Kingdom, and one in Switzerland. Poongsan receives investment from at least 15 Korean financial entities, including eight US financial entities, two in France, and one each in Switzerland and Singapore.[18]

Transfers

South Korea has imported a variety of cluster munitions from the US. It is known to possess M26 rockets, M26A1 extended-range rockets, and ATACMS missiles for its MLRS launchers. Between 1993 and 1999, the US provided 393 M26A1 extended-range rocket pods, 271 M26 rocket pods, 111 ATACMS-1 missiles, and 111 ATACMS missiles.[19] South Korea also stockpiles several artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions (M483A1, M864, and M509A1) imported from the US.[20] In 2001, the US supplied South Korea with 16 each of the following cluster bombs: CBU-87, CBU-97, CBU-103, and CBU-105.[21] Jane’s Information Group lists it as possessing CBU-87 and Rockeye cluster bombs.[22]

In December 2011, Korea’s National Assembly set aside 236 billion won (US$205 million) for the procurement of some 350 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons from the US.[23] On 1 June 2012, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible sale of 367 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons at an estimated cost of $325 million including associated parts, equipment, and logistical support. The agreement requires “a statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea that the cluster munitions and cluster munitions technology will be used only against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[24] While US law bans the export of nearly all US cluster munitions, it permits the export of the CBU-105 version of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon, since this variant meets a 99% submunition reliability criteria. The Convention on Cluster Munitions bans sensor-fuzed weapons.

In March 2008, Hanwha apparently exported an unknown quantity of M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rockets (each containing nine M73 submunitions) to Pakistan.[25]

Stockpile

The current size and content of South Korea’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In 2005, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense acknowledged that it “maintains stockpiles of old types of cluster munitions with a high failure rate” and stated, “[t]here are currently no plans to upgrade these holdings … Equipping old types of submunitions with [self-destruct] mechanisms is not considered feasible due to technical and financial problems.”[26] In April 2012, South Korea informed the Monitor that it had destroyed 27 cluster munitions during the previous year.[27]

 



[1] Statement of South Korea, UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 11 October 2009.

[2] “Facing military confrontation, South Korea clings to cluster munitions,” Mainichi Daily News, 8 December 2008. For more details on South Korea’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 217–219.

[3] Statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 14 January 2008.

[4] Statement of South Korea, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/598BFE96A43EFC24C1257965005ADFE7/$file/4thRevCon_KOREA.pdf.

[5] In September 2011, Wikileaks released a United States (US) Department of State cable from January 2007 that stated that South Korea apparently considered participating in the first meeting of the Oslo Process as an observer, because it was reportedly concerned that the cluster munition “issue will be co-opted just as the landmine issue was in the Ottawa process.” “ROKG supportive of US position on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 07SEOUL219 dated 23 January 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07SEOUL219&q=cluster munitions. In September 2011, Wikileaks released five US Department of State cables from 2007 that showed that South Korean officials discussed the Oslo Process on several occasions with officials from the US government. In February 2007, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official reportedly told US officials that the South Korean government decided against attending the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions in February 2007 because of its “understanding that the United Kingdom and the United States would not attend.” “ROKG will not attend Oslo CM conference,” US Department of State cable 07SEOUL374 dated 7 February 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07SEOUL374&q=cluster munitions.

[6] See Weapon Zero Team website, www.wzero.org/ (in Korean).

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. South Korea has stated on several occasions that it has never used cluster munitions. See statement by Amb. Dong-hee Chang, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 7 July 2008.

[8] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[9] The Ministry of National Defense reportedly informed the US that “the ROK military was not in a position to dismantle its current CM stockpiles, prohibit CM production or development, or replace their stockpiles with effective alternative weapon systems for at least the next 20 years.” “ROKG supports USG cluster munitions policy,” US Department of State cable07SEOUL1329 dated 7 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07SEOUL1329.html.

[10] Statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee, New York, 11 October 2009. See also statement of South Korea, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 November 2008; and statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee, New York, 30 October 2008.

[11] Both companies were excluded from investment under the Norwegian Petroleum Fund’s ethical guidelines for producing cluster munitions, Poongsan in December 2006 and Hanwha in January 2008. For more details on production by these companies, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[12] Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation on exclusion of the companies Rheinmetall AG and Hanwha Corp.,” 15 May 2007.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The response also stated that Hanwha produced 6,150 227mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) during the year.

[14] Letter from Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund –  Global to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Recommendation of 6 September 2006,” 6 September 2006.

[15] Poongsan, “Defense Products, Howitzer Ammunition,” www.poongsan.co.kr.

[16] “Pakistan Ordnance Factory and S. Korean Firm Sign Ammunition Pact,” Asia Pulse (Karachi), 24 November 2006.

[17] Notification to Congress pursuant to Section 36 (c) and (d) of the Arms Export Control Act, Transmittal No. DTC 132–00, 4 April 2001, www.pmddtc.state.gov.

[18] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” June 2012, pp.18−22, www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org/uploads/pdf/5.%20Worldwide%20investments%20in%20cluster%20munitions;%20a%20shared%20responsibility%20June%202012.pdf.

[19] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Notifications to Congress of Pending U.S. Arms Transfers,” “Foreign Military Sales,” “Direct Commercial Sales,” and “Excess Defense Articles” databases, www.dsca.osd.mil. M26 rockets each contain 644 submunitions, and there are six rockets to a pod. M26A1 rockets have 518 submunitions each. ATACMS-1 missiles have 950 submunitions each.

[20] M483A1 shells have 88 submunitions, whereas M864 have 72 submunitions.

[21] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Republic of Korea - F-15E/K Aircraft Munitions and Avionics,” Press release, 15 February 2001, www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/02152001korea.htm. It also provided 45 AGM-54 joint stand-off weapons (JSOW) bombs, but it is not known if these were the version with submunitions.

[22] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 841. CBU-87 bombs have 202 submunitions, and Rockeye cluster bombs have 247 submunitions.

[23] Lee Tae-hoon, “Seoul to buy 350 advanced cluster bombs,” The Korea Times, 13 December 2011, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/12/116_100728.html.

[24] “Republic of Korea – CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” DSCA News Release No. 12-23, 4 June 2012, www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2012/Korea_12.23.pdf. This statement is required by the US law that bans the export of cluster munitions other than sensor-fuzed weapons.

[25] See HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 219.

[26] Communication from the Ministry of National Defense through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in Geneva to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands, 3 June 2005.

[27] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The question asked if any old or unstable cluster munitions had been destroyed during the year.