[1] Statement of the Russian Federation, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 24 November 2011. Notes by Human Rights Watch (HRW).

[2] Statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov, Head of the Russian Delegation, CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before 2010, Russia argued that the humanitarian problems associated with cluster munition use are “mythical” and asserted that submunitions can be accurately targeted to minimize civilian damage. Presentation of the Russian Federation, “Cluster Weapons: Real or Mythical Threat,” CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 2–12 August 2005, p. 3.

[3] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols.” Statement by Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006.

[4] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer (in Brussels in October 2007). For details on Russia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[5] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the CMC. See letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CMC, 18 September 2009. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[6] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” UN Security Council, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[7] David McHugh, “Troops in Ukraine strike back at rebels; Putin pushes truce,” Boston Globe, 4 July 2014.

[8] “Ukraine used phosphorous incendiaries, cluster bombs against cities – Russian military,” RT, 25 July 2014.

[9] Mennonite Central Committee, “Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons,” June 1999, p. 5. Additionally, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts that resulted from the breakup of the Soviet Union in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The degree of involvement of Russian forces in the use of cluster munitions is not known but cannot be discounted.

[10] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, Chapter 3.

[11] See HRW, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009.

[12] Ibid; and see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233.

[13] The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Russian authorities with a report by an independent commission that investigated the incident and concluded that a Russian cluster munition strike killed Storimans. “Verslag onderzoeksmissie Storimans” (“Storimans commission of inquiry report”), 24 October 2008.

[14] Jeroen Akkermans, “Het kan Rusland in feite geen barst schelen” (“Russia actually doesn’t give a damn”), RT Nieuws, 10 July 2013.

[15] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[16] The primary sources for information on Russian companies that produce cluster munitions are Jane’s Air Launched Weapons and Jane’s Ammunition Handbook. Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket details the numerous types of rockets it produced.

[17] Unless otherwise footnoted with supplementary information, the source is Jane’s Information Group.

[18] The Georgian Ministry of Defense reports having RBK-500 cluster munitions and BKF blocks of submunitions that are carried in KMG-U dispensers, but told HRW that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated for destruction. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Georgian Ministry of Defense, 12 February 2009.

[19] In February 2006, India bought 28 launch units for the 300mm Smerch multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) fitted with dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) and sensor-fuzed submunitions. “India, Russia sign $500mn [sic] rocket systems deal,” Indo-Asian News Service (New Delhi), 9 February 2006.

[20] In 1995, Kuwait was the first export customer for the Russian produced 300mm Smerch MLRS fitted with DPCIM and sensor-fuzed submunitions, buying 27 launch units. “Kuwait to get smart submunitions for Smerch MRL,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April 1995.

[21] HRW observed PTAB submunitions at the abandoned ammunitions storage depot at Mizdah during a visit in March 2012. See HRW, “Statement on Explosive Remnants of War in Libya and Implementation of CCW Protocol V,” 25 April 2012. In addition, deminers from the Mines Advisory Group encountered dud PTAB submunitions about 20 miles from Ajdjabiya. See CJ Chivers, “More Evidence of Cluster-Bomb Use Discovered in Libya,” At War blog, 13 February 2012.

[22] The Polish Air Force possesses “BKF expendable unit loader with anti-tank, incendiary and fragmentation bomblets, imported from USSR.” Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Director, Security Policy Department, Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs to HRW, 10 March 2009.

[23] Remnants of numerous types of Russian/Soviet cluster munitions have been documented: RBK series air-dropped bombs containing AO-1SCh, PTAB-2.5M, and ShOAB-0.5 submunitions; AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions dispersed by KMGU dispensers; submunitions from 220mm 9M27K Uragan rockets; and, submunitions from 300mm 9M55K Smerch rockets. See HRW, “Technical Briefing Note: Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 4 April 2014.

[24] Presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version)” on Ukraine’s Defense Capacity, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 30 March 2011.

[25] The Houthi Administration in Saada Governorate  provided VICE News with still photographs showing remnants of Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs with its associated antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions. Multiple emails from Ben Anderson, Correspondent and Producer, VICE News, May 2014.

[26] For example, independent journalist Aris Roussinos filmed and photographed a failed RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb near the village of Ongolo in South Kodorfan in April 2012. See HRW, “Sudan: Cluster Bomb Found in Conflict Zone,” 25 May 2012.

[27] Bulgaria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013. Bulgaria has declared RBK series bombs containing a variety of submunition types, including 488 RBK-250 bombs with 20,538 PTAB-2.5M, 238 RBK 250-275 bombs containing 35,700 AO-1SCh submunitions, one RBK-250-275 bomb with AO-2.5SCh submunitions, 60 RBK-250 bombs with 2,880 ZAB-2.5SM, 201 RBK-500 bombs with 12,060 AO-2.5RT, 86 RBK-500 bombs with 4,725 ZAB-2.5SM, 36 RBK-500 bombs with 20,340 SHOAB-0.5M, and three RBK-500 bombs with 1,695 SHOAB-0.5. It also declares eight warheads for 9N123K surface-to-surface missiles, and 400 9N24 submunitions.

[28] Statement of Côte d’Ivoire, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, Switzerland, 17 April 2013. Côte d’Ivoire destroyed a total of 68 RBK-250-275 cluster bombs, each containing 150 AO-1SCh submunitions, between 28 January 2013 and 6 February 2013, with the assistance of the UN Mine Action Service.

[29] Croatia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B and C, 2 May 2013 and Forms B and C, 10 April 2012. Croatia has declared a stockpile that includes RBK series bombs: nine RBK-250 bombs containing 415 PTAB-2.5M submunitions, five RBK-250-275 bombs containing 897 AO-1SCh submunitions, and 44 RBK-250 bombs containing 2,112 ZAB-2.5M submunitions.

[30] Czech Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 August 2012. Prior to its destruction, the Czech Republic’s stockpile included 191 RBK-500 cluster bombs (containing PTAB-2.5, AO-10, and AO-2.5RT submunitions) and 289 BFK cartridges or “blocks” containing AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5 submunitions for KMG-U dispensers.

[31] Hungary, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 April 2013. Hungary has declared the destruction of 287 cluster bombs containing a total of 3,954 submunitions of three types: 247 BKF blocks containing 2,964 AO-2.5 submunitions, 23 BKF blocks containing 276 PTAB-2.5KO submunitions, and 17 RBK-250 cluster bombs containing 714 PTAB-2.5M submunitions.

[32] FYR Macedonia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B and C, 2 May 2013. FYR Macedonia has declared a stockpile of 40,376 submunitions: 23,000 KB-2 submunitions and 17,376 AO-2.5RT submunitions contained in BKF cartridges.

[33] Moldova, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 January 2011. Moldova reported destroying a stockpile of 1,385 cluster munitions with more than 27,000 submunitions in July 2010, including RBK series bombs containing PTAB, AO-2.5, and AO-1SCh submunitions. It also destroyed 473 9M27K rockets, each containing 30 9N210 self-destructing submunitions and 834 3-O-13 artillery projectiles, each containing eight O-16 submunitions.

[34] Mozambique, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, June 2012. Mozambique has declared a stockpile of 97 RBK-250 bombs containing 14,550 AO-1SCh submunitions and 193 RBK-250 bombs, each containing 8,106 PTAB submunitions.

[35] Peru declared a stockpile containing 388 RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh bombs containing 58,200 AO-1SCh submunitions. Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 August 2013.

[36] HRW press release, “Syria: Mounting Casualties from Cluster Munitions,” 16 March 2013.

[37] The New York Times correspondent C.J. Chivers noted: “The only charitable way to characterize that denial is to offer that perhaps Mr. Lavrov was engaging in misdirection by word play, as these weapons, by their date stamps, appeared to have been manufactured during the late Soviet period, and not during the period of the current, post-union Russian state.” The Gun blog, “Data Sharing: The ATK-EB Fuze,” 28 December 2012.

[38] All information in this table was extracted from Article 7 reports submitted so far by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and is available here. The RBK-250 bombs containing ZAB series incendiary submunitions are not covered by the Convention on Cluster Munitions because they contain incendiary submunitions.

[39] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[40] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.

[41] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[42] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House “Arms and Technologies;” and Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia, ‘Russia’s Arms and Technologies,’ Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions,” CD Version 2006; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air–Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 414–415, and 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, and 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” Military Parade: Moscow, 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, and 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise corporate website.