Syria
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Policy
The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
The Syrian government made its first and last statement on the matter of accession in September 2011, when a representative informed a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that Syria views cluster munitions as “criminalized by humanity” and said “we appreciate the international effort to ban these weapons but cannot sign due to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.”[1]
Syria did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Since 2008, it has attended just one meeting of the convention, when it participated as an observer in the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in 2011.
Syria is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Production, transfer, and stockpiling
Syria is not known to have produced cluster munitions.
Based on evidence of cluster munition use by government forces in the period since in 2012, Syria has imported or received at least seven types of cluster munitions made by two countries:
· Six types of cluster munitions manufactured by the Soviet Union (now Russia): air dropped RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M, RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh, and RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 bombs, as well as ground-launched 9M55K 300mm Smerch rockets containing 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, 9M27K 220mm Uragan rockets, and KMGU dispensers containing PTAB-2.5KO bomblets.[2]
· 122mm surface-fired rockets produced by Egypt that contain dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[3]
In addition, the use of a DPICM-type submunition of unknown delivery method and origin called “ZP-39” on the basis of its markings was documented in the first half of 2014.
It is not known when Syria imported the cluster munition stockpile or in what quantities.[4]
Use
From July 2012 until July 2014, at least 249 cluster munitions have been used in multiple locations across 10 of Syria’s 14 governorates, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).[5] This analysis provides an indication of the scale of cluster munition use, but the data is incomplete as not all remnants are likely to have been recorded and the actual number of cluster munitions used in Syria is most probably much higher. At least seven types of cluster munitions have been used in the Syria conflict, including air-dropped bombs, dispensers fixed to aircraft, and ground-launched rockets, and at least nine types of explosive submunitions, as shown by the following table.[6]
Cluster munitions used in Syria (July 2012–June 2014)
|
Type of cluster munition |
First use |
|
RBK-250-275 cluster bomb, each containing 150 AO-1SCh submunitions |
July 2012 |
|
RBK-250 cluster bomb, each containing 30 PTAB-2.5M fragmentation submunitions |
August 2012 |
|
122mm SAKR surface-to-surface rockets, each containing either 72 or 98 submunitions |
December 2012 |
|
RBK-500 cluster bomb, each containing 565 ShOAB-0.5 submunitions |
March 2013 |
|
BKF cartridges containing 96 PTAB-2.5KO submunitions |
May 2013 |
|
AO-2.5RT submunitions (delivery system not known) |
June 2013 |
|
9M55K 300mm rockets, each containing 72 9N235 fragmentation submunitions |
February 2014 |
|
9M27K-series 220mm rockets, each containing an unknown submunition |
February 2014 |
|
“ZP-39” DPICM-like submunition (delivery system not known) |
April 2014 |
Initial reports of cluster munition use emerged in mid-2012 and then increased sharply in October 2012 as the government intensified its air campaign on rebel-held areas with the use of RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets.[7] The Syrian government continued to use air-dropped cluster bombs in 2013 and 2014, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions. Use of AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions was also recorded, but the delivery system was not clear.[8]
At the end of 2012, the first use of ground-launched cluster munitions was recorded when Syrian government forces used multi-barrel rocket launchers to deliver Egyptian-made 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM-like submunitions with distinctive white ribbons.[9] In early 2014, the use of 9M55K and 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms was first documented.[10] HRW attributed the use to the Syrian government.[11]
Video footage of another DPICM-like submunition with a red ribbon was reportedly filmed in the village of Maliha in rural Damascus in early April 2014 and again in the town of al-Waziyeh southeast of Homs on 22 July 2014.[12] From its markings, arms experts have called the weapon as a “ZP-39” submunition, but its origin and the delivery system used are not known. Markings on the submunitions indicate they were manufactured in 1993, making them more recently produced than the RBK-series cluster bombs, but still old stock at more than 20 years of age.[13]
The Syrian military initially denied possessing or using cluster munitions and the government has continued to deny its use of the weapons.[14] As of July 2014, it does not appear that cluster munitions have been used by opposition rebel groups, but there is some evidence of unexploded submunitions being used as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by some rebel groups.[15] The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage and public outcry. By 1 July 2014, a total of 142 states had condemned the Syrian government’s use of cluster munitions in national statements and/or by supporting joint statements or resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and others.[16]
At least 33 of these states have made national statements to express concern and condemn the use, including foreign ministers from Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Norway, and UK.[17]
Almost all of these countries and another 113 states have expressed concern at the cluster munition use by voting in favor of UNGA resolutions on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic during 2013 that included specific references to the use of cluster munitions in Syria:
· On 18 December 2013, the UNGA adopted Resolution 68/182, expressing “outrage” at the “continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights” in Syria “including those involving the use of…cluster munitions.” Drafted by Saudi Arabia, Resolution 68/182 was passed by 127 votes in favor, 13 against, and 47 abstentions.[18]
· On 15 May 2013, a total of 107 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 67/262 that included a strong condemnation of “the use by the Syrian authorities of...cluster munitions.”[19]
At the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2013, the matter of Syria’s continued cluster munition use was a key concern. During the meeting, 31 countries, in addition to the European Union (EU) and the UN, made statements expressing concern or condemning the cluster munition use in Syria, including Ghana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Togo for the first time.[20] The meeting adopted the Lusaka Progress Report, which found that “Reactions have been particularly vocal with regard to the sustained use of cluster munitions in the Syrian Arab Republic” and noted the “large number of States Parties and States not Parties have condemned or otherwise expressed concern with the use of cluster munitions in Syria in 2012 and 2013.”[21]
Norway, as the President of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, made multiple statements condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including in September 2013, when it welcomed the widespread condemnations of use and said that the condemnations “underline the extent to which the use of cluster munitions today is considered illegitimate, and unbecoming of responsible members of the international community.”[22]
At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2013, the EU and several states expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in their national statements, including Ireland, France, Netherlands, Lithuania, Portugal, and the UK,.
A meeting of the “London 11” group of the “Friends on Syria” on 22 October 2013 issued a communiqué calling on the Syrian regime to “end the siege of urban areas and the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, in particular through air bombardment and the use of ballistic missiles, cluster bombs and explosive barrels.”[23]
At the April 2014 intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, several states expressed their concern at the continued use of cluster munitions in Syria, including New Zealand, Netherlands, and Norway. The CMC said it was “deeply concerned by continuing use of cluster munitions by Syrian government forces and the resulting toll of civilian casualties” and again called on Syria to immediately halt use, clear contaminated land, and join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[24]
[1] Statement of Syria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011.
[2] Additionally, AO-2.5RT submunitions have been identified, though it is unclear whether these were delivered by RBK-series bomb or KMGU dispensers.
[3] It is not known if Syria was the source for Chinese Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets fired by Hezbollah into northern Israel from southern Lebanon in July–August 2006.
[4] A review by Human Rights Watch (HRW) of the markings on the RBK-series air-dropped bombs and the submunitions contained inside them, as well as a comparison with the Soviet manuals for the weapons, show that they were manufactured at Soviet state munitions factories in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 9M55K 330mm cluster munition rocket was designed and initially manufactured by the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and then manufactured and exported by the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise “SPLAV State Research And Production Association” from 1991 onward. A decade ago, Jane’s Information Group listed Syria as possessing some of the RBK-series air-dropped bombs as well as the KMGU dispensers, indicating that the stocks used after 2012 were not newly-manufactured. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 846.
[5] Since 2012, HRW has systematically researched, recorded, and documented the use of cluster munitions in Syria. The information contained in this Monitor profile updates information previously provided in an April 2014 briefing note. See HRW, “Technical Briefing Note: Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 4 April 2014.
[6] In addition, ZAB incendiary submunitions delivered by RBK bombs have been used by government forces, but this weapon is not accounted for by the Monitor as it is not considered to be an explosive submunition covered by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. An incendiary weapon, the ZAB submunitions ignite after release from its container instead of detonating on, before, or after impact. For further information on Syria’s use of incendiary weapons, see HRW memorandum to CCW Delegates, “Syria Use of Incendiary Weapons,” November 2013.
[7] The 250-kilogram class RBK-series cluster bombs can be delivered by jet aircraft as well as rotary wing aircraft, such as Mi-24 and Mi-8 series helicopters. Brown Moses Blog, “Evidence of cluster bombs being deployed in Syria,” 10 July 2012; and HRW press release, “Syria: Evidence of Cluster Munitions Use by Syrian Forces,” New York, 12 July 2012.
[8] AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions are capable of being loaded into BKF cartridges and dispersed by KMG-U dispensers. The AO-2.5RT submunition can also be delivered by the RBK-500 cluster bomb.
[9] It is not known if the 122mm rockets are SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 variants, which contain 72 and 98 submunitions respectively. The design of the fuze system in this type of submunition makes it very sensitive and submunitions that fail to explode on initial impact are liable to detonate if disturbed. HRW press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” New York, 14 January 2013.
[10] Armament Research Services, “9M27K Series Cargo Rockets in Syria,” 22 February 2014.
[11] HRW stated, “It is highly unlikely that rebel forces could acquire the eight-wheeled, 43,700 kilogram launch vehicle or operate its sophisticated fire control system without significant training or time to conduct practice drills. There is no video evidence or written claims that any rebel group controls any BM-30 launchers, its similarly sized re-supply vehicle, or any 300mm surface-to-surface rockets like the 9M55K rocket.” HRW press release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014.
[12] Collective Awareness to UXO blog, “AP-39 Syria Unidentified Submunition,” undated. See also videos posted by Syrian activists at youtu.be/rRGRVM4qaC8 and youtu.be/kdpgLV5FKCE.
[13] See Brown Moses Blog, “The markings on what’s assumed to be a Sakr submunition suggests the designation is ZP39, made in 1993,” 4 April 2014; and and Wareham, Mary (marywareham). "Meanwhile cluster munitions still used in #Syria - unexploded submunition filmed near Homs: http://t.co/Q6yhCeW70x http://t.co/U28bYPCHxr" 22 Jul 2014, 21:21 UTC, tweet.
[14] According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stressed on [15 October 2012] that the misleading media outlets have recently published untrue news claiming the Syrian Arab Army has been using cluster bombs against terrorists.” According to SANA, “the General Command said the Syrian Army does not possess such bombs.” “Syria denies using cluster bombs,” CNN, 16 October 2012. In March 2013, Syrian diplomatic representatives denied the evidence of Syrian cluster bomb use. Letter from Firas al Rashidi, Charge d’affair ad interim, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic to Japan, to the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, 7 March 2013.
[15] A video uploaded to YouTube on 26 March 2014 reportedly of arms captured by government forces from rebel groups shows submunitions prepared for use as IEDs.
[16] The countries that have expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria come from 91 States Parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovia (BiH), Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 51 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia FS, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen). The Monitor does not count signatories to the Lome regional meeting declaration of May 2013, which expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in general and was endorsed by 36 African states including Angola, Congo Rep, Eritrea, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[17] National statements have also been made by States Parties and signatories Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, and Togo, as well as by representatives from states not party Cambodia, Qatar, and the United States. See also, CMC, “Cluster munition use in Syria,” undated, but 2014.
[18] The 127 countries that voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 68/182 were from 78 states parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, France, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 49 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, FS Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, UAE, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen). “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/182, 18 December 2013.
[19] The 107 countries that voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 67/262 were from 69 states parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, CAR, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, France, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the UK) and 38 non-signatories (Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, FS Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, UAE, Vanuatu, and Yemen). “The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/67/L.63, 15 May 2013.
[20] Albania, Austria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, Togo, and the UK. Notes by HRW.
[21] Lusaka Progress Report adopted by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, September 2013.
[22] See, for example: statement of the President of the Third Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Continued use of cluster munitions in Syria,” 22 March 2013.
[23] The London 11 Core Group of the Friends of Syria that met in London on 22 October 2013 to discuss Syria was comprised of 11 countries: four States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (France, Germany, Italy, and the UK), and seven states not party (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States). London 11 Final Communiqué.
[24] Statement of the CMC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 7 April 2014.