Contamination and Impact

Overall Mine Action Performance: AVERAGE[1]

Mine contamination in the Republic of Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan were mined by Russian and Uzbek forces in 1991–1998 while the central region of the country was contaminated as a result of the 1992–1997 internal conflict. A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated the area of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination at 50km².[2]

As of January 2013, the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) had reduced total suspect hazardous area (SHA) to 7.2km² through non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), and clearance, of which 4.9km² of SHAs were along Tajikistan’s Afghan border and almost 2.3km² were in the central region.[3] In September 2013, however, TMAC unexpectedly revised its estimate of remaining contamination to almost 11.7km² of contaminated land: 9.3km² of mined area and almost 2.4km² of battle area.[4] The basis for this new estimate was unclear.

In March 2014, TMAC reiterated its estimate of contaminated area of 11.7km², but claimed that 8.9km² contained mines while 2.8km² contained ERW. No cluster munition-contaminated area is now reported by TMAC.[5] The estimates did not, however, include area covered by 110 minefield records that were made public for the first time by TMAC in September 2013.[6] According to TMAC, survey of the areas covered by these records would take place in 2014.[7] The 110 records concern areas where security constraints have prevented survey activities in the past.[8]

In 1992–2012, TMAC recorded 846 mine/ERW casualties (368 killed, 478 injured). Of that total, almost 30% were children (101 killed and another 142 injured) and 88 were women.[9]

Mine Action Program

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) is Tajikistan’s national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government’s socio-economic development policies.[10]

In June 2003, the government of Tajikistan and UNDP established the TMAC with the intention that it would become a nationally-owned program in the near future.[11] TMAC was made responsible for coordination and monitoring of all mine action activities.[12] Since then, TMAC has acted as the executive body of the CIIHL to which it reports.[13]

Tajikistan’s mine action program is not yet fully nationally-owned.[14] TMAC has no legal status and does not report directly to a government ministry. Lack of legal recognition has presented problems for TMAC.[15] For example, without legal status, TMAC cannot open a bank account to receive and disburse funds.[16] The importance of clarifying TMAC’s status was also highlighted in the 2012 evaluation of UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan.[17] The Ministry of Justice is leading the government effort in nationalizing TMAC, and a commission has been established to study the issue and make recommendations on the structure of the center. A decision was expected sometime in 2014.[18]

The Ministry of Defense plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With the adoption by the Ministry of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–2016) in July 2013, the ministry focuses on three main objectives: to further support humanitarian demining; enhance national capacities; and create the conditions for a sound national mine action program.[19]

Following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009, the ministry established a Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU). Since 2010, the OSCE has supported the HDU via the Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST). The UST was contracted by the OSCE in order to provide project management and administrative support to the HDU in 2010–13.[20]

FSD and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are the two international demining operators in Tajikistan. FSD started its operations in 2003. Since then, it has conducted surveys (in 2004–2005 and 2007–2009) and clearance; provided technical assistance to TMAC; and, by November 2012, supported the development of UST’s capacity.[21] NPA started operations in Tajikistan after signing an MOU with the government in 2010. NPA’s arrival significantly increased the demining capacity of Tajikistan’s mine action program and made a positive impact on clearance output.[22]

The OSCE Office in Tajikistan has been supporting mine action since 2003. OSCE’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: supporting national capacity building in humanitarian demining and fostering regional cooperation in borders management and security issues.[23] Its work focused on supporting the government in cooperation with neighboring states and fostering dialogue through a regional mine action cooperation project in Central Asia.[24]

Strategic planning

In May 2011, the national mine action strategic plan (NMASP) for 2010–2015 was approved by the government.[25] Among the plan’s specific objectives, TMAC was to ensure that all priority areas—7.5 km² of SHAs—are cleared by the end of 2015; that survey activities could initiate along the Tajik-Uzbek border; and that a plan for nationalization of TMAC is established.[26] According to the NMASP, TMAC was to be fully nationalized by the end of 2011. As of April 2014, however, TMAC was still not established as a national entity, remaining a nationally-executed UNDP project.[27]

During the Mid-Term Review workshop (MTR) on the NMASP in Dushanbe in June 2013, nationalization of Tajikistan’s mine action center was discussed at length. As a consequence of the review, a revised national strategic plan was expected, with a clear and definite plan for TMAC’s nationalization.[28] As of April 2014, however, a revised national strategy was still awaited.

In collaboration with the EU and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), TMAC organized an Article 5 completion workshop in Dushanbe in September 2013. The aim was to clarify the extent of remaining contamination, and to agree on a work plan to achieve Tajikistan’s Article 5 clearance deadline in 2020. TMAC committed to revise its completion work plan (2014–20).[29]As of April 2014, the plan was still under development.[30]

According to the GICHD, there is little commitment from the government to assume ownership of the mine action program.[31] Unless UNDP acts effectively, the GICHD sees a real risk of no real progress in the nationalization process in the near future.[32]

Land Release

Survey in 2013

No areas were cancelled by NTS in 2013.[33] Following an operational efficiency assessment in June 2013, the GICHD recommended NTS in the districts bordering Uzbekistan. Survey activities were conducted by FSD to confirm if SHAs were on Uzbek territory.[34] Survey was completed at the end of 2013. FSD, jointly with TMAC, concluded that no contaminated areas were located in Tajikistan.[35]

Clearance in 2013

In 2013, FSD, NPA, and the Ministry of Defense’s HDU released 47 contaminated areas covering 2.97km² of land. During clearance operations, 22,486 antipersonnel mines, 3 antivehicle mines, and 872 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were destroyed. Of the 2.97km² of land released, 2.01km² were released by clearance and 0.94km² by TS. No battle area clearance (BAC) was conducted in 2013.[36]

Release of mined area in 2013

Note: MoD = Ministry of Defense

TMAC had planned to release 2km² of contaminated land in 2013. It expected to release another 2km² of contaminated land in 2014.[37] In 2014, demining activities were planned to be concentrated in the central region.[38]

In the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared a total of 6.75km² of mined area.

Mine clearance in 2009–13 (km²)

Capacity

As of April 2014, three demining operators in Tajikistan comprised capacity of one survey team, thirteen manual demining teams, five mine detection dog (MDD) teams, and three mechanical demining machines.[39]

From 2012 to 2014, FSD capacity decreased from seven to two manual demining teams. Due to lack of funding, it was expected that FSD would close its program in Tajikistan by the end of 2014 after handing over its capacity to a local NGO.[40] In the same period, NPA capacity increased from six to eight manual demining teams. In addition, in April 2014 NPA deployed an additional demining team consisting entirely of women.[41] Due to the type of contamination in Tajikistan, the NPA’s MDD team (10 dogs) was cancelled.[42]

In 2013, the OSCE financed the operational costs of the HDU’s Mini MineWolf, which was procured and delivered by the United States (US) Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing program in 2012.[43] Between 2012 and 2013, the HDU increased its demining capacity by adding a manual demining team, which has been financed by the US’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and by Luxembourg via the OSCE Office in Tajikistan.[44]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020.

In granting the request, the States Parties noted that, while no demining had taken place until more than four years after entry into force, since that time significant progress has been made, particularly by release of land through resurvey. The States Parties further noted that use of mechanical demining assets might enable Tajikistan to “find itself in a situation wherein it could proceed with implementation much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested.” The Analysing Group mandated to analyze extension requests under Article 5 of the treaty had also noted shortcomings in Tajikistan’s original estimate of the size and locations of mined areas and recognition by Tajikistan of the need for resurvey.

More recently, the extent to which Tajikistan is making best efforts to complete its Article 5 obligations is unclear, in particular given the significant increase in suspected mined area in 2013.

Support for Mine Action

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan budget for 2010–15 was estimated at US$30 million.[45] In 2012, international contributions came from five states, UNDP, and the OSCE for a total of US$6.6 million. Germany, Norway, and the US provided two-thirds of the funding while NPA and FSD were the main recipients of support.[46] In 2012, Tajikistan reported contributing US$700,000 toward its mine action program.[47]

In 2012, the US Department of State PM/WRA provided US$1.7 million to Tajikistan for mine action and conventional weapons destruction activities. These funds were channeled through international organizations, namely, FSD, NPA, and the OSCE.[48] In addition, through the US Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense received the Mini MineWolf, currently operated by the HDU.[49]

 In 2013, the mine action sector in Tajikistan received almost US$3 million less than the previous year. Total international funding decreased from US$7.3 million in 2012 to US$4.5 million in 2013. The government of Tajikistan provided to its national mine action program only technical contribution but not financial support.[50] Germany and Norway were the major donors in 2013, contributing more than half of the total funding between them. As in 2012, NPA, FSD, and TMAC were the main recipients of funds.[51] Additionally, in 2013 the OSCE office in Tajikistan channeled funds for US$681,010 directed to mine action, capacity building, regional cooperation, and borders management.[52]

In 2014, TMAC was expecting to receive less funding. As of March 2014, committed funding was about US$3.4 million. Germany was providing FSD with €300,000 for handover of capacity to a local NGO.[53] But donors had not committed to support Tajikistan’s MDD and mechanical demining teams. TMAC feared lack of funds would affect land release in 2014 and that its target of releasing 2km² might not be achieved.[54]

In 2014, NPA was expecting to receive less funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, NPA planned to increase its demining capacity by adding a female demining team funded by the US Department of State PM/WRA.[55]

The OSCE in Tajikistan was expecting to receive more funding for 2014.[56] Funding allocated by the OSCE Unified Budget for 2014 was estimated at US$360,000, while extra funds are planned via the OSCE extra-budgetary projects estimated at about US$560,000.[57]

Recommendations

·         Tajikistan should survey the new 110 minefield records as soon as possible so as to clarify the actual extent of mine/ERW contamination.

·         It should then revise its Article 5 completion work plan and its mine action strategic plan for the period 2014–20 with precise and clear milestones.

·         In order to improve operational efficiency and strategic planning, TMAC and the Tajik government must enhance their commitment to assume full ownership of the national mine action program.