The Sri Lankan government
has been engaged in an intense civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) since 1983. Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been
used extensively by the LTTE in the conflict. Government forces have also used
antipersonnel mines.
Most of the conflict has taken place in the northern and eastern provinces
which are heavily contaminated with
landmines.[1] One severely
mined area is the Jaffna peninsula, which the government now controls and is
encouraging resettlement of people displaced by the war. The UN Development
Program (UNDP) noted in 1998, “Landmines laid by both the Sri Lankan
military and by the Armed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have caused
increasing numbers of civilian deaths and casualties particularly as returnees
begin to rehabilitate their dwellings and to re-cultivate gardens and fields.
Naturally, many innocent children become
victims.”[2] Fighting,
and use of antipersonnel mines by both sides, continues to this day.
Mine Ban Policy
Sri Lanka has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty.
Government officials say that Sri Lanka is opposing the ban for internal
security reasons. ''Sri Lanka welcomes, in principle, a verifiable ban on APLMs
[antipersonnel landmines] but is not in a position to accede to such a treaty in
the near future due to legitimate national security requirements arising out of
the current situation.”[3]
At the ban treaty signing ceremony in Ottawa in December 1997, the Sri Lankan
representative said, “As a matter of principle the Government of Sri Lanka
welcomes a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines as it has a laudable
humanitarian goal. However, such as ban should certainly encompass the use of
antipersonnel mines by security forces as well as by terrorist groups like the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam.”[4]
The representative continued, “The Government of Sri Lanka is therefore
conscious of the fact that antipersonnel mines are a legitimate defense weapon
in the context of protecting the security forces installations against the
threat caused by terrorist groups. Further, at a time when Sri Lankan armed
forces are engaged in a war with the LTTE terrorists...it is not conducive for
Sri Lanka to be a signatory to a convention which totally prohibits the
production, use, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel
mines.”[5] Some observers
believe that the government is unlikely to agree to a treaty banning landmine
use by states until the question of IEDs and use by non-state actors in internal
armed conflicts is satisfactorily
addressed.[6]
Sri Lanka attended the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, including
the negotiations in Oslo and the treaty signing in Ottawa, but always as an
observer, not a full participant. At the Vienna conference in February 1997 to
discuss elements of a ban treaty, out of the 111 governments attending, Sri
Lanka was one of only four who spoke openly of their continued need to use
antipersonnel mines.[7] Yet,
Sri Lanka voted “yes” on the pro-ban UNGA Resolutions in 1996, 1997,
and 1998, indicating its support at some level for a ban at some point in time.
Sri Lanka has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Sri Lanka is a
member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a notable proponent or
opponent of mine negotiations in that forum.
Use
The LTTE were originally trained in use of mines
and IEDs by Indian security forces and later used these techniques with great
effect against them during 1987-90. The LTTE are considered among the most
skilled in the world in improvised explosives
use.[8] According to a U.S.
government report, “The separatists mine specific routes used by
government forces, and usually warn the local population, thereby lowering
civilian casualties.”[9]
They use pressure mines captured from government forces as well as their
homemade mines and IEDs.[10]
Use has been particularly heavy in the northern and eastern regions.
In February 1999, Sri Lankan officials were quoted as saying they could not
sign the ban treaty because the armed forces fighting Tamil rebels heavily
depend on various types of
mines.[11] The government has
used mines to defend localities against rebel ambushes and raids. The UNDP has
noted that government forces have laid two types of antipersonnel mines: Chinese
Type 72A and Pakistani P4. It has also said, “Although minefield
records have been produced they are rarely accurate.... Mines have been laid in
front of defensive positions which have subsequently been hurriedly evacuated
and the mines forgotten about. We have also encountered numerous examples in
similar locations of ordnance rigged to an initiation chain and command wire.
The most notorious example so far has been two 20 kg charges located under a
classroom floor in a Technical College, abandoned, undocumented and forgotten
about by the
Army.”[12]
According to the UNDP, both sides of the conflict have agreed that they will
not lay mines in any of the areas targeted by the UNDP mine action project in
Jaffna.[13]
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
The Sri Lankan government is not thought to be a
producer of antipersonnel mines. The LTTE has manufactured IEDs and homemade
mines in significant numbers, including one known as a “Johnny” or
“Jony” mine.[14]
UNDP describes this as the “most commonly encountered” mine, a small
wooden box with 3-400 grams of TNT or C4 that explodes from pressure. The LTTE
also makes and uses a directional fragmentation, Claymore-type
mine.[15]
It is likely that the government has received antipersonnel mines from China
and Pakistan. The government claims that a wide range of weapons are readily
available to the LTTE, including explosives and mines. In particular, the Army
claims that antipersonnel mines have been supplied to the LTTE by Bulgaria and
Romania, or obtained from these countries by clandestine
traders.[16] The size of the
APM stockpiles of the government and the LTTE are unknown.
Landmine Problem
There are an estimated 25,000 landmines planted in
Sri Lanka.[17] The northern and
eastern provinces are badly mine-affected. Landmines littering the Jaffna
peninsula have slowed down the government's efforts to resettle civilians there.
The UNDP has noted that on the Jaffna peninsula, “landmines are scattered
widely, sometimes indiscriminately, and often outside marked minefields; it is
common for them to be found in gardens and buildings.... Many of the people
returning to their homes and fields have become mine casualties, being unaware
of the presence of landmines or UXO in a formerly safe
environment.”[18]
UNDP has also said, “The greater proportion of mines in Jaffna are the
antipersonnel type and they can be found virtually anywhere from marked
minefields, to agricultural land, to houses and gardens. Quantities are
difficult to calculate, but it is estimated that there are around 50 to 75
square kilometres of suspect or contaminated
land.”[19]
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
The Army conducts some mine clearance operations.
According to the UN, however, “It is common for the Army to declare an
area clear and a day or two later for a mine casualty to be reported there....
In one case Sri Lanka sappers were clearing a minefield containing 55 mines they
had laid, using their own records as reference. They failed to recover three
mines which they considered a satisfactory
result.”[20]
In late 1997, the UNDP conducted a feasibility study which concluded that
there was a serious mine problem and that it was feasible to initiate a mine
action program to reduce the impact of landmines on local
communities.[21] A pilot
project was started in Jaffna in April 1998. The UNDP states, “A mine
action plan was formulated which addressed several aspects of mine action, but
which stopped short of the systematic clearance of densely mines areas. Instead,
the plan focused upon a more cost-effective and locally appropriate
approach.”[22] Elements
of the plan include: a mine awareness program with UNICEF; a level one survey to
identify suspect areas and facilitate prioritization; followed by a level two
survey supported by mine dog teams aimed at accurate surveying and physical
marking of densely mined areas; a rapid response capacity to clear reported
mines and UXOs posing an immediate threat to people or vital facilities; a
victim rehabilitation component. Systematic clearance of minefields must wait
for peace. “As long as mines continue to be laid by either side it is
difficult to justify the risk and cost of systematic demining in the
country.”[23]
According to press accounts, the project is expected to take about two years
and cost $3.5 million. British sniffer dogs will be used. Some mine areas will
be cordoned off and not
cleared.[24]
The project was initially supposed to be fully operational by August 1998,
but due to the “lengthy and complex bureaucratic process” of the
government, it is now hoped that full operational capacity will be reached in
mid-1999, though “further difficulties suggest this target will slip yet
again.”[25]
To date, only a few areas close to Jaffna have been cleared of mines. Vast
stretches of farmland and villages in the peninsula remain mine infested.
Landmine Casualties
There are no official Sri Lankan government figures
of casualties. According to UNDP representative Svend Madsen between 15 and 20
people in the Jaffna peninsula become mine casualties every
month.[26] Children are
particularly vulnerable. A U.S. government report indicated that there have
been thousands of mine casualties, now occurring at a rate of 15 per
month.[27] Non-governmental
groups say at least 196 people were killed between May and December 1996.
Udayan, a top-selling Tamil language weekly published from Jaffna, said
84 people died and 145 were injured between January and August 1997. Landmine
Monitor has a list of major landmine incidents in Sri Lanka 1995-1997 compiled
from the United Nations Demining
Database.[28]
Survivor Assistance
The UNDP notes that hospitals are poorly equipped
and unable to acquire basic drugs such as anaesthetics. Because of the
conflict, there is no reliable road or air link between Jaffna and the main city
of Colombo. There is the possibility of air evacuations by military aircraft,
but it cannot be counted on. “The alternative is to enhance local capacity
by importing expertise and providing dedicated drug supplies to enable
casualties to be treated in Jaffna. The professional competence of local medics
is reasonably high, but there are serious shortcomings in management
practices.”[29]
[6] Dipankar Banerjee,
Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, “South
Asian Regional Survey,” prepared for Landmine Monitor, p. 25.
[7] International Campaign to
Ban Landmines press release, “Mine Ban Closer to Reality,” 14
February 1997.
[8] Dipankar Banerjee,
Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, “South
Asian Regional Survey,” prepared for Landmine Monitor, p. 25.
[9] U.S. Department of
State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, December 1994, p.
19.
[24] Reuters, “UN
launches drive in Sri Lanka to clear landmines,” Colombo, 25 June 1998;
NEB/RAE newswire report, Vandana Chopra, “Sri Lanka/Landmine,”
Colombo, 23 June 1998; Xinhua, “UN to Begin Landmine Clearing in Northern
Sri Lanka,” 15 November 1998.
[25] UNDP, “Mine Action
Pilot Project Jaffna,” p. 3.
[26] Reuters, “UN
launches drive in Sri Lanka to clear landmines,” Colombo, 25 June 1998.
The February 1999 UNDP report stated, “The number of casualties, around
ten per month, relative to the size of the population of less than half a
million, was high and showing every indication of increasing.” UNDP,
“Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna.”
[27] U.S. Department of
State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p.
A-5.
[28] See, Dipankar Banerjee,
Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, “South
Asian Regional Survey,” prepared for Landmine Monitor.
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