Key developments since May 2004: On 14 July 2005, the General
Assembly of Senegal adopted a law on mine action. Following a security incident
in April 2004, the Army ceased demining activities. At the end of 2004, UNDP
began assistance to the mine action program in Senegal. A six-month emergency
study was planned to start in October 2005, to collect information on the
presence of landmines in Casamance and assess their impact on the population.
Limited mine clearance which started in the second half of 2003 stopped in April
2004 after deminers were killed in a security incident. Handicap International
believes that the reduction in casualties, from 198 in 1998 to 17 in 2004, is
due in large part to mine risk education. Senegal has been identified as one of
24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with the
greatest needs and responsibility to provide adequate survivor assistance.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997,
ratified on 24 September 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. Since
August 1999, the National Commission on the Implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty has been responsible for the mine
issue.[1 ]As of mid-2005, there was
no specific implementation legislation, but Senegal has reported that violations
of Mine Ban Treaty provisions are sanctioned by national constitutional law and
the 2001 penal code.[2 ]In July 2005,
a new law on mine action was adopted by the National
Assembly.[3 ]
On 30 December 2004, Senegal signed a peace agreement with the Movement of
Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de
Casamance, MFDC). The preamble of the agreement acknowledges “the
disastrous consequences provoked by over twenty years of conflict and fighting
in Casamance, notably the economic regression of the region, the suffering of
populations and the risks incurred because of the presence of antipersonnel
mines.” The agreement calls for humanitarian demining in Casamance
without delay and urges parties to facilitate mine
clearance.[4 ]
Senegal participated in the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty,
held in Nairobi in November-December 2004, but did not make any statement.
Senegal was absent from the June 2005 intersessional Standing Committee
meetings. In 2004, Senegal participated in international meetings on landmines
in Burkina Faso in January, and in Paris in March. Senegal has not engaged in
the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on matters of
interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, Senegal
has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with
non-States Parties, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling
devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training. However, in
September 2002, Senegal stated that it would not allow transit or stockpiling of
antipersonnel mines on its
territory.[5 ]
Senegal submitted its sixth Article 7 transparency report on 9 June 2005, for
calendar year 2004.[6]
Senegal is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons and submitted its annual Article 13 report on 17 November 2004. It
attended the annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November
2004.
In 2004, the Senegalese NGO Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des
Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO), in cooperation with Witness, completed a
documentary about Casamance landmine survivors and their urgent need for
psychosocial rehabilitation.[7 ]On 6
July 2004, the Association Sénégalaise de Victimes de Mines
organized several awareness-raising events in Ziguinchor, including a roundtable
entitled For a Mine-Free Casamance.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
In its Article 7 reports, Senegal has consistently stated that it has never
produced, possessed or stockpiled mines, even for training
purposes.[8 ]Senegal has still not
been transparent about an incident in which the Senegalese Navy reportedly
intercepted a ship in its territorial waters in 2001 destined for Angola and
seized antipersonnel mines, which it reportedly then destroyed in April
2003.[9 ]
In 1999, the government stated the MFDC possessed mines of Belgian,
Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Chinese
origin.[10]
Use
During 2004, the level of violence in Casamance decreased sharply and the
conflict officially ended with the December 2004 peace accord. Landmine Monitor
did not find any reports or allegations of antipersonnel mine use in 2004 or the
first half of 2005 by the MFDC or government forces.
Government authorities claim that Senegal has never used antipersonnel mines
inside or outside the
country.[11]In the Banjul
Declaration of 26 December 1999, the Senegalese Army and the MFDC committed to
not use antipersonnel landmines.[12 ]However, Landmine Monitor reported significant use of antipersonnel and
antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices, by MFDC rebels in
Casamance until
2001.[13]
Landmine and UXO Problem
Mines can be found in almost all the villages between the Casamance river and
the border with Guinea-Bissau, and along the border with The Gambia.
Senegal’s Article 7 report for 2004 identifies known mine contamination
“of medium density” in the Niagulss, Niassya and Loudia-Ouloff
sectors south of Ziguinchor. Suspected mined areas are found north of Sindian
in Ziguinchor region, and in the Saré Téning and Saré
Boubou sectors south of Goudcomp in Kolda region; these areas may contain
scattered mines laid by armed groups.[14 ]In December 2003, the Army was reported as estimating that about 1,400
square kilometers of land were mined or suspected to be mined, with most (about
80 percent) of the mine contamination in Ziguinchor region. Some 250,000 people
were estimated by the government to be exposed to the danger of mines,
representing 38 percent of the
population.[15 ]Handicap
International’s mine action expert characterized the mine problem in
Senegal as “few mines, but a big
impact.”[16]
According to the military, one-third of mines laid are antivehicle and the
remaining two-thirds are
antipersonnel.[17 ]During the rainy
season mines often move because of the sandy soil, appearing on the surface and
then moving toward the side of roads. Although mines are reported to have been
laid without marking or sketching the areas, both sides stated having some
knowledge of where their opponents had laid mines. However, international aid
agencies working in the region say they have difficulty obtaining information on
the location of mines, especially from the former
rebels.[18 ]
Contamination by UXO is believed to be limited, in view of the low number of
casualties resulting from UXO and the quantities found and
destroyed.[19 ]
The mine problem results mainly from fighting in Casamance region since 1982,
and especially since 1997, between the Army and MFDC. Over the course of the
conflict, several thousand people were internally displaced, and thousands more
fled to The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.[20 ]Since the peace agreement in December 2004, thousands of people have been
expected to return. But, according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the
mine and UXO problem is “a clear impediment to resettlement of IDPs
[internally displaced persons] and development of agricultural
resources.”[21 ]A refugee who
had returned back to his village close to the border with Guinea-Bissau
explained that “a lot of people here are also worried about landmines that
were buried here during the civil war. Because of this we are afraid to venture
into the bush to do farm work.”[22 ]In 2005, as a consequence of fear of cultivating their own land, some of
the population of Casamance fled again to Guinea-Bissau, in order to find safe
agricultural land for cultivation or to become agricultural
workers.[23 ]
The mine problem seriously affects the rehabilitation process and the
economic development of Casamance, having an impact on reconstruction,
agriculture, fishing, transport of goods and services, and tourism. It also has
an impact on trade between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. It is estimated that
landmines kill 20 livestock per week on average and jeopardize the use of 1,000
square kilometers of productive land. The presence of landmines is said to
block humanitarian projects, notably for the World Food Programme, which cannot
access populations living in some areas reported as
contaminated.[24 ]
A lack of marking and fencing of mined and mine-suspected areas was
criticized in April 2004 by Senegalese human rights organizations, including the
Senegalese section of Amnesty
International.[25 ]In its Article
7 report for 2004, Senegal states that known mined areas are marked and entry
into some mine-suspected areas is
banned.[26]
Mine Action Coordination and Planning
On 14 July 2005, the National Assembly adopted a law on mine action. This
stipulates that an interministerial commission will be established to ensure the
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, and to supervise a mine action center
soon to be established in Ziguinchor. As soon as the law is promulgated by the
president of Senegal, decrees to implement it and define the responsibilities of
the commission and the mine action center will be
signed.[27 ]
Before the peace agreement was signed in December 2004, humanitarian mine
clearance was considered impossible. In March 2004, UNMAS conducted an
assessment mission which recommended that the government and the UN, under the
auspices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), should immediately establish a
mine action program that should “aim to be modest at the start with a
focus on problem identification through a socioeconomic impact survey conducted
by Handicap International and a limited number of clearance sections.”
The mission report also recommends that efforts be placed on national
capacity-building, and suggests that the program should come under a civilian
body with policy and executive functions
separated.[28]
Shortly before the peace agreement was signed, the government had asked UNDP
to assist with the creation of a national mine action commission and a national
mine action center, and the development of a mine action program. In March
2005, a UNDP mission was conducted to provide this assistance. A chief
technical advisor was recruited in June 2005. An operations technical manager
may be recruited at the end of the year, if the program progresses according to
plan. A national mine action strategy will be drafted by the future mine action
authorities, with the technical assistance of UNDP. Discussions between UNDP
and Senegalese authorities on the drafting process are expected to take place at
the end of 2005.[29 ]
The national commission for mine action will be responsible for supervising
the mine action center, and adopting national strategies, budgets and annual
workplans submitted by the mine action center. The commission will also liaise
with financial partners to ensure funding for its operations. It will ensure
the integration of mine action into Senegal’s wider development and
poverty reduction strategy.[30]
With the exception of the Handicap International (HI) mine casualty database
in Ziguinchor, there is no other database on mine action in Senegal. The UNMAS
assessment recommended establishment of the Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA) as soon as possible, before the impact study is
implemented.[31 ]
Survey and Assessment
Starting in December 2004, a technical consultant assessed the feasibility of
the impact study.[32 ]With UNDP
support, HI planned to start the six-month emergency landmine impact study in
Casamance in October 2005. The study is expected to “better define the
extent of the mine and UXO problem in Casamance, to develop a more precise idea
of areas suspected to be mined and to build a more thorough knowledge of the
social and economical impact of mines and UXO in affected communities.”
From the information gathered, a mine action strategy and annual workplans will
be drafted, and the necessary resources
defined.[33 ]
A verbal agreement for the study was obtained from the Ministry of Defense,
to have access to military archives providing information on military casualties
and battlefield locations. The chief of the former rebels also agreed verbally
to reveal areas where mines were laid. Written agreement from both parties was
pending as of 27 July 2005.[34]
Mine and UXO Clearance
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Senegal is required to destroy all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2009.
Senegal’s Article 7 report for 2004 noted that 708 antipersonnel mines,
and 63 rockets and grenades, had been discovered and destroyed during the
year.[35 ]The Army started some
clearance operations in the second half of 2003, which according to the Ministry
of Defense cleared 607 mines.[36 ]In January 2004, three mine clearance teams were deployed in the sectors
of Oussouye, Niassya and Adéane, and at the end of March 2004 had
destroyed 1,500 antipersonnel and antivehicle
mines.[37 ]In April 2004, the Army
stopped demining after a wing of the MFDC opposed to the peace process attacked
government forces clearing landmines in Guidel village, killing three and
injuring five soldiers.[38 ]As of
July 2005, the Army had not restarted clearance
activities.[39 ]
The Army has two military companies with standard demining equipment. One
company was based in Ziguinchor region, with 30 old detectors unable to detect
new antipersonnel mines containing small amounts of
metal.[40 ]The French Army
supported the training of the Senegalese Army deminers and the development of a
clearance plan in 2003.[41]
Mine clearance priorities have been decided by the army command, with no
apparent mechanism for integrating the needs of communities. Clearance
priorities were mainly villages and communication routes. The Army declares
that it prioritizes returnee areas for demining, but reportedly the MFDC
observed a lack of transparency, which led to suspicion regarding the
Army’s demining
operations.[42 ]
Mine Risk Education
Mine risk education (MRE) is provided mainly through the Mine Risk Education
Program (PEPAM) activities of HI, and a network of local NGOs and community
groups.[43 ]Senegal’s Article
7 report for 2004 states that there is a public information and awareness
campaign on the dangers of mines, radio and television broadcasts, and a special
campaign in schools, but does not indicate who is carrying out these
activities.[44]
HI has worked closely with the regional education department to insert MRE
into the curriculum, with 1,400 teachers trained to date and 70,000 students
exposed to MRE by the end of 2004.[45 ]For its community-based activities, HI works either directly or through
community-level volunteers trained in MRE. In 15 communities the volunteers are
part of a larger mine committee, which includes the village chief or other
respected resource people. The committee’s tasks include MRE and marking
minefields with locally appropriate
signs.[46 ]As of July 2005, HI in
collaboration with the NGO Fankanta ou Enfance et Paix and other local NGOs had
trained 669 community agents chosen by community members, including 81 women and
nine mine survivors; these agents were providing MRE in 30
localities.[47 ]MRE tools included
image boxes, mine folders, posters and banners. Mass media is also used, with
MRE messages transmitted twice a week through two radio stations in Ziguinchor,
and once a week on one radio station in
Kolda.[48 ]
HI believes that the large reduction in mine casualties, from 198 in 1998
when the program started, to 17 in 2004—a period when no humanitarian mine
clearance had been undertaken—is due mainly to effective
MRE.[49]
In addition to these prevention activities, a casualty data system has been
established, which will help protect internally displaced persons returning to
zones that are considered to be
dangerous.[50]
Funding and Assistance
Total funding reported by donors in 2004 was US$584,459, provided by Canada
and the US. The Canadian International Development Agency provided C$370,000
($284,244), through UNDP, to implement the emergency landmine impact
study.[51 ]Canada also provided
C$245,000 ($188,215) to College Montmorency for physiotherapy and prosthetics
services training assistance.[52]US reported a contribution of $112,000 through the Department of
State.[53]Landmine Monitor has not
been able to determine the Army’s expenditure on mine clearance in 2004.
In 2003, it was CFA60 million
($113,770).[54 ]
The mine action component of PRAESC had a budget of $55 million for
2004–2006, of which $5 million was allocated to coordination and $50
million to operations.[55 ]According to its chief of delegation in Senegal, the European Commission
(EC) will provide around €40 million ($49.7 million) for the
reconstruction of Casamance.[56 ]The program has three components: demining; rehabilitation of
infrastructure; reconstruction of the Ziguinchor to Cap Skiring road. Around
€4 million ($4,975,200) has been allocated for demining. The delegation
ordered a study to prepare for an EC mine action program for Senegal, at a cost
of €100,000 ($124,380), due to start in September
2005.[57]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
In 2004, 17 new landmine casualties were recorded by Handicap International
in the regions of Kolda and Ziguinchor, including 11 men and six women; all were
injured. This represents a small decrease from the 19 new mine/UXO casualties
recorded in 2003; four were killed and 15 injured. No UXO casualties were
recorded in 2004.[58 ]
Casualties continued to be reported in 2005. As of September, two people had
been killed and two were injured in two mine/UXO
incidents.[59 ]On 14 April, one
soldier was killed and another injured when their vehicle hit a landmine near
the border with
Guinea-Bissau.[60 ]
HI maintains a database of mine and UXO casualties in Casamance. From 1996
to September 2005, 648 mine and 12 UXO casualties were recorded, including 149
people killed and 511
injured.[61 ]The reported figures on casualties may not reflect the true number of
mine/UXO casualties in the region, because of the influence of Islamic practice
(burials take place as soon as possible after a death) and the absence of death
registries.
According to the government, there has been a total of 729 mine/UXO
casualties in Ziguinchor and Kolda regions, including 157 people killed and 572
injured; 533 were men, 130 were women, and 66 were
children.[62]
Survivor Assistance
At the First Review Conference, Senegal was identified as one of 24 States
Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest
responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for
assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation
and reintegration of survivors.[63 ]Senegal participated in the workshop on advancing landmine victim
assistance in Africa, in Nairobi, from 31 May to 2 June 2005. The workshop was
hosted by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and
Socio-Economic Reintegration, to assist States Parties in developing a plan of
action to meet the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan in relation to mine victim
assistance.
Senegal’s objectives for victim assistance in the period 2005 to 2009
include: establishing a centralized network for data collection and management;
equipping ambulances to respond to emergencies; setting up blood banks at
regional hospitals; enhancing training for first aid providers, orthopedic
surgeons and technicians, physiotherapists and other healthcare personnel; and
upgrading equipment at the orthopedic
centers.[64]
The Ziguinchor regional hospital is the best-equipped institution in the
mine-affected area. Mine casualties are often evacuated to the hospital by the
Army. The average time to reach the hospital is more than eight hours, and
sometimes up to 36 hours. First aid is available at military camps. Ziguinchor
hospital has two surgeons and is reinforced by a military surgical team.
Assistance is also available from Kolda regional hospital, which has one general
surgeon. The hospitals reportedly lack some supplies and equipment to
adequately treat mine
casualties.[65]
Military mine casualties are sent to the military hospital in Dakar, after
receiving first aid. The Senegalese Army has a mobile emergency medical service
in Ziguinchor for military personnel. Outside the towns of Ziguinchor and
Kolda, the first aid and evacuation infrastructure is almost
non-existent.[66 ]
Prosthetics and rehabilitation services are available in Ziguinchor and at
the Centre d’Appareillage orthopédique (Center of Orthopedic
Appliances) in Dakar. In Ziguinchor, the regional hospital has an orthopedic
department with facilities for surgery, rehabilitation, an orthopedic workshop
and a mobile orthopedic workshop. The rehabilitation center has a team of two
physiotherapists and four orthopedic technicians. In Kolda, the regional
hospital center has facilities for prosthetics and
rehabilitation.[67 ]
Handicap International operates the program for Prevention of Mine Accidents
and Assisting People with Disabilities, Mines Victims or Others in Casamance.
The main focus of the program is the socioeconomic rehabilitation of landmine
survivors and other persons with disabilities, including income generation
activities, sports and support for associations of the disabled. HI also
supports the ongoing training of orthopedic technicians and physiotherapists.
In 2004, 426 orthopedic appliances were produced with HI’s support; 12
people obtained employment and 40 benefited from socioeconomic activities
through the program. A total of 83 mine survivors were assisted through
HI’s activities in
2004.[68 ]
The Senegalese Association of Mine Victims works to empower mine survivors
and the families of those killed by mines, to facilitate their social and
economic reintegration. On 6 July 2004, the association organized a day of
action and seminar to raise awareness on the mine problem in Casamance, and the
needs of mine survivors and the families of those
killed.[69 ]
Psychological support and services are not well developed in Casamance. HI
has trained 42 people, including mine survivors, to provide psychological
support. UNICEF also established about 12 support centers. A psychiatrist
comes to Zinguinchor every two months for one week, and a psychiatric nurse
provides support over a six-month period every year. However, there is no
psychologist or permanent psychiatrist in Casamance, which prevents long-term
follow-up of people in need.[70 ]
Socioeconomic reintegration programs are integrated into the Poverty
Reduction Strategy through national development
plans.[71 ]Other components of the
plan include setting up a national community-based rehabilitation program,
improving health and mobility, promoting education and training, and fighting
discrimination against persons with
disabilities.[72 ]
Disability Policy and Practice
There is no specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with
disabilities in
Senegal.[73 ]However, some measures reportedly exist to provide pensions to disabled
military personnel and to support their reintegration into
society.[74]
[1 ]See Landmine Monitor Report
2000, p. 96.
[2 ]Article 7 Report, Form A, 2
June 2004. Articles 407, 408 and 409 of the penal code are cited as relevant
sanctions for violations of the ban treaty.
[3 ]Email from Pascal Simon, Chief
Technical Advisor, UN Development Programme (UNDP) Mine Action Program in
Senegal, 21 July 2005. The decision to draft new legislation was announced in
June 2004. Article 7 Report, Form A, 2 June 2004. However, progress with the
new law was not reported in Senegal’s Article 7 report for 2004. Article
7 Report, Form A, 9 June 2005.
[4 ]“General Peace Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de Casamance,” Preamble and Articles 2.4 and 4.1, 30
December 2004.
[5 ]Statement by Senegal, Fourth
Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2002.
[6]Article 7 Report, 9 June 2005.
The report is dated 29 April 2005, but was posted by the UN on 9 June 2005.
Senegal has submitted five previous Article 7 reports: 1 September 1999; 27
March 2001; 22 April 2002; 6 May 2003; 2 June 2004.
[7 ]The film is entitled
“Against the Tide of History: Anti-personnel landmines in the
Casamance.” See http://dev.witness.org/option.com.
[8 ]However, in 1998, members of
the engineering corps said that the Senegalese Army possessed mines of Warsaw
Pact origin. Handicap International (HI), “The Impact of Landmines in
Casamance/Senegal,” Exploratory Mission Report, August 1998, first
reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 76.
[9 ]For more information on this
incident, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 701-702.
[10]Landmine Monitor Report
1999, p. 76. See also, “Des mines à profusion,” Sud
Quotidien, 17 December 2003.
[11]However, it appears certain
that Senegalese forces used antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, to
support government troops against a self-proclaimed military junta. Such use
would have occurred after Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty, but before its
entry into force for the government. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
pp. 78-79.
[12 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2000, p. 98.
[13]For more details, see
previous editions of Landmine Monitor Report.
[14 ]Article 7 Report, Form C, 9
June.
[15 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 702-703.
[16]Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, Senior Technical Advisor, HI, 27 April 2004.
[17 ]UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS), “Assessment mission report on the mine and UXO problem in
Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p. 10.
[18 ]“Rebuilding
war-ravaged Casamance,” BBC News, 20 May 2005; UNMAS,
“Assessment mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,”
20 May 2004, p. 9; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 703.
[19 ]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p. 9;
Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2005.
[20 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 702-703.
[21 ]Email from Jacqueline Seck,
Treaty Implementation Officer, UNMAS, 10 May 2004.
[22 ]“Re-build war-ravaged
Casamance,” BBC News, 20 May 2005.
[23 ]“Insécurité
en Casamance: retour forcé vers la Guinée-Bissau,” Wal
Fadjri/AllAfrica Global Media via COMTEX, Senegal, 27 June 2005.
[24 ]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p.
11; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 703.
[25 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 704.
[26]Article 7 Report, Form I, 9
June 2005.
[27 ]Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 21 July 2005.
[28]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p.
16.
[29 ]Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 21 July 2005.
[30]Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 21 July 2005.
[31 ]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p.
12.
[32 ]Email from Sophie Bonichon
Yilma, HI, 13 July 2005.
[33 ]Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 21 July 2005.
[34]Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, Senior Technical Advisor, HI, 27 July 2005.
[35 ]Article 7 Report, Form B, 9
June 2005.
[36 ]Response to Landmine Monitor
Questionnaire by Ministry of Defense, 29 March 2004. Until late 2003, it
appears that the Army responded in an EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) capacity
to reports of mines and UXO. From 1996-2002, the Army destroyed about 400 mines
discovered on patrol or reported by villagers. Article 7 Report, Form F, 2 June
2004 (for calendar year 2003).
[37 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 705; UNMAS, “Assessment mission report on the mine and
UXO problem in the Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p. 15.
[38 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 706.
[39 ]Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 21 July 2005.
[40 ]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p.
12.
[41]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 705; UNMAS, “Assessment mission report on the mine and
UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p. 12.
[42 ]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p.
15.
[43 ]HI, “Rapport final
narratif du programme Amélioration de la prise en charge des personnes
handicappées par mines ou autres et mise en place
d’activités anti-mines en Casamance,” October 2003, p. 36.
PEPAM is the French abbreviation for Mine Risk Education Program. The program
aims “to reduce mine incidents, to prepare for future marking and
clearance, and to increase the knowledge on the mine issue of several
institutions in the region.”
[44]Article 7 Report, Form I, 9
June 2005.
[45 ]Email from Sophie Bonichon
Yilma, HI, 13 July 2005.
[46 ]HI, “Rapport final
narratif du programme Amélioration de la prise en charge des personnes
handicappées par mines ou autres et mise en place
d’activités anti-mines en Casamance,” October 2003, p. 41.
[47 ]Email from Sophie Bonichon
Yilma, HI, 13 July 2005.
[48 ]HI, “PEPAM en
Casamance,” September 2002.
[49]Email from Sophie Bonichon
Yilma, HI, 13 July 2005.
[50]Email from Sophie Bonichon
Yilma, HI, 13 July 2005.
[51 ]Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 21 July 2005. Average exchange rate for 2004: US$1 = C$1.3017. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2005.
[52]Mine Action Investments
database; emails from Elvan Isikozlu, Mine Action Team, Foreign Affairs Canada,
June-August 2005.
[53]USG Historical Chart
containing data for FY2004, email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management
Specialist, US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 20
July 2005.
[54 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 707.
[55 ]UNMAS, “Assessment
mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,” 20 May 2004, p.
12. PRAESC stands for Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et
Sociales en Casamance.
[56 ]“Le
Sénégal manqué d’une politique sectorielle Claire sur
l’arachide,” Wal Fadjri/AllAfrica Global Media via COMTEX,
Senegal, 20 May 2005. Average exchange rate for 2004: €1 = $1.2438. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2005.
[57]Email from Amparo Gonzalez
Diez, Program Manager for Rural Development and Civil Society, EC delegation in
Senegal, 25 July 2005.
[58 ]Email from Philippe
Martinez, Regional Coordinator, HI Senegal, 26 July 2005; email to Landmine
Monitor (HI) from Momar Gueye, Data Collection Assistant, HI Senegal, 13
September 2005; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 707.
[59 ]Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Momar Gueye, HI Senegal, 13 September 2005.
[60 ]“Land mine kills
soldier in Senegal’s separatist province,” Associated Press
(Ziguinchor), 14 April 2005.
[61 ]Email to Landmine Monitor
(HI) from Momar Gueye, HI Senegal, 13 September 2005.
[62]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005.
[63 ]United Nations, Final
Report, First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction, Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004,
APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33.
[64]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005.
[65]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp.
708-709.
[66 ]For details, see Landmine
Monitor Report 2004, pp. 708-709.
[67 ]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p.
709.
[68 ]Fax from Philippe Martinez,
Regional Coordinator, HI Senegal, 12 May 2005; see also Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 709; Standing Tall Australia and Mines Action Canada,
“101 Great Ideas for Socio-Economic Reintegration of Mine
Survivors,” June 2005, p. 71.
[69 ]The Landmine Monitor
researcher represented the ICBL at the event.
[70 ]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005.
[71 ]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005.
[72 ]Standing Tall Australia and
Handicap International, “Landmine Victim Assistance in 2004: Overview of
the Situation in 24 States Parties,” June 2005, p.71.
[73 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 710.
[74]Presentation by Senegal,
“Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,”
Nairobi, 31 May-2 June 2005.