Colombia

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 6 September 2000 and became a State Party on 1 March 2001. National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.^[1]

Colombia prepared an annual updated Article 7 transparency report, dated April 2007.^[2] Colombia has previously submitted six Article 7 reports.^[3]

At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006, Colombia made statements during the General Exchange of Views, as well as during the sessions on mine clearance and victim assistance. Colombia participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 and April 2007; at both meetings it again made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Colombia has made few interventions on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Most notably, in 2004 Colombia stated that any mine that is victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine, and is banned.^[4] It has not stated its views on the prohibition on “assistance,” joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, or the acceptable number of mines retained for training.

Colombia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but did not attend the Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2006 and has not submitted an Article 13 national measures report for 2006. It is not party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) maintains a network of local coordinators in 22 administrative departments of Colombia. CCCM members advise municipal governments and community leaders on victim assistance and mine risk education activities, visit areas where mine-related events occur to verify incidents, carry out awareness workshops, and help survivors to claim medical support, rehabilitation and compensation. In 2006 and the first half of 2007 CCCM continued to issue its quarterly national mine action bulletin, Colombia sin minas (Colombia without mines), as well as press releases.^[5] CCCM also organized workshops for regional government officers to inform them of the responsibilities and obligations of various national institutions under the Mine Ban Treaty, for integration into local planning and responses.

CCCM continued its efforts to engage Colombian non-state armed groups (NSAGs) on the antipersonnel mine ban, working closely with the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call. With the support of CCCM, Geneva Call developed regional workshops on and distributed a video on ban advocacy among civil society organizations, communicators and local communities in Antioquia, Meta, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, and in the Magdalena Medio region.^[6]

Non-State Armed Groups

NSAGs continue to use antipersonnel mines and improvised explosives devices (IEDs) on a daily basis. Principal among opposition armed groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista - Ejército de Liberación Nacional, UC-ELN).^[7]

FARC is the largest NSAG and most prolific user of mines. In a June 2007 interview, FARC Commander Raul Reyes affirmed that FARC uses antipersonnel mines, which he justified, “The minefields are used against the public forces, never against the civilian population, never. There are cases when a road is suddenly mined and a civilian might not know they are there and through some carelessness of the guards or himself he fails to avoid it. Sadly, those cases have always occurred. But the norm is that one must try and ensure that there are no civilian casualties.”^[8]

In December 2005 the government and the ELN commenced exploratory talks, and in October 2006 announced the start of formal peace negotiations.^[9] Mine use has apparently not been explicitly included as part of the talks but joint mine action was discussed among the parties. At the October talks ELN Commander Antonio García indicated the ELN would accept a proposal made by a Civil Society Commission from Samaniego (a heavily mined area in Nariño department) and facilitated by CCCM and Geneva Call for the demining of 14 population centers there. The ELN stated that they “expect the will of the National Government to facilitate this humanitarian demining as a true contribution for the society in peace seeking.”^[10] However, the ELN continued to use antipersonnel mines in 2006 and 2007 (see below). In April 2006, Antonio García said ELN “complies with international norms against…indiscriminate use” of landmines, and noted that “when we mine, we do not do it on roads, nor in populated areas.”^[11]

Colombia has a large number of paramilitary organizations which in the past operated with the tolerance or support of some members of the Colombian Army. A three-year process of disarmament of paramilitary forces came to an end in April 2006, and some antipersonnel mines were recovered during the disarmament process or seized from paramilitaries.^[12] Some former combatants have formed new armed organizations, or restructured former ones, but Landmine Monitor knows of no landmine use by these new paramilitary groups.^[13]

Child soldiers have been and continue to be recruited by combatant groups within the country, and child soldiers have apparently been trained to use mines. A former child combatant was quoted in a February 2007 report as saying that, after demobilization, the Colombian Army offered him work, and “promised me that if I worked with them, they would pay me a million pesos per head for every guerrilla I killed. I’m an explosives specialist so I can work laying mines and other explosives.”^[14] UNICEF believes that 5,000-6,000 child combatants remain in the ranks of Colombian NSAGs.^[15]

Production and Transfer

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998, and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.^[16] As of 2001, INDUMIL was still fabricating Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.^[17] Colombia has stated that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty.^[18] However, Colombia has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode.

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for non-state armed groups in Colombia, but Landmine Monitor knows of none since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are expert in the production of explosive devices. Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, metallic content, photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle and Claymore mines, as well as IEDs.^[19] The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.^[20] Some mines produced by FARC or ELN can be either command or victim-activated. NSAG mines in Colombia utilize self-manufactured Anfo or R1 explosive.^[21] In May 2006 media reported the seizure of a FARC arsenal held by the Jacinto Matallana Front in the hamlet of Santa Lucía, Pasto municipality, Nariño, that included nearly four tons of Anfo, a mixture of ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel, the explosive commonly used in mineral mining.^[22]

Stockpiling and Destruction

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its 18,531 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.^[23]

According to its 2007 Article 7 report, Colombia had a total of 586 MAP-1 antipersonnel mines retained for training purposes, which is 300 less than in its 2006 and 2005 reports.^[24]

Colombia made a decision to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training, primarily because the majority of mines laid within the country are of NSAG design, irregular, and do not correspond to the MAP-1 mines used for demining instruction.^[25] The Army’s 3rd Division destroyed an initial 100 mines at Palmira, Valle del Cauca, on 20 March 2006.^[26] One hundred of these mines were destroyed at a military base in Palanquero, Puerto Salgar municipality, Cundinamarca, in September 2006, observed by the Vice President, Vice Minister of Defense, military commanders, and representatives of multilateral organizations and NGOs.^[27] Another 100 mines were destroyed at Meseta Ranch, municipality of Simití, in December 2006.^[28]

Seizures of NSAG Stockpiles

In February 2007 the army seized a cache of arms including 30 landmines and mine production materials in the village of San Pablo in Bolívar department.^[29] In January 2007 police seized 45 antipersonnel landmines in San Roque town, Antioquia, believed to have been made by the ELN.^[30] In October 2006 the army seized 25 antipersonnel mines and 1.5 tons of Anfo believed to belong to FARC in La Rondonera, in Meta department.^[31] Also in October the army found five antipersonnel mines in an area close to the historical center of the ELN command, in Caño Frío, a rural village in the mountains of the northern municipality of San Pablo, Bolívar department.^[32] In June 2006 the army seized four FARC-manufactured antipersonnel mines in a rural area near the municipalities of Arauquita (Arauca), Cáceres (Antioquia), Vistahermosa and Puerto Rico (Meta).^[33]

Use

In June 2007 a visiting ICBL delegation received an allegation from a community in Cauca about use of mines by the army in the area, but Landmine Monitor has found no evidence linking the army to use of antipersonnel mines.^[34]

Phony Minefields and Misuse of Mine Warning Signs

Some police and army units have misused mine warning signs in Colombia to prohibit access to areas near military and police posts. In March 2007 a member of the Spanish ICBL affiliate Moviment per la Pau photographed minefield warning signs on the edge of a playground near an army base in Popayan, Cauca.^[35] An ICBL mission in late June 2007 was taken to see the same “minefield.” It found that the signs had been removed, except for one which had the words “mined area” taped over. No demining had taken place.^[36]

Local NGOs in Popayan told the ICBL delegation that there was another false use of minefield signs in Silvia municipality, Cauca, at the back of the police station. Officials said the signs were used for “dissuasion.”^[37]

In October 2006 the mayor of Bogotá asked the Vice President to investigate minefield warning signs near an engineering battalion camp near Santa Fe on the outskirts of the capital. The Vice President confirmed that the area was not mined, and said that the signs had been placed to “drive away possible intruders.”^[38]

The ICBL delegation met with General Eduardo Behar, Inspector General of the Armed Forces, at the Ministry of Defense and requested clarification about the observed misuse of mine warning signs. He stated that such use was due to the “misguided behavior of commanders that have large areas to control and not enough men to patrol them with.” The ICBL delegation stated that this was not acceptable and that a clear message should be sent out to all the armed forces to this effect.^[39] In many respects, the purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty is to prevent and stigmatize any use of antipersonnel mines; it is clearly inappropriate to pretend to use antipersonnel mines and gain military or tactical benefit from such action.

“Phony minefields” are militarily defined as “an area free of live mines used to simulate a minefield, or section of a minefield, with the object of deceiving the enemy.”^[40]

Use by Non-State Armed Groups

A July 2007 report by Human Rights Watch on the impact of landmine use in Colombia stated that “most landmine experts we interviewed in Colombia agreed that FARC’s use of antipersonnel landmines has in fact increased substantially since 2000. In many cases it is difficult to pinpoint with certainty which armed party laid any given landmine. However, all the nongovernmental organizations we interviewed that were working on landmine issues in Colombia stated that based on their experience the FARC guerrillas were the biggest users of landmines in the country and were responsible for the recorded increase in landmine casualties, while the ELN guerrillas also use landmines regularly.”^[41]

FARC and ELN have used mines on the perimeter of their military camps, but have also laid mines on public roads, and near water sources and schools. The Colombian government claims that there is a close correlation between the location of mine-related events and the location of coca routes. The government reports that mines have been found on strategic corridors where arms and drugs are trafficked, near illicit drug laboratories and near illicit plantations.^[42] Vice President Santos has said, “We have found a direct relationship between mine planting, mine accidents and illegal crops. Meaning that FARC–basically–are using mines to protect the traffic business.”^[43] As armed conflict between ELN and FARC has increased across the country, the CCCM has received allegations from local communities about mine use by both sides against each other.^[44]

Most media accounts which attribute responsibility for mine-laying to a specific guerrilla group do so based on information provided by the army. The army maps the movement of insurgents in different areas of the country, and uses these maps to allocate responsibility for mine incidents and other armed activities.

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

FARC remains the country’s principal user of antipersonnel mines. Forty-one of 54 press reports identified by Landmine Monitor of mine use since May 2006 indicate FARC responsibility. The CCCM has a registry of 34 incidents of FARC use of antipersonnel mines, including in 22 departments of the country.

As noted above, in June 2007 a FARC commander publicly admitted that FARC continues to use antipersonnel mines, but claimed never against civilian populations.^[45] FARC issued a press communiqué in March 2007 accusing the ELN of laying antipersonnel mines that have caused FARC casualties and requesting them to halt.^[46] Incidents believed to have been due to use of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines by FARC include:

• In May 2006 four soldiers were killed and eight wounded after entering a minefield while pursuing FARC rebels in Antioquia province.^[47]
• In August 2006 six were killed and seven injured by a landmine allegedly planted by FARC. The explosion took place in La Macarena National Park in Meta during a government-sponsored coca eradication program.^[48] Also in August Colombian authorities deactivated a FARC minefield on the main road to San Vicente del Caguán, in southern Colombia, a day prior to a visit by President Alvaro Uribe.^[49]
• In September 2006 an army unit encountered a FARC rebel laying mines, and recovered four mines he was carrying, in Cocorna municipality of Antioquia.^[50] In another incident attributed to FARC two soldiers were killed and seven wounded by a landmine explosion in Cauca.^[51]
• In October 2006 two police officers died and three were wounded by a landmine laid by FARC in Puerto Rico.^[52] Also, police seized a FARC arms cache in the village of Meta containing 25 antipersonnel landmines.^[53]
• In January 2007 five police officers were killed in the town of Puerto Asis when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by FARC.^[54]
• In February 2007 police in the village of San Pablo seized a FARC weapons cache containing 30 landmines.^[55]
• In April 2007 two soldiers were killed by a landmine planted by FARC in the province of Valle del Cauca.^[56]
• In May 2007 a FARC-laid antivehicle mine killed 10 soldiers and injured 17 on their way to guard the eradication of coca crops.^[57]

Unión Camilista–Ejército de Liberación Nacional

Landmine Monitor recorded significantly fewer reports of mine use by the ELN in this reporting period (since May 2006) than in the previous year. It may be that mine use by the ELN is declining as the group enters into a peace dialogue with the government, and as a result of civil society initiatives.

However, one incident drew special condemnation from CCCM and ICBL. In May 2007 the ELN laid mines, for a second time in recent years, on the road that links the villages of La Plaza and La Guásima, in the area of Micoahumado, in the southern part of Bolívar department. Villagers said that the ELN warned them about the mines. The local population reported that the mines were made by the ELN and were powerful enough to damage vehicles, but may also have functioned as antipersonnel mines. In response, CCCM and Geneva Call visited Micoahumado and joined the community’s efforts to dissuade the ELN from such activities. In June 2007 the ELN informed villagers that they had again removed the mines. However, lack of knowledge in the community about both the deployment and clearance of the mines by the ELN led people to avoid using the road afterwards.^[58]

In another incident, in January 2007 police officers in Antioquia seized 45 antipersonnel landmines allegedly made by members of the ELN.^[59]

Landmine and ERW Problem

Colombia is considered to be the country most affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the Americas, as a result of 40 years of internal conflict.^[60] Mines laid by the military are found around military installations and infrastructure.^[61] Antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines laid by NSAGs are found along routes used by government forces and around NSAG bases, in rural areas, around schools, houses, national parks, indigenous communities’ land, and illicit drug cultivation sites. Improvised explosive devices and mines are also used against the military forces and in civilian areas, including urban areas, by NSAGs. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ERW contamination has also resulted from hostilities between government forces and NSAGs as well as between various NSAGs.^[62]

According to Colombia’s 2007 Article 7 report, 669 municipalities in 31 departments are affected by either mines or ERW, the only exception being the Caribbean Archipelago Department of San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina. This represents 60 percent of the 1,098 municipalities in the country.^[63] As in previous years, the most affected department was Antioquia, accounting for 27.15 percent of mine/ERW incidents registered since 1990, followed by Meta and Bolívar. Colombia’s landmine and ERW problem continues to be overwhelmingly in the countryside, with 97 percent of all mine/ERW incidents taking place in rural areas.^[64] The total area contaminated is unknown.

Colombia reported in 2006 that 34 military bases were mined.^[65] However, one (Mamonal in Bolívar) of the 34 contaminated bases was reported as being cleared in 2005 and two (El Bagre in Antioquia, La Pita in Bolívar) were cleared in 2006, leaving, as of 10 August 2007, 30 mined military bases. A total of 209,622 square meters of land are known to be contaminated around 18 bases with an estimated 3,280 mines; the number of mines around seven bases is unknown.^[66]

In June 2007 an ICBL and Landmine Monitor mission to Colombia confirmed that not all minefields laid by government forces before adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty were recorded by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory in its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). For example, in a meeting in Pasto with an official from the regional national parks system managing Galeras National Park and volcano, the mission was informed of a minefield of around 500 square meters containing M16 mines located next to the road at an abandoned police base at the top of the volcano, where a child died and another was injured in a mine incident in 1990.^[68] The Observatory and the Armed Forces were not aware of this situation and the incident had not been recorded in IMSMA as of 26 July 2007.^[69] The parks official mentioned that other national parks such as Purace in Cauca and Nevado del Huila are said to be mined.^[70] Another mined area was reported at El Dorado military base in Meta during 2007, which is not included in the list of 34 bases reported in 2006.^[71]

In 2006 an independent think-tank on security issues in Colombia produced a special report on antipersonnel mines and the internal conflict. According to its report, mines are used by NSAGs not only to gain control over territory or as a tactic during combat but also as a way of controlling the civilian population. Mines act as defensive belts that lock the communities inside the mined territory, so people can only transit through specific areas monitored by NSAGs or risk becoming a mine casuality. When an NSAG is defeated and another group takes over, the indigenous population may be displaced and people from other areas brought in, creating a new cycle of displacement and mine casualties.^[72]

Mine Action Program

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMA), established on 8 October 2001, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions and coordination of international assistance. The commission has technical committees for victim assistance and for prevention, marking, mapping and mine clearance.^[73] CINAMA was due to meet on 14 August 2007 to address the transition from the Observatory to the Presidential Program for Integral Action against Landmines.^[74]

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, established in 2002, has operated as the technical secretariat of CINAMA. In 2006 and the first seven months of 2007 it continued to collect mine-related information and issue statistical reports.^[75] On 12 June 2007 Presidential Decree 2150 was signed creating the Presidential Program for Integrated Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Programa Presidencial de Accion Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal, PPAICMA).^[76] The decree transfers all functions previously held by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, but would come into effect only when the PPAICMA’s director took up his post, scheduled for mid-August 2007.^[77]

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory reported in April 2007 that it has supported mine action committees functioning as focal points for mine action around the country.^[78] However, the committees vary in levels of activity. The ICBL/Landmine Monitor mission observed that Antioquia remains the department most active in mine action, mainly because of strong support by local government authorities.^[79] In contrast, the departmental committees in Cauca, Nariño and Bolívar appeared not to function to any meaningful extent.^[80] The UN Development Programme (UNDP) stated that it has supported the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory in efforts to strengthen capacities at departmental and local levels in Antioquia and Meta, as well as in the Montes de María region in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre.^[81]

Colombia has used IMSMA since 2002; as of 2007, it ran a mixed system of version 3 and version 4.^[82]

The National Demining Protocol for Military Bases was under review in May 2007. The protocol is based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and it covers issues such as safety, procedures for impact and technical survey, marking, the destruction of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and internal quality assurance. ^[83] Two further protocols, on humanitarian demining in contaminated civilian areas and on prioritization were developed. As of May 2007, clearance priorities for military bases were based on security of access and during clearance, logistics such as access of the demining teams to the mined area, running water and electricity, and medical evacuation possibilities. Humanitarian emergencies are responded to on request and availability of personnel, but are not conducted to IMAS.^[84]

International Cooperation on Mine Action

The European Commission (EC) delegation office in Colombia has funded a project to strengthen Colombia’s institutional mine action capacity; the project was signed on 27 December 2005 with an addendum in October 2006. The five-year project (four years of implementation followed by one year of closure) was due to end in 2010; it was costed at €3.15 million (US$3.96 million), of which the EC will contribute €2.5 million ($3.1 million) and the government will contribute the remainder.^[85] The project resulted from the Colombian government’s request for EC support and a 2004 fact finding mission. Its main objective is “to contribute to the regional development for the free movement of the people and a better understanding of the landmine situation.” A specific objective was to “contribute to the institutional strengthening of the PPAICMA and the reduction of future mine victims in Colombia.”^[86] Main activities expected were:

• “global” and annual operational planning, and a technical assistance mission;
• Landmine Impact Survey adapted to the Colombian context;
• review and publication of the national quality assurance/control standards; and,
• accreditation of demining, mine risk education and victim assistance organizations, strengthening of the decentralized coordination entities, and training in mine risk education.^[87]

The first technical assistance mission took place on 26 July 2007.^[88] The EC has an additional project, on mine risk education and victim assistance (see later).

International support provided since 2003 by the Organization of American States (OAS) continued in 2006-2007, through the OAS Program for Integrated Action against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA). Initially, AICMA provided limited assistance in mine awareness, survivor rehabilitation and database development. Since 2005 the OAS, with the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), has assisted Colombian Army personnel to strengthen the national capacity for humanitarian demining.^[89]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

Colombia’s National Strategic Plan for 2004-2009, which was approved by the government on 10 August 2004, included four goals:

• capacity-building and implementing state policy against landmines;
• reducing casualties and providing assistance;
• meeting treaty obligations by demining military bases, destroying stockpiles and “universalizing the fulfillment of the Treaty;” and,
• promoting changes in perception and practice of the population towards landmines.

The strategy did not set timelines for these goals.^[90]

Integration of Mine Action with Reconstruction and Development

In the National Development Plan 2006-2010, approved by Congress with Law 1151 of 24 July 2007, mine action has been included through mine and UXO risk education and victim assistance as a primary part of the reconciliation strategy. In addition, a specific strategy will be developed for children involved in the conflict and those that have been victims of the war, guaranteeing also special protection and rehabilitation for those affected by antipersonnel mines. The National Development Plan does not make any mention of demining.^[91]

Demining

Demining in Colombia was conducted during 2006 by a joint platoon (number 1) composed by 40 deminers from the army, air force, navy and police under the coordination of the General Inspector Office of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. Operations were said to have been coordinated with the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, carried out with technical assistance from the OAS and monitored by the IADB.^[92]

Demining capacity was increased by the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Demining of the Armed Forces in June 2006, with a total of 160 deminers allocated to four platoons.^[93] A Demining Center is part of the School of Engineers under the responsibility of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces. The Department of Humanitarian Demining has as its functions clearance of the military bases and dangerous areas reported by civilians as “humanitarian demining emergencies.” The training of two platoons started after June 2006, delivered by the Colombian Army’s School of Engineers, the OAS, IADB, British Army and Salamandra Foundation (Fundación Salamandra) and was completed in December 2006.^[94]

Further expansion of demining capacity was achieved in 2006 with the formation of an additional 980 explosives and demolition (EXDE) teams throughout the country, and eight MARTE teams specialized in dealing with IEDs and mines found during military combat operations.^[95] These units conduct clearance to military and not to humanitarian standards; however, the coordinates of cleared areas are recorded for humanitarian demining “when the conflict is over.”^[96] Both EXDE and MARTE teams use mine detection dogs.^[97]

In the first half of 2007 the fourth platoon of humanitarian deminers was trained by the School of Engineers and were due to receive training from the OAS and IADB in the second half of 2007.^[98] Platoons 2 and 3, created and trained in the second half of 2006, also required further training in 2007, as the OAS-supplied personal protective equipment, mine detectors and support supplies were delayed until April/May 2007.^[99]

As of 29 July 2007, 1,170 EXDE and eight MARTE teams were conducting military demining operations in Colombia.^[100]

Demining by NSAGs

During 2006 the ELN and the government continued discussing humanitarian demining in new areas of the country, as part of the peace talks. At the meeting planned for August 2007 in Cuba, the government planned to present a proposal for joint mine and UXO clearance operations.^[101]

Pablo Beltran, the ELN commander and negotiator in the peace talks, declared in a media interview that the ELN “has taken into account mine clearance activities in critical areas.”^[102] The ELN conducted some mine clearance in Micoahumado in 2005 and in 2006 announced plans to carry out humanitarian demining in 14 “veredas” in Samaniego, Nariño Department. The situation was complicated, however, by the need to gain the agreement of local paramilitaries. During the ICBL/Landmine Monitor mission in June 2007, the mayor of Samaniego called for support from the international community in putting pressure on the ELN and the government to enable the promised demining to go ahead, and to include demining in the cease-fire agreement.^[103]

In September 2006, an agreement was signed by ELN, FARC and AUC commanders imprisoned in a maximum security jail in Itagui, Antioquia, with the objective of working towards humanitarian demining in the west of Antioquia as a peace gesture. Maps of mined areas were given to the government.^[104]

Surveys of Affected Areas

During 2006, 11 impact surveys were conducted around the military bases.^[105] Impact surveys are based on the standard IMSMA form and conducted by a special team drawn from the Department of Humanitarian Demining and the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory. In the first seven months of 2007, a further five impact surveys were conducted around military bases.^[106]

For the remainder of 2007, impact surveys were planned to be conducted around the military bases of Montezuma, Risaralda; Alguacil, Cesar; Yatacue, Fortaleza, La Riqueza, Cerro Luna, and Cerro Curva military bases, all in Valle del Cauca; El Dorado, Meta; and Galeras Volcano, Nariño.

For 2008, impact surveys were planned around the abandoned military bases in Tokio, Valle del Cauca; Mecana, El Sireno in Choco; Santa Rosa, Bolívar; and Munchique, Cauca; as well as the Gabinete military base still in use in Huila.^[107]

Village Demining

The ICBL and Landmine Monitor visited the indigenous community of Jambalo in the north of Cauca Department on 25 June 2007. The delegation met with the Indigenous Guard that form part of the Association of Indigenous Councillors of North Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indigenas del Norte del Cauca, ACIN) and who have conducted village demining since 2005. The guards’ coordinator reported that since 2005 they have cleared 18 mines in Toribio municipality and 60 items of UXO in the northern Cauca cabildos; he also reported that 40 bombs remained stored as they “do not know how to dispose of them.” ACIN representatives stated that “they know that clearing is the responsibility of the state, but we take it on in defense of human life” since no solution has come from the government.^[108] ACIN asked the Colombian government in September 2006 to set up a demining body that could conduct emergency humanitarian demining and was independent from the Colombian Armed Forces.^[109] The Observatory stated in July 2007 that it was looking for ways to solve the problem of these indigenous communities.^[110]

Mine/ERW Clearance

Colombia uses manual demining but planned to introduce mechanical demining by the end of 2007.^[111] Its quality management system is said to comply with IMAS; quality control is conducted by the army and navy and monitored by the OAS and IADB.^[112]

In 2006 a total of 5,723 square meters of mined areas was cleared by humanitarian demining platoon 1, with the destruction of 226 antipersonnel mines and the cancellation of 9,800 square meters of suspected hazardous areas.

In addition, during 2006 EXDE and MARTE teams cleared 721 areas with military mine clearance (breaching) and attended 676 “events” in which mines were “seized,” according to the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory.^[114] However, Colombia reported that EXDE and MARTE groups participated in 155 military demining operations in 2006.^[115] The difference in figures was said to be due to the under-reporting by the Armed Forces to the Observatory.^[116]

Between January and June 2007 the military base of Cerro Neiva (Huila) was cleared by platoon 1; 150 antipersonnel mines were destroyed from an area of 1,140 square meters.

Platoon 1 was due to start clearance of the minefield in Cerro Neusa (Cundinamarca) at the beginning of August 2007, and then Alguacil military base, Pueblo Bello, Cesar (Sierra Nevada).^[117] Platoons 2 and 3 started clearance operations on 8 June 2007.

In addition, in the first seven months of 2007, 695 IEDs were cleared from 129 mined areas and seven car bombs were deactivated by EXDE and MARTE teams.^[118]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2011. The Chief of the Joint Command told Landmine Monitor in June 2007 that Colombia would clear “all mined areas under its control,” that is, only the military bases.^[120] Through the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, Colombia had made a similar statement: “the government plans to meet the Article 5 deadline in terms of clearance of the minefields under the jurisdiction of the armed forces,” but “there is no guarantee that Colombia will be able to declare itself mine-free in 2011, especially if non-State actors do not embrace the principles in the Convention. However, the Government will not ask for any extension until evaluating the possibility to completely fulfill what is established in the Treaty.”^[121]

Mine Risk Education

In 2006 mine risk education (MRE) in Colombia increased but remained inadequate in relation to the large number of affected municipalities and civilian casualties. There has been no regular coordination of MRE activities through the Observatory; stakeholders are invited to participate in planning sessions but systematic coordination is missing. Some departmental mine action committees take on a coordinating role.^[122]

UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) significantly increased their efforts and gave new momentum to MRE in Colombia, involving the Observatory and UN agencies, national NGOs and the Colombian Red Cross Society.^[123] Education efforts by the military to reduce its own casualties were not reported; it has admitted that one third to half of all its casualties are due to landmines.^[124]

MRE activities were undertaken in 2006 by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory and some departmental governments with the support of UNICEF and UNDP, and eight national NGOs: CCCM, Corporación Paz y Democracia, Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco, Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia (CIREC), Land of Peace (Tierra de Paz), Corporación Indígena Caucana Horizontes del Mañana (CICHM), Hogar Jesús de Nazareth, and the Colombian Red Cross Society supported by the ICRC. The military started providing limited MRE in accordance with IMAS as part of surveying and humanitarian clearance; communities living within a five kilometer radius are reached. OAS, in its project proposals for mine action, includes a joint budget line for MRE and victim assistance.^[125]

The National Strategic Plan 2005-2009 includes MRE, which is also a part of Colombia’s National Development Plan 2006-2010 and seen as a key component of the reconciliation process. One objective is to reach 80 percent of the 100 most affected municipalities of the country to teach safe behaviors.^[126]

For 2006, the Observatory aimed to provide MRE in 12 departments to at least 68 municipalities. Mine action committees were created and trained in 14 departments; in total more than 420 authorities in municipalities and departments were familiarized with MRE.^[127] However, an office-based needs assessment in May 2006 prioritized 100 municipalities in 19 departments for MRE; the assessment was based on civilian casualties, unlike the 2005 assessment which was based on overall casualties and therefore influenced by the preponderance (over 70 percent) of military/police casualties.^[128] The May 2006 assessment included 54 municipalities in 17 departments with at least five civilian casualties from 1 January 2003 to 5 May 2006, and other municipalities were identified based on other criteria such as the presence of illicit crops.^[129]

Colombia’s Article 7 report indicates that less than half of the targeted municipalities were reached by the end of 2006. In five departments (Arauca, Caquetá, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Santander) all targeted municipalities were reached, while in Antioquia four of the 10 targeted and one additional municipality were reached. The extent of MRE varied, from a full MRE project in Antioquia, where 34 college heads and four municipal chiefs of education were trained who then trained teachers in each municipality to provide MRE, to single workshops such as in Santander where one workshop trained 84 teachers from four municipalities. At least 64 school heads and 518 teachers were trained, but figures provided are incomplete.^[130] Whether teachers provided MRE classes is not reported, nor how many students were educated. Teacher training usually lasted for only 2.5 hours.^[131]

Due to the high proportion of children among civilian casualties, one focus has been on MRE in schools by training of teachers, MRE teaching materials and inclusion of MRE in competitions as part of a national Change Day (Dia de Cambio). Departmental workshops with civil servants from the education sector and teachers were held in 12 departments; materials were distributed including nearly 320,000 notebooks.^[132]

The Colombian Institute of Family Well Being (ICBF) incorporated MRE into the work of its mobile units assisting vulnerable children and teenagers aged under 18 years in remote areas. ICBF staff received MRE training from UNICEF in June 2006 and provided some courses.^[133]

The Observatory and the Office of the Ombudsperson gave mine action training including MRE to human rights defenders working in the municipalities; during 2006, 246 staff were trained in six departments.^[134] An 80-hour training workshop focusing on MRE was provided for 40 National Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA) staff from 17 departments by the Geneva International Centre for International Demining (GICHD) in 2006; participants from NGOs and other institutions also participated.^[135] A follow-up workshop with GICHD was held in June 2007.^[136]

The Observatory reported that a specific risk reduction plan for indigenous communities is being developed taking into account cultural specificities.^[137] There are indications that the indigenous population is suffering to a higher degree than other population groups from the conflict.^[138]

UNICEF support of MRE included data collection, social mobilization, municipal level needs assessment and planning, and community/school-based MRE. UNICEF produced a manual for community MRE facilitators in 2006 and translated IMAS MRE guidebooks into Spanish.^[139]

The NGO Corporación Paz y Democracia continued implementing three MRE projects with UNICEF and UNDP support; all were extended for 2007. In 2006, 18,927 people (10,299 community members, 8,628 civil servants) received 506 basic “sensitization sessions” and 9,963 people attended 514 in-depth “prevention workshops.” An additional project was implemented with financial support from the Observatory in four municipalities of Antioquia.^[140]

CCCM carried out a variety of MRE activities in 2006-2007. The CCCM project in collaboration with Corporación Paz y Democracia trained 23 mine survivors in four workshops as MRE trainers in 14 departments in 2006. CCCM organized a series of workshops, sessions and public events throughout 22 departments of Colombia.^[141] Another CCCM campaign in the most affected municipalities of 10 departments reached 400 civil servants in 90 MRE workshops.^[142]

MRE in Colombia is limited due to the ongoing conflict in many parts of the country. According to CCCM, without humanitarian clearance a rapid reduction in incidents and casualties cannot be expected as a result of MRE.^[143] Knowledge, Attitude, Practices studies undertaken by ICRC in 2007 suggested relatively low levels of understanding and some dangerous practices, as well as positive practices in some areas which have received limited. 

In 2006 the ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross Society reviewed the mine and ERW response to the mine/ERW problem in Colombia “in order to develop a broad and flexible approach aimed at preventing accidents and reducing the socio-economic impact of mine/ERW contamination.” MRE training was provided to 105 volunteers in seven branches and five staff members, and MRE was extended to three new departments (Arauca, Bolívar and Cesar); MRE continued in Cauca, Meta and Norte de Santander despite security constraints.^[144] For 2007, it was planned to conduct MRE in 30 municipalities in 10 departments and negotiate access to currently inaccessible zones.^[145]

MRE in Colombia was also carried out by several local NGOs, including Corporación Indígena Caucana Horizontes del Mañana, Tierra de Paz, Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco, CIREC and Hogar Jesús de Nazareth.^[146]

A second European Commission-funded project was planned to include MRE, to be implemented by Colombian civil society organizations.^[147] Funding of €2.5 million ($3.2 million) was set aside; however, application criteria were said to be strict and, for example, UNICEF and CCCM proposals were not accepted.^[148]

Landmine/IED/ERW Casualties^[149]

Colombia continues to report the highest number of mine/IED/ERW casualties in the world. In 2006 the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory recorded 1,106 new mine/ERW/IED casualties (226 killed and 880 injured) in 547 incidents; 28 percent were civilians (314) and 72 percent were military/police (792). The vast majority of casualties were men (1,014; 222 civilians); 20 were women, 66 were children (54 boys, 12 girls); and details of six civilian casualties were unknown.

Although the Observatory does not distinguish between mine and IED casualties, recording both as antipersonnel mine casualties, it acknowledges that most casualties are likely caused by victim-activated IEDs.^[150] In 2006 the Observatory recorded 1,042 casualties due to “mines” (94 percent) and 64 due to ERW (six percent).^[151] The most common activity at the time of the incident was military activity (777); other activities were “passing by” (151), tampering (38) and livelihood activities (24). Civilian casualties were registered in 25 of the 31 affected departments in Colombia; only five were in urban areas. Most civilian casualties occurred in Meta (80), followed by Antioquia (55) and Nariño (34). Nariño is one of the areas with the most intense conflicts.

The 2006 casualty rate remains constant compared to 2005 (1,112 casualties in 551 incidents).^[152] This is an average of three casualties per day.^[153] Whereas the civilian casualty rate is lower than some other severely mine-affected countries (for example Afghanistan and Cambodia), under-reporting of civilian casualties in Colombia is said to be high.^[154] This may be responsible for the declining percentage of recorded civilian casualties (in 2004-2005 civilians were 31 percent of total casualties while in 2002 they were nearly 50 percent), but another factor may be the intensified conflict and targeting of military personnel in recent years. No casualties among non-state armed groups were registered by the Observatory in 2006, although the category for Illegal Armed Actor exists in the database. It is unknown if any demining accidents occurred as they are not recorded as such.

Casualties continued in 2007, at an apparently decreased rate. Between January and 1 June 2007, 390 casualties (79 killed and 311 injured) were recorded in 202 incidents; 72 casualties were civilians, including 10 women and 22 children (17 boys, 4 girls, 1 unknown gender); 318 were military/police. Most of the casualties (364) were caused by mines and IEDs, and 64 were caused by ERW. In the same period of 2006, 526 casualties were registered.^[155]

The 2005-2006 increase in casualties (from 863 in 2004 and 668 in 2003) may be explained by a change in government policy in dealing with NSAGs. After 2002 the army started actively searching out NSAGs and confronting them. In response, NSAGs increased their use of mines and victim-activated IEDs.^[156] The increasing number of casualties has also been linked to the government’s policy of eradicating coca fields and reclaiming land.^[157]

Data Collection

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory registers mine/ERW/IED casualty data in IMSMA and has four full-time IMSMA staff. Information is obtained from departmental and municipal authorities, regional ombudspersons, daily bulletins of the secret service, military sources, civilians, and six Colombian newspapers. The ICRC provides non-classified data to the Observatory, as do various NGOs and CCCM. In 2006 CCCM began collecting information on mine/ERW incidents in the 22 departments where it operates; in early 2007 a more rigorous reporting format was developed with the support of Moviment per la Pau and the ICRC. Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe-Humanitarian Aid Germany provided a web-based information system with EC funding.^[158]

Although Colombia has the highest number of mine/ERW/IED casualties, recorded data likely under-represents the true extent of the problem, especially with regard to civilian casualties. The Observatory continually updates its records as casualties from previous periods are brought to its notice, but it is unable to proactively identify casualties and is dependent on departmental authorities which often lack resources. There is known to be significant under-reporting of casualties among displaced people and people living in conflict areas or remote areas. For security reasons civilian mine/ERW casualties are not always recorded as such at hospitals and in areas where mine use is suspected; verification of casualties is impossible in conflict areas where access is restricted. There is practically no reporting on NSAG casualties; in 2006 none were recorded by the Observatory and since 1990 only 41 have been recorded.^[159] Some NSAG casualties are taken prisoner and treated by the government; others present themselves as “civilian casualties” or do not disclose the cause of their injuries.^[160] According to the Observatory casualties with any kind of injury (even very minor) caused by a “mine” or ERW are registered as injured.^[161] This information contradicts information provided to CCCM-Santander by the Army’s Second Division in June 2005 stating that military personnel were considered injured only if they lost a leg or if the injury was severe.^[162]

Casualty statistics are available online but more detailed data and analysis are not actively shared with mine action providers. The online information is aggregated data making it impossible for NGOs and other data collectors to verify if their information is included. Some stakeholders have stated that the way information is presented prevents them using it effectively in their planning.^[163] Exact details of the device, location, date, activity or source of the incident are not recorded. Cases have been identified where NGO data submitted to the Observatory is not included in IMSMA.^[164]

The Observatory, aware of the need to decentralize data gathering, organized a national workshop on data management in August 2006 with the technical and financial cooperation of GICHD, USAID and the International Organization of Migration. Approximately 80 participants from 70 organizations aimed to create a glossary of key terminology for mine action in Colombia. Decentralization of data management is also included in the national Strategic Mine Action Plan 2004-2009. In November 2006 another workshop was held with representatives from the 12 most affected departments and with stakeholders to train data management staff, mine action committees and local NGOs in key terminology, data gathering tools, and data flow mechanisms.^[165] As of July 2007 no changes in the data management system have been observed since early 2006.^[166]

The 2006 national disability census collected information on conflict-induced disabilities, including landmine injuries. However, they only identified 250 mine casualties, a number that does not match any other data.^[167]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Colombia is unknown. On the assumption of 20 percent under-reporting, there could be at least 7,500 casualties. Between 1990 and 1 June 2007 the Observatory recorded 6,107 casualties, including 1,426 killed and 4,681 injured in 31 of 33 departments. There were at least 2,113 civilians (including 197 women, 460 boys, and 130 girls). The great majority (97 percent) of incidents occurred in rural areas (3,100 out of 3,182 incidents). The most affected departments are: Antioquia with 1,421 casualties (619 civilian, 802 military), Meta 598 (244 civilian, 354 military), and Bolívar 478 (136 civilian, 342 military). In 2006, Nariño entered the top 10 with 162 casualties (104 civilian, 58 military) due to the intensified conflict. Since 1990, 40 percent of municipalities have registered mine casualties (448 of 1,119 municipalities); civilian casualties were registered in 30 percent of municipalities (335).^[168] Five municipalities recorded 40 or more civilian casualties.^[169] The most common activity at the time of the incident was military activity (76 percent), then “passing by” (706 casualties), and various livelihood activities (220 casualties).^[170]

Survivor Assistance

Colombia has acknowledged “limitations” in addressing survivors’ rights to complete and integral care and integration.^[171] Information on the conditions of survivors living in NSAG- areas of influence is scarce, but most survivors are forced to seek medical care and economic opportunities elsewhere. It was reported that, in several cases, FARC threatened survivors who tried to claim government help or benefits. However, FARC does not appear to provide alternative assistance to civilians.^[172] Paramilitary groups and NSAGs are said to have their own health services, but it is unknown if these services are of good quality. It was reported that some NSAGs “kidnap” health staff to provide assistance to injured rebels. The military provides comprehensive health services to its personnel, but the level of services differs between professional soldiers and conscripts.^[173] The government acknowledged that the military is not able to offer reintegration to its disabled soldiers, as “the magnitude of the problem requires a paradigm shift.”^[174]

Mine/ERW survivors are entitled to free emergency transport, medical and rehabilitation care in both public and private health institutions. Emergency transport and first-aid at the incident location are often insufficient; roadblocks and “vehicle-free days” are further obstacles. Hospitals in the urban centers of mine-affected areas have sufficient infrastructure and staff to deal with landmine casualties. Rural health posts vary in medical supplies and personnel.^[175] Health professionals and centers in conflict areas are at risk of kidnapping or raids. Referrals to specialized health centers are not always conducted.^[176]

Physical rehabilitation is available in major cities and of good quality, but access is limited by centers’ locations, by lack of free transport and accommodation, and because services are only free for one year after the incident. People also need identification and disability certificates, which is problematic for indigenous and displaced people but also for ordinary civilians who are suspected to have links to combatants.^[177]

The government reimburses medical and rehabilitation service providers for the cost, but they have complained about delayed reimbursement. Consequently, service providers prefer treating patients with private health insurance.^[178] In 2006 the CCCM coordinator in Santander department had to assist at least six survivors in filing legal complaints against healthcare administrators to obtain services; they won every case.^[179] Humanitarian agencies will often help with transport, accommodation and food.

Mine/ERW survivors are also entitled to psychosocial support for one year after the incident, but mental health services are under-funded.^[180] Community-based mental health programs are rare, but in some mine-affected departments mental health services are provided at the municipality level as part of Basic Attention Plans.^[181]

Mine/ERW survivors can access free vocational training at the National Learning Institute, but must have at least seven years formal schooling.^[182] Economic reintegration opportunities for people with disabilities also exist, but it is unknown how many mine/ERW survivors actually benefit from these services.^[183]

There are one-time government compensations up to COP 17,348,000 ($7,633) for mine/ERW survivors and the families of those killed by mines/ERW, obtainable within one year of the incident. The Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation offers an additional disability payment of a maximum of COP 2,602,188 ($1,145) if claimed within half a year of the incident.^[184] The bureaucratic process to obtain these benefits is complicated. Colombia’s 2007 Article 7 report acknowledges that, “pensions or one-time payments are for the majority insufficient to satisfy even basic necessities.”^[185] This is also the case for military disabled.

Colombia has legislation protecting the rights of people with disabilities, but its implementation is limited due to a lack of capacity in the health sector, inter-sectoral coordination and institutional leadership. Many mine survivors do not know about benefits and services available.^[186] The Presidential Program for Human Rights is responsible for protecting the rights of people with disabilities.^[187] On 30 March 2007 Colombia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities but not its Optional Protocol allowing for the monitoring of disability activities.

Progress in Meeting VA24 Survivor Assistance Objectives

At the First Review Conference in 2004, Colombia was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[188] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Colombia presented its 2005-2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. They were, and remain, incomplete and not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound).^[189] The objectives also remain largely unachieved, as consolidation and decentralization of the casualty database, and reduction of casualties and effective healthcare provision have not occurred. Progress was reported on only one of the objectives, namely the creation of the Integral Rehabilitation Plan, which was presented at the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007.^[190]

Colombia included information on victim assistance in its 2007 Article 7 report. Colombia received support from the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in 2007.^[191]

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework

Survivor assistance is coordinated and monitored by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory technical subcommittee on mine victim assistance working in close cooperation with the Ministry of Social Protection, the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Acción Social), and the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Interior coordinates the Committee of Prevention and Assistance of Disasters.^[192] Survivor assistance providers noted a lack of coordination, not only between NGOs but also by the Observatory which invites NGOs to help develop strategies but does not hold regular coordination meetings.^[193] In April 2007 Colombia announced the creation of an integral rehabilitation plan; in preparation of the plan, three study groups were created in 2006.^[194]

Assistance for landmine/ERW survivors is also a part of Colombia’s National Development Plan 2006-2010, and seen as a key component of the reconciliation strategy. It states that progress was made in formulating “a policy of integral assistance for victims in emergency, rehabilitation and equal opportunities with emphasis on activities during childhood.”^[195] The plan is equivalent to law and it was said its budget should ensure “integral and retroactive attention” to landmine survivors.^[196] The plan includes six main activities: improving capacity to adequately address rural urgencies, providing referral and access to departmental and national hospitals, using efficient communication systems, guaranteeing the security of medical staff (by security forces), providing information about services to survivors and family members, and government prioritizing of survivor assistance.^[197]

Over 1,000 people with disabilities including 860 mine/UXO survivors received services during 2006. Within this total, the University Hospital in Cali provided physical rehabilitation to five mine/ERW survivors.^[198] ICRC provided medical care for 362 weapon-injured people (265 mine/ERW survivors).^[199] CCCM provided various types of assistance to 278 survivors; an additional 50 people from the departments of Antioquia (20), Cauca (20) and Santander (10) received economic reintegration assistance in cooperation with SENA and with the economic support of the Norway and the Observatory.^[200] Handicap International assisted 73 survivors with medical care, physical rehabilitation and psychosocial integration.^[201] CIREC provided comprehensive survivor assistance to eight survivors; statistics for the entire CIREC program are unknown for 2006.^[202] The Mi Sangre Foundation funded activities in support of 133 landmine survivors in 2006 through the Walking Hero Foundation (73 disabled veterans), Committee for Rehabilitation in Antioquia (30 survivors) and the Association of Mine/ERW Survivors of Cocorná in Antioquia (30 survivors).^[203] The Meta departmental government, with financial support from UNDP, assisted 80 survivors with medical examinations resulting in 55 people receiving mobility aids and physical rehabilitation.^[204]

Several mine/ERW survivors received treatment outside Colombia; six child casualties received rehabilitation services in the United States and two received medical treatment in Spain.^[205]

Six Colombian military paramedics from demining units participated in an EC-funded mine injury and trauma seminar in Quito, Ecuador from 7-10 November 2006.^[206]

ICRC continued to provide medical supplies for war-injured people in remote rural areas. In cooperation with the ministries of health and defense, ICRC organized a war-surgery seminar for 80 civilian and military surgeons in Bogotá in May 2006. In 2006 the Ministry of Social Protection and ICRC organized one-week workshops on the clinical management of weapon-injured patients, particularly mine casualties, in five major cities for 150 national health staff.^[207] ICRC also provided material for the production of prosthetics to four rehabilitation centers; with ICRC support, three technicians received prosthetic/orthotic training in Nicaragua.^[208]

Other challenges included the lack of transportation and accommodation.^[209]

CIREC operates a prosthetic workshop in Bogotá and a community leadership program including psychosocial and socioeconomic reintegration programs. It also provides technical support to associations of people with disabilities. Two CIREC staff enrolled in a distance learning ortho-prosthetics course of the University of Don Bosco, El Salvador.^[210]

Coordination among rehabilitation services is lacking in Colombia. Some agencies raised funds for medical care and physical rehabilitation for patients who do not meet the requirements for reimbursement.

Handicap International (HI) continued its integrated assistance project for people with disabilities, providing community-based rehabilitation, referrals, psychosocial support and economic reintegration. On 1 July 2006 HI started a project to assist civilian survivors in Antioquia and Bolívar, implemented with CIREC and UNICEF support.^[211] HI assisted more people than planned in 2006 (73 instead of 50 planned).^[212]

The Mi Sangre Foundation in Medellín, founded by Colombian singer Juanes in December 2005, aims to provide equal educational opportunities to child mine survivors by creating public-private partnerships with Observatory support. At least two companies replied positively.^[213]

Enforcing legislation and public policy appears to be a major obstacle impeding improvements in survivor assistance. Only seven of 312 people who made claims between 1 January and 15 December 2006 received compensation from Acción Social. Eighteen casualties whose incidents occurred in 2005 also received payments in 2006. In total, 151 civilian casualties have received Acción Social disability payments; payments for light injuries are not included in this data. To tackle the lack of knowledge about survivors’ rights among administrations and health providers, the Observatory in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Protection and its claims fund organized 16 workshops in 2006.^[214]

Other organizations providing rehabilitation services were reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor.^[215]

Funding and Assistance

In 2006 international donations totaling US$4,336,602 (€3,451,889) for mine action in Colombia were reported by six countries and the European Commission (EC), an increase of 86 percent from 2005 ($2,332,300 provided by seven countries and the EC).^[216] Donor countries reporting funding in 2006 were:

• Canada: C$866,400 ($763,992) consisting of C$140,000 to HI for capacity-building, C$250,000 to UNICEF for MRE and victim assistance, and C$476,400 to the OAS for mine action;^[217]
• EC: €2,000,000 ($2,512,600) consisting of €675,000 to CARITAS for victim assistance and MRE in southern Colombia, €800,000 to HI for victim assistance, and €525,000 to the regional government of Antioquia for MRE and victim assistance;^[218]
• Italy: $11,720 to the OAS for mine clearance;^[219]
• Slovenia: SIT4,250,001 ($22,100) for mine action and coordination;^[220]
• Spain: €300,000 ($376,890) to UNICEF for MRE and victim assistance;^[221]
• Switzerland: CHF350,000 ($279,300) consisting of CHF150,000 for mine action, and CHF200,000 to UNICEF; ^[222]
• US: $370,000 from the Department of State, consisting of $300,000 to the OAS for emergency mine clearance capacity building and $70,000 to CIREC for victim assistance.^[223]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Colombia received only 3 percent ($157,110) of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006.^[224] In October 2006 UNICEF reported a shortfall of 88 percent of required funds for its mine action programs in Colombia. UNICEF reported funding of $76,071 provided by Germany against $650,000 required funds for 2006.^[225] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that lack of funding resulted in the cancellation of MRE materials and affected medical and physical rehabilitation programs and the “psychological well-being” of mine victims and their families.^[226] However, the OAS reported in April 2007 that funding for its mine action programs in Colombia had increased substantially in 2006, and that the need for funding would continue to grow, in part to meet victim assistance needs.^[227]

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects included 21 project appeals for Colombia with a total value of $6,250,431, none of which had been funded at the time of publication.^[228]

National Contribution to Mine Action

In its 2007 Article 7 report Colombia reported a government commitment of COP2.562 billion (about $1,127,280/€897,302) for the national mine action program in July 2006-June 2007; in the previous period, July 2005-June 2006, the government allocated COP571 million (about $213,000 at the average 2005 exchange rate). The 2007 commitment was estimated to be COP2.665 billion ($1,172,600).^[229]

Landmine Monitor sent a questionnaire to authorities in Colombia requesting details of national funding of mine action in 2006; no response had been received by mid-2007.

Colombia was among OAS member states reported as providing in-kind support in 2006 to the OAS Program for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines; the total value of all in-kind contributions was $2.9 million.^[230]