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Country Reports
Download PDF of country response to Human Rights Watch letter.
UK

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo on 3 December 2008. It has not yet ratified the convention.

In March 2009, the UK stated, “The next step is to put in place the necessary implementing legislation to enable us to proceed with ratification. In accordance with UK practice and Article 9 of the [Convention on Cluster Munitions] CCM, before we can deposit our instrument of ratification we need to put in place domestic legislation to implement those provisions contained within the CCM which require legislation to implement them, in particular the imposition of the necessary penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention being carried out by persons, or on territory, under UK jurisdiction or control. Given our strong support for the Convention the UK wants to ratify it as soon as feasible and officials have begun preparatory work with this objective in mind. In the meantime the actions we take nationally will be important in promoting the CCM and its spirit.”[1]

The UK is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. The UK has been actively involved in and supportive of discussions on cluster munitions in the CCW in recent years.

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Cluster munitions have been a subject of extensive discussion in the UK, and particularly in parliament since 1990.[2] UK policy on cluster munitions evolved remarkably from 2006 to 2008. The basic position maintained by the government from 1999 through to the end of 2006 was that cluster munitions were legal weapons and that existing international humanitarian law was adequate in relation to these weapons. In response to questions about the UK’s use of cluster munitions in Iraq in 2003, the Secretary of State for Defence argued that the “right balance ha[d] been struck” between risk to civilians and the protection of coalition forces.[3]

In March 2005, the UK presented a working paper to the CCW on the military utility of cluster munitions. While reiterating that these weapons provided an “essential capacity,” the paper also described the failure rate of the UK’s air-dropped cluster munitions (RBL-755) as “unacceptably high” noting that “this particular weapon [would] go out of service in the coming years and by 2015 all submunitions [would] contain a self-destruct mechanism reducing their failure rate to less than 1%.”[4] A year later, in March 2006, the UK revealed that it had tested its M85 submunitions, fitted with self-destruct mechanisms, in Norway and that these tests gave a “bomblet failure rate of 2.3%.”[5] This contrasted with earlier official claims that these weapons had a failure rate of “less than 1% in test conditions.”[6]

Just before the Third Review Conference of the CCW in November 2006, an article in The Times newspaper quoted a “leaked letter” from the Secretary of State for International Development to the Foreign Secretary. This letter argued that, given the very serious humanitarian impact that had resulted from cluster munition use in the past, the UK “should go into the conference advocating for a process that will lead to an effective ban of ‘dumb’ cluster munitions.”[7] During the CCW Review Conference, the UK announced that it recognized “the need for a ban on dumb cluster munitions” and proposed certain features that would characterize such “dumb” cluster munitions.[8] Subsequently, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office ministerial statement on 4 December 2006 stated that the UK planned to withdraw its “dumb” cluster munitions from service “by the middle of the next decade.”[9]

At the CCW Review Conference the UK did not, however, support a proposal for a mandate to negotiate a CCW protocol “that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions.”[10] Instead, it promoted a weak mandate simply to discuss explosive remnants of war, with a particular focus on cluster munitions.[11] The UK did not endorse a joint declaration by 25 other states calling for an agreement that would prohibit the use of cluster munitions “within concentrations of civilians,” prohibit the use of cluster munitions that “pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for example unreliable and/or inaccurate,” and require destruction of stockpiles of such cluster munitions.[12] At the end of this CCW session, Norway announced that it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a cluster munition treaty and invited other governments to join.

Despite the UK calling for a ban on certain cluster munitions at the CCW, in Parliament on 23 November 2006, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces argued that the “United Kingdom believes that cluster munitions are legal weapons, that international humanitarian law is adequate to govern their use, and that the international community would be better served by implementing existing law in a consistent manner when using cluster munitions.”[13]

The latter part of 2006 also saw the Cluster Munition Prohibition Bill tabled as a Private Members Bill in the House of Lords.[14] In the debate on this bill, many pointed to apparent contradictions in the government’s positions and challenged the coherence of terms such as “dumb” cluster munition.[15]

The UK participated in the Oslo Process from the outset, though it made clear its preference for the CCW, and frequently expressed reservations about the process and the draft convention text.

The UK participated in the initial conference in Oslo in February 2007, the three international diplomatic conferences to develop the convention text in Lima, Vienna, and Wellington, and the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008. It also attended the Belgrade conference for affected states (October 2007), and regional conferences in Brussels (October 2007) and Beirut (November 2008).

During the Oslo conference in February 2007, the UK was cautiously supportive of work on cluster munitions, but continued to call for negotiations in the CCW. While the UK ultimately endorsed the Oslo Declaration committing states to conclude in 2008 an international agreement prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, it lobbied for the inclusion of a reference to ongoing work on cluster munitions “in other fora” (meaning the CCW), and stressed “the importance of including all major users and producers.” The UK also said in its view it was not clear what form a new international legally-binding instrument might take, “nor whether existing IHL might need to be strengthened.” The UK indicated that the goal should not be a categorical ban on cluster munitions, but only on certain types, and also noted that a transition period would be necessary to facilitate this.[16]

One month after the conference in Oslo, on 20 March 2007, the Secretary of State for Defence announced that the UK was withdrawing from service its so-called dumb cluster munitions (RBL-755 air-dropped bombs and M26 rockets for the Multiple Launch Rocket System) with immediate effect. In a statement given in parliament the Secretary noted that “the types that we intend to retain are legitimate weapons with significant military value which, as a result of mitigating features, is not outweighed by humanitarian factors.”[17] The types left in service after this announcement were artillery projectiles with M85 submunitions with self-destruct mechanisms and helicopter rockets with M73 submunitions without self-destruct mechanisms.

During the Lima conference in May 2007, the UK essentially argued in support of transferring its domestic policy to an international agreement. In addition, it noted that stockpile destruction would be challenging and would require the possibility of deadline extensions for those that have “resource issues, technological issues or environmental issues” to contend with. It also supported proposals to allow retention of some stocks for training purposes. [18]

One month after the conference in Lima, discussions on cluster munitions in parliament revealed that the UK had revised its definition of a cluster munition. In 2006, parliamentary records showed that the UK had categorized its CRV-7 rocket equipped with nine M73 submunitions as a cluster munition.[19] However, in June 2007, the government stated that “the CRV-7 with its [M73] multi-purpose submunitions does not fall within the UK’s understanding of a cluster munition primarily because of its direct fire capability and also because it has too few submunitions.”[20]

In August 2007, two influential Select Committees in the House of Commons published reports recommending that the UK withdraw its remaining cluster munitions from service.[21] In November 2007, the government issued a response to the reports stating that this would “impose serious capability gaps on our Armed Forces.” [22]

On 12 November 2007, in his first foreign policy speech after taking office, Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that “having led the way by taking two types of cluster munitions out of service, we want to work internationally for a ban on the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”[23]

During the Vienna conference in December 2007, the UK again insisted that only certain types of cluster munitions needed to be prohibited. The UK argued that there should be no prohibition for cluster munitions containing a limited number of submunitions or that met “specified reliability benchmarks.” Again the UK noted that there would need to be a transition period for the introduction of any such prohibition. On other matters, the UK raised the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations with states not party), saying that this would be a “major issue” for states adopting a new instrument on cluster munitions but operating in multinational military coalitions alongside states that were not party to such an instrument. With respect to victim assistance, the UK recognized the need for long-term care and reintegration of victims but was concerned that legal provisions for these could be discriminatory if based on the mechanism of injury.[24] The UK opposed provisions in the draft text which would place special legal obligations on past users of cluster munitions.[25]

During the Wellington conference in February 2008, the UK aligned itself with the so-called like-minded group that put forward numerous proposals that the CMC sharply criticized as weakening the draft text. The UK continued to argue that weapons with a low number of submunitions and weapons that met “specified reliability and accuracy benchmarks” should not be considered as prohibited cluster munitions. It also said that “direct-fire weapons” should not be prohibited.[26] The UK continued to call for a transition period for any prohibition, for new text on interoperability, and for deletion of provisions imposing retroactive obligations on past users of cluster munitions.[27] The UK argued for lengthening the stockpile destruction deadline to 10 years, with the possibility for extensions, and supported proposals allowing cluster munitions to be kept for training and research purposes.[28] The UK proposed to limit the definition of “cluster munition victims” to those people “directly impacted by cluster munitions” as opposed to affected families and communities.[29] It argued that the number of ratifications required to bring the convention into force should be increased from 20 to “at least 40” if not more.[30] At the conclusion of the conference, the UK associated itself with a statement made on behalf of the like-minded group declaring dissatisfaction with the conference as it felt different opinions and views had not been taken into account in a balanced way.[31] However, the UK announced it would subscribe to the Wellington Declaration, indicating its intention to participate fully in the Dublin negotiations on the basis of the Wellington draft text.[32]

On the opening day of the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 19 May 2008, The Times newspaper published a letter signed by nine senior former British military commanders calling on the UK government to give up its remaining stocks of cluster munitions and “establish a new benchmark for the responsible projection of force in the modern world.”[33]

During the negotiations the UK maintained many of the same lines of argument that it had developed since Vienna. It pushed, initially, for changes to Article 1 of the convention to address concerns over interoperability and then supported the inclusion of a new Article 21 on Relations with States not party to the Convention.[34] The UK pushed for exemptions from prohibition for cluster munitions that incorporate technical devices to lower their failure rate, as well as for “direct fire” munitions and those with less than a certain number of cluster munitions—thus allowing the UK to keep the cluster munitions that it had in service at the time. It also proposed an exclusion of weapons that were for use only in “an air-defence role,” and this was reflected in the definition of cluster munition finally adopted.[35] The UK argued for a provision allowing retention cluster munitions for development of clearance techniques or countermeasures.[36] It sought to delete the special obligation for past users of cluster munitions to aid clearance in affected countries.[37] This provision was amended from being a legally-binding obligation to a politically-binding obligation in the text that was adopted. On victim assistance, the UK was initially opposed to the use of a broad definition of “cluster munition victim” to include the individual, family, and community. When the majority of other states firmly supported this approach, the UK proposed a compromise and supported the convention’s provisions on victim assistance.[38]

On 28 May, as the negotiations were drawing to a close, Prime Minister Gordon Brown issued a statement saying, “In order to secure as strong a Convention as possible in the last hours of negotiations we have issued instructions that we should support a ban on all cluster bombs, including those currently in service by the UK.”[39] In Dublin, the UK announced that instructions had been given for these cluster munitions to be withdrawn from service.[40] This change in the UK position was a major factor in many other nations deciding to support the convention text.

The UK then joined in the consensus adoption of the convention. In its closing statement, the UK paid tribute to the role of cluster munition survivors in the Oslo Process and heralded the convention text as a major contribution towards redefining the technological limits of war for the benefit of humanity.[41]

Shortly after the negotiations, the government stated that it intended to sign the convention in Oslo in December.[42] On 4 June 2009, the Prime Minister restated his intention to promote the convention internationally to ensure that it would become a global convention outlawing cluster munitions.[43]

Upon signing the convention in Oslo on 3 December 2008, Foreign Secretary David Miliband gave a strong statement calling it a “remarkable achievement.” He pledged the UK’s support in promoting the universalization of the convention “to encourage those countries not here today to accept that the world has changed, and that we have changed it.”[44]

UK cluster munition policy was subject to sustained analysis and criticism by NGOs from 1999 onwards. Coordinated by Landmine Action, a loose partnership of NGOs, civil society groups and parliamentarians, used parliamentary questions, freedom of information requests, research, and media opportunities to cast doubt on the adequacy of the government’s policies. The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund was a major supporter not only of work in the UK, but also of international civil society engagement throughout the Oslo Process.

Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

The UK used cluster munitions extensively in the past. It also produced, exported, and imported the weapon and had a sizable stockpile.

In March 2009, the UK stated, “Since the adoption of the [Convention on Cluster Munitions] CCM on 30 May the UK has taken steps to begin implementing the Convention’s provisions on transfers and stockpile destruction. On 1 October 2008 the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) placed cluster munitions in category ‘A’ of their new three tiered structure for trade controls, making them subject to the most stringent trade controls. This has put in place additional controls on trading cluster munitions between countries overseas: trading between two overseas countries where any part of that trading takes place within the UK or is carried out by UK persons anywhere in the world, will be controlled, as will any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of cluster munitions.”[45]

On 5 June 2009, the government stated that although it does not deem it to be a legal requirement under the convention, in keeping with its spirit, the UK would seek the removal of all foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territory within the eight year period allowed for stockpile destruction.[46]

The UK used cluster munitions in the Falkland Islands in 1982, in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999, and Iraq in 2003.[47]

The UK has produced several variations of one type of cluster bomb, the BL-755 with 147 submunitions, and has also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.

The BL-755 cluster bombs produced in the UK have been exported to, or otherwise ended up being possessed by, the following countries: Belgium, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[48]

The UK purchased 59,364 L20A1 projectiles between 1996 and 2004. The L20A1 projectiles, 2,100 of which were used in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, were manufactured by BAE Systems Royal Ordnance under license from Israel Military Industries.[49]

The UK has imported cluster munitions from the United States: M483 155mm artillery projectiles with 88 submunitions each; M26 rockets with 644 submunitions each for MLRS; M261 Multipurpose Submunition (nine M73 submunitions each) in the 70mm rockets used in the CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers; and CBU-87 cluster bombs with 202 submunitions each.

All UK stockpiles of cluster munitions have been removed from service and are now either in the process of being destroyed or contracts have been agreed for their destruction. The UK stockpiled 190,850 cluster munitions of six different types that contained 38,759,976 submunitions.

M26 ground rocket (43,692 rockets containing 28,137,648 submunitions): Disposal began in September 2007 at the NAMMO Buck facility in Germany and should be completed by the end of 2013.[50] In September 2008, the UK stated that it would cost €45 million to destroy this stockpile.[51]

L20A1 artillery projectile (56,000 projectiles containing 2,744,000 submunitions): The L20A1 shells, containing M85 submunitions, were the subject of a competitive tendering process as of March 2009 and disposal will be complete in 2010.[52]

BL-755 bomb (3,687 bombs containing 541,989 submunitions): Stocks were shipped to Germany for destruction, which was expected to be completed in 2009.[53] The contract for disposal was placed on 22 January 2007.[54]

CRV-7 rocket (4,571 rockets containing 41,139 submunitions):[55] On 6 October 2008 it was stated in parliament that a contract had recently been placed for the disposal of the CRV-7 cluster munitions variants and that it is due to be complete in 2009.[56]

M483 artillery projectile (82,900 projectiles containing 7,295,200 submunitions):[57] Disposal began in April 2005 and was completed in July 2008.[58] The contract for this was let under the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency in conjunction with the Dutch Ministry of Defense and was awarded to an Italian company, Esplodenti Sabino.[59]

The US supplied the UK with 1,008 CBU-87 cluster bombs, with a total of 203,616 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995, but they do not appear to be in service any longer.[60]


[1] Letter from Nick Packard, Head of the Security Policy Group, International Security and Institutions Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 March 2009. The UK specifically cited national actions taken on transfer and stockpile destruction. See section below on Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling.

[2] A report by Landmine Action in 2005 was based on an analysis of some 900 entries relating to cluster munitions on the UK parliamentary record between 1990 and 2005. Landmine Action, “Out of Balance: The UK Government’s efforts to understand cluster munitions and international humanitarian law,” November 2005, p. 6. Much of the discussion revolved around UK use of cluster munitions in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, and in Iraq in 2003.

[3] Statement by Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, House of Commons, Hansard, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, HMSO, 7 April 2003), Column 29, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[4] Working Paper on the Military Utility of Cluster Munitions, prepared by the UK, Tenth 2005 Session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)on Explosive Remnants of War, CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.1, 21 February 2005.

[5] The information was released in a letter from the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) Secretariat (Supply Chain), DLO Andover, to Richard Moyes, Landmine Action, 27 March 2006, in response to a request under the UK Freedom of Information Act.

[6] Letter from Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, to Sarah Teather MP, 22 April 2004. See also, Adam Ingram, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 26 January 2005), Column 332W, www.publications.parliament.uk, where Adam Ingram describes the M85 submunitions as having a “maximum failure rate of 2 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.”

[7] “Benn calls for cluster bomb ban,” BBC News, 5 November 2006, news.bbc.co.uk; and “Benn slams cluster bombs,” The Times (London), 5 November 2006, www.timesonline.co.uk.

[8] Statement by Amb. John Duncan, Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 13 November 2006. The UK proposed that “dumb” cluster munitions would have the following characteristics: numerous submunitions; an explosive content; would not have a target discriminatory capability, or would not have a self-destruction, neutralization or deactivation capability.

[9] Statement by Kim Howells, Minister for the Middle East, Written Ministerial Statements, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 4 December 2006), Column 1WS, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[10] Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument that Addresses the Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster Munitions, Presented by Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva, CCW/CONF.III/WP.1, Geneva, 25 October 2006.

[11] Statement by Amb. John Duncan, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 17 November 2006.

[12] Declaration on Cluster Munitions, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, CCW/CONF.III/WP.18, Geneva, 17 November 2006.

[13] Statement by Adam Ingram, Ministry of Defence, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 23 November 2006), Column 804, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[14] The Cluster Munitions (Prohibition of Development and Acquisition) Bill was first introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Dubs on 23 November 2006, and it was debated extensively during a second reading in the House of Lords on 15 December 2006. On 31 January 2007 the Order of Commitment was discharged, and on 20 February 2007 the Bill was read a third time, passed, and sent to the House of Commons. The Bill was presented to the House of Commons by Nick Harvey MP, on 19 December 2006 but received no further parliamentary time. Text of the Bill is available at: www.publications.parliament.uk.

[15] See, for example, Debate on Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Bill, House of Lords, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 15 December 2006), Column 1764, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[16] Statement by Amb. John Duncan, Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 23 February 2007.

[17] Statement by Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 20 Mar 2007), Column 37WS, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[18] Statement of the UK, Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, 24 May 2007. Unofficial transcription by WILPF.

[19] Statement by Adam Ingram, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 7 November 2006), Column 1453W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[20] Statement by Bob Ainsworth MP, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 16 July 2007), Column 22W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[21] The reports both recognized that the failure rate of the M85 submunition was significant and that the potential to cause substantial humanitarian harm was high. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Global Security: The Middle East,” Eighth Report of Session 2006–07, 25 July 2007, pp. 7, 48, www.publications.parliament.uk; and House of Commons, Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees, “Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review,” First Joint Report of Session 2006–07, 7 August 2007, pp. 15, 144–145, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[22] Reports from the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees, “Strategic Export Controls: HMG’s Annual Report for 2005, Quarterly Reports for 2006, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny – Response of the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Business, Enterprise and Regulatory,” November 2007, pp. 34–35, www.official-documents.gov.uk; and Foreign Affairs Committee, “Global Security: The Middle East – Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,” Eighth Report, October 2007, p.16, collections.europarchive.org.

[23] Statement by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “Lord Mayor Banquet Speech,” 12 November 2007, www.number10.gov.uk.

[24] Statement of the UK, Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 6 December 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[25] The UK said that language on user responsibility should be consistent with that in CCW Protocol V, although the UK has not yet ratified Protocol V. Statement of the UK, Vienna Conference, 5 December 2007. Notes by CMC/WILPF.

[26] Compendium of Proposals Submitted by Delegations during the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, p.13, www.mfat.govt.nz.

[27] Statement by Amb. John Duncan, Wellington Conference, 18 February 2008, www.mfat.govt.nz; and Statement by Phil Tissot, Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Wellington Conference, 20 February 2008, ukunarmscontrol.fco.gov.uk.

[28] Statement of the UK, Session on Storage and Stockpile Destruction, Wellington Conference, 21 February 2008. Notes by CMC.

[29] The UK maintained its concerns that legal provisions on victim assistance should not be discriminatory on the basis of the mechanism of injury and raised concerns about the jurisdiction of the proposed legal provisions on victim assistance. Statement of the UK, Session on Victim Assistance, Wellington Conference. Notes by CMC; UK proposal on victim assistance, Compendium of Proposals Submitted by Delegations during the Wellington Conference, pp. 13, 24, www.mfat.govt.nz.

[30] Statement of the UK, National implementation, Wellington Conference, 21 February 2008. Notes by CMC.

[31] Statement of France on behalf of like-minded countries, Closing Plenary, Wellington Conference, 22 February 2008, www.mfat.govt.nz.

[32] Statement by Phil Tissot, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Wellington Conference, 20 February 2008, ukunarmscontrol.fco.gov.uk.

[33] “Letters to the Editor: Cluster bombs don’t work and must be banned,” The Times (London), 19 May 2009.

[34] Proposal by Germany, supported by the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK, for the amendment of Article 1, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, CCM/13, 19 May 2008.

[35] Statement of the UK, Informal Discussions on Definitions, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 21 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[36] Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland argued for this as well.

[37] Proposal by the UK for the Amendment of Article 4, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, CCM/33, 19 May 2008.

[38] Statement of the UK, Informal Discussions on Victim Assistance, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 21 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action. The compromise was the addition of a qualifying phrase “affected by cluster munitions.”

[39] Statement by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “Breakthrough on cluster bombs draws closer,” 28 May 2008, www.number10.gov.uk.

[40] Statement of the UK, Committee of the Whole, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 28 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[41] Ibid; and Statement of the UK, Closing Plenary, Dublin Diplomatic Conference, 30 May 2008, www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie.

[42] Statement by Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, House of Lords, Hansard (London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 78, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[43] Statement by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, House of Commons, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 4 June 2008), Column 769, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[44] Statement by David Miliband, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008.

[45] Letter from Nick Packard, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 March 2009.

[46] Statement by Bob Ainsworth, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 5 June 2008), Column 1061W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[47] Human Rights Watch, “Cluster Munition Information Chart,” April 2009, www.hrw.org; Human Rights Watch, “Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,” vol. 11, no. 6(D), June 1999, www.hrw.org; Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” vol. 12, no. 1(D), February 2000, www.hrw.org; and Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), www.hrw.org.

[48] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 468–470; Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), CD-edition, entries for Germany, 14 December 2007; Iran, 10 January 2008; Italy, 10 January 2008; Netherlands, 10 January 2008; Oman, 10 January 2008; Pakistan, 10 January 2008; Saudi Arabia, 3 December 2007; Thailand, 10 January 2008; and United Arab Emirates, 10 January 2008; and Landmine Action, Explosive remnants of war: unexploded ordnance and post-conflict communities, (London: Landmine Action, 2002), www.landmineaction.org. Belgium, Germany, Montenegro, Netherlands, and Switzerland have destroyed or pledged to destroy these weapons.

[49] Adam Ingram, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 17 November 2003), Columns 497W and 498W.

[50] Statement by Bob Ainsworth, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 6 October 2008), Column 248W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[51] Statement of the UK, Fourth 2008 Session of the CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 2 September 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[52] Statement by Bob Ainsworth, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 6 October 2008), Column 248W, www.publications.parliament.uk; and Letter from Nick Packard, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 March 2009.

[53] Bob Ainsworth, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 6 October 2008), Column 248W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[54] Statement by Adam Ingram, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 1 February 2007), Column 504W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[55] Statement by Bob Ainsworth, House of Commons, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 6 October 2008), Column 248W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[56] Ibid. In March 2009, the UK said destruction was underway and expected to be completed in 2009. Letter from Nick Packard, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 March 2009.

[57] Bob Ainsworth, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 6 October 2008), Column 248W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Adam Ingram, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard (London: HMSO, 12 March 2007), Column 51–52W, www.publications.parliament.uk.

[60] US Defense Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defense, “Cluster Bomb Exports under FMS, FY1970–FY1995,” 15 November 1995, obtained by Human Rights Watch in a Freedom of Information Act request, 28 November 1995.