Colombia is one of the
relatively small number of Mine Ban Treaty signatories that is actively engaged
in conflict. Colombia’s ongoing, fifty-year-old internal armed conflict is
clearly an obstacle to rapid and effective implementation of the ban treaty.
The three largest guerrilla groups are: the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia, Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces Army), the
UC-ELN (Unión Camilista-Ejército Nacional de Liberación
Nacional, National Liberation Army) and the EPL (Ejército Popular de
Liberación, Popular Liberation Army). There are also numerous
paramilitary organizations. During this internal conflict, antipersonnel mines
have been used by the Colombian armed forces and several guerrilla groups,
including the FARC and UC-ELN.
Mine Ban Policy
Colombia’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Camilo Reyes Rodriguez signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. Colombia
has not yet ratified the treaty, even though it was a member of the Core Group
of nations which steered the Ottawa Process. Colombia participated in all of the
ban treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration,
and took part in the Oslo negotiations. It also voted in favor of the pro-ban
UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998, as well as the pro-ban
resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS).
The ratification process is under way according to the requirements of the
Colombian National Constitution. The legislative process for international
treaties requires a more extensive process than other legislation; the
ratification legislation must pass through three debates in the Congress, and as
of March 1999, the legislation was in the second debate. It is hoped that the
process will be completed during the first session of the year 2000.
However, some members of the Second Commission of the Senate, which studies
all international affairs and agreements relating to Colombia, have stated that
it will not ratify the Mine Ban Treaty until the government wins from the
guerrillas a commitment to destroy antipersonnel mines under their
control.[1] Several senior
Colombian military officials have also indicated that ratification may not be
feasible until the conflict is resolved, or alternatives to mines are found.
The Colombian delegate to the January 1999 Mexico City Regional Seminar on
Landmines, Colonel José Manuel Castro, stated that “[a]lthough
Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty, and is willing to ratify it, we have to say
that our position is particularly difficult because of being a country in
war.”[2]
As the process toward ratification continues, the Ministry of Defense is
already beginning to change its doctrine and training manuals to take into
account non-use of antipersonnel mines. It is also developing the
country’s domestic demining capacity and searching for alternative means
to protect infrastructure.[3]
The Commander of the Army, General Fernando Tapias, has committed the Army to
remove approximately 20,000 antipersonnel mines that the Army has planted all
over the country to protect the country’s military and communications
infrastructure.[4]
Colombia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but
legislation to ratify the CCW and its 1996 amended Protocol II on mines is
currently before the
Congress.[5] Colombia is also
a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or
opponent of efforts to launch negotiations on antipersonnel mines in that forum.
Colombia was not one of twenty-two CD members that in February 1999 jointly
called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the
establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export
ban.[6]
Production
Though never before publicly acknowledged, Colombia
has been a producer of antipersonnel mines. Antipersonnel mines were produced
at Industria Militar (INDUMIL), a Colombian government
facility.[7] The Ministry of
Defense instructed INDUMIL to cease its production in
1996.[8]
INDUMIL produced one type of antipersonnel mine in two versions: the
MN-MAP-1, a plastic blast copper percussion mine equipped with a charge of
pentolite 60 grams, a IM-M8 detonator with red explosive, a hammer and a total
weight of 200 grams; and the MN-MAP-2, an antipersonnel mine simulator used for
military practice which has a perforated plastic body, an inert charge, a IM-M9
detonator with a bronze simulator and percussion cap, an iron percussion hammer
and a total weight of 140 grams. Both mines require 35 kilograms of pressure to
explode and are identical in appearance with a red copper shattering pin of
1mm., a diameter of 75 mm., height of 70 mm., and a security system of forked
pole and plate spin.[9] There
is no available information on the quantities produced or production costs of
these antipersonnel mines.
Nearly all the major guerrilla groups have acknowledged publicly that they
are not only users but also manufacturers of the so-called “Minas
Quiebrapatas” (Legbreaker
mines).[10] The Colombian
military have identified and denounced in several documents and declarations the
production of antipersonnel mines by Colombian guerrilla groups.
[11]
Most of these mines are homemade using cheap and easy to find materials and
come in various forms. Some production is believed to be done in a
semi-industrial way. Between 1993 and 1995, the Colombian Army destroyed
approximately 17,000 antipersonnel mines manufactured by the ELN in the
“Talleres de Armamento Popular” (Factories of Popular
Weapons).[12]
The common “Legbreaker” mine is manufactured mainly by the ELN,
using materials including PVC, wire for electric installation, a plastic bag, an
AA battery, sulfuric acid, nails, staples, clips and other sharp material,
explosive and gunpowder. “Kleimor” mines are homemade versions of
the U.S. Claymore directional fragmentation antipersonnel mine. These mines are
also called “Cazabobos”(Fool Hunters). M-Klim mines are made with
materials such as a tin can, an electric explosive, dynamite, and a battery.
Other antipersonnel mines used by non-state actors in Colombia include the
Propelled Mine or Charge and the “Bomba
Elena.”[13]
Mines (and Improvised Explosive Devices) are also made and used by
non-combatants. In several parts of the country such as Chocó, farmers
make their own kinds of antipersonnel mines for different reasons, including to
protect their crops from animals and from
theft.[14] These mines are often
called “pig mines” and are very cheap and easy to manufacture. They
can be made with syringes filled with explosive or hollowed canes filled with
explosive and sealed with
excrement.[15]
Transfer
Colombia is not believed to have ever exported
antipersonnel mines, though it has never adopted a formal moratorium on
export.
According to U.S. government documents, Colombia imported 12,132
antipersonnel mines from the U.S. That includes 6,030 M14 blast mines in 1974,
and 6,102 M18A1 Claymore mines in
1989-1991.[16] Colombia
confirms that it did import Claymore mines from the United
States.[17] It is not known if
Colombia has imported mines from other nations as well.
Stockpiling
Detailed information on the size or composition of
the Colombian stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not available. There have
been no official declarations on stockpiles, but Colonel José Manuel
Castro, legal consultant for the Ministry of National Defense, stated that the
Colombian Armed Forces have mines in stockpile and that “the Ministry
wants to search for alternatives to destroy them as soon as
possible.”[18]
When it ceased production, INDUMIL still retained 2,220 weapons; these mines
were subsequently destroyed by the Military
Industry.[19] The Colombian
Army has also reportedly destroyed a considerable number of antipersonnel mines
belonging to the Colombian guerrillas. Between 1993 and 1995, the Second Mobile
Brigade of the National Army found and destroyed an estimated 17,000
antipersonnel mines that were either hidden or
laid.[20] In 1993 2,000
antipersonnel mines were reported destroyed in the Department of Bolivar, while
in the zone of Santander an average of fifteen antipersonnel mines are
reportedly destroyed each week. In 1995, in Serranía de Micoahumado, 100
antipersonnel mines were
destroyed.[21]
Neither the Ministry of National Defense, nor the General Command for the
Armed Forces, have provided a timetable for destruction of the stockpiles, and
there is no information available about the possible methods of destruction, the
location where this process could take place, or the cost of the destruction of
the stockpiles.[22]
There is no comprehensive information available on the quantities or types of
stockpiled mines held by Colombia’s non-state actors.
Use
Colombian armed forces have used antipersonnel
mines primarily to protect military and communications infrastructure. Mines
were laid as soon as construction of an installation, or an electrical tower
for example, was finished and then maintained for an indefinite
period.[23] The Commander of
the Army, General Fernando Tapias, has indicated that the Army laid
approximately 20,000 antipersonnel mines all over the country, and has now
ordered their removal.[24]
Members of the armed forces claim that all mined areas are well marked to ensure
the effective exclusion of
civilians.[25] Military
regulations oblige the official in charge of the mined area to periodically
review the area and to remove mines when
necessary.[26]
There are no known instances of new laying of antipersonnel mines by the
Colombian Army since Colombia signed the ban treaty in December 1997.
Several guerrilla groups, as well as paramilitary groups, have used and are
still using antipersonnel mines. The most frequent user of antipersonnel mines
in Colombia is the UC-ELN. The UC-ELN have been identified as using landmines
in populated areas of Antioquia, Arauca, and Santander, among
others.[27] The UC-ELN uses
several types of antipersonnel mines including Claymore-type mines, Chinese-type
mines called Chinese or Vietnamese “hats” (sombreros chinos o
vietnamitas), and so-called “foot-breaker” (quiebrapata) mines.
These are generally manufactured in UC-ELN
camps.[28]
The July 1998 “Heaven’s Door Agreement” between the UC-ELN
and representatives of Colombian civil society, under the auspices of Colombian
and German Catholic bishops, stated, “Mines to deliberately kill or
mutilate civilians will not be used,” and committed the parties to
promoting “ratification of the Ottawa Treaty for banning the use of
antipersonnel landmines in the Colombian Congress.” But it also
reflected compromise language committing the parties to “no longer plant
antipersonnel mines in high-risk areas for the civilian
population.”[29]
FARC has also regularly employed mines, but there is no evidence that EPL is
a user of antipersonnel mines. In 1996, FARC confirmed to Human Rights Watch
that it uses landmines.[30]
According to the Ninth Conference of FARC, held in 1993, antipersonnel mines are
used to prevent the advancement of troops, and to create confusion and fear in
the enemy.[31] According to
their 1993 code, FARC commanders and combatants are instructed to remove all
mines laid in a given area when they change position and leave that
area.[32]
Mines have also been laid around the country’s oil export pipeline by
the guerrillas.[33] Various
non-state actors have declared that civilians are aware of the warning signals
of the presence of mines.[34]
The ICRC in Colombia has conducted missions to ask guerrillas to mark the areas
where they use mines.[35]
Antipersonnel mines are also being used to protect illegal drug
plantations.[36] Ordinary
citizens also use mines and Improvised Explosive Devices; in several parts of
the country such as Chocó, farmers use mines to protect their crops from
animals and from theft.[37]
Landmine Problem
There has not been an objective, impartial and
in-depth assessment of the extent of the Colombia’s landmine problem. A
two-year old proposal for an in-depth assessment under the auspices of one of
the major universities has not obtained the necessary resources to proceed. It
is nearly impossible to find official or unofficial records of mined areas,
including maps. While the Armed Forces claim to have maps of the zones mined by
them, because of national security reasons they are not
available.[38] Neither the
government nor Colombian or international NGOs know the real number of mines in
the ground, the areas of mined land or the number and location of landmine
victims. Available sources are the Armed Forces, the International Committee of
the Red Cross, Colombian Red Cross, churches, news media reports and the
victims, their families and
communities.[39]
Colombia is made up of thirty departments comprising approximately 1,050
municipalities. According to the Office for Special Issues of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, at least 125 municipalities in eighteen departments are
mine-affected.[40] Data from
the Armed Forces, the media (especially El Tiempo), the Colombian
Commission of Jurists, and the ICRC, indicates that at least twenty-one
departments are mine-affected in the five regions of Colombia: the Caribbean,
Andean, Amazonia, Orinoquia and Pacific
regions.[41]
In the Caribbean region at least five departments are mine-affected:
1. Bolivar including the isolated mountainous areas of Serranía de
Micoahumado and Serranía de San Lucas, and the municipalities of
Simití, Morales, Rosa, Santo Domingo, San Jacinto, San Juan Nepomuceno,
El Carmen de Bolivar, Magangué, Montecristo, Bodega Central;
2. Cesar including municipalities of Codazzi, Becerril, Curumaní and
Serranía de los Motilones, an isolated mountainous area;
3. Sucre including municipalities of San Onofre, Tolu Viejo and Ovejas;
4. Cordoba including the municipality of Tierralta;
5. Guajira including the municipality of San Juan del Cesar.
In the Andean region at least eight departments are mine-affected:
1. Antioquia Occidental including municipalities of Remedios, El Bagre,
Segovia, Zaragoza, Amalfi, Maceo, San Roque, San Francisco, Itagui, Urrao and La
Granja;
2. Cauca including the mountainous area of Nudo de Almaguer, and
municipalities of Balboa and El Bordo;
3. Santander including municipalities of San Vicente de Chucurí, El
Carmen de Chucurí, La Mugrosa, Barrancabermeja, Matanza and Betulia;
4. Norte de Santander including municipalities of Hacarí and
Convención;
5. Nariño including areas of Galeras and Cumbal, both volcanos in the
Andean Cordillera;
6. Huila including the municipality of Guadalupe;
7. Tolima including the municipalities of Chaparral, Alpujarra and
Dolores;
8. Cundinamarca including the municipalities of Sumapaz and Medina.
In the Amazonian region at least three departments are mine-affected:
1. Putumayo including the municipalities of Mocoa, Puerto Asis and Orito;
2. Caquetá including the municipalities of San Vicente del
Caguán, Florencia, Milán and Puerto Rico;
3. Guaviare including the municipalities of Calamara and Miraflores.
In the Orinoquia region at last two districts are mine-affected:
1. Arauca including the municipalities of Saravena, Tame, Fortul, Arauquita
and La Esmeralda;
2. Meta including the municipality of San Juanito;
In the Pacific region, at least three districts are mine-affected:
1. Antioquia Oriental including the municipalities or areas of
Necoclí, Turbo, Apartadó, Chigorodó and Mutatá;
2. Chocó including the municipality of Unguía;
3. Valle including the municipality of Jamundí.
No survey or study has been made on the broader effects of mined or suspected
mined land on communities, but more than 30,000 families are thought to have
left their homes because of the presence of
landmines.[42] Colombia is
primarily an agricultural country, therefore the population most affected by
landmines are peasants who have to abandon their lands and normal way of life
because of the presense of uncleared mines and violence in general. This leaves
Colombia with relatively few farmers, cattle raisers, and people in the rural
regions to develop the country. It has resulted in migration of the displaced
rural population to urban areas where poverty is growing and economic recession
is more evident day by day. Colombia‘s rural population would therefore
benefit greatly from mine clearance.
Mine Clearance
There are no official humanitarian mine clearance
programs underway in Colombia. All mine clearance is currently undertaken by the
National Army and is primarily military, not humanitarian, in its purpose. It
is usually conducted during combat
situations.[43]
The Commander of the Army, General Fernando Tapias, has ordered the removal
of the approximately 20,000 antipersonnel mines laid by the Army all over the
country.[44] But no timetable
has been established, and no clearance of government-laid mines has occurred
since the signing of the Mine Ban
Treaty.[45] General Tapias has
estimated that the cost of clearing Colombia’s landmines could be as high
as U.S.$37 million.[46]
Fifty-two Colombian military mine action experts, trained by the Colombian
Military Forces, are working on the OAS mine clearance program in
Nicaragua.[47]
Mine Awareness
The Colombian Government has not initiated any mine
awareness campaigns or programs but it has co-funded two important initiatives.
The UNICEF-Colombian Red Cross mine awareness education program called “We
All Have the Right To Put Our Feet On The Ground” (Todos Tenemos Derecho a
Tener los Pies en la Tierra) was initiated in 1996. This initiative has
assisted several communities to live with the threats posed by
landmines.[48] There is also
the “Project of Communication for the Problem of Disability because of
Explosive Artifacts,” which is developing an awareness campaign on
disability due to conflict.[49]
In general, civil society is unaware of the extent of the damage landmines
cause to Colombia. With the exception of the new Campaña Colombiana
Contra Minas, there is virtually no pressure on government or non-state actors
to stop laying mines, to clear the mine-affected areas, and to ratify and
implement the treaty.
Landmine Casualties
Landmines claim victims in Colombia on a regular
basis, with recent casulties in Bolívar, Arauca and Caquetá
districts. According to statistics provided by the Armed Forces, there were 255
landmine casualties in different parts of the country during the first five
months of 1998. This included 55 military and 45 civilians killed, and 68
military and 87 civilians
injured.[50] Most civilian
casualties were farmers or cattle ranchers working in the field at the time of
the accident, while most military casualties were the result of combat or while
on patrol.
A paucity of information makes it difficult to estimate the total number of
people killed or injured by antipersonnel mines in Colombia. With the exception
of the proposed but not yet resourced assessment to be carried out under the
auspices of one of the major universities there has been no national survey or
study. Statistics held by the Ministry of Health group landmine injuries
together with other types of
wounds.[51] It is impossible to
determine sex or occupation of the victim. Sometimes the same victim is counted
three and even four times, depending on the number of medical institutions they
visit.
According to the Ministry of National Defense, between January 1992 and
December 1994, ninety-eight military died by antipersonnel mines, or 15% of
military deaths in combat for the Armed
Forces.[52]
Statistics collected by the non-governmental Colombian Commission of Jurists
show that in the one year period from October 1996 to September 1997, there were
forty-one casualties to antipersonnel mines, including seven civilian and
thirty-four military.[53]
Survivor Assistance
Because the great majority of civilian mine victims
are in rural areas, it is sometimes nearly impossible to get immediate medical
help and can sometimes take hours or even days to reach the nearest hospital. In
one case, a victim stepped on an antipersonnel mine while taking cattle to
pasture and then waited two hours for first aid, and 32 hours for surgery as he
had to travel a very long distance on bad roads, passing through two guerrilla
check-points.[54] In addition,
victims often cannot pay for appropriate transportation and they have to take
vehicles such as beer trucks and jeeps. The injured person is often presumed
to be the enemy, making their transit extremely dangerous.
In Colombia adequate medical, surgical and rehabilitation services for
victims are available but are usually in located in the main
urban centers, whereas most victims live in rural areas. While major hospitals
can provide quality medical assistance to mine victims, equipment is imported
and expensive, and there are relatively few doctors expert in dealing with the
complex surgical demands of landmine injuries.
Most victims never receive mobility devices, apart from crutches or
improvised prostheses. When victims are lucky enough to find prostheses, through
the different private and social programs, they often can afford just two or
three adjustments, which are too few considering a prosthetic often requires
many adjustments.
In Colombia, there are four institutions that manufacture prostheses and
provide services for landmine and other victims of violence. The Hospital
Militar de Colombia (Colombia’s Military Hospital) in Bogotá is the
only institution fully prepared and equipped to treat a landmine victim from the
emergency room to rehabilitation, including psychological support. The Hospital
manufactures prostheses and has a rehabilitation center. It treats military but
also provides services for civilians. The CIREC foundation in Bogotá has
worked with Colombia’s disabled population since 1975 and provides an
integral service to victims disabled by war violence. It has a prostheses
factory which also manufactures orthopedic devices. The San Juan Bautista
Orthopedic Center is located in Bucarmanga in Santander department north of
Bogotá. The Antioquia Rehabilitation Committeee is in Medellín in
Antioquia department north-west of Bogotá.
Social and economic reintegration programs for landmine and war-disabled are
virtually non-existent in Colombia. In the context of the armed conflict, the
need for such programmes for injured police or armed forces is not acknowledged.
Victims sometimes never return to their past jobs or occupation. FOSYGA (Fund of
Guarantees and Solidarity), of the Ministry of Health, is a governmental fund
that provides some money to victims of political violence to cover their medical
expenses. In 1992, the President’s Office created a fund to guarantee 8
million Colombia pesos (approximately U.S.$5,000) to victims of
violence.[55]
In 1981, the President’s Office decreed Law 2358, creating the National
Rehabilitation System. In 1990, Law 10 reorganized the National Health System.
In 1997, Law 418 established the obligation of the state to care for victims of
armed political or ideological conflict.
[1]"Ejército
Desmontaría sus Minas Quiebrapatas,” El Tiempo, 23 September
1998.
[2]Colonel José Manuel
Castro, delegate from the Colombian Government to the Regional Seminar on
Antipersonnel Landmines, Mexico City, Mexico, 11-12 January 1999.
[3]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Captain Miguel Torralvo, Bogotá, Colombia, 19 January
1999.
[4]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Captain Miguel Torralvo, Bogotá, Colombia, 19 January
1999; and Landmine Monitor/Colombia interview with Major Juan Carlos Barrios,
Director of Human Rights Office, V Division, National Army, Bogotá,
Colombia, 24 February 1999.
[5] Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Daniel Avila, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá,
Colombia, 28 January 1999.
[6]Statement by Bulgarian
Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February
1999.
[7]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Engineer Hector Rodríguez, Production Manager, Military
Industry – INDUMIL, Bogotá, Colombia, 18 and 21 January 1999.
[8]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Engineer Héctor Rodríguez, Production Manager,
INDUMIL, Bogotá, Colombia, 21 January 1999.
[10]Antipersonnel mines are
better known in Colombia by the name quiebrapata, which translated to
leg-breaker or foot-breaker.
[11]Ministry of National
Defense, “Infracciones al D.I. H. Por el Uso de Minas y Otros Artefactos
Explosivos de Manera Indiscriminada por la Narco-Guerrilla Colombiana”
(“Infractions Of International Humanitarian Law By The Use Of
Antipersonnel Mines And Other Explosive Artifacts In An Indiscriminate Way By
The Colombian Narco – Guerrilla”), Bogotá, May 1997;
Landmine Monitor/Colombia interview with Captain Miguel Torralvo, Bogotá,
Colombia, 19 January 1999.
[12]“Las Zonas Minadas
en Colombia”, El Tiempo, 29 September 1998, p. 13 A.
[13]Ministry of National
Defense, “Infractions Of International Humanitarian Law By The Use Of
Antipersonnel Mines...,” May 1997.
[14]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with users of “Pig mines” in Chocó, Bogotá,
Colombia, November 1998.
[16]U.S. Army, Armament,
Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25
August 1993, and attached statistical tables; U.S. Defense Security Assistance
Agency, Foreign Military Sales of Antipersonnel Mines, FY 1983-1992.
[17]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Engineer Hector Rodríguez, Military Industry –
INDUMIL, Bogotá, Colombia, 18 January 1999.
[18] Landmine
Monitor/Colombia interview with Colonel José Manuel Castro, Consultant
for Legal Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, 21 January 1999.
[19]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Engineer Hector Rodríguez, Bogotá, 18 January
1999.
[20]“Las Zonas Minadas
en Colombia,” El Tiempo, 29 September 1998, p. 13 A.
[21] Ministry of National
Defense, “Infractions Of International Humanitarian Law By The Use Of
Antipersonnel Mines...,” May 1997.
[23]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Colonel José Manuel Castro, Ministry of National Defense,
21 January 1999.
[24]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Captain Miguel Torralvo, Bogotá, Colombia, 19 January
1999; and Landmine Monitor/Colombia interview with Major Juan Carlos Barrios,
Director of Human Rights Office, V Division, National Army, Bogotá,
Colombia, 24 February 1999.
[25]Colonel José
Manuel Castro, legal consultant for the Ministry of National Defense; Major Juan
Carlos Barrios, Director of the Human Rights Unit of the V Division of the
National Army; Captain Miguel Torralvo, Director of the Human Rights Unit of the
Ministry of National Defense.
[26]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview, Major Juan Carlos Barrios, National Army, Bogotá, Colombia,
24 February 1999.
[27] See HRW interviews in
Magdalena Medio, 27-30 June 1997; HRW interviews with human rights defenders,
Arauca and Saravena, 2-3 February 1997; and “Minas quiebrapatas cobran
más victimas,” El Colombiano, 29 April 1996, in Human Rights
Watch, War Without Quarter, October 1998, p. 182.
[28] See HRW interview with
Francisco Galán and Felipe Torres, Itagui Prison, Medellin, Antioquia, 8
December 1997 in Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter, October 1998,
p. 182.
[29]See Article 7.d., and
7.10., in “Regarding Humanization of War” section of
“Heaven’s Door Agreement”, First Agreement Between Civil
Society and the Ejercito Popular de Liberacion Nacional, E.L.N. - National
Liberation Army.
[30] See HRW interview with
Marco Leon Calarcá, Frente Internacional-FARC, Mexico City, 13 July 1996,
in Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colombia and International
Humanitarian Law (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1998), p. 182.
[31]Colombian Campaign
Against Landmines interview, Olga Lucia Marín and Marco Leon
Calarcá, Spokesmen of FARC EP, México D. F., México, 13
January 1999.
[33] “Fear of landmines
delays work on Colombia pipeline,” Reuters, Bogota, 3 July
1998.
[34]Colombian Campaign
Against Landmines interview, Olga Lucia Marín and Marco Leon
Calarcá, Spokesmen of FARC EP, México D. F., México, 13
January 1999.
[35]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Roland Vabre, ICRC, Bogotá, Colombia, 5 February 1999.
[36]“Las zonas Minadas
en Colombia,” El Tiempo, 21 September 1998, p.13A
[37]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with users of “Pig mines” in Chocó, Bogotá,
Colombia, November 1998.
[38]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview, Major Juan Carlos Barrios, National Army, Bogotá, Colombia,
24 February 1999; "Ejército Desmontaría sus Minas Quiebrapatas,"
El Tiempo, 23 September 1998.
[39]Most information on this
in the Ministry of National Defense is classified. Information from the ICRC
Colombia Medical Department is available, but data such as names, addresses and
details on the victims is not releasable.
[40]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview, Graciela Uribe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogotá, Colombia,
2 February 1999.
[41] See Ministry of National
Defense, ““Infractions Of International Humanitarian Law By The Use
Of Antipersonnel Mines...,” May 1997; El Tiempo Database, articles
from 1992 to January 1999; Colombian Commission of Jurists Database, data from
1996 to 1998; and ICRC Patient Information.
[42]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Alicia Londoño, Juridical Assistant, Juridical Office,
ICRC, Bogotá, Colombia, 9 February 1999.
[43]Landmine
Monitor/Colombia, interview with Colonel José Manuel Castro, Ministry of
National Defense, 21 January 1999.
[44]Landmine Monitor/Colombia
interview with Captain Miguel Torralvo, Bogotá, Colombia, 19 January
1999; and Landmine Monitor/Colombia interview with Major Juan Carlos Barrios,
Director of Human Rights Office, V Division, National Army, Bogotá,
Colombia, 24 February 1999.
[45]Orlando Henríquez
and Orlando Restrepo, “The Peace Process, a “Mined Field”?,
El Tiempo, 21 September 1998, p. 12 A.
[46]"Ejército
Desmontaría sus Minas Quiebrapatas," El Tiempo, 23 September
1998.
[47]Colombian Campaign
Against Landmines interview, Cesar Gaviria, General Secretary of the OAS,
México D.F., México, 11 January 1999.
[48]Landmine
Monitor/Colombia, information provided by telephone from the Colombian Red
Cross, 27 January 1999.
[49]Landmine
Monitor/Colombia, information provided by telephone from the Colombian Red
Cross, 27 January 1999.
[50]“La Guerra Sucia de
los Campos Minados,” El Espectador, 6 June 1998.
[51]Diagnosis of Hospital
Discharge, Ministry of Health, Bogotá, 1996.
[52]Ministry of National
Defense, “Infractions Of International Humanitarian Law By The Use Of
Antipersonnel Mines...,” May 1997.
About Us
Our Research Products