India has not signed the
1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While expressing support for the eventual elimination of
antipersonnel mines, India has been critical of the Ottawa Process and the Mine
Ban Treaty itself.
India attended the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process and the Oslo
negotiations, but in each instance only in an observer capacity. It did not
endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It did not send
an observer to the treaty signing conference in December 1997. While India did
vote in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45S dated 10 December
1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning
antipersonnel mines, it was one of the few governments to abstain on both the
1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the ban treaty signing, and the 1998
UNGA Resolution welcoming the addition of new States to the Mine Ban Treaty,
urging its full realization and inviting all state parties to the First Meeting
of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999.
India’s position on a ban has been well-articulated, and has changed
little in recent years, despite the global momentum toward complete elimination
of the weapon. India favors a phased approach to a ban, including a prohibition
on transfers and on use, except for long-term border defense; India has also
proposed a ban on use of antipersonnel mines in internal (as opposed to
international) armed conflicts.
During the negotiations on Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW), Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghosh expressed these
views:
India has supported the efforts to strengthen Protocol II of the CCW.... [I]n
January this year [1995], India had called for a ban on the use of land mines in
armed conflicts not of an international character. Mr. President, we would like
to restate our position at this Review Conference that the use of mines be
totally prohibited in armed conflicts not of an international character.
This should be our immediate goal to pave the way for the ultimate
elimination of landmines. We have also called for the prohibition of the use of
booby traps in armed conflicts not of an international character and would like
this prohibition to be extended to other devices including improvised explosive
devices.... India firmly believes that the best way to win the battle against
land mines is to drastically reduce their easy availability which leads to their
indiscriminate use. India therefore strongly supports proposals to ban the
transfer of mines as we believe that such transfers not only fan existing
tensions but also have an adverse humanitarian
impact.[1]
At the conclusion of the CCW negotiations on 3 May 1996, the Director of
Disarmament of the Ministry of External Affairs Shri Rakesh Sood stated: "Our
delegation remains firmly convinced that the use of mines in armed conflicts not
of an international character should be prohibited. In fact, we believe that the
use of anti-personnel landmines should only be permitted for long term defense
of borders, perimeters and peripheries of
states."[2]
In a more recent statement, India's Ambassador to the Conference on
Disarmament, Ms. Savitri Kunnadi, on 12 February 1998 emphasized the ban on
transfers, and India's insistence on using mines "only for the defense of
borders," and only until "appropriate military solutions are found." She
said:
India remains committed to the objective of a non-discriminatory and
universal ban on anti-personnel landmines. We believe that the objective can be
achieved in a meaningful way through a phased approach that would enjoy
international consensus, and by addressing humanitarian concerns and legitimate
defense requirements of States. We could start with a ban on transfers.... We
could follow other steps and gradually narrow the field, as it were, to a
situation in which landmines are used only for the defense of borders, a
situation which could finally be dealt with as appropriate military solutions
are found. The basis of this phased approach would be seen as a
confidence-building – enabling States to deal urgently with the
humanitarian crisis, while remaining sensitive to their legitimate security
needs. The international community should also effectively address the critical
issue of mine clearance and dedicate greater efforts and assistance to affected
areas.[3]
Subsequently, the Indian Government's position on APM elimination was spelled
out in the Ministry of External Affairs 1998 Annual Report to the Parliament:
India remains committed to the goal of the eventual elimination of landmines
and supports a phased approach towards attaining the objective of a
non-discriminatory and universal ban on anti-personnel landmines. In the
meanwhile, the responsible use of mines should be permitted for the long term
defense of borders, perimeters and peripheries of states. India has closely
watched the developments within the “fast-track” Ottawa Process.
India is convinced that a global, effective and lasting solution to the problem
of anti-personnel landmines requires sustained international cooperation in all
relevant fora and enhanced international assistance for care and rehabilitation
of mine victims. India is concerned about the humanitarian tragedy caused by the
indiscriminate export and irresponsible use of APM especially in internal
conflicts. A consensus that would prohibit such transfers and use of these
weapons in internal conflicts, coupled with increasing attention to the
humanitarian issues of demining and rehabilitation of mine victims would go a
long way in addressing the problem. India remains flexible on the issue of forum
for negotiations and believes that availability of non-lethal technologies to
perform the legitimate defensive role of landmines will help accelerate their
complete elimination.[4]
India has not yet ratified the amended Protocol II of the CCW. Preparations
have apparently been completed but it is still waiting clearance by the Cabinet.
There are no procedural or other obstacles. It may be that the Government is
waiting for Pakistan's ratification. Only after ratification will actions
required by the Protocol be undertaken, such as inserting minimum metallic
content in each non-detectable antipersonnel
mine.[5]
India is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been
especially supportive of efforts in that forum first in 1997 to consider a
comprehensive APM ban, then in 1998 and 1999 to consider a transfer ban. India
was not among the twenty-two governments that in February 1999 called for
negotiations on a transfer ban in the
CD.[6]
An Indian official has said, “We would also be supportive of
negotiations in the CD on ban on transfers on the basis of a mandate that
reflects the interests of all
delegations."[7]
Production
India produces two types of antipersonnel
landmines. Both are copies of U.S. mines. The Indian AP NM M14 is a copy of
the U.S. M14 pressure-initiated, blast antipersonnel mine. These mines are
thought to constitute the vast majority of the Indian stockpile. The mine has a
plastic body and very low metallic content, limited to the striker and
detonator. Because of their undetectable nature, these mines are not permitted
under CCW amended Protocol II. When India ratifies amended Protocol II, it will
have to add metal to each of the mines, or destroy them.
The second Indian mine is the AP MN M16A1, a copy of the U.S. M16A1. This
is a bounding fragmentation mine. The mine can be detonated either by pressure
or tripwire. A first blast propels the mine into the air, then the main charge
explodes when the mine is approximately one meter in the air, spraying cast-iron
fragments in all directions.
Though not officially stated, India is most likely continuing to produce
mines today, at least to replace existing mines and for training
purposes.[8]
Various armed groups in India have manufactured improvised explosive devices
(IED). Some IEDs are developed with great ingenuity using whatever explosives
are available, with sophisticated detonators and a variety of timing and setting
off mechanisms. Most are victim-actuated and are targeted primarily against
people on foot and in vehicles.
Transfer
India is not thought to have ever exported
antipersonnel mines. Until 1987 it was Indian government policy not to export
any arms. Since then some arms have been exported, but these have not included
antipersonnel mines. India announced a comprehensive moratorium on APM exports
on 3 May 1996.[9] It is of
indefinite length.
Information is not available on any Indian import of mines. Insurgent groups
have obtained mines through the global clandestine arms trade.
Stockpiling
India’s antipersonnel mine stockpile may
number as many as four to five million, according to some non-Indian
governmental sources, although confirmed details are not
available.[10] Stocks of mines
are well dispersed. Large quantities are held with the field formations ready to
be laid at short notice. The great majority of mines in the stockpile are
believed to be the Indian AP NM M14 mines.
Use in Past Wars
A brief history of use of mines in past wars
appears in the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Antipersonnel
Landmines: Friend or Foe?, based on a report by retired Indian Major General
Dipankar Banerjee:
India-Pakistan wars 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. The mine warfare carried out by
both parties during the India-Pakistan wars was almost unique in the way in
which it was conducted. In the 1947-48 war in Jammu and Kashmir, a very small
number of mines were laid to protect certain installations . During the
protracted build-up to the 1965 war, the main minefields had been laid on the
plains by both parties. In the 1971 war, very few mines were laid because the
terrain was soft riverine country. In all three cases mine warfare was conducted
by well-trained and disciplined soldiers. The wars themselves were limited in
their objectives, of short duration and fairly static. Minefields were carefully
mapped, and maps were made available to both parties after the conflict,
allowing the early removal of the mines and the return of land to food
production soon after the end of the hostilities. It was significant that most
minefields were on arable land which was of value to both countries and
therefore particular care was taken. Because of the disciplined way in which the
mines were laid and removed, civilian casualties were reported to be negligible
although there were a few casualties among the engineers removing mines. The
contribution of these minefields to the ultimate outcome of the conflict was
considered to be marginal.
India-China War, 1962. No pre-planned minefields were laid at the start of
the war but as conflict progressed some were laid in mountainous areas. This
caused problems as AP mines had no effect in snow and worse still, they slid
down the slopes, even if they were anchored, because of snow movement and
precipitation. Mapping was extremely difficult and was
ineffective.[11]
Use Today
The Indian Army does not believe in the doctrine of
border minefields in peace. According to the Army, no mines are laid for border
protection or to prevent armed infiltration in the hills, such as the one
presently in progress in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Army claims that it has
never laid mines in internal armed conflicts. Some portions of the border both
in the Punjab in the west and a limited area in the east against Bangladesh have
been fenced to keep out intruders. These fenced areas are not
mined.[12]
Mines are to be used only by the Indian Army. The police and paramilitary
forces are not authorized to hold mines. In Indian military strategy antitank
minefields are an integral element of an obstacle system that is considered
essential to dissuade or defeat a surprise conventional attack by Pakistan.
Antipersonnel mines are seen as vital to prevent easy lifting of antitank mines.
The minefields are laid only when hostilities are imminent and detailed plans
are prepared well in advance for doing so. In wartime mines are likely to be
laid all along the very extended land border in the plains. In addition
antipersonnel mines may be laid to provide additional protection to defended
localities both in the plains and in the
hills.[13]
Mines do not form an integral part of the defensive system in the mountains
against China. The very high mountains there preclude any possibility of laying
large numbers of mines. However, small quantities of APMs may still be laid to
provide additional security to defended
localities.[14]
Armed groups in India have used a wide variety and type of both regular mines
as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). More than 700 incidents
involving use of IEDs in Jammu and Kashmir were recorded from
1992-1996,[15] and such attacks
continue to this day. A November 1998 report stated that “Separatist
guerrillas in Jammu and Kashmir...have intensified grenade, landmine and bomb
attacks since the start of this month.... According to police records, 22 people
have been killed and 120 wounded in at least 15 explosions...since November
1.”[16] The
People’s War Group in Central India (Andhra Pradesh stae) has also been
using mines and IEDs.[17]
Landmine Problem
The Indian Government states that there is no
problem with uncleared mines in India. Some reports indicate that there may be
uncleared mines along the India/Pakistan border in Kashmir and along the
India/China border.[18]
Mine Action Funding
At the International Meeting on Mine Clearance held
in Geneva in July 1995, India announced a voluntary contribution of U.S. $50,000
to UN demining operations in the form of a broad range of services to be
rendered by Indian experts.
[19]
Mine Clearance
The Indian armed forces have very extensive mine
clearance capabilities. Its large engineering corps would be able to field
hundreds of mine clearance teams. It is this that has enabled the Indian Army to
clear mines in the last wars within a very short time. Mine clearance is done
by the normal method of probing and blast, with indigenously manufactured
equipment.
India’s Ambassador, Arundhati Ghosh, has noted:
India has contributed consistently in many ways to efforts aimed at
alleviating this crisis. The Indian Army has been associated with U.N. demining
activities since the Congo U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in 1961-63. It has also
participated in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia and
Indian Army engineers are currently deployed in Rwanda as well as Angola. In
Cambodia, Indian experts assisted in the training of civilians and worked
closely with non-governmental Organisations in developing a data base,
undertaking area fencing and sensitizing the local population. In Mozambique,
Indian experts undertook humanitarian relief work including reconstruction and
restoration of communications. The Indian Army has also suffered casualties in
these operations.[20]
Mine Awareness
The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines believes that
there is a need for mine awareness programs in India as rebel groups are using
mines and improvised explosive devices, resulting in civilian and police
casualties. The Campaign has arranged National Conferences and Regional Seminars
and Photo Exhibitions in state capitals and major cities.
Landmine Casualties
There are regular press accounts of landmine
incidents and casualties in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere due to insurgent
activities. Landmine Monitor has a list of twenty reported mine incidents
resulting in deaths or injuries in Jammu and Kashmir in the nineteen months
between February 1995 and August
1996.[21]
[1] Statement by H.E.
Arundhati Ghose to the Review Conference on the Inhumane Weapons Convention, 26
September 1995.
[2] Statement by Mr. Rakesh
Sood, Deputy Leader of Delegation of India to the Review Conference on Inhumane
Weapons Convention, 3 May 1996.
[3] Statement by Ambassador
Savitri Kunadi in the CD Plenary of 12 February 1998.
[4] Ministry of External
Affairs, Annual Report 1997-98, p. 92. Similar language is found in
Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 1997-98, p. 6.
[5] Interviews with Ministry
of External Affairs officials.
[6] Statement by Bulgarian
Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, on behalf of 22
governments (undated).
[7] Statement by Sharad Pawar
at General Debate of UN First Committee, 14 October 1998.
[8] Major General (retired)
Dipankar Banerjee, Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New
Delhi, “South Asian Regional Survey,” prepared for Landmine Monitor,
p. 20. Based on observations from the South Asian Regional Landmines Workshop,
held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 7-8 December 1998.
[9] From United Nations
Demining Database at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/
[10] Estimate provided by
government officials involved in discussions with the Indian government during
the CCW negotiations.
[11] International Committee
of the Red Cross, Antipersonnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? (Geneva: March
1996), p. 29.
[15] Banerjee, “South
Asian Regional Survey,” pp. 40-43.
[16] Reuters, “Mine
Explodes in Kashmir, Kills Six Policemen,” 24 November 1998.
[17] According to Director
General of Police, Ministry of Home Affairs, State Government of Andhra Pradesh,
there were 107 mine/IED incidents from 1989-1998.
[18] U.S. Department of
State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. A-3
states “Contested areas of Jammu/Kashmir are mined.” In “25
Lose Limbs in Kupwara landmines explosions,” Kashmir Times, 9
August 1997, Army Colonel G.I. Reddy estimates that approximately 5,000 mines in
51 minefields have been laid in Kashmir during conflicts in 1948, 1965 and 1971,
and after 1990. The article notes that despite the areas being marked and
warning signs properly displayed in local language, casualties do occur.
[19] Statement by H.E.
Arundhati Ghose to the Review Conference on the Inhumane Weapons Convention, 26
September 1995.