Key developments
since March 1999: The UK completed destruction of its antipersonnel mine
stockpile in October 1999. It contributed $25.7 million to mine action in
1999/2000. The UK has served as co-chair of the SCE on Mine Clearance, and has
played an important role in promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.
In May 2000, the UK acknowledged participating in fifteen joint military
operations involving use of AP mines over the last three years, while stressing
that in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their use. Attempts
were made by Romanian and Pakistani companies to sell AP mines in the UK.
Mine Ban Policy
The UK government signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT)
on 3 December 1997. On 3 July 1998 a Landmines Bill was published to implement
the MBT in British law and to enable the UK to ratify. The bill became the
Landmines Act, receiving Royal Assent on 28 July, and the United Kingdom
deposited the instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 31 July
1998.
The UK participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May
1999, with Department for International Development Minister Baroness Amos
representing the government for part of the meeting. At the FMSP the UK became
the co-chair for one year, with Mozambique, of the Standing Committee of Experts
(SCE) on Mine Clearance established to take forward implementation of this
aspect of the treaty. This SCE met in September 1999 and March 2000. The UK
also actively participated in all the other SCE meetings.
The UK submitted its first Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report to the UN on time
on 26 August 1999, covering the period from 1 March 1999 to 1 August 1999.
While generally thorough, there are several gaps as described in the section
below on stockpiling. The UK's second Article 7 report was submitted on 17
April 2000, covering the period from 1 August 1999 to 1 April 2000.
The UK undertook advocacy efforts through its Overseas Missions to promote
the MBT in 1999 and 2000. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office wants “to
see a truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines, and...shall continue to press
all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the [Ottawa] Convention
as soon as possible.”[1]
In addition, the Department for International Development has provided funds for
the Landmine Monitor initiative in 1999 and 2000. In most public statements the
government has stressed the importance it attaches to the MBT and its
implementation. For example, the UK was one of the eighty-five sponsors of the
1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B promoting the MBT, and voted in favor
of the Resolution.
The UK is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW). The government submitted its CCW Protocol II report as required
under Article 13 and participated in the First Conference of States Parties to
Protocol II in December 1999.
The UK continues to support efforts to work on a transfer ban of AP mines in
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
Declaration on Joint Operations with Non-Signatories of the MBT
With its ratification of the MBT, the UK deposited a declaration with which
it seeks to protect British troops from prosecution for the “mere
participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other
military activity,” where non-MBT states use AP
mines.[2] The UK Working Group
has expressed concern that the language of the declaration is so broad that it
effectively only prohibits the actual laying of AP mines by British troops, in
what would appear to be a direct contravention of the MBT. British government
explanations and clarifications have not allayed concern about the British
declaration.[3] This issue was
described at length in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 675-678.
On 17 May 2000 the Ministry of Defence stated, “UK armed forces were
involved in 15 joint operations involving the use of anti-personnel landmines
over the last three years, primarily involving operations in the Balkans.
However, in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their
use.”[4]
The Ministry of Defence also stated on 12 May 2000 that the UK has
participated in ten joint operations and thirteen joint exercises outside the UK
since 1 March 1999 with the armed forces of twenty-five non-states parties to
the MBT: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, India,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates and the
U.S.[5]
Production
The UK has been a major past producer and
developer of antipersonnel
mines.[6] There are no private
companies now producing AP mines in the UK. In its Article 7 report, the status
of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities was
described as
“completed.”[7]
British firms continue to cooperate with European firms on the production or
development of antivehicle mines. There is concern that the following mines,
although categorized by their manufacturer as antitank, can be fitted with fuses
that may enable the mine to be activated by a person, and thus have the effect
of AP mines:
Ajax-APILAS off-route antitank mine produced by Manurhin, British Aerospace
Systems and Equipment, and
Giat;[8]
ARGES (Automatic Rocket Guardian with Electronic Sensor) rocket-launched
antitank mine system produced in a consortium of Giat Industries, Hunting
Engineering, Dynamit Nobel and Honeywell
Regelsysteme;[9]
the German AT2 antitank mine utilized in the MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket
System), manufactured by a consortium of European companies including the
UK’s BAE Systems and Hunting Engineering.
In June 1999
details emerged of contracts between Royal Ordnance, a subsidiary of British
Aerospace, and the U.S. Army. One five-year contract, worth ₤55 million,
makes Royal Ordnance the sole supplier of RDX, an ingredient of explosive
charges commonly used in the past by the U.S. in its AP mines. 40% of the RDX
is to be manufactured at Bridgwater in Somerset. According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, the Royal Ordnance contract with the U.S. Army contained
nothing to prevent the use of RDX in any future AP mine production or
replenishment, although the company is said to be attempting to renegotiate the
contract to achieve this.[10]
Although the U.S. has not renounced production, there has been no production of
AP mines since 1997, nor are there any current plans for production.
A briefing prepared by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in December 1998
describes “a few of the non-lethal alternatives” to AP mines,
including “blunt impact” munitions, pyrotechnic stun, electric stun,
entanglements, anti-traction agents, foams and malodorous agents, and acoustics.
It is not yet known which UK manufacturers might be involved in the production
of such alternatives. In reply to a Parliamentary question on alternatives to
landmines, a UK Government Minister said, “There is no single weapon that
can replace the capability previously provided by anti-personnel landmines. Work
is continuing to establish how best to provide the required capability in the
future, consistent with our obligations under UK and International law. Where
necessary, antitank mines will continue to be used in military
operations.”[11]
Transfer
The UK was a major exporter of antipersonnel mines
in the past.[12] According to
the UK government, there have been no exports of AP mines from the UK since the
late 1980s. Parliamentary Questions on the numbers of British mines exported
since 1979 remain unanswered.
Since April 1996 there has been a moratorium on the export of all types of AP
mines to all destinations.[13]
The export from the UK of all landmines and their designs has been controlled by
Export of Goods (Control) Orders. Section 2(1) of the Landmines Act 1998 is
now the primary UK legislation banning the production and transfer of all AP
mines and their components as defined in the Act and MBT.
Imports of AP mines are now banned under the Landmines Act 1998. In addition,
“HM Customs and Excise make targeted checks at import to enforce the
prohibition on the importation of anti-personnel mines and
components”[14] (For
information on past imports see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.
684-685).
There were two attempted transfers of AP mines in the UK in 1999. At the
Defence Systems and Equipment International (DSEi) exhibition in Chertsey,
Surrey between 14 and 17 September 1999, the Romanian company Romtehnica was
offering AP mines for sale (See Landmine Monitor Report 2000--Romania
also). Three items were being offered: the MS-3 Surprise Mine, which, although
re-named, is identical to the ML-3 antipersonnel mine; the MAI-75 antipersonnel
mine; and the Leaping Splinter Mine (MSS). The Romtehnica sales representative
made it clear to a researcher that the items were for sale. A color brochure
was available for the MS-3 Surprise Mine, that included technical details. Also
available was a List of Romanian Defense Industry Products that included
the Leaping Splinter Mine, and the MAI-75, that has been used widely in Angola
and is clearly prohibited under both the MBT and the Landmines Act. In a
Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question, the Minister of State for the Armed
Forces said:
Prior to the opening of the exhibition, my Department was in regular contact
with Defence Systems and Equipment International Ltd., the private company which
working closely with the Defence industry trade organisations organised the
event at Chertsey. We made sure that DSEi Ltd. was fully aware of the
Government's policies concerning the export of Defence equipment, and we sought
and obtained from them assurances that they would require exhibitors to comply
with these policies and with UK legislation, including the Landmines Act 1998.
Following allegations in the British media that a Romanian company was
promoting anti-personnel landmines at DSEi, we instructed the MOD Police to
investigate the matter. Separately, the Romanian authorities have contacted the
MOD to explain that, in error, their company had on its stand literature, which
mentioned an anti-personnel landmine. They have informed us that they stopped
manufacturing this item in 1990, but that the company had not updated its
equipment lists. We have received an apology from the Romanian authorities, but
the MOD Police are still investigating the matter and will submit a file to the
Crown Prosecution Service in due
course.[15]
In a second incident, in November 1999, the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance
Factories (POF) and a Pakistani official in London offered AP mines for sale to
a television journalist from TV Channel 4, who was posing as a representative of
a private company seeking a variety of arms. (See LM report on Pakistan also).
First contact with POF was made in September 1999 at the DSEi exhibition in
Surrey. POF were not asked about landmines at that time. However, at a
subsequent meeting in London, a technical attaché to the Pakistan embassy
in London unexpectedly also offered to sell AP mines. This meeting was filmed
and shown on the Channel 4 television program
Dispatches.[16] The mines
appeared in a subsequent faxed quotation from POF. They are described in
detailed technical specifications accompanying the quotation as the "Mine A.P.
Jumping P-7 MK2," and the "Mine anti personnel fragmentation P5A3."
In a Parliamentary Answer, a Foreign Office Minister said that "the
allegation that an official at the Pakistan High Commission offered to sell
anti-personnel mines has been referred to HM Customs and Excise as the
appropriate law enforcement agency and I have protested strongly to the
Pakistani High Commission."[17]
The POF stand was “reviewed by MoD officials and, at that time, no
literature promoting Anti-Personnel Mines was found. No specific action was
therefore required or taken to prevent the company from exhibiting brochures at
DSEi99."[18]
The UK government has made no further announcements as to the progress of
investigations into these two incidents.
A stock of 297,990 HB 876 mines was transferred to EBV Ammunition Company in
Saxony, Germany, for destruction, as permitted under the MBT, which was
completed on 19 October
1999.[19]
Stockpile and Destruction
The UK completed destruction of its antipersonnel
mine stockpile in October 1999. Information released by the MoD shows that,
before stockpile destruction began in earnest in 1995 (even before the MBT), the
UK’s AP mine stockpile amounted to some 2,103,626 mines. 1,277,882 AP
mines were destroyed from 1997-1999.
Prior to the MBT, the government announced that 44% of its AP mine stocks
were to be destroyed, including 60% of Elsie stocks and 40% of Ranger AP mines.
In addition, in May 1997, the government classified the L27 mine as an AP mine
because it is activated by a breakwire, and withdrew the mine from
service.[20] The majority of
stocks were destroyed by incineration. In 1997 the cost of destroying the
stockpiles was expected to be $8.2 million (₤5
million).[21]
The UK government announced in October 1999 that "the UK no longer stores any
operational anti-personnel mines. The last of the Army's operational stocks of
APMs were destroyed on 22 February this year [1999]. The destruction program
for the last of the RAF's operational stocks of APMs – the HB 876
sub-munition for the JP233 weapon system – was completed on 19 October
1999."[22] The HB876 were
destroyed by thermal disposal by a contractor in Germany. In a Written Answer
to a Parliamentary Question, the Secretary of State for Defence announced that
no AP mines are held by the Royal Navy or Special Forces. The Defence Minister
described the stockpile destruction as "accelerated to demonstrate to the world
the UK's clear and unequivocal commitment to the
MBT."[23]
The government announced in April 1998 that the UK would “retain about
4,000 anti-personnel landmines, less than half of one per cent of current
stocks, in order to be able to carry out training in
demining.”[24] The
relevant section of the first Article 7 report stated that in addition to 3,578
AP mines of UK and Canadian origin, in August 1999 "the UK held 859 APMs of
foreign manufacture for the development of and training in mine detection, mine
clearance, or mine destruction techniques."[25] Additional non-UK AP mines were
transferred to the UK between August 1999 and April 2000, making a total of
4,519 mines retained at the time of the second Article 7 report (as of 1 April
2000). UK forces also possess “inert” AP mines, that are designed
for training purposes, as UK forces do not use live mines for training. The
UKWGL has pointed out that, in the light of this, and the training possibilities
for UK forces posted overseas in carrying out humanitarian mine clearance, the
retention of stocks for training appears unnecessary. Instead, the MoD stresses
the retention of AP mines is for the development of mine detection, clearance or
destruction techniques.
UK mine stockpiles and mines retained under Article 3 of the MBT
HB876 AP mine bomblets contained in JP233 runway denial weapon
March 1999: 297,990
October 1999: 434 "inert training shapes" retained
M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munition
Pre-1993: 204
October 1999: 0
Various AP mines of foreign manufacture.
August 1999: 859
April 2000: 1,375 retained
L1E1 Projector Area Defense (PJRAD) AP fragmentation mine
Stock not known – not considered AP mines by MoD
M18A1 Claymore AP fragmentation mine
Total stock held: not known – not classified by the MoD as a mine
when in command detonated mode.
[27] Additionally, there is
no specific indication that the Claymore mines have been physically
adapted (by closing the second fuse well for tripwire activation) to prevent use
in the victim-actuated mode. The PJRAD was understood to remain in service in
Northern Ireland at least until mid-1998.
Antivehicle mines
During discussions at the SCE meeting on the General Status and Operation of
the MBT in January 2000, nine states parties restated that under the
treaty’s definitions and provisions, antivehicle mines (AVMs) with
antihandling devices (AHDs) that can be activated by the unintentional act of a
person are banned by the MBT. This is based on what was negotiated in Oslo in
September 1997, when the treaty text was finalized by consensus (including the
UK government) to exempt from prohibition only those antihandling devices, which
activate “when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise
intentionally disturb the
mine.”[28] It was
proposed at the January SCE to set up an informal, expert group to examine the
AVM/AHD issue. Only the UK delegation publicly opposed this proposal, and by
May 2000 no consensus had been achieved on the establishment of such a group.
At the May 2000 SCE on the General Status of the Convention, the UK
delegation stated that the UK had a different understanding of the words in the
Convention than that expressed by other States Parties, but supported a proposal
by the ICRC to hold consultations on this issue of AVMs and AHDs in early 2001.
Although the UK acknowledges that some very sensitive antidisturbance devices
do exist, the MoD argues that these are not found in UK stocks. According to
Parliamentary statements, "All UK weapons systems have been checked for
compliance with the provisions of the MBT. There are no weapons or munitions in
the UK inventory which fall under the Ottawa definition of an antipersonnel
mine."[29] The UK argues that
it is problematic to try to distinguish between intentional and unintentional
acts that cause a mine to detonate. Although the MoD is concerned about
potential humanitarian problems, AVMs are not considered to be a cause of
these.[30]
The UKWGL is concerned that the antivehicle mines in the following chart may
have features that could cause them to explode from an unintentional act of a
person, thus functioning as antipersonnel mines.
UK Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices
Mk 7 antitank (AT) blast mine
Can be used with tilt rod fuse.
Total stock held: not known. To be phased out in 2000/01.
L27A1 Off Route AT blast mine
Classified anti-personnel because it is activated by breakwire, and
withdrawn from service.
1995-96: 4,874
1997: 4,870
October 1999: 0
Barmine pressure operated AT blast mine
Has three add-on fuse options including Anti Disturbance Double Impulse
(ADDI) fuse (detonates mine when it is rotated about its longitudinal axis); and
the Full Width Attack Mine Electronic (FWAM (E)) fuse, with a seismic and
magnetic sensor.
Total stock held: not known.
AT2 AT shaped charge mine (scatterable) Contains integral
antihandling device. Designed to self-destruct after a maximum four days.
Total stock held: estimated 100,000
Shielder Vehicle Launched Scatterable Mine System L35A1 AT mines with
full width attack magnetic influence fuses
L35A1 are designed to self-destruct after a maximum fifteen days. They
contain no integral antihandling device, but moving the mine through the earth's
magnetic field will cause it to detonate.
Total stock held: minimum 63,300 L35A1 mines
Foreign stockpiles on UK territory
In written answers to questions put to a Foreign Office Minister of State,
the government stated that "NATO itself does not have stocks of APL. There are
no US stocks in Britain. The question of transit is being looked at carefully by
legal advisers." In addition, a Ministry of Defence statement said,
“There are no anti-personnel mines as defined under the MBT stocked by
other governments or their armed forces, or on behalf of other governments and
their armed forces, in the
UK.”[31] Allies who "have
forces stationed in the UK are well aware of the MBT's obligations which include
the prohibition of the stockpiling of APMs on UK
territory."[32] Also, according
to the government, the UK holds no stocks of AP mines outside UK
territories.[33]
Official U.S. sources have indicated that the U.S. has stored AP mines at
Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean some 1,000 miles southwest of India,
governed by a Foreign Office commissioner, that now houses only military
personnel. Information obtained in the U.S. suggests that as of 1997 more than
10,000 Gator, Volcano and MOPMS mines were held at Diego
Garcia.[34] The UK Article 7
report makes no mention of these U.S. mines. In March 2000 the UK Government
gave the following response to a request for a statement about the storage of AP
mines at Diego Garcia:
“The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and the USA concerning the
availability of the British Indian Ocean Territory for Defence purposes provides
for the Territory to remain available to meet the Defence needs of both
Governments, while remaining under UK sovereignty. There are no US APM on Diego
Garcia. We understand that the US stores munitions of various kinds on US
warships anchored off Diego Garcia. Such vessels enjoy state immunity and are
therefore outside the UK’s jurisdiction and control. The US understands
the importance we attach to their adherence to the Ottawa Convention as soon as
possible.”[35]
The UK contributed $25.7 million to mine action in
1999/2000, a very significant increase on previous years. This included $9.6
million spent on mine action in Kosovo. From 1993 through 1999, the UK
government had spent about $43 million on humanitarian mine
action.[37] Between 1992-1996,
it also indirectly funded mine clearance through the European Community, with
contributions of $17.7 million (₤
10.87m.)[38] and another $8.8
million (₤ 5.4m.) in
1998.[39] In addition, $15.7
million (₤ 9.6m.) for humanitarian mine clearance was contributed through
various UN funds and programs between 1992 and November 1998, and more than
$28.7 million (₤ 17.6m.) in the same period to NGOs.
The only known funding to assist other countries with stockpile destruction
is $24-27 million (₤ 15-17m.); this MoD expenditure is to destroy Saudi
Arabian stocks of HB876 weapons, and replace them with one hundred Paveway 3
bombs.[40]
Nearly $31 million of UK mine action spending, or 72% of funding, went to
equipment and mine clearance activities.
Since 1997, the Department for International Development (DFID) has funded
mine and UXO clearance in Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia,
Egypt, Georgia, Northern Iraq, Jordan, Lao, Mozambique and Yugoslavia (Kosovo).
In 1998, surplus equipment valued at ₤375,000 ($611,250) was donated by
the UK Government for mine
clearance.[42] In June 1999,
the government committed more than US$ 9 million for humanitarian mine clearance
in Kosovo. The Secretary of State for International Development announced,
“As part of the Government's recently announced package of ₤50
million for humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance for Kosovo, ₤5
million has been allocated for mine clearance and mine awareness education. We
have provided grants and practical assistance for UN Mines [Action] Service
(co-ordination and oversight), Halo Trust (region wide survey), and clearance
teams from Mines [Advisory]
Group.”[43]
An update in July 1999 confirmed that DFID funded twelve emergency clearance
teams, including MAG, Halo Trust, Defence Systems Limited (DSL), BACTEC, and
Greenfield Consultants. Mines awareness training was also funded, through
UNICEF. This was the first time that resources made available by DFID went to
commercial mine clearance.
Two Aardvark Mk II Flail Units were donated by DFID to Jordan in September
1999, a package of assistance including funding for training personnel and
essential maintenance equipment valued at ₤500,000
($800,000).[44] A further
donation of sixty-six surplus military vehicles, consisting of earth-moving
plant and administrative vehicles, was made to Halo and MAG on 5 April
2000.[45]
MoD funded activity since 1992 has taken place in Bosnia, and more recently
UK military personnel have been attached to the Mine Action Center in Kosovo, in
the Falklands/Malvinas, the UK’s Mine Information and Technology Center,
the UN Mine Action Service in New York and at the Geneva Center for
International Humanitarian Demining. In total, fifty-nine personnel, about 14%
of trained EOD specialists, were “involved in, or training for, mine
clearance operations.”[46]
The majority, forty-six, were a part of the Bosnia Stabilization Force. More
recently, four teams of EOD personnel have been based in Kosovo, where they
undertake "demining tasks in support of KFOR operations, although they have also
responded positively to local requests to clear unexploded ordnance where there
was a pressing humanitarian
need."[47]
At the time of writing, the UK had also published plans to provide support
for regional, multilateral or thematic programs amounting to $7,811,200 up to
2002. This includes research and development projects, advice, monitoring,
advocacy and information, as well as DFID participation in conferences.
Confirmed country-specific spending on the $7.8 million for the period ending
2002 and the programs this will support are as follows:
Afghanistan: demining in Kabul and Shomali for resettlement;
UNOCHA Mine Action Program.
Albania: EOD protective clothing and clearance of unexploded
ordnance which pose a civilian threat; jointly supporting clearance by Albanian
armed forces through NATO/EODASTT; protective clothing for two clearance
teams.
Cambodia: evaluation of Pearson tractor as a mechanical tool for
demining; Halo Trust Demining – Humanitarian Mine Action Banteay Meanchay,
Oddar Meanchay and Siem Riep for resettlement and improved access for rural
communities; Mines Advisory Group – Battambang Province –
humanitarian demining for resettlement and improved access for rural
communities; MAG – continuation of mine clearance activities in western
Cambodia in support of post-conflict resettlement from 1 April 2000-31 March
2001; contribution to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) with UNDP Trust
Fund.
Croatia: to support the United Nations Mine Action Awareness
Program through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.
Georgia: Halo Trust Mine/UXO clearance and national capacity
building in Abkhazia.
Guinea-Bissau: HUMAID – To clear unexploded ordnance in
Bissau.
Northern Iraq: MAG - Integrated mine/UXO program to reduce
impact on rural communities and develop regional mine action capacity.
Jordan: mine clearance – procurement of mine clearance
equipment for Jordan Valley project; to improve efficiency and safety of
humanitarian mine clearance in the Jordan Valley.
Laos: MAG – UXO/mine clearance in Saravanne Province.
Sierra Leone: mine awareness assessment.
Thailand: To quantify to international standard the impact of
landmines and UXO on communities
Kosovo: UN Mine Action Center Deputy Program Manager to assist
in the work of UNMACC and the implementation of the work plan for UXO clearance
throughout 2000; equipment for MAG mine clearance (Mitrovica); to improve
efficiency of UN mine action.
Spending on mine action programs in the UK
The Ministry of Defence monitors and maintains the minefields in the Falkland
Islands/Malvinas, as well as maintaining the presence of an Explosives Ordnance
Disposal Response Team. The Department currently spends approximately ₤3
million ($4.9 million) per annum on research into countermine technologies,
although the MoD's remit is to fund research only into military demining, rather
than humanitarian mine clearance. Ministers have stated that this funding has
increased significantly over the past three years and is expected to remain high
for the next five years at least. The MoD is researching sensors and
countermine technologies, including (since May 1997) “ground penetrating
radar, polarized thermal imaging, metal detection, quadropole resonance,
ultra-wide band radar, and ultra-wide band synthetic aperture radar,” for
military demining. Spending on the latter is approximately $624,000
(₤390,000) to date. In addition, research is being carried out on
technology for neutralization of mines for military purposes, including
"projectile attack, shaped charge attack, lasers, pyrotechnic torch, disruptors
and mechanical
extraction."[50]
A new Mine Information and Technology Center at the Royal Engineers
Battlefield Engineering Wing, at Minley in Surrey, was also established in
November 1997; this provides information on demining operations and offers mines
awareness training to both military and civilian personnel in the UK. The
additional annual cost to the defense budget is $203,750 (₤
125,000).[51]
The Department for International Development (DFID) funds R&D of new
technologies to improve the safety, efficiency and speed of humanitarian mine
clearance. This source of support for R&D has been small in scale until
recent years. However, it amounted to 9.3% of DFID spending allocated to
humanitarian mine action in 1998-99. DFID contributed $326,000 (₤
200,000) towards EC trials for a multi-sensor
system.[52] In addition,
funding has been made available for assessment trials of prototypes and full
field trials of equipment for AP mine detection and clearance, preliminary
vegetation clearance, operator safety tests and studies to improve the
effectiveness of UN-managed
operations.[53] DFID has
invited proposals from UK-based organizations for new mine clearance and
detection technology, under a Humanitarian Mine Action Knowledge Generation and
Research Program. The MoD's Defence Evaluation and Research Agency is also
evaluating mine detection technology for humanitarian demining.
Planned expenditure on research and development
Planned Expenditure (US$)
Program Description
Years
$208,000
Advice and services on demining technology. DFID requires specialist advice
and services on aspects of demining technology from time to time for specific
self-contained tasks.
1999 - 2000
$640,000
Mine Action Knowledge Generation and Research - DFID funding the
development, testing and evaluation of demining techniques and equipment
designed to employ these techniques.
1999 - 2002
$49,600
Testing of protective boots for mine clearance. DFID contribution for phase
1of testing by AIGIS.
1999 - 1999
$160,000
Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) field trials of Redbus
Landmine Disposal System (LMDS) M1. To undertake field trials to assess the
effectiveness of the Redbus Landmine Disposal System (prototype).
2000 - 2000
$104,000
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining: To provide the
secondment of Assistant Project Manager (Technology).
2000 - 2002
Funding for Survivor Assistance
DFID does not specify funding allocated for mine survivors, instead providing
support for "health care and community-based rehabilitation assistance...through
DFID's bilateral development co-operation Programs or institutional Program
support. The financial records do not disaggregate assistance to land mine
survivors from other categories of special
needs."[54] In January 1999,
the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, set up to commemorate the Princess
of Wales and to support causes with which she was associated, donated
₤1,055,225 ($1.7 million) to thirteen charitable organizations working
with landmine survivors. These grants are to address “the problems of
people and communities who have been physically, mentally and economically
affected by
landmines.”[55] A further
₤1 million ($1.6 million) was awarded to landmine projects in August 1999,
including funding for the Cambodia Trust, the Halo Trust, MAG, Sandy Gall's
Afghanistan Appeal, and the UK Working Group on Landmines; projects supported
include mine clearance, advocacy and victim
assistance.[56]
Landmine Problem
Most of the UK, and territories currently under
its administrative authority, are not significantly mine- or UXO-affected.
There is, however, a problem in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, where AP mines,
including remotely-delivered mines, were used by British and Argentine forces in
the war of 1982 (See Landmine Monitor Report
2000—Falklands/Malvinas). Because of the lack of civilian casualties
the government has considered the Falklands/Malvinas a low priority for
demining. Argentina offered funding for the clearance of landmines in December
1993, an offer that was welcomed by the UK Government. Recent statements
indicate that negotiations between the UK and Argentina are continuing.
[1] Letter to UK Working Group on Landmines
from Keith Vaz MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8
February 2000. [2] Treaty Series No. 18
(1999(), Cm. 4308, March 1999. [3] See
statements of Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to the House of Commons, Hansard, 10
July 1998, col. 1347 and col. 1348; Statement of the Defence Minister, Hansard,
10 July 1998, col. 1391. [4] Hansard, 17
May 2000, col 161W. [5] Hansard, 12 May
2000, col. 514W. [6] Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, pp. 680-682. [7] UK,
Article 7 Report, submitted on covering 1 March 1999-1 August
1999. [8] Belkacem Elomari and Bruno
Barillot, Le complexe francais de production des mines et systemes associes,
(Lyon: Observatoire des Transferts d'Armaments,
1997). [9]
Ibid. [10] Jonathan Theobald,
“Britain Sells Landmine Explosive to US Army,” Independent on
Sunday, 27 June 1999, p. 1. [11]
Hansard, 9 February 1999, col. 129. [12]
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 683-684. Sources including Jane's Information
Group, Mines and Mine Clearance, 1998, and HRW and PHR, Landmines: A Deadly
Legacy indicate that British mines have been found or are held by the armed
forces in the following countries: Abu Dhabi (barmine), Australia (barmine),
Afghanistan (Mk &), Angola (Mk 2, Mk 5, Mk 7), Denmark (barmine), Egypt
(barmine, Mk 2, Mk 5, Mk 7), Eritrea (Mk 7), Ethiopia (Mk 7), India (barmine),
Jordan (barmine, Mk 5, Ranger), Kenya (barmine), Kuwait (barmine), Libya (Mk 2,
Mk 5, Mk 7), Mozambique (Mk 5, No 6), Namibia (Mk 7), New Zealand (barmine),
Nigeria (barmine, Ranger), Oman (Mk 7), Peru (barmine), Saudi Arabia (barmine),
Somalia (Mk 2, Mk 7), Spain (barmine), Zambia (Mk 7), Zimbabwe (Mk 5, Mk 7, No
6). This list is not exhaustive. [13]
Hansard, 22 April 1996, col. 28. [14]
Hansard, 31 January 2000, col.
462W. [15] Hansard, 3 November 1999,
cols. 213-214. [16] Dispatches, Channel
4 Television, 9 November 1999. [17]
Hansard, 10 January 2000, col. 2W. [18]
Hansard, 31 January 2000, col.
462W. [19] Hansard, 25 October 1999,
col. 695. [20] Mines Advisory Group,
“UK Landmine Stockpiles,” February
1998. [21] Hansard, 10 July 1998, col.
1369. [22] Hansard, 25 October 1999,
col. 695. [23]
Ibid. [24] Letter from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to UK Working Group on Landmines, 27 April
1998. [25] MBT Article 7 Report,
submitted 26 August 1999, covering 1 March 1999-1 August
1999. [26] Ibid; Hansard, 25 October
1999, col. 695. [27] Interview with
Ministry of Defence officials, 8 May
2000. [28] Mine Ban Treaty, Article 2.3
(emphasis added). [29] Hansard, 19
October 1999, col.420. [30] Interview
with MoD officials, 8 May 2000. Remarks of the UK delegation at the SCE on the
General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29 May
2000. [31] Hansard, 24 January 2000,
col. WA168. [32] Hansard, 8 December
1999, col. 559W. [33] Hansard, 20 March
1998, col. 746. [34] Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, pp. 328-334. [35] Hansard,
6 March 2000, col. 504W. [36] For a more
detailed breakdown of past funding described in the first paragraphs of this
section, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 689-695. This includes breakdown
by country, also by activity. For even more detail, more tables are available
from UKWGLM or Landmine Monitor. See also see information supplied by DFID to
UNMAS Mine Action Investments
database. [37] UNMAS Mine Action
Investment database. [38] Paul Bowers
and Tom Dodd, Anti-personnel mines and the policies of two British Governments,
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, February 1998, p.
17. [39] Department for International
Development, Humanitarian mine action, a progress report, (London: DFID,
February 1999), p.7. [40] Hansard, 15
March 1999, col. 506. [41] Information
supplied by DFID to UNMAS Mine Action Investments
database. [42] Hansard, 9 March 1998,
col. 11. [43] Hansard, 22 June 1999,
col. 344. [44] DFID Press Release, 1
September 1999. [45] Ministry of Defence
Press Release, 5 April 2000. [46]
Hansard, 4 March 1999, col. 869. [47]
Hansard, 6 March 2000, col. 498W. [48]
Mine Action Investments Database, June
2000. [49]
Ibid. [50] Hansard, 11 February 2000,
col. 345W. [51] Bowers and Dodd,
Anti-personnel mines and the policies of two British Governments, RUSI Journal,
February 1998. [52] Hansard, 2 March
1999, col. 681. [53]
Ibid. [54] Hansard, 25 October 1999,
col. 709. [55] Diana, Princess of Wales
Memorial Fund press release, 12 January
1999. [56] Diana, Princess of Wales
Memorial Fund press release, 2 August 1999.
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