Key developments since May 2003: In November 2003, Venezuela
officially reported that it completed destruction of its stockpile of 47,189
antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003, just days ahead of the treaty deadline
of 1 October 2003, and that 5,000 mines would be retained for training. An
official later told Landmine Monitor that 4,960 antipersonnel mines remain, of
which 3,960 mines will be destroyed by October 2004, leaving 1,000 mines for
training.
Key developments since 1999: Venezuela ratified the Mine Ban Treaty
on 14 April 1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 October 1999.
Venezuela’s initial Article 7 report, due 29 March 2000, was submitted in
September 2002. Venezuela reported that it completed destruction of its
stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003. Venezuela has
revealed that it laid antipersonnel mines in May 1998, five months after signing
the Mine Ban Treaty.
Mine Ban Policy
Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 14 April
1999, and the treaty entered into force on 1 October 1999. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has said that legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is
not considered necessary, because when an international treaty is ratified, it
immediately becomes national
law.[1] Neither the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs nor the Armed Forces have proposed to the National Assembly that
penal sanctions be enacted specifically for antipersonnel
mines.[2]
Venezuela participated actively in the Ottawa Process, including the Oslo
negotiations where it caused some concern among ban campaigners by supporting
several US proposals that would have weakened the treaty greatly. Since the
treaty took effect, Venezuela has attended three of the five annual Meetings of
States Parties (2000, 2001, and 2002), and most intersessional Standing
Committee meetings, including in February and June 2004. It has voted in
support of every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1996,
including UNGA Resolution 58/53 of 8 December 2003. Venezuela has also
participated in several regional conferences, including in a regional seminar on
stockpile destruction held in Buenos Aires, Argentina in November 2000 and a
regional mine action seminar in Lima, Perú in August 2003.
As of 30 September 2004, Venezuela had not submitted its annual Article 7
transparency report, due 30 April 2004. It submitted its initial Article 7
report, due 1 March 2000, two and one-half years late on 10 September 2002. It
provided an annual update on 15 May
2003.[3]The Ministry of
Defense is responsible for preparing the report, through the Director of
Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the National Armed Forces and the
Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law of the National
Armed Forces.
Venezuela has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties
have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1,
2, and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military
operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of
antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling
devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
While Venezuela is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW), it has indicated its intent to ratify the CCW’s Amended Protocol II
(Landmines) and attended the Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties as an
observer in November 2003.[4]
Production and Transfer
Venezuela reports that it is not a producer of antipersonnel
mines.[5] The country is not
known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Information in Venezuela’s
Article 7 reports indicates that in the past Venezuela obtained antipersonnel
landmines from Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United States and the former
Yugoslavia.[6]
While the media has continued to report instances of weapons trafficking
between Colombia and Venezuela, Landmine Monitor has not found any evidence of
antipersonnel mine transfers.
Stockpiling and Destruction
In September 2002, Venezuela reported a stockpile of 22,136 antipersonnel
mines. In May 2003, Venezuela reported a revised total of 46,135 antipersonnel
mines, an increase of 23,999
mines.[7] The stockpile
reported in May 2003 consisted of antipersonnel mines manufactured in the former
Yugoslavia (27,003 AM PMA3 mines), Spain (18,805 SB33), Belgium (253 M-35), and
the United States (40 NMM-1401P, 32 M16-A1 and one
M18-A1).[8]
On 25 November 2003, Venezuela reported to the UN Secretary General that it
completed destruction of a stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24
September 2003, days ahead of the country’s four-year deadline of 1
October 2003.[9] It also stated
that another 5,000 antipersonnel mines would be retained for training.
There is a difference of 6,054 mines between the number reported in the May
2003 Article 7 report and the number provided to the Secretary-General in
September 2003. In August 2004, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative
told Landmine Monitor that the Venezuelan government assumes that there were
errors in information previously provided. He stated that 4,960 antipersonnel
mines remain, of which 3,960 mines will be destroyed in El Pao, Cojedes state
before October 2004 and 1,000 will be retained for
training.[10]
Landmine Monitor was not invited to witness any of the destruction events,
despite several requests made to observe the destruction, and it does not appear
that media or other observers were in attendance, or that Venezuela made any
effort to inform States Parties at the time that it had met its treaty
obligation.
It appears that the mines were destroyed in several events in the period from
May to September 2003. On 15 May 2003, Venezuela announced that the destruction
process was initiated on 7 May 2003 and would be completed by 22 May
2003.[11] In June 2003, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that 35,360 mines were
destroyed in the first phase from 7-14 May 2003, and destruction would continue
until it was completed ahead of the treaty-mandated
deadline.[12] In August 2003,
Venezuela reported that 35,947 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed to
date.[13]
Landmine Use
In its Article 7 reports, Venezuela reported that it had emplaced 1,036
antipersonnel mines at six naval posts around the country: Atabapo (PNFA),
Cararabo (PNME), Guafitas (PNGUA), Isla Vapor (PNISVA), Puerto Páez
(PNPP), and Río Arauca Internacional (PNRAI). In August 2004, Landmine
Monitor was told by the government that there were errors in the information
provided and that a total of 1,074 mines were
emplaced.[14]
According to the Article 7 reports, three minefields were laid at Guafitas in
May 1998, which is five months after Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3
December 1997.[15] In May 2002,
Landmine Monitor visited the community of Guafitas, in Páez municipality,
Apure state, where it verified the presence of a small minefield inside a Navy
post on the Arauca River, on the Colombian
border.[16] The minefield,
approximately five meters in width, was located around the perimeter of the Navy
post and fenced with ten warning signs. A local resident told Landmine Monitor
that the Navy post was established in 1997 and that he did not know of any
incidents involving
landmines.[17]
Venezuela’s September 2002 Article 7 report stated the three Guafitas
minefields contained 58 SB-33 antipersonnel mines, while the May 2003 report
cited 20. At a mine action seminar held in August 2003, Venezuela again
reported 58 mines laid at
Guafitas,[18] and this number
was confirmed by the government in August
2004.[19]
According to the May 2003 Article 7 report, three minefields were laid at
Atabapo in May 1995, containing 299 PMA-3 antipersonnel mines. In April 2003,
Landmine Monitor visited the community of San Fernando de Atabapo in Atabapo
municipality, Amazonas state, which lies on the Atabapo River bordering with
Colombia. Landmine Monitor verified the presence of a minefield at Navy Post
Atabapo (PNFA), some 30 meters from the nearest homes in the village. The
minefield was fenced, but the warning signs were only seen from the inside of
the post, and not by persons approaching from the
outside.[20] While Landmine
Monitor was told that the local population was aware of the danger and that
there had been no casualties, a Marine at the post said a few years before there
had been an accident when a soldier was cutting bush (maleza). The
officer in charge did not know the total number of mines emplaced, but indicated
they were laid to prevent attacks from Colombian guerrillas. He added that a
number of mines had been destroyed recently, but some could not be cleared
because they had moved by natural causes and their exact location was not
known.[21]
Two minefields were laid at Puerto Páez in April 1995, containing 281
PMA-3 mines according to the May 2003 Article 7 report. Landmine Monitor
visited Puerto Paéz, in Pedro Camejo municipality, Apure state in April
2004 and confirmed the presence of a minefield at the Navy post named
“General José Antonio
Páez.”[22] The Navy
post is located at the point where the Meta and Orinoco Rivers join, across the
border from the Colombian town of Puerto Carreño (Vichada department).
There are two small minefields in Puerto Paéz, which lie next to some ten
inhabited houses. While people living nearby knew of the minefields, others in
the town of 10,000 inhabitants did
not.[23] A local priest said he
had found out about the minefields from a woman who had a
“minefield” warning sign in her house that had been emplaced between
her house and the Navy post, but had fallen
down.[24] Landmine Monitor saw
only one sign, in an area with abundant vegetation to one side of the main
entrance to the Navy Post. The head of the Navy post told Landmine Monitor that
some of the signs may have fallen
down.[25] Military officials
reported that the minefields are flooded by the river and that mines might have
shifted location. Landmine Monitor was shown a new fence that had been put up
to further separate the civilian population from the minefield. There are no
known incidents involving civilians or military personnel at the Navy
post.[26]
At Cararabo in Apure state, three minefields laid in April 1995 contain 316
PMA-3 mines according to the May 2003 Article 7 report. The commander of the
Puerto Páez Navy post told Landmine Monitor that the Cararabo Navy post
was located in a difficult to access zone consisting of thick vegetation and
while a few houses are located near the Navy post, there is no large community
in the vicinity.[27]
According to the May 2003 Article 7 report, the Isla Vapor location contains
one minefield laid in March 1996 containing 43 PMA-3 mines. At a mine action
seminar in August 2003, Venezuela reported different figures for Isla Vapor
(PNISVA), indicating 127 mines instead of 43, and four mined areas instead of
one.[28] In August 2004, the
government told Landmine Monitor that the Article 7 reports were correct, and
the discrepancy was explained by the fact that 84 mines had been cleared since
1996.[29]
The Rio Arauca Navy Post (Puesto Naval Río Arauca Internacional, PRAI)
in Amazonas reportedly has one minefield containing 77 PMA-3 mines that was laid
in May 1995.[30]
While Colombian non-state actors are active in the border regions between
Colombia and Venezuela, Landmine Monitor knows of no cases of peasants or
landowners using mines along these areas. One media report, issued in December
2001, noted that guerrillas belonging to a Colombian group called the Latin
American Popular Army (EPLA, Ejército Popular Latinoamericano) were using
“explosive mines” to surround and protect their camps in Venezuelan
territory, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this
report.[31]
Mine Action
The Mine Ban Treaty requires that Venezuela destroy all antipersonnel mines
in mined areas as soon as possible, but no later than 1 October 2009. The mined
areas at the six Naval posts were inspected and checked between April 2002 and
April 2003, according to the May 2003 Article 7 report. Between April 2002 and
January 2003, a Combat Engineering company of the Marines in Meseta de Mamo,
Vargas state, engaged in training with metal detection equipment. There was
also a coordination meeting with a French military attaché “with
the purpose of presenting the requirements for the endowment of special
equipment for the destruction of minefields.”
Venezuela was to begin clearance “operations” in February 2002,
but this had not occurred by September 2004. In February 2003, a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the clearance delay was due
to a lack of specialized
equipment.[32] In August 2003,
Venezuela reported that minefield inspections were planned for August to
December 2003 and assistance had been requested from France and Canada for the
acquisition of needed clearance equipment. The Venezuelan representative noted
that it was difficult to demine because the mined areas are “remote,
difficult to access, sometimes only reachable by helicopter or unfinished
roads,” and rainfall and thick vegetation can also restrict
deminers.[33]
Since 1996, Venezuela has contributed 32 military mine action supervisors to
the MARMINCA mine clearance efforts by the OAS in Central America, including
four in 2001 and four in 2002. In May 2003, the OAS reported that prior to
January 2003 new military supervisors for MARMINCA from seven OAS member states
including Venezuela received training and were
integrated.[34]
Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance
In August 2003, Venezuela acknowledged that a Marine injured by a landmine in
Atabapo while cutting bush had received
rehabilitation.[35] It is not
known when the incident occurred. There are no known civilian landmine survivors
in Venezuela, including in the border region communities where Landmine Monitor
has consulted with various groups. Animals have reportedly detonated mines
after escaping from
farms.[36]
Two incidents involving unexploded ordnance were reported by the media. On
14 October 2003, a 25-year-old man was killed and a child injured after the man
handled a grenade found on a military shooting range zone in Puerto Paéz
while collecting aluminum to
sell.[37] The shooting range
zone was well-known to the local population, but was not fenced-off. After the
incident “military zone” signs were erected. On 26 February 2004,
the media reported that a 32-year-old man and his two children aged seven and
five were killed after a buried grenade exploded near the Infantry battalion
“Rivas Dávila N° 222,” in Félix Sánchez
Cánsales municipality, Trujillo
state.[38]
Venezuela has a national health system with specialized services located in
main urban centers, including rehabilitation services.
[1] Telephone interview with Victor
Manzanares, First Secretary for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Venezuela, 4 February
2000. [2] Interview with Farida
Yamín, First Secretary, Directorate of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and with Admiral Alcibíades Paz, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Caracas, 20 August 2004. [3]
See Article 7 Report, 10 September 2002; Article 7 Report, 15 May 2003. For both
reports, a single time period is not covered. The various forms are relevant for
different time periods. [4] Notes
taken by Landmine Monitor (MAC) during the Standing Committee on Stockpile
Destruction meeting, 12 February 2004; also, Meeting Report, Standing Committee
on Stockpile Destruction, 12 February 2004, p.
2. [5] Article 7 Report, Form H, 15
May 2003. In the past the US Department of Defense identified Venezuela as the
producer of the MV-1 improvised fragmentation antipersonnel mine. In January
2002, Brigadier General José Esteban Godoy Peña told Landmine
Monitor that Venezuela had not produced mines, and explained the MV-1 was a mine
used by guerrillas in the 1960s, known as trampas caza bobos
(“fool-catcher booby-traps”). See ORDATA online
maic.jmu.edu/ordata/srdetaildesc.asp?ordid=2310, accessed on 11 October
2004. [6] Article 7 Report, Form B, 15
May 2003. [7] Ibid; Article 7 Report,
Form B, 10 September 2002. [8] Article
7 Report, Form B, 15 May 2003. The stockpile included one unspecified mine (lot
LOP90E113-001). [9] Letter from the
Permanent Mission of Venezuela in Geneva to the UN Disarmament Conference
Secretariat, 25 November 2003. The ICBL and a number of States Parties had
attempted to get confirmation from Venezuela both before and after the 1 October
2003 deadline that Venezuela had met its obligation, but received no
response. [10] Interview with Farida
Yamín and Adm. Alcibíades Paz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20
August 2004. [11] Intervention by
Venezuela, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 15 May 2003
(Notes taken by Landmine
Monitor/MAC). [12] Letter from
Alexandra París, Director of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, No. 0968, 3 June 2003. [13]
Presentation by Capt. Lino Poleo, Chief of the Evaluation Division of the
Military Power, Directorate of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
National Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Regional Mine Action Seminar
“En Camino hacia un Hemisferio Libre de Minas Antipersonal,” Lima,
Perú, 14-15 August 2003. Available at
maic.jmu.edu/conference/proceedings/2003Lima/summaries/venezuela.htm, accessed
11 October 2004. [14] Interview with
Farida Yamín and Adm. Alcibíades Paz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
20 August 2004. [15] The May 2003
Article 7 report indicates Venezuela laid 20 SB-33 antipersonnel mines in
Guafita in May 1998. The September 2002 Article 7 report indicates the number
was 58 SB-33 antipersonnel mines. See Article 7 Report, Form C, 15 May 2003 and
Article 7 Report, Form C, 10 September
2002. [16] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, p. 520. [17] Landmine Monitor
field visit to Guafitas, Páez, Apure State, 31 May
2002. [18] Presentation by Capt. Lino
Poleo, Ministry of Defense, Lima Seminar, 14-15 August
2003. [19] Interview with Farida
Yamín and Adm. Alcibíades Paz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20
August 2004. [20] Ibid; Landmine
Monitor field visit to San Fernando de Atabapo, Atabapo, Amazonas state, 18
April 2003. [21] Interview with Lt.
Frankbel Campos Velásquez, at the Af. Clemente Maldonado Navy Post, San
Fernando de Atabapo, Atabapo, Amazonas State, 18 April
2003. [22] Landmine Monitor field
visit to Puerto Paéz, Pedro Camejo, Apure state, 17 April
2004. [23] Landmine Monitor informally
interviewed 15 locals who did not know of the
minefield. [24] Interview with Priest
Otto Benaventa, Puerto Paéz, 17 April
2004. [25] Interview with Lt. Rafael
Acosta Arévalo, Puerto Paéz, 17 April
2004. [26] Ibid; Interview with Lt.
Col. Ambrosio Luis Ramos Cairos, Commander of the “Julián
Mellado” Cavalry Group, Puerto Paéz, 17 April
2004. [27] Interview with Lt. Rafael
Acosta Arévalo, Commander of the Navy Post, Puerto Paéz, 17 April
2004. [28] Presentation by Capt. Lino
Poleo, Ministry of Defense, Lima Seminar, 14-15 August
2003. [29] Interview with Farida
Yamín and Adm. Alcibíades Paz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20
August 2004. [30] Article 7 Report,
Form C, 15 May 2003. [31] See Landmine
Monitor Report 2002, p. 520. [32] See
Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p.
494. [33] Presentation by Capt. Lino
Poleo, Ministry of Defense, Lima Seminar, 14-15 August
2003. [34] OAS, “Update on
Regional Mine Action Efforts,” May 2003, p.
2. [35] Presentation by Capt. Lino
Poleo, Ministry of Defense, Lima Seminar, 14-15 August 2003. See also Interview
with Marine, Af. Clemente Maldonado Navy Post, San Fernando de Atabapo, Atabapo,
Amazonas State, 18 April 2003. [36]
Presentation by Capt. Lino Poleo, Ministry of Defense, Lima Seminar, 14-15
August 2003. [37] Landmine Monitor
interview with the widow of the 25-year-old man, Puerto Paéz, 17 April
2004. [38] Últimas Noticias, 26
February 2004, p. 16.