Table of Contents

Country Reports

LM Report 2006

Afghanistan

Key developments since May 2005: In May 2006, Afghanistan reported that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed, including 44,819 since the beginning of 2005. Afghanistan served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration from December 2005 to September 2006. The pace of demining accelerated in 2005; the amount of land demined increased by over one-third to almost 140 square kilometers, despite deteriorating security. Mine clearance operations ran into severe funding shortfalls in mid-2006; the laying-off of demining personnel was announced in July, with further cuts expected. Mine risk education reached over 1.8 million Afghans and 2,365 communities in 2005. There were 848 new casualties recorded in 2005, maintaining the relatively constant casualty rate of recent years; however, child casualties continued to increase.

Mine Ban Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2003. Afghanistan has yet to adopt new national implementation legislation, including penal sanctions, for the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2005, it “worked toward the development of a national mine action law,” but this apparently would not serve as comprehensive implementation legislation.^[1] Afghanistan has stated that the new constitution adopted in January 2004 requires the country to respect all international treaties it has signed.^[2]

Afghanistan submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 1 May 2006, covering calendar year 2005.^[3] The report included voluntary Form J with information on victim assistance and mine awareness activities.

Afghanistan has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration since December 2005, having served as co-rapporteur of the committee for the previous year. Its term will end in September 2006.

At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, Afghanistan made presentations on stockpile destruction, mine clearance and victim assistance. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 (in addition to its role co-chairing the victim assistance Standing Committee), it made interventions on universalization, stockpile destruction, mine clearance and victim assistance.

Afghanistan has not yet made known its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, and in particular issues related to joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.

Mine action has been fully integrated into Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals as part of the efforts to enhance human security.^[4] Mine action is also included in the UN Development Assistance Framework for Afghanistan for 2006-2008 as an activity that improves the welfare of Afghans and leads to more development.^[5]

The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) has continued to raise public awareness of the mine ban issue. It helped to sponsor Afghan Mine Action and Awareness Month from 25 March to 24 April 2006. During the month, activities were held in nine major cities, and the ACBL helped to organize conferences, mine awareness exhibitions, rallies, sports tournaments (including for the disabled), and a disabled wheelchair race.^[6]

Production, Transfer and Use

Afghanistan is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines in the past, though there have been reports of non-state armed groups from Afghanistan smuggling mines into other countries such as Pakistan. Large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan during the many years of armed conflict, but there have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to government or opposition forces in recent years.^[7]

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Afghan government forces since Afghanistan decided to join the Mine Ban Treaty and became a State Party.

Despite the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, there have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines—or mine-like victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—in 2005 or early 2006 by opposition forces.^[8]

Local and international media have continued almost every day to report attacks by Taliban and other opposition groups. Attacks with explosive devices appeared to increase in 2005 and early 2006. But instead of antipersonnel mines, these incidents most commonly involved IEDs and antivehicle mines, in the form of remote-controlled roadside attacks. They target not only international and national troops, but also government officials, national and international aid workers, including mine action personnel, and other civilians.^[9]

According to the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), IEDs are manufactured by government opponents in the south and southeastern parts of the country.^[10] Antivehicle devices are often made from shells, rockets, mines and other munitions, and are transported to the site by bicycle or donkey, placed and detonated from a distance once a target comes into sight.^[11]

In 2005, there were six IED incidents affecting staff of mine action agencies which killed five and left five people injured. The incidents took place in Farah, Helmand, Paktia and Nangarhar provinces while the teams were working in support of reconstruction projects.^[12]

The US government has justified the enemy combatant status of some Guantanamo Bay detainees with allegations of landmine use and training in Afghanistan. An enemy combatant is defined by the US government as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Between August and December 2004, at least nine Guantanamo Bay detainees were found to be enemy combatants by the Combatant Status Review Board in part because of antipersonnel landmine use and/or training.^[13]

Summary of Evidence reports released by the Combatant Status Review Board make specific allegations against individual detainees, stating in one instance, “On July 20, 2002 detainee planted 10 mines against US forces in the mountain region between Khost and Ghardez.” Another report said, “The detainee received...mine training in a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba training camp.” Another said, “Other detainees are accused of recruiting individuals to lay antipersonnel landmine against US and Afghan forces.”^[14]

Stockpiling and Destruction

In May 2006, Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs told States Parties that, “locating and destroying the stockpiles of anti-personnel mines that have accumulated throughout the country over the past two decades is a major challenge. In some ways, the stockpiles are even more difficult to locate than the mines in the ground. We cannot rely on metal detectors or mine sniffing dogs. Instead we have to convince local commanders and villagers to voluntarily give up their stockpiled caches of weapons and or disclose their locations.”^[15]

He went on to say, “Despite these challenges we are committed to meeting our obligations by March 2007.... As the deadline for the destruction of all anti-personnel mines approaches, we can say with confidence that all known stockpiles in Afghanistan are or will be destroyed by our deadline of March 2007. However, because of various factors like the ones mentioned above, there exists the possibility that more stockpiled mines will be discovered after March 2007.”^[16]

The precise size, location and composition of antipersonnel mine stockpiles in Afghanistan remains to be established.^[17] In December 2004, the Ministry of Defense started a nationwide survey of explosive remnants of war including stockpiled antipersonnel mines.^[18] The survey was still ongoing in mid-2006 in conjunction with Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, a UN Development Programme (UNDP)-supported program of demobilization of ex-combatants.^[19]

As of 31 July 2005, destruction of stockpiled mines became the responsibility of the New Beginnings Programme and the Ministry of Defense, with assistance from UNMACA. Afghanistan states that stockpiled mines are removed whenever possible to demolition sites in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat for destruction.^[20]

In May 2006, Afghanistan reported that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed, including 44,819 since the beginning of 2005.^[21] Afghanistan’s 2006 Article 7 report indicates that from 30 April 2003 to 31 December 2005, a total of 58,056 stockpiled mines were destroyed.^[22] The report gives extensive details on types, numbers, locations and dates of destruction, as well as the agency carrying out the destruction.^[23]

Mines Retained for Training and Development

Afghanistan reported that, at the end of 2005, it retained 1,887 antipersonnel mines for training purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.^[24] This is an increase of 811 mines from the total reported as of April 2005.^[25] An additional 505 mines were retained by UNMACA from a stockpile destruction held on 9 November 2005 in Kabul. Another 306 mines that had been used by the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) for training were handed over to UNMACA after META’s training program ceased. In 2005, retained mines were used for mine dog accreditation sites.^[26]

Afghanistan states that only UNMACA can retain antipersonnel mines, and that the precise number is based on the needs of the program. The Ministry of Defense approves the number. UNMACA can disburse mines “to select MAPA implement [sic] partners for training purposes,” but the mines remain under the control of UNMACA.^[27]

Landmine and ERW Problem

Afghanistan emerged from more than two decades of conflict, starting in the 1970s, as one of the countries most contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Security forces have continued to discover huge quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and unexploded ordnance (UXO).^[28] The Landmine Impact Survey, which completed fieldwork in January 2005, reported 2,245 casualties in the two years before the survey, including 922 people killed and 1,323 injured. It also found 2,368 communities and more than four million people affected by mines and identified some 715 square kilometers of hazardous areas.^[29]

Most of the landmines in Afghanistan were laid in the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet occupation in 1979, but significant contamination also occurred during the civil war (1992-1996) and during the Taliban regime (1996-2001). The US-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001 added considerable quantities of UXO to the problem, including large quantities of cluster munitions, and this was followed by further landmine use by non-coalition forces.^[30]

Landmines were used by Soviet occupation forces both for conventional military purposes, as defensive barriers around military installations and to protect communications, and as part of a strategy to depopulate villages, placing mines in houses, irrigation systems and agricultural and grazing land. Mines were also scattered from helicopters and other aircraft; huge quantities of UXO remained in areas of conflict. Afghan guerrilla forces also used mines to block roads and harass movement of enemy forces.^[31] More mines were laid during the civil war by the Northern Alliance.

As a result, although Afghanistan has the oldest, biggest and most richly resourced mine action program in the world, mines and ERW continue to pose a formidable challenge to social and economic reconstruction, which is critical to the country’s political stabilization and to the return of refugees. Contamination affects towns and urban commercial areas as well as villages, farmland, grazing land and roads, with particularly heavy concentrations and the most impact in the central, northern and southeastern regions.^[32]

Mine Action Program

National Mine Action Authority: Afghanistan does not have a national mine action authority, but has been in the process of creating one since late 2004. A Mine Action Task Force comprising representatives of the government, the UN, donor countries and implementing partners, completed preparation of a draft national mine action law in November 2004, which set out “the roles and responsibilities of the national mine action institutions, including a new National Mine Action Agency” directly under the office of the president.^[33] The government noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expected the law to be issued by presidential decree in 2005, but with the election of a parliament in that year, the draft had to follow new procedures for passing legislation and this would take longer than projected.^[34] As of June 2006, it appeared likely that the bill would be presented to parliament in September or October 2006.^[35]

Transition to full national ownership of the program started in June 2005, and was expected to take two years. The Afghan government reported that in 2005 it worked with UNMACA and other stakeholders on revising the law and the regulatory framework for a national mine action authority, and on developing a timetable for a phased transition of UNMACA’s role to the government. They also prepared capacity-building programs and recruitment mechanisms needed for a successful transfer to full government ownership. In 2006, UNMACA and UNDP started setting up a joint Mine Action Transition Coordination Office to assist the government in developing policies and structures to facilitate the transition.^[36]

Mine Action Center: UNMACA, on behalf of the government, is responsible for managing, planning and coordinating all aspects of mine action undertaken by the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). From the creation of MAPA in 1989 until June 2002, it was administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA). Since then, MAPA has been the responsibility of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), with technical support from the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS).^[37]

Until 2006, overall policy for mine action was provided by the Mine Action Consultative Group (MACG), chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including representatives of other government departments concerned with mine action, as well as representatives of donors, UN agencies and implementing partners.^[38] The MACG oversaw preparation of an annual Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Public Investment Programme, and budget.^[39]

Management of mine action was reorganized after the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2006 when the government adopted a new approach to development set out in the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The new strategy provided for seven consultative groups, one for each of the seven sectors in the Compact. Mine action falls under CG1–Security, but was made the focus of a separate Consultative Working Group, still chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the same participants as the MACG; this new mechanism for coordination and monitoring replaced the MACG from May 2006.^[40]

UNMACA’s coordination activities include updating strategic and operational mine action plans and policies, developing the national operational workplan, providing technical assistance to help Afghanistan meet its treaty obligations, and coordinating the monitoring of mine risk education. It is also responsible for maintaining the mine action database, resource mobilization, support to and coordination of implementing partners, oversight of national mine action standards, and assistance in developing a comprehensive antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction strategy.^[41] In 2006, UNMACA expanded its management team by adding a Chief of Staff with a view to strengthening operations, and freeing the Program Manager to attend to transition issues. The appointment was also expected to facilitate a separation of UNMACA’s roles as regulator and implementing agency.^[42]

UNMACA has seven Area Mine Action Centers, which coordinate, oversee and monitor demining activities at regional and provincial levels. Regional coordination meetings are held once a week. National coordination meetings are held every one or two months. Afghanistan uses a decentralized data entry system, which operates in the seven area centers. The centers report to UNMACA, which is responsible for quality control, updating of information and sending these updates to the area centers, so that each one has data for all of Afghanistan. The advantage of this decentralized system, according to MAPA, is that the centers have to check the data on the activities of demining NGOs working in their areas for accuracy and completeness, to eliminate discrepancies between the UNMACA database and demining agencies.^[43]

In February 2006, quality assurance previously outsourced to the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META), which had been set up in 1989, was moved into UNMACA. META had been primarily responsible for monitoring, evaluating and quality assurance of demining operations; investigating demining accidents; testing demining equipment and procedures; producing technical and reference materials; and providing mine action technical and management training courses. In 2004, META employed 241 staff, including 188 in operations; following META’s closure, its staff were rehired as employees of UNMACA.^[44]

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) have been translated into both national languages (Dari and Pashtu) and Afghan mine action standards based on IMAS have been produced and released by UNMACA as a provisional working document pending government approval.^[45]

Strategic Planning and Progress

The MAPA adopted a 10-year strategic plan in 2003, which set the targets of clearing all high-priority mined areas in the first five years until 2007, medium-priority areas between 2007 and 2009 and all low-priority mined areas by 2013. The plan was revised by the MACG in 2005 to take account of several new factors: the findings of the Afghan Landmine Impact Survey, the expectation that UNMACA would transition in this period to a national program, and the requirement for mine clearance to support rehabilitation of national infrastructure as well as humanitarian needs.^[46]

A revised strategy, The Way Ahead, released in draft form in April 2006, set out planning assumptions and factors and some end-goals for mine action. The assumptions included improved security and continued international donor funding for a number of years. The “influencing factors” included Afghanistan’s international obligations, firstly, under the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2007 and to clear all known mined areas by 2013, and secondly, in accordance with its Millennium Development Goals, to destroy all other explosive contaminants by 2015 and all other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks by 2020.^[47]

UNMACA remains confident that the deadline for destruction of all known stockpiles of mines by 2007 will be met, but notes that prospects for completing clearance of all high-priority mined areas by 2007 are contingent on the security situation. An increase in attacks on civilians, particularly through the use of roadside IEDs, raised the security threat for humanitarian demining efforts.^[48] Approximately one-quarter of high priority hazardous areas are in locations where the deterioration in security in 2005 and 2006 has restricted access by humanitarian demining agencies.^[49]

The strategy called for UNMACA to draw up a three-year plan of action for 2006-2009 and for UNMACA or, subsequently, the national mine action authority, to set annual integrated work plans to implement the strategy. The new authority would draw up subsequent medium-term plans.^[50] As of June 2006, UNMACA was still drafting the three-year plan.

The Afghanistan Compact, published after the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January to 1 February 2006, also sets out a number of key targets for mines action:

• By end-2007 locate and destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines;
• By end-2010 reduce the area contaminated by landmines and UXO by 70 percent; and,
• By end-2010 destroy all unsafe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition.^[51]

These targets were re-stated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy published in January 2006, which called for an investment program for mine action to ensure implementation.^[52]

UNMACA’s more immediate mine action targets for the year 1385 (2006/2007) were:^[53]

Minefield manual clearance:	13,007,285 square meters
Battlefield clearance:	34,992,000 square meters
Minefield clearance in support of reconstruction:	17,962,560 square meters
Minefield technical surveys:	33,520,000 square meters
Former battlefield surveys:	40,176,000 square meters
Permanent marking of contaminated areas:	36,000,000 square meters

Two major evaluations of mine action in Afghanistan have been performed in recent years, the first by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), and the second by UNDP and the World Bank. Both found significant economic benefits from mine action in the country, although they differed as to the type of land that generates the greatest benefit from clearance.^[54]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2013. This obligation is recognized as an influencing factor in The Way Ahead draft strategy for mine action, which sets the target of completing clearance of all known mined areas by 2013, and is incorporated into the national Public Investment Program.^[55] UNMAS has warned that Afghanistan’s ability to meet its treaty commitments, as well as its Millennium Development Goals and other targets, would be affected by cuts in the MAPA’s capacity resulting from shortfalls in donor funding.^[56]

Demining

Afghanistan has the world’s longest established and biggest mine action program, with some 9,500 Afghans working for organizations coordinated by the MAPA.^[57] These include seven national NGOs: the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan, Afghan Technical Consultants and its offshoot Community Based Mine Action Program, Demining Agency for Afghanistan, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency, Mine Detection and Dog Center and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation. Foreign demining organizations include the international NGOs HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group (DDG). META provided quality assurance until its closure in February 2006.

International commercial companies active in Afghanistan include, MineTech International, RONCO Consulting Corporation and DynCorp International. RONCO provided humanitarian demining services under contract to the US Department of State for three years until August 2005, and now conducts demining for coalition forces at Bagram air base, as well as commercial explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) work.^[58] DynCorp International has conducted stockpile destruction, and from September 2005, took on humanitarian demining and EOD under contract to the US Department of State.^[59]

Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments

The first survey was conducted in 1990 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG).^[60] Since then, surveying of mine/ERW-affected areas became an integral part of the Mine Action Program in Afghanistan conducted principally by MCPA and HALO. MCPA conducted a general survey in 2003 and since then has carried out general, technical, battle area, and socioeconomic impact surveys on behalf of all of MAPA’s implementing partners. HALO has carried out surveys in its own areas of operation in central and northern Afghanistan, and DDG reported that it started to conduct general and technical surveys in September 2004.^[61]

In 2005, MCPA and HALO conducted surveys on a total of more than 14 square kilometers of mined areas and over 28 square kilometers of battlefield areas. MCPA, with 537 staff (427 field staff and 110 administrative staff), deployed 41 technical survey teams and 16 landmine impact assessment teams which engaged mainly in surveys, but also undertook limited clearance as part of minefield boundary marking and reduction of mined areas. In 2005, MCPA marked and mapped 25,056,000 square meters of mined areas and 22,680,000 square meters of battlefield. It also resurveyed 164,778 square meters of mined areas.^[62] In the same period, HALO surveyed 15,811,817 square meters of former battlefield areas and 892,429 square meters of minefields. DDG surveyed 157,626 square meters of minefields.^[63]

The Ministry of Defense, in collaboration with UNMACA, UNDP, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), launched a survey of landmine stockpiles in December 2004, implemented by nine survey teams composed of representatives from UNDP’s Afghan New Beginnings Program, HALO, DynCorp International, the Ministry of Defense and UNMACA.^[64] By the end of 2005, the survey had located 25,475 landmines in 16 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces and was continuing.^[65]

The Afghan Landmine Impact Survey, completed in January 2005 and certified by the UN on 30 September 2005, provided a basis for significantly refocusing mine action. The survey, implemented by MCPA according to Survey Working Group protocols, identified 2,368 landmine and UXO-impacted communities in 259 districts, and found that 4.2 million people, about 15 percent of the population, are affected by mines and UXO, including 1.6 million people living in high- or medium-impact communities. It also confirmed the existence of 4,514 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), of which 281 (12 percent) were high-impact, 480 (20 per cent) medium-impact and 1,607 (61 percent) low-impact.^[66]

Beyond this baseline data, the survey yielded some significant findings and established benchmarks against which to measure the progress of Afghanistan’s mine action program. Survey teams visited 324 of Afghanistan’s 329 districts in 32 provinces, carrying existing database records for the areas they were surveying.^[67] In the course of the survey they were able to discount approximately half of the UNMACA database as no longer valid and obtained a similar volume of new information about suspected contamination. As a result of the survey, the total area of SHAs in the UNMACA database fell from 850 square kilometers to 715 square kilometers, a drop of 15 percent.^[68]

The Afghan Landmine Impact Survey found that Afghanistan’s mine and UXO contamination is more geographically concentrated than previously thought. The survey found all but two (Oruzgan and Daykondi) of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces are mine-affected, but three-quarters of SHAs and the same proportion of recent casualties are located in only 12 provinces and half the SHAs are located in just six provinces, led by Kabul.^[69] Also, 45 percent of the recent casualties recorded by the survey were in just the three provinces of Kabul, Parvan and Takhar. (See Landmine/ERW Casualties section in this report).

The survey estimated that up to 100 square kilometers would have to be cleared to get rid of all SHAs associated with recent casualties. However, “based on current clearance rates of 30 square kilometers per annum, it is not inconceivable that the most dangerous 20 percent of SHAs could be cleared in three years.” It also concluded that “considerably less than half” the number of SHAs would have to be cleared to make significant reductions in casualties and to enable major infrastructure projects to go forward.^[70]

After completion of the survey, UNMACA converted the survey teams into Landmine Impact Assessment Teams and deployed them to regional Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs) to continue community visits in order to validate and update the findings. Their monitoring is intended to ensure that the database is kept up-to-date, that high-impact communities remain at the top of the agenda and that priorities take account of communities newly categorized as impacted owing to recent victims or new blockages. These updates are intended to maintain the critical two-year window of information that drives community scoring and allows UNMACA and MAPA to base annual and quarterly planning on current information.^[71]

Fencing and Marking

The Afghan Landmine Impact Survey reported that of 4,514 SHAs in Afghanistan, only 10 were fenced and only 542 had warning signs. A total of 3,962 SHAs, or 87 percent, were not marked or fenced.^[72]

Mine and ERW Clearance

Mine action in Afghanistan accelerated in 2005 when the total amount of land reported cleared by UNMACA increased by over one-third to 139.3 square kilometers, despite constraints imposed by deteriorating security, notably in the south of the country. This total included 39.8 square kilometers of mined area clearance, 19 percent more than in 2005, and 99.7 square kilometers of battle area clearance, 45 percent more than in 2005.

Minefield and Battle Area Clearance (square meters) and Devices Destroyed in Afghanistan in 2005[73]

Organization	Minefield clearance	Battle area clearance	Antipersonnel mines	Antivehicle mines	UXO
ATC	4,957,094	3,034,362	3,467	305	270,290
ATC-CBMAP	516,405	0	0	0	0
AREA	14,416	0	0	0	1
DAFA	3,675,685	5,822,462	905	30	37,153
DDG	172,718	3,275,354	1,406	57	151,659
HALO	3,968,084	86,436,955	4,314	192	250,772
HI	0	0	6	9	101,790
MCPA	81,517	0	51	5	127
MDC	18,204,830	0	76	155	1,930
MineTech	0	20,256	0	0	18
OMAR	8,173,454	919,320	4,219	34	12,490
RONCO	n/a	n/a	20,221	518	1,156,266
Total	39,764,203	99,508,709	34,665	1,305	1,982,496

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), one of the largest Afghan humanitarian and reconstruction mine clearance organizations, employed 1,825 administrative and field staff working in all areas of Afghanistan undertaking manual and mechanical clearance and EOD. ATC operations in 2005 included commercial work clearing 1.8 million square meters of land. In addition, ATC cleared 516,270 square meters of mined area under its community-based mine clearance program in 2005.^[74]

Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA) operated for one month of 2005, after which ATC absorbed AREA’s community-based assets as the Community Based Mine Action Program (CBMAP). It works in the eastern province of Nangarhar and aims to provide local inhabitants with the capacity to clear their own land. In 2005, it cleared 14,416 square meters of mined areas and destroyed one item of UXO.^[75]

Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) started working in June 1990 and planned to continue until 2013. In 2005, it operated with 1,092 staff, including 652 in field operations, conducting mine and ERW clearance, mainly in western and southern provinces, including Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Oruzgan and Nimruz. DAFA cleared 9.5 million square meters, including 4.5 million square meters of agricultural and grazing land, 2 million square meters of access roads and 1.8 million square meters of residential areas.^[76]

Danish Demining Group increased its workforce by nearly one-third in 2005, to 402 people, including 362 field staff (up from 282 in 2004), and at the same time sharply raised productivity. DDG’s battle area clearance more than tripled from 803,378 square meters in 2004 to 3.3 million square meters in 2005, and mined area clearance rose from 119,308 square meters in 2004 to 172,718 square meters in 2005.^[77]

HALO Trust, the biggest mine action NGO in Afghanistan, also reported large increases in productivity in 2005 and planned to push clearance rates up further in 2006. HALO employs more than 2,600 people deployed in 54 manual, 21 mechanical, 16 battle area clearance, 13 technical survey, six general survey, two mine risk education, 23 weapons and ammunition disposal and six ammunition survey teams.^[78] Its operations supported repatriation of refugees and poverty elimination by releasing land for agriculture and rebuilding infrastructure. HALO’s total battle area clearance of 86.4 square kilometers in 2005 was 83 percent higher than the previous year; it included 60.5 square kilometers of agricultural land, 17.3 square kilometers for infrastructure and 8.7 square kilometers for social uses. Mined areas cleared in 2005 increased 88 percent to 3.96 square kilometers in 2005, from 2.1 square kilometers in 2004. HALO was also involved in a project for the disposal of weapons and ammunition.^[79]

Mine Detection and Dog Center (MDC) set out to virtually double the amount of land it cleared to 18 square kilometers in 2005, and achieved, or even surpassed, its target. In addition to clearing 6.7 square kilometers of mined areas, MDC reported clearing 11.4 square kilometers in support of reconstruction. Nearly two-thirds of MDC clearance was roads and 17 percent was grazing land. MDC had a total staff of 1,610 people and deployed 33 mine dog groups, each with 29 people and four dogs, and 47 mine dog sets, each with five people and two dogs. MDC keeps its headquarters in Kabul city and has five site offices in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif.^[80] MDC also undertook training of mine detection dogs on behalf of Tajikistan’s mine action program.

Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), set up in 1990, undertakes manual and mechanical mine clearance and EOD across the country, closely linking its clearance operations to mine risk education. In 2005, it employed a staff of 935, including 829 in operations, and reported clearing 17.2 square kilometers, almost double the clearance recorded by UNMACA. OMAR said it gave priority to clearing residential land followed by agricultural land, irrigation canals, roads and grazing land.^[81]

Handicap International, previously engaged in mine risk education, participated in EOD for the first time in 2005, deploying two teams in western Afghanistan, focusing mainly on Herat.^[82]

RONCO’s main activity was demining at Bagram air base for US Central Command, where it started in February 2002 under a contract until February 2007. As of June 2006, RONCO employed 174 expatriates and third country nationals at Bagram, including Bosnians, Mozambicans and South Africans, deploying about 100 manual deminers, 22 mine detection dog teams and four mechanical teams using Casspir mine clearance vehicles. For more than three years until August 2005, RONCO provided technical support to Afghan demining NGOs; under this contract, RONCO also operated a specialized EOD unit with five teams in Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif which cleared more than 1.6 million mines and UXO items in 2005. When the contract expired, RONCO retained most of the personnel for commercial work in which, as of June 2006, it employed three internationals and 380 national staff. In 2005, these personnel conducted 25 short-term commercial mine/UXO clearance tasks, clearing 6.4 million square meters of land and destroying 89,775 mines and UXO.^[83]

Deminer Safety: In 2005, nine deminers were killed and 21 injured in 15 incidents, nine of them involving mines and six involving UXO. The agencies affected included ATC, HALO, MineTech, OMAR and RONCO. By mid-June 2006, another six incidents occurred in which one deminer was killed and five injured.^[84] The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reported in May 2006 that a French engineer died of injuries sustained in a mine explosion during demining operations near Kabul airport.^[85]

From 1990 until the end of 2005, almost all demining NGOs experienced mine/UXO accidents in which 79 deminers were killed and 620 injured.^[86] Investigations by META in previous years found that 75 percent of accidents occurred during prodding. All deminers are insured in Afghanistan.^[87]

In addition to the danger posed by mines and UXO, deminers faced a growing threat from declining security. In 2005, seven deminers were killed and five injured by IEDs.^[88] In June 2006, one deminer was killed and two injured by an IED on the road between Kandahar and Herat.

Demining Progress in 2006

Demining operations in the early months of 2006 were largely on course to achieve targets set in UNMACA’s annual workplan, but by mid-year they faced increasing constraints from financial shortfalls and deteriorating security.^[89] In the first quarter of 2006, the seven most established NGOs completed 10,358,016 square meters of battle area clearance and 6,246,520 square meters of mined area clearance.^[90] In the process they disposed of 3,318 antipersonnel mines, 93 antivehicle mines and 108,714 UXO.^[91] RONCO completed 11 short-term commercial contracts and in addition, took on five clearance and one survey project which required 463,000 square meters of clearance and 151 kilometers of road surveys. As of June, RONCO teams had cleared 4,184,000 square meters, destroying 743 mines and UXO, and had surveyed 23 kilometers of road.^[92]

The UN mine action program had budgeted for US$76.1 million in 2006, including $53 million for mine/UXO clearance and stockpile destruction.^[93] In April 2006, UNMAS Deputy Director John Flanagan appealed for donor support warning that impending funding shortfalls would cause cuts in the workforce.^[94] The problem was partly due to substantial numbers of NGO deminers having been employed on reconstruction projects that reached completion in mid-2006. UNMACA faced a shortfall of approximately $5 million for the third quarter of 2006.^[95]

In June 2006, UNMACA announced to its implementing partners that shortfalls in funding necessitated the loss of 1,130 jobs. Without an improvement in funding, it expected to cut another 1,300 jobs in August and 1,500 jobs in September―a total of 3,930 jobs representing approximately 41 percent of the some 9,500 strong workforce.^[96]

Mine Risk Education

Afghanistan provided a summary of mine risk education (MRE) activities in 2005 in its Article 7 report submitted on 1 May 2006.^[97]

In 2005, over 1.8 million people attended MRE sessions across the country; some 43 percent were female and 61 percent children. MRE was provided by 12 organizations, coordinated by UNICEF for UNMACA; in 2006, UNICEF ceased funding MRE in Afghanistan and the coordinator was integrated into UNMACA.^[98] MRE is coordinated at the field level by Area Mine Action Centers; in 2006, MRE quality assurance was integrated into the quality assurance teams of each Area Mine Action Center, which has one focal point for MRE.^[99] META provided MRE capacity-building in 2005. IMAS for MRE have been translated into the two national languages, and are used by implementing NGOs.^[100]

Number of Civilians Attending MRE Sessions in Afghanistan in 2005[101]

Organization	Adults		Children		Total 2005
	Male	Female	Male	Female
AARJ	1,122	44	6,695	2,784	10,645
ARCS	34,869	69,793	91,496	63,098	259,256
ARCS/ICRC volunteers	12,442	18,775	15,748	12,031	58,976
AREA	18	0	1,070	420	1,508
ATC	9,799	11,356	19,210	15,159	55,524
DAFA	382	2	2,432	5,313	8,129
DDG	1,535	762	2,264	1,851	6,412
HALO	18,696	15,715	32,339	30,358	97,108
HI	193,495	98,619	231,663	127,335	651,112
ICRC	8,994	3,739	7,447	4,836	25,016
MCPA	58	0	114	13	185
OMAR	119,450	90,450	226,664	206,207	642,771
Total	400,860	309,235	637,142	469,405	1,816,642

MAPA’s community-based MRE is designed to respond to the needs of communities through emergency response, community liaison networks, teacher training, and community monitoring of risk (victim and incident data collection) and of the impact of MRE activities. The program has been based on the Landmine Impact Survey.^[102] In 2005, the program, implemented by MAPA partners Handicap International, Afghan Red Crescent Society, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), OMAR, and for the first time by ATC, reached over 2,365 communities. Over a million posters and brochures were produced and distributed through the UNMACA regional offices in 2005. A UNICEF peer education program and a mobile cinema MRE program were piloted to enhance community-based activities.^[103]

The Afghan Red Crescent Society MRE teams, with financial and technical support and training from ICRC, continued its program in 2005. A total of 8,652 sessions in 2,544 locations provided MRE to 259,256 people (34,869 men, 69,793 women, 91,496 boys and 63,098 girls) in 2005, mainly in central regions. Over 100 community volunteers in 10 provinces conducted 1,858 sessions in 526 locations for 58,976 people (12,442 men, 18,755 women, 15,748 boys and 12,031 girls).^[104] In 2005, the Afghan Red Crescent Society and ICRC also provided 211 reports on mine/ERW-contaminated areas.

ICRC teams in the northern and eastern regions, combining MRE and data gathering, delivered 1,903 MRE sessions in 1,374 locations to 25,016 people (8,994 men, 3,739 women, 7,447 boys and 4,836 girls), including 268 MRE sessions for 4,537 people driving to remote areas. The incident and casualty data collected is complemented by information from more than 500 healthcare facilities and accounts for 90 percent of all data available on new injuries.^[105]

During 2005, nearly 240,000 MRE materials were distributed. ICRC organized 13 training workshops and one review meeting; 190 people were trained in mine action and data collection; 24 attended the review meeting.^[106]

Teacher training has been an integral part of UNICEF MRE programming, in coordination with the Ministry of Education. A total of 63,000 teachers received MRE training during 2004 and 2005. An evaluation on school-based MRE was due in 2005, but was not undertaken due to lack of resources. A new community-based teacher training program, which targets non-formal teachers (religious and community leaders, and women) to provide educational opportunities to children outside the formal school system, included MRE.^[107]

MRE for returning Afghan refugees was provided in UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation centers on the borders of Pakistan and Iran, which “provided an introduction to the risks associated with mines and ERW and promoted safe behaviors to assist with travel and the possible resettlement in communities with a mine/ERW risk.” As of December 2005, over 725,000 people had returned to Afghanistan through eight repatriation centers; all were provided with MRE. UNICEF and AARJ produced more than 1 million brochures and posters for distribution through these centers. Handicap International, HALO and OMAR implemented MRE activities in seven out of the eight UNHCR centers, and the Afghan Red Crescent Society covered the remaining center.^[108]

MRE is also provided by clearance and survey organizations, including AREA, MCPA, DDG and HALO.^[109]

In 2005, DDG had one team conducting stand-alone MRE in communities before EOD teams are deployed. Training for DDG MRE staff was provided by UNMACA through META. In May 2006, DDG recruited two new MRE teams to be based with its EOD teams in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif; the teams underwent refresher training in June.^[110]

HALO had two MRE teams operating in 2005 in the northern and central regions, conducting MRE at UNHCR encashment centers and in villages.^[111]

Public information on MRE continued to be spread in 2005 by the BBC Afghan Education Project. In January 2006, the BBC introduced City Voice, which also included MRE messages. It continued publishing the magazine New Home, New Life, and a monthly cartoon that includes MRE stories.^[112]

In March 2006, MAPA published a comprehensive MRE impact monitoring study based on two surveys in 2004-2005, to guide future MRE programming.^[113] The first survey was reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor.^[114] In 2005, a Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Beliefs survey covering all eight regions of Afghanistan included questions on cultural issues; 800 people from nine provinces were interviewed, including mullahs and female teachers, half from rural and half from urban areas; 48 percent of those interviewed were female. The two surveys showed that the overwhelming majority of people are fully aware of the dangers posed by mines and UXO, but when asked about appropriate behavior in the case of being trapped in a minefield, only a quarter responded correctly; one-third considered retracing their steps. In the second survey, 42 percent said that if they saw a friend or family member lying injured in a minefield they would run to their assistance.^[115]

Belief questions in the second survey revealed that mine incidents have a different impact according to age; each new incident evokes traumatic war memories in older people, while younger people feel they can change risky behaviors to avoid risks. The MRE knowledge level among boys and young men was higher than among women and girls. Nevertheless, most mine/UXO incidents involve boys and young men which, the survey report concluded, confirms that MRE as a stand-alone activity is not sufficient to change dangerous behavior: “Economic necessity leads to this subconscious ignoring of danger.”^[116]

UNMACA commented that providing MRE to women is difficult as female MRE teams are unable to be as mobile as their male counterparts.^[117] DDG commented that, “The challenges faced by the MRE teams include the need for female MRE facilitators to work with acceptable male counterparts such as brothers or husbands or be chaperoned by such a person.”^[118]

However, the MAPA objective of reducing casualties from mines and UXO by raising awareness, especially among women, children and youth, and promoting safe behavior in affected communities was revised at the end of 2005, as women are not one of the highest at-risk groups. The MRE end-goal of the draft mine action strategy was stated as, “a comprehensive and sustainable system ... to educate the population within Afghanistan regarding the residual mines/ERW threat. This education would include sufficient training to recognize and report these items to the appropriate authorities.”^[119]

Funding and Assistance

In 2005, donations totaling $66.8 million for mine action in Afghanistan were reported by 16 countries and the European Commission (EC), a decrease of some 27 percent from 2004 ($91.8 million provided by 16 countries and the EC).^[120] Donor countries reporting funding in 2005 were:

• Australia: A$1 million ($762,700) to ICRC for victim assistance;^[121]
• Belgium: €58,800 ($73,200) in-kind contribution of clearance experts;^[122]
• Canada: C$9,417,205 ($7,773,178), consisting of C$4 million ($3,301,692) to UNDP for stockpile destruction, C$36,765 ($30,347) to UNICEF for MRE, C$380,440 ($314,024) to UNMACA for stockpile destruction, and C$5 million ($4,127,115) to UNMAS for UNMACA;^[123]
• Czech Republic: CZK27,886,000 ($1,162,378) in-kind contribution of Czech military personnel deployed with NATO;^[124]
• Denmark: DKK17 million ($2,835,555), consisting of DKK5 million ($833,987) to DDG for mine action, DKK7 million ($1,167,581) to DDG for mine clearance and MRE, and DKK5 million ($833,987) to UNMAS for mine clearance;^[125]
• Finland: €1 million ($1,244,900) to UNMAS for mine clearance;^[126]
• EC: €15,083,391 ($18,777,313), consisting of €15 million ($18,673,500) to UNMAS/ MAPA for survey, clearance, stockpile destruction and MRE, and €83,391 ($103,813) to Agrisystems Consortiums for stockpile destruction assessment;^[127]
• Germany: €3,381,066 ($4,209,089), consisting of €108,219 ($134,722) in-kind contribution of a German expert for MDC, €400,000 ($497,960) to HALO for manual/battle area clearance and technical survey, €880,326 ($1,095,918) to OMAR for mechanical and manual demining, and €1,992,521 ($2,480,489) to MDC;^[128]
• Ireland: €500,000 ($622,450) to HALO for mine clearance;^[129]
• Japan: ¥682,439,441 ($6,197,797), consisting of ¥77,719,129 ($705,832) to HALO for mine clearance, ¥95,425,564 ($866,638) to the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention for demining and EOD, and ¥509,294,748 ($4,625,327) to UNDP/MACA for mine clearance;^[130]
• Netherlands: €1,489,544 ($1,854,333), consisting of €500,000 ($622,450) to UNMAS for mine clearance and MRE, and €989,544 ($1,231,883) to HALO for mine clearance and MRE;^[131]
• Norway: NOK8,560,000 ($1,328,945), consisting of NOK7,560,000 ($1,173,694) to HALO for mine clearance, and NOK1 million ($155,251) to Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Centre for victim assistance;^[132]
• Slovakia: €868,208 ($1,080,832) in-kind contribution of EOD team for NATO;^[133]
• Spain: €282,200 ($351,311) as an in-kind contribution of EOD personnel;^[134]
• Sweden: SEK3,175,000 ($424,977) to DDG for mine clearance quality management;^[135]
• Switzerland: CHF300,000 ($240,790), consisting of CHF250,000 ($200,658) to HI for victim assistance, and CHF50,000 ($40,132) to UNICEF for advocacy;^[136]
• UK: £1,893,468 ($3,446,112), consisting of £1,309,760 ($2,383,763) to HALO for integrated demining, and £583,708 ($1,062,349) to Mines Advisory Group for integrated demining;^[137]
• US: $14,400,000, consisting of $13,700,000 from the Department of State (including $300,000 to Cranfield University for mid-level management training of local demining groups), and $700,000 from USAID/Leahy War Victims Fund.^[138]

In addition, Adopt-A-Minefield reported donating $663,218 to UNDP for mine action in Afghanistan.^[139] The German NGO, Kindernothilfe (Help for children in Need) reported providing €18,900 ($23,529) for rehabilitation for children with disabilities including landmine survivors in 2005.^[140] Including these contributions, international funding in 2005 totaled some $67.5 million.

The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action received $28,673,358 for mine action in Afghanistan in 2005, less than the $31,008,267 received in 2004.^[141] UNDP reported receiving $16,592,955 for mine action in Afghanistan in 2005, all contributed by the US.^[142] This was also a decrease from 2004 funding (of $20,692,955).^[143]

Donor information collected by Landmine Monitor indicated that from 1991 to March 2006, more than $515 million has been invested in mine action in Afghanistan.^[144]

As reported by the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, total funding of $80.6 million for MAPA in April 2005-March 2006 was received for the following activities: $56,772,747 (70 percent) on mine/UXO clearance, $8,202,597 (10 percent) on survey activities, $4,414,701 (five percent) on coordination, $3,932,427 (five percent) on training and capacity-building, $2,844,418 (four percent) on MRE, $2,110,880 (three percent) on MAFP,^[145] $1,897,500 (two percent) on stockpile destruction, and $463,660 (one percent) on victim assistance.^[146]

Landmine and ERW Casualties

The collection of comprehensive landmine casualty data in Afghanistan remains problematic, due in part to communication constraints and the time needed to centralize information. Key actors in mine action estimate that there are 70-100 new mine/ERW casualties each month, which is a significant reduction from earlier years.^[147] However, many mine casualties are believed to die before reaching medical assistance and are therefore not recorded.^[148] The government estimates that there are approximately 1,100 new mine/UXO casualties per year (or 92 per month), which is “a significant decrease from 1993 (600 to 720 monthly), 1997 (300 to 360 monthly) and 2000 (150 to 300 monthly).”^[150]

In 2005, UNMACA recorded 848 new casualties from landmines, UXO and cluster munitions, of which 150 people were killed and 698 injured.^[151] This represents a small decrease from the 857 mine/ERW casualties UNMACA recorded in 2004.^[152] However, in reality, the casualty rate seems to be relatively constant, with 846 casualties recorded in 2003, when a significant decline was recorded, compared to 1,194 casualties in 2002, and 1,667 in 2001.^[153] The UNMACA database is continually updated as information of recent casualties and information on casualties from prior periods becomes available. Usually there is a two-month gap between data collection and the final entry in the database, as casualty data received is sent back to the Area Mine Action Centers for verification and is then crosschecked at UNMACA in Kabul. The UNMACA database does not include casualties recorded by the Italian NGO, Emergency, or the Coalition Hospital.^[154]

In 2005, 190 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 103 by antivehicle mines, two by unspecified landmines, 17 by cluster munitions and 404 by other UXO.^[155] Only 11 casualties were recorded as military personnel. UNMACA recorded at least 67 female casualties, but the vast majority of casualties are male (781 or 92 percent). With 427 recorded casualties, boys under 21 years constitute just over half of the casualties. In total, nearly 56 percent of casualties (472) were under 21 years, with the largest group of children being between seven and 14 years (274 or 54 percent); however, only 45 of the child casualties were female (32 between seven and 14 years). This is an increase compared to 449 child casualties in 2004 despite reportedly improved MRE in schools. The increase is possibly explained by the fact that the number of people returning from Pakistan and Iran forced people to utilize land that they have not used in the past. Additionally, as children traditionally tend animals and collect wood and water, they are at greater risk―particularly boys.^[156] Main activities at the time of incidents were tending animals (158), tampering (155, of which 119 involved UXO), traveling (116), collecting wood, food or water (78), playing/recreation (76) and farming (46).^[157]

ICRC is the main source of mine casualty data, providing the UNMACA with about 95 percent of its information on new casualties. ICRC carries out community-based data gathering in all mine-affected areas and mine casualty data is provided by 490 health facilities supported by several agencies and organizations.^[158] Differences between ICRC data and UNMACA casualty data are likely due to timing differences in updating data and continuous verification of the respective databases.

In 2005, ICRC recorded 898 mine/UXO casualties (137 killed and 761 injured), a small decrease from 940 casualties recorded in 2004.^[159] According to ICRC data, 272 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 87 by antivehicle mines, 24 by cluster munitions and 420 by other UXO.^[160] Fifty-six of the casualties were recorded as military personnel. At least 75 casualties were female, including 48 girls under 18 years. ICRC records show 397 casualties among children under 18 years (44 percent) and 496 under 21 years (55 percent); the age group of seven to 14 years accounted for 55 percent of casualties (272). Most common activities at the time of the incident were tampering (188 casualties), tending animals (174), playing or recreation (103), traveling (94), collecting wood or food (87), and farming (53). New mine/ERW casualties were reported in 32 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, with 21 percent in Herat, 14 percent in Kandahar, 11 percent in Kabul and eight percent in Nangarhar; the only provinces without reported casualties in 2005 were Nimruz and Daykondi. Approximately 12 percent of the casualties reported having received MRE before the incident occurred, and about 84 percent of casualties occurred in unmarked areas. Of those injured in 2005, approximately 30 percent required an upper or lower limb amputation.^[161]

Handicap International (HI) collects casualty data in the southern and western parts of Afghanistan via its Community Based Mine Action Program (CBMAP). HI recorded 201 new mine/ERW casualties (82 killed and 119 injured) in 2005, which is a significant increase from 152 in 2004.^[162] The increase in casualties in the Kandahar region is reportedly due to increased tensions in the area and the return of refugees and internally displaced people to the area.^[163]

In 2005, Emergency admitted 488 new mine casualties in its three surgical centers and health posts. These casualties are reportedly not sent directly to UNMACA, but to the Ministry of Public Health.^[164] However, there likely is a significant overlap with other data collectors; at least in Kabul, where many people treated at the Emergency hospital would be recorded while receiving ICRC rehabilitation services.^[165] According to ICRC, more than 70 people who were injured in 2005 and who received treatment by Emergency have received ICRC rehabilitation and are included in the database.^[166]

Landmine Monitor media analysis identified at least 230 mine/UXO casualties, including 108 killed and 122 injured, in 2005.^[167] The majority of reported casualties were foreign or Afghan military personnel. Civilian casualties included three people injured and one killed by a landmine on 22 October when they were driving to Khost city; the person killed was a radio journalist.^[168] In November, six people were killed and six injured, including several women and children, when a passenger vehicle hit an antivehicle mine 70 kilometers from Dalabadin, just 100 meters on the Afghan side of the border with Pakistan.^[169] Two boys between nine and 12 years old were killed and two were injured by a landmine while herding animals in Khost province in November. Reportedly the boys found the old mine, which had washed up due to the rains, and set it on fire.^[170]

According to UNMACA, nine deminers were killed and 21 injured during mine clearance activities in 2005. Another five deminers were injured in mine incidents not related to their work.^[171] The ICRC reported 35 demining casualties in 2005.^[172] Landmine Monitor identified at least 13 deminers killed and 14 injured in demining accidents reported in the media. On 18 July 2005, two Zimbabweans were killed and one was seriously injured during a mine clearance operation.^[173] On 2 October, a Zimbabwean deminer was injured during mine clearance for MineTech.^[174]

Landmine Monitor identified at least 49 soldiers and peacekeepers killed, and another 61 injured in mine incidents reported in the media in 2005.^[175] The majority of casualties were Afghan soldiers and police (35 killed and 32 injured). At least 14 foreign soldiers and peacekeepers were killed and 30 injured in mine incidents, including personnel from Portugal, France, Romania and the US. On 16 March, one US soldier was killed and four others were injured when their vehicle struck a mine in the western province of Herat; five Afghan civilians died when their truck hit a mine in the same area just hours later.^[176] On 5 April, a US soldier, who had only been in Afghanistan for two weeks, lost part of his foot when he stepped on a landmine; in another incident in April, another US soldier was injured when a landmine exploded while he was burning garbage.^[177] On 26 April, one Romanian soldier was killed and two others injured in a mine explosion in Kandahar.^[178] In November, one Portuguese peacekeeper was killed and three others injured, when a landmine exploded while they were on patrol in the east of Kabul.^[179] Also in November, five Afghan policemen were killed and two injured when their car hit a landmine in Omna district of Paktika province.^[180]

Over the course of 2005, 15 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs in Afghanistan. As of 17 March, six US military personnel had been killed by landmines and one death was attributed to “exploded ordnance.”^[181] Four Swedish soldiers were involved in an IED incident.^[182]

At least five international reconstruction workers were killed and five injured in six IED incidents in Farah, Helmand, Paktia and Nangarhar provinces.^[183] Seven deminers were also killed in IED attacks.^[184] However, UNMACA, HI and ICRC do not collect information on IED casualties as this is considered to be a security issue.

Mine casualties continued to be recorded in 2006. UNMACA recorded 194 new mine/UXO casualties as of 15 June 2006, including 32 killed and 162 injured. Antipersonnel mines caused 41 casualties; antivehicle mines, 17; cluster munitions, four; other UXO, 108; and the remainder unknown.^[185]

The ICRC recorded 160 new mine/UXO casualties to the end of March, including 21 people killed and 139 injured. Antipersonnel mines caused 36 casualties; antivehicle mines, 10; cluster munitions, two; other UXO, 95; and the remainder unknown. From January to the end of March 2006, ICRC recorded three Afghan military personnel killed and five injured in seven landmine incidents.^[186] HI recorded 42 new mine/UXO casualties in the Kandahar regions between January and April 2006.^[187]

Landmine Monitor media analysis identified at least 67 new landmine casualties reported in the media from 1 January 2006 to 15 June 2006, including 35 killed and 32 injured. The majority were military personnel or police (31), including 18 Afghans and 13 foreign soldiers from the UK, US and France. Foreign civilians from Turkey, India and Russia were also involved in mine incidents. On 7 February, a Turkish engineer, an Indian colleague and two Afghan colleagues were killed when their vehicle struck a landmine in Farah province.^[188] On 19 February, one person was killed and six injured in a landmine explosion in front of a private residence; it is believed the mine was placed there in the context of a personal conflict.^[189] Also in February, two Russian embassy staff were injured when one of them stepped off the road onto a landmine in Hairatan, northern Afghanistan. They were rushed to a hospital in Uzbekistan for treatment.^[190] On 12 April, three British soldiers were injured when their vehicle hit a mine in Helmand province; it is thought to be the first British landmine incident in Afghanistan.^[191] On 29 April, two children were killed and two more injured when an antivehicle mine detonated while the children were herding cows in Ghazni province.^[192] In May, four health workers were killed when their vehicle drove over a landmine in Vardak province.^[193] Also in May, a French soldier was severely injured during a mine clearance accident near Kabul airport; he died later at the hospital.^[194] In May and June, two people were killed in incidents that reportedly involved newly laid mines; on 23 May, a cyclist was killed when he cycled over a mine believed to be planted by the Taliban in Andar district of Ghazni province.^[195] On 7 June, a suspected Talib was killed when the mine he was planting at the sports grounds in Sharan, the capital of Paktika province, exploded prematurely.^[196] On 15 June, an ATC deminer was killed while defusing a mine in Paktia province.^[197]

IED incidents occured at an increasing rate in the first five months of 2006. By 17 March, nine US military personnel had been killed in Afghanistan as a result of IED attacks in 2006.^[198] Six Canadian soldiers were also involved in IED incidents, resulting in four killed and two injured.^[199]

It is not possible to determine the exact number of landmine casualties or mine survivors in Afghanistan. There could be as many as 100,000 mine/UXO survivors.^[200] As of November 2005, the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled had collected data on 86,354 people with disabilities in 33 provinces; however, the information available on the cause of disability was limited. In February 2004, it was reported that 18 percent of people with disabilities recorded by the ministry were mine survivors.^[201] Results of an HI study on disability stated that there are between 747,500 and 867,100 people with disabilities, of whom approximately 17 percent are war disabled (126,000 to 146,000). According to HI, seven percent of those war disabled are mine survivors injured after the war; this would indicate that there are between 52,000 and 60,000 mine/UXO survivors in Afghanistan.^[202]

On 31 December 2005, the UNMACA database contained information on 15,215 mine/UXO casualties since 1988 (and one from 1966), including 2,627 people killed and 12,588 injured; 1,074 (seven percent) were female. Children under 21 years account for 8,217 casualties (54 percent), making children between seven and 14 years the largest group of casualties at 4,487 (400 girls, 4,087 boys). The second largest age group is people between 27 and 40 years (3,036 casualties), followed by children between 15 and 20 years (2,967). Most casualties occurred in Kabul province (4,339), followed by Nangarhar (1,946), Herat (1,045) and Kandahar (1,043).^[203] The information provides an indication of the trends in reported mine casualties but does not provide a precise representation of the true number of casualties over time. As of 30 May 2006, 15,289 casualties had been recorded in the UNMACA database.^[204]

At the end of March 2006, the ICRC database contained information on 11,038 mine/UXO casualties (1,906 killed and 9,132 injured) between 1998 and 2006: 160 in 2006; 898 in 2005; 940 in 2004; 1,011 in 2003; 1,654 in 2002; 1,856 in 2001; 1,710 in 2000; 1,587 in 1999; and 1,222 in 1998. At least 4,471 casualties were children under 18 years old. Most incidents occurred in Kabul (1,810), Nangarhar (1,120), Parvan (1,057) and Herat (962).^[205] The database also contains information on approximately 3,500 casualties recorded between 1980 and 1997. Data collection is an ongoing process and statistics are continually updated as new casualties, and those from previous periods, are identified.

Between 2001 and 2004, the Landmine Impact Survey identified 2,245 recent mine/ERW casualties (922 killed and 1,323 injured); 143 (six percent) were female. Of the total recent casualties: 416 (19 percent) were under 15 years; 924 (41 percent) were aged between 15 and 29 years. Sixty percent of casualties (1,336) were tending animals, farming, collecting food, water and fuel, or doing household duties at the time of the incident; only three percent (63) reported tampering with the device. No less than 45 percent of all recent casualties were in Kabul, Parvan and Takhar provinces, with 20 percent in Kabul province alone.^[206] According to the Survey Action Center, this is an extraordinarily high number of victims for a young age group (mostly boys), compared to other countries where a similar survey has been conducted.^[207] UNMACA and ICRC recorded even higher percentages of child casualties; UNMACA total statistics show that 35 percent of casualties since 1980 are children under 15 years (mostly boys).^[208] ICRC data shows that 43 percent of casualties since 1998 are aged under 18 years; and between 2001 and 2004, 2,502 of 5,461 recorded casualties (46 percent) were boys and girls younger than 18 years.^[209] According to experts, children have had, and continue to have, a traditional role in rural Afghan families supporting the home.^[210]

Mines are still used in personal feuds in eastern Afghanistan, which can have grave consequences. In Nurestan, for example, an area of approximately two square kilometers is mined due to feuds and inter-clan conflicts. This has resulted in approximately 70 casualties over the years, mainly women performing agricultural activities. In the Kandahar and Herat regions, demobilization activities have caused problems as ammunition depots are left abandoned, which is responsible for increased scrap metal collection and tampering. People in the south see mines more as a risk, due to the generally more volatile situation, than people in the north, but radio messages are less effective in the southern parts of the country as there is less infrastructure. With older people, more fatalistic attitudes might lead to greater risk taking.^[211]

Survivor Assistance

At the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004, Afghanistan was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate assistance for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[212] Four mine survivors from Afghanistan took part in the conference. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties held in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, Afghanistan became co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. Afghanistan prepared its objectives for inclusion in the Zagreb Progress Report. These included: maintaining up-to-date casualty data and expanding data collection by implementing an injury surveillance system (2005); gathering and analyzing information on people with disabilities, and establishing a database on available disability services and assistance received (2006); assessing, improving and expanding healthcare via a package of disability services and development of primary care in rural areas; increasing coordination and support services, increasing equipment, training and staff capacity, and free healthcare for mine casualties (2006); increasing access to integral rehabilitation services to 70-80 percent by increasing production of mobility devices; establishing new centers and physiotherapy services, training staff and extending the community-based rehabilitation network according to needs; addressing the gap in psychosocial support; developing an effective package of programs ensuring the sustainable livelihood of vulnerable people; finalizing, disseminating and raising awareness of the National Disability Policy for Afghanistan (2005-2006); drafting and adopting a comprehensive law, stimulating political action and establishing a Disability Desk at the government level in favor of people with disabilities; and strengthening capacity of people with disabilities through skills training, financial support and inclusion in planning and representation. In all of these objectives, interministerial coordination was noted as a priority, as was adequate attention for women with disabilities and female staff.^[213]

The Afghan delegation to the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 included a mine survivor who is also a disability and survivor assistance expert. Afghanistan updated some of its objectives and presented the progress in achieving its objectives, including improved coordination, plans for the development of emergency preparedness capacities, the establishment of a Disability Task Force and drafting of a National Disability Policy. Future steps were also outlined: at least 50 trauma specialists will be trained by 2009; formal training for social workers will be started by 2007; comprehensive disability legislation will be adopted by the end of 2007; a national workshop on victim assistance was scheduled for August 2006; and a national plan of action for victim assistance was to be presented by September 2006. The plan will be “fully integrated into long-term public health and development strategies...[to] benefit all people with disabilities and lay the groundwork for Afghanistan to fully reintegrate landmine survivors back into Afghan society.”^[214]

Afghanistan submitted the voluntary Form J with its 2006 Article 7 report, providing information on victim assistance issues. It stated that the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a coordination committee for VA, with Ministries of Health, Education, Martyrs and Disabled, and Labor and Social Affairs.”^[215] However, the interministerial working group activities have been delayed due to the elections and the subsequent changes in personnel and ministerial responsibilities.^[216]

The government’s Mine Action Strategy April 2006-March 2009 includes end-goals and specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and time-bound objectives for this timeframe. The end-goal for survivor assistance “will be achieved when mine/ERW survivors are reintegrated into Afghan society, with support provided through a national system that incorporates the rights and needs of people with disabilities.”^[217]

UNMACA provides technical support to the government on victim assistance issues.^[218] The main priority of UNMACA is to engage the new ministries and create national ownership of victim assistance activities by building capacity at the ministerial level, stimulating inclusion of relevant actors in decision-making processes and raising awareness of disability. It is reported that UNMACA, with its partners, is working to make victim assistance a government priority leading to integrated and coordinated action. National and international NGOs and agencies continue to play an important role in the delivery of assistance to landmine survivors and other people with disabilities in Afghanistan. However, through capacity building, it is expected that relevant ministries will gradually take over responsibilities. An important step in this process would be the August 2006 national workshop on victim assistance, which aims to finalize the national victim assistance plan of action and budget, starting in 2007. The workshop will also seek to identify focal points in every ministry to participate in the interministerial committee and duplicate this coordination process at the regional and local authority levels, as these authorities will be the main implementers. UNMACA will build on existing infrastructure such as the provincial working groups of the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, and the disability focal point in the Ministry of Public Health.^[219]

Until August 2004, the UNOPS/Comprehensive Disabled Afghans Program (CDAP) served as the national coordinating body for rehabilitation services provided by NGOs, and operated a community-based rehabilitation program for people with disabilities in Afghanistan, in cooperation with relevant ministries. Following a 2003 external evaluation, UNDP took over responsibility for CDAP in September 2004 and developed a new project, the National Programme for Action on Disability (NPAD), in consultation and with inputs from key line ministries and other disability stakeholders. The NPAD program was officially launched in March 2005 in cooperation with the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled and worked mainly on capacity-building within ministries and awareness-raising. NPAD assists the government in formulating disability policy, legislation and welfare reform with the aim of establishing a government-led body that can coordinate and manage comprehensive quality disability services nationwide within three years. Additionally, NPAD was developing a database and resource center with information on disability and disability services, and provided material support to the ministries. Four provincial offices were established to assist the local government in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. NPAD does not provide direct services as CDAP used to do, but tenders contracts to relevant partners. In 2005, the Disability Task Force and an NGO Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled were established, and a national capacity-building program was developed. The Disability Task Force, headed by the Ministry of Public Health, was formed to assist the government with the integration of disability services; NPAD, UNMACA, HI, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and other relevant actors are members. The NGO Coordination Unit (NCU) within the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled meets monthly to discuss disability issues and coordination of NGO activities within the sector. NPAD sees the following challenges: limited understanding of disability and leadership capacity at government level, limited coordination with NGOs, lack of survivor inclusion, low funding commitments and a deteriorating security situation. NPAD’s 2005-2007 budget is $10,900,000, funded by Canada, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, France, Sweden, the US and UNDP.^[220]

However, as of mid-2006, the creation of task forces and coordination initiatives had not led to concrete improvements: organizations feared duplication between the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled; operators continued to work separately; NGOs had not been involved at all stages of policy development; there remained a lack of long-term planning at the government level; and there was limited capacity at the level of disabled people’s organizations.^[221]

Emergency and Continuing Medical Care

In 2004, the Landmine Impact Survey found that only 10 percent of mine-impacted communities had healthcare facilities of any kind.^[222] The government acknowledges that healthcare spending, healthcare services and rehabilitation are limited, and, “Therefore public healthcare expenditures must be targeted towards the most vulnerable. This includes landmine survivors and other disabled Afghans who are recognized as a priority in [the] healthcare system.”^[223] Healthcare in Afghanistan has been severely affected by decades of conflict and ranks among the worst in the world. Health infrastructure is damaged and poorly maintained, lacks trained staff, resources and supplies, and is unable to meet the basic health needs of most of the population; 30 percent of Afghans reportedly do not have access to health facilities, despite recent improvements in geographic coverage.^[224]

Healthcare services are provided through the Afghan hospital network and international NGOs and agencies.^[225] But there is limited coordination between relevant actors. Reportedly, about 80 percent of public health services are run by NGOs.^[226] The Ministry of Health provides free services through the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), but many people in the poorest regions of Afghanistan are not covered by the package and donors requested NGOs to assist in covering these areas. A new version of the BPHS has recently been approved including physiotherapy and disability-related services as services with the highest priority based on identified needs; however, the new package is rudimentary and needs to be properly designed, costed, approved and field-tested.^[227] The Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), the national plan for provision of secondary healthcare, was developed by the Hospital Management Task Force and adopted in 2005.^[228] The Disability Task Force assists the government with the integration of disability services into both the BPHS and the EPHS.^[229]

First aid is available at the district level; trauma care is limited to a few hospitals in major cities and can be of questionable quality. There are very few ambulances, so that travel to hospital can take up to three days; as a result, many mine casualties may die before reaching a medical facility. Other challenges are the lack of trained staff, equipment, accommodation and centers in rural areas.^[230] Reportedly, the geographic coverage of health services in Afghanistan has improved to approximately 77 percent, with support of the European Commission, World Bank and Management Sciences for Health/USAID.^[231] Cultural barriers mean that women may be denied care or refused treatment by male practitioners, in a country with few female practitioners. Continuing medical care is often prohibitive due to the cost of the treatment, transport and accommodation.^[232] The National Health Policy 2005-2009 prioritized disability issues in the BPHS. Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC was monitoring the performance of health facilities and services.^[233]

The World Health Organization (WHO) assists the Ministry of Public Health at the national and regional levels with the planning and monitoring of healthcare delivery, by building capacity and providing technical support for data collection via the health information system.^[234] 

Hospitals in the Afghan healthcare network assisting mine casualties/survivors include the Indira Ghandhi Child Health Institute, the Paraplegic Hospital and the Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences. The 600-bed Armed Forces Academy, the only public hospital for emergency trauma cases in Kabul, accepts all emergency cases, including military personnel and civilians.^[235] The Indira Ghandhi Child Health Institute in Kabul, one of the main hospitals for children, recorded only one boy injured by a mine in its orthopedic/surgery ward during 2005.^[236] The hospital has experienced doctors but lacks resources; children admitted are often too poorly nourished to respond well to treatment.^[237] Between 21 March 2005 and the end of December 2005, the Paraplegic Hospital in Kabul registered 3,801 patients with disabilities and assisted 596 of those as inpatients, including mine survivors. It also assessed the degree of disability of patients who are then referred to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled for assistance and employment support; 2,400 people with disabilities, including 1,500 mine survivors, were assessed in 2005. The Paraplegic Hospital also has an orthopedic center that provides prosthetic and rehabilitation services to people with disabilities. In 2005, it provided 300 people with prostheses.^[238]

ICRC supports hospitals, clinics, and first-aid posts in Afghanistan, providing medicines, medical and surgical supplies, training, repair and renovation of facilities, as well as support to ambulance services in Kabul. In 2005, the ICRC supported eight hospitals in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Shiberghan, Samangan, Taloqan and Ghazni. In the course of 2005, it started handing responsibility of hospitals in Ghazni, Kabul and Taloqan to the Ministry of Public Health, as the ministry has been strengthening its capacity. However, these and other hospitals receive ad hoc material assistance when necessary.^[239] ICRC-supported hospitals surgically treated 2,241 war-injured, including 250 mine casualties, in 2005. ICRC conducted a seminar on war surgery in Jalalabad and an emergency room training course for government doctors in Kabul; it gave technical support to the International Federation/Afghan Red Crescent Society community-based first aid program in eastern and southern Afghanistan.^[240]

Emergency provides emergency medical care, surgery, physical rehabilitation and psychological support, through its surgical centers in Kabul and Lashkargah, one general hospital in the Anabah-Panshir Valley, and 26 first aid posts and public health centers. It carries out medical visits to prisoners, operates 18 ambulances and started an income-generating project in Panshir. In 2005, a new health center was opened in Griskh (Lashkargah). The surgical hospital in Kabul has become the main trauma center for the country, as it has the only intensive care unit for civilians in Afghanistan. The center received a single-layer CT scan in 2005, and is trying to apply European standards of trauma care. In 2005, more than 418,891 people were treated, admitting 421 new landmine casualties to three hospitals and 67 to the health posts, and providing follow-up for 400 survivors. Emergency performed 1,335 surgical operations for the war-injured (including 421 for landmine casualties). Emergency does not have a waiting list and has a medical staff of 361 in the three surgical centers and 166 in the first-aid posts. Additionally, it provided 31 wheelchairs, 335 crutches and seven other mobility devices. Forty widows work in the Panshir Carpet Factory Project, either as trainers or trainees; Emergency also employs people with disabilities in its centers.^[241]

The Mobile Medical Emergency Center (MMC) trains doctors and nurses at rural clinics in emergency procedures; they then train village first-aid helpers who provide the emergency response needed to increase the chances of survival for mine casualties. In 2006, the system will expand to midwives to reduce the high maternal mortality rates.^[242]

International Medical Corps (IMC) runs the Paktika Provincial Hospital, which was recognized by the Ministry of Public Health in April 2005. IMC renovated the hospital, built a guesthouse, recruited staff, provided modern equipment and supplied medication; it also provides medical management training and English language training. In 2006, IMC and the Ministry of Public Health started the Master Training course, providing three-month intensive refresher courses to Afghan health professionals, sponsored by the Sager Family Foundation.^[243]

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) German hospital in Kabul accepts up to about 10 of the most seriously injured mine casualties each month, depending on how much free capacity there is, as ISAF personnel are prioritized. Facilities are of a very high standard and well equipped to handle trauma cases. The CURE International Hospital provides general surgery, orthopedics and plastic surgery, and was scheduled to open an emergency care ward in 2006.^[244] Save the Children was involved in the renovation of health centers, provision of resources and the establishment of health committees in the northern province of Jowzjan.^[245] Saudi Arabia provided funding to the Qalat Hospital (Zabul province), which was completed at the beginning of 2006, however the hospital is not functioning to its full capacity due to security issues. The hospital needs 26 doctors but had found only seven, according to a June 2006 media report, although it pays double the salary for women, and 50 percent extra for men.^[246]

Physical Rehabilitation, Psychosocial Support and Socioeconomic Reintegration

According to the ICRC, “While no accurate figures for the number of people in need of physical rehabilitation, including those injured by landmines, are available, it is obvious that the national health system, still struggling to rebuild the country's most basic services, is not yet in a position to provide services for them.”^[247]

The rehabilitation and reintegration needs of mine survivors and other people with disabilities are not being met; only about 20 to 40 percent of mine/ERW survivors have access to rehabilitation. In 2005, there were approximately 200 physiotherapists, 126 orthopedic technicians and 105 artisans providing services in 20 of the 34 provinces. Rehabilitation programs are available free of charge in several major cities, but distances, a limited number of services, transport and accommodation costs, as well as cultural barriers for women, impede access. To meet the needs, physical rehabilitation facilities should to be located in each large city or main town in at least 30 of the 34 provinces. Mobility devices are produced locally, but raw materials are often imported due to lack of quality materials on the local market. Coordination is good among disability stakeholders, but interministerial coordination and the technical capacity of the relevant ministries is said to be weak.^[248]

NPAD stimulated the redrafting and implementation of a new three-year physiotherapy curriculum under the Ministry of Public Health, but carried out by NGOs. This is seen as a first step in taking national ownership, as the ministry does not have the capacity to carry out physical rehabilitation, but can start coordinating activities.^[249]

There is a lack of psychosocial support activities, relevant information, and coordination; ICRC and NGOs carry out projects directed at specific needs, but not long-term programs. Formal counseling is not available and peer support mainly takes place on the work-floor of service providers who employ people with disabilities. The Ministry of Education has no separate programs of inclusive or exclusive education for children with disabilities, but NGOs provide some activities. The ministry suffers from a lack of infrastructure, trained teachers and financial means. Access to educational opportunities is limited, as most people with disabilities are illiterate, general school participation incentives are low, or survivors are limited to education available in their communities. According to the HI disability study, 70 percent of people with disabilities do not have access to schools.^[250] However, the draft National Disability Plan includes objectives to increase education of children with disabilities. ^[251]

A survey by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the International Rescue Committee found an estimated 84 percent unemployment rate among people with disabilities. The Landmine Impact Survey indicated that unemployment among mine survivors increased by 38 percent after the incident, especially among farmers, herders, military personnel, deminers and laborers. Before the social affairs department became part of the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled in 2006, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) was the main provider of vocational training and employment services to people with disabilities, and had vocational training centers in 32 of the 34 provinces. However, results “have not been particularly good due to lack of adequate funding, lack of infrastructure and lack of employment opportunities after the training is completed.”^[252] Therefore, MoLSA asked for technical assistance from NPAD to improve institutional capacity, develop policies, training materials and monitoring systems to provide vocational training and employment services to people with disabilities countrywide. This process has slowed down since the social affairs department of MoLSA moved to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, and it is unclear how it will evolve.^[253] However, it is hoped that the merger will increase the coordination and no major changes are expected.^[254]

NPAD drafted a manual for inclusive vocational training, which was field-tested; 23 contracts were issued for physical rehabilitation, community-based rehabilitation, education, livelihood and awareness-raising projects to, among others, the International Rescue Committee and International Organisation for Migration.^[255]

ICRC is the principal service provider to mine survivors in Afghanistan, with orthopedic centers in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Gulbahar and Faizabad, and a component factory in Kabul. The centers fit upper and lower limb prostheses and orthoses, and provide free medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, vocational training, micro-credit for small business, and public awareness services related to government rules and programs. All services are free of charge.

In 2005, ICRC assisted approximately 55,877 people with rehabilitation services. The centers fitted or provided 4,511 prostheses (3,186 for mine survivors), 9,462 orthoses (32 for mine survivors), 11,063 crutches, 927 wheelchairs and more than 150,000 physical therapy treatments. The ICRC supplied raw materials to International Assistance Mission, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and Handicap International, and the orthopedic component factory in Kabul provided 576 prosthetic knee joints and 921 prosthetic alignment systems to most other centers in the country. It operates a home-based program for paraplegics, providing medical, economic and psychosocial support; 925 paraplegics were assisted in 2005. During 2005, 19 prosthetic/orthotic students were enrolled in the ICRC-supported, nine-month upgrade training program for prosthetics and orthotics in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. The ICRC also supported basic orthotic/prosthetic training for 14 people and training for 26 physiotherapists.^[256]

ICRC’s social reintegration program assisted 2,691 people with disabilities in 2005 with vocational training, special education, job placement, and setting up or improving small businesses. Micro-credit loans were provided to 754 people and approximately 400 received vocational training. It also provided technical, financial and material support to the Afghan Red Crescent Society including 79 food-for-work projects and support to 1,285 trainees and 603 trainers in the Vocational Training Program.^[257]

The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan implements the rights-based Rehabilitation of Afghans with Disabilities (RAD) Program in more than 1,500 villages in 37 districts in 13 provinces. The program has five components: community mobilization and awareness, employment support, special education, physiotherapy and orthopedic workshops. The services are provided through four orthopedic workshops, 52 physiotherapy clinics, 44 community rehabilitation and development centers, and home visits. In January 2006, RAD started a joint prosthetic workshop with Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal (SGAA) in the east. The partnership of RAD and SGAA will pave the way for a future expansion of community-based rehabilitation services in Nangarhar, Laghman, Konar and Nurestan provinces. RAD employs 412 people (102 women and 36 people with disabilities), as well as community volunteers and self-help groups of disabled people. The RAD program assists all people with disabilities, including mine survivors.^[258] In 2005, RAD provided assistance to 39,839 people with disabilities (including 15,411 women and 8,000 mine survivors); 31,061 people benefited from physiotherapy services and 8,039 from the orthopedic workshops. The workshops provided 482 prostheses, 1,763 orthoses, 112 wheelchairs and 3,740 other assistive devices, and repaired 1,942 mobility aids. Two physiotherapists finished the upgrade course and 18 physiotherapy trainees graduated from initial training. Also in 2005, 2,272 disabled people received special education in their homes or at community-based rehabilitation centers; 1,586 people benefited from employment support services, 645 from income-generating projects and 91 from direct job placements. An additional 12,500 people with disabilities were referred to other organizations.

An assessment of RAD’s special educational component and advice to strengthen community-based component will be carried out by UNDP in 2006. RAD will conduct internal monitoring of the physiotherapy services and capacities of the orthopedic workshops. At the national level, the main challenge is that rehabilitation services are not integrated in general health services. There is also a lack of coordination and national policy on disability, and disabled people’s organizations are weak.^[259]

In 2006, HI unified its Belgian and French operations to make its presence in the country more efficient. This has not led to the closure of any programs. HI continues to provide physical rehabilitation and prostheses through its orthopedic center in Kandahar, and collects information on people with disabilities in the Helmand, Zabul, Farah, Ghazni and Herat provinces, through a network of community volunteers. In April 2005, the Afghan NGO Guardians officially handed over full management of the prosthetic department to HI. The Kandahar center assisted 5,176 people (2,132 new patients) in 2005, provided 11,058 physiotherapy treatments, produced 388 and repaired 1,050 prostheses, produced 822 and repaired 488 orthoses, produced 215 and repaired 134 wheelchairs, and produced 3,053 and repaired 263 mobility aids. The majority of patients (4,898) received free accommodation, and 14,694 meals were prepared at the patients’ guesthouse. The Kandahar Center was evaluated in late 2005, indicating that the center is the only one in the south of Afghanistan but that the needs of people with disabilities are largely unknown. Quality of services and staff were good and internal management capacity has improved; however, there were some accessibility problems due to geography, security issues and socio-cultural perceptions of disability, and the follow-up system and physiotherapy treatment are weaker components of the center. It was recommended to strengthen referral and follow-up, provide home-based care and other victim assistance components (education, vocational training, micro-credit), upgrade staff training and improve accessibility for female patients.^[260] Through the community-based mine action program, HI refers people with disabilities to rehabilitation services; however, the program was not active as of July 2006 in Ghazni, Farah and Herat. The program was scheduled to be evaluated in 2006. HI’s program to support mine survivors and other people with disabilities in Herat and Badghis included upgrading physiotherapy centers, through training, materials and technical support to physiotherapy services.^[261]

Since July 2004, HI has also provided technical advice and financial support to the Community Center for the Disabled (CCD) in Kabul, providing social services, basic education and interpersonal skills training, vocational training, job placement and income-generating activity, sports activities and a resource center, as well as awareness-raising at the community level (local authorities, mosque, people’s council/shura). A June 2005 evaluation of the results and practices at CCD concluded that the center’s main value-added was its knowledge of disabled people and its ability to include these people into society; however, it recommended increased outreach to women with disabilities, increased liaison with other actors, and increased employment and vocational training services.^[262] Via its MRE activities, HI raises awareness on inclusive attitudes.^[263] HI is also a member of the Disability Task Force, the NGO Coordination Unit and the Civil Society Legislation Task Force, and lobbies to ensure that disability is not forgotten in general development and reconstruction programs, such as the National Solidarity Program. Main priorities are accessibility of reconstructed or new buildings, inclusive education, increased inclusion of NGOs and disabled people’s organizations, and improved coordination.^[264]

Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal operates orthopedic and physiotherapy services, disability awareness and health education in Kabul and Jalalabad, and physiotherapy centers in Konar and Laghman provinces. Services are free of charge for people with disabilities. A group of students graduated from SGAA’s two-year physiotherapy course in Jalalabad in 2005. Training seminars were also organized for physiotherapists and orthopedic technicians.^[265] In January 2006, SGAA and RAD started a joint operation in the eastern region, leading to future expansion of community-based rehabilitation services in Nangarhar, Laghman, Konar and Nurestan provinces.^[266]

The Kabul Orthopedic Organization (KOO) provides physical rehabilitation and orthopedic devices for mine survivors and other people with disabilities. In 2005, it assisted 3,880 people with disabilities. Of the total assisted, 2,728 received physiotherapy, 362 received prosthetic assistance and 620 received orthotic assistance.^[267]

The International Assistance Mission operates physical and ophthalmic rehabilitation and psychosocial support programs.^[268]

Until March 2005, the Technical Orthopedic Center operated independently in providing orthotic and prosthetic assistance with support from the Ministry of Public Health. Since then it has been integrated in the Paraplegic Hospital.^[269]

Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan (PARSA) provides physiotherapy services through its two clinics in Kabul. It also distributes wheelchairs and walking aids, and refers amputees to the ICRC or KOO. In 2005, it assisted 2,087 people, including 18 mine survivors.^[270]

Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AARJ) provides physiotherapy services through its clinics in Kalafgan and Khawjaghar districts of Takhar province, in cooperation with the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and the Afghan Red Crescent Society. In 2005, it assisted 5,781 people in the clinics, including 35 mine survivors. It also referred 57 disabled, including 10 mine survivors, to other organizations for prosthetics. In addition to clinical services, AARJ conducts outreach services on a regular basis in order to expand services to remote areas.^[271]

Help Handicapped International works in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Health to fit Jaipur Foot prostheses for Afghan amputee mine survivors in Kabul. The program consists of annual camps to fit prostheses. From 13 April-12 May 2005, the Jaipur Team fitted nearly 700 above- and below-knee prostheses, mainly for mine survivors, at the Technical Orthopedic Center in Kabul. In 2006, a camp was planned in Jalalabad.^[272]

The Physical Therapy Institute (PTI) provides training of physiotherapists for all other organizations. It is the only training center in the country and is supported by the Ministry of Public Health. It also provides treatment sessions.^[273]

Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR) focuses on the physical rehabilitation and socioeconomic integration of people with disabilities. In 2005, it assisted 6,511 people (including 4,723 mine/ERW survivors), and distributed 480 bicycles and 15 sewing machines to people with disabilities.^[274]

Serving Emergency Relief and Vocational Enterprises/Enabling and Mobilizing Afghans with Disabilities provides psychosocial support and vocational training for the sight and hearing impaired and physically disabled in Kabul, Parvan, Kapisa, Laghman, Nangarhar and Konar provinces.^[275]

Humanitarian Community Development of Afghanistan (HCDA) provides physiotherapy, vocational training and employment support, capacity-building, awareness and advocacy for people with disabilities in Kabul province. However, HCDA is not well known and it is not clear if any activities have been implemented since the end of the Comprehensive Disabled Afghans Program (CDAP) in 2004.^[276]

The Afghan Disabled Union (ADU), founded in 2004 by a mine survivor, trained 509 people with disabilities in 2005, including approximately 50 percent women. It also referred 38 people to NGOs and government for employment; 17 of them found jobs. In 2005, ADU assisted 100 community leaders and family support groups in gaining knowledge on disability rights, and provided disability rights materials in the Dari and Pashtu languages. It pressured the government through collective advocacy to adopt appropriate legislation for people with disabilities, and encouraged mine survivors and other people with disabilities to take part in the September parliamentary election. ADU was involved in consultation meetings on disability policy with the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled.^[277]

In 2005, Danish Demining Group decided to include a victim assistance component in its mine action activities, as it feels this is the neglected component of mine action in Afghanistan. The first phase of the program started in April 2006 with a six-month study, in coordination with the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, to identify gaps in services and to avoid duplication. If the study indicates there is a need to start a victim assistance program, activities will start towards the end of 2006 in the three provinces where DDG works.^[278]

Disability Policy and Practice

Afghanistan has no law protecting the rights and needs of people with disabilities, but the 2004 constitution provides some basic protection. Two people with disabilities have a seat in the Afghan parliament. The government has the aim of mainstreaming disability through the integration of people with disabilities into schools, vocational training and employment, and to fight discrimination through media campaigns and national legislation, so that “male and female people with disabilities will become positive contributors to and beneficiaries of national development.”^[279]

The Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled is the focal point for all issues relating to people with disabilities, including all aspects of mine survivor assistance, legislation and awareness-raising. In 2005, a Disability Task Force was created to better coordinate disability policy and activities. In May 2005, the ministry began a consultative process to develop a 2006-2008 national disability policy to be included in the national development framework. This document will replace the 2003 Comprehensive National Disability Policy, which was not well understood and had not been formally adopted or implemented. In December 2005, the ministry finished drafting a National Policy for Action on Disability, but the document was still under revision in mid-2006. The draft states that, “Afghanistan has articulated a vision in political terms of what it wants for and expects of its population of people with disabilities. This yet exists solely at the ‘political level’. To realize State aspirations and to support the growing interests of the target group, there is a need [for] a policy framework and a time-bound plan of action.”^[280] Some partner organizations and survivors regret that they have not been involved in the drafting process from the beginning and fear certain contributions they made will not be included in the final policy.^[281]

NPAD’s three-year program aims to raise awareness, build capacity and provide coordination for disability issues both by specific disability-focused initiatives and through inclusion in mainstream government and civil society strategies (twin-track approach). In 2005, it organized two awareness-raising and advocacy workshops for 73 disabled people (representing civil society, exchange visits, management courses and disability training for government staff; provided five disability people’s organizations with material assistance; and broadcast the weekly Qahir-Qaraman radio program on disability issues. It supported the Joint Election Management Body for inclusion of disabled people in the parliamentary electoral process; 300 people with disabilities worked as election staff.^[282]

UNMACA carries out a national disability awareness and community mobilization campaign using mass communication tools, workshops and meetings for, and about, people with disabilities; this reached approximately 250 communities (130,747 people, including 3,446 people with disabilities).^[283]

The National Disability Survey in Afghanistan, started by HI in 2004, was completed by the end of 2005 and submitted to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled for approval. The survey on the prevalence, living conditions and needs for rehabilitation, employment, education and livelihoods of people with disabilities in Afghanistan aimed to interview 5,250 households from 175 randomly selected districts in all provinces of Afghanistan, covering an estimated 40,000 people. As of mid-2006, the ministry had not released the survey’s complete results, but made a joint statement with HI, which noted that one in five families has a person with a disability living in the same house; the total number of people with disabilities is estimated at between 747,500 and 867,100, more than half of whom live in the western and central parts of the country; and mine/UXO survivors make up seven percent of people with disabilities (between 52,000 and 60,000 people).^[284]

Afghanistan is developing the Afghanistan National Development Strategy for 2005-2009 via interministerial consultation and with UNDP technical advice, which will include mine action and disability components.^[285]

Afghanistan’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, approved in May 2006, includes the government’s general goal of creating a barrier-free society for people with disabilities and includes the government’s disability strategy plans in the Social Sector Chapter.^[286]

Social security benefits of 300 Afghanis per month (about $6) is paid to some 300,000 recipients registered at the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, including mine survivors and other people disabled by the war, and the families of those killed in the war. People with less than 50 percent disability receive 150 Afghanis ($3) per month.^[287] The benefit is reported to be insufficient to maintain a basic standard of living, and the bureaucratic application procedure prevents many disabled people from receiving the benefit.^[288]

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[1] Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 May 2006.
[2] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2004, citing Constitution of Afghanistan, Ch. I, Article 7. In addition, the Ministry of Defense instructed all military forces to respect the comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines and the prohibition on use in any situation by militaries or individuals. Statement by Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 24 June 2004.
[3] Previous Article 7 reports were submitted on 1 September 2003, 30 April 2004 and 30 April 2005. The “30 April 2005” report now posted on the UN website states that it covers the period 1 March 2005-30 April 2005. Afghanistan’s 30 April 2005 report posted by the UN in 2005, used by Landmine Monitor Report 2005 and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, covered the period 1 May 2004-30 April 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 84. There are also three postings for the 20 April 2004 report on the UN website.
[4] Presentation by Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Eight International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and UN Advisors, Geneva, 19-21 September 2005.
[5] Email from External Relations Official, UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), 26 February 2006. UNMAS requested that none of the UNMAS or UNMACA officials providing information to Landmine Monitor be named; email from Programme Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006.
[6] ACBL, “Brief Report on Mine Action and Awareness Month,” received by email 18 May 2006.
[7] The UN said that after the collapse of the Taliban regime, there has been no indication of importation of landmines by opposition forces. Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, 26 February 2006.
[8] This is based on an extensive review of media reports, as well as interviews with knowledgeable sources, for example, interview with Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[9] Response to Landmine Monitor Questions by UNMACA Official, 23 February 2006; Landmine Monitor (MAC) interview with Mohammad Shohab Hakimi, Chair, ACBL, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[10] Response to Landmine Monitor Questions by UNMACA Official, 23 February 2006.
[11] Landmine Monitor (MAC) interview with Mohammad Shohab Hakimi, ACBL, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[12] Response to Landmine Monitor Questions by UNMACA Official, 23 February 2006.
[13] The Combatant Status Review Board’s Summary of Evidence reports were released through a Freedom of Information Act request. The US Department of Defense released the reports over a five month period beginning in January 2005; www.defenselink.mil.
[14] “Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal,” Combatant Status Review Board, 21 September 2004, pp. 29, 36, 256. Released by the US Department of Defense in March 2005.
[15] Statement by H.E. Mahmoud Saikal, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[16] Ibid.
[17] In June 2004, the Ministry of Defense estimated that there are 250 major ammunition storage points in Afghanistan containing at least 130,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Statement by Dr. Mohammed Haider Reza, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 24 June 2004.
[18] By the end of 2005, the survey had identified 25,475 stockpiled antipersonnel mines—of at least 32 different types made in at least five countries—in 16 provinces. Countries of origin included the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Italy, China and Iran. The survey was carried out under the aegis of the Ammunition Steering Committee and in cooperation with UNMACA, UNDP, HALO Trust, DynCorp International and other partners. Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 May 2006.
[19] Statement by H.E. Mahmoud Saikal, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[20] Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006.
[21] Statement by H.E. Mahmoud Saikal, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[22] Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 May 2006.
[23] Article 7 Report, Forms F and G, 1 May 2006. Most of the destruction is carried out by mine action organizations, including Afghan Technical Consultants, HALO and RONCO. Some of the mines listed appear to be antivehicle mines (112 M19), some are booby-traps/fuzes (75 MS-3), while others are unknown to Landmine Monitor (232 LO-6). It is also noteworthy that 313 PFM-1 mines are listed, as these have presented serious destruction challenges in other countries.
[24] Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006.
[25] As of April 2005, Afghanistan retained a total of 1,076 mines for the accreditation and training of mine detection dogs. The mines were kept from the stockpile destruction event in Herat on 3 February 2005 and all have had their detonators removed. Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2005. Mines retained include 2 Type 69 (China); 4 Type 72 (China); 110 M-19 (Iran); 40 No. 4 (Iran); 129 YM1 (Iran); 1 YM3 (Iran); 3 YM11 (Iran); 7 TC 2.4 (Italy); 72 TC-6 (Italy); 22 P2 MK1 and 2 (Pakistan); 4 P2 MK3 (Pakistan); 24 P3 MK1 (Pakistan); 5 P3 MK3 (Pakistan); 16 MK 7 (UK); 28 MON 50 (USSR); 2 MON 200 (USSR); 1 MS3 (USSR); 20 OZM 3 (USSR); 10 OZM 4 (USSR); 23 OZM-72 (USSR); 264 PMN (USSR); 6 PMN-2 (USSR); 30 POMZ-2M (USSR); 42 TM-46 (USSR); 70 TM-57 (USSR); 140 TM-62 (USSR); and 1 MORSAD 3 (unknown origin). Many of the mines listed appear to be antivehicle mines (M-19, TC-2, TC-6, MK-7, TM-46, TM-57, TM-62).
[26] Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006. The 505 include 500 PMN, 1 YM1, 1 No. 4, and 3 TM-57 AT. The latter are antivehicle mines. The 306 include 194 PMN, 27 PMN-2, 21 YM-1, 3 OZM-72, 4 Type 72, 2 Type 69, 10 MS-3, 18 Claymore, 5 No. 4, and 22 P-2MK1/2.
[27] Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 May 2006. MAPA is the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
[28] In March 2006, the US State Department reported the biggest discovery yet in bunkers containing 80 tons of TNT and 15,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, detonators and other munitions. See “Bouquet of Flowers Leads to Largest Cache of Abandoned Munitions in Afghanistan,” US Department of State, Press Release, 20 March 2006, accessed at www.state.gov.
[29] Patrick Fruchet and Mike Kendellen, “Landmine Impact Survey of Afghanistan: results and implications for planning,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006.
[30] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 88.
[31] William A. Byrd and Bjor Gildestad, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan,” World Bank, 10 December 2001, p. 22.
[32] Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA), “National Operational Work Plan 1385 (1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007),” Kabul, 1 April 2006.
[33] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2005; statement by Afghanistan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2004.
[34] Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 May 2006.
[35] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 2 July 2006.
[36] “UN demining official warns of funding gap if no new donors come forward,” UN News Center, 24 April 2006; telephone interview with External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 5 July 2006; Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 May 2006.
[37] Information provided by External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 17 April 2005.
[38] Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 May 2006.
[39] UN, “Country Profile: Afghanistan,” www.mineaction.org.
[40] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 3 July 2006.
[41] MAPA, Fact Sheet, April 2005; UN, “2004 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” and UN, “2005 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” Afghanistan sections.
[42] Email from Program Support Official, UNMAS, New York, 4 July 2006.
[43] Interview with External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 18 April 2005.
[44] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 3 July 2006; email from Program Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006.
[45] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, Kabul, 2 July 2006.
[46] UNMACA, “The Way Ahead,” draft, April 2006, pp. 2-3; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 75.
[47] UNMACA, “The Way Ahead,” draft, April 2006, pp. 4-7.
[48] UNMAS, “2005 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York.
[49] Telephone interview with Operations Official, UNMACA, 27 June 2006.
[50] UNMACA, “The Way Ahead,” draft, April 2006, p. 9.
[51] “The Afghanistan Compact,” Annex 1, Benchmarks and Timetables, February 2006, p. 18. The Afghan Compact gives these dates according to the Afghan calendar as, respectively, 1386, 1389, 1389.
[52] The Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary, undated but January 2006, p. 11.
[53] MAPA, “National Operational Work Plan 1385 (1st April 2006–31st March 2007),” Kabul, 1 April 2006.
[54] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 91.
[55] UN, “Country Profile: Afghanistan.”
[56] “UN demining official warns of funding gap if no new donors come forward,” UN News Center, 24 April 2006.
[57] UN, “Country Profile: Afghanistan;” email from Program Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006.
[58] Email from Stacy Smith, Communications Manager, RONCO Consulting Corporation, 28 June 2006.
[59] “DynCorp International to remove landmines,” Aerospace-defense.com, 8 September 2005; email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 20 July 2006.
[60] Charlotte Drombower, “Afghanistan,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.1, August 2005.
[61] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 91.
[62] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Amir Mohammad, Operations Coordinator, MCPA, 13 February 2006.
[63] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, 5 April 2006.
[64] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2005.
[65] Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 May 2006.
[66] Survey Action Center (SAC), “Afghan Landmine Impact Survey,” 2005, p. 19.
[67] The survey omitted five districts in southern Afghanistan because of lack of security.
[68] SAC, “Afghan Landmine Impact Survey,” 2005, pp. 8-9.
[69] Ibid, pp. 19-26; email from Program Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006. Kabul accounted for 313 affected communities (13 percent of affected communities), 155 SHAs (18 percent) and 420 recent victims (19 percent).
[70] SAC, “Afghan Landmine Impact Survey,” 2005, pp. 12, 71.
[71] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, 26 February 2006; Patrick Fruchet and Mike Kendellen, “Landmine Impact Survey of Afghanistan: results and implications,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006.
[72] SAC, “Afghan Landmine Impact Survey,” 2005, pp. 48-49.
[73] Data provided by UNMACA Database Official, 1 July 2006. According to UNMAS, data for RONCO refers to stockpile destruction; this would reduce the total number of mines and UXO destroyed in 2005 by all operators to 14,444 antipersonnel mines, 787 antivehicle mines and 826,270 UXO; email from Program Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006. Organizations: Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA), Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) and ATC-Community Based Mine Action Program (CBMAP), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Mine Detection and Dog Center (MDC), Handicap International (HI), Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA).
[74] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Sayed Haroon, Deputy Program Officer, ATC, 23 February 2006.
[75] Ibid; email from Program Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006.
[76] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Mohammad Daud Farahi, Executive Operations/Planning Manager, DAFA, 10 February 2006.
[77] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Matti Nikkila, Operations Manager, DDG Afghanistan, 5 February 2006.
[78] Email from Andrew Lyons, Senior Operations Officer, HALO, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006.
[79] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Dr. Farid Homayoon, Director, HALO, 23 February 2006.
[80] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Shah Wali Ayubi, Operations Coordinator, MDC, 29 January 2006.
[81] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Zekria Payab, Deputy Director, OMAR, 22 February 2006.
[82] Discussion with UNMACA Operations Official, 1 July 2006.
[83] Emails from Stacy Smith, RONCO, 28 June and 6 July 2006.
[84] Interview with UNMACA Operations Official, UNMACA, 1 July 2006; data from UNMACA database sent by UNMACA Database Official, 1 July 2006.
[85] “French engineer dies in mine explosion,” Pazhwak Afghan News, 16 May 2006.
[86] UNMACA, “Monthly database report,” end-March 2006.
[87] Ibid; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 96.
[88] UNMACA letter in email from Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance (MRE/VA) Advisor, UNMACA, 21 June 2006.
[89] Telephone interview UNMACA Operations Official, Kabul, 27 June 2006.
[90] These included ATC, ATC-CBMAP, DAFA, DDG, HALO, MDC and OMAR.
[91] Data provided by UNMACA Database Official, 28 June 2006.
[92] Email from Stacy Smith, RONCO, 28 June 2006.
[93] UNMAS, Portfolio of Projects, Project Funding Summary Chart (as of 3 January 2006).
[94] “UN demining official warns of funding gap if no new donors come forward,” UN News Center, 24 April 2006.
[95] Telephone interview with UNMACA Operations Official, Kabul, 27 June 2006.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Article 7 Report, Form I, 1 May 2006.
[98] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Interview with Sameem Hashemi, MRE Programme Manager, META, Kabul, 27 June 2005. The translations were finalized at a meeting convened by META at the end of June 2005.
[101] Based on data provided by MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 25 May 2006 and ICRC, “Afghanistan Mine Action Program, Annual Report 2005,” February 2006, p. 8. Organizations: Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AARJ), Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). OMAR provided higher figures to Landmine Monitor, totaling 717,663 beneficiaries. The twelfth MRE provider, BBC Afghan Education Project, is not included in the table as it provides indirect MRE via mass media.
[102] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 25 March 2006.
[103] Article 7 Report, Form I, 1 May 2006.
[104] ICRC, “ICRC Afghanistan Mine Action Program, Annual Report 2005,” February 2006, pp. 3, 7, 8; interview with Mohammad Zaman, Database Coordinator, Mine Action Program, ICRC, Kabul, 8 February 2006.
[105] ICRC, “Afghanistan Mine Action Program, Annual Report 2005,” February 2006, pp. 3, 7.
[106] Ibid, pp. 8, 9.
[107] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, Kabul, 25 May 2006.
[108] Article 7 Report, Form I, 1 May 2006.
[109] For MRE activities by AREA, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 98; for MRE activities by MCPA, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 82.
[110] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Matti Nikkila, DDG Afghanistan, 5 February; email from Steve Robinson, Program Manager, DDG Afghanistan, 25 May 2006.
[111] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Frid Homayoun, Director, HALO Afghanistan, 22 February 2006.
[112] Interview with Naqibullah Bayan, BBC Afghan Education Project, Kabul, 28 May 2006.
[113] MAPA, “KAP Analysis 2004/2005, Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan,” Kabul, 2006; interview with MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, Kabul, 25 May 2006; email from Pia Cantini, INTERSOS, Rome, 4 May 2006.
[114] Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 100.
[115] MAPA, “KAP Analysis 2004/2005, Mine Risk Education Impact Monitoring in Afghanistan,” Kabul, 2006, pp. 38-70.
[116] Ibid, pp. 35-36, 66-70.
[117] Interview with UNMACA, Kabul, 25 May 2006.
[118] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Matti Nikkila, DDG Afghanistan, 5 February 2006; email from Steve Robinson, DDG Afghanistan, 25 May 2006.
[119] UN, “Country Profile: Afghanistan.”
[120] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 100-102.
[121] Email from Katheryn Bennett, AusAID, 30 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: A$1 = US$0.762. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[122] Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006; email from Dominique Jones, Conseiller, Ministry of Defence, 17 May 2006.
[123] Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.211. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[124] Email from Jan Kara, Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CZK23.99048. Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com.
[125] Mine Action Investments database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = DKK5.9953. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[126] Mine Action Investments database; email from Paula Sirkiä, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[127] Email from Laura Liguori, Security Policy Unit, Conventional Disarmament, EC, 20 June 2006.
[128] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database.
[129] Ireland Article 7 Report, Form J, 21 April 2006; emails from Therese Healy, Department of Foreign Affairs, May 2006. HALO reported having received €520,000 ($647,348) from Ireland for Afghanistan. Email from Andrew Lyons, HALO, Afghanistan, 20 July 2006.
[130] Emails from Kitagawa Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated information received by JCBL from Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May 2005, and Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = ¥110.11. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[131] Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006.
[132] Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = NOK6.4412. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[133] Slovakia Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 May 2006; email from Henrik Markus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2006.
[134] Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Luis Gómez Nogueira, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 25 April 2006.
[135] Sweden Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March-May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[136] Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[137] Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 20 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: £1 = US$1.820. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[138] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” June 2006, p. 20.
[139] Email from Zach Hudson, Program Manager, Adopt-A-Minefield, 2 June 2006.
[140] Information collected from Actiongroup Landmine.de member organizations in email from Markus Haake, Actiongroup Landmine.de, 8 June 2006.
[141] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” pp. 61, 64; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2004,” p. 35.
[142] UNDP, “Mine Action Contributions to UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,” 20 April 2006.
[143] UNDP, “Funding Update by Donors,” 2005.
[144] This total includes UN reported amounts.
[145] For Mine Action for Peace (MAFP), see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 75.
[146] Information provided by External Relations Official, UNMACA, 28 March 2006; email from Program Officer, UNMAS, Afghanistan, 4 July 2006. For mine action in Afghanistan for April 2006-March 2007, $76,135,024 was needed, according to UN, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2006,” New York, p. 1. MAPA required $43,505,024 for 2006, according to UNMAS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 4.
[147] “Mines kill and maim up to 100 each month,” IRIN, Kabul, 4 April 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004,
p. 86.
[148] The Landmine Impact Survey data on mine/UXO casualties between 2001 and 2004 indicates that 922 (41 percent) of the 2,245 casualties recorded died from their injuries.149 In comparison, ICRC and UNMACA data for 2005 indicates that only 15 percent and 18 percent respectively are killed in mine/UXO incidents. Handicap International recorded 41 percent fatal casualties in 2005.
[150] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, “Victim Assistance objectives of the States Parties that have the responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 86.
[151] Email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, 11 June 2006; email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 30 May 2006.
[152] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 30 May 2006. In Landmine Monitor Report 2005 it was reported that 878 casualties were recorded by UNMACA in 2004; however, database verification is ongoing.
[153] UNMACA IMSMA extract as of 31 December 2005, provided by Sheree Bailey, Victim Assistance Specialist, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[154] Interview with UNMACA MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[155] Additionally, there were 32 fuze casualties, seven booby-trap casualties, one bomb casualty and the cause of 92 was unknown. Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 30 May 2006.
[156] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 21 June 2006.
[157] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 30 May 2006; email from External Relations, UNMACA, 11 June 2006.
[158] Interview with Mohammad Zaman, ICRC, Kabul, 8 February 2006.
[159] Landmine Monitor analysis of data on mine casualties provided by Olivier Moeckli, Communication Delegate, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006. In Landmine Monitor Report 2005, it was reported that ICRC had recorded 895 casualties in 2004, however database updating is ongoing.
[160] ICRC recorded 34 fuze casualties, seven booby-trap casualties, and 54 unknown.
[161] Landmine Monitor analysis of data on mine casualties provided by Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006.
[162] Email from Awlia Mayar, Coordinator, CBMAP, HI, Kandahar, 21 May 2006.
[163] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[164] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Alessandro Greblo, Human Resources Coordinator, Emergency, Milan, 26 May 2006; and email, 16 June 2006.
[165] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 17 June 2006.
[166] Email from Zamanuddin Noori, Mine Action Programme Manager, ICRC, Kabul, 18 June 2006.
[167] Landmine Monitor media analysis between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2005; only casualties in incidents identified as landmine incidents and demining accidents were counted, not those identified as being involved in a roadside bomb or IED attack.
[168] “Radio journalist dies in Afghan blast,” BBC (Khost), 22 October 2005.
[169] “6 killed, 6 injured along Pak-Afghan border,” PPI (Chagai), 10 November 2005.
[170] “Mine explosion claims two lives in Khost,” Pajhwok Afghan News (Khost), 26 November 2005.
[171] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, Kabul, 19 June 2006.
[172] Landmine Monitor analysis of data on mine casualties provided by Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006.
[173] “Zimbabweans killed in landmine explosion,” Reuters (Harare), 18 July 2005.
[174] Morris Mkwate, “Landmine Shatters Ex-Soccer Star's Leg,” The Herald (Harare), 17 October 2005.
[175] Landmine Monitor media analysis between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2005; only casualties in incidents identified as landmine incidents were counted, not those identified as being involved in a roadside bomb or IED attack.
[176] “US soldier, five Afghans die in Afghan landmine blasts,” Agence France-Presse (Kabul), 16 March 2005; Daily Outlook Afghanistan (Kabul), Vol. No. 17, 27 March 2005.
[177] “Soldier loses left foot after mine explosion in Afghanistan,” Associated Press (Anchorage), 15 April 2005; “National Guard soldier injured in Afghanistan,” Associated Press (Winchester), 18 April 2005.
[178] “Romanian patrols halted,” Agence France-Presse (Romania), 26 April 2005.
[179] “Portugal says one of its soldiers killed, three injured in blast in Afghanistan,” Associated Press (Lisbon), 18 November 2005.
[180] “Five policemen killed in mine blast in southeast Afghanistan,” BBC (Sharan), 15 November 2005.
[181] Figures derived from an examination of US Department of Defense casualty reports, www.defenselink.mil.
[182] “One Swedish soldier killed after Afghan bomb explosion,” Xinhua News Agency (Kabul), 26 November 2005.
[183] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by two Operations Officials, UNMACA, 23 February 2006.
[184] UNMACA, “Landmine Monitor IED letter,” Kabul, 21 June 2006.
[185] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 15 June 2006; email from External Relations Official, UNMACA, 18 June 2006.
[186] Landmine Monitor analysis of data on mine casualties provided by Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006.
[187] Email from Awlia Mayar, HI, Kandahar, 21 May 2006.
[188] “Turkish engineer among four killed in Afghanistan mine blast,” Kuwait News Agency (Kabul), 7 February 2006.
[189] Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, “ANSO EAST-INCIDENT REPORT-Mine Explosion-Nangarhar Province, Achin district, Goshtal village,” received via email on 21 February 2006.
[190] “Russian embassy staffers wounded in mine blast,” Pajhwok Afghan News (Mazar-e-Sharif), 25 February 2006.
[191] Declan Walsh, “Three British soldiers injured by landmine,” The Guardian (Islamabad), 12 April 2006.
[192] “Leftover mine explodes, killing 2 Afghan children, wounding two,” Associated Press (Kabul), 29 April 2006.
[193] “Four health workers killed in explosion,” IRIN (Kabul), 23 May 2006.
[194] “French soldier killed, Canadians injured in Afghanistan,” Kuwait News Agency (Kabul), 15 May 2006.
[195] “Cyclist killed as Taliban again ban vehicles in Andar,” Pajhwok Afghan News (Ghazni City), 23 May 2006.
[196] “Afghan suicide bomber dies in botched attack on Turkish company,” Turkish Press (Kabul), 7 June 2006.
[197] “Demining engineer killed in Afghanistan’s Paktia province,” BBC Monitoring South Asia (Khost), 15 June 2006.
[198] Figures derived from an examination of US Department of Defense casualty reports.
[199] Bob Weber, “Afghan roadside bomb injures two Canadians in armoured patrol vehicle,” Canadian Press, 15 May 2006.
[200] Statement by Afghanistan, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005.
[201] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 87.
[202] Statement by the Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, 23 April 2006.
[203] UNMACA IMSMA extract as of 31 December 2005, provided by Sheree Bailey, GICHD, Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[204] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 30 May 2006.
[205] Landmine Monitor analysis of data on mine casualties provided by Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006.
[206] Email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 1 May 2006. “Recent” refers to an incident within the two years preceding the survey (November 2003-November 2004).
[207] Ibid.
[208] UNMACA IMSMA extract as of 31 December 2005, provided by Sheree Bailey, GICHD, Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[209] Landmine Monitor analysis of data on mine casualties provided by Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006.
[210] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 21 June 2006.
[211] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[212] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33.
[213] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 86-98.
[214] Statement by Afghanistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 8 May 2006.
[215] Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 May 2006.
[216] The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs was dissolved; social affairs were tasked to the expanded Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled; labor issues were handed to the Ministry of Economy, becoming the Ministry of Economy and Labor.
[217] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2006, p. 3.
[218] Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 May 2006. Until April 2006, this was done with UNICEF support.
[219] Interview with UNMACA MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[220] UNDP, “National Programme for Action on Disability (NPAD);” interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006; email from Dr. Zia Bina, Technical Advisor (government), UNDP-NPAD, Kabul, 7 June 2006.
[221] Email from Zemarai Saqeb, Disability Programme Coordinator, SCA, Kabul, 16 June 2006; response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Mohammed Amin Qanet, Program Officer, Rehabilitation of Afghans with Disabilities (RAD), Kabul, 11 June 2006; interview with Firoz Ali Alizada, Assistant to Country Director, HI, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[222] Final Draft, “Landmine Impact Survey Report: Afghanistan,” SAC, Washington, provided by Mike Kendellen, SAC, 27 July 2005; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 89.
[223] Statement by Afghanistan, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005.
[224] Interview with Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[225] For details of organizations and activities, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 89-96. The current report is limited to changes since the previous report.
[226] World Health Organization, “Health Action in Crisis, Afghanistan.”
[227] Public Health Consultants, “External Evaluation of the Physical Rehabilitation Centre, Kandahar, Afghanistan,” (internal document), January 2006, p. 14.
[228] ICRC, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 160.
[229] Email from MRE/VA Advisor, UNMACA, 21 June 2006.
[230] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 88-89.
[231] Extract of Ministry of Public Health database, provided by Dr. Ashraf Mashkoor, Officer in Charge, Health Information System, Kabul, 2 March 2006. According to the database, there are 17 regional, 29 provincial and 66 district hospitals as well as 411 comprehensive health centers, 675 basic health centers, approximately 5,000 health posts, and more than 13,000 hospital beds.
[232] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 88-89.
[233] Extract of Ministry of Public Health database, provided by Dr. Ashraf Mashkoor, Health Information System, Kabul, 2 March 2006.
[234] Email from Dr. Riyad M. F. Musa Ahmad, Representative, WHO Afghanistan, 4 May 2006.
[235] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 106.
[236] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Ms. Saleha, Head of Statistics Department, Indira Gandhi Child Health Institute, April 2005.
[237] Interview with Dr. Zobaida, Deputy Director, Indira Ghandhi Child Health Institute, by Landmine Monitor Victim Assistance Research Coordinator, Kabul, 23 March 2004.
[238] Interview with Dr. Mahmood Shah Darwish, Director, Paraplegic Hospital, Kabul, 2 January 2006.
[239] Telephone interview with Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006.
[240] ICRC, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 161.
[241] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Alessandro Greblo, Emergency, Milan, 26 May 2006, and email, 1 June 2006.
[242] Email from Hans Petter Husum, Head, Trauma Care Foundation, Oslo, 29 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 107.
[243] IMC, “IMC Enjoys Success of Master Trainer Course in Afghanistan,” January 2006.
[244] Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), “Medical Services in Kabul,” June 2006.
[245] Save the Children, “Emergencies Overview, Save the Children Emergency Response Programmes,” March 2006, p. 1.
[246] “Afghanistan: Villagers caught in crossfire between Taliban ad government forces: Beaten, robbed and exiled: life on the frontline of someone else's war,” The Guardian, 20 June 2006.
[247] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 26.
[248] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 90-92.
[249] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[250] HI, “Concept Paper Community Center for the Disabled,” (internal document), 8 March 2006, p. 2.
[251] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 92-93.
[252] Ibid, p. 95.
[253] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[254] Email from Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, 18 June 2006.
[255] Email from Dr. Zia Bina, UNDP-NPAD, Kabul, 7 June 2006.
[256] Email from Olivier Moeckli, ICRC, Kabul, 2 May 2006; ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 26; ICRC, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 161; ICRC, “ICRC activities in Afghanistan, Facts and Figures (January-December 2005).”
[257] ICRC, “Annual Report 2004,” June 2005, p. 22; “The ICRC Orthopedic Project in Afghanistan,” information sheet, 2005; Standing Tall Australia and Mines Action Canada, “101 Great Ideas for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Mine Survivors,” June 2005, p. 11.
[258] SCA, “Rehabilitation of Afghans with Disabilities,” www.swedishcommittee.org, accessed 30 April 2006.
[259] Email from Zemarai Saqeb, Disability Programme Coordinator, SCA, Kabul, 16 June 2006; response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Mohammed Amin Qanet, RAD, Kabul, 11 June 2006.
[260] Public Health Consultants, “External Evaluation of the Physical Rehabilitation Centre, Kandahar, Afghanistan,” (internal document), January 2006, pp. 20-39.
[261] Ibid; email from Thierry Hergault, Country Director, HI, Kabul, 25 May 2006.
[262] HI, “Concept Paper Community Center for the Disabled,” (internal document), 8 March 2006, p. 3.
[263] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[264] Interview with Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[265] SGAA, www.sandygallsafghanistanappeal.org, accessed 15 June 2006.
[266] Email from Zemarai Saqeb, SCA, Kabul, 16 June 2006.
[267] Interview with Maky Siawash, Director, KOO, 8 February 2006.
[268] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 94.
[269] Email from Mohammad Ershad, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, Kabul, 4 May 2006.
[270] Interview with Mohammad Yasin Farid, Head, Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan (PARSA), Kabul, 11 January 2006.
[271] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Yasuo Namuta, Project Coordinator, AARJ, Taloqan, 9 February 2006.
[272] Email from Help Handicapped International, Mumbai (India), 30 May 2006.
[273] Interview with Aziz Ahmad Adel, Director, PTI, Kabul, 11 April 2005.
[274] Interview with Dr. Abdul Baseer, Director, AABRAR, Kabul, 8 May 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 110.
[275] For more information, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 95.
[276] CDAP, “Annual Report 2004,” AFG/00/0018, Appendix 1.
[277] Response to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Omara Khan, Director, ADU, 25 May 2006; and emails, 1 and 4 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 111.
[278] Interview with Michaële Bock Pedersen, Officer for Donor Relations, DDG, Geneva, 10 May 2006; email from Christine Lang, Consultant for Victim Assistance, DDG, Kabul, 7 May 2006.
[279] Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, “National Policy on Action on Disability in Afghanistan,” Kabul, December 2005, p. 5.
[280] Ibid, p. 2.
[281] Interview with MRE/VA Advisor, and Operations Official, UNMACA, Geneva, 10 May 2006; interview with Firoz Ali Alizada, HI, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[282] Email from Dr. Zia Bina, UNDP-NPAD, Kabul, 7 June 2006.
[283] Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 May 2006.
[284] Statement by the Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, 23 April 2006.
[285] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 96.
[286] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” May 2006, pp. 153-154.
[287] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 96.
[288] Interview with Jean-François Trani, HI, and Dr. Abdul Baseer, AABRAR, Kabul, 30 March 2004.