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Country Reports
Georgia, Landmine Monitor Report 2006


Key developments since May 2005: At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Georgia said that its position on non-accession to the Mine Ban Treaty was being reconsidered. It re-stated its commitment not to use, produce, import or export antipersonnel mines. Georgia hosted a workshop on confidence-building and regional cooperation through mine action in Tbilisi in October 2005, the first government-sponsored international landmine event in Georgia. There were reports that Georgian combat engineers cleared mines in South Ossetia in 2005. At least 31 new casualties were reported in 2005, a decrease from 2004.

Mine Ban Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has expressed support for the global ban on antipersonnel mines on several occasions, most recently in May 2006: “Georgia is convinced that the negative impact of landmines far outweigh their military value and tries to make its possible contribution [to] the process of elimination and eradication of this threat.”[1] Georgia also stated, “Over the years one of the principle reasons for not [acceding] to the convention has been the existence of the territories uncontrolled by central authorities of the state,” and therefore, Georgia’s inability “to fulfill the obligations put forward in the convention. However, it has to be mentioned, that discussions concerning the possibility of reconsideration of the above-stated position have started.”[2]

In a May 2005 visit by the ICBL, Georgian officials said that the main reasons for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty are Georgia’s lack of jurisdiction over mined areas in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the difficulties of clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left by the forces of the former Soviet Union and Russia.[3] They also said that without financial and technological assistance, Georgia would not be able to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.[4]

Georgia has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution supporting a ban on antipersonnel mines since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 60/80 on 8 December 2005. In May 2006, it pledged to “continue to vote in favor of it in the future.”[5]

Georgia did not attend the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005 or Standing Committee meetings in June 2005. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who attended the intersessional meetings in May 2006 said it was “the first time when representative of Georgia participates in this very important event.” He also noted that the National Security Council may establish a permanent working group on landmines.[6]

Georgia is party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but it has not ratified Amended Protocol II for the “same reasons as [it has not acceded to] the Ottawa Convention.”[7]

The government of Georgia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), and the governments of Canada and Slovenia convened a workshop, Confidence-Building and Regional Cooperation through Mine Action, in October 2005 in Tbilisi. With over 70 participants from organizing bodies, local, regional and international NGOs (including the ICBL), and government delegates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, this workshop was the first ever government-sponsored international landmine event in Georgia.

At the same time as the workshop, the Canadian government undertook a mission to Georgia from 2-6 October 2005 to promote the Mine Ban Treaty. The delegation included retired General Maurice Baril, the former head of the Canadian Armed Forces and now Special Advisor for Mine Action.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Georgian officials have maintained that Georgia has never produced, exported or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence. In May 2006, a representative stated, “Since Georgia gained independence in 1991 it has never produced, exported or imported antipersonnel mines, furthermore, in September 1996 Georgia declared a moratorium on production, use, export and import of antipersonnel mines....”[8]

Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, but its exact size and composition remain unknown.[9] In September-October 2005, Georgia was due to complete an inventory and assessment of the condition of its stockpile of munitions. The Deputy Minister of Defense told the ICBL that landmines will be among the first weapons scheduled for destruction, and that Georgia intends to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines and not keep a reserve.[10]


Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[11] In May 2006, Georgia stated that, “since that time corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of antipersonnel mines. I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm my country’s intention to keep the above-mentioned commitment in future.”[12] In May 2005, the Ministry of Defense told the ICBL that the operational plan of the Georgian Armed Forces does not include mine use.[13]

Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of mine use in 2005 or 2006. However, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004.[14] Georgia has denied any use.

In September 2004, the OSCE expressed concern “about the fact that Georgia and South Ossetia are mining the conflict area” in order to reinforce their defense facilities.[15] During renewed fighting in South Ossetia in November 2004, several civilian landmine casualties were reported.[16 ] In May 2005, OSCE officials told the ICBL that the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (Russian, Georgian and North Ossetian) had drawn up maps of mined territories.[17]

According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, “In recent years the South Ossetian separatists accused the Georgian side in mining the territories in conflict area, however, it must be stressed, that all allegations of that sort do not reflect the real picture – the Georgian Armed Forces and other relevant structures strictly follow the declared moratorium.”[18] The military advisor to the President of Georgia told the ICBL that Georgian military forces in South Ossetia laid only remote-controlled Claymore mines, and removed them when leaving the territory.[19] The Deputy Minister of Defense noted that both armed forces in South Ossetia were supported by militias, and he could not guarantee that militias did not use antipersonnel mines.[20]

Landmine and ERW Problem

Georgia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[21] The majority of landmines in Georgia are located near the Ingur river separating Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia.[22 ] The other main mine threat to civilians comes from mines laid or abandoned around existing and former Russian military bases. For instance, in May 2006, two Russian-made antivehicle mines were reported to have been found in a garbage dump, near a range used by the Russian military base in Adjara. The mines were found by the drivers of a garbage truck. Following a report to the authorities, deminers are said to have destroyed the mines.[23]

A number of surveys and assessments have, however, concluded that overall, the mine problem in Georgia, outside of Abkhazia, is not large in scope and the impact is currently low.[24] According to HALO Trust: “As for Georgia, we have closed our operational office there and made the staff redundant as we feel there is not a humanitarian mine problem in the country. There are some mines around military bases and some border regions but it is not practical to demine these areas at the moment. Other surveys conducted by the Survey Action Center and DynCorp arrived at the same conclusion as HALO.”[25]

A renewed mine threat does, however, appear to exist near Tskhinvali in the separatist region of South Ossetia, as indicated by the report of a mine explosion on 17 June 2005, near the village of Kurta in the former conflict zone. The incident is said to have occurred while the Georgian police, in cooperation with Russian peacekeepers, were trying to recover the body of a Georgian man who had been missing for two days. According to the separatist South Ossetian Press and Information Committee, the area near the Georgian village of Kurta was mined by the Georgian side during armed clashes between the Georgian and Ossetian troops last August.[26]

There have also been press reports of arms caches being detected by Georgian law enforcement officials during 2005 and in early 2006 across the country; these have reportedly included landmines.[27]

Mine Action Program

There is no formal mine action program in Georgia, and there is no single national authority responsible for mine action coordination.[28] Responsibility for mine action in military zones and bases has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. The Department of Border Guards is responsible for border areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for mine action in populated areas, including roads and railroads.

In May 2005, a presidential military advisor indicated that a crisis management group would be formed under the aegis of the National Security Council, whereby one unit would have responsibility for landmine policy, assessment of mine action needs and ensuring effective mine action.[29] In May 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again noted the intention to establish a permanent working group on landmines under the National Security Council, “but due to recent reorganization of the Council the issue is still open. Nevertheless, I hope that the establishment of such working group will be completed in the foreseeable future.”[30]

Georgian military forces are said to conduct clearance operations upon finding mines or ERW. For example, in November 2005, clearance teams from the Ministry of Defense reported the discovery of 150 unexploded shells on the former Russian military base in Khelvachauri district. The ordnance is said to have been destroyed in situ.[31] The following month, there were press reports that demining operations were being conducted along the road connecting Didi and Patara Liakhvi in South Ossetia; there was no confirmation of any mines having been cleared.[32]

It was reported that the Senior Engineer Officer of the General Staff made a public offer in October 2005 to the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Georgia would clear the mines laid during the conflicts.[33]

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) was carried out in 2005 by the ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) and HALO Trust.[34]

On 20 November 2005, ICBL-GC with support from the Youth LEAP Program (Mines Action Canada), conducted basic MRE for schoolchildren in the village of Tamarasheni, the closest Georgian settlement to the city of Tskhinvali in the separatist South Ossetia region. Posters and leaflets using pictures drawn by the children were printed by ICBL-GC and Mines Action Canada and disseminated among children. Two staff members and three volunteers were involved in the activities, which were conducted as part of other ongoing projects due to lack of funds for a permanent MRE project. The posters were exhibited in presence of the teachers, government officials and for the public at large in the Elene Akhvlediani childrens’ art gallery on 24-26 March 2006.[35]

ICBL-GC also conducted MRE training sessions for five schoolteachers on 27 November 2005, as part of an OSCE project.[36]

UNICEF included mine action within its planned humanitarian action for 2006. Plans included support for HALO “in developing culturally appropriate and accessible mine-risk education (MRE) communication materials for HALO’s interactive MRE initiatives for children and their families in Abkhazia and Zugdidi (on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line).”[37]

Throughout 2005 and early 2006, HALO carried out MRE in all mined or suspected mined areas in Georgia; particular attention was paid to areas near abandoned military bases where mines were laid around the perimeters. Leaflets, funded by UNICEF, were distributed to all schools and houses in the vicinity of the bases, and MRE lectures were given by HALO personnel. Each mined area was visited at least twice and warning signs were placed around suspect areas; most of the danger mine signs were stolen. Given the lack of support HALO received in Georgia, it decided to suspend MRE operations in early 2006.[38]

Funding and Assistance

No donors reported contributing funding to mine clearance, MRE or survivor assistance in Georgia in 2005. Georgia reported receiving no funding for its 2005 UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects appeal for $23,520 for MRE and survivor assistance activities.[39] No proposal for funding was submitted to the UN Portfolio for 2006.[40]

Canada reported contributing C$35,240 ($29,088) to the ITF for the workshop, Mine Action as a Confidence Building Measure, hosted in Tbilisi in 2005.[41] ITF reported an additional contribution of $5,018 from the Netherlands and $8,013 from Slovenia for the workshop; other donors included Georgia and OSCE.[42]

Although Georgia was previously listed as one of the countries in the region to receive mine action support from the European Commission (EC) during the period 2002-2004, no contributions were provided. In its 2005-2007 strategy, the EC reported that it may fund future mine action in Georgia, if Georgia undertakes the necessary steps to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.[43]

In previous years, the United States provided training of army deminers and supplied equipment. Georgia’s request for US assistance to clear minefields surrounding two ex-Soviet military bases was deferred in 1999 and subsequently declined in 2003, as the assistance requested did not meet humanitarian criteria.[44] Following the November 2003 change of government in Georgia, the US left open the possibility of future support. [45] As of June 2006, no further US mine assistance had been identified; however, humanitarian mine action assistance remains under active consideration.[46]

Landmine/UXO Casualties 

There is no official record of the number of people killed or injured by landmines and UXO in Georgia. In 2005, ICBL-GC collected data on 31 new casualties caused by landmines, UXO or improvised explosive devices; five people were killed and 26 injured, including one child and five military personnel; 15 of the casualties occurred in Abkhazia.[47] This represents a significant decrease from the 53 casualties (seven killed, 46 injured) recorded in 2004.[48] However, data collection in Georgia is incomplete; therefore the actual number of casualties may be higher.

In 2005, one deminer was injured during clearance operations at the military base in Vaziani. On 17 June, a Russian peacekeeper and two Georgian police officers were injured by a mine in South Ossetia. On 10 December, two men were seriously injured by a mine on Zarskaya road in South Ossetia. On 21 December, a 13-year-old boy was killed when he picked up UXO.

In Greece, two Georgian men were killed by a mine while illegally crossing the border from Turkey in May.[49]

No new landmine/UXO casualties were reported in Georgia from January to May 2006.

The total number of landmine casualties in Georgia is not known. ICBL-GC has recorded 350 casualties since 2001 (including 57 children, 21 women and 56 military, security forces, deminers or Russian peacekeepers).[50] The accuracy of the ICBL-GC database, the only information on mine casualties in Georgia outside the territory of Abkhazia, was questioned by a Survey Action Center advance mission in July 2004. HALO identified 27 mine casualties in Georgia, excluding Abkhazia, between 2001 and August 2005, including 15 in 2004 and two in 2005. However, HALO collected no casualty data after August 2005, closing its operations in Georgia as it considered there was no significant humanitarian mine problem there.[51]

Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice

Shortages of basic medical supplies occur routinely in Georgian hospitals due to lack of funding. According to official estimates, there are more than 5,000 amputees in Georgia, and over 600 in Abkhazia, in need of physical rehabilitation services.[52] State funds allocated for physical rehabilitation cover only a limited range of services. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported two prosthetic/orthotic centers: the Gagra Orthopedic Centre in Abkhazia, and the Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation in Tbilisi. These are the only major facilities for physical rehabilitation. ICRC also supported an outreach program in the Gali area of Abkhazia for those unable to reach the main center in Gagra without assistance. In addition to quality assurance through regular visits from ICRC ortho-prosthetists, a one-month refresher course in the management of lower-limb amputees was held at each center. The ICRC sponsored one orthopedic technician for a three-year course at the Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics.[53]

In 2005, the Tbilisi and Gagra centers produced 343 prostheses (71 for mine survivors) and 653 orthoses (six for mine survivors), 446 pairs of crutches and five wheelchairs. In total, 1,077 people with disabilities had access to rehabilitation services. At the Tbilisi center, where ICRC reimbursed 60 percent of the costs of services, 765 patients were assisted, including the fitting of 263 prostheses (30 for mine survivors) and 615 orthoses.[54]

Following a needs assessment in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, an agreement was reached in 2005 between the local authorities, Vladikavkaz Orthopedic Center (in the Russian Federation) and ICRC; local authorities will cover the cost of transport and accommodation for patients, the center will provide services, and the ICRC will cover the cost of treatment. The ICRC also funded an external consultant to conduct an assessment and make recommendations to the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs for the development of a national physical rehabilitation policy.[55]

In September 2005, two experts from Slovenia’s Institute for Rehabilitation and an ITF representative visited rehabilitation services in Georgia and concluded that rehabilitation centers were adequately equipped, but staff would benefit from additional training. The centers were having problems obtaining sufficient materials for the manufacture of prostheses.[56]

The NGO, Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children, promotes disability issues and the Mine Ban Treaty through meetings, training, a newspaper and a radio broadcast. Mine survivors participate in all the activities. The organization faced capacity issues in 2005.[57]

The June 1995 Law on the Social Protection of the Disabled outlines the rights of people with disabilities; however, it has not been fully implemented because of the economic situation in Georgia, and is reportedly a low priority for the government. People with disabilities faced discrimination in employment, education, access to healthcare and in the provision of other state services; no law mandates access to buildings, and very few public facilities or buildings were accessible.[58]

[1] Statement by George Dolidze, Deputy Director, Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 1.
[2] Ibid.
[3] ICBL meetings with David Sikharulidze, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005; with Alexander Maisuradze, Deputy Director, Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005; and with Vakhtang Kapanadze, Military Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[4] Ibid. See also, Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC. DEL/12/01, 17 January 2001.
[5] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 1.
[6] Ibid. However, Landmine Monitor has reported that Georgia attended the intersessional meetings in February 2003, and the annual Meeting of States Parties in 1999, 2000 and 2002.
[7] Ibid, p. 2.
[8] Ibid.
[9] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. This same information was provided to the ICBL Georgian Committee by the Ministry of Defense on 6 February 2002.
[10] Ibid.
[11] The moratorium was proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792, and Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001.
[12] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 2.
[13] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[14] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 706-707; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 968-969.
[15] “OSCE voices concern over landmines in Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone,” Interfax (Tbilisi), 10 September 2004.
[16 ] Two members of a television crew were injured when they stepped on a mine in a forest near the village of Kekhvi. “Georgia: TV crew injured in South Ossetia mine explosion,” Kavkasia Press (Tbilisi), 6 November 2004. A few days later, a resident of the village of Eredvi was injured by a mine on the road linking Didi and Patara Liakhvi gorges. “Mine Explosion, Shelling Reported in South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 9 November 2004. Civil Georgia is an online news magazine set up by the UN Association of Georgia in 2001.
[17] ICBL meeting with Roy Reeve, Head, OSCE Mission to Georgia, and Lt. Col. R.M. Zbigniew Fec, Chief Military Officer, OSCE Mission to Georgia, Tbilisi, 23 May 2005.
[18] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 2.
[19] ICBL meeting with Vakhtang Kapanadze, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[20] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[21] Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
[22 ] According to HALO, the mines have been cleared from the river banks; HALO declared the area “mine impact free” in 2005. Email from David McMahon, Programme Manager for Georgia and Abkhazia, HALO, Abkhazia, 29 June 2006.
[23] “Anti-tank mines have been found on a garbage dump (Georgia),” Regnum (online Russian news agency), 17 May 2006.
[24] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 707.
[25] Email from David McMahon, HALO, Abkhazia, 21 February 2006. HALO continues to monitor the mine problem in Georgia from its administrative and liaison office in Tbilisi and annually reviews all mined areas. HALO is prepared to conduct humanitarian mine clearance in Georgia if and when security and political conditions permit. Email from David McMahon, HALO Abkhazia, 29 June 2006.
[26] “Mine injures Russian serviceman, Georgian policemen in S. Ossetia,” UN Association of Georgia, 17 June 2005, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 10 March 2006.
[27] On 17 February 2005, the Georgian Border Guards Department recovered an arms cache in Mestia district. The Department stated that the arms cache included RPG-7 antitank and single-use Mukha grenade-launchers, a dozen PG-7L and six RKG-3M antitank grenades, as well as four MON-100 landmines. Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 18 February 2005, www.civil.ge. On 20 May 2005, police in Zugdidi district in western Georgia found a “large number” of weapons and explosives. The Interior Ministry reported that the arms cache included Russian-made antitank mines, grenade-launchers and both guided and unguided missiles of unspecified types. No other details were reported. Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 20 May 2005.
[28] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 708-709.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 2. In May 2004, a high-ranking official told ICBL that the National Security Council was preparing a decree to establish a permanent working group on landmines, which would include a mandate to develop landmine policy. ICBL meeting with Vakhtang Kapanadze, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005.
[31] Telephone interview with Col. Avtamdil Piliev, Head of Engineer Task Group, Military Forces of Georgia, Tbilisi, 13 March 2006; “Mines in Khelvachauri district,” Rustavi 2 (broadcasting company), www.rustavi2.com.ge, accessed 24 November 2005.
[32] “Combat engineers in conflict zone,” Rustavi 2, 9 December 2005.
[33] Remarks made during a roundtable convened by the South Caucasus Institute for Regional Security/Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Tbilisi, 17 October 2005.
[34] Interview by ICBL-GC with Jonathan Hadaway, UNICEF, Tbilisi, 17 February 2006.
[35] Email from Mamuka Gachechiladze, Executive Director, ICBL-GC, 13 March 2006.
[36] Ibid.
[37] UNICEF, “Georgia: Planned Humanitarian Action for 2006,” www.unicef.org, accessed 19 June 2006. For HALO activities in Abkhazia, see report on Abkhazia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
[38] Email from David McMahon, HALO, Abkhazia, 29 June 2006.
[39] UN Mines Action Service (UNMAS), “2005 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, p. 1, www.mineaction.org, accessed 20 May 2005.
[40] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 4, www.minesaction.org.
[41] Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. ITF reported receiving US$35,147 from Canada for the Tblisi workshop. ITF, “Annual Report 2005,” pp. 12-17.
[42] ITF, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 45; email from Luka Buhin, Program Manager for Macedonia and Caucasus, ITF, 3 July 2006.
[43] EC, “Mine Action 2005-2007,” p. 38.
[44] Email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 12 July 2006.
[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 711.
[46] The US reported a contribution of $3 million in fiscal year 2005 to Georgia; this funding was for HALO mine action in Abkhazia. USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 937; email from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., US Department of State, 12 July 2006.
[47] Unless otherwise stated, all information in this section is from the ICBL-GC casualty database, which records information obtained from hospitals throughout Georgia, media reports and surveys, since 2001.
[48] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 711.
[49] “Greek soldier killed during demining operation near Turkish border,” Associated Press (Athens), 14 June 2005.
[50] Email from Mamuka Gachechiladze, ICBL-GC, Tbilisi, 6 June 2006.
[51] Email from David McMahon, HALO, Abkhazia, 4 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 712.
[52] Email from Maia Kordava, Spokesperson, ICRC Delegation to Georgia, Tbilisi, 25 February 2006.
[53] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 712.
[54] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Program - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 38; ICRC, “Special Report - Mine Action 2005,” Geneva, May 2006, p. 23; email from Helene Maillet, ICRC, 3 July 2006.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Email from Luka Buhin, ITF, 3 July 2006. Ibid.
[57] Email from Mamuka Gachechiladze, ICBL-GC, Tbilisi, 6 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 713.
[58] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Georgia,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 974.