Key developments since May 2005: At the intersessional Standing
Committee meetings in May 2006, Georgia said that its position on non-accession
to the Mine Ban Treaty was being reconsidered. It re-stated its commitment not
to use, produce, import or export antipersonnel mines. Georgia hosted a
workshop on confidence-building and regional cooperation through mine action in
Tbilisi in October 2005, the first government-sponsored international landmine
event in Georgia. There were reports that Georgian combat engineers cleared
mines in South Ossetia in 2005. At least 31 new casualties were reported in
2005, a decrease from 2004.
Mine Ban Policy
Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has expressed support for
the global ban on antipersonnel mines on several occasions, most recently in May
2006: “Georgia is convinced that the negative impact of landmines far
outweigh their military value and tries to make its possible contribution [to]
the process of elimination and eradication of this
threat.”[1] Georgia also
stated, “Over the years one of the principle reasons for not [acceding] to
the convention has been the existence of the territories uncontrolled by central
authorities of the state,” and therefore, Georgia’s inability
“to fulfill the obligations put forward in the convention. However, it
has to be mentioned, that discussions concerning the possibility of
reconsideration of the above-stated position have
started.”[2]
In a May 2005 visit by the ICBL, Georgian officials said that the main
reasons for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty are Georgia’s lack of
jurisdiction over mined areas in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the
difficulties of clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left by the
forces of the former Soviet Union and
Russia.[3] They also said that
without financial and technological assistance, Georgia would not be able to
fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban
Treaty.[4]
Georgia has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly (UNGA)
resolution supporting a ban on antipersonnel mines since 1996, including UNGA
Resolution 60/80 on 8 December 2005. In May 2006, it pledged to “continue
to vote in favor of it in the
future.”[5]
Georgia did not attend the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia
in November-December 2005 or Standing Committee meetings in June 2005. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who attended the intersessional meetings in
May 2006 said it was “the first time when representative of Georgia
participates in this very important event.” He also noted that the
National Security Council may establish a permanent working group on
landmines.[6]
Georgia is party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its
original Protocol II, but it has not ratified Amended Protocol II for the
“same reasons as [it has not acceded to] the Ottawa
Convention.”[7]
The government of Georgia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims
Assistance (ITF), and the governments of Canada and Slovenia convened a
workshop, Confidence-Building and Regional Cooperation through Mine Action, in
October 2005 in Tbilisi. With over 70 participants from organizing bodies,
local, regional and international NGOs (including the ICBL), and government
delegates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, this workshop was the first ever government-sponsored international
landmine event in Georgia.
At the same time as the workshop, the Canadian government undertook a mission
to Georgia from 2-6 October 2005 to promote the Mine Ban Treaty. The delegation
included retired General Maurice Baril, the former head of the Canadian Armed
Forces and now Special Advisor for Mine Action.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Georgian officials have maintained that Georgia has never produced, exported
or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence. In May 2006, a
representative stated, “Since Georgia gained independence in 1991 it has
never produced, exported or imported antipersonnel mines, furthermore, in
September 1996 Georgia declared a moratorium on production, use, export and
import of antipersonnel mines....”[8]
Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel
mines from the former Soviet Union, but its exact size and composition remain
unknown.[9] In September-October
2005, Georgia was due to complete an inventory and assessment of the condition
of its stockpile of munitions. The Deputy Minister of Defense told the ICBL
that landmines will be among the first weapons scheduled for destruction, and
that Georgia intends to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines and not keep a
reserve.[10]
Use
Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in
place since September 1996.[11] In
May 2006, Georgia stated that, “since that time corresponding official
structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of antipersonnel
mines. I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm my country’s intention
to keep the above-mentioned commitment in
future.”[12] In May 2005, the
Ministry of Defense told the ICBL that the operational plan of the Georgian
Armed Forces does not include mine
use.[13]
Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of mine use in 2005 or
2006. However, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines
every year from 2001 to 2004.[14] Georgia has denied any use.
In September 2004, the OSCE expressed concern “about the fact that
Georgia and South Ossetia are mining the conflict area” in order to
reinforce their defense facilities.[15] During renewed fighting in South Ossetia in November 2004, several
civilian landmine casualties were
reported.[16 ] In May 2005, OSCE
officials told the ICBL that the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (Russian, Georgian
and North Ossetian) had drawn up maps of mined
territories.[17]
According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, “In recent
years the South Ossetian separatists accused the Georgian side in mining the
territories in conflict area, however, it must be stressed, that all allegations
of that sort do not reflect the real picture – the Georgian Armed Forces
and other relevant structures strictly follow the declared
moratorium.”[18] The military
advisor to the President of Georgia told the ICBL that Georgian military forces
in South Ossetia laid only remote-controlled Claymore mines, and removed them
when leaving the territory.[19] The
Deputy Minister of Defense noted that both armed forces in South Ossetia were
supported by militias, and he could not guarantee that militias did not use
antipersonnel mines.[20]
Landmine and ERW Problem
Georgia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW).[21] The majority of
landmines in Georgia are located near the Ingur river separating Abkhazia from
the rest of Georgia.[22 ] The other
main mine threat to civilians comes from mines laid or abandoned around existing
and former Russian military bases. For instance, in May 2006, two Russian-made
antivehicle mines were reported to have been found in a garbage dump, near a
range used by the Russian military base in Adjara. The mines were found by the
drivers of a garbage truck. Following a report to the authorities, deminers are
said to have destroyed the
mines.[23]
A number of surveys and assessments have, however, concluded that overall,
the mine problem in Georgia, outside of Abkhazia, is not large in scope and the
impact is currently low.[24]
According to HALO Trust: “As for Georgia, we have closed our operational
office there and made the staff redundant as we feel there is not a humanitarian
mine problem in the country. There are some mines around military bases and some
border regions but it is not practical to demine these areas at the moment.
Other surveys conducted by the Survey Action Center and DynCorp arrived at the
same conclusion as
HALO.”[25]
A renewed mine threat does, however, appear to exist near Tskhinvali in the
separatist region of South Ossetia, as indicated by the report of a mine
explosion on 17 June 2005, near the village of Kurta in the former conflict
zone. The incident is said to have occurred while the Georgian police, in
cooperation with Russian peacekeepers, were trying to recover the body of a
Georgian man who had been missing for two days. According to the separatist
South Ossetian Press and Information Committee, the area near the Georgian
village of Kurta was mined by the Georgian side during armed clashes between the
Georgian and Ossetian troops last
August.[26]
There have also been press reports of arms caches being detected by Georgian
law enforcement officials during 2005 and in early 2006 across the country;
these have reportedly included
landmines.[27]
Mine Action Program
There is no formal mine action program in Georgia, and there is no single
national authority responsible for mine action
coordination.[28] Responsibility
for mine action in military zones and bases has been the responsibility of the
Ministry of Defense. The Department of Border Guards is responsible for border
areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for mine action in
populated areas, including roads and railroads.
In May 2005, a presidential military advisor indicated that a crisis
management group would be formed under the aegis of the National Security
Council, whereby one unit would have responsibility for landmine policy,
assessment of mine action needs and ensuring effective mine
action.[29] In May 2006, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs again noted the intention to establish a permanent
working group on landmines under the National Security Council, “but due
to recent reorganization of the Council the issue is still open. Nevertheless,
I hope that the establishment of such working group will be completed in the
foreseeable future.”[30]
Georgian military forces are said to conduct clearance operations upon
finding mines or ERW. For example, in November 2005, clearance teams from the
Ministry of Defense reported the discovery of 150 unexploded shells on the
former Russian military base in Khelvachauri district. The ordnance is said to
have been destroyed in situ.[31] The following month, there were press reports that demining operations
were being conducted along the road connecting Didi and Patara Liakhvi in South
Ossetia; there was no confirmation of any mines having been
cleared.[32]
It was reported that the Senior Engineer Officer of the General Staff made a
public offer in October 2005 to the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia that Georgia would clear the mines laid during the
conflicts.[33]
Mine Risk Education
Mine risk education (MRE) was carried out in 2005 by the ICBL Georgian
Committee (ICBL-GC) and HALO
Trust.[34]
On 20 November 2005, ICBL-GC with support from the Youth LEAP Program (Mines
Action Canada), conducted basic MRE for schoolchildren in the village of
Tamarasheni, the closest Georgian settlement to the city of Tskhinvali in the
separatist South Ossetia region. Posters and leaflets using pictures drawn by
the children were printed by ICBL-GC and Mines Action Canada and disseminated
among children. Two staff members and three volunteers were involved in the
activities, which were conducted as part of other ongoing projects due to lack
of funds for a permanent MRE project. The posters were exhibited in presence of
the teachers, government officials and for the public at large in the Elene
Akhvlediani childrens’ art gallery on 24-26 March
2006.[35]
ICBL-GC also conducted MRE training sessions for five schoolteachers on 27
November 2005, as part of an OSCE
project.[36]
UNICEF included mine action within its planned humanitarian action for 2006.
Plans included support for HALO “in developing culturally appropriate and
accessible mine-risk education (MRE) communication materials for HALO’s
interactive MRE initiatives for children and their families in Abkhazia and
Zugdidi (on the Georgian side of the ceasefire
line).”[37]
Throughout 2005 and early 2006, HALO carried out MRE in all mined or
suspected mined areas in Georgia; particular attention was paid to areas near
abandoned military bases where mines were laid around the perimeters. Leaflets,
funded by UNICEF, were distributed to all schools and houses in the vicinity of
the bases, and MRE lectures were given by HALO personnel. Each mined area was
visited at least twice and warning signs were placed around suspect areas; most
of the danger mine signs were stolen. Given the lack of support HALO received
in Georgia, it decided to suspend MRE operations in early
2006.[38]
Funding and Assistance
No donors reported contributing funding to mine clearance, MRE or survivor
assistance in Georgia in 2005. Georgia reported receiving no funding for its
2005 UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects appeal for $23,520 for MRE and
survivor assistance activities.[39] No proposal for funding was submitted to the UN Portfolio for
2006.[40]
Canada reported contributing C$35,240 ($29,088) to the ITF for the workshop,
Mine Action as a Confidence Building Measure, hosted in Tbilisi in
2005.[41] ITF reported an
additional contribution of $5,018 from the Netherlands and $8,013 from Slovenia
for the workshop; other donors included Georgia and
OSCE.[42]
Although Georgia was previously listed as one of the countries in the region
to receive mine action support from the European Commission (EC) during the
period 2002-2004, no contributions were provided. In its 2005-2007 strategy,
the EC reported that it may fund future mine action in Georgia, if Georgia
undertakes the necessary steps to accede to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[43]
In previous years, the United States provided training of army deminers and
supplied equipment. Georgia’s request for US assistance to clear
minefields surrounding two ex-Soviet military bases was deferred in 1999 and
subsequently declined in 2003, as the assistance requested did not meet
humanitarian criteria.[44] Following the November 2003 change of government in Georgia, the US left
open the possibility of future support.
[45] As of June 2006, no further US
mine assistance had been identified; however, humanitarian mine action
assistance remains under active
consideration.[46]
Landmine/UXO Casualties
There is no official record of the number of people killed or injured by
landmines and UXO in Georgia. In 2005, ICBL-GC collected data on 31 new
casualties caused by landmines, UXO or improvised explosive devices; five people
were killed and 26 injured, including one child and five military personnel; 15
of the casualties occurred in
Abkhazia.[47] This represents a
significant decrease from the 53 casualties (seven killed, 46 injured) recorded
in 2004.[48] However, data collection in Georgia is incomplete; therefore the actual
number of casualties may be higher.
In 2005, one deminer was injured during clearance operations at the military
base in Vaziani. On 17 June, a Russian peacekeeper and two Georgian police
officers were injured by a mine in South Ossetia. On 10 December, two men were
seriously injured by a mine on Zarskaya road in South Ossetia. On 21 December,
a 13-year-old boy was killed when he picked up UXO.
In Greece, two Georgian men were killed by a mine while illegally crossing
the border from Turkey in May.[49]
No new landmine/UXO casualties were reported in Georgia from January to May
2006.
The total number of landmine casualties in Georgia is not known. ICBL-GC has
recorded 350 casualties since 2001 (including 57 children, 21 women and 56
military, security forces, deminers or Russian
peacekeepers).[50] The accuracy of
the ICBL-GC database, the only information on mine casualties in Georgia outside
the territory of Abkhazia, was questioned by a Survey Action Center advance
mission in July 2004. HALO identified 27 mine casualties in Georgia, excluding
Abkhazia, between 2001 and August 2005, including 15 in 2004 and two in 2005.
However, HALO collected no casualty data after August 2005, closing its
operations in Georgia as it considered there was no significant humanitarian
mine problem there.[51]
Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice
Shortages of basic medical supplies occur routinely in Georgian hospitals due
to lack of funding. According to official estimates, there are more than 5,000
amputees in Georgia, and over 600 in Abkhazia, in need of physical
rehabilitation services.[52] State
funds allocated for physical rehabilitation cover only a limited range of
services. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported two
prosthetic/orthotic centers: the Gagra Orthopedic Centre in Abkhazia, and the
Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation in Tbilisi.
These are the only major facilities for physical rehabilitation. ICRC also
supported an outreach program in the Gali area of Abkhazia for those unable to
reach the main center in Gagra without assistance. In addition to quality
assurance through regular visits from ICRC ortho-prosthetists, a one-month
refresher course in the management of lower-limb amputees was held at each
center. The ICRC sponsored one orthopedic technician for a three-year course at
the Cambodian School of Prosthetics and
Orthotics.[53]
In 2005, the Tbilisi and Gagra centers produced 343 prostheses (71 for mine
survivors) and 653 orthoses (six for mine survivors), 446 pairs of crutches and
five wheelchairs. In total, 1,077 people with disabilities had access to
rehabilitation services. At the Tbilisi center, where ICRC reimbursed 60
percent of the costs of services, 765 patients were assisted, including the
fitting of 263 prostheses (30 for mine survivors) and 615
orthoses.[54]
Following a needs assessment in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, an
agreement was reached in 2005 between the local authorities, Vladikavkaz
Orthopedic Center (in the Russian Federation) and ICRC; local authorities will
cover the cost of transport and accommodation for patients, the center will
provide services, and the ICRC will cover the cost of treatment. The ICRC also
funded an external consultant to conduct an assessment and make recommendations
to the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs for the development of a
national physical rehabilitation
policy.[55]
In September 2005, two experts from Slovenia’s Institute for
Rehabilitation and an ITF representative visited rehabilitation services in
Georgia and concluded that rehabilitation centers were adequately equipped, but
staff would benefit from additional training. The centers were having problems
obtaining sufficient materials for the manufacture of
prostheses.[56]
The NGO, Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children,
promotes disability issues and the Mine Ban Treaty through meetings, training, a
newspaper and a radio broadcast. Mine survivors participate in all the
activities. The organization faced capacity issues in
2005.[57]
The June 1995 Law on the Social Protection of the Disabled outlines the
rights of people with disabilities; however, it has not been fully implemented
because of the economic situation in Georgia, and is reportedly a low priority
for the government. People with disabilities faced discrimination in
employment, education, access to healthcare and in the provision of other state
services; no law mandates access to buildings, and very few public facilities or
buildings were
accessible.[58]
[1] Statement by George Dolidze,
Deputy Director, Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 1. [2] Ibid. [3] ICBL meetings with David
Sikharulidze, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005; with
Alexander Maisuradze, Deputy Director, Department for Security Policy and
Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005;
and with Vakhtang Kapanadze, Military Advisor to the President, Tbilisi, 25 May
2005. [4] Ibid. See also, Note Verbale
from the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC. DEL/12/01, 17 January 2001. [5] Statement by George Dolidze,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 1. [6] Ibid. However, Landmine
Monitor has reported that Georgia attended the intersessional meetings in
February 2003, and the annual Meeting of States Parties in 1999, 2000 and 2002.
[7] Ibid, p. 2. [8] Ibid. [9] ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. This same information
was provided to the ICBL Georgian Committee by the Ministry of Defense on 6
February 2002. [10] Ibid. [11] The moratorium was
proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has
been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report
1999, p. 792, and Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001. [12] Statement by George Dolidze,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 2. [13] ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. [14] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 706-707; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp.
968-969. [15] “OSCE voices concern
over landmines in Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone,” Interfax
(Tbilisi), 10 September 2004. [16 ] Two members of a television
crew were injured when they stepped on a mine in a forest near the village of
Kekhvi. “Georgia: TV crew injured in South Ossetia mine explosion,”
Kavkasia Press (Tbilisi), 6 November 2004. A few days later, a resident
of the village of Eredvi was injured by a mine on the road linking Didi and
Patara Liakhvi gorges. “Mine Explosion, Shelling Reported in South
Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 9 November 2004. Civil Georgia is
an online news magazine set up by the UN Association of Georgia in 2001. [17] ICBL meeting with Roy Reeve,
Head, OSCE Mission to Georgia, and Lt. Col. R.M. Zbigniew Fec, Chief Military
Officer, OSCE Mission to Georgia, Tbilisi, 23 May 2005. [18] Statement by George Dolidze,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 2. [19] ICBL meeting with Vakhtang
Kapanadze, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. [20] ICBL meeting with David
Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. [21] Under Protocol V to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as
unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly
excluded from the definition. [22 ] According to HALO, the
mines have been cleared from the river banks; HALO declared the area “mine
impact free” in 2005. Email from David McMahon, Programme Manager for
Georgia and Abkhazia, HALO, Abkhazia, 29 June 2006. [23] “Anti-tank mines have
been found on a garbage dump (Georgia),” Regnum (online Russian
news agency), 17 May 2006. [24] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 707. [25] Email from David McMahon,
HALO, Abkhazia, 21 February 2006. HALO continues to monitor the mine problem in
Georgia from its administrative and liaison office in Tbilisi and annually
reviews all mined areas. HALO is prepared to conduct humanitarian mine
clearance in Georgia if and when security and political conditions permit.
Email from David McMahon, HALO Abkhazia, 29 June 2006. [26] “Mine injures Russian
serviceman, Georgian policemen in S. Ossetia,” UN Association of Georgia,
17 June 2005, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 10 March 2006. [27] On 17 February 2005, the
Georgian Border Guards Department recovered an arms cache in Mestia district.
The Department stated that the arms cache included RPG-7 antitank and single-use
Mukha grenade-launchers, a dozen PG-7L and six RKG-3M antitank grenades, as well
as four MON-100 landmines. Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 18 February 2005, www.civil.ge. On 20 May 2005, police in
Zugdidi district in western Georgia found a “large
number” of weapons and explosives. The Interior Ministry reported that
the arms cache included Russian-made antitank mines, grenade-launchers and both
guided and unguided missiles of unspecified types. No other details were
reported. Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 20 May 2005. [28] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 708-709. [29] Ibid. [30] Statement by George Dolidze,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation
of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006, p. 2. In May 2004, a high-ranking
official told ICBL that the National Security Council was preparing a decree to
establish a permanent working group on landmines, which would include a mandate
to develop landmine policy. ICBL meeting with Vakhtang Kapanadze, Tbilisi, 25
May 2005. [31] Telephone interview with
Col. Avtamdil Piliev, Head of Engineer Task Group, Military Forces of Georgia,
Tbilisi, 13 March 2006; “Mines in Khelvachauri district,” Rustavi
2 (broadcasting company), www.rustavi2.com.ge, accessed 24 November
2005. [32] “Combat engineers in
conflict zone,” Rustavi 2, 9 December 2005. [33] Remarks made during a
roundtable convened by the South Caucasus Institute for Regional
Security/Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Tbilisi, 17 October 2005. [34] Interview by ICBL-GC with
Jonathan Hadaway, UNICEF, Tbilisi, 17 February 2006. [35] Email from Mamuka
Gachechiladze, Executive Director, ICBL-GC, 13 March 2006. [36] Ibid. [37] UNICEF, “Georgia:
Planned Humanitarian Action for 2006,” www.unicef.org, accessed 19 June
2006. For HALO activities in Abkhazia, see report on Abkhazia in this edition
of Landmine Monitor. [38] Email from David McMahon,
HALO, Abkhazia, 29 June 2006. [39] UN Mines Action Service
(UNMAS), “2005 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, p. 1,
www.mineaction.org, accessed 20 May 2005. [40] UN, “2006 Portfolio of
Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 4, www.minesaction.org. [41] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate
for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates
(Annual),” 3 January 2006. ITF reported receiving US$35,147 from Canada
for the Tblisi workshop. ITF, “Annual Report 2005,” pp. 12-17. [42] ITF, “Annual Report
2005,” p. 45; email from Luka Buhin, Program Manager for Macedonia and
Caucasus, ITF, 3 July 2006. [43] EC, “Mine Action
2005-2007,” p. 38. [44] Email from H. Murphey McCloy
Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 12 July 2006. [45] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 711. [46] The US reported a
contribution of $3 million in fiscal year 2005 to Georgia; this funding was for
HALO mine action in Abkhazia. USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005,
by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department
of State, 8 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 937; email
from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., US Department of State, 12 July 2006. [47] Unless otherwise stated, all
information in this section is from the ICBL-GC casualty database, which records
information obtained from hospitals throughout Georgia, media reports and
surveys, since 2001. [48] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 711. [49] “Greek soldier killed
during demining operation near Turkish border,” Associated Press
(Athens), 14 June 2005. [50] Email from Mamuka
Gachechiladze, ICBL-GC, Tbilisi, 6 June 2006. [51] Email from David McMahon,
HALO, Abkhazia, 4 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 712.
[52] Email from Maia Kordava,
Spokesperson, ICRC Delegation to Georgia, Tbilisi, 25 February 2006. [53] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 712. [54] ICRC, “Physical
Rehabilitation Program - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 38;
ICRC, “Special Report - Mine Action 2005,” Geneva, May 2006, p. 23;
email from Helene Maillet, ICRC, 3 July 2006. [55] Ibid. [56] Email from Luka Buhin, ITF,
3 July 2006. Ibid. [57] Email from Mamuka
Gachechiladze, ICBL-GC, Tbilisi, 6 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 713. [58]US
Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005:
Georgia,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report
2004, p. 974.