Key developments since May 2005: Rebels from an MFDC faction used
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in Guinea-Bissau in March 2006. In August
2005, Senegal adopted national implementation legislation for the Mine Ban
Treaty. This included authorization for a national mine action authority and a
mine action center. In October 2005, the UN Development Programme and Handicap
International initiated an emergency landmine impact survey in Casamance;
preliminary results indicated that 93 villages are affected by landmines. In
2005, 10 new casualties were recorded, a decrease from 17 casualties in
2004.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997,
ratified on 24 September 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. Since
August 1999, the National Commission on the Implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty has been responsible for the mine
issue.[1] On 3 August 2005, the
president signed the “Law in regard to ban of antipersonnel mines”
after its approval by the parliament on 14 July
2005.[2] The new law makes
production, purchase, sale, stockpiling, transfer, and use of antipersonnel
mines a criminal offence. Articles 5 and 6 of the law include penal sanctions
of a prison term of five to ten years, a fine of one to three million Senegalese
francs (US$1,912-$5,737) for individuals, and a fine of 30 to 50 million
Senegalese francs ($57,370-$95,617) for legal
entities.[3]
Senegal reported that two enforcement decrees—on the National
Commission on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and on the Mine Action
Center—were adopted by the Council of Ministers, and as of May 2006 were
awaiting signature.[4]
Senegal submitted its seventh Article 7 transparency report on 8 May 2006,
for calendar year 2005. It included voluntary Form J with mine victim
data.[5]
Senegal attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in
November-December 2005, where it made statements during the general exchange of
views and the session on victim assistance. Senegal did not participate in the
intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2005 and May 2006.
Senegal has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have
had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and
3. Thus, Senegal has not made known its views on issues related to joint
military operations with non-States Parties, antivehicle mines with sensitive
fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for
training. However, in September 2002, Senegal stated that it would not allow
transit or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on its
territory.[6]
Senegal is party to Amended Protocol II (landmines) of the Convention on
Conventional Weapons. Senegal attended the Seventh Annual Conference of States
Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2005, but did not submit the annual
report required by Article 13.
On 14 December 2005, the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association
Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ASVM) in cooperation with
Handicap International released Landmine Monitor Report 2005 in
Ziguinchor, Casamance. The event gathered representatives of the mine action
community, members of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement
des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC), and
media.[7]
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
In its Article 7 reports, Senegal has consistently stated that it has never
produced, possessed or stockpiled mines, even for training
purposes.[8] Government authorities
claim that Senegal has never used antipersonnel mines inside or outside the
country.[9]
Use by Non-State Armed Groups
The conflict with the MFDC in Casamance officially ended with the December
2004 peace accord.[10] MFDC rebels
used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines extensively, as well as improvised
explosive devices, until 2001.[11] Landmine Monitor did not record any use of antipersonnel mines by the MFDC
from 2002 through 2005.
In March 2006, a faction of the MFDC led by Salif Sadio fled to Guinea-Bissau
and used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines against the armed forces of
Guinea-Bissau. The Sadio faction reportedly entered northern Guinea-Bissau
after fighting with another MFDC faction led by Cesar Badiate. Badiate allied
his faction with the military forces of Guinea-Bissau, which launched attacks on
Sadio-occupied areas.[12]
Reportedly, the Sadio rebels laid mines in the northern border districts of
Guinea-Bissau, in particular on the road linking Sao Domingos with Varela. The
fighting caused thousands of people to flee into other regions of Guinea-Bissau
and into Senegal.[13] The UN and
the mine action community in Guinea-Bissau confirmed the reports of mine use by
the Senegalese rebels.[14] In April
2006, the ICBL condemned the use of antipersonnel mines in northern
Guinea-Bissau by the
rebels.[15]
Landmine and UXO Problem
The landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem in Senegal resulted mainly
from fighting in Casamance, an area composed of the regions of Kolda and
Ziguinchor, between the Senegalese Army and the MFDC; armed violence started in
1982, and intensified in 1997. The problem is limited to Casamance, and
believed to be concentrated mainly in departments south of Ziguinchor town,
between the Casamance river and the border with Guinea-Bissau, as well as in
northern parts of Bignona department along the border with The Gambia. Nuisance
mines laid by the MFDC may also be found in Sédhiou department, in the
east of Kolda region.[16]
The results of the Emergency Landmine Impact Study in Casamance (ELISC),
initiated in October 2005 by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Handicap
International (HI), are expected to give a more comprehensive picture of the
impact of landmines and UXO in the area. Preliminary results showed that
landmines and UXO in 149 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affect 93 (2.7
percent) of the 3,446 villages in Casamance. According to Senegal’s
Article 7 report of May 2006, the department of Ziguinchor is the most affected
with 72 SHAs, followed by Sédhiou where 58 SHAs were identified by the
ELISC preliminary results. Three other departments are impacted to a lesser
degree: Oussouye (12 SHAs), Kolda (four SHAs) and Bignona (three
SHAs).[17] Mines and UXO directly
affect 90,702 inhabitants and contaminate some 95 kilometers of paths, tracks
and roads as well as 11 square kilometers of other suspected mined areas.
Preliminary ELISC results also confirmed that UXO contamination is
limited.[18] The Senegalese Army
had previously reported that one-third of mines laid in Casamance were
antivehicle, and the remaining two-thirds were
antipersonnel.[19]
ELISC preliminary results decreased dramatically previous estimates by
Senegal in September 2005 that some 1,400 square kilometers were
“potentially hazardous” and thus that 250,000 people were or could
be affected by the contamination, representing one-fifth of the population of
Casamance.[20] HI’s mine
action expert characterized the mine problem in Senegal as “few mines, but
a big impact.”[21]
The ELISC confirmed that landmines have a serious social and economic impact
on the population. According to preliminary results, access to paths, tracks
and roads is often impeded by the presence of mines and UXO, as is access to
land for growing rice, hunting, crop harvesting and wood collection. Mines and
UXO exacerbate population displacement, leading to problems of land ownership
because of the lack of available land. They also contaminate grazing areas and
water points, and access to housing to a lesser degree, and compromise access to
social services and fishing activities to a limited
degree.[22] More generally, it has
been claimed that mine contamination has slowed down the rehabilitation and
development of the region, especially the reconstruction of
roads.[23]
It was expected that, following the peace agreement in December 2004,
thousands of internally displaced people would return to their home areas, as
well as those who sought refuge in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. However, no
significant movement of returnees was registered in 2005-2006. UN agencies have
reported consistently that the mine and UXO problem is an impediment to the
resettlement of displaced people and is slowing down the peace process in the
region.[24]
Following clashes between Guinea-Bissau troops and one faction of the MFDC in
mid-March 2006 in Guinea-Bissau, some 7,000 people on both sides of the border
were displaced.[25] Despite the
increased risk inherent in population displacement, as of the end of April 2006,
there were no reports of an increase in the number of civilian casualties caused
by mines within Senegal.[26]
Mine Action Program
As of May 2006, there was no national mine action authority or mine action
center in Casamance, and there was no formal mine action program. However, a
law on the mine ban and on mine action was adopted by the National Assembly on
14 July 2005 and promulgated by the president on 3 August 2005; Article 8
stipulates that a national commission will be established to ensure
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and of the law itself, as well as of
assistance to victims and support to demining. Article 9 states that the
commission will also supervise the national mine action center, in charge of
coordination of mine action
activities.[27] To bring these
measures into effect, two decrees were adopted by the Council of Ministers in
March 2005, and were awaiting signature at the end of
2005.[28]
Since August 1999, the National Commission on the Implementation of the Mine
Ban Treaty has been responsible for the mine issue. The first decree adopted in
March 2005 will make it a proper national mine action authority, enlarging its
responsibilities to include supervision of the mine action center, developing
national strategies, and approving budgets and annual workplans submitted by the
new mine action center. The decree also foresees the linking of the National
Agency for the Revival of Economic and Social Activities in Casamance (Agence
Nationale pour la Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en
Casamance) to the National Commission in order to ensure effective coordination
between mine action activities and projects aiming to rehabilitate Casamance.
The second decree establishes and defines the role and responsibilities of a
national mine action center, to be located in Ziguinchor, in Casamance; the
center would ensure the coordination, management, planning and monitoring of
mine action activities in the
country.[29]
In 2004, before the peace agreement was signed, the Senegalese government
asked UNDP to help create national mine action structures and a mine action
program. UNDP conducted a mission in March 2005 and deployed a chief technical
advisor in June to support national mine action capacity-building. In November
2005, UNDP and the government finalized a Mine Action Assistance Project for
Casamance (Projet d’Assistance à la Lutte Antimines en Casamance,
PALAC) for 2005-2009.
Main objectives of the PALAC are “the provision of technical assistance
to the government of Senegal to develop and to implement a mine action
program” as well as “to ensure mobilization of resources necessary
for the mine action program.” It adds that UNDP will coordinate and
manage, with the government, financial contributions to the program; donations
will be used to support the establishment of the mine action center in
Ziguinchor and its running costs, as well as to fund the mine action
program’s operations.[30]
An UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) mission in March 2004 also recommended that
a mine action program be established, that should “aim to be modest at the
start with a focus on problem identification through a socioeconomic impact
survey conducted by HI and a limited number of clearance
sections.”[31]
The European Commission (EC) conducted an assessment mission at the end of
2005, but as of May 2006, the report had not been finalized. The EC confirmed
its willingness to support demining in Senegal with funding of €4 million,
but required first that Senegal set in place the necessary institutional
framework for mine action.[32]
Strategic Planning and Progress
Senegal has not yet adopted a mine action strategy. However, despite the
slow progress on legislating in support of mine action in Senegal, UNDP
supported the implementation of the Emergency Landmine Impact Study in Casamance
(ELISC) at the end of 2005. The results of the study were due to be made public
by the end of May 2006, and to assist the development of a national mine action
strategy and operational action plans.
UNDP and the government, through the National Commission, had already drafted
a national mine action strategy which, as of April 2006, was under revision by
the National Commission. The strategy was said to be in line with the 2009
deadline set for Senegal by Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The total cost of
implementing that strategy was estimated as $22 million. It is unclear how the
strategy may change in light of the ELISC results and better understanding of
the mine threat in Casamance. According to the UNDP chief technical advisor,
the final objective was to reach a situation in which Casamance would be
“free from the impact of mines” by
2009.[33]
In 2005, Senegal was asked to submit a proposal to the UNDP Completion
Initiative, which aims to accelerate mine action in countries where a concerted
effort and relatively modest investment will solve the landmine and UXO problem
within five years. The contaminated area and percentage of the population
affected in Senegal are believed to be limited; therefore, with sufficient
funding, it could be possible to eliminate the mine threat in high and medium
priority areas by 2009. However, Senegal’s application was not in the
first batch of priority countries accepted by the Completion Initiative. Its
application was due to be updated with the results of the ELISC and
reconsidered.[34]
For data management, Senegal has relied upon the landmine casualty database
developed by HI, and a database developed to serve the ELISC, which allows
mapping and is reportedly compatible with the Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA). When IMSMA is installed in the mine action center, the
ELISC data will be transferred to
it.[35]
Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Senegal is required to destroy all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but no later than 1 March 2009. As of May 2006, Senegal had no mine
action program or strategy and no comprehensive national legislation in support
of mine action.
UNDP and the National Commission have drafted a national mine action strategy
to which could be added the results of the ELISC. However, the draft mine
action strategy’s final objective is reported to be that Casamance
“is free from the impact of mines by 2009,” whereas Article 5
requires that all mines in mined areas are destroyed, which may be termed
“mine-free” as distinct from “impact-free.”
Demining
In 2005, only HI and the Senegalese Army carried out demining activities in
Senegal. France supported the training of six army officers at the regional
demining school in Benin in
2005.[36]
Identification of Mined Areas: Surveys and Assessments
In October 2005, HI initiated the ELISC, with funding from Canada through
UNDP; final results were due to be made available at the end of May 2006.
Four teams of three “surveyors” visited 251 villages in Kolda and
Ziguinchor, the two regions of Casamance. Village visits were made with mine
risk education community volunteers from HI’s community-based project, in
order to spread safety messages to affected villages. Of the 3,446 villages in
Casamance, the initial Expert Opinion Collection identified 311 villages
requiring survey; however, 60 villages could not be visited because they were
abandoned. Those communities will be surveyed later when the political
situation allows.
The village visits identified 93 communities as mine-affected, and a total of
49 SHAs; there were seven high-impact, 45 medium-impact and 41 low-impact
communities. The departments of Ziguinchor and Sédhiou were the most
heavily impacted with a total of 71 impacted
villages.[37]
UNMAS ensured the external quality assurance of the ELISC. A quality
assurance monitor conducted two missions in 2006 with a view to allowing the UN
to certify the study.[38]
According to HI, the ELISC worked in close cooperation with the MFDC to
encourage its participation in the study and ensure the safety of the survey
teams. By letter, the General Secretary of the MFDC called on all MFDC branches
to collaborate with the teams. However, the MFDC did not provide information on
the locations of mines and UXO. The Senegalese Army provided information on
where they thought mines had been laid.
[39]
Marking and Fencing
Senegal reported in its Article 7 report for 2004 that known mined areas are
marked and entry into some mine-suspected areas is
“banned.”[40] In its
Article 7 report for 2005, Senegal stated that the only marking undertaken in
Casamance is the fact of villagers living in contaminated
areas.[41] As of April 2006, no
official marking in accordance with international standards and the requirements
of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty had taken place. However, Senegal’s
Article 7 report for 2005 notes that marking activities combined with technical
survey will be an important component of the future mine action
program.[42]
NGOs have reported previously that mined areas are not marked. Very
occasionally they have observed suspected areas being indicated with pieces of
red cloth or red paint.[43]
Mine and UXO Clearance
The Senegalese Army stopped its demining program in April 2004, after a
faction of the MFDC opposed to the peace process attacked government forces
clearing landmines, killing three and injuring five
soldiers.[44] In 2005-2006, the
Army conducted small-scale clearance to allow its forces to pass though
suspected areas, and when requested by the government (for example, before road
reconstruction). The Army cleared 55 landmines in 2005, and 18 landmines at the
start of 2006. From 1996 to 2006, 1,851 landmines were
destroyed.[45]
In its previous Article 7 report, Senegal reported that 708 antipersonnel
mines, and 63 rockets and grenades had been destroyed in
2004.[46]
Mine Risk Education
Mine risk education (MRE) in Casamance was provided in 2005 by HI, UNICEF and
a network of local NGOs and community
groups.[47 ]
Senegal’s Article 7 report for 2005 stated that the Ministry of
Education conducted MRE in schools in Casamance, supported by HI and UNICEF.
More than 40,000 students and their families were reached by interactive MRE
sessions in 112 schools in 51
villages.[48] UNICEF stated that,
“it is possible that this intensive campaign was a decisive factor leading
to the reduction of mine accidents in
2005.”[49] HI worked closely
with the regional education department to integrate MRE into the curriculum;
1,921 teachers were trained in over 300 elementary schools; 85,000 students had
been exposed to MRE by 22 March
2006.[50]
The Article 7 report, however, omits the village-based activities undertaken
by HI, which works either directly with villages or through community-level
volunteers trained in MRE. HI, in collaboration with the NGO Fankanta ou
Enfance et Paix and other local NGOs, has trained 669 community volunteers
chosen by community members, including 81 women and nine mine
survivors.[51] The volunteers are
part of mine committees in 17 villages; the committees’ tasks include MRE
and marking minefields with locally appropriate
signs.[52]
Mass media was used as an integral component of HI’s MRE
community-based program, with MRE messages transmitted twice a week through two
radio stations in Ziguinchor, and once a week on one radio station in Kolda. No
additional materials were developed by HI in 2005; in previous years, it
produced a set of MRE tools including image boxes, mine folders, posters and
banners, and initiated the use of videos, dramas and “frescos” to
disseminate MRE-messages.[53]
UNICEF trained MRE facilitators during 2005, including 116 members from the
national NGO Senegalese Association of Mine Victims. About 500 school directors
and teachers from Sédhiou and Ziguinchor departments were also trained.
A set of MRE materials was provided to each
participant.[54]
MRE is one of the key components of the PALAC finalized in November 2005; the
project describes MRE according to the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) definition (to cover public information dissemination, education and
training, and community liaison), highlighting community liaison in particular
“to put the affected communities at the heart of the program and to be
involved in all stages of the
program.”[55] For 2006,
UNICEF planned to provide an MRE advisor and coordinator to the new mine action
center.[56]
Funding and Assistance
A total of $807,758 was contributed to mine action in Senegal by Canada and
the US in 2005. Canada reported donating C$372,849 ($307,758), consisting of
C$90,886 ($75,019) to UNDP for the ELISC, and C$281,963 ($232,739) for survivor
assistance;[57] the US reported
$500,000 from the Leahy War Victims
Fund.[58] Canada and the US
provided $584,459 in 2004.[59]
In addition, Sweden reported contributing SEK3 million ($401,553) to the
Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) for mine clearance and for survey and
marking of mine-affected areas in Casamance in
2005.[60] However, the project was
not implemented in 2005; SRSA reported that the project had been postponed due
to the delay in establishing a national mine action authority in Senegal. SRSA
visited Senegal in January 2006; it expected to send one specialist to Senegal
in April 2006.[61]
The EC anticipated funding mine action in Senegal through the European
Development Fund during 2005-2007, reporting that the amount of projected
funding for mine clearance and MRE should “free Senegal from the mine
problem.”[62] However, the EC
did not provide mine action funding in
2005.[63]
Landmine and UXO Casualties
In 2005, HI recorded 10 new mine/UXO casualties in five incidents in Kolda
and Ziguinchor (Casamance); two people were killed and eight were injured,
including two children.[64] All the
casualties were male; six were civilian and four military. Landmines caused six
casualties and UXO caused four. This represents a decrease from the 17
casualties, all caused by mines, in
2004.[65]
Casualties continued to be reported in 2006. HI recorded nine new casualties
as of 19 May (two killed, seven injured; three were
children).[66] On 28 February, a
10-year-old boy was killed by an antivehicle mine while collecting cassava, in
the village of Dijbelor Baraf, some five kilometers south of Ziguinchor. His
two friends and one adult were seriously injured in the
blast.[67] All the 2006 casualties
occurred while collecting wood, water or
food.[68] After increased tension
in Casamance, at least 27 new casualties occurred when a minibus hit a landmine
on the Guinea-Bissau side of the border. ICRC transported the 13 injured people
to a hospital in Casamance.[69]
Since 1999, HI has maintained a database of mine
and UXO casualties in Casamance, which includes 689 casualties between 1988 and
2006. From 1997 to March 2006, 667 mine/UXO casualties were recorded, including
151 people killed and 516 injured. Sixty-nine percent of casualties were men
(463), 20 percent were women (131) and 11 percent were children
(73).[70] The system is effective,
but “could be improved as it is probable that not all casualties,
particularly those killed, are registered.” This is because of the
influence of Islamic practice (burials take place as soon as possible after a
death) and the absence of death registries. Data on mine/UXO casualties is
usually provided by the hospital. Reportedly, the army also collects casualty
data in a separate database and the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims
collects casualty information. There is no data collection coordination at the
national level. Senegal aims to integrate “the casualty databases of
Handicap International and the Army, and transfer the monitoring system to
AVSM.”[71]
Preliminary results of the ELISC included 400 mine casualties, of whom 17
were within the previous two
years.[72]
Survivor Assistance
At the First Review Conference, Senegal was identified as one of 24 States
Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest
responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for
assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation
and reintegration of survivors.[73] At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005, Senegal
declared that “it attaches great importance to assistance to mine
survivors,”[74] and presented
its objectives for survivor assistance for 2005-2009, including: improve the
effectiveness and analysis of data collection while amalgamating databases;
reduce time to reach emergency care and enhance capacities of medical staff and
supplies; improve services, capacities and coordination of rehabilitation
centers; develop two public cells for psychological support and reinforce social
service capacity and teacher training; restart economic activities in Casamance
and reinforce national development programs to increase access to credit and
training for people with disabilities; implement legislation relative to
disability and ensure accessibility of schools and public
buildings.[75]
Senegal did not attend the Standing Committee Meeting on Victim Assistance
and Socio-Economic Reintegration in Geneva in May 2006, and did not provide
updates on the progress made towards achieving its 2005-2009 goals.
Senegal provided information on victim assistance in voluntary Form J of its
Article 7 report.[76] It
participated in the Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa,
in Nairobi, Kenya on 31 May-2 June 2005; the workshop aimed to help States
Parties fulfill the Nairobi Action Plan’s victim assistance aims.
Within the framework of the PALAC, the Mine Action Assistance Project for
Casamance 2005-2009, UNDP planned to provide technical assistance for the
development of action plans for all components of mine action, including
survivor assistance. PALAC seeks to finance survivor assistance as part of mine
action operations, including medical care, physical rehabilitation and
socioeconomic reintegration for mine survivors and their
families.[77]
Casualties are usually evacuated by the army to the Ziguinchor Regional
Hospital complex (Complexe hospitalier régional de Ziguinchor), or the
Regional Hospital complex in Kolda (Complexe hospitalier régional de
Kolda). On average, it takes more than eight hours to reach the first health
facility. But extremes vary between 20 minutes, when an incident occurs near a
military base or road-junction, and more than 36 hours in remote
areas.[78] Outside the towns of
Ziguinchor and Kolda, first aid and evacuation infrastructure is almost
non-existent; some first aid is available at military camps.
The Ziguinchor Regional Hospital is the best-equipped hospital in the
mine-affected area; it has two surgeons and an anaesthetist. A military
surgical team assists the hospital when necessary. In 2004 and 2005, surgeons
received upgrade training in France and in Senegal. It has the equipment to
provide adequate care and does not face supply shortages, so it carries out the
majority of interventions.[79] Since 2001, HI has supported the hospital with material and technical
advice in traumatology and
orthopedics.[80] Kolda Regional
Hospital also has trauma care and surgical capacities, but suffers from supply,
equipment and capacity shortages.[81]
Military mine casualties are sent to the military hospital in Dakar, after
receiving first aid. The Senegalese army has a mobile emergency medical service
in Ziguinchor for military
personnel.[82]
Mobility aids are said to be available, and all mine survivors are directed
towards rehabilitation services as required. Survivors have access to
rehabilitation and survivors are involved in the planning of their
rehabilitation. Devices are locally produced and can be adjusted at all times;
however, replacement of devices is limited. Services are available through the
orthopedic department at Ziguinchor Regional Hospital near the mine-affected
areas, and at the Center of Orthopedic Appliances. There are satellite centers
in Bignona and Oussouye. The rehabilitation sector suffers from a lack of
coordination.[83]
In Ziguinchor, the regional hospital has an orthopedic department with
facilities for surgery, and rehabilitation, an orthopedic workshop, and a mobile
orthopedic workshop. Mine survivors have access to the adjustment of their
assistive devices. The rehabilitation center has two trained
orthotic/prosthetic technicians and two physiotherapists; personnel are
periodically rotated with staff from the National Centre of Orthopaedic
Appliances in Dakar. HI built and supports the department, and equipped and
trained personnel at the satellites centers in Oussouye and Bignona.
In Kolda, the regional hospital has facilities for prosthetics and
rehabilitation. [84]
HI continued operating the program for Prevention of Mine Accidents and
Assisting People with Disabilities, Mines Victims or Others in Casamance. The
main focus of the program is incident prevention, as well as technical support
for medical and rehabilitation issues, and the socioeconomic rehabilitation of
landmine survivors and other people with disabilities. HI supported the ongoing
training of orthopedic technicians and physiotherapists. In 2005, 260
wheelchairs were produced with HI’s support. The main challenge is the
unstable political context in Casamance. HI operates with a budget of
$1,000,000.[85]
Psychological support and services are not well developed in Casamance and
the absence of a permanent psychologist and psychiatrist in Ziguinchor impedes
long-term follow-up of survivors. However, a psychiatrist from Dakar visits
Ziguinchor for one week every two months. Peer and family support groups are
available. HI has trained 42 people, including hospital staff and mine
survivors, to provide psychological support and has supported groups of mine
survivors to provide peer support in the hospital. HI provides technical
support to the activities of the Centers for Protection and Social Reintegration
in Ziguinchor. UNICEF also has a network of 14 cells providing support through
the area.[86] There is no
coordination at the national level for the psychological support of mine
survivors.[87]
The Senegalese Association of Mine Victims works to empower mine survivors
and the families of those killed by mines to facilitate their socioeconomic
reintegration.[88]
Economic reintegration programs and the promotion of education and training
for people with disabilities are integrated into the Poverty Reduction Strategy
through national development plans, such as the Programme for the Revival of
Social and Economic Activities (Programme de Relance des Activités
Economiques et Sociales en Casamance) in Casamance. In Casamance, the National
Agency for the Revival of Activities is responsible for implementing and
coordinating economic reintegration through a participatory
approach.[89] In 2005, the
government ran schools for children with disabilities, provided vocational
training grants and micro-credit
support.[90] Vocational training is
available in Ziguinchor, but is not accessible for mine survivors because it is
not free of charge. Mine survivors rarely resume their former employment and
are often refused access to credit by the banks. However, two micro-credit
programs include mine survivors and other people with disabilities among their
clients.[91]
The army provides comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration services for
soldiers disabled in action. The Foundation of Invalids and Mutilated Military
Personnel provides funds for physical and psychological assistance and disabled
soldiers can remain employed and/or receive a disability pension; an agency for
the social rehabilitation of soldiers is being set
up.[92]
Disability Policy and Practice
There is no specific legislation protecting the rights of people with
disabilities in Senegal. However, the 2001 Constitution says that, “the
State and the public bodies have the social duty to take care of the physical
and moral health of the family, and in particular of handicapped people and old
people.”[93]
As of December 2005, a bill for social guidance and equal opportunity for
people with disabilities was before
parliament.[94] It aims to increase
access to medical care, economic reintegration and social protection.
The Advisor to the President on disability issues, at the department of
Social Services and Development, Family Planning and National Solidarity is a
disabled person and head of the Federation of Disability Associations in
Senegal.[95] In 2005, Senegal
announced that 15 percent of those recruited to public offices will be people
with disabilities.[96]
Despite these efforts, disabled people’s representatives state that the
government has not appointed a ministry responsible for disability issues.
There is a the lack of attention paid to people with disabilities in development
strategies, and a lack of special training for teachers and accessible schools,
with the result that only 30 percent of children with disabilities attend
school.[97]
On the 2006 International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine
Action, mine survivors organized a parade to draw attention to their
situation.[98]
The Association of People with a Physical Disability advocates for equal
rights of people with disabilities and was the venue for an information and
communication technologies workshop for people with disabilities in Dakar in
July 2005, in cooperation with the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities.
The workshop aimed at increasing access to
information.[99]
In Montreal, the Symphonie des Vents (Wind Symphony) organized a benefit
concert for mine survivors in Casamance in November
2005.[100]
[1] See Landmine Monitor Report
2000, p. 96. [2] Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 May
2006. Previously, Senegal reported that violations of the Mine Ban Treaty were
sanctioned by national constitutional law and the 2001 penal code. [3] Law in regard to ban of
antipersonnel mines (Loi relative à l’interdiction des mines
antipersonnel), 3 August 2005. The law was submitted with the 2006 Article 7
report as an attachment. Average exchange rate: US1$ = CFA523.05, Landmine
Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com, accessed 26 June 2006. [4] Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 May
2006. [5] Senegal submitted previous
reports on 1 September 1999, 27 March 2001, 22 April 2002, 6 May 2003, 2 June
2004 and 9 June 2005. [6] Statement by Senegal, Fourth
Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2002. [7] Interview with a member of
Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, Phnom Penh, 3 April
2006. [8] However, in 1998, members of
the engineering corps said that the Senegalese Army possessed mines of Warsaw
Pact origin. Handicap International (HI), “The Impact of Landmines in
Casamance/Senegal,” Exploratory Mission Report, August 1998, first
reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 76. [9] However, it appears certain
that Senegalese forces used antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, to
support government troops against a self-proclaimed military junta. Such use
would have occurred after Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty, but before its
entry into force for the government. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999,
pp. 78-79. [10] “General Peace
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the Mouvement
des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance,” 30 December 2004. The
agreement acknowledged the scourge of antipersonnel mines and called for
humanitarian demining in Casamance. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p.
505. [11] For more details, see
previous editions of Landmine Monitor. MFDC use continued even after it agreed
to the Banjul Declaration of 26
December 1999, which committed both the Senegalese army and the MFDC to non-use
of antipersonnel landmines. In 1999, the government stated MFDC rebels
possessed mines of Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Chinese origin.
Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 76; “Des mines à
profusion,” Sud Quotidien, 17 December 2003. [12] Alberto Dabo, “Bissau
army hits mines, halts Senegal rebel attack,” Reuters (Sao
Domingos), 25 March 2006. [13] Ibid, 20 March 2006. [14] Email from Tammy Hall, Chief
Technical Advisor, UN Development Programme (UNDP), Bissau, 29 March 2006. [15] ICBL Press Release,
“Nobel Peace Prize Organization Urges Senegalese Rebels to Stop Laying
Landmines in Guinea-Bissau,” 3 April 2006. See report on Guinea-Bissau in
this edition of Landmine Monitor. [16] Article 7 Report, Form C, 9
June 2005. [17] Email from Pascal Simon,
Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2005; Article 7 Report, Form C,
8 May 2006. [18] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2005; HI, “Emergency Landmine Impact Study in
Casamance (ELISC) draft report,” 28 April 2006. [19] UN Mine Action Service,
“Assessment mission report on the mine and UXO problem in Senegal,”
20 May 2004, p. 10. [20] Statement by Senegal, Eighth
International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors, 19
September 2005. One estimate puts the total population of Casamance at 1.2
million. Government of Senegal/UNDP, Project document, “Projet
d’Assistance à la Lutte Antimines en Casamance (PALAC)
2005-2009,” Dakar, November 2005, p. 6. [21] Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, (then) Senior Technical Advisor, HI, Ziguinchor, 27 April
2004. [22] HI, “ELISC draft
report,” 28 April 2006. [23] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp.
506-507. [24] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 507; email from Pascal Simon, UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006;
Senegal/UNDP, “PALAC 2005-2009,” Dakar, November 2005, p. 6. [25] “Guinea-Bissau-Senegal:
Not enough aid reaching communities stranded by fighting,” IRIN, 11
April 2006; “Guinea-Bissau-Senegal: Clashes leave villagers cut off as
rebels lay fresh mines,” IRIN, 21 March 2006. [26] Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, Project Manager, ELISC, HI, Ziguinchor, 24 April 2006; email from
Pascal Simon, UNDP Senegal, 27 April 2006. However, new casualties did result
in Guinea-Bissau. See report on Guinea-Bissau in this edition of Landmine
Monitor. [27] “Projet de loi
relative a l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel,” Dakar, undated
but 2005. [28] Article 7 Report, Form A, 8
May 2006. [29] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006. [30] Senegal/UNDP, “PALAC
2005-2009,” Dakar, November 2005, pp. 4-5. [31] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 508. [32] Email from Agnès
Hano, Head of Section for Rural Development and Civil Society, EC Delegation in
Senegal, 3 May 2006. [33] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006. [34] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 27 April 2006. [35] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p.
508. [36] “Bilan total du Centre
de Perfectionnement aux Actions post-conflictuelles de Déminage et de
Dépollution (CPADD),” CPADD, April 2006, provided to Landmine
Monitor on 26 April 2006. [37] Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, HI, Ziguinchor, 11 April 2006; HI, “ELISC draft
report,” 28 April 2006. [38] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006. [39] Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, HI, Ziguinchor, 11 April 2006. [40] Article 7 Report, Form I, 9
June 2005. [41] Article 7 Report, Form I, 8
May 2006, states, “Les seules activités de marquage qui ont eu lieu
en Casamance sont le fait de villageois vivant dans les zones
contaminées.” [42] Article 7 Report, Form I, 8
May 2006. [43] Telephone interview with
Manuel Gonzal, HI, Ziguinchor, 24 April 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 507. [44] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 509. [45] Article 7 Report, Form F, 8
May 2006; telephone interview with Manuel Gonzal, HI, Ziguinchor, 24 April
2006. [46] Article 7 Report, Form B, 9
June 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 509. [47 ] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006. [48] Article 7 Report, Form I, 8
May 2006; email from Isabelle Austin, Senior Program Officer, UNICEF Senegal, 29
May 2006. [49] Email from Isabelle Austin,
UNICEF Senegal, 29 May 2006. [50] Interview with Doudou Fall,
MRE Coordinator, HI, Dakar, 2 March 2006, and update from Doudou Fall in email
from Sophie Bonichon Yilma, MRE Technical Coordinator, HI, Lyon, 8 June
2006. [51] Email from Sophie Bonichon
Yilma, HI, Lyon, 13 July 2005. [52] HI, “Rapport final
narratif du programme Amélioration de la prise en charge des personnes
handicappées par mines ou autres et mise en place
d’activités anti-mines en Casamance,” October 2003, p. 41.
[53] Email from Isabelle Austin,
UNICEF Senegal, 29 May 2006. [54] Article 7 Report, Form I, 8
May 2006; email from Isabelle Austin, UNICEF Senegal, 29 May 2006. [55] Senegal/UNDP, “PALAC
2005-2009,” Dakar, November 2005, pp. 5, 13, 19. [56] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2006; email from Isabelle Austin, UNICEF Senegal, 29 May
2006. [57] Mine Action Investments
database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, Canada, 7 June 2006. Average exchange
rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange
Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. UNDP reports having received $298,387
from Canada for Senegal in 2005. UNDP, “Mine Action Contributions to
UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,” 20
April 2006. [58] USG Historical Chart
containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial
Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006. [59] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 510. [60] Sweden Article 7 Report,
Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, March-May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US
Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006;
Sida, “Senegal: Mine Action Project,” Decision number: 2005-3133, 11
November 2005. [61] SRSA, “The Swedish
Rescue Services Agency’s Mine Action Newsletter No. 1 2006,” 24
March 2006. [62] EC, “Mine Action
2005-2007,” pp. 38, 34. [63] Email from Agnès
Hano, EC Delegation in Senegal, 3 May 2006. [64] Email from Gilbert
Hascoët, Program Director Senegal and Cape Verde, HI Senegal, 23 March
2006. [65] Ibid, 29 May 2006; response
to Landmine Monitor VA Questionnaire by Gilbert Hascoët, HI Senegal, 23
March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 511. [66] Response to Landmine Monitor
VA Questionnaire by Gilbert Hascoët, HI Senegal, 23 March 2006. [67] “Ten-Year-Old Killed
By Landmine,” All Africa (Ziguinchor), 6 March 2006. [68] Email from Gilbert
Hascoët, HI Senegal, 29 May 2006. [69] ICRC, “Senegal: ICRC
aids people displaced by fighting,” 31 March 2006, www.icrc.org. [70] Email from Gilbert
Hascoët, HI Senegal, 23 March 2006; Article 7 Report, Form J, 8 May
2006. [71] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, “Victim Assistance objectives of the state parties that have the
responsibility for significant number of landmine survivors,” Zagreb, 28
November-2 December 2005, pp. 180-181. [72] Email from Pascal Simon,
UNDP Senegal, 18 April 2005; HI, “ELISC draft report,” 28 April
2006. [73] UN, “Final Report,
First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November-3 December 2004,
APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99. [74] Statement by Senegal, Sixth
Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005. [75] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 180-187. [76] Article 7 Report, Form J, 8
May 2006. [77] Senegal/UNDP, “PALAC
2005-2009,” Dakar, November 2005, pp. 4-5, 15, 17. [78] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 181. [79] Ibid, p. 182. [80] Article 7 Report, Form J, 8
May 2006. [81] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, pp. 181-182; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 708-709. [82] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 708-709. [83] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 183. [84] Presentation by Senegal,
Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa, Nairobi, 31 May-2
June 2005. [85] Response to Landmine Monitor
VA Questionnaire by Gilbert Hascoët, HI Senegal, 23 March 2006. [86] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 184. [87] Presentation by Senegal,
Workshop on Advancing Landmine Victim Assistance in Africa, Nairobi, 31 May-2
June 2005. [88] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 512. [89] Mamadou Aliou Diallo,
“Reconstruction de la Casamance: l'enveloppe passe de 80 à 100
milliards (The Development of Casamance: the budget goes from 80 to 100
billion),” Wal Fadjri (Dakar), 29 April 2006. [90] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005: Senegal,” 8
March 2006. [91] “Final Report of the
Sixth Meeting of States Parties / Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex
V, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005, p. 186. [92] Ibid, pp. 186-187. [93] Ibid, p. 187. [94] Statement by Senegal, Sixth
Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005. [95] Secretariat of the Africa
Decade of Persons with Disabilities, “Activities in Senegal: National
Decade Steering Committee created in Senegal,” March 2005. [96] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices–2005: Senegal,” 8
March 2006. [97] Ibid. [98] “A Ziguinchor les
victimes de mines à l’honneur (In Zinguinchor, honor to the mine
survivors),” All Africa (Ziguinchor), 5 April 2006. [99] Secretariat of the Africa
Decade of Persons with Disabilities, “Activities in Senegal: ICT training
in Dakar,” July 2005. [100]
“Concert-bénéfice au profit des victimes des mines
terrestres en Casamance au Sénégal (Benefit concert for the
victims of landmines in Casamance in Senegal),” Canada News Wire
(Quebec), 25 November 2005.