

SIGNATORIES

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Brunei Darussalam signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. It did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, or any of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002. Brunei cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M promoting the implementation and universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2001, as it had in previous years. Brunei is not party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Brunei responded to a letter from the ICBL on 17 June 2002, stating simply, "I wish to inform you that Brunei Darussalam is not ready at this stage to ratify the Convention."¹ Landmine Monitor requests for interviews with the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs have not received any response in 2000, 2001, and 2002.

Brunei attended the regional seminar Landmines in Southeast Asia hosted by Thailand from 13-15 May 2002 in Bangkok, but made no public statements and would not respond for the record to the Landmine Monitor researcher's questions. Brunei did not attend the regional stockpile destruction seminar held in Malaysia in August 2001.

In 1999, the Ministry of Defense indicated that Brunei needed to retain the option of using antipersonnel mines for security concerns. At that time, Brunei stated that it has never used, produced or exported antipersonnel mines and has a small stockpile largely for training purposes.² The Army has an Engineer unit.

Brunei is not mine-affected.

BURUNDI

Key developments since May 2001: There continue to be allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Burundian troops both inside Burundi and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Landmine Monitor has not been able to corroborate such allegations, or to determine if rebel or government forces are responsible for ongoing mine use. The government strongly denies any use of mines, and has again invited an observer mission to establish facts. Burundi declared a stockpile of 1,200 antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Burundi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified it. The government participated as an observer in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001, as well as intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

At the January 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meeting, the Burundi delegate noted that "the only urgency that delayed the adoption of the instruments of ratification of the Ottawa Convention" had been the need to put in place the transitional government structures provided for in the Arusha Peace Agreement.¹ He assured the States Parties that Burundi "will be among the ten new countries which will ratify the Convention by next September."² The delegation also stated

¹ Letter from Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei Darussalam, to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator, ICBL, 17 June 2002.

² Interview with Ministry of Defense officials, 11 February 1999. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 449 for more details.

¹ Statement by Ambassador Nahayo Adolphe, Burundi Permanent Representative to the Mission in Geneva, Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 31 January 2002.

² *Ibid.*

that the government of Burundi is “against the use of landmines,” and called on the “international community to intervene in stopping the use of landmines by Non-State Actors.”³

In an interview with Landmine Monitor at the intersessional Standing Committee meeting in January 2002, the Burundi delegation further confirmed that as normalcy was slowly returning to the country, and institutions taking root, ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was underway and that “Burundi will be very active in universalizing the Convention.”⁴

In February 2002, a military official said, “Today the National Army has given its full support to the ratification of the Ottawa Convention. Technically, there is no reason why Burundi should not ratify the Ottawa Convention. There is no longer any part of the territory of Burundi that is not accessible due to the presence of rebels. Even Tenga that used to be their stronghold is now fully controlled by the National Army.”⁵ In April 2002, the same official reported, “The texts of ratification will soon be presented by the Minister of Defense and discussed so that a decision can be made before September in regard with the ratification of the treaty.”⁶ At the May 2002 Standing Committee meetings, the Burundi delegate said the date of ratification “is hard to predict,” but was hoped for “at least by September or the end of the year.”⁷

Minister of Foreign Affairs Therence Sinunguruza told Landmine Monitor on 25 July 2002 that he was making every effort to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible. He indicated that ratification would be put on the agenda of the cabinet in September.⁸

Burundi cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), nor did it participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Burundi is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines.⁹ In a letter of August 2001, Burundi for the first time stated that it has a stockpile of 1,200 antipersonnel mines.¹⁰ While the letter did not indicate whether the stockpile was for training or for other purposes, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* had quoted Colonel Juvenal Bujeje as saying Burundi’s “limited stock” was for training purposes.¹¹ During the Standing Committee meeting in January 2002, an official of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining characterized Burundi as being among the countries whose stockpile is non-existent or reduced.¹²

Use

Landmine Monitor Report 2001 stated that it seemed certain that in the past antipersonnel mines had been used in Burundi by both government and rebel forces.¹³ Government officials have

³ Ibid.

⁴ Interview with Col. Nicodeme Nduhirubusa and Col. Juvenal Bujeje, Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 31 January 2002.

⁵ Interview with Col. Juvenal Bujeje, officer in charge of landmine issues, Ministry of Defense, Bujumbura, 10 February 2002.

⁶ Interview with Col. Juvenal Bujeje, Ministry of Defense, Bujumbura, 7 April 2002.

⁷ Interview with Col. Juvenal Bujeje, Ministry of Defense, Bujumbura, 29 May 2002.

⁸ Meeting with HE Therence Sinunguruza, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bujumbura, 25 July 2002.

⁹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.198.

¹⁰ Letter addressed to the UNDDA Office and other International Organizations in Geneva from the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the UN in Geneva, 7 August 2001.

¹¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p.198. Colonel Bujeje said the stockpile was “less than 15,000” antipersonnel mines.

¹² Presentation by Fabrice Delaître, GICHD, to intersessional Standing Committee meeting on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2002.

¹³ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp.199-202. The 1999, 2000, and 2001 *Landmine Monitor Reports* have reported allegations of use of antipersonnel mines on the border with Tanzania, in various areas of combat

repeatedly denied any use of landmines by government forces. At the Third Meeting of States Parties, head of delegation Ambassador Nahayo Adolphe said, "The delegation of Burundi reminds the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention that the allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the National Army are false. In its concern for transparency, Burundi renews its call for an international observation commission on antipersonnel mines to come establish reality in the field."¹⁴ During the January 2002 Standing Committee meetings, the Burundi delegation again fiercely rebutted the allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, stating, "There is absolutely no need to lay antipersonnel mines as ours is an agricultural country."¹⁵

In response to a letter from Landmine Monitor regarding allegations of use in this reporting period, Burundi responded that "the Government of the Republic of Burundi has always denied using landmines for military purposes for the only reason the Government of the Republic of Burundi cannot hinder the main population activity that is agriculture. Concerning the DRC, the Government of the Republic of Burundi has no interest in using those landmines because its main activities in this area are securing the commercial fleets on the lake Tanganyika and has no major military activities that would require the use of antipersonnel mines."¹⁶

Despite the repeated strong denials, Landmine Monitor continues to receive troubling accounts of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines inside Burundi by both rebel and government forces, and ongoing use in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the Burundi Army. Landmine Monitor has been unable to corroborate independently these allegations.

Landmine Monitor strongly encourages States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to accept the invitations of the Burundi government, extended at both the Second and Third Meetings of States Parties, to send an "observer mission" or an "international observation commission" to try to establish the facts regarding use of antipersonnel mines in Burundi or by Burundian forces.

Allegations of Use in Burundi

It appears certain that landmines continue to be used in Burundi, but it is difficult to determine who is planting the mines. Médecins sans Frontières Belgium and Médecins sans Frontières France receive sporadic cases of civilians wounded by mines in the area around the capital, Bujumbura Rural, on average about one a week. According to the survivors, mines have been laid in forested areas in Tenga and Rukoko, which are areas where rebels have operated.¹⁷ It is not clear if the mines were laid recently or in past years, and it is not clear whether government or rebel forces have been responsible.

In February and March 2002, residents of an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp near Tenga reported that people were forced to clear brush in the area and they exploded mines set off by tripwire.¹⁸ A 33-year-old man told Human Rights Watch that in early 2002 in Tenga two IDPs were injured by a tripwire mine they exploded while cutting brush; he said the IDPs know to look for wires or string that are across the path, because they will explode a mine.¹⁹ A 30-year-old woman living in Kivoga site said that the paths outside the site are mined by the military. She believes it is a way of protecting the site from rebels, but also of keeping the people in. She said

with rebels, near refugee/IDP camps, around the Bujumbura airport, at isolated military posts, and around economic infrastructure, as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

¹⁴ Statement by Ambassador Nahayo Adolphe, Burundi Permanent Representative to the Mission in Geneva, "Declaration de la delegation du Burundi a la troisieme assemblee des estats-parties a la convention d'Ottawa Managua," Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

¹⁵ Interview, Col. Nicome Nduhirubusa and Col. Juvenal Bujjeje, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

¹⁶ Letter to Landmine Monitor Coordinator from Col. Nicodeme Nduhirubusa, Adviser to the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Relations and Cooperation, Bujumbura, 26 July 2002.

¹⁷ Email from Médecins sans Frontières-Belgium. 23 July 2002; email to Landmine Monitor from Human Rights Watch staff in Burundi, 10 June 2002.

¹⁸ Email to Landmine Monitor from Human Rights Watch staff in Burundi, 10 June 2002.

¹⁹ Ibid., testimony taken in Bujumbura on 18 March 2002.

IDPs have planted crops outside the camp in the fields, and they must ask permission to go to the fields because there are mines and if they don't ask, they risk being killed by mines. She said on 5 March 2002, a man forced to cut brush in Tenga was killed by a mine, and three others wounded.²⁰

A senior UN official also referred to Army use of mines in an interview with Landmine Monitor.²¹ He said that there is no systematic recording of mined areas and observed, that most of the time, neither the National Army nor the rebels had the time to follow standard procedures, but were responding to emergencies to defend occupied territories or to block passages, and failed to mark the mined areas.

Burundi officials contend that the presence of antipersonnel mines on Burundi soil could be "the work of rebels crossing into Burundi from neighboring countries."²² In its statement during the January 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Burundi sought the support of the international community to "push the rebels of FFD and FNL to negotiate a ceasefire and to adhere to the Peace agreement signed in Arusha."²³ Ambassador Nahayo Adolphe specifically asked for an intensified campaign addressed to producers and exporters of antipersonnel mines to "stop any transfer to non-state actors that do not feel concerned by international conventions."²⁴

In a July 2002 letter to Landmine Monitor, Burundi stated that "rebels are using landmines to impede Government forces military convoys mainly on roads permitting them easy mobility but unfortunately they are affecting mostly civilian vehicles." The letter listed five incidents from 10-15 July 2002 in which civilian trucks exploded antivehicle mines.²⁵

Allegations of Use in DRC

The Burundi military continues to carry out operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Local human rights organizations and others in the DRC have reported the laying of mines by Burundian soldiers around their military camps in Mboko, Swima, Ake, and Kaboke in Fizi Territory. These are located along Lake Tanganyika between Uvira and Baraka, directly across the lake from Burundi. One Congolese group reported, "The Burundian military used antipersonnel mines on the main road and on secondary roads in Mboko, Ake, and Kabondozi villages (Tanganyika collective, Fizi Territory). These mines caused victims, most of them children and women."²⁶ The organization took testimony on five incidents between 7 November 2001 and 5 January 2002 in which antipersonnel mines allegedly laid by the Burundi military caused nine civilian casualties, including three dead and six injured.²⁷ Another organization noted, "Several credible groups have reported Burundian military mining these areas."²⁸

Landmine Monitor was not able to independently corroborate these allegations. In July 2002, Minister of Foreign Affairs Therence Sinunguruza categorically denied any use of antipersonnel mines by Burundian troops in the DRC.²⁹

It is important to note that the DRC ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002, and it will enter into force for the DRC on 1 November 2002. As a State Party, the DRC will have an obligation to prevent, suppress and punish use of antipersonnel mines by any entity on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the DRC government.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Confidential interview with UN official, Bujumbura, February 2002.

²² Interview, Col. Nicome Nduhirubusa and Col. Juvenal Bujeje, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

²³ Statement by Ambassador Nahayo Adolphe, Burundi Permanent Representative to the Mission in Geneva, Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 31 January 2002.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Letter from Col. Nicodeme Nduhirubusa, Adviser to the Cabinet of Minister of Foreign Relations and Cooperation, 26 July 2002.

²⁶ Report of Congolese human rights organization from the first quarter of 2002. The organization has requested anonymity.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Email to Landmine Monitor from Human Rights Watch staff in Burundi, 10 June 2002.

²⁹ Landmine Monitor Meeting with HE Therence Sinunguruza, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 2002.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Although there is undoubtedly mine contamination in Burundi, there is no accurate data on the extent or nature of that contamination. No survey or assessment has been conducted in Burundi, nor is any mine clearance activity taking place. Most of the suspected contaminated areas in Burundi are inaccessible for security reasons, so independent verification is problematic.³⁰ It is generally believed that landmine contamination is mainly centered in three areas in Burundi: in Bujumbura Rural, along the border between Burundi and Tanzania, and in Cibitoke province.³¹

To date, the government has not initiated any demining or mine awareness programs. However, after the fighting in Kinama (February 2001), unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination was identified and an ad hoc mine action response was organized.³² It was coordinated through the government and the national gendarmerie administration and supported by UNICEF. It apparently was efficient, as there have been no reported injuries or deaths after the return of the population to the area.

UNICEF is the only entity in Burundi carrying out mine risk education. To date, 100 persons have been trained in mine risk education, and five educational posters have been developed.³³ UNICEF has estimated the cost of a one-year program of mine risk education activities, which would involve the government, the National Army and Gendarmerie, and civilians, to be US\$210,600.³⁴ In a UNICEF press release of 31 May 2002, the agency noted it had not been successful in raising funds for the effort. The press release also stated, "Highlighting the current intensity of fighting in Burundi, UNICEF insists that it is urgent to fund this sector that would enable the implementation of advocacy, mine risk education, victim assistance or mine data collection."³⁵

Landmine Casualties

There is an absence of accurate mine victim and incident data.³⁶ There are reports of mine injuries from hospitals, although not on a wide scale. Mine injuries are classified together with bullet wounds, vehicle accidents, and other traumatic injuries.

The UN Security Unit recorded ten mine incidents for 2001. These incidents occurred between January and November and were mainly reported from Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke, and Makamba provinces.³⁷ On 29 January 2001, in Mutimbuzi commune, Bujumbura Rural province, one civilian was killed and another seriously injured by an antipersonnel mine allegedly planted by the army.³⁸ On 9 March 2001, a landmine explosion killed a child in Kabezi commune.³⁹ On 23 June 2001, in Mutimbuzi commune, a landmine explosion killed one civilian and seriously injured two others.⁴⁰ As noted above, Médecins sans Frontières receives sporadic cases of civilians wounded by mines in the area around the capital, Bujumbura Rural, reportedly on average about one a week.

It is likely that the number of reported incidents does not accurately reflect the actual number of mine casualties. According to the Director of the UN Security Unit, the list of incidents/casualties could more comprehensive if NGOs that operate in the countryside were

³⁰ Report produced by Ben Lark, UNICEF consultant, May 2001. (untitled).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Interview with Liliane Bigayimpunzi, UNICEF Protection Officer, Burundi, 17 January 2002.

³⁴ Report produced by Ben Lark, UNICEF consultant, May 2001.

³⁵ "Penurie de fonds pour les programmes de l'UNICEF (Burundi)," IRIN, Nairobi, Kenya, 31 May 2002.

³⁶ Report produced by Ben Lark, UNICEF consultant, May 2001.

³⁷ UN Security Unit, monthly data collection of mines incidents for 2001. The data does not give details on the number of casualties or whether killed or injured.

³⁸ U.S. State Department, *Human Rights Report 2001*, country report on Burundi.
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8280.htm>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

willing to cooperate and participate in reporting incidents.⁴¹ When asked to cooperate, many respond that their primary purpose is not to deal with the landmine issue alone. For instance, Handicap International Belgium programs include assistance to mines victims, but they do not have records that account for mines victims only.⁴² Another fact that hampers accurate recording of mine incidents is that many of the mine victims seek medical care in the refugee camps in Tanzania, as incidents often occur along the border.

A Landmine Monitor field survey on the Burundi-Tanzania border in January 2002 identified 11 Burundi landmine survivors who were being treated in border hospitals inside Tanzania.⁴³ One landmine survivor interviewed had stepped on a landmine near the border with Tanzania on 7 September 2001.⁴⁴ Another survivor said that on 16 September 2001, while fleeing to Tanzania from Rutana, he was injured by a landmine and a male companion died on the spot.⁴⁵

According to the Ministry of Defense, up to 1998, 80 people were killed and 187 seriously injured in mine-related incidents. Other sources claim that, between 1993 and 2000, there were 791 deaths in mine-related incidents.⁴⁶

Survivor Assistance

Burundi's health care system has deteriorated since 1993, and the availability of basic medicines and health supplies is limited. In 2001, the ICRC provided medicines and other medical supplies to the Prince Regent Charles Hospital in Bujumbura, the military hospital in Kamenge, and the provincial hospitals of Gitega, Kirundo, Muyinga, Ngozi and Ruyigi. The supplies enabled the hospitals to treat almost 3,000 surgical cases, which included 69 mine/UXO casualties. In 2001, Médecins sans Frontières provided basic medical and surgical care to civilians in the Bujumbura, Bujumbura Rural, Cankuzo, Karuzi, Kayanza, and Makamba provinces.⁴⁷ The Jesuit Refugee Service also operated health posts in Buterere, Kinama, and Kiyange.⁴⁸

The National Army began a program to assist military victims of the war in December 2000, which has now completed the first cycle of training war victims. The program entails the provision of medical rehabilitation and vocational training, in fields such as computer skills, electrical, masonry, and carpentry. When the training is completed, the graduates are returned to military barracks to carry out activities relevant to their training.⁴⁹ It is planned to continue the program, which assists only the military.

Handicap International Belgium (HIB) has a program to assist war victims, including mine victims, and other persons with disabilities.⁵⁰ In 2001, HIB supported three orthopedic workshops in Bujumbura, Gitega, and Muyinga providing physiotherapy, prosthetics, crutches, and tricycles. Ongoing training was given to 24 prosthetic technicians and 27 physiotherapists. HIB's program also included disability awareness raising activities and support for socio-economic reintegration.⁵¹

In May 2002, a newly established South African Company, Africa Medical Assistance (ASA) entered into an agreement with the Institute for National Social Security (INSS) in Burundi for the supply of prostheses. The first phase of the project is the supply of prostheses for approximately

⁴¹ Interview with Jean Luc Khister, Director, UN Security Unit, Bujumbura, 4 February 2002. Some NGOs are said to be reluctant to cooperate out of concern for the security of the victims and themselves.

⁴² Interview with Muriel Gevaerts, former Burundi Program Coordinator, Handicap International Belgium, Bujumbura, 4 February 2002.

⁴³ Landmine Monitor/Tanzania, field survey in Tanzania, January 2002.

⁴⁴ Ibid. and visit to Heri Mission Hospital, Tanzania border, January 2002.

⁴⁵ Landmine Monitor/Tanzania, field survey in Tanzania, January 2002.

⁴⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 203.

⁴⁷ "Burundi: Fever, hunger and war," *MSF Activity Report 2000-2001*. <http://www.msf.org>.

⁴⁸ Jesuit Refugee Service Annual Report 2001.

⁴⁹ Interview with one of the trained disabled soldiers, November 2001. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 204.

⁵⁰ Interview with Muriel Gevaerts, former Burundi Program Coordinator, Handicap International Belgium, Bujumbura, 8 February 2002.

⁵¹ Handicap International Belgium Activity Report 2001.

100 patients. The provision of prostheses is linked to a physical rehabilitation training program and support for local authorities.⁵²

CAMEROON

The Republic of Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Despite having completed the domestic procedures for ratification on 28 July 2000, Cameroon's instrument of ratification still has not been deposited at the United Nations.¹ Several officials reconfirmed that the documents had been sent to the Permanent Mission of Cameroon in New York on 6 June 2001 to be deposited with the UN Secretary-General.² When asked about the continuing delay, an official from the Ministry of External Relations told *Landmine Monitor* in January 2002 that the keys of the diplomatic pouch containing the ratification instruments had been lost, adding that the problem should be solved within a short time.³

Although not yet a State Party, Cameroon submitted an Article 7 transparency report on 14 March 2001. In that report, the government stated that national implementation measures for the Mine Ban Treaty were being prepared;⁴ however, no such legislation has yet been submitted to the National Parliament.

Cameroon attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 as an observer. Ambassador Martin Mbarga Nguete, head of the Cameroonian delegation, reconfirmed the government's support for a total ban on landmines and encouraged all countries to respect the promises for a mine-free world made to children, destroyed families, and the hundreds of thousands of mutilated victims.⁵ In November 2001, Cameroon cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Cameroon did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002.

Cameroon has not produced, exported or used antipersonnel mines and will not facilitate their transit through its territory.⁶ It possesses a stockpile of 500 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, which will be destroyed once the mines are out-of-date.⁷

Cameroon has said it wants to comply with treaty obligations concerning international assistance and cooperation in mine clearance. To that end, the Army trained a small number of Cameroonian personnel in mine clearance techniques.⁸ The Military School in Yaounde plans to give courses on the Mine Ban Treaty.⁹

Cameroon is not mine-affected, but according to Ambassador Mbarga Nguete, Cameroonian Blue Helmets have been killed or injured by landmines in Cambodia, and each year on 24 October,

⁵² *Landmine Monitor* (South Africa) interview with Christo Schutte, Africa Medical Assistance, 2 July 2002.

¹ For details of the domestic steps, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 205.

² Phone interview with Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, First Counselor, Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the UN, New York, 20 February 2002; Statement of Martin Mbarga Nguete, Ambassador of Cameroon in Mexico, Head of Cameroon Delegation, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001; Letter to Handicap International Belgium from François-Xavier Ngoubeyou, Minister of State in charge of External Relations, 17 September 2001.

³ Interview with Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Deputy Director, UN Department of the Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, 29 January 2002.

⁴ Article 7 Report, Form A, 14 March 2001.

⁵ Statement of Ambassador of Cameroon in Mexico, Third Meeting of States Parties, 19 September 2001.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*; see also Article 7 Report, Forms B and F, 14 March 2001. Regarding types of mines, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 206.

⁸ Interview with Capt. David Yotsa, Military School, Yaounde, 24 January 2002.

⁹ *Ibid.*

United Nations Day, they are commemorated.¹⁰ Another official indicated there has been only one Cameroonian victim, Air Force Captain Ndi Cho Abrahams, who died during military operations with the United Nations Peacekeepers during the 1992-93 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.¹¹

COOK ISLANDS

The Cook Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has still not ratified. In January 2002, the government's legal advisor for international affairs said that ratification legislation has been drafted and after consideration by the Crown Law Office, it will be sent to Parliament for approval.¹ The Cook Islands is not a member of the United Nations and therefore has not voted on any of the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines. The Cook Islands has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines.²

CYPRUS

Key developments since May 2001: In January 2002, the government of Cyprus introduced a bill to Parliament calling for early approval and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. Cyprus reports that it has cleared and destroyed more than 11,000 mines during the last two years. It has announced plans to clear the heavily-mined buffer zone that divides the island, starting unilaterally if necessary.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Cyprus signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified it. In April 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the procedures for ratification were being pursued.¹ On 17 January 2002, the government introduced a bill to the House of Representatives "for the early approval and ratification of the Convention and its subsequent implementation."² A spokesman for the government, Michalis Papapetrou, stated that the National Guard, the Republic's armed forces, had no objection as it believes that it would not create any problems in the country's defense capacity.³ At the same time, the government announced a proposal to clear the heavily-mined buffer zone that divides the island. On 10 April 2002, the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defense met to discuss ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴

Cyprus attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, represented by Alexandros Vikis, Ambassador to the United Nations

¹⁰ Statement of Ambassador of Cameroon in Mexico, Third Meeting of State Parties, 19 September 2001.

¹¹ Interview with an officer of the Cameroonian Army who requests anonymity, Yaounde, 2 February 2002.

¹ Meeting between James Gosselin, Legal Adviser for International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Cook Islands, and John Head, Spokesperson, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, Rarotonga, 1 January 2002.

² Interview with James Gosselin, Legal Adviser for International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Cook Islands, Wellington, 30 March 2001.

³ For details of previous policy statements, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 824-825.

² Statement to the intersessional Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies, Geneva, 29 January 2002. These developments have taken place during intensive peace talks between Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides, and Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş. The talks have been strongly encouraged by the European Union in the context of the application of Cyprus to join the European Union. The EU set a target date of June 2002 for a settlement, with the aim of Cyprus acceding by the end of 2002.

³ "Cyprus government engaged in moves to remove landmines," *Cyprus News Agency*, Nicosia, 24 January 2002.

⁴ Interview with Tassos Tzionis, Head of Political Affairs Division (Cyprus Question), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia, 29 March 2002.

in Geneva. Cyprus associated itself with a statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union (EU), which urged all States that had not already done so to ratify or accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible. In November 2001, Cyprus cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Cyprus also participated in the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.⁵ On 29 January 2002, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies, the Cypriot delegation informed the meeting of the progress towards ratification and referred to its proposals to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to clear minefields in the buffer zone “in the context of the United Nations Policy of Mine Action and Effective Coordination, and within the spirit of the Ottawa Convention.”⁶

The statement added, “We sincerely hope that the Turkish side will be equally constructive by cooperating with UNFICYP.... [A]lthough the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is looking forward to a positive response from the Turkish side for the implementation of the project, it has therefore expressed its willingness to proceed unilaterally, in cooperation with UNFICYP, with the clearing of the National Guard minefields in the buffer zone.”⁷ All previous statements about the possibility of clearing mines from the buffer zone had been dependent on reciprocity from the Turkish side.

The delegation said that “it is our conviction that this proposal will have a positive impact on the political climate in Cyprus with beneficial effects on the process of inter-communal talks for the solution of the Cyprus problem, which have recently resumed within the framework of the United Nations Secretary-General’s good offices mandate.”⁸ The Cypriot Minister of Defense, Socratis Hasikos, was reported as saying that “the government’s decision to remove landmines in and around the buffer zone was an important political gesture.”⁹

On 29 March 2002, a Turkish Cypriot representative declared that “demining is an issue of disarmament” and that it “will not deal with the issue of disarmament until a political settlement has been reached.”¹⁰ He added later, “The situation in Cyprus was different from the situation in Afghanistan and areas of Africa where the minefields were unknown and posed a humanitarian risk.... We believe that demining, which is one of the secondary issues, could easily be tackled after a settlement is reached.”¹¹

On 6 February 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked UNFICYP to request that the Turkish side undertake demining on their side of the buffer zone, although it was stated that “even if the other side doesn’t accept this, we are still willing to permit the removal of National Guard mines from the buffer zone.”¹² In response, the Turkish Cypriots told UNFICYP “that at present it was not prepared to join in the effort to demine the buffer zone.”¹³ As a result, UNFICYP has decided to focus on assisting the government of Cyprus in clearing National Guard minefields.¹⁴

Cyprus is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not ratified its Amended Protocol II. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had previously stated that ratification

⁵ It was represented by members of the Ministry of Defense and Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations in Geneva.

⁶ Statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Melina Demetriou, “Mine Clearing an ‘Important Political Step,’” *Cyprus Mail* (English language daily newspaper), 8 February 2002.

¹⁰ Interview with Rabat Caglar, Turkish Cypriot Representative, Nicosia, 29 March 2002.

¹¹ Email from Rabat Caglar, Turkish Cypriot Representative, Nicosia, 29 April 2002.

¹² Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Government to Go Ahead with Unilateral Mine Clearing,” *Cyprus Weekly*, (English language newspaper), 8 February 2002.

¹³ Email from Wlodek Cibor, Senior Adviser, UNFICYP, 25 April 2002.

¹⁴ Ibid.

legislation for the protocol would be put before Parliament in late 2001, but the following March, the Ministry declared that it was according priority to ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁵

Cyprus attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II as an observer, and participated in the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001. The delegation associated itself with a statement made by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Cyprus has declared that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. For the few known details on importation and stockpiling of mines, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.¹⁶ No further clarification has been provided by either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense. The Special Advisor on Demining stated that Cyprus could meet the Mine Ban Treaty requirement for stockpile destruction within four years of entry into force.¹⁷

The Special Advisor on Demining also said that during the last year the National Guard has continued to refurbish dangerous antipersonnel mines in government-controlled areas outside the buffer zone.¹⁸ The UN reported on 30 May 2002 that the National Guard had continued strengthening two defensive positions just outside the buffer zone, south of Pyla.¹⁹

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

UNFICYP, which is responsible for supervising the buffer zone, reports that “the number of minefields inside the buffer zone stands at 47; 13 minefields belong to the Cyprus National Guard and 26 to the Turkish forces. The remaining minefields were laid by unknown parties.” All the minefields are fenced, and marked by UNFICYP in Greek, Turkish and English.²⁰

The Ministry of Defense appointed Major Theodoros Efthymiou its Special Advisor on Demining to address the obligations to clear antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty. He stated that it would be possible for Cyprus to meet the treaty requirements for demining within the required timeframe, although outside aid would be needed to demine the buffer zone.²¹

In January 2002, Cyprus reported “that the government of Cyprus has since 1983 cleared ten minefields, adjacent to the buffer zone, and during the last two years destroyed more than 11,000 mines of various types.”²² In 2001 and 2002, the National Guard has continued to clear two minefields in the village of Pyla.²³ The UN reported on 30 May 2002 that removal of these minefields was nearing completion.²⁴

With regard to the buffer zone, Cyprus stated that “the government has proposed that consultations begin [at] the earliest, between the government of Cyprus and UNFICYP in order to work out the modalities and the order to be followed in the process of clearing the National Guard’s minefields within the buffer zone.”²⁵ Cyprus also noted that the government has “brought to the attention of UNFICYP that foreign governments expressed in the past their interest in providing

¹⁵ Interview with Tassos Tzionis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 March, 2002.

¹⁶ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 825-826.

¹⁷ Interview with Major Theodoros Efthymiou, Special Advisor on Demining, National Guard, Nicosia, 30 March 2002.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus,” United Nations Security Council, ref. S/2002/590, 30 May 2002, para 7.

²⁰ Email from Brian Kelly, UNFICYP Spokesperson, 25 April 2002; interview with Brian Kelly, Spokesperson, UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia, 28 March 2002. If part of a minefield or the markings of the minefield are inside the buffer zone, UNFICYP considers the minefield to be within the buffer zone; this may account for disparities in the numbers provided by UNFICYP and those furnished by the National Guard. For fuller description of the landmine problem in Cyprus, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 826-827.

²¹ Interview with Major Efthymiou, National Guard, 30 March 2002.

²² Statement to the SC on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

²³ Interview with Major Efthymiou, National Guard, 30 March 2002.

²⁴ “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus,” United Nations Security Council, ref. S/2002/590, 30 May 2002, para 7.

²⁵ Statement to the SC on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

practical assistance and/or funding for the implementation of this project. The Government of Cyprus is ready to engage in discussions with these Governments and their relevant agencies in order to define the extent and nature of their assistance, so as to be in a position to devise a specific plan of action, on the basis of modalities agreed with UNFICYP and with UNFICYP's cooperation."²⁶ Defense Minister Socratis Hasikos said that "the demining will not be carried out by the National Guard...although the Army is capable of performing the operation.... Foreign governments as well as private companies have expressed interest in carrying out the task."²⁷

The National Guard stated that "it is estimated that the demining the 11 National Guard minefields of the buffer zone will take two years" and that they have records for all these minefields.²⁸ UNFICYP stated that "due to the age of the minefields" it envisages the clearance will take a considerable period of time, manpower and money. "All information from a two year survey on minefields that was completed in May 2001 has been entered onto a database. UNFICYP has all possible information regarding minefield records. Further information would involve personnel investigating minefields. UNFICYP are not mandated to investigate the contents of minefields."²⁹ Therefore, "when demining goes ahead UNFICYP considers its role as one of coordination and facilitation.... In accordance with the Ottawa Convention, it is the responsibility of the Government of Cyprus to secure the necessary funding for the demining operation, however it can facilitate requests for technical and financial assistance."³⁰

Marina Laker, Political Counselor at the Canadian High Commission in Damascus, said, "Canada has repeatedly offered its help in demining efforts on the island and last year donated US\$30,000 worth of computer hardware and software that will better enable UNFICYP personnel to keep track of shifting minefields." But no formal request for Canada's help in demining has yet been made.³¹ In 2001, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining installed the IMSMA (Information Management System for Mine Action) database at the UNFICYP headquarters in Cyprus.³²

In early June 2002, a team from the UN Mine Action Service visited Cyprus to assess and make recommendations on clearance of the Greek Cypriot minefields.³³

Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Tassos Tzionis, told parliamentary committee members that mine removal would reintroduce a sense of normality to the buffer zone, helping thousands of Greek Cypriot farmers make use of the fertile land.³⁴ But the Turkish side responded by saying that, although they do not object to the demining, they do object to what is done with this land afterwards – because it is in the buffer zone. They would object to construction of any kind on this land: "the buffer zone is under the control of UNFICYP and the status of the area cannot be unilaterally altered by the Greek Cypriot side."³⁵

There have been no press reports in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot media of demining, refurbishment or mine-laying activities by the Turkish Army in Cyprus. A Turkish Cypriot

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Melina Demetriou, "Mine Clearing an 'Important Political Step,'" *Cyprus Mail* (English language daily newspaper), 8 February 2002.

²⁸ Interview with Major Efthymiou, National Guard, 30 March 2002.

²⁹ Interview with Brian Kelly, UNFICYP, 28 March 2002.

³⁰ Interview with Wlodek Cibor, Senior Advisor, UNFICYP, Headquarters, Nicosia, 28 March 2002, and email of 25 April 2002.

³¹ Menelaos Hadjicostis, "Canada Might Lead Mine Removal Efforts," *Cyprus Weekly*, 25 January 2002.

³² "Update on Activities between January and December 2001," Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 31 December 2001, p. 4.

³³ "UN Mines Action Team Assesses Cyprus Minefields," *Cyprus Mail*, 5 June 2002.

³⁴ Menelaos Hadjicostis, "Government To Go Ahead With Unilateral Mine Clearing," *Cyprus Weekly* (English language newspaper), 8 February 2002.

³⁵ Interview with Rabat Caglar, Turkish Cypriot Representative, Nicosia, 29 March 2002, and email of 29 April 2002.

representative said that he had no information in relation to the issue of minefields in the north, and that this was the responsibility of the Turkish Army.³⁶

Mine Casualties

According to a press report, over the past 28 years three United Nations peacekeepers and several civilians have been killed or injured by landmines in Cyprus. The most recent death of a Greek Cypriot civilian was in 1997. In March 1999, a National Guard soldier was killed when an antivehicle mine exploded during a demining operation in a village on the ceasefire line south of Nicosia.³⁷

In 2001, there were no casualties from mines in the government-controlled areas or in the buffer zone.³⁸ A Turkish Cypriot official added that there have been no landmine casualties in the north; there have been no media reports of casualties.³⁹ Nicosia General Hospital did not treat and was not asked to advise on the treatment of any mine casualties (including from the north) in 2001.⁴⁰

ETHIOPIA

Key developments since May 2001: A national Landmine Impact Survey was initiated in April 2002. While no demining has started in Ethiopia, two demining companies have been trained, and some survey work has been carried out since February 2002. During 2001, nearly 200,000 people received some form of mine risk education. In April 2002, Ethiopia provided to the UN detailed maps of mines its forces laid in Eritrea during the border conflict. In 2001, there were at least 71 new landmine/UXO casualties, a significant decrease from the previous year.

Mine Ban Policy

Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified it. Ethiopia attended as an observer the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. The head of delegation said, "It should be noted that Ethiopia was among one of the first countries to sign the Ottawa Treaty. Even though Ethiopia has yet to ratify the treaty, it has been practically implementing the provisions and objectives of the treaty, by clearing, not transferring and not planting landmines. Ethiopia believes that universalization will ensure the realization of the objective and spirit of the Treaty.... Ethiopia will stand ready to ratify the Treaty when those states in question in our sub-region are willing to adhere to the international legal norms that ban the use of anti-personnel landmines."¹

In November 2001, Ethiopia cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. During the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meeting in Geneva in January 2002, the Ethiopian delegate told Landmine Monitor that the ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty

³⁶ Interview with Rabat Caglar, Turkish Cypriot Representative, 29 March 2002. Lack of information about refurbishment of the minefields may be due to restricted press freedom in the Turkish-occupied north of the island.

³⁷ "Cyprus Submits Landmine-Clearing Plan to UN," *Xinhua News Agency*, 23 January 2002; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 765.

³⁸ Press and Information Office, Nicosia, Cyprus, 27 March 2002.

³⁹ Interview with Rabat Caglar, Turkish Cypriot Representative, 29 March 2002; interview with Kyriakos Vrahimis, Press and Information Officer, Turkish Media Section, Press and Information Office, Nicosia, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁰ Interview with Dr. Costas Antoniadis, Director, Accident and Emergency Department, Nicosia General Hospital, 28 March 2002.

¹ Statement by Miheret Getahun, Head of Delegation, Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations, at the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

was not a priority for the government compared to “issues of national and regional security.”² At the May 2002 Standing Committee meetings, the delegate told Landmine Monitor that the landmines issue has the attention of the government, and that discussions on ratification are underway, but that there are other priorities, such as HIV/AIDS.³

Ethiopia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW); it did not attend the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference, both held in December 2001.

Use

There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by Ethiopian forces since the end of the border conflict in June 2000. There have not been reports of mine use by non-state actors in this period either.⁴

Landmine Monitor Report 2001 reported serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Ethiopian forces during the 1998-2000 border conflict with Ethiopia.⁵ In a 23 July 2001 letter of response, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister denied any antipersonnel mine use by Ethiopia.⁶ During the January 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Ethiopia again denied having used antipersonnel mines, stating, “Our government only got involved in the removal of mines that were laid by the Eritrea forces during the occupation.”⁷

However, in April 2002 Ethiopia provided to UN MACC detailed maps of mines Ethiopian forces laid in Eritrea during the conflict.⁸ These records include information on mines remaining in the ground after Ethiopian forces conducted substantial clearance operations prior to withdrawing from territories it held.⁹ MACC estimates Ethiopia laid approximately 150,000 to 200,000 mines in Eritrea during this period.¹⁰

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Ethiopia has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel mines, and has not imported antipersonnel mines since the overthrow of the Mengistu regime in 1991.¹¹ The size and composition of Ethiopia’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not yet known, though the types of mines found planted in Ethiopia have been identified.¹²

There are no documented cases of Ethiopian export of antipersonnel mines. However, Somalia’s Transitional National Government (TNG) has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of supplying armed factions with weapons, including landmines.¹³ On 3 April, 2002, the Somali Interim President said, “We want Ethiopia to desist from destabilizing Somalia by training militias against

² Interview with Tekleweled Mengesha, Director, Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO), Geneva, 30 January 2002.

³ Interview with Tekleweled Mengesha, Director, EMAO, Geneva, 29 May 2002.

⁴ NSAs are active particularly in the eastern part of Ethiopia in the Somali National regional state and have used mines in the past. See, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 211.

⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 208-210.

⁶ Letter from Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, to Landmine Monitor, 23 July 2001.

⁷ Interview with the Ethiopian delegation during the intersessional Standing Committee meeting, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

⁸ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager UNMEE MACC, 23 April 2002.

⁹ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 29 April 2002.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 159.

¹² See, for example, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 145-146.

¹³ TNG issued a press release on 28 February 2002 accusing Ethiopia of training and arming militias in Bay and Bakool regions. See also *BBC Somali Service* interview with Prime Minister Hassan Abshir, 2 March 2002; “Ethiopian Troops Deploy in Somalia,” *BBC*, January 7, 2002.

the TNG and certain regions, sending mines, ammunition, and weapons into Somalia. They are doing it right now.”¹⁴

On 23 May 2002, a group of 38 former military officials held a press conference in Mogadishu to state their restored allegiance to Somalia. In the press conference, Major Abdurahman Haji Mursal (aka Major Birreh) said the Somali fighters had been approached by Ethiopia shortly after the formation of the TNG and were taken into Ethiopia for training. According to Birreh, the “Ethiopians taught us new explosive devices such as modern landmines and their usage in fighting and terrorizing urban areas.”¹⁵

Landmine Problem

Ethiopia has had a landmine problem for the last 60 years, during which time 33 types of antipersonnel mines have been used.¹⁶ The country is littered with large numbers of antipersonnel mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Prior to the 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, the Ethiopian demining headquarters identified 97 minefields in three regions of the country where it was operating.¹⁷ Many of the mines and minefields are near populated areas and inflict casualties on both people and livestock.

Mine Action Funding

For 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Investment Database lists \$1,999,695 in mine action contributions to Ethiopia from five donors.¹⁸ These include (all in US \$): Canada, \$135,381; Finland, \$49,000; Germany, \$148,648; Netherlands, \$1,000,000; and Norway, \$666,666.

One U.S. government document indicates that no U.S. mine action funds were provided to Ethiopia in 2001.¹⁹ Another states that in 2001, the U.S. “provided Ethiopia with \$1 million in humanitarian demining assistance,” and that a “U.S. State Department contractor completed training of ... 160 deminers in September 2001.”²⁰ A UN report indicated that the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) has received \$1.6 million from the U.S. government to train the first two companies of deminers.²¹

The UN reports that Norway and the Netherlands have contributed through UNDP approximately \$750,000 of the estimated \$1.5 million that will be necessary to complete the national Landmine Impact Survey.²²

UNICEF’s mine risk education program had a total budget of \$840,000 for the year 2001-2002, and UNICEF received these funds from the US, Finland, and UNICEF-UK national committee.²³

EMAO has calculated a \$3.34 million funding shortfall for 2002-2003, including: equipment for two additional companies (\$350,000), support for rapid response teams (\$250,000), mine detection dogs (\$350,000), mechanical capacity (\$340,000), mine risk education (\$50,000), and support for EMAO headquarters and training facility (\$2 million).²⁴

¹⁴ A press report quoting an interview with the president of Somalia’s interim government, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. “Ethiopia threatens peace, says Somali president,” *Reuters* (Mogadishu), 3 April 2002.

¹⁵ “Ethiopia ‘trained us to terrorise Somalia,’” *BBC News Online*, 23 May 2002. Birreh named two of six Ethiopian military (Colonel Hamsala and Colonel Walto) who were allegedly responsible for the 45-day-long training session in the Ethiopian town of Godey.

¹⁶ Interview with Ethiopian delegation, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

¹⁷ United States Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” November 2001, p. 6.

¹⁸ UNMAS, “Mine Action Database,” (see <http://webapps.dfait-maacci.gc.ca/mai/>), visited 2 July 2002.

¹⁹ US Department of State, Fact Sheet, “The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding,” 5 April 2002.

²⁰ US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” November 2001, p. 6.

²¹ “Humanitarian Activities and Reconciliation in the North of Ethiopia,” UNCT, prepared for UN Security Council Mission to Ethiopia, UNDP Project Report, 21 February 2002, p. 1.

²² “The Ethiopia Humanitarian Update November 2001,” UNCT for Ethiopia, November 2001, p. 4.

²³ UNICEF/RaDO Project Statements, 14 May 2001 and 1 August 2001.

²⁴ Mine Action Support Group, “June Newsletter,” 14 June 2002.

Survey and Assessment

As reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, there was a rapid assessment survey carried out by the British NGO, HALO Trust in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defense of Ethiopia along the conflict areas bordering Eritrea.²⁵ The results of the survey remain undisclosed.

The Survey Action Center (SAC) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) met with EMAO in November 2001 for preliminary discussions on a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) for Ethiopia.²⁶ SAC subsequently contracted NPA to work with EMAO to carry out the national survey.²⁷ Work on the Landmine Impact Survey began in April 2002.²⁸ The target for completion is mid-2003.²⁹

EMAO has also trained general surveyors to carry out minefield surveys. In February 2002, they began surveys in Gerhu Sirnay and Marta, east of Zalanbesa.³⁰

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission released its ruling on the new border between the two countries on 13 April 2002, paving way for accelerated demining for border demarcation.

In April 2002, Ethiopia provided to MACC detailed maps of mines its forces laid in Eritrea during the 1998-2000 conflict.³¹ These records include information on mines remaining in the ground after the Ethiopian forces conducted substantial clearance operations prior to their withdrawal from territories it held.³² At an UNMEE press briefing in June 2002, MACC Program Manager Phil Lewis said, "On the minefield records issue, I'm delighted to announce that the Ethiopian authorities have accepted 182 minefield records which will be utilized to assist with expeditious, efficient, and safer mine clearance in Northern Ethiopia. This is the final step in the exchange of detailed mine information between the two parties [Eritrea and Ethiopia], and represents another major step forward in the peace process."³³

Mine Clearance and Coordination

The Ethiopian Mine Action Office, an autonomous legal entity, was established in February 2001 to be responsible for overall mine action activities in Ethiopia.³⁴ Its two directors were appointed on 9 July 2001, after the Prime Minister approved the structure and budget of the office.³⁵

In Ethiopia, the UN's role in demining is largely advisory, under the aegis of a technical team from the UN Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP team works mainly on problems in the northern part of Ethiopia, though mechanisms are being explored for expanding its efforts to help improve Ethiopia's demining capacities nationwide.³⁶

By September 2001, with the support of the US government, two companies of 200 deminers had been trained and provided with demining equipment.³⁷ As of June 2002, the EMAO deminers had not engaged in mine clearance in Ethiopia yet, but they had moved to the north to prepare for

²⁵ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 213.

²⁶ "The Ethiopian Humanitarian Update November 2001," UNCT for Ethiopia, November 2001, p. 4.

²⁷ Discussion with Dr. Michael L. Fleisher, deputy team leader, NPA Landmine Impact Survey Team, 1 April 2002.

²⁸ Email from Survey Action Center, 24 July 2002.

²⁹ Mine Action Support Group, "June Newsletter," 14 June 2002.

³⁰ "Humanitarian Activities and Reconciliation in the North Ethiopia," UNCT prepared for the UN Security Council Mission to Ethiopia, UNDP project report, 21 February 2002, p. 4.

³¹ Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 23 April 2002.

³² Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, 29 April 2002.

³³ UNMEE Press Briefing, UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Addis Ababa), 10 June 2002.

³⁴ Ethiopian Council of Ministers, Regulation No. 70/2001, 5 February 2001.

³⁵ Interview with Tekleweled Mengesha, Director, EMAO, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

³⁶ "UNMEE News," UNMEE monthly newsletter, July 2001, p. 11.

³⁷ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 6; "Humanitarian Activities and Reconciliation in the North of Ethiopia," UNCT, prepared for UN Security Council Mission to Ethiopia, UNDP Project Report, 21 February 2002, p. 1; "US donates de-mining equipment," *IRIN*, Nairobi, 8 November 2001.

operations in Gerhu Sirnay and Marta.³⁸ Mine clearance has been carried out in the Temporary Security Zone. (See Eritrea country report for details).

The Mine Action Support Group, consisting of donor countries, carried out a field mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea from 19-24 May 2002. The 24 May visit to Ethiopia was to “acquire a clear view of this recently started program directly under national ownership.”³⁹ The field mission noted that the country required “additional mine action assets above the current field capacity of two companies of 200 manual deminers....”⁴⁰ The MASG also stated that training of two additional companies by September 2002 was “essential,” noting that UNDP could provide the capacity to train the companies, but funding was still lacking.⁴¹

The UN has said it expects demining for border demarcation to be completed by April 2003 “at the latest.”⁴² UNMEE would start formal clearance of access routes to the areas where it is likely border posts will be placed. “What we are doing at the moment is humanitarian demining, general clearance. What we will be doing in support of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) project is ‘spot clearing’— we will only clear a very small area inside either a minefield or contaminated area.”⁴³

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) is being carried out by RaDO in Tigray and Afar regions, all along the border with Eritrea, with UNICEF’s technical and financial support. During 2001, nearly 200,000 people received some form of mine risk education. A total of 43,785 adults received community-based MRE and 44,447 students through classroom-based MRE, while 28,986 people were addressed by volunteers in 645 sessions through the house-to-house approach. A total of 34,418 children not in school received MRE from 379 trained Child Instructors and RaDO agents. A total of 3,694 deportees also received mine risk education before their departure from the transit camp. Sixty-five school clubs were formed, and 32,531 people were sensitized. Moreover, 52 radio programs on mine issues were transmitted on a weekly basis and 430 listening groups constituting about 4,300 members were established who listen to the radio programs and discuss the issue further and disseminate the information to family and other community members.⁴⁴

In the Tigray region, seven educators were trained in addition to the existing 36. One thousand posters, 30,000 leaflets, 150 banners, 1700 T-shirts, 1,500 caps, 150 carry bags, and 500 cartoon characters were produced. Taskforces are established from local administration, associations and government offices to support the implementation process at different levels.⁴⁵

The RaDO MRE program was extended to the Afar regional state in April 2001, where the program deals with a largely pastoralist community, which is totally different from that of Tigray.⁴⁶ The training and deployment of mobile MRE agents, the use of clan leaders and Imams in the MRE process, and Koranic schools as venues of MRE are some of the specific approaches used in this area. Twenty-seven project staff have been recruited, trained and deployed in the area. Through December 2001, 17,420 people received community-based MRE, 9,491 people were covered through sensitization program, 710 students were reached in Koranic school and 20 school drama

³⁸ “Humanitarian Activities and Reconciliation in the North of Ethiopia,” UNCT, prepared for the UN Security Council Mission to Ethiopia, UNDP Project Report, 21 February 2002, p. 4.

³⁹ Mine Action Support Group, “June Newsletter,” 14 June 2002. The MASG is a group of 22 donor countries and the EU. The May 2002 field trip to Eritrea and Ethiopia was the first of its kind for MASG.

⁴⁰ Mine Action Support Group, “June Newsletter,” 14 June 2002.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report of 29 April 2002, quoting Phil Lewis, Program Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Interview with Ato Temesgen Abrha, Tigray Mine Risk Education Project Manager, 1 January 2002.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Interview with Ato Abdu Ali, Afar Mine Awareness Project Manager, 11 January 2002.

clubs were established. There is also a weekly radio program in Afari language and 132 radio listening groups have been established.⁴⁷

With the support of the ICRC, the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, Tigray branch initiated a video film production to further carry out mine awareness in Tigray region, as a component of other humanitarian activities.⁴⁸

Handicap International had a project on Mine Risk Education in Eastern Ethiopia in the Somali refugee camps.⁴⁹ This project ended in June 2001.⁵⁰

UNMEE, with UNICEF and other NGOs, carried out mine risk education for the population of the TSZ. By March 2002, 97,000 people had participated.⁵¹

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, there were at least 71 new landmine/UXO casualties: 16 people were killed and 55 injured. Reported new casualties decreased from 2000, when 202 new landmine/UXO casualties were reported in Tigray, Afar, Somali National Region, and Dabu Kebele.⁵²

Casualty data was collected in RaDO's mine awareness project. In the Tigray region, 49 new mine/UXO casualties were reported, of which 11 died and 38 were injured; 27 were below 18 years-of-age. All the casualties were males. RaDO also registered 22 new casualties in the Afar region, of which five were killed and 17 injured; 12 were below 18 years-of-age, four were women and six were men. Most of the casualties are child herders. The areas where the incidents occurred were trenches and grazing lands.⁵³ There are media reports of landmine incident in other parts of the country, but these are not well documented.

On 4 October 2001, a vehicle carrying seven Ethiopian Armed Forces soldiers hit a landmine, killing one soldier and injuring six, in an incident in Sector West of the TSZ.⁵⁴

According to the U.S. State Department, since 1995 landmines have killed at least 172 civilians and injured 113, while Ethiopian deminers have suffered four deaths and 16 wounded in clearance operations.⁵⁵

Survivor Assistance⁵⁶

In Ethiopia, few hospitals are capable of performing emergency surgery and most health posts in the mine-affected areas do not have the capacity to provide emergency care to mine casualties. Adigrat hospital provides emergency care and physiotherapy services, with support from Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland in surgery. In 2001, the hospital assisted five landmine casualties; three crutches were also supplied to landmine survivors.⁵⁷ Shire Hospital, a government hospital, has also assisted a number of landmine casualties in emergency care and treatment. In 2001, 12 landmine survivors were assisted by the hospital and two crutches were supplied.⁵⁸ The

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4 January 2002.

⁴⁸ Interview with Thomas Russell, Cooperation Delegate, 4 January 2002.

⁴⁹ "MRE in Eastern Ethiopia, Evaluation of Effects," Handicap International, Lyon, 2001, p. 38.

⁵⁰ Olivier Francois, HI Country Representative-Mine Risk Education in Ethiopia, project summary and achievements, Addis Ababa, September 2001.

⁵¹ UN Security Council, "Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea," S/2002/245, New York, 8 March 2002.

⁵² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 216-217.

⁵³ Interviews with Ato Abdu Ali and Ato Temesgen of Afar and Tigray mine awareness projects, respectively, January 2002.

⁵⁴ UN Security Council, "Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea," New York, 13 December 2001.

⁵⁵ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," November 2001, p. 6.

⁵⁶ For more details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 217-219. A more detailed report on survivor assistance in 2001 is available from Landmine Monitor.

⁵⁷ Interview with Dr. Amanuel Gessesew, Medical Director, Adigrat Hospital, Adigrat, 30 January 2002.

⁵⁸ Interview with Dr. Yibrah, Medical Director, Shire Hospital, 24 December 2001.

ICRC supports the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) Tigray branch: ERCS first aid volunteers and ambulance service provides emergency assistance in mine-affected areas.⁵⁹

In Ethiopia there are centers providing physical rehabilitation and orthopedic devices; some are government run and others are operated by NGOs or international agencies. The Rehabilitation Affairs Department, of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for providing rehabilitation services for the disabled. It oversees four orthopedic workshops in different parts of the country: Addis Ababa, Mekelle, Harar, and Dessie.

The Addis Ababa Prosthetic-Orthotic Center (POC) is a referral center for physical rehabilitation and operates an orthopedic workshop and physiotherapy department. In 2001, the center assisted 5,361 persons with disabilities, including 1,546 landmine survivors. The center produced 863 prostheses, 61 wheelchairs, 2,234 crutches, 1,111 orthoses, and 1,055 other assistive devices. It also provided physiotherapy treatments for 1,339 people. Patients who cannot afford to pay receive free services; for those who can pay the cost is from US\$5 to US\$200, depending on the type of service. The annual budget for the program is 2.8 million ETB (US\$329,411) with funding for the program from the sale of orthopedic devices, charges for services, and donations from the ICRC, Christoffel Blinden Mission (CBM) and the Sheraton Addis.⁶⁰ The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) manages a training center at the Addis Ababa POC. In 2001, 31 prosthetics from 14 countries benefited from the training.⁶¹

The Dessie Orthopedic workshop provides physical rehabilitation services to persons with disabilities, free of charge. In 2001, the center assisted 194 persons with disabilities, including 88 landmine survivors. In 2001, the workshop produced 161 prostheses, 449 crutches, and 23 orthoses, and distributed 10 wheelchairs. The annual budget for the program is provided from two sources; the Government allocated 189,600 Birr (US\$22,305) and the ICRC allocated Birr 106,000 (US\$12,470). The workshop plans to continue providing similar services in 2002 in cooperation with VVAF, Pact and the ICRC.⁶²

The Harar Orthopedic workshop provides physical rehabilitation services. In 2001, the center assisted 142 persons with disabilities, including 92 mine survivors. The workshop produced 142 prostheses and 100 crutches, of which 88 prostheses and all the crutches, together with three wheelchairs, were distributed to landmine survivors. The sources of funding for the workshop are the regional government and the ICRC.⁶³

The Mekelle Orthopedic workshop is operated by the Tigray Disabled Veterans Association. In 2001, the center assisted 728 persons with disabilities, including 206 landmine survivors. The workshop produced and supplied 330 prostheses, 1,322 crutches, and 377 assistive devices, and supplied 21 wheelchairs. Of these 193 prostheses, 386 crutches, and 13 assistive devices were for landmine survivors. The annual budget of the center is 382,500 Birr (US\$45,000).⁶⁴

The ICRC continues to support the orthopedic workshops in Addis Ababa, Dessie, Harar, and Mekelle. The support includes assistance with the provision of transportation, accommodation, orthopedic devices, physiotherapy services, psychological support, and technical assistance.⁶⁵ In 2001, the ICRC made 40 technical visits to the centers to provide training and to monitor the quality of patient services. The ICRC also works with the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, the Ministry of Health, the Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs, and the Tigray Disabled Veterans Association. The ICRC sponsored two national technicians to undertake a 3-year course in prosthetics/orthotics at TATCOT in Tanzania.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Interview with Thomas Russell, ICRC delegate, 4 January 2002.

⁶⁰ Interview with Ato Yohannes Berhanu, POC General Manager, 8 January 2002.

⁶¹ ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled, Annual Report 2001.

⁶² Interview with Ato Daniel Kassa, Manager, Dessie Orthopedic Workshop, December 2001.

⁶³ Interview with Ato Tsegaye Weldemedhin, Manager, Harar Orthopedic Workshop, December 2001.

⁶⁴ Interview with Girmay Gebremeskel, General Manager, Mekelle Orthopedic Workshop, 11 April 2002.

⁶⁵ Interview with Thomas Russell, ICRC delegate, 4 January 2002.

⁶⁶ ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes Annual Report 2001.

The local NGO, Arbaminch Rehabilitation Center, provides assistance in physical and medical rehabilitation, and social, economic and vocational reintegration. The center works in partnership with the Arbaminch Hospital, Action Aid and Integrated Community Development Programme (ICDP). From 1 January to 17 November 2001, the center assisted 83 landmine survivors with physiotherapy treatments and CBR. If the patient has a poverty certificate the cost is Birr five to ten (US\$0.60 to US\$1.20), otherwise services cost from Birr 200-1,000 (US\$24 to US\$118). In 2001, the center produced 83 prostheses, 175 crutches, 11 assistive devices, and supplied three wheelchairs; 63 prostheses, 112 crutches and six assistive devices were for landmine survivors. The center's socio-economic reintegration program assisted 397 persons with disabilities, including 83 landmine survivors.⁶⁷

Addis Development Vision is a local NGO in Addis Ababa, with services including the provision of basic rehabilitation services, referral services, vocational training, and financial support for education, to persons with disabilities. In 2001, the organization assisted 331 people, including 11 mine survivors.⁶⁸

The Landmine Survivors Network's (LSN) program in Ethiopia uses community-based outreach workers, who are also amputees, to work with individual survivors to assess their needs, offer psychological and social support, and educate families about the effects of limb loss. The program also provides material support, and prostheses and physiotherapy through referrals. In 2001, LSN assisted 380 people, including 232 mine survivors; services are free of charge. The annual budget for the program is approximately US\$239,000. LSN receives technical cooperation and duty-free privileges from the Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs and Bureau of Foreign Relation and Development Cooperation.⁶⁹

The Ethiopian Prosthetics-Orthotics National Professional Association was established in 21 June 2001. This association advocates for a high standard of prosthetic-orthotic care for landmine survivors through research, education and practice, working in partnership with the Ministry of Health, ICRC, EPTA, Maltaser, Ethiopia, and Handicap International.⁷⁰

The local NGO, Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO) works in the Somali refugee camps providing social and physical rehabilitation services. The program is implemented in collaboration with UNHCR, Stichting Vluchteling (SV) and the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA). In 2001, 530 people were assisted, including 24 landmine survivors. The program provides psychological support, physiotherapy service and prostheses.⁷¹ RaDO also provides physical and social rehabilitation services to Sudanese refugees, in four camps, in partnership with UNHCR and Stichting Vluchteling (SV). In 2001, 895 people received physical rehabilitation services. The number of landmine survivors assisted is not known.⁷² Since September 2001, RaDo has provided counseling service to landmine survivors in Tigray. RaDO's assessment identified 41 mine survivors in need of the counseling service; 32 received counseling service and as a result, most of the children under counseling started attending school.⁷³

Other organizations assisting persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, in physical rehabilitation, orthopedic devices, and social and economic reintegration include: Cheshire Service Ethiopia, Handicap National-Action for Children with Disabilities (HN-ACD), Ethiopian

⁶⁷ Interview with Ato Tafesse Chirbo, General Manager, Arbaminch Rehabilitation Center, 15 December 2001.

⁶⁸ Interview with Ato Adane Alemu, Executive Director, Addis Development Mission, 25 December 2001.

⁶⁹ Interview with Ato Yiberta Tadesse, Social Worker, LSN-Ethiopia, 29 December 2001; response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 13 March 2002.

⁷⁰ Interview with Ato Mulugeta Gedu, President, EPONPA, 20 December 2001.

⁷¹ Interview with Ato Negussie Seifu, Program Coordinator, RaDO, 11 January 2002.

⁷² Interview with Ato Alemayohu Mitiku, Technical Coordinator, Addis Ababa, 15 January 2002.

⁷³ Interview with Ato Temesgen Abhra, Tigray Mine Risk Education Project Manager, 1 January 2002.

Physiotherapists Association, Ethiopian National Association of the Blind, Ethiopian National Association of the Deaf, and the Ethiopian National Association of the Physically Handicapped.⁷⁴

Disability Policy and Practice

The Ethiopian Federation of Persons with Disabilities (EFPD) is an umbrella organization of the five national disability associations. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the EFPD coordinate disability issues at the national level. The principal disability law that relates to landmine survivors is Proclamation No. 101/1994, the Right of Persons with Disabilities to Employment. Disabled civil servants receive a pension, however, there is no special attention given to persons with disabilities.⁷⁵

A component of the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) is the strengthening of five regional POCs and the establishment of a National Rehabilitation Center.⁷⁶ The EDRP, using a loan from the World Bank, has allocated US\$9 million for construction and US\$10.3 million for equipment for the project.⁷⁷

GAMBIA

The Gambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, and ratification was approved by Parliament on 2 November 1999. In early March 2002, an official from the Office of the President said the instrument of ratification had been sent to the United Nations.¹ However, it still has not been formally deposited with the UN Secretary-General in New York.

No national implementation legislation is being formulated.² According to the same official, this is because of a lack of human resources, but added, “we are aware that this is a critical issue and we are going to address it very shortly.”³

The Gambia did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 for financial reasons.⁴ It did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002. It also was absent during the vote on the UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Gambia attended the “Conference on Arms and International Humanitarian Law: the CCW and the Ottawa Convention” in Abuja, Nigeria, organized by the ICRC in collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 10 and 11 October 2001.

The Permanent Secretary of Defense confirmed that The Gambia has never produced, transferred, or used mines, and has no stockpile.⁵

He added that, although there are recent Senegalese refugee movements from the Casamance region into The Gambia, no mine incident has been reported on the Gambian territory. However,

⁷⁴ Interview with Ato Alemayohu Teferi, Ethiopian Federation of Persons with Disabilities.

⁷⁵ Interview with Ato Kassaye Tikuye, Acting Team Leader, Rehabilitation Affairs Department, 24 December 2001.

⁷⁶ “Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project,” Progress Report No. 4, prepared for the UN Security Council Mission to Ethiopia, 21 February 2002, p. 6.

⁷⁷ Ato Negussie Kibret, Head of Accounting Department, EDRP, 22 February 2002.

¹ Telephone interview with Essa Khan, Permanent Secretary of Defense, Office of the President, Banjul, 15 March 2002. Khan made the same assertion to Landmine Monitor in an interview on 15 January 2001, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 219.

² Telephone interview with Essa Khan, Office of the President, 15 March 2002.

³ Telephone interview with Essa Khan, Office of the President, 2 April 2002.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Telephone interview with Essa Khan, Office of the President, 2 April 2002; also, interview with Essa Khan, 15 January 2001; interview with Habib Jarra, Gambian representative to the Bamako Seminar on Landmines, Mali, 16 February 2001.

mines are considered as a potential threat.⁶ Of the eight victims killed in a mine explosion in the Casamance region in March 2002, one was a Gambian.⁷

GREECE

Key developments since May 2001: On 19 March 2002, the Greek parliament voted unanimously in favor of ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. The instrument of ratification will be deposited at the same time as Turkey's instrument of accession. Greece is believed to hold a stockpile of 1.25 million antipersonnel mines. Greece reported that clearance of all minefields on the Greek-Bulgarian border was completed in December 2001, and included the destruction of 25,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. Illegal immigrants crossing into Greece continue to fall victim to landmines.

Mine Ban Policy

Greece signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. On 19 March 2002, the Greek parliament voted unanimously in favor of ratifying the treaty, which was published as Law 2999/2002 in the Official Gazette on 8 April.¹ The final step of depositing the instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations will take place jointly with Turkey, according to an agreement between the foreign ministers of both countries announced on 6 April 2001.²

Greece participated, as an observer, in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, represented by its ambassador to Argentina. A statement was delivered on behalf of the European Union, which includes Greece; it urged all non-party States to adhere to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, and to maintain high levels of funding for mine action.³

On 18-19 October 2001, the Ministry of Defense hosted a NATO Partnership for Peace seminar on regional mine action, attended by representatives of 21 countries and NGOs, including the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Landmine Monitor. Greece made a presentation on its ongoing mine clearance activities.

In November 2001, Greece cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Greece participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.⁴ In May 2002, the Greek representative announced that Parliament had voted unanimously to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty and was ready to do so as soon as arrangements had been made with Turkey for the two countries to deposit jointly the instruments of ratification/accession. Two military officers made presentations on Greece's stockpile of antipersonnel mines and progress with mine clearance (see later sections).

Greece is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. An annual report as required by Article 13 of the protocol was submitted on 10 December 2001 to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II.⁵ It was identical to the report submitted in March 2001, covering the period 16 October 1999 to 28

⁶ Telephone interview with Essa Khan, Office of the President, 2 April 2002.

⁷ "Eight Killed in Landmine Explosion," *The Independent*, 15 March 2002.

¹ "Land Mine Ban," *Kathimerini* (daily newspaper, English language edition), 22 March 2002.

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 828-829.

³ See the report on Belgium in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

⁴ At the January session, Greece was represented by Brigadier-General Emanuel Krasanakis, Ministry of Defense, and Vassiliki Gounari, from the Greek Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and in May by Major Ioannis Christogiannis and Major Konstantinos Kalatzis, from the Ministry of Defense, and Vassiliki Gounari.

⁵ CCW, Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, submitted on 10 December 2001, but dated 27 June 2001.

February 2001. Greece attended both the Third Annual Conference and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001 in Geneva.

The annual report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on landmine-related matters for 2001 was submitted on 14 December 2001.⁶

Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer

In February 2001, Greek officials described as “too high” the previous estimate of 1.5 million for the country’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines. In March 2002, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to advance any figure,⁷ but a report of a closed session of parliament on 19 March disclosed that Greece has a stockpile of 1.25 million antipersonnel mines.⁸

In May 2002, at the Standing Committee meetings, Major Ioannis Christogiannis presented new information on Greece’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines, without revealing its total size, although he referred to “big quantities.” He stated that Greece possesses four types of antipersonnel mines: M2 and M16, which are both in stockpiles and deployed in minefields, and the M14 and DM31, which are stockpiled but not deployed. He noted two options for disposal of these mines in line with NATO and EU environmental and safety requirements: via international tender or via the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). He noted that no suitable destruction facility exists in Greece at present. The cost of destroying mines both in stockpiles and deployed in minefields was estimated at €6 million (US\$5.39 million),⁹ although it is not clear how this figure was arrived at. Later, in conversation with the Landmine Monitor, Major Christogiannis agreed that Greece also possesses a fifth type of antipersonnel mine, the ADAM projectile, and that this may pose greater disposal problems as it contains depleted uranium.¹⁰

Greece has had a moratorium on production and export of antipersonnel mines for a number of years.¹¹ The closed session of parliament also heard from the Deputy Defense Minister that Greece has imported the Skorpion mine delivery system from Germany or will do so; the report did not make clear which mine(s) would be used with the system, or if new mines would be acquired.¹²

Landmine Problem

Greece has created and maintained minefields on the eastern border with Turkey along the river Evros. There are also mined areas dating from the Greek civil war (1947-1949) in the Epirus, Grammos, and Vitsi mountains in northern Greece, and in areas near the border with Bulgaria. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Major Constantinos Kalatzis stated that “after the end of World War II, the politico-military situation in Balkans forced the Hellenic Army to lay

⁶ Report of the Permanent Mission of Greece to the OSCE, submitted on 14 December 2001.

⁷ Interview with Ambassador Stephanou, Nikos Kanellos, First Counselor, and Dimitris Skoutas, Attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 March 2002, and subsequent faxes and emails.

⁸ Πρακτικά Βουλής, I Περίοδος (Προεδρευομένης Δημοκρατίας), Συνοδος Β', Συνεδρίαση Ρστ', Τρίτη 19 Μαρτίου 2002, (Minutes of the Governmental 1st Period, Presidential Democracy, Second Meeting, Tuesday 19 March 2002).

⁹ Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US\$0.898, used throughout.

¹⁰ Landmine Monitor notes and Presentation by Major Ioannis Christogiannis to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002. Greece imported 504 artillery projectiles containing 18,444 ADAM mines from the U.S. in 1988. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 710.

¹¹ Apparently, the moratorium on export has been in place since 1994, and on production since 1997. Greece produced at least one type of antipersonnel mines, a copy of the U.S. M16A2. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 829, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 767, for more details on past production, import, and export.

¹² The German AT2 antivehicle mine, which fits the Skorpion system, may not be Mine Ban Treaty-compliant; see report on Germany in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 699-701. In November 1999, there were reports in Germany that the export of 36,000 AT2 mines to Greece was planned. In February 2001, Greek officials claimed that this export did not take place. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 647, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 829.

minefields in the borders of the country.” It was clarified after the presentation that this referred only to the border with Bulgaria.¹³

There appears to be no comprehensive report of the mine problem in Greece. A media report in October 2001 gave the fullest description yet, but omitted the minefields on the border with Turkey. It identified the Grammos, Vitsi, Smolikas, Mourgana, and Tomaros mountains as most affected by mines and other munitions during the Greek civil war, and said that “it is still not safe for anyone crossing the slopes of Grammos and other mountains of western Macedonia and Epirus.... In contrast, Mount Belles and the Rhodope range on the Greek-Bulgarian border have been cleared of mines. During the Cold War ... the Greek Army sowed thousands of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines from Lake Doirani to Echino, Xanthi.... The Germans used anti-personnel mines widely in Greece to neutralize action by partisans.”¹⁴

Mine Clearance

In May 2002, Greece reported that demining activities since 1954 have cleared more than 150,000 square kilometers of land and disposed of 250,000 mines and other munitions. In the last two years 3,700 square kilometers have been cleared and 2,210 square kilometers returned to public use. In this time, 16,000 antipersonnel and 14,000 antivehicle mines were disarmed and 18,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) destroyed.¹⁵

Greece’s Land Minefield Clearance Battalion was formed in 1954. It includes five minesweeper companies, each led by an Engineering officer with eight men.¹⁶ Manual clearance techniques are used, and “canine detection is also being explored.”¹⁷ Mines in minefields are assessed as either having “booby-trap status,” in which case they are destroyed in situ, or as “pick up, carry away” status, in which case they are collected for open burning/open detonation in a sheltered pit.¹⁸

Bulgaria Border

Clearance near the Bulgarian border started in November 1997, and was completed in 2001.¹⁹ At the October 2001 NATO seminar, a Greek officer claimed that clearance of minefields near the Bulgarian border had just been completed, at an estimated cost of US\$1 million.²⁰ Greek officials later told Landmine Monitor that 16,181 antipersonnel mines and 12,409 antivehicle mines were removed and 38 minefields cleared. Twenty-three of the minefields are being re-checked to ensure their complete safety; the rest are open to public use. The officials said that communities were not affected by mines since they were only on Ministry of Defense land, and no mine awareness programs were carried out as the minefields were well marked and secure.²¹

At the May 2002 Standing Committee meetings, Greece provided somewhat different information regarding clearance on the Bulgarian border. It stated that the operation was completed in December 2001, with the clearance of 25,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and “hundreds of UXOs,” and at a cost of €5,900,000 (US\$5,298,200). This was described as one

¹³ “Demining operations by Hellenic army,” Presentation by Major Constantinos Kalatzis to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

¹⁴ Stavros Tzimas, “Live Minefields Cast a Dark Shadow on Peace,” *Kathimerini*, 22 October 2001.

¹⁵ Presentation by Major Kalatzis to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

¹⁶ Captain Panagiotis Kafetsellis, “Land Minefield Clearance Presentation,” Workshop on Regionally-focused Mine Action, NATO Partnership for Peace, Athens, 18-19 October 2001; before 1971 the Battalion was named the Land Minefield Clearance Service and Command.

¹⁷ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Form F, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001; Report to the OSCE, 14 December 2001, p. 2.

¹⁸ Presentation by Major Ionannis Christogiannis to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002.

¹⁹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Form B, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001.

²⁰ Captain Kafetsellis, “Land Minefield Clearance Presentation,” 18-19 October 2001.

²¹ Interview with Ambassador Stephanou, Nikos Kanellos, First Counselor, and Dimitris Skoutas, Attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 March 2002, and subsequent faxes and emails.

of the largest and most difficult tasks for the Greek Army, due to the mountainous terrain, dense vegetation, and adverse weather conditions.²²

Turkey Border

The government maintains that “all minefields along the border with Turkey in the Evros province are clearly defined and marked, well above any standard established by Amended Protocol II and the relevant NATO STANAGs.”²³ Minefields laid by Greece on its border with Turkey have been protected with an extra barbed wire fence, two meters high with illuminating signs, which was erected some three years ago at a cost of €150,000 (\$134,700) in order to minimize accidents by illegal migrants. Greece claims, “The result of this program contributed to the reduction of accidents by almost 90%.”²⁴

Northwest

Greece has reported on a “huge mine clearance program ... in vast areas of Western Macedonia and Ipiros in northwest Greece, in ‘suspected areas’ containing not only mines but also booby-traps, UXOs and other devices dating from World War II and the 1946-1949 era.”²⁵ In these areas, there are no properly defined minefields and no maps. Weather conditions for much of the year make progress in clearance slow. In the Grammos and Vitsi mountains alone, the affected areas total over 40,000 hectares.²⁶ In May 2002, a Greek official said, “All over Hellenic territory and especially at North West, which was an operational theater for almost ten years during WWII, the Hellenic army is conducting clearance of all these old minefields including UXO and booby-traps in order to give all these areas back to free use by the civilians.”²⁷

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

In 2001, Greece gave \$80,000 to Bosnia and Herzegovina for demining operations.²⁸

Personnel in the Greek contingent with KFOR in Kosovo ran mine awareness courses for the local population in 2001. The Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center near Kilkis in northern Greece was established in 1998 under command of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff. Seminars offered by the Center include the topics of international humanitarian law and mine-related matters.²⁹

Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, ten civilians were killed and four injured in mine incidents; and in March 2002, another three civilians were killed and four injured in two incidents. There is no central register of mine casualties, but incidents continue to be reported in the media. On 21 May 2001, three immigrants from Turkey were killed and one was injured after straying into a minefield.³⁰ A day later, the bodies of two men evidently killed by landmines were found near the border with Turkey.³¹ On 29 September 2001, the dismembered body of a male mine casualty was found by

²² Presentation by Major Kalatzis to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 28 May 2002.

²³ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Form B, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001.

²⁴ Presentation by Major Kalatzis to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 28 May 2002.

²⁵ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001, Form B.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Presentation by Major Kalatzis to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 28 May 2002.

²⁸ Interview with Ambassador Stephanou, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 March 2002, and subsequent faxes and emails.

²⁹ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Form F, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001; Report to the OSCE, 14 December 2001, p. 3; and email from Dimitrios Skoutas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2002.

³⁰ “Three killed after straying into minefield while crossing Greece-Turkey border,” *Associated Press* (Athens), 21 May 2001.

³¹ “Migrants die in attempt to cross border,” *Athens News* (weekly English language newspaper), 25 May 2001.

Greek army personnel between Gemisti and Gefyra in the Evros minefields.³² On 24 December 2001, four immigrants were killed and three were seriously injured in “the worst incident of its sort since late 1999 when five Iraqi Kurds died in one minefield.” The incident occurred early in the morning in the area of Gemisti near the village of Ferres. It was reported that the minefield they entered had been marked and fenced.³³ On 20 March 2002, two immigrants from Turkey were killed and another injured near the border village of Kastanies, 70 kilometers south of Gemisti, after entering a minefield which an army official said, was “clearly marked and even had fluorescent warning signs and a double perimeter fence.”³⁴ On 28 March, another immigrant was killed and three others were injured after straying into a fenced minefield, again near Gemisti. The casualties were from Algeria, Iraq, and Morocco.³⁵

Officially, Greece claims that “there are no mine victims among the Greek population. Few mine casualties suffered during the last years by illegal migrants who tried to cross the border coming from Turkey.... Mine casualties among illegal migrants are suffered from time to time because they are led to the border along river Evros at night and then instructed to ignore any mine fences and markings and walk into the Greek territory.”³⁶

On 15 October 2001, two Army mine clearers were killed while defusing a mine near Petritsi, Serres, on the Bulgarian border.³⁷ According to the Greek military, since 1954, 30 personnel have been killed and 17 more injured in mine/UXO clearance operations.³⁸

According to one media report, since 1990, 59 illegal immigrants and three Greek soldiers have been killed by mines in the Evros area on the border with Turkey, and 20 people have been injured.³⁹ At least 13 immigrants have died in the Evros minefields in the last two years.⁴⁰ The NGO Médecins du Monde Greece calculated that 55 people have been killed and 46 seriously wounded since 1994.⁴¹

Mine casualties are treated in the Alexandroupolis hospital or other major hospitals in northern Greece and then offered “full disabled people programs (including prosthetic services) through the National Health System of Greece (ESY).”⁴² This covers “all expenses.”⁴³

GUYANA

Key developments since May 2001: A seminar on the Mine Ban Treaty took place in Georgetown in May 2002. A parliamentary motion for ratification of the treaty has been submitted to the National Assembly.

³² “Man Dies in Mine Blast in Evros Region,” *Athens News*, 5 October 2001.

³³ “Minefield Kills Four Immigrants,” *Kathimerini*, 24 December 2001. For details of previous incidents, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 831.

³⁴ “Two More Die in Evros Minefields,” *Kathimerini*, 21 March 2002; “Mines Spell Death for Illegals,” *Athens News*, 22 March 2002.

³⁵ “More Bad News,” *Athens News Agency*, 28 March 2002.

³⁶ Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001, Form B.

³⁷ “Land Mine Kills Officers,” *Athens News*, 19 October 2001; Stavros Tzimas, “Live Minefields Cast a Dark Shadow on Peace,” *Kathimerini*, 22 October 2001.

³⁸ Presentation by Major Kalatzis to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 28 May 2002.

³⁹ “Two More Die in Evros Minefields,” *Kathimerini*, 21 March 2002.

⁴⁰ “Minefield Kills Four Immigrants,” *Kathimerini*, 24 December 2001; “Mines kill 4 Iraqi migrants, injure 3 at Evros border,” *Athens News*, 28 December 2001.

⁴¹ Kathy Tzilivakis, “Greece to Scrap Evros Landmines Ahead of Turkey,” *Athens News*, 30 March 2002. It arrived at those numbers using media reports in one newspaper and the websites of three NGOs, including the ICBL/Landmine Monitor.

⁴² Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Form B, submitted in March 2001 and on 10 December 2001.

⁴³ Interview with Ambassador Stephanou, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 March 2002, and subsequent faxes and emails.

Guyana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. The Speaker of the National Assembly told Landmine Monitor that a parliamentary motion for ratification of the treaty had been submitted to the National Assembly, but the motion had not yet been tabled for approval.¹ Canada has indicated that it anticipates Guyana will ratify the treaty without objection once unrelated state-level political issues are resolved.²

In July 2001, the Permanent Mission of Guyana to the UN in New York told Landmine Monitor that, "Guyana, although not directly affected by landmines, has always and will continue to support international efforts to put an end to the use of landmines."³ In November 2001, Guyana cosponsored and voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty; Guyana had voted in favor of similar pro-ban resolutions in recent years.

Guyana did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Nicaragua, or the intersessional meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva.

On 7 May 2002, a seminar on implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was held in Georgetown, hosted by the Canadian High Commission and the Embassy of the Netherlands, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guyana.⁴ Representatives from the Guyana Defence Force, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, the Attorney General's Chambers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Guyana Red Cross Association participated in the seminar. Guyana's Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Elisabeth Harper, and Canada's Ambassador for Mine Action, Daniel Livermore, addressed the seminar.

Guyana is not a State Party to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Guyana is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor estimates that Guyana has some 20,000 antipersonnel mines stockpiled. According to a Guyana Defense Force official, some, if not all, of the stockpiled antipersonnel mines are PMB-2 mines manufactured by North Korea.⁵

Guyana is not mine-affected.

HAITI

Haiti signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. In June 2002, the ICBL provided materials including information on the ratification process in response to a request from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. According to the official, the ratification procedure was on a "fast track" and ratification documents had been sent to the office of President Jean Bertrand Aristide.¹ Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, wrote a letter of encouragement to Haiti's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Philippe Antonio, as have the ICBL, OAS, and other actors.²

Haiti did not attend any meetings related to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2001 or the first half of 2002, but it cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in

¹ Brief submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Mine Action Seminar, 7 May 2002; interview with Ralph Ramkarran, S.C., Speaker of the National Assembly, Georgetown, 27 June 2002.

² "Universalization News," Newsletter of the Ottawa Convention's Universalization Contact Group, Volume 1, Issue 3, June 2002, p. 1.

³ Letter to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Sonia Elliot, Charge d'affaires a.i., Permanent Mission of Guyana to the United Nations, New York, 27 July 2001.

⁴ "Guyana urged to ratify Ottawa Convention banning landmines," *Starboek News* (Georgetown), 8 May 2002.

⁵ Interview with Guyana Defence Force official who requested anonymity, Georgetown, June 2002.

¹ Email to ICBL from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2002.

² "Universalization News," Newsletter of the Ottawa Convention's Universalization Contact Group, Volume 1, Issue 3, June 2002, p. 1.

November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Haiti has never produced, imported, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines and is not mine-affected.³

INDONESIA

Key developments since May 2001: Indonesia has progressed toward ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. It established a National Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2002, Indonesia for the first time revealed that it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Indonesia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. It has taken significant steps toward ratification in the past year. In September 2001, Indonesia informed States Parties, “At the present, [it] is in the process towards its ratification.”¹

The government established a National Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Mine Ban Treaty coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense.² The Working Group had the mandate to: coordinate all the concerned parties, including the Department of Trade and Industry, universities, NGOs and the industrial sector; to issue a National Action Plan for the dissemination of the Mine Ban Treaty; to provide Standard Operating Procedures and a Technical Manual on stockpile destruction; to draft national implementation legislation; to establish a database on stockpiled antipersonnel mines; to issue a stockpile destruction plan; and to translate the Mine Ban Treaty into the local language.³

As a result of the consultation process, the Department of Defense, the Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Industry declared that they had “no objection” to the ratification of the treaty.⁴ The ratification document was drafted and was sent together with a concept paper to the Presidential Office. As a next step the document should have been sent to the Parliament for final approval. However, following the dismissal of President Abdurrahman Wahid in July 2001, the ratification document had to be re-submitted to the new President Megawati Sukarnoputri.⁵

In May 2002, an Indonesian official told States Parties that there were no major obstacles to ratification and that it was simply a matter of legislative priorities; he said the Mine Ban Treaty would be ratified as soon as possible after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.⁶

As a part of the information program under the National Action Plan, the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a National Seminar on the Mine Ban Treaty in Bogor, West Java, in August 2001. The Army, representatives of industry, and NGOs, including the Indonesian Campaign to Ban Landmines, also participated.⁷ Indonesia attended the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Antipersonnel Mines and Other Munitions, a joint initiative of Malaysia and Canada, which was held in Kuala Lumpur on 8-9 August 2001.

Indonesia participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Nicaragua in September 2001, where it stated, “Despite the fact of not being a mine-infested

³ Letter to ICBL Coordinator from Minister Fritz Longchamp, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, , 31 January 2000.

¹ Statement by Yayan GH Mulyana, Representative of Indonesia to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

² Statement by Col. Bambang Irawan, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Defense, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 30 May 2002.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Landmine Monitor (Nonviolence International) interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Defense, Bangkok, 14 May 2002.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Statement by Col. Bambang Irawan, Department of Defense, 30 May 2002.

⁷ Ibid.; Interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Department of Defense, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

country, Indonesia has a strong commitment to take part in the efforts of the international community in bringing to an end the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines.⁸ The Indonesia delegate participated in the informal ASEAN meeting held on the side of the Third Meeting of States Parties, to discuss the issue of landmines within the ASEAN context.

In November 2001, Indonesia voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Indonesia did not participate in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but it attended the May 2002 Standing Committee meetings. Indonesia also participated in the "Landmines in Southeast Asia" conference hosted by Thailand in Bangkok on 13-15 May 2002.

Indonesia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and it did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, or the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

Landmine Monitor Report 2001 was distributed to the Indonesian government. An official of the Department of Defense expressed his appreciation and said that an abstract of the report on Indonesia was published in the Research and Development Journal of the Department of Defense in December 2001.⁹

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Indonesia states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.¹⁰ In May 2002, Indonesia for the first time revealed details on its stockpile of antipersonnel mines. At one point, the stockpile numbered 22,000 mines, obtained from the United States, former Soviet Union, and former Yugoslavia, mainly for training purposes.¹¹ Some of the mines became unstable and Indonesia began destroying them. The stockpile now numbers 16,000 antipersonnel mines.¹²

Rebels groups in Aceh may have tried to illegally acquire antipersonnel mines. On 10 May 2001, two Thai Army officials were caught when they allegedly tried to smuggle a consignment of arms, including 23 M14 mines, 25 M18A1 mines, and 23 fuzes for M14 mines. They reportedly said that the arms were to be directed to rebel groups in Aceh, Indonesia.¹³ A Department of Defense official said that he is unaware of illegal transfer of antipersonnel mines.¹⁴

Landmine Monitor cited reports of the use of homemade mines by rebel groups in Aceh in the previous edition.¹⁵ Since May 2001, there have been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines or improvised explosive devices in Aceh or elsewhere. There have been conflicting reports, even from Indonesian officials, on possible use of antipersonnel mines by Indonesian forces in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁶

Mine Action

Indonesia has declared that is not mine-affected.¹⁷ The Indonesian Army does not have sufficient experience or ability to perform mine clearance operations.¹⁸ It has not contributed to

⁸ Statement by Yayan GH Mulyana, Representative of Indonesia to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Managua, Nicaragua, 19 September 2001.

⁹ Interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Department of Defense, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

¹⁰ Statement by Col. Bambang Irawan, Department of Defense, 30 May 2002.

¹¹ *Ibid.* He said these mines were imported in 1963. In an interview, he identified the Yugoslav mines as PROM and PMA types, and said no mines had been imported since 1963. Landmine Monitor (Nonviolence International) interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Bangkok, 14 May 2002; Landmine Monitor (HIB) interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "Two army personnel captured in stealing weapons to sell to Aceh Non-state Actors in Indonesia" (in Thai language), *Matchon Weekly* (local magazine), 14-20 May 2001.

¹⁴ Landmine Monitor (Nonviolence International) interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Defense, Bangkok, 14 May 2002.

¹⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 494.

¹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 452-453.

¹⁷ Statement by Col. Bambang Irawan, Department of Defense, 30 May 2002.

international mine action funding since 1998. An official told Landmine Monitor that Indonesia suffered three landmine casualties during past peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.¹⁹

LITHUANIA

Key developments since May 2001: In July 2002, Lithuania submitted, on a voluntary basis, an Article 7 transparency report as an indication of the government's commitment to meet the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty. Lithuania has reported a stockpile of 8,091 antipersonnel mines, for training purposes.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Lithuania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 February 1999. Since then, delay in ratification has been attributed to the need to review defense plans, find alternatives to antipersonnel mines and secure funding, including international assistance. On 2 July 2002, Lithuania voluntarily submitted to the United Nations an Article 7 Report even though it is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ The report gives no date for future ratification, but provides legislative details of the export moratorium on antipersonnel mines and for the first time gives details of the antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Lithuania.

Lithuania attended, as an observer, the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. It was represented by Dainius Baublys, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. Lithuania associated itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union, which called for "worldwide application of the Convention."

On 29 November 2001, Lithuania cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/24M, which calls on signatory States to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty without delay. Lithuania has voted for similar resolutions in previous years.

Lithuania attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in January and May 2002.² On 20 February 2002, a Canadian delegation visited Lithuania to discuss aspects of the Mine Ban Treaty with the head of the Lithuanian armed forces and other officials.³

On 28 March 2002, the Baltic International Center of Human Education wrote to the Lithuanian Minister of National Defense encouraging Lithuania to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty immediately after joining NATO.⁴ The Minister replied on 25 April 2002 stating that:

I fully share your view that landmines remain archaic and barbaric weapon, thus, Lithuania observes the spirit of the Ottawa Convention and does not produce, export or use anti-personnel mines. The debate in Lithuania is not whether to ratify the Convention, but when is the most appropriate time for such ratification. The reasons of not ratifying are focused on several aspects: a need for replacement for landmines; Lithuania's neighbors have not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty yet; a need to review national defense plans.

¹⁸ Landmine Monitor (HIB) interview with Col. Bambang Irawan, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Defense, Geneva, 28 May 2002.

¹⁹ Ibid.

¹ Article 7 Report, submitted on 2 July 2002, for calendar year 2001.

² In January it was represented by Erikas Petrikas, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and in May by Erikas Petrikas, Captain Nikolajus Polocevas and Lieutenant Arunas Janusonis, Engineer Officers, Ministry of Defense.

³ Email from Lt.-Col. John-Eric MacBride, Military Advisor, Mine Action Team, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 28 March 2002.

⁴ It is expected that Lithuania and other East European States will join NATO in November 2002.

As you may well know, Lithuania is positively considering a possibility of a submitting, on a voluntary basis, its transparency measures report under Article 7 of the Convention which well indicate a government's commitment to meet the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty. In addition to this, it is worth noticing that Lithuania may reconsider its position after receiving international security guarantee under the NATO...⁵

Lithuania is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and submitted its report under Article 13 of the protocol on 15 December 2001. It attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. Lithuania associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.

Lithuania submitted its annual report on landmines to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on 15 December 2001.⁶

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in January 2000 that no licenses have been issued for the production or import/export of antipersonnel mines since 1990. Two-year export moratoria have existed since September 1998.⁷ When the current moratorium expires in September 2002 it will be renewed, therefore "harmonizing Lithuania's position with that of the European Union," according to the Ministry of Defense.⁸

The Article 7 Report declares a total stockpile of 8,091 antipersonnel mines, consisting of four types: 3,975 PMN blast mines, 4 MON-50 directional fragmentation mines, 409 MON-100 directional fragmentation mines, and 3,703 OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines. The origin of the mines is noted as the former Soviet Union. The Report indicates the mines are for training purposes.⁹ The Report states that there are no antipersonnel mine production facilities, no stockpile destruction programs, and no mined areas.¹⁰

Landmine/UXO Problem and Clearance

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II continues to be found in Lithuania. The Amended Protocol II Article 13 report of 14 November 2001 states that there are no mine clearance programs in Lithuania, and no rehabilitation programs for landmine/UXO victims. However, according to the Ministry of Defense spokesperson, a mine clearance program is currently being developed.¹¹

There are four military units for explosive ordnance disposal operations, which during 2001 have destroyed the following numbers of mines and UXO: Juozas Vitkus engineering battalion – 80 items; Iron Wolf motorized infantry brigade – 1,267 items; Zemaitija motorized infantry brigade – 710 items; and Jaeger battalion – 101 items.¹²

⁵ Letter to Iğors Tipans from Linas Linkevicius, Minister of the National Defense, Republic of Lithuania, 25 April 2002.

⁶ Email from Grazvydas Jasutis, Senior Executive Officer, International Law Division, Ministry of Defense, 18 February 2002; a copy of the report could not be supplied.

⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 771-772.

⁸ Email from Grazvydas Jasutis, Ministry of Defense, 18 February 2002.

⁹ Article 7 Report, 2 July 2002, for calendar year 2001. The mines are not recorded on Form B (stockpiled antipersonnel mines), but on Form D (mines retained for development and training under Article 3).

¹⁰ Article 7 Report, 2 July 2002, for calendar year 2001.

¹¹ Email from Grazvydas Jasutis, Ministry of Defense, 18 March 2002.

¹² *Ibid.*

Lithuania's international cooperation on mine clearance, the assistance which it has received from other countries, and its research into mine detection and clearance have been reported previously by *Landmine Monitor*.¹³

The Ministry of Defense was unaware of any casualties from mine incidents in 2001 or 2002.¹⁴

MARSHALL ISLANDS

The Republic of the Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has still not ratified. It was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Marshall Islands was the only treaty signatory to abstain from voting on similar pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1998, 1999, and 2000. One possible reason for these abstentions and for the lack of ratification could be the close economic, political and military dependence between the Marshall Islands and non-signatory, the United States, as defined by the Compact of Free Association. The Marshall Islands is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel mines. There are considerable quantities of UXO left over from World War II when Japanese and American forces fought over many of the islands.

POLAND

Key developments since May 2001: Poland has participated in the Mine Ban Treaty process, but has taken no concrete steps toward ratification. Ministry of Defense officials have estimated the cost of destruction of Poland's antipersonnel mine stockpile as "a few million Polish Zloty," and have informally estimated the size at more than one million. The Engineering Corps identified the types of antipersonnel mines stockpiled. Poland spent around \$6 million on domestic mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal in 2001, destroying 3,842 mines and 45,000 items of unexploded ordnance. In March 2002, 39 deminers were sent to Afghanistan.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Poland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 with pre-conditions for ratification. In 2002, its position was re-stated: "[R]atification is dependent on the accession of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, all states in our region, and supplying the Armed Forces with mine alternatives. So far, none of these conditions has been fulfilled. Ratification at the moment would deprive the armed forces of an important means of national defense system."¹

Poland participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. Its statement described the Mine Ban Treaty as a "perfect example of an instrument that serves a noble humanitarian purpose" and "provides States with a framework for solving the mine crisis, not just by imposing a political ban, but also spelling out the principles of demining and survivor assistance." But, it also noted that while "some States security environments have given them the opportunity to ratify the Ottawa Convention, our particular defense requirements

¹³ These activities were reviewed in *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 772-773. They are included in Lithuania's Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Forms B, E, G, 14 November 2001, and earlier Article 13 reports.

¹⁴ Email from Grazydas Jasutis, Ministry of Defense, 22 May 2002.

¹ Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Deputy Director, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002. See previous editions of the *Landmine Monitor Report* for similar past statements. All Polish originals in this report have been translated by the *Landmine Monitor* researcher.

have not so far permitted us to take such steps."² Poland also aligned itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union, which urged all non-members to become States Parties as soon as possible.

On 29 November 2001, Poland cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Poland participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.³ At the meetings in January 2002, Poland declared "Despite political support expressed on various occasions, we are still not completely prepared to withdraw from possessing the anti-personnel mines.... We need to find adequate alternative means. This process requires time. Nevertheless Poland would like to be seen as a state [whose] strategic position and painful historical experiences justify the delay in withdrawing from that type of weapon. At the same time we are ready to declare that the ratification of the Ottawa Convention by our country is a matter of near future."⁴

Subsequent interviews seeking to clarify this statement indicated that the "near future" could mean five or even ten years. The Polish Armed Forces are currently undergoing a six-year modernization process, and ratification may be dependent on decisions regarding arms acquisition.⁵

Poland's ongoing search for alternatives to antipersonnel mines was referred to at the Third Meeting of States Parties and at the Standing Committee meeting on 1 February 2002. The alternatives program and the ratification timetable and process are the responsibility of an inter-ministerial working group, on which are represented the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and others including the scientific research committee. Since May 2001, the working group has met monthly. Initially, work was dominated by the related issue of antivehicle mines, in view of proposed changes to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). At the working group meeting in February 2002, General Ryszard Zuchowki summarized international research and development, Poland's military need of alternatives to antipersonnel mines, and financial aspects of the six-year modernization plan.⁶

Previous Polish-Canadian consultations on ratification and research into alternatives to mines continued in 2001, with Canada providing a study of alternatives.⁷ On 15 April 2002, General Baril, retired Chief of the Defence Staff in Canada, visited Poland for meetings with representatives of ministries of defense, general staff and foreign affairs. The work of the inter-ministerial group, particularly regarding alternatives and treaty ratification, was discussed at the meeting.⁸

In 2001, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense also discussed the issues of stockpile destruction and development of alternative weapons, as well as demining and other issues connected with ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty and the CCW, with the Czech, Latvian and

² Statement delivered on behalf of Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

³ It was represented by General Ryszard Zuchowski, Chief of the Engineering Forces, Colonel Boguslaw Bebenek, Chief of Training Division, Engineering Corps, Zbigniew Ciolek, Ministry of Defense, and Adam Wilczynski, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and in January 2002, Mariusz Handzlik, Deputy Director of the Department of Security Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Statement by Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

⁵ Interview with Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 5 February and 11 March 2002, and interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Head of Division and Lt.-Col. Waldemar Ratajczak, Senior Expert, Department of International Co-operation and Capt. Cezary Pawlak, Engineering Corps, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002.

⁶ Interview with Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 February and 11 March 2002; and interview with Col. Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Ratajczak, and Capt. Pawlak, Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002.

⁷ Email from Lt.-Col. John Macbride, Military Advisor, to Daniel Livermore, Ambassador for Mine Action, Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada.

⁸ Telephone interview with Irena Juszczyk, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 16 April 2002; email from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2002.

Norwegian armed forces.⁹ In October 2001, Poland attended a NATO Partnership for Peace seminar on regional mine action in Athens, which included representatives of 21 countries, the United Nations and NGOs, including the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Landmine Monitor.

Following the seminar "Understanding the Ottawa Convention," held in Warsaw from 18-19 June 2001, Poland plans to hold another regional meeting on the mine issue in late 2002.¹⁰ Poland described itself as "an active promoter of the values set out by the Convention among the States in our region."¹¹

Poland announced in February 2001 that it intended to ratify Amended Protocol II to the CCW by the end of 2001,¹² but did not do so. Poland attended as an observer the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 2001 and distributed a statement which explained: "the reason why Poland cannot go ahead with it at the moment is the lack of funds the Polish Army needs to modernize its stocks of landmines" to comply with Amended Protocol II, and the need to prioritize "other, more pressing obligations and, consequently, re-route the resources away from landmine modernisation projects." But, "we are perfectly aware of the importance of the Second Amended Protocol and are all for having it ratified."¹³ Poland aligned itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.

Subsequently, in January 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that ratification of Amended Protocol II was delayed because Poland was trying to avoid modernizing mines to be CCW-compliant, which would later have to be destroyed after ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁴ In February 2002, the Ministry stated that all relevant ministries had agreed to ratify Amended Protocol II and it expected the legislative procedures to be ready by September 2002. Poland will not modernize its stock of antipersonnel mines, and all costs of complying with Amended Protocol II will be covered by the Ministry of Defense.¹⁵

Poland attended as a State Party the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. At the Review Conference, Poland acted as a "Friend to the Chair," and was co-sponsor of a US-Danish proposal to increase the regulation of antivehicle mines. Poland also supported establishing an expert group to study how the problem of explosive remnants of war may be addressed by the CCW. Poland supported the CCW's extension to internal conflicts and the introduction of a verification regime which should be carefully considered in order "to avoid undermining the process of universalization of the Convention."¹⁶

Poland's 2001 report to the OSCE stated that it "actively supports the efforts on creation of legally-binding instrument banning the transfers of anti-personnel landmines within the Conference on Disarmament. Poland believes that the most important way of combating landmine hazards is to eliminate the possibility of their transfers to high-risked and armed-conflict areas."¹⁷

⁹ Report of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 15 December 2001, p. 2.

¹⁰ Interview with Mariusz Handzlik and Irena Juszczyk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 5 February 2002. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* for details on the June 2001 regional meeting.

¹¹ Statement by Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

¹² Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 February 2001; previously, it was stated that Protocol II would be ratified in 2000 but was then delayed for legal reasons.

¹³ Statement by Krzysztof Jakubowski, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to the Third Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 10 December 2001.

¹⁴ Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002.

¹⁵ Interview with Mariusz Handzlik and Irena Juszczyk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 5 February 2002; Report of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the OSCE, 15 December 2001, p. 2.

¹⁶ Statement by Krzysztof Jakubowski, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, to the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001.

¹⁷ Report of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the OSCE, 15 December 2001, p. 2.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

The Polish statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties affirmed that “Poland complies with the conditions of the Ottawa Convention concerning the prohibition of production and transfer of landmines.”¹⁸ No precise information on the size and make-up of Poland’s antipersonnel mine stockpile has yet been given. In January 2002, a Polish military representative at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva indicated unofficially that the stockpile is “over 1 million” antipersonnel mines.¹⁹ The Ministry of Defense declined to comment on this figure, as it has with previous estimates.²⁰ However, Ministry of Defense officials stated that they have estimated the cost of destruction of the stockpile as “a few million Polish Zloty, a cost the Ministry does not consider a problem.”²¹

The Engineering Corps indicated that Poland possesses the following types of antipersonnel mines: PMD-6, POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PSM-1, PSM-1 (no explosive content - for training), MON-100, MON-100 (no explosive content - for training), and MOP-2 (very small quantities).²²

Human Rights Watch has identified several antivehicle mines produced and stockpiled by Poland that may have antipersonnel capabilities: MN-111, MN-121, MN-123 and MPP-B varieties.²³

Use

The Ministry of Defense stated that the armed forces of Poland did not use antipersonnel mines in 2001 “in joint military operations, or in joint exercises with other States. APs are used exclusively for trainings for the demining troops and it is very rare and in a limited range.”²⁴ The statement by Poland to the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 explained, “Poland has always regarded mines as a typically defensive weapon, which should be applied in a way minimizing any undesirable effects.”²⁵

Research and Development (R&D)

The Military Institute of Technical Engineering in Wroclaw conducts R&D on landmine detection and clearance technology, as well as on antipersonnel mine alternatives. In early 2002, the Ministry of Defense explained that “limited financial resources provided for research and outlined priorities of modernization were not sufficient to conduct broader research in the previous year.”²⁶ The engineering forces are responsible for a study on alternative means of antipersonnel

¹⁸ Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001. Production was previously stated to have ceased in the 1980s, and an indefinite export ban started in 1995. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 837.

¹⁹ Discussion with a member of the Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.

²⁰ Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002. Presented with previous estimates, the Ministry of Defense declared: “Transparency in armaments has an extremely important role in cooperation, security and confidence-building process... The process of opening access to the information...requires decisions on the level of the Ministry of Defense, Chief of General Staff and the Defense Affairs Committee... These issues will be on the agenda of the interagency task force group.” See also, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 837-838.

²¹ Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Ratajczak, and Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002. Exchange rate at 22 March 2002: US\$1 = 4.1085 Zloty, used throughout this report.

²² Telephone interview with Col. Boguslaw Bebenek, Chief of Training Division, Command of Engineer Corps, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 12 April 2002.

²³ Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” prepared for the Standing Committee of Experts on General Status and Operation of the Convention, 10-11 January 2000.

²⁴ Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.

²⁵ Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001.

²⁶ Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.

mines, which is expected to be finished in late 2002. Many institutions were reported to be involved in research on alternative means to antipersonnel mines.²⁷

Landmine/UXO Problem, Clearance, and Risk Education

The areas considered as most contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II and the Soviet occupation are the drainage basins of the Vistula and Odra rivers, and the forest areas of southeast Poland. Mines and UXO are discovered most often in urbanized areas during the construction of buildings. Planned clearance operations are carried out on former military sites. In other areas, mine clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) "interventions" are carried out in response to reports of mine/UXO contamination. The military engineering forces are responsible for coordination and carrying out both types of operations. The Ministry of Defense estimated that between 90 and 97 percent of the total contaminated area had been cleared by the end of 2001, but caution that it is very hard to identify the area remaining contaminated.²⁸

In 2001, a total of 3,842 mines and 45,322 UXO were detected and destroyed.²⁹ Former military areas totaling 62,500,000 square meters were cleared and 8,822 interventions were reported in 2001. Each intervention requires checking an area of approximately 3,000 square meters.³⁰ In 2001, the cost of mine clearance and EOD was 25.5 million Zloty (US\$6.2 million), a similar amount to the previous year.³¹

Former military areas (now in local civilian control) suspected of mine/UXO contamination cover a total of 241,090,000 square meters and clearance operations are planned to the end of 2003. These former military areas are fenced. In total, 380 deminers and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists are involved in these clearance operations.³²

A further 320 deminers and EOD specialists conduct clearance in other areas. They are divided into 39 troops of six deminers (including four troops in the navy, of which two are specialized in clearing sea mines).³³ If an area is thought to be contaminated by mines or UXO, it is fenced and marked with warning tape and signs. Very large areas are marked only with warning signs.³⁴ After clearance, areas are handed over to the local authorities and the State forest administration, which decide on the use of the land in accordance with local plans.³⁵

According to the Ministry of Defense, the task of mine and UXO risk education is mainly carried out by the engineering forces, who draw attention to the problem in radio and TV programs and in the press. When there is a major clearance operation or removal of dangerous objects, the public is warned. The Ministry of Defense says that awareness activities are also conducted in schools by soldiers of the engineering forces.³⁶

²⁷ Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Waldemar Ratajczak, Department of International Co-operation, and Capt. Cezary Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from Ministry of Defense, 15 April 2002.

²⁸ Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 838-839.

²⁹ Interview with Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from the Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 5 February 2002. In 2000, 2,091 mines and 35,386 UXO were cleared. In 1999, 2,737 mines and 57,844 UXO were cleared.

³⁰ Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Witold Gabis, Chief of the Transfer Protection Division, Engineer Forces, Warsaw, 15 April 2002.

³¹ Interview with Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2002.

³² Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.

³³ Interview with Capt. Cezary Pawlak, Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from the Ministry of Defense, Warsaw 14 March 2002.

³⁴ Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Witold Gabis, Chief of the Transfer Protection Division, Engineer Forces, Warsaw, 15 April 2002.

³⁵ Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

In 2001, Polish media reported several mine/UXO incidents. On 5 July 2001, mines and UXO were found at a construction site in the center of the town of Bochnia. On 27 July, 100 World War II mines were found in a lake. On 7 August, a man was found with 21 stolen landmines in his car. No injuries were reported in these cases.³⁷

Landmine/UXO Casualties

There is no comprehensive record of mine/UXO casualties in Poland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred inquiries to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of the Interior and Administration, which have not supplied data on mine/UXO casualties in 2001. According to police sources, seven civilians were killed as a result of handling UXO in 2001.³⁸ However, according to the engineer corps, there were about 40 mine/UXO incidents resulting in injuries, most of the casualties being children, in 2001.³⁹ No Polish peacekeepers were killed or injured by mines or UXO while on international missions in 2001.⁴⁰ On 31 May 2002, the commander of a Polish demining platoon clearing mines near Bagram in Afghanistan was injured by an antipersonnel mine.⁴¹ Subsequently, on 26 June, a Polish captain was lightly injured by a landmine at the Bagram base.⁴²

Survivors of landmines and UXO are covered by the standard social healthcare system, which provides hospital care and some rehabilitative measures based on the law on general health insurance.⁴³ Regardless of insurance, mine/UXO casualties are treated as an emergency and receive first aid and surgery if needed. If the survivors are insured, they are entitled to surgery, prostheses, and rehabilitation free of charge. If not insured, survivors must cover the costs.

Mine Action Assistance

Poland contributed US\$10,000 to the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in Ukraine, and the same amount for the Trust Fund project in Moldova.⁴⁴

Polish deminers conduct mine and UXO clearance in their areas of responsibility within the following international missions: UNDOF in Syria (one troop, since 1974), UNIFIL in Lebanon (one troop, since 1992), DFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (two troops, since 1997), and KFOR in Kosovo (one troop, since 1999). Each troop includes eight mine/EOD specialists, therefore a total of 40 mine/EOD specialists are involved in international missions. The estimated annual cost of each troop is about US\$175,000. In early 2002, the Polish government decided to send about 300 soldiers, including deminers, to Afghanistan.⁴⁵ On 16 March 2002, 39 deminers went to Afghanistan. Their primary purpose is to participate in the allied operation, and to conduct clearance mainly for military purposes.⁴⁶

³⁷ "Niewybuchy usunięto już z bochni" ("UXO Have Already Been Removed from Bochnia"), *Gazeta Wyborcza* (daily newspaper), 5 July 2001; "Wybuchowe jezioro" ("An Explosive Lake"), *Polish Press Agency*, www.wp.pl, 27 July 2001, and "Samochod pełen min" ("A Car Full of Mines"), *Polish Press Agency*, www.wp.pl, 7 August 2001.

³⁸ Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002.

³⁹ Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Gabis, Engineer Forces, 15 April 2002.

⁴⁰ Interview with Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2002.

⁴¹ "Victim of the Black Widow – Sapper Injured in Afghanistan," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (daily newspaper), 1 June 2002.

⁴² TV Channel 1, 26 June 2002; *Gazeta Wyborcza* (daily newspaper), 27 June 2002.

⁴³ "Ustawa o Powszechnym Ubezpieczeniu Zdrowotnym," 6 February 1997, DZ. UST. 1997 NR 28, POZ. 153, NR75, POZ468.

⁴⁴ Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002.

⁴⁵ Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.

⁴⁶ Interview with Col. Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Ratajczak, and Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2002; letter from Lt.-Col. Waldemar Ratajczak, Department of International Co-operation, Ministry of Defense, 15 April 2002.

NGO Activities

The Polish Red Cross includes the mine issue in its work. In 2001, the video “The Ottawa Treaty,” produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross, was translated into Polish and distributed to all Polish Red Cross district branches, the Ministry of Defense, and the Academy of National Defense. The mine issue was included in a course entitled “Armed Conflicts and Media” organized by the Polish Red Cross at the Department of Journalism at Warsaw University in 2001 and 2002.⁴⁷ In 2001, a young Polish filmmaker made the film “22 Minuty” (22 Minutes) about the global landmine problem.⁴⁸ Excerpts of the film were also been shown on State television in late 2001. In January 2002, the Polish edition of *Newsweek* magazine published an article about the landmine problem in Afghanistan.⁴⁹

SÃO TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE

São Tomé e Príncipe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 April 1998. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor in July 2000 that the Parliament approved ratification in early 1999, but the President had not yet signed it.¹

In August 2001, a representative from São Tomé’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “[T]he Democratic Republic of São Tomé holds dear any enterprise seeking to totally eliminate this plague.... However, due to internal problems, São Tomé e Príncipe does not stand amongst the countries which have ratified the Treaty in question, despite its permanent desire to do so.”²

In February 2002, a representative from São Tomé’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated, “Notwithstanding its profound conviction regarding the need for a total elimination of antipersonnel mines, for several reasons the Democratic Republic of São Tomé, was not able to conclude the internal procedures towards the ratification of the Treaty of Ottawa, a fact that we deeply regret.... [T]he National Parliament is currently dissolved and ... a Permanent Commission is functioning which competencies do not allow the ratification of conventions. The new Parliament will be elected in the next legislative elections fixed for 3 March [2002]. To conclude, we thank the manifested availability of support so that São Tomé e Príncipe ratifies as soon as possible the Convention, demonstrating our unequivocal will to see the Earth rid of this atrocious weapon.”³

São Tomé did not attend the Third Meeting of the States Parties in September 2001 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Although São Tomé cosponsored UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, it was absent from the vote on the resolution on 29 November 2001.

It is believed that São Tomé has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and according to the office of the Chief of Staff of the São Toméan Armed Forces, there are no

⁴⁷ Interview with Anna Wilk, International Humanitarian Law Dissemination Center, Polish Red Cross Headquarters, Warsaw, 18 December 2001.

⁴⁸ 22 Minuty (22 Minutes), documentary film produced and directed by Rafal Matysiak, Poland, 2001; interview with Rafal Matysiak, Warsaw, 19 February 2002.

⁴⁹ Joanna Kowalska and Katarzyna Derlicka, “Pola smierci” (“Fields of Death”), *Newsweek Polska* (Polish edition of Newsweek), 20 January 2002, pp. 34-35.

¹ Telephone interview with Dr. Ana Paula Alvim, Department of Multilateral Issues in the Office of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, São Tomé, 3 July 2000. The President reportedly told a visiting delegation in 2001 that São Tomé had already “signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 20 January 1999.” See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 220.

² Letter from Director Luís Viegas, International Policy and Economy Affairs Directorate, to Elisabeth Bernstein (ICBL Coordinator), São Tomé, 20 August 2001.

³ Letter from Director Luís Viegas, International Policy and Economy Affairs Directorate, to Landmine Monitor, São Tomé, 20 February 2002.

stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the country.⁴ The Protocol Service of São Tomé e Príncipe's Embassy confirmed that São Tomé e Príncipe is not mine-affected.⁵ It should be noted that the liberation struggle never involved armed fighting and this insular state has not been at war since its independence.

SUDAN

Key developments since May 2001: After the signing a cease-fire agreement for the Nuba Mountains area, a series of new mine action projects were initiated. A number of assessments were carried out in both government- and rebel-controlled areas. The United States deployed part of its quick reaction demining force to clear mines from roads in the Nuba Mountains for a five-week period. The Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative was formed in 2001. Between April 2001 and March 2002, Operation Save Innocent Lives cleared a total of 329 miles of road and 263,093 square meters of land. Both the government and the SPLA have renewed pledges not to use antipersonnel mines, although there are still unconfirmed allegations of use by both sides.

Background

A series of diplomatic missions resulted in the U.S./Swiss-brokered Burgenstock Ceasefire Agreement for the Nuba Mountains, signed on 19 January 2002. This agreement specifically calls for an end to the use of mines and for mine clearance in this northern Sudanese rebel enclave. It also allows humanitarian access and monitoring. A Joint Military Commission has been established to regulate and monitor the ceasefire and international monitors are also to be deployed.

Mine Ban Policy

Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not ratified it. In June 2001, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the Sudanese government focal point for mine issues, convened a workshop on the treaty and a technical committee was formed from ministries to advise on treaty ratification. Both the head of the Army's engineering department, General Mohamed Abdelgadir, and the deputy commissioner of HAC, Abdel Ati Abdel Kheir, supported the workshop's recommendation for the government to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ The Commissioner General of the HAC in May 2002 stated, "The Government of Sudan has not finalized the ratification of Ottawa Convention banning the use of Landmines yet because it is still facing several problems...." After citing continued use of mines by rebel groups, he said, "The Government of Sudan reaffirms its commitment for the ratification of Ottawa Convention for Banning the use of Landmines which will be effective soon as the above-mentioned violations are ceased."²

Representatives of the Sudan government attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 and actively participated in the meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in Geneva in January and May 2002. Sudan cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The President of Sudan has called for a regional mechanism to address the problem of landmines in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, an East African regional

⁴ Telephone interview with Luis Maria, Office of the Chief of Staff, São Toméan Armed Forces, São Tomé, 26 March 1999.

⁵ Meeting with a Protocol Service Official to deliver a Landmine Monitor Report Questionnaire, Lisbon, 17 January 2001.

¹ Statements made at the second national seminar on landmines organized by the government's Humanitarian Aid Commission, Khartoum, 18 June 2001.

² "Statement of Sudan delegation to the Intersessional Meeting of Experts on Implementation of Ottawa Convention on Banning Anti personnel Landmines," delivered by Dr. Sulafeldin Salih Mohamed, Commissioner General, Humanitarian Aid Commission, Geneva, May 2002.

grouping) countries. Based on that call, HAC started contacts with Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya trying to implement the President's call, which focuses on mine action, and not a ban. These contacts also included Chad, which is not an IGAD country.³

The main rebel army, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), has now twice signed the "Geneva Call Commitment to Non-Use," first on 10 August 2001, in southern Sudan and again 4 October 2001, in Geneva.⁴ In January 2002, the SPLA and the rival Sudan People's Defense Forces (SPDF) signed an agreement to merge, drastically changing the military situation in south Sudan by ending most factional fighting in Upper Nile. According to an SPLM⁵ official, "This agreement is binding on any party or faction that joins with the SPLA, past present or future."⁶ The same official said the SPLA's agreement to the mine ban was "triggered by the simple fact that we are fighting for a peaceful homeland and not a turbulent minefield."⁷ A leader of the SPDF was more equivocal, believing his faction still had to negotiate these issues during the ongoing merger talks, but insisted his forces had renounced the use of antipersonnel mines since 1996, and had no stocks or intention to use them.⁸

Production, Trade, Stockpiling

Both civilian and military representatives of Sudan have stated that the country does not produce, export, import, or possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.⁹ A July 2001 letter to Landmine Monitor claimed there were no stocks of antipersonnel mines.¹⁰ These statements are at odds with the allegations and evidence of past use of antipersonnel mines reported in previous editions of *Landmine Monitor Report*. According to the government, all mines collected during demining and those taken from the rebel forces are destroyed.¹¹

It appears that the Lord's Resistance Army, a Ugandan separatist group, has stockpiled landmines inside Sudan. In February 2002, Uganda and Sudan signed a protocol to allow Ugandan army units to pursue LRA units within Sudanese territory. In late March 2002, the Ugandan Defense Minister claimed that the Ugandan army had overrun four LRA bases inside Sudan and seized weapons including "55 assault rifles, grenades, bombs, land mines and ammunition." These were handed over to the Sudanese military intelligence chief at Lubang Tek in a videotaped ceremony.¹²

³ Interview with Hasabo Mohamed Abdolrahman, Head of Peace Administration, Humanitarian Aid Commission, Khartoum, 17 March 2002.

⁴ Interview with Commander Nhial Deng Nhial, SPLM Foreign Minister, London, 2 March 2002. The SPLA first orally committed to the Geneva Call on 27 March 2000, in Geneva, though SPLA mine use apparently continued after that point.

⁵ The Sudan People's Liberation Movement is the largest opposition group. Its armed forces are the SPLA.

⁶ Interview with Commander Nhial Deng Nhial, SPLM Foreign Minister, London, 2 March 2002.

⁷ "Sudan: The scourge of landmines," *Africa News*, Issue 68, November 2001.

⁸ Interview with SPDF leader Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, London, 2 March 2002.

⁹ "Sudan Report to the Meeting of the Standing Committees of Experts on Mine Clearance, Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration And Status, Operation of the Ottawa Convention on Banning Antipersonnel Land Mines," Geneva, 7 May 2001, pp. 3-4, hereinafter cited as "Sudan Report Geneva, 7 May 2001;" *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 223-224.

¹⁰ Letter from Abdellati Abdelkheir, Deputy Commissioner, Humanitarian Aid Commission-Sudan, to Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 29 July 2001.

¹¹ Sudan Report Geneva, 7 May 2001, p. 3.

¹² "Ugandan army finds large rebel arms cache in Southern Sudan," *Agence France Presse* (Kampala), 17 April 2002; Report by Osike Felix, *New Vision*, 30 March 2002, p. 1, referred to antipersonnel mines. Sudan has been accused in the past of supplying arms to the LRA.

Use

Landmine Monitor Report 2001 stated that there were “strong indications” that both government and SPLA forces continued to use antipersonnel mines.¹³ On numerous occasions in the past year Sudanese military and civilian officials have denied that the army uses antipersonnel mines. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, the head of the Sudanese delegation said that the government reiterates its commitment not to use antipersonnel mines.¹⁴

The government stated at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2002, “The rebels are still using antipersonnel landmines in many parts of the southern Sudan. Several incidents had occurred recently in Raga and Ganmet near Wau of Western Bahr El Gazal State.... In the Eastern Sudan the opposition based in a neighboring country also uses antipersonnel landmines with devastating effects on the civilians and their livestock.”¹⁵ For a number of years there have been reports of various militias in the south using mines.¹⁶

The UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sudan, 2002, mentions a UN assessment report that claims both the government and opposition parties use landmines: “the former to protect its garrison towns, while the latter uses landmines to fix government forces in the towns and interdict their supply lines.” Furthermore, “both sides reportedly have used landmines to terrorize local populations in order to diminish their support for the opposing sides.”¹⁷

Both sides have accused each other of having mined the town of Raga in Western Baher el Ghazal area, recaptured in October 2001 by the government after being taken by the SPLA in June 2001. The SPLA allegedly warned a security official with UN Operation Lifeline Sudan that the SPLA had used antipersonnel mines in October 2001 to defend the nearby airstrips at Mangayat and Deim Zubeir.¹⁸ An SPLM official stated, “If this incident took place I’m sure that it was from lack of local information by commanders on the ground. We hope that we will be able to resolve these local difficulties through a program of education and training in international humanitarian norms, as planned with Geneva Call.”¹⁹

Although a cease-fire has been in effect in the Nuba Mountains since January 2002, fighting continues in the nearby oil-producing areas of the south, particularly Western Upper Nile. The SPLA provided a Landmine Monitor researcher with sketch maps indicating some 49 known or suspected minefields in the Nuba Mountains. The SPLA alleges the Sudanese Army laid all but three. The SPLA also claims that government forces continued nuisance mining as late as January 2002.²⁰

¹³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 224-227 and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 183-186, for details about prior accusations and denials of mine use.

¹⁴ Statement by Dr. Sulafeldein S. Mohamed, Humanitarian Aid Commissioner to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001. Other officials making denials of mine use include: General Mohamed Abdelgadir, head of the army engineering corps, and Abdelkareem Abdelmoula, Minister of International Cooperation, in statements to the government organized second national seminar on landmines on 18 June 2001; General Abdelrahman Sirelkhatim in a statement addressing the opening of a workshop on landmine victims organized by the Abrar Organization, 26 October 2001; and, Siddig Mujtaba, State Minister of Culture and Tourism, in a statement to the forum on landmines organized by the UNESCO Clubs, 20 March 2002. Delegates from Sudan have also issued denials to Landmine Monitor representatives at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January and May 2002.

¹⁵ “Statement of Sudan delegation to the Intersessional Meeting of Experts on Implementation of Ottawa Convention on Banning Anti personnel Landmines,” delivered by Dr. Sulafeldin Salih Mohamed, Commissioner General, Humanitarian Aid Commission, Geneva, May 2002.

¹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 227.

¹⁷ UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sudan, 2002, Executive Summary.

¹⁸ Interview with an OLS security official, Loki, 18 March 2002.

¹⁹ Interview with Commander Nhial Deng, Nairobi, 10 April 2002.

²⁰ Interview with Lt. Maluk Roya, SPLA Nuba Engineering Officer, Moro Hills, Nugurban County, 24 March 2002.

Landmine Problem, Survey, and Assessment

The landmine situation in Sudan has not been comprehensively surveyed. This includes rebel-controlled parts of south Sudan, and other locations such as the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and the Red Sea Hills. Following the January 2002 cease-fire, several initial assessments were conducted in the Nuba Mountains (an area hitherto excluded from international humanitarian assistance).

The Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI), UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) undertook missions in government-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS), and SLIRI assessed some SPLA-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains in March 2002. SLIRI, advised by Landmine Action (UK), carried out an assessment on both sides, working with OSIL in the SPLA areas. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided technical expertise for the assessment in the Nuba Mountains.

The Joint Military Commission and International Monitoring Unit began initial deployment in mid-April 2002 and called for immediate demining of key access routes. There are several plans to collect and collate data from mine-affected communities and regions. SLIRI and UNMAS are planning to establish in-country information centers.

The assessment reports of specific locations, as well as other information provided by a variety of sources, give a fragmentary picture at best of the mine situation in Sudan. Some findings include:

- An emergency assessment of the Nuba Mountains area by SLIRI, funded by the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, reports: "The use of [antipersonnel mines] in combat areas is clearly widespread based on the high incidence of injuries within the population which conform to those normally associated with an [antipersonnel mine] detonation."²¹
- World Food Program (WFP) food security calculations suggest up to a million people in southern Sudan could be affected directly and indirectly by mines - half the total estimated in need of food relief. Most affected are the populations inside towns who are prevented from grazing and cultivation by encircling minefields.²²
- The Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization (NRRDO) indicates that the southeastern Nuba counties of Heiban and Nugurban are most heavily contaminated, with three times the number of mine victims of the other five counties. NRRDO food security officer Mohamed Osman claims that 90 percent of fertile land is also unavailable due to the mine situation. He also believes that almost the entire population of the rebel enclave has been affected by the use of landmines, both due to the inability to cultivate in the fertile valleys and by the difficulty in accessing waterpoints. Osman believes the total number affected is around 400,000, over twice the WFP estimates of around 157,000.²³
- UNMAS notes that areas "worst affected" by mines include Bahr el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile.²⁴
- The southeastern region of Eastern Equatoria is reported to be mined and in the opinion of one senior cleric, Juba is the worst affected town in the region, having been mined in the first year of the war (1983) and besieged for almost two decades. Several hundred thousand displaced people have swollen its existing population and they have virtually no access to the countryside.²⁵ Another senior cleric claims that most of Eastern Equatoria is contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).²⁶

²¹ Sudan Landmine Information and Response Network, "Explosive Remnants of War in the Nuba Mountains: An Emergency Field Assessment," March 2002, p. 12.

²² Interview with a WFP liaison officer, Loki, 16 March 2002.

²³ Interview with Mohamed Osman, Kauda (Nuba Mountains), 30 March 2002.

²⁴ UNMAS, "Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," February 2002, p. 220.

²⁵ Interview Archbishop Paulino Lukudu, President of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference, London, 2 March 2002.

²⁶ Interview with Bishop Parade Taban, head of the Catholic Diocese of Torit, London, 2 March 2002.

- Referring to the mine situation in Upper Nile, former U.S. State Department Sudan advisor John Prendergast, said “Landmines as a perimeter defense of the oilfield infrastructure will have an adverse impact on the people of that area for the next century, as unexploded ordnance will remain a serious threat to southern Sudanese civilians...”²⁷ Another source states that the Upper Nile areas of Malakal and Bentiu are very seriously affected.²⁸
- The western portion of southern Sudan is thought to be less heavily contaminated, although all contested areas and besieged government towns are believed to be mined. According to SIMAS, OSIL and the SPLA, every town captured by the SPLA or government has been defensively mined.
- Some of the traditional fishing areas around Yirol in Lakes Province have been deserted because of the widespread deployment of mines around the lakes.²⁹

Mine Action Coordination, Planning, and Funding

A number of mine action programs were initiated in Sudan during the reporting period. While none of these programs has the immediate objective of establishing a national mine action program, many are focused on establishing and developing local capacities to eliminate landmines. Programs have increasingly concentrated on the Nuba Mountains since the January cease-fire.

In August 2001, representatives of civil society from both sides of the Sudan conflict met in London at a meeting hosted by Landmine Action (a UK-based NGO) to discuss the potential for a coordinated cross-conflict mine action response, with the full approval of the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. This “Crosslines” meeting developed the Sudan Landmine Information and Response Network concept. SLIRI is now a consortium of over 70 Sudanese and international NGOs with the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), Operation Save Innocent Lives, and Landmine Action being the main partners. SLIRI intends to serve as a nationwide “crosslines” information network in both government- and rebel-controlled areas of Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains. The European Commission funds the initiative and OXFAM (Great Britain) serves as the contractor.³⁰ The EC is providing €1.5 million (US\$1.35 million) for an initial period of one year.³¹

UNMAS has established a presence in Sudan and visited both government and SPLA controlled areas in March 2002. An UNMAS representative has been stationed in Khartoum since March 2002. The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) pledged \$250,000 for UNMAS to start its emergency mine action in Sudan. The German Embassy in Khartoum announced that it has pledged €115,000 for emergency mine action in Sudan via the UN system.³² The German Fund is supporting UNMAS in its effort to gather information on mines in Sudan.³³

To lay the groundwork for post-conflict mine action, UNMAS, within the confines of an ongoing conflict, “will focus on the development and capacity building of an appropriate, national, mine action co-ordination body (National Mine Action Office), the professional development of an emergency national, mine clearance capability and the development and draft of National Mine Action Standards coupled with the establishment and implementation of a recognized and workable Quality Assurance monitoring system. It will also seek to establish proven mine awareness/mine

²⁷ Written statement to Landmine Monitor following a question raised at a book launch, Reform Club, London, 5 February 2002. Prendergast is currently co-director of the Africa Program of the International Crisis Group.

²⁸ Interview with Reverend Stephan Tut, *South Sudan Post*, Loki, 4 April 2002.

²⁹ Interview with official from SIMAS, Nairobi, 12 March 2002.

³⁰ For details see, Sudan Landmine Information and Response Network, “Explosive Remnants of War in the Nuba Mountains: An Emergency Field Assessment,” March 2002.

³¹ Statement at a press conference by Xavier Marshal, Head of EC Delegation, Khartoum, 3 March 2002.

³² *Sahafa* daily, 2 March 2002.

³³ Interview with Matthias Meyer, German Ambassador to Sudan, 24 March 2002.

risk reduction routines and to strengthen existing mine victim assistance and reintegration systems.”³⁴

Mine Clearance

There has been a reluctance to engage in or fund mine clearance while conflict has been ongoing in Sudan. Until recently, OSIL had been the only agency involved in demining. OSIL has projects in parts of Eastern Equatoria accessed via Uganda. OSIL has bases in Yei and Nimule for operations west and east of the Nile. Between April 2001 and March 2002, OSIL cleared a total of 329 miles of road and 263,093 square meters of land, disposing of 125 antivehicle mines, 439 antipersonnel mines, and 21,531 UXO.

In a response to donor enquiries regarding the unit cost of demining, OSIL figures indicate that in the three months between April and June 2001, it spent \$190,000, and cleared 363 antipersonnel mines, 45 antitank mines and 3,496 UXO from 45 miles of roads and 238,649 square meters of land. In June 2001 OSIL conducted an emergency clearance of the recently SPLA-captured town of Gogrial, in Bahr el Ghazal, which perhaps accounts for the fact that OSIL claims to have cleared 226,000 square meters in that month alone.³⁵ This equals an average cost per mine of \$49 and \$0.15 per square meter.³⁶ While cautioning that averages are not really relevant and that it takes as much care and attention to demine an area with a low density of mines as an area with many, OSIL states that its costs are far lower than any international mine action organization because OSIL employs only local staff.³⁷

OSIL began demining a heavily mined area around the hospital in Chukudum in September 2001. OSIL demined the hospital area, but claimed that the local population refused to allow it to remove the perimeter mines due to security fears.³⁸ In 2002, OSIL has been working in the Aswa Valley, north of Nimule, which it describes as “the most heavily contaminated area in all Sudan.”³⁹

The Mines Advisory Group has provided capacity development and support to OSIL staff, deploying one technical advisor and one community liaison advisor, each for six months. MAG also provided funding for two OSIL mine clearance teams on behalf of the government of Switzerland.⁴⁰

As part of the cease-fire agreement and humanitarian relief plans in the Nuba Mountains, in late April 2002, the U.S. deployed specialist mine clearance teams with mine detecting dogs from its quick reaction demining force (QRDF), which is based in Mozambique. The RONCO Consulting Corporation, a Washington, D.C.-based commercial demining firm will implement the mission in Sudan.⁴¹ A U.S. demining official described the effort as “opening up roads for humanitarian aid,” and said that the mission is “very finite, very specific, with specific tasks assigned by the JMC.” He indicated the key task would be to clear the main road network before the onset of the heavy rains, probably in June or July.⁴² The QRDF began work on 18 May,⁴³ and as of June 2002, the force was demining a route between the villages of Um Sirdeba and Kauda and some 37,000 square meters had been cleared.⁴⁴

³⁴ UNMAS statement to Landmine Monitor, 25 April 2002.

³⁵ OSIL Monthly reports. See also 2001 annual report.

³⁶ “What Can You Get for a Fiver?” OSIL donor update, August 2001.

³⁷ Interview with Pers Holmsgaard, Deputy Director of OSIL, Nairobi, 4 April 2002.

³⁸ Interview with Aleu A. Aleu, Director of OSIL, Nairobi, 5 April 2002.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Policy, MAG, 25 July 2002.

⁴¹ “U.S. Demining Assistance to Sudan,” U.S. State Department Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 23 April 2002.

⁴² Telephone interview with Colonel Thomas Seal, Deputy Director of the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, U.S. State Department, 29 April 2002.

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, “Humanitarian Mine Action Subgroup Minutes of June 14, 2002 Meeting,” 10 July 2002.

⁴⁴ UNMAS, “Report of the UNMAS Emergency Mine Action Project in Sudan: May 2002,” 3 June 2002.

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education activities in Kassala, eastern Sudan and Malakal, Upper Nile of southern Sudan are being conducted by Save the Children Sweden, Oxfam and the Sudanese Red Crescent. Childrens' groups, drama, songs, sports, posters, booklets, billboards and other promotional material are intensively used together with a mine risk education training package for children, teachers, and NGO workers.⁴⁵

In an emergency revision of the UN interagency consolidated appeal for Sudan for 2002, issued in March, numerous new projects are proposed for the Nuba area. UNICEF has budgeted \$40,000 for mine risk education in the Nuba Mountains on the rebel side, to be conducted by SIMAS, and a further \$40,000 for similar work on the government side. Save the Children Fund USA has also planned to expand into mine risk education.⁴⁶

OSIL conducted mine awareness in Yei and Nimule, supported by a MAG Community Liaison Adviser. OSIL as targeted primary and secondary school children, adults and working children in market places, church and mosque attendees, and returned refugees. OSI uses a variety of mine risk education materials, including role play, songs and games, posters, story books, and videos.⁴⁷

Landmine Casualties

At a seminar on landmines in June 2001, the former commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Hussein el Obaid, reported that there had been 123 landmine casualties already in 2001.⁴⁸

There is presently no nationwide mechanism to collect data on landmine casualties in Sudan, although the SLIRI network aims to do so. Limited data on landmine casualties in the Nuba Mountains has been reported, which gives an indication of the magnitude of the problem. It is believed that many casualties are not reported, as an unknown number of landmine victims die before reaching medical assistance. The true casualty figures are likely to be much higher than reported.

The government of Sudan reportedly states that between 1989 and 2001, landmines incidents caused 1,135 casualties in the Nuba Mountains,⁴⁹ which is similar to the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization records of 1,129 mine casualties for the same period. The NRRDO acknowledges that the data does not include all those killed in an incident.⁵⁰ An SPLA Commander provided information on 1,137 casualties from 35 villages, including both government and SPLA-controlled areas.⁵¹ It is not known to what extent the casualty data overlaps.

Save the Children-USA reported 16 landmine casualties in south Kordofan States, and another 12 antitank mine incidents involving six commercial vehicles, three military trucks, and three tractors between December 2000 and December 2001.⁵² In 2001, NRRDO evacuated 25 mine casualties to Lokichokio for medical treatment; 29 were evacuated in 2000.⁵³ An Oxfam GB/Save the Children Sweden mine risk education project annual report from Malakal, Upper Nile, provided information on mine casualties that reached the local hospital: two women and six children were

⁴⁵ Kassala Mine Awareness Project Evaluation, February 2002.

⁴⁶ UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sudan 2002 (Revised), 3 April 2002.

⁴⁷ Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Communications, MAG, 25 July 2002.

⁴⁸ Yahya el Hassan, "Landmines claim 70,000 victims in Sudan," *Pan African News Agency (PANA)*, 19 June 2001.

⁴⁹ "Sudan: Food deliveries vital for Nuba ceasefire," *UNOCHA Integrated Regional Information Network*, 27 May 2002.

⁵⁰ Landmines in the Nuba Mountains, SLIRI Emergency Field Assessment – March 2002, 4 April 2002.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Save the Children USA reports from the Nuba Mountains.

⁵³ Yousif Ali, Mine Coordinator, NRRDO.

killed and four others were seriously injured.⁵⁴ The Sudanese Red Crescent reported on landmines/UXO casualties in the Kassala area during the period March 2001 - March 2002: one shepherd killed and one child injured by antipersonnel mines; three people killed and 24 injured in UXO explosions; 15 people injured by antivehicle mines.⁵⁵

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. In February, two people were killed in Kadugli province, and in March another person was killed in the Talodi area by antipersonnel mines.⁵⁶ In May, eleven people were killed and fifteen others injured when the vehicle in which they were traveling hit a landmine. The casualties were local officials from Warap State on their way to visit a food security program.⁵⁷

Survivor Assistance

In general, the assistance available to landmine survivors, from both the government and the international community, is irregular and not sufficient to address the size of the problem.⁵⁸ Years of war seriously damaged the healthcare system, and for many people living in remote areas, the nearest medical facilities are days of travel away. According to a recent report, in the Nuba Mountains there was only one doctor for every 300,000 people and health workers are often insufficiently trained or equipped to treat patients.⁵⁹

The ICRC's medical assistance activities in Sudan include first aid training and providing comprehensive medical and surgical care to the war-wounded and other surgical emergencies, including landmine casualties, at its two referral hospitals. These are the ICRC Lopiding surgical hospital in Lokichokio in northern Kenya and, as support to existing local structures, the government-run Juba Teaching Hospital (JTH). The ICRC airlift emergency cases from Sudan to the hospital in Lokichokio; 300 were transferred between July and September alone. In 2001, the two hospitals treated 45 mine/UXO casualties. Limited surgical assistance and medical supplies were provided to Wau's two hospitals, one for military and one for civilians. Support is also given to approximately 15 primary health care facilities in southern Sudan.⁶⁰

Inside the rebel controlled Nuba area, Save the Children USA and MSF Holland established new health clinics, in Como and Limoon, prior to the cease-fire in addition to the existing German Emergency Doctors hospital in Luwari. However, all suffer shortages of doctors and medical supplies.⁶¹

In July 2002, the World Health Organization (WHO) started a training program for medical assistants to treat landmine casualties in the Nuba Mountains. Initially the health workers will provide emergency assistance to the demining operations. WHO will also train 50 medical assistants, 150 nurses and 50 first aid staff of Kadugli-based NGOs with the intention of building the health capacity in the area. The training course was organized in collaboration with the South Kordofan State government, and the Federal Ministry of Health.⁶²

The ICRC supports the National Corporation for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPCO). In 2001, NAPCO assisted 991 amputees, including 158 landmine survivors. Both the ICRC and WHO provide training for local staff, who are provided by the government of Sudan, through

⁵⁴ Oxfam GB – annual report to Save the Children Sweden, September 2001.

⁵⁵ Information provided by SRC to Landmine Monitor March 2002.

⁵⁶ Save the Children-USA Updates, February and March 2002.

⁵⁷ "Landmine Kills Over 10 Officials Near Wau", *Khartoum Monitor*, 4 May 2002, accessed at <http://www.khartoummonitor.com/news44.htm> (7 July 2002).

⁵⁸ Interview with Hasabo Mohamed Abdolrahman, Head of Peace Administration, HAC, 17 March 2002.

⁵⁹ "The Key to Peace: Unlocking the Human Potential of Sudan," Interagency Paper, May 2002, p. 27, prepared by Save the Children, Christian Aid, Oxfam, CARE, IRC, and TEARFUND.

⁶⁰ ICRC (Geneva), *Special Report, Mine Action 2001*, July 2002, p. 21; and Sudan, Update on ICRC Activities, 30 November 2001, accessed at <http://www.icrc.org>.

⁶¹ Landmine Monitor field work, March-April 2002; interview with SPLA Nuba Commander Abdelaziz Adam el Helu, 22 April 2002; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 232-233.

⁶² "WHO trains health workers in Nuba Mountains," *Khartoum Monitor*, 20 June 2002, accessed at <http://www.khartoummonitor.com/news177.htm> (7 July 2002).

Ministry of Social Planning & Development and Ministry of Defense. NAPCO provides free services to military personnel and charges 50 percent to civilians.⁶³ In 2001, ICRC activities included: on-the-job training for Khartoum staff in prosthetics, orthotics, and physiotherapy; intensive training courses for technicians from Nyala and Juba; equipment was provided to start local production of crutches using recycled polypropylene; transport was provided for 15 patients from Wau and two from Malakal for treatment in Khartoum; and prosthetic manufacturing equipment was provided to the Norwegian Association for the Disabled (NAD) center in Juba.⁶⁴

The ICRC's Lopiding Hospital, with its annexed prosthetic-orthotic center in Lokichokio, has continued to provide physical rehabilitation to amputees and other disabled people from across the border in rebel-held areas of Southern Sudan since 1992. In 2001, 365 prostheses were fitted, of which 91 were for mine survivors. In addition, 1,299 crutches and walking sticks were produced using recycled polypropylene, and 23 tricycles, produced by the Physically Disabled of Kenya, were also distributed.⁶⁵

The Sudanese Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of War Victims (ABRAR) provides support to 650 war victims, including 153 landmine survivors. ABRAR works with very limited resources to provide medical assistance as well as psychosocial and economic support. ABRAR is advocating for a disability policy and legislation that supports the victims of war, including landmine survivors.⁶⁶

Disability Policy and Practice

According to a government report, landmine survivors have access to free medical treatment in the public and NGO hospitals, and a Presidential decision protects the jobs of government employees who are disabled by landmines.⁶⁷

UKRAINE

Key developments since May 2001: In December 2001, Ukraine and NATO signed a framework agreement for destruction of Ukraine's PMN mines. In 2001, Ukrainian deminers cleared 15,500 mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), most left from World War II.

Mine Ban Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999, shortly after signing an agreement with Canada for the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpiles.¹ A key stumbling block to Ukraine's ratification of the treaty continues to be working out the destruction of its significant mine stockpile within the four years required by the treaty. (For previous discussion of this issue, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 839-840, as well as Stockpiling and Destruction section below.)

On 5 December 2001, in Kiev, Ukraine and Canada signed a "Joint Declaration On Continuing Development of the Special Partnership Between Canada and Ukraine."² Regarding the Mine Ban Treaty, the Joint Declaration pledges to "Continue active cooperation in implementing the obligations of the Ottawa Convention, the Framework Arrangement Between the Government of Canada and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Landmines in Ukraine and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Cabinet of

⁶³ Interview with Abdeldaim Elmagbol, Administrative Manager, NAPCO, Khartoum, 10 March 2002.

⁶⁴ ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes, Annual Report 2001, accessed at <http://www.icrc.org>.

⁶⁵ ICRC Special Report: Mine Action 2001, p. 21.

⁶⁶ Report from Najat Salih, Executive Director, ABRAR, to Landmine Monitor, March 2002.

⁶⁷ Sudan Report Geneva, 7 May 2001; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 232.

¹ "Memorandum on Mutually Beneficial Cooperation between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ukraine on Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines Stockpiled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Prohibited by the [Mine Ban Treaty]," 28 January 1999.

² See: canadaeuropa.gc.ca/country_ukr_f-7-e.asp.

Ministers of Ukraine and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization on Logistic Support Cooperation and work towards ratification of the Ottawa Convention as soon as possible.”³

In late 2001, the Committee on Defense and National Security of the Ukrainian Parliament and the State Commission on the Defense Industrial Complex were given additional responsibilities for implementation of the treaty.⁴ The State Commission on the Defense Industrial Complex has the main role in developing and coordinating national policy on military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and organizations, and for coordination and control of national activities on the destruction of arms, including landmines.⁵

From 4-5 February 2002, at a meeting organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with Ukrainian and Canadian officials, the Head of the Ukrainian Interdepartmental Working Group on Landmines, Lieutenant-General Tereshchenko, declared that Ukraine might be able to initiate the ratification process in the parliament in October-November 2002, even earlier than, as the Canadian delegation suggested, in March 2002, when Ukraine held Parliamentary elections.⁶

Ukraine did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 because of funding constraints.⁷ Ukraine did participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Government representatives also attended landmine conferences in Warsaw in June 2001, in Moscow in June 2001, in Washington, DC in July 2001, and in Athens in October 2001.⁸

On 29 November 2001, Ukraine cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine is a party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It attended the third annual meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. At the Review Conference in December 2001, Anatoliy Scherba, Head of the Ukraine Delegation, noted the government’s concern with explosive remnants of war (ERW). He stated that “in particular, we strongly believe that the problem of explosive remnants of war should be addressed by the international community as a matter of urgency given the fact that these remnants in many respects constitute the same type of hazard to civilians as mines do and that many countries including some European ones have been affected by ERW. Ukraine has a first-hand experience of the adverse consequences of this problem as well as of its considerable financial and technical implications. Therefore we believe that the world community should take the opportunity provided by the current Conference to consider the ways to minimize the incidence of unexploded ordnance and support a mandate calling for further work on the ERW issue.”⁹

NGO Activities

During 2001, the Ukrainian Campaign to Ban Landmines (UCBL), formed in November 1998, continued its activities.¹⁰ In October 2001, the popular Ukrainian television program “Snyadanok z 1+1” and UCBL organized a discussion about landmines in Afghanistan. On 24 October 2001, United Nations Day, the Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association (UPVA), and Ukrainian UN Association organized a meeting at the Parliament Library in Kiev, with the

³ Ibid.

⁴ Statement of Sergey Pashinskiy, Director, Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center, at the Annual Meeting of the Ukrainian Peacekeepers Association, 24 October 2001.

⁵ Order of the Government of Ukraine, 26 October 2001.

⁶ Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, *Express News Agency*, 6 February 2002, see: www.defense-ua.com.

⁷ Report of Engineers Forces Command, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, 18 September 2001.

⁸ Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center, Annual Report 2001.

⁹ Statement of Anatoliy Scherba, Head of the Delegation of Ukraine, to the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, December 2001.

¹⁰ UCBL coordination is provided by Ukrainian Peacekeepers Association and the information network is managed by the Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center.

participation of the Deputy Foreign Minister among others. Discussion focused on the Ukraine and the Mine Ban Treaty, and international mine action programs.¹¹

Production, Transfer, and Use

Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine produced components for Soviet mines, but the government has repeatedly stated that Ukraine has not been involved in production since its independence.¹²

Ukraine has a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines in place through 2003.¹³ In 2001, at the request of the Pentagon, a US company tried to purchase 3,000-4,000 landmines from “UKRSPECEXPORT,” the main Ukrainian State arms trade company, for training military personnel and for research and development. The Ukrainian Ministry of Justice did not sign the contract in accordance with Ukraine’s moratorium on the export of landmines.¹⁴ Subsequently, the Ukrainian government prepared a special resolution on the procedures for mine transfer for training purposes, in accordance with the text of the Mine Ban Treaty. Monitoring of the situation will be provided the the State Commission on Defense Industrial Complex.¹⁵

The Ministry of Defense states that antipersonnel mines have not been used on Ukrainian territory since World War II. However, Ukrainian police have recorded individual cases of criminal use of landmines. The Ministry of Emergency Situations reported about 67 incidents of criminals using of mines and UXO in 2001.¹⁶

Stockpiling and Destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of mines from the Soviet Union. It has 6.35 million antipersonnel mines that must be destroyed, including 404,903 PMN mines and 5,947,596 PFM-1/1-S mines. In March 2001, Canada and Ukraine signed a Framework Arrangement for assistance in antipersonnel mine destruction that establishes a Coordination Committee on stockpile destruction in Ukraine. (For previous discussion on stockpiles, their locations, and developments in the joint destruction project, which has moved more slowly than anticipated, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 841-842, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 786-787.)

At the first meeting of the Coordinating Committee on 7 September 2001, Ukraine requested the UN Development Program to be Project Manager of future destruction efforts and designated its State Commission on the Defense and Industrial Complex as the national counterpart.¹⁷

On 5 December 2001, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, John Manley, visited Kiev and discussed future cooperation with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, and Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko. During a public event at the Diplomatic Academy in Kiev, Manley said, “We are also proud to sponsor the first large-scale project in this country to destroy the antipersonnel landmine stockpile, following on a Framework Agreement, signed by Foreign Minister Zlenko and myself in Ottawa last March. Hopefully, with such a start, Ukraine may soon rid itself of landmine stockpiles and join the 122 countries which have now ratified the Ottawa Convention, which Ukraine signed in 1999. It is an incredible record of cooperation—with so much accomplished between us in such a very short time.”¹⁸

¹¹ Press Release, Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association, 25 October 2001; see also: www.mineaction.org/misc/resultdisplayproject.cfm?pro_ID=191.

¹² *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 841.

¹³ Order of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, No. 426, 22 March 1999; See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 841.

¹⁴ Order of the Prime Minister of Ukraine, No. 426, 22 March 1999.

¹⁵ Information provided by Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and Colonel Zahazhevsky, US Department of Defense.

¹⁶ Ministry of Emergencies, Annual Report 2001, see: www.mns.gov.ua.

¹⁷ Protocol of Coordinating Meeting, PFM Series APL Destruction Project in Ukraine, 7 September 2001; UNDP Project “Support to Ukraine Stockpile Destruction,” accessed at: www.mineaction.org on 22 July 2002.

¹⁸ Statement of former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, John Manley, at the Kiev Institute of International Relations and the Diplomatic Academy, 5 December 2001.

On 6 December 2001, President Kuchma signed an order requiring the National Defense and Security Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Cabinet of Ministers to immediately take all measures to expedite the weapons and ammunition destruction process.¹⁹ From 8-12 January 2002, a special government commission completed inspections of all the arsenals and stockpiles of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including engineer's arms and mines.²⁰

On 14 February 2002, the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, International Fund for Social Adaptation of Retired Military Personnel, and the Embassy of Norway to Ukraine organized an international conference in Kiev to discuss problems on the reorganization of the military system in Ukraine, and the liquidation of stockpiles. Representatives of NATO, the European Commission, and foreign diplomatic corps took part.

Destruction of PFM-1 Mines

From 21-23 June 2001, a Ukrainian delegation visited Moscow to discuss research and development (R&D) efforts on the destruction of PFM-1 mines; the visit was organized by the Russian "Basalt" and "ECODEM" companies. The Ukrainian delegation signed a framework agreement with Russia on joint cooperation on R&D on the best technology to destroy PFM-1 landmines.

During consultations from 23-26 July 2001, with representatives from UNDP's Mine Action Unit, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the government of Canada, the Ukrainian government agreed to the basic concepts of a PFM-1 destruction program.²¹

On 15 March 2002, during a regional seminar in Kiev, Ukrainian officials stated that standard specifications on the destruction of PFM mines would be determined by mid-year, followed by an announcement of the results of the international tender on destruction of PFM-1 mines.²² As of July 2002, however, no technology had been selected for the destruction of PFM-1 mines in Ukraine.

PMN Mines

From 18-19 October 2001, Ukraine took part in a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) "Workshop on Regionally Focused Mine Action" in Athens. Discussions were held on a future PfP Trust Fund project in Ukraine to destroy more than 400,000 PMN mines, to be carried out by NATO's Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

On 6 December 2001, in Brussels, Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anatoliy Zlenko, signed an implementation agreement with NAMSA on the destruction of the PMN mines.²³ A Canadian delegation worked in Kiev on the implementation of the agreement on 4-5 February 2002, headed by the Canadian Ambassador for Mine Action, Dan Livermore.²⁴

On 27 February 2002, NAMSA signed a technical agreement with Spivdruzhnist, a Ukrainian company, providing that Ukraine should destroy the mines in one year and four months.²⁵ On 14 March 2002, NAMSA signed an agreement with Spivdruzhnist and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to transport 404,000 PMN-1 and PMP-2 antipersonnel mines to Spivdruzhnist for destruction. The head of Spivdruzhnist stated that the destruction would use Ukrainian equipment, technologies, and labor.

¹⁹ Order of President of Ukraine, No. 1195/2001, 6 December 2001.

²⁰ LigaOnline (press agency), accessed at: www.liga.kiev.ua/lenta/get.html?id=31370 on 8 January 2002.

²¹ UNDP, Ukraine Report, 7 September 2001.

²² Statement of Lt.-Gen. V. Tereshenko, Head of Ukrainian Inter-Agency Working Team on the Destruction of Mines, Kiev, 15 March 2002.

²³ See: www.ukraine.ru/stories/01/11/08/1973/91394.html.

²⁴ *Defense Express* (news agency) report, 6 February 2002, accessed at: www.defense-ua.com.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Mine Action in Ukraine

Ukraine is still affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II. According to new information from the Engineers Command of the Ministry of Defense, between 1945-1992 more than 62 million mines and UXO were cleared, with more than 85,000 deminers taking part in mine clearance operations.²⁶

In 2001, Ukraine carried out 1,052 operations involving demining or explosive ordnance disposal, an increase of 4.3 percent over 2000; some 15,500 mines and UXO were cleared. Since achieving independence in 1992, Ukrainian demining teams have collected more than 370,000 mines and UXO. Approximately 260,000 hectares of land have been cleared.²⁷

For clearance purposes, Ukraine is divided into 497 areas of responsibility; of these, the Ministry of Defense is responsible for demining in 442 areas, and the Ministry of Emergencies is responsible for demining in 55 areas. In some cases, for example with improvised explosive devices, special police teams are employed.²⁸ There are no systematic mine risk education programs in Ukraine. During mine clearance operations, deminers meet with the local population and educate them on the rules of behavior when they come across UXO.

International Mine Action Programs

Ukraine has continued to participate in United Nations demining operations abroad. The Ukrainian 3rd Separate Engineers Battalion is carrying out demining operations in southern Lebanon.²⁹ In 2001, a Ukrainian-Polish Joint Peacekeeping Battalion conducted demining operations in Kosovo.³⁰

In 2002, bilateral cooperation between the Ministries of Defense of Ukraine and Belarus has included studying the experiences of Ukrainian engineers in UN demining operations, as well as cooperation on the destruction of stockpiles of landmines.³¹

Ukrainian demining units preparing to take part in UN demining operations in Lebanon and Africa participated in training sessions at the Ukrainian International Demining Training Center (IDTC) in Kamenets Podolsky. From June 2001-February 2002, training sessions at IDTC focused on demining, data collection, minefield mapping and marking, and other technical areas. In November 2001, the Ministry of Defense sent an official letter to the UN Mine Action Service and asked about procedures for UN certification and accreditation for the Ukrainian Demining Center and the new demining company "UROORONSEVRVICE."

Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, there were 18 mine and UXO casualties in Ukraine; 14 people were killed and four people were injured.³²

In accordance with the national law for veterans and persons with disabilities, Ukraine provided financial support for medical rehabilitation in sanatoriums for 29,469 war disabled, including 3,150 landmine survivors, in 2001.

On 3 December 2001, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Ukrainian parliamentarians took part in an official ceremony to mark the opening of a new national center near Kiev for the medical and social rehabilitation of persons with disabilities. The center's activities will include vocational training.³³

²⁶ Press Release, Ministry of Defense Press Service, 3 November 2001.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 843.

²⁹ Press Release, Ministry of Defense Press Service, 3 November 2001.

³⁰ Press Release, Ministry of Defense Press Service, February 2002.

³¹ "Status and Prospects of Cooperation Between Ministries of Defense of Ukraine and Republic of Byelorussia," *Defense Express*, 11 January 2002.

³² Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies, Annual Report 2001, 14 February 2002, available at: www.mns.gov.ua.

³³ Press Release, Ukrainian Department for Veterans Affairs, 4 December 2001

In 2001, President Kuchma signed a series of new State decrees to improve social protection and medical support for veterans, persons with disabilities, and victims of war, including mine survivors.³⁴

VANUATU

The Republic of Vanuatu signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has still not ratified. Vanuatu was absent from the vote on pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. In March 2001, a government representative said that Vanuatu has no stockpiled mines.¹ It is not believed to be mine-affected, although there are still major dumps of military equipment left over from World War II.

³⁴ Press Release No. 23, Ukrainian Department for Veterans Affairs, December 2001.

¹ Interview with Paul Sami, Head of Asia-Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Vanuatu, Wellington, 27 March 2001.