Executive Summary
2008
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. ERW includes unexploded artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munitions. Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or the air, the containers open and disperse submunitions over a wide area.

Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its next victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

Weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines.

Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict and has been left behind and is no longer under control of the party that left it behind. It may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for use. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmer’s fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and clear all antipersonnel landmines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

Until May 2008, the only international legislation explicitly covering ERW was Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Its provisions are considered insufficient by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but Protocol V does make efforts to address responsibility for ERW clearance, sharing information for clearance, mine/ERW risk education, warning civilian populations, and assistance.

Using the Mine Ban Treaty as a model, building on its strengths and learning from experiences in implementing its provisions, in May 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was negotiated in Dublin, Ireland, and formally adopted by a total of 107 countries. This new treaty is a legally binding agreement prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. When the treaty enters into force, States Parties will be obligated to stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of cluster munitions immediately. States must destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years of becoming party to the treaty, and clear all cluster munitions in areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of cluster munition survivors, and support mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent cluster munition casualties. The Convention on Cluster Munitions includes ground-breaking provisions for victim assistance, and includes those killed or injured by cluster munitions, their families and communities in the definition of a cluster munition survivor. The Convention on Cluster Munition will be opened for signature in Oslo, Norway on 3 December 2008.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ICBL’s ultimate goal is a landmine- and ERW-free world, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, and where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy.

**International Campaign to Ban Landmines**

The ICBL is a coalition of more than 1,000 organizations in 72 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six non-governmental organizations: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in 72 countries.
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada, more than 10 years ago. It is in part due to sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to join the treaty. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

In 2007, the ICBL began actively campaigning in support of the Oslo Process to negotiate a treaty prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. This marked the first time that the ICBL engaged substantively on an issue other than antipersonnel mines. The ICBL chose to begin working to address the cluster munition threat at the beginning of the Convention on Cluster Munitions negotiation process. The goal was to help prevent another humanitarian crisis similar to the global mine problem, because cluster munitions leave behind unexploded submunitions with effects similar to antipersonnel mines. The ICBL is dedicated to working toward the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and many ICBL member organizations have already been actively campaigning against cluster munitions.

The ICBL is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Eleven years after its opening for signature, the ICBL considers the Mine Ban Treaty a success in progress, meaning that an enormous amount has been accomplished so far, but that continued vigilance is required to ensure its universal implementation. The ICBL will work to ensure similar success for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and ICBL member campaigns will continue their work until the goal of a world without mines or cluster munitions becomes a reality.

**Landmine Monitor**

*Landmine Monitor Report 2008* is the tenth annual report. Since 1999, each of the nine previous reports have been presented to the respective annual meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Landmine Monitor is the ICBL’s research and monitoring initiative and the *de facto* monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problem caused by landmines and ERW. The Landmine Monitor project represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. A four-member Editorial Board coordinates the Landmine Monitor system: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Norwegian People’s Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency. The Editorial Board assumes overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Landmine Monitor system.

Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send
preface

Landmine Monitor is designed to complement the States Parties’ transparency reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications, to help reach the goal of a world free of mines and ERW, including cluster munitions. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Landmine Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 59 Landmine Monitor researchers from 46 countries, and a 20-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the ICBL’s campaigning coalition and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

The 2008 Annual Report contains information on 120 countries and other areas with respect to ban policy, use, production, transfer, stockpiling, demining, mine/ERW risk education, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. It covers affected countries, States Parties with major outstanding treaty implementation obligations, and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It includes summary and analysis of trends in ban policy, mine action, mine/ERW risk education, casualties and victim assistance, and support for mine action. The Executive Summary is published separately, in addition to a set of maps. A CD-ROM containing the Annual Report and translations of the Executive Summary and maps in Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish, comes packaged together with the Executive Summary. All report contents are available online at www.icbl.org/lm/2008.

Unless otherwise specified all translations were done by Landmine Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. Landmine Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

Acknowledgements

This Executive Summary was prepared by the Landmine Monitor Editorial Team:

**Editing and Production**

*Project Manager:* Jacqueline Hansen, Mines Action Canada  
*Final Editor:* Stuart Casey-Maslen, Mines Action Canada  
*Copy Editor:* Jack Glattbach, Mines Action Canada  
*Project Support Officers:* Katie Pitts, Tatiana Stephens, Mines Action Canada  
*Intern:* Elizabeth Whitehurst, Mines Action Canada

**Ban Policy**

*Coordinator:* Steve Goose, Human Rights Watch  
*Human Rights Watch:* Rachel Good, Mark Hiznay, Mary Wareham, Kerri West  
*ICBL:* Anders Fink  
*Mines Action Canada:* Anthony Forrest, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan

**Mine Action**

*Coordinator:* Stuart Casey-Maslen, Norwegian People’s Aid  
*ICBL:* Emil Hasanov, Mike Kendellen  
*Norwegian People’s Aid:* Nick Cumming-Bruce
Preface

Report formatting and the online version of the report at www.icbl.org/lm/2008 was provided by Lixar I.T. Inc. and St. Joseph Communications printed the report. Glenn Ruga and Rafael Jiménez provided design. Stéphane De Greef provided cartography services. Digital Interactive produced the CD-Rom version of the report.

We extend our gratitude to Landmine Monitor contributors. Landmine Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. It was only possible to carry out this work with the aid of grants from:

• Government of Australia
• Government of Austria
• Government of Belgium
• Government of Canada
• Government of the Czech Republic
• Government of France
• Government of Germany
• Government of Ireland
• Government of Luxembourg
• Government of New Zealand
• Government of Norway
• Government of Spain
• Government of Sweden
• Government of Switzerland
• Government of the United Kingdom
• European Commission
• UN Development Programme
• UNICEF

We also thank the donors who have contributed to the individual members of the Landmine Monitor Editorial Board and other participating organizations.

Landmine Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, mine action practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information.

Mine/ERW Risk Education, Casualty Data Collection and Victim Assistance
Coordinator: Katleen Maes, Handicap International
Handicap International: Megan Burke, Stéphane De Greef, Hugh Hosman, Loren Persi, Patrizia Pompili

Support for Mine Action
Coordinator: Anthony Forrest, Mines Action Canada

Ugandan campaigner participates in opening of Miss Landmine exhibition in Poland.

© Marta Kulikowska/Polish Red Cross, March 2008
Contents

Preface
Introduction
Ban Policy
Key Developments
Universalization
Use of Antipersonnel Mines
Production of Antipersonnel Mines
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines
Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction
Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)
Transparency Reporting (Article 7)
National Implementation Measures (Article 9)
Special Issues of Concern
Treaty-Related Meetings
The Oslo Process and the Convention of Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Mine Action
Key Developments
The Extent of the Problem
Program Coordination and Management
Demining
Compliance with Article 5 Obligations
Clearance Obligations in the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups
Deminer Security
Other Challenges for Mine Action

Mine/ERW Casualties
Key Developments
Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties in 2007
Data Collection

Mine/ERW Risk Education
Key Developments
Risk Education in 2007–2008

Strategic Frameworks and Coordination
Assessments
At-Risk Groups
Coverage and Response
Activities
Legal Obligations to Provide Risk Education

Victim Assistance
Key Developments
Victim Assistance in 2007–2008
VA Strategic Framework
National Ownership and Sustainability
Victim Assistance Obligations in the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Beneficiary Statistics

Support for Mine Action
Key Developments
Introduction
Global Mine Action Funding
National Contributions to Mine Action
International Contributions to Mine Action
Major Recipients
Mine Action Funding Requirements

Status of the Convention

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Appendix
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Glossary
Introduction

The Good News

No use, production or transfer of antipersonnel mines was recorded by any State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Three States Parties completed stockpile destruction: Afghanistan, Burundi and Sudan.

France, Malawi and Swaziland declared completion of mine clearance operations, bringing the total of formerly affected States Parties that have fulfilled their treaty clearance obligations to 10.

Recorded casualty rates from mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices continued to decrease, from 6,022 in 2006 to 5,426 in 2007. Of the 2007 casualties, 1,401 people were killed, 3,939 injured, and the remaining 86 were unknown.

More than 8.4 million people received direct risk education in 2007, the highest level ever recorded by Landmine Monitor. An increasing number of risk education programs in highly mine/ERW-affected countries directly targeted those most at risk due to their economic activities to encourage behavior changes.

The Bad News

States not party Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines, as did non-state armed groups in at least nine countries.

Three States Parties—Belarus, Greece and Turkey—all with very large stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, putting them in serious violation of the treaty.

Fifteen States Parties with 2009 mine clearance deadlines declared they would not meet them and requested an extension: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

The decrease in casualties was markedly less significant than in previous years. Casualties occurred in more countries than ever before—and in several countries where none had ever been recorded.

Lack of evidence on the effectiveness of risk education continues to impede efforts to improve performance.
**The Good News (Cont.)**

Several countries such as Afghanistan and Uganda integrated victim assistance into national disability plans guaranteeing future sustainability. Others, such as Albania and Sudan, built national capacity for victim assistance services.

For 2007, donors provided more than US$430 million of international funding to mine action, the second highest total ever. Mine-affected states generated a further $117 million in national funding, an increase of $33 million compared to 2006.


In May 2008, 107 states adopted the new Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions.

**The Bad News (Cont.)**

Overall, progress in the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors was hampered by delayed planning or a lack of capacity. Direct assistance was often sporadic, and not linked to broader national improvements in legislation or the disability and development sectors.

International funding for 2007 decreased by nearly $45 million (close to 10%) compared to 2006.

Only three states became party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2007, and none had ratified or acceded in 2008 to September.

In August 2008, Georgia and Russia both used cluster munitions in the armed conflict between the two countries.
Key Developments

Only one state joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2007: Palau in November 2007. Three States Parties—Belarus, Greece, and Turkey—all of whom have very large stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, putting them in serious violation of the treaty. Three other States Parties completed stockpile destruction: Burundi, Sudan, and Afghanistan, which was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction, but completed it in October 2007. No use, production, or transfer of antipersonnel mines was recorded by any State Party during the reporting period (May 2007 to May 2008).

Three other States Parties—Belarus, Greece, and Turkey—all of whom have very large stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, putting them in serious violation of the treaty. Three other States Parties completed stockpile destruction: Burundi, Sudan, and Afghanistan, which was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction, but completed it in October 2007. No use, production, or transfer of antipersonnel mines was recorded by any State Party during the reporting period (May 2007 to May 2008).

Universalization

The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later. Outreach by States Parties to the treaty has helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 156 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 25 acceded.¹

¹ For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March 1999) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for that state on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which it deposited its instrument of ratification with the Depositary. That state (now a party) is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and destroy antipersonnel mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

² The 25 accessions include Montenegro, which technically “succeeded” to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 131 ratifications, 43 came on or before entry into force of the treaty on 1 March 1999 and 88 came afterward.


Two states have signed but not yet ratified the treaty: Poland and the Marshall Islands. Poland has backed away from plans to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future. The Marshall Islands gave a positive signal by, for the second year in a row, voting in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution (Resolution 62/41) calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The year 2007 marked the ten-year anniversary of the negotiation and signing of the Mine Ban Treaty and a series of events was held to commemorate the anniversary and to promote its full implementation and universalization. Events included those held in Vienna (February), Geneva (March), Phnom Penh (March), Port Vila, Vanuatu (May), Brussels (May), Oslo (September), and Ottawa (December).

UN General Assembly Resolution 62/41

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for a ban on antipersonnel mines has been annual voting for UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Adherence by Year to the Mine Ban Treaty

![Graph showing adherence by year to the Mine Ban Treaty](image-url)
In November 2007, Mongolia
Ban Policy

for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 62/41 was adopted on 5
December 2007 by a vote of 164 in favor, none opposed, and 18 abstentions. This is the highest number of votes in favor of this annual resolution since 1997 when it was first introduced. Nineteen states not party to the treaty voted in favor. This included the two signatory countries and 17 non-signatories.

Regional Developments

Africa: Somalia voted in favor of the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time.

Asia and the Pacific: In November 2007, Mongolia reiterated its intention to accede to the treaty soon, but it has not indicated that it will meet its goal of joining in 2008. Lao PDR voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time. Vietnam participated in more mine-oriented international meetings than in the past, and made its first statement at a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in June 2008 in Geneva, when it told States Parties that Vietnam has “joined the world community to welcome the various bans, moratoria and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines.” Indonesia hosted an Asia regional meeting to promote universalization of the treaty in February 2008; six states not party participated, including Myanmar. Malaysia hosted an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum Seminar on Anti-personnel Mines in April 2008, attended by five states not party. In addition to acceding to the treaty in November 2008, Palau hosted a Pacific regional workshop aimed at universalization in August 2008. The Marshall Islands attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings for the first time in June 2008.

Commonwealth of Independent States: Kazakhstan voted for the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time.

1 Eighteen states abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 62/41 in December 2007: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

2 Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38A)—142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77N)—147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54B)—139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/539)—143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24M)—18 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74)—143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53)—153 in favor, none against, 25 abstaining; 2004 (Resolution 59/84)—157 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2005 (Resolution 60/86)—158 in favor, none against, 17 abstaining; 2006 (Resolution 61/84)—161 in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstaining.

3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tonga, and the United Arab Emirates. Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, and Somalia voted in favor for the first time. Nepal and North Korea abstained from voting for the first time. Nepal had voted in favor of the resolution in previous years, except for 2004 and 2006 when it was absent. North Korea had been absent from every previous vote. For the December 2007 vote, ten States Parties were absent (Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kiribati, Seychelles, Timor-Leste, Uganda, and Vanuatu). Two states not party were absent (Saudi Arabia and Tuvalu). Tuvalu has supported the resolution in the past, while Saudi Arabia has always been absent.

Middle East and North Africa: In November 2007, the United Arab Emirates told Landmine Monitor it would join the treaty in the near future. Also in November 2007, an Omani official told the ICBL that the decision about accession was at cabinet level. A seminar for states of the Gulf Cooperation Council on antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war was held in Kuwait City in June 2007.

Non-State Armed Groups

A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. This has taken place through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, signature to the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call, and most recently through the “Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines” developed by the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines.

This declaration of adherence unilaterally commits the signatory to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW) (see below), as well as customary international humanitarian law rules regarding use of mines and explosive devices. As of July 2008, it had been signed by three rebel groups in the Philippines.

4 Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action. Geneva Call has received signatures from NSAGs in Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara.

5 In February 2008, the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Min-
In October 2007, the United Jihad Council, a coalition of 18 armed groups in Kashmir, unilaterally issued a Declaration of a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines in Kashmir. This followed a Declaration for a Mine Free Kashmir in which some Kashmiri political parties called on all combatant groups in Kashmir to halt the use of antipersonnel mines, and requested international assistance for mine survivors and for mine clearance.

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in December 2007.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. Use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon.

In this reporting period, since May 2007, the armed forces of Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. There were also serious allegations of use by the armed forces of Sri Lanka, but Landmine Monitor could not verify them.

Myanmar’s military forces used antipersonnel mines extensively, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Mine use was recorded in Karen state and Pegu division.

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields. In discussions with Landmine Monitor since 2006, Russian officials have not stated that use of antipersonnel mines has stopped. Landmine Monitor will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing and active user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

There have been allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the fighting in August 2008, but each side denies it. At the time of writing, Landmine Monitor had not yet been able to investigate or confirm the allegations.

Knowledgeable sources in Sri Lanka who wish to remain anonymous, including those engaged in mine action activities in the field, have alleged that Sri Lankan security forces have used antipersonnel landmines in 2007 and 2008. Although Landmine Monitor is not able to confirm the allegations, it considers this the first serious charge of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Sri Lanka since the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army have strongly denied the allegations when asked by Landmine Monitor.

Landmine Monitor also received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Armenia, Pakistan, and Yemen, but could find no evidence to substantiate the claims.

Use by Non-State Armed Groups

Use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs has declined modestly in recent years. However, NSAG use of antipersonnel mines still takes place in more countries than use by government forces.

In this reporting period, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least nine countries. NSAG use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was reported in five States Parties—Afghanistan, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, and Peru—and in four states not party to the treaty—India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Compared to the previous Landmine Monitor report, Lebanon and Russia (Chechnya) have been dropped from the list, and Ecuador, Peru, and Sri Lanka have been added. Landmine Monitor cited NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries in its 2007 report, 10 countries in its 2006 report, and 13 countries in its 2005 report.

Some NSAG use of antipersonnel mines may have taken place during the reporting period in Niger, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to confirm use from available information.

Insurgent and rebel groups have been using IEDs in increasing numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—that explodes from the contact, presence or proximity of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices is often in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently reported by the media, militaries, and governments as “landmines.” This has led to some confusion, and Landmine Monitor has consistently attempted to determine if an IED was victim-activated, or detonated by some other means.

In Afghanistan, new use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs by the Taliban has been reported. A spokesperson for the Taliban reportedly confirmed the planting of new mines against the Afghan army and international forces.
In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) continued to be the largest user of landmines in the country, and among the largest in the world, causing hundreds of casualties each year. The overwhelming majority of devices are improvised, rather than factory-made mines. The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) also used mines.

In Ecuador, in March 2008, many FARC rebels reportedly died while fleeing through one of their own minefields during a Colombian military attack on a FARC camp in Sucumbios province of Ecuador. In April 2008, the Ecuadorian army seized and destroyed landmines found in another FARC camp inside their border.

In India, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) has used victim-activated explosive devices in Manipur. In Iraq, insurgent forces used command-detonated IEDs extensively but, according to both UN and Landmine Monitor data, only rarely used antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or booby-traps. However, there are many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines by Coalition and Iraqi Forces.

In Myanmar, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karen Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Shan State Army-South (SSA), the Monland Restoration Party, the United Wa State Army, and several other NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines in 2007 and 2008. The Southern Shan State Army (SSS) off-Wa warlord Maha Ja, not previously identified as a user of antipersonnel mines, was alleged to have used mines in this reporting period.

In Pakistan, NSAGs sporadically used antipersonnel mines in Balochistan, some districts of the North-West Frontier Province, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in attacks on Pakistani security forces and civil administration, and in sectarian, inter-tribal and inter-family conflicts.

In Peru, since early 2007, remnants of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps,” around illegal coca fields in the Alto Huallaga sector, Huánuco region, and in the San Martín region.

In Sri Lanka, the army has repeatedly accused the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of planting antipersonnel mines. The army has reported encountering newly laid mines, and capturing newly manufactured mines.

In the Philippines, there were no confirmed instances of use of improvised antipersonnel mines, but the Armed Forces of the Philippines alleged that the New People’s Army (NPA) used victim-activated explosive devices in July 2008 in Maco, Compostela Valley, and that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) used antipersonnel mines in North Cotabato and Maguindanao provinces in August 2008. NPA and MILF publicly rejected the allegations.

The government of Turkey continues to accuse the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) of using antipersonnel mines. In May 2008, Turkish officials showed an ICBL mission photos of VS-50 mines they said were seized from the PKK as recently as March 2008. According to media reports, the PKK is regularly using command-detonated IEDs in attacks on security personnel. These explosive attacks have frequently been reported as “landmines” in the Turkish media, but Landmine Monitor was only able to identify one media report in which an incident attributed to recent use by the PKK appeared to have been the result of a victim-activated antipersonnel mine or IED.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Algeria, the Temporary Security Zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Iran, Lebanon, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, and Yemen.

NSAGs reportedly used command-detonated IEDs in Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, El Salvador, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.

**Production of Antipersonnel Mines**

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines. Thirty-eight states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel, and Poland. Taiwan, which announced several years ago that it had stopped production, passed legislation banning production in June 2006.

---

2 The PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel is listed as a terrorist organization by Australia, Canada, the EU, NATO, US, and the UK.

3 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.

4 Thirty-four States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.
Landmine Monitor identifies 13 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United States, and Vietnam. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period.\footnote{Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor has removed Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories.}

**China:** In April 2008, several sources in Beijing told Landmine Monitor that facilities to produce antipersonnel mines are idle, have shut down, or have been converted for production of other products such as plastic materials. They said this reflected several factors: the existence of adequate stockpiles for China’s own use; the government’s policy not to export antipersonnel mines; and the lack of demand internationally for CCW-compliant antipersonnel mines. One official noted that production began to decrease in 1996, when China announced its moratorium on export, and continued to diminish until coming to a halt in recent years, although these companies retain some technicians and a limited production capacity.

**India:** The country is actively engaged in the production of detectable versions of M14 antipersonnel mines that are compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II. India has informed Landmine Monitor that it does not produce remotely-delivered mines.

**Nepal:** Officials have given conflicting information about production of antipersonnel mines, with some military and political officials acknowledging domestic production, but others—more recently—denying it. In 2007 and 2008, two different army officials insisted that there was no past or current production of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, a Nepal Army spokesperson denied any mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs at barracks using obsolete weapons such as mortar shells, rockets, bombs, and antivehicle mines. In 2008, another army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs.

**Pakistan:** In November 2007, Pakistan reported that it planned incorporation of self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms in its future production of antipersonnel mines, in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II. The protocol requires that all remotely-delivered mines have self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. Pakistan reported in 2002 that it was developing a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, but has provided no further details.

**South Korea:** In 2007 it was reported to Landmine Monitor that the Hanwha Corporation, a private company, produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, designated KM 74, which can be set to self-destruct 48 hours after deployment. In June 2008, South Korea told Landmine Monitor that a government-managed research project on alternatives to antipersonnel mines is scheduled for 2009–2012.

**US:** In May 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army stated that the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition would be procured in a configuration that only allowed command detonation. Previously, the Spider system contained a feature that would permit it to function in a victim-activated mode, making it incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. This would have constituted the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997. However, research and development continues on the Intelligent Munitions System which contains a victim-activated capability. Legislation has been introduced in the Congress that would block production of the systems.

**Vietnam:** In May 2008, representatives of the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a visiting Canadian governmental delegation that Vietnam has not produced mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official also emphasized that Vietnam reserves the right to use and produce landmines in the future.

### Production by NSAGs

Compared to a decade ago, very few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel landmines. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs have access to the mine stocks of previous regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), but most armed groups today produce their own improvised mines.

The LTTE probably produce the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs. In March 2008, a Sri Lanka Army officer told Landmine Monitor the LTTE had started producing and using antipersonnel mines with an electronic antihandling feature. NSAGs in Colombia, India, Myanmar, and Peru are known to produce victim-activated improvised mines.
Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers. In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of such trafficking in antipersonnel mines. In July 2007, the UN Monitoring Group on the arms embargo on Somalia reported that at the Bakaraasha arms market, Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere,” the mayor of Mogadishu, purchased “a variety of anti-tank mines and antipersonnel mines” between November and December 2006. It also reported new information about two alleged shipments of antipersonnel mines in July 2006 from Eritrea (a State Party) to Somalia. The Monitoring Group’s reports in July 2007 and April 2008 cited several other transactions of unspecified types of mines.

Antipersonnel mines were reportedly available on the clandestine market in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Ugandan authorities reportedly seized several caches of antipersonnel mines, which were being trafficked from Sudan to the DRC.

In December 2007, the US extended its comprehensive antipersonnel mine export moratorium until 2014. In July 2008, Israel extended its export moratorium for another three years. A significant number of other states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have formal export moratoria including China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, and South Korea. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 130 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that 44 countries stockpile about 176 million antipersonnel mines.

States Parties

As of August 2008, 144 of the 156 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have stated that they do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. An additional four states have not yet formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines: Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Haiti, and Palau. Eighty-three States Parties have declared the destruction of their stockpiles. Sixty-one States Parties have declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.

States Parties collectively have destroyed more than 42 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 500,000 since the publication of the previous Landmine Monitor report. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Burundi (March 2008), Sudan (March 2008), and Afghanistan, which was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction, but completed it in October 2007.

While compliance with this core obligation of the treaty has been excellent, this record has been tarnished...
recently by three States Parties—Belarus, Greece, and Turkey—that missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008. They each have very large stockpiles and both Belarus and Turkey have so far failed to indicate when they expect to comply with their obligations. Greece wrote to the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties that it would complete the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines no later than 28 May 2009. While all three remain in serious violation of the treaty, the ICBL has been particularly critical of Greece, which as of August 2008 had not destroyed a single stockpiled mine.

About 14 million antipersonnel mines remain to be destroyed by six to eight States Parties, including Belarus (3.37 million), Greece (1.6 million), Indonesia (10,894), Kuwait (87,582), Turkey (2.5 million), and Ukraine (6.45 million). It is not clear if Ethiopia and Iraq have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 report, dated 31 July 2008, Iraq stated that while it had not yet identified any stockpiles, “this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report.” Ethiopia has not made any statements on the subject, and its latest Article 7 report does not include a Form B (for reporting on stockpiled mines). However, it did report on destruction of some stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 2004 and 2007.

### Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1 August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### States Not Party

Landmine Monitor estimates that more than 160 million antipersonnel mines are stockpiled by states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (estimated 24.5 million), and the US (10.4 million).

Other states with very large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated 6 million) and India (estimated 4–5 million).

Poland, a signatory state, declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2007. In April 2008, it said that it would destroy 750,000 of the mines within three to four years.

China has reported that, from 1 October 2006 to 31 August 2007, the People’s Liberation Army destroyed more than 50 tons (50,000kg) of old and obsolete stockpiled antipersonnel mines and other munitions that did not meet the technical requirements of CCW Amended Protocol II or were of too little value to modify. In November 2007, a Russian official said that “during previous years” about 9 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed. It appears that in recent years Russia has been destroying about one million mines per year.

In May 2008, a Vietnamese army official informed a Canadian delegation that Vietnam’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines will expire in a few years, and stated that Vietnam has gradually started to destroy the mines.

### Non-State Armed Groups

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uganda. NSAGs were reported to possess stocks of victim-activated improvised mines in Colombia, Ecuador, India, and Peru. Most often, Landmine Monitor identifies whether an NSAG possesses stocks through reports of seizures by government forces.

Several NSAGs which have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment revealed information on or destroyed some stocks of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Polisario Front destroyed 2,000 antipersonnel mines in May 2008 in Western Sahara. In Somalia, in July 2008, the Puntland Mine Action Center destroyed 48 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. On 1 September 2008, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan destroyed 392 stockpiled antipersonnel mines at Koya in northern Iraq. In Myanmar, the Lahu

Brazilian campaigners participate in a congressional hearing on cluster munitions.
Democratic Front informed Geneva Call that it had destroyed 34 mines from its stockpile.

**Reporting on and Destroying Captured, Seized, or Newly Discovered Stockpiles**

Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, [all States Parties will] report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information, and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.” States Parties took this a step further by agreeing to adopt a modified voluntary reporting format for Form B for reporting on these mines.

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, there have been official or media reports of discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Peru, Tajikistan, and Uganda. Afghanistan and Tajikistan provided information on this in their Article 7 reports, but the other states did not.

Afghanistan reported that 81,595 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2007, including many that were discovered, seized, or received through turn-ins during the year. The mines were destroyed in 114 events at 22 different sites, all by open detonation. Some destruction events occurred in November and December after the announcement in October that the stockpile destruction program was completed. The type and number of mines destroyed in each location, and the dates of destruction, have been recorded in detail in Afghanistan’s latest Article 7 report in Forms F and G.

In its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2007, Tajikistan included a great amount of information on antipersonnel mines discovered and destroyed after completion of its stockpile destruction deadline using the new optional form B2. Sometime in 2006, 49,152 PFM-1S remotely-delivered blast mines and 100 “blocks” of POM remotely-delivered fragmentation mines were transferred by Tajik border protection forces to Russian forces in Tajikistan for destruction. These stocks were destroyed in October 2006 by the order of the Russian Federation Federal Border Service. Tajikistan also reported two other cases where mines were “confiscated or detected” by Tajik armed forces.

In June 2007, Algerian Army intelligence agencies reportedly seized about 2,500 antipersonnel mines from a house in the city of Maghnia, Tlemcen province in western Algeria. The mines were alleged to have been brought in by networks of smugglers from the Moroccan border, and were destined for “the terrorist groups in the mountains of Tizi Ouzou” in central Algeria. This would constitute the largest seizure Landmine Monitor has ever seen reported. Algeria has not officially reported the matter.

**Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)**

Of the 156 States Parties, 71 retain a total of approximately 216,000 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes under the exception granted by Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.64 There were three additions to this list as states submitted their initial Article 7 reports and declared that they would retain mines: Ethiopia (303), Indonesia (4,978), and Iraq (1,234).

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.65 Another 23 States Parties retain fewer than 1,000 mines.66 At least 80 States Parties have chosen not to retain any antipersonnel mines. Suriname and Tajikistan joined this group by destroying all their antipersonnel mines previously retained for training. Other additions included Kuwait and São Tomé e Príncipe, which declared in their initial Article 7 reports that they will not retain mines.

Four States Parties account for nearly 30% of all retained mines: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Turkey. Of these, only Brazil consumed mines in 2007. A further six States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Australia, Belarus, Croatia, Greece, Serbia, and Sweden. Of these, only Australia, Croatia, and Sweden consumed mines in 2007. See table at left for details.

In 2007, 35 States Parties reported consuming 14,758 mines for training and research purposes.67 At

---

64 At least 4 States Parties reported acquiring or destroying previously unknown antipersonnel mines for training and research in 2007, including Serbia (increase of 5,507), BiH (212), Canada (increase of 22), and Bulgaria (12).

65 Thirty-eight States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bhutan, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

66 Twenty-three States Parties retain less than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Benin, Burundi, Colombia, Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, the UK, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.

67 The following 35 States Parties reported consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2007: Afghanistan (626), Argentina (91), Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
least 38 States Parties did not report consuming any retained mines in 2007.14 Fourteen countries have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry-into-force for that country: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Djibouti, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia.

In addition to mines consumed in training activities, a number of States Parties decided to reduce their number of retained mines as excessive to their need. Ecuador decided to cut its number of retained mines in half, destroying 1,001 mines and leaving 1,000. Thailand, in addition to consuming 63 mines in training activities, decided to destroy another 1,000 retained mines because they were no longer deemed necessary leaving a total of 3,650. Ukraine decided to reduce its number of retained mine significantly, destroying 847 PMN and 880 PMN-2 mines and leaving 223. Zambia destroyed 1,226 retained mines, leaving 2,232. Sudan, which completed its stockpile destruction in March 2008, decided to retain 4,979 mines instead of 10,000.

Five States Parties have not made clear if they intend to retain any mines. Four are not thought to have any antipersonnel mines, but have not yet submitted an Article 7 report formally declaring that fact: Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and Palau. In past years, the DRC has stated that reporting on mines retained for training purposes was “not applicable,” but in 2008 instead stated that information on retained mines was not yet available.

Only 15 States Parties made use of the expanded voluntary Form D to report on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines retained: Afghanistan, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Peru, Rwanda, Tajikistan, and the United Kingdom.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 97%. This compares to 96% in 2006 and 2005, 91% in 2004, 88% in 2003, and 75% in 2002.

Seven States Parties have submitted initial reports in this reporting period: Cook Islands, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Montenegro, and São Tomé e Príncipe.

Only one State Party has a pending deadline for an initial report: Palau (28 October 2008). Four States Parties are late in submitting their initial reports: Cape Verde (deadline: 30 April 2002), Equatorial Guinea (28 August 1999), the Gambia (28 August 2003), and Haiti (28 January 2007).

As of late August 2008, only 85 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2007, four more than submitted reports for calendar year 2006. A total of 59 States Parties have not submitted updates.22 This equates to a compliance rate of 59%.23 Several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports as a demonstration of their commitment to the goals of the Mine Ban

14 The 38 States Parties did not report consuming any antipersonnel mines in 2007: Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Venezuela. In 2006, a total of 44 States Parties did not report consuming any mines; in 2005, 51 did not consume any mines; in 2004, 36 did not consume any mines; in 2003, 26 did not consume any mines; and in 2002, 29 did not consume any mines.

22 The 59 States Parties not submitting updates were: Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, the Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, and Uganda.

23 The rate of compliance for annual reports for calendar year 2006 was 54%, for calendar year 2005 was 63%, for calendar year 2004 was 65%, for calendar year 2003 was 78%, and for calendar year 2002 was 62%.
National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty.

Only 57 of 156 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.24 This is an increase of four State Parties in this reporting period: Cook Islands, Jordan, Latvia, and Mauritania.

A total of 27 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. Kuwait, Palau, and Vanuatu initiated the process in the past year.25

Special Issues of Concern

For many years, the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty’s ban on assistance with prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with non-States Parties; foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines; the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices; and the acceptable number of mines retained for training purposes.

Ever since the treaty entered force in 1999, States Parties have regularly discussed these issues at the intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties, and many have tried to reach common understandings, as urged by the ICBL and the International Committee of the Red Cross.26 States Parties agreed in the Nairobi

23 A total of 38 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.23 Indonesia joined this category in the past year. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

ICBL addresses the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Jordan.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 34 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.24


26 A total of 37 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Peru, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, the UK, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

27 Legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in the following states: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Chile, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda. Others reported to be in progress more recently include: Brunei, Ecuador, Haiti, Kuwait, Palau, and Vanuatu.
Action Plan in 2004, and in the subsequent Progress Reports from the annual meetings of States Parties, that there should be ongoing discussion and exchange of views on these matters.79

However, too few states have expressed their views in recent years, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2.

Ecuador stated in a July 2007 response to a Landmine Monitor questionnaire that it has never participated in a joint military operation with states not party to the treaty, it has never received a request for the transit of antipersonnel mines, it has not produced antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and it views 1,000 as the acceptable limit for the number of mines retained for training.

In July 2008, BiH responded to a Landmine Monitor inquiry on these matters. It stated that during joint military operations with its allies, it cannot be engaged in the process of planning and preparing military action where antipersonnel mines will be used. It also said that it will consider ways to ensure that mines such as TMRP-6 antivehicle mines with tilt rods cannot be victim activated and function as antipersonnel mines.80

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, no country spoke on Article 1, but five spoke on Article 2: Austria, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, and Zambia.81

Austria expressed its view that if a mine explodes from the presence, proximity or contact of a person, it is banned, regardless of any other purpose or design of the mine, and that States Parties should remove any such mines from their inventories and destroy them. It stated its willingness to have States Parties elaborate a formal understanding on the matter.

Canada stated that any mine that can be victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. The Netherlands agreed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and anti-handling devices. It also stated its understanding that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited, and that participation in joint military operations must be in adherence with the treaty.

For detailed information on States Parties policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation, which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty, see past editions of Landmine Monitor.

Treaty-Related Meetings

Eighth Meeting of States Parties

States Parties, observer states, and other participants met for the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty at the Dead Sea, Jordan, from 18–22 November 2007. In its assessment, the ICBL said, “The meeting has served to reinvigorate the mine ban community and reaffirm commitment to finish the task we began 10 years ago when the Mine Ban Treaty was signed.” 82 It labeled the treaty a “success in progress,” and stressed the unique ongoing cooperation between states, civil society, UN agencies, and the ICRC on the issue. It also expressed its
appreciation that the meeting was held in and presided over by a mine-affected country.

On the opening day, Palau announced its accession to the treaty. The meeting generated considerable momentum in the Middle East region, with Kuwait and Iraq acceding in the run-up. Twenty countries not yet party to the treaty participated as observers, including seven from the Middle East, demonstrating the continuing spread of the international norm against antipersonnel mines.33

The meeting produced a strong Dead Sea Progress Report, which, in addition to reviewing progress in the past year, highlighted priority areas of work for the coming year. This built on Progress Reports from the previous two years, and the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009 adopted at the First Review Conference (Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World) in November–December 2004.

A template for requesting an extension of the mine clearance deadline was adopted, as was a proposal to amend the Article 7 reporting format to facilitate reporting on stockpiled mines discovered after destruction deadlines have passed.

New co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committees were selected for the period until the next annual meeting, which was to be held in Geneva under the Presidency of Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland from 24–28 November 2008, as set out in the table below.

Discussions focused on the two crucial aspects of implementation at this point in the life of the treaty—victim assistance and mine clearance—with particular emphasis on the upcoming clearance deadlines and the process for possible extensions. The clear sense of the meeting was that extension requests will be carefully studied and there will be no “rubber-stamped” approvals.

The ICBL identified several disappointing aspects of the meeting, most notably that, based on statements, more than half of the states with clearance deadlines in 2009 and 2010 were unlikely to meet them. In addition, there continued to be very little meaningful discussion on the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2, regarding acts permitted under the treaty’s prohibition on “assistance” and mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes.

Participation in the meeting was high—nearly 800 people—with a total of 115 country delegations attending, including delegations from 95 States Parties.34 The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem.

More than 250 members of the ICBL attended. For the first time, a parallel session was held that was entirely facilitated by mine survivors. Also for the first time, youth from 30 countries participated in a parallel model review conference and adopted a Jordan Action Plan. The Jordanian government sponsored a field visit the day before the meeting began, and the week was packed with an array of side events.

Cluster munition containers and submunitions in Western Sahara.

Some of the more notable “holdouts” attended, including China, Egypt, India, Laos, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Others included Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates.

Cluster munition containers and submunitions in Western Sahara.

The 95 total includes Iraq, Kuwait, and Palau, for which the treaty had not yet entered into force at the time.

Standing Committee Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs in 2007–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Committee</th>
<th>Co-chairs</th>
<th>Co-rapporteurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Status and Operation</td>
<td>Germany and Kenya</td>
<td>Chile and Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies</td>
<td>Canada and Peru Argentina and Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile Destruction</td>
<td>Lithuania and Serbia</td>
<td>Italy and Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration</td>
<td>Cambodia and New Zealand Belgium and Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Some of the more notable “holdouts” attended, including China, Egypt, India, Laos, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Others included Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates.

34 The 95 total includes Iraq, Kuwait, and Palau, for which the treaty had not yet entered into force at the time.
four Standing Committees, a coordinating committee, and contact groups on universalization of the treaty, Articles 7 and 9, resource utilization, and linking mine action and development.

The intersessional Standing Committees met for one week in June 2008. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic sections. One session was devoted to preparations for the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008. Cambodia and Colombia each offered to host the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2010.

Among the many side events were briefings on CCW Protocol V and on the new Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted the week before in Dublin, Ireland, by 107 countries.

The Oslo Process and the Convention on Cluster Munitions

With the failure of the CCW Third Review Conference in November 2006 to adequately address cluster munitions (see below), Norway announced it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It subsequently held the first meeting in the “Oslo Process” in February 2007, where 46 states committed themselves to conclude a new international treaty banning cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians” by 2008. A “Core Group” of nations took responsibility for the initiative, including Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Peru.

At the first follow-up meeting in Lima, Peru, in May 2007, a draft treaty text was distributed and discussed. Additional sessions to develop the treaty took place in Vienna, Austria, in December 2007 and Wellington, New Zealand, in February 2008. A total of about 140 countries participated in at least one of these Oslo Process preparatory meetings. Regional meetings to build support for the treaty were also held in Costa Rica in September 2007, Serbia in October 2007 (for affected states), Zambia in April 2008, and Thailand in April 2008 (sponsored by the ICRC).

Formal negotiations were held in Dublin, Ireland from 19–30 May 2008. At the conclusion, all 107 of the participating states adopted the new Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. An additional 20 states attended the negotiations as observers. The convention will be open for signature in Oslo on 3 December 2008.

The Cluster Munition Coalition and the ICBL praised the new treaty as one that will save thousands of lives for decades to come. Like the Mine Ban Treaty, it takes an integrated approach to the cluster munition problem, and requires clearance of contaminated areas as well as assistance to survivors and affected communities. The victim assistance provisions are especially laudable and much stronger than those included in the Mine Ban Treaty. Efforts to weaken the treaty with exceptions for certain cluster munitions, and to have a transition period allowing use of banned weapons for a number of years, were defeated. The most highly criticized aspect of the new convention is a provision that could be seen by some as a loophole allowing States Parties to assist in some way with the use of cluster munitions by states not party to the treaty in joint military operations.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Amended Protocol II

CCW Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the 1996 protocol gave impetus to the “Ottawa Process” that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 91 states were party to Amended Protocol II as of August 2008. Just 10 of the 91 have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Thus, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries.

Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory, it cannot do anything contrary to the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.
The nine-year deadline for states that chose to defer compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines and the requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines, as provided in the Technical Annex, was 3 December 2007. China, Latvia, Pakistan, and Russia deferred on detectability, while Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine deferred on self-destruction and self-deactivation.  

In its September 2007 Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, China stated that it had met its December deadline to comply with the protocol’s technical specifications. In November 2007, China stated that it had made technical modification to or destroyed stockpiled antipersonnel mines which failed to meet the requirements of the protocol. It has provided few additional details.  

Pakistan stated in November 2007 that it had made all the necessary technical changes to be compliant with the protocol, but it provided no details.  

A Russian official said in November 2007, “By the end of this year a set of measures to implement requirements of the Protocol...will be nearing its completion. In particular, a national system of technical requirements to land mines, including anti-personnel ones, will be finalized and adopted for practical application, a planned disposal of obsolete types of mines is being carried out...” Russia has not subsequently announced completion of the work, and over the years has provided few details about how it is complying with the technical requirements of the protocol.  

Latvia’s deferral is presumably irrelevant since it already destroyed its stockpile as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has retained some mines for training purposes. Belarus was obliged by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008, but has not yet complied. Ukraine is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010.  

Protocol V  
Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War is intended to address the post-conflict dangers posed by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance. It was adopted in December 2003 and entered into force on 12 November 2006. As of August 2008, 46 states had ratified the protocol. The first annual meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva in November 2007, and an intersessional meeting was held in July 2008.  

Cluster Munitions  
At the Third CCW Review Conference held in Geneva from 7–17 November 2006, States Parties rejected a proposal to begin negotiations within the CCW on a “legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions” and instead agreed to a weak mandate to continue discussions on ERW, with a focus on cluster munitions, in 2007.  

CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts met for one week in June 2007 with the sole substantive topic being cluster munitions. However, the outcome was again weak, with a statement that the Group “without prejudice to the outcome, recommends to the [November 2007 Meeting of States Parties] to decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument. Striking the right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the decision.”  

During the week-long November 2007 meeting, a proposal from the European Union to negotiate in 2008 a legally binding instrument that prohibits cluster

---

36 Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US. The Mine Ban Treaty required Belarus, Greece and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and the UK have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.  


38 Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2007, 14 additional states ratified Protocol V: Austria, BiH, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Madagascar, Moldova, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Tunisia, and Uruguay.  

municions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians was rejected. States considered several ever-weaker proposals to begin negotiations on cluster munitions in 2008, and settled for an agreement to “negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations.” The mandate did not specify that negotiations should lead to a new legally binding protocol, or include any kind of prohibition, and had no timeline.

Meetings were held in accordance with the mandate on 14–18 January, 7–11 April, 7–25 July, and 1–5 September 2008. By the end of the September session, the chairperson had developed a draft protocol text, but there were still wildly divergent views on the need for a protocol and what it should contain. The outcome of the year-long negotiations, to be decided at the annual meeting of States Parties in November 2008, remained unclear.
Key Developments

Mine-affected states are legally required to clear all mined areas on their territory of antipersonnel mines within 10 years of becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The first deadlines expire in March 2009, but by August 2008, 15 States Parties—almost two-thirds of those with 2009 deadlines—had already declared they would fail to meet them. Four years ago, the First Review Conference of the treaty had pledged that “few, if any, States Parties” would be required to seek an extension to their Article 5 deadlines.

On the positive side, since May 2007, France, Malawi, and Swaziland have declared completion of mine clearance operations, bringing the global total of affected States Parties that have fulfilled their Article 5 obligations to 10. Landmine Monitor believes at least 122km² of suspected mined areas were cleared in 2007, similar to clearance output in 2006.

The Extent of the Problem

More than a decade after the Mine Ban Treaty was signed, a truly reliable estimate of the size of the global landmine problem still does not exist. Early estimates of the numbers of mines laid were merely speculative and often proved to be wildly inaccurate. Similarly, surveys have often hugely overestimated the size of contaminated areas. As a result, there is no credible, precise estimate for the amount of land contaminated (a far better measure of the problem than the number of mines).

Based on available information, Landmine Monitor believes global mine and ERW contamination affects many thousands—but likely not tens of thousands—of square kilometers. Against this backdrop, Landmine Monitor recorded global clearance of at least 122km² of mined areas and 412km² of battle areas in 30 states and other areas in 2007 (for further details, see below).

Furthermore, states are increasingly recognizing that land release principles—the release of formerly suspect mined areas other than purely by clearance—offers an opportunity to demine with significantly more efficiency and effectiveness.

Since May 2007, new and/or additional mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination occurred in several States Parties—notably Afghanistan, Colombia, the Gambia, Iraq, Mali, and Niger—as well as states not party Georgia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. As a consequence, more than 70 states, as well as six areas not internationally recognized, were believed to be mine-affected as of August 2008, as set out in the table below. France, Malawi, and Swaziland have been removed from the list following completion of their demining operations.

Conflict in August 2008 increased contamination in Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia, the

Footnotes:
1 In accordance with the treaty, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the United Kingdom (UK), Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all made requests for an extension to their Article 5 deadlines ranging from 1 to 10 years, the maximum period permitted for any extension period (though more than one extension period can be requested). These requests were to be considered at the November 2008 Meeting of States Parties.


3 A battle area is an area of combat affected by explosive remnants of war (abandoned explosive ordnance or unexploded ordnance) but which does not contain mines.
extent of which was unknown as Landmine Monitor was going to press. Ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka continued to add to an already significant mine/ERW threat throughout the reporting period. There appeared to be a smaller new mine hazard in Ecuador, the Gambia, and the Philippines, the result of non-state armed group activities. New antivehicle mine contamination affected Mali and Niger, but no antipersonnel mine threat was confirmed.

The adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 highlighted a specific threat that Landmine Monitor has reported on for many years—that of unexploded submunitions. Although the full extent of contamination is not yet known, clearance operations in 2007 and 2008 revealed at least 25 states and three areas with uncleared submunitions on their territory, as set out in the table above.

In addition to submunitions and other ERW, the threat from poorly managed ammunition storage areas (ASAs) has gained greater prominence over the last few years. In 2007 and 2008 alone, explosions in ASAs occurred in Albania, Bulgaria, Colombia, DRC, India, Iran, Iraq, Mozambique, Syria, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, killing and

---

* Both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which is cluster munition-affected.

4 These are also called “blinds” or “duds.”
that the introduction of the much-heralded latest version of the software has, in several cases, been problematic. In Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cyprus, and Lao PDR, among others, migration of data from older versions of IMSMA has been troublesome.

It is also surprising that data recording and entry has been so difficult in several programs that have received extensive international support and assistance. In Somalia, for example, the problems are so significant that the IMSMA database has not been effectively updated since 2003. In Angola, the National Demining Institute, despite having 2,000 operational staff across the country, was unable to provide statistics on its demining activities in 2007 because its data management system was said to be not functioning properly.

Demining

Demining encompasses not just mine and ERW clearance, according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) definition, but also survey, marking, mapping, community liaison, post-clearance documentation, and the handover of cleared land. This covers a wide range of techniques and tools that represent more than two-thirds of global expenditure on mine action programs.

The primary mine clearance technique remains the manual deminer equipped with a metal detector. When a signal is heard, the deminer must stop and either the deminer or a colleague must carefully excavate the object to determine if it is an item of explosive ordnance or a harmless piece of metal. The overwhelming majority of signals lead to innocuous metal fragments being discovered (e.g. nails, barbed wire, tin cans).

Program Coordination and Management

Effective coordination and management are essential for a successful mine action program. Landmine Monitor remains convinced that civilian rather than military management of mine action—as opposed to military involvement in demining, which is generally welcomed—is more likely to result in an effective and efficient program.

Today, the majority of mine action programs around the world are civilian led. That is not to say that civilian management is a guarantor of success. The national mine action authorities in a number of countries where hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on mine action over the course of many years—in some instances for well over a decade—are still unable to quantify the problem with any reasonable degree of accuracy.

The primary mine action information management software remains the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMASMA), managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This is used by some 50 mine action programs around the world, but remains the subject of considerable criticism. Some blame the tools for any problems and others blame the operators. What is clear is some states have understood the constraints that military control can impose on mine action, particularly the free exchange of information. For example, Mauritania put its mine action program under civilian control in 2007. The impact—if any—of a military coup in July 2008 was not known as of end August 2008. Thailand has pledged to transfer its mine action program to civilian control, but a military coup has impeded efforts to fulfill its promise. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 37.

Military-managed programs are in Armenia, China, India, Iran, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Rwanda, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.


The explosion in Ukraine occurred in late August 2008, as Landmine Monitor was going to press, and is not included in the country report. See “Ukraine can’t deal with fires and its own stockpiles,” Izvestia, 27 August 2008, www.izvestia.ru.

Thus, the lack of coordination structures in Myanmar and Russia in Chechnya, and unwillingness of the authorities there to clear the contamination for which they are, to a large degree, responsible has resulted in significant, unnecessary suffering among the respective civilian populations.

Several states have understood the constraints that military control can impose on mine action, particularly the free exchange of information. For example, Mauritania put its mine action program under civilian control in 2007. The impact—if any—of a military coup in July 2008 was not known as of end August 2008. Thailand has pledged to transfer its mine action program to civilian control, but a military coup has impeded efforts to fulfill its promise. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 37.

Military-managed programs are in Armenia, China, India, Iran, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Rwanda, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.


© Pablo Parra, PAICMA, 2008

Mine stored in villager’s homes in Cambodia.
Landmine Monitor researcher gathers information for Thailand report.

UXO removed from a house after a munitions depot explosion in Albania.

Land Release

If the mine problem is to be solved, national authorities will have to develop transparent systems to reduce suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to known mined areas. Currently, the approach is one of extreme caution akin, in the words of one Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Program Manager, to treating every piece of possibly suspect land as “guilty until proven innocent.” As a consequence, according to the GICHD, on average less than 3% of cleared land has contained mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO). That represents a staggering rate of inefficiency for a national demining program, and a huge waste of resources.

Indeed, the concept of land release has come to the fore in mine action in the past two years. In part this is a recognition that some surveys have led to vastly exaggerated estimates of hazardous area. There is also

In 2007, they cleared 43,600 m$^2$ of land in one hour, or an area the size of a football field (about 5,000 m$^2$) in less than a day. In comparison, it could take a deminer 100 days to achieve the latter area of clearance.

Mine detection rats are being used in one country but have attracted considerable attention, especially from the media. Since 2006, the Belgian research organization APOPO has been accredited by the National Demining Institute as a full demining operator in Mozambique. APOPO operations consist of 36 mine detection rats, a manual demining team, and a mechanical brush cutter. In 2007, they cleared 43,600 m$^2$ of land in Gaza province. According to a leading expert on mine detection animals, “Rats could play a complementary role or a similar role to dogs. Rats and dogs are equally sensitive/reliable detectors and there are pros and cons with both.”

HALO Trust’s program in Mozambique notes, though, that rats “are not licensed as primary clearance assets. Every square meter checked by rats must be then cleared by human beings, and in reality therefore adds to the cost, complication and time required for clearance.”

15 Prodding, by which a metal rod is carefully inserted into the ground at a 30 degree angle to check for mines, is more dangerous than the use of a metal detector as the risk of accidental detonation of a mine or item of explosive ordnance is significantly higher. Raking is a technique used in sandy soil, which has proved effective in Somaliland and Sri Lanka.

16 Mechanical assets of some kind are used in the following programs: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen. Chile and Ecuador have both procured new mechanical demining assets to speed up productivity in their programs. As of August 2008, NPA had brought a machine to Rwanda from its program in Sudan to assist in the completion of its Article 5 obligations; demining in Rwanda had previously been primarily manual.


19 Email from Lawrence Timpson, Representative, HALO, 10 September 2008.

20 See, for example, “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5,” a discussion paper prepared by the Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway), Revised version, July 2008.

21 According to one expert, the term “land release”, which has appeared in the mine action world in recent months, is simply a correction of very inaccurate LIS information. There is no land being released back to the communities which they, the land owners/users, actually thought was mined in the first place!” Email from Guy Willoughby, Director, HALO, 21 December 2007.
now a better understanding that an array of tools short of full clearance enables SHAs to be addressed efficiently and with a high degree of safety for both program personnel and the intended beneficiaries. These tools and techniques include better information-gathering and verification, and greater use of rigorous general and technical survey. Thus, for example, since 1996, Croatia has released through survey more than 12,000km², reducing its suspected mine problem by 92%. Since 2007, Ethiopia, with technical assistance from NPA, has released several hundred square kilometers through general and technical surveys in more than 1,000 communities in its ongoing land release program. In 2008, HALO reported that in Angola they only physically clear an average of one-quarter of each SHA (the remainder is released by survey).

### Land Release Principles

Care must, however, be taken when applying land release to ensure that certain basic principles are followed. In particular, any land confirmed to be contaminated must be fully cleared to humanitarian standards to meet the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, and the process of land release must follow applicable national and international mine action standards. A paper by Norway in July 2008 set down seven principles for land release, i.e. there should be:

1. A formal, well documented and recorded process for identifying mined areas;
2. Well-defined and objective criteria for the reclassification of land;
3. A high degree of community involvement and acceptance of decision-making;
4. A formal process of handover of land prior to the release of land;
5. An ongoing monitoring mechanism after the handover has taken place;
6. A formal national policy addressing liability issues; and
7. A common set of terminology to be used when describing the process.

The paper concludes that: “States Parties [to the Mine Ban Treaty] should acknowledge that land reassessment and release through non-technical means, when undertaken in accordance with high quality national policies and standards that incorporate key principles highlighted in this paper, is not a short-cut to implementing Article 5, but rather is a means to more expeditiously release, with confidence, areas at one time deemed to be 'mined areas'.

At the request of Lao PDR’s National Regulatory Authority (NRA), the GICHD assisted Lao PDR with a risk management and mitigation model to provide operators with a methodology for classifying land and determining the appropriate action (from clearance to release) to be applied to it. The GICHD conducted the initial study in 2006, which underwent an initial three-month trial in early 2007. A revised model started further trials in 2008. A critical outstanding issue, however, is liability. Neither the government (in the case of Lao PDR, the NRA) nor the operators want to accept liability for incidents on land released under this model.

### Survey in 2007 and 2008

There continue to be concerns about the accuracy of estimates of contaminated area resulting from impact surveys—in particular, older surveys—that hugely exaggerated the problem. A major Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was completed in Angola in 2007, significantly reducing estimates of SHA in the country to less than 250km²; however.

---

23 Although the definitions of each continue to be contentious, most agree that general survey is conducted with non-technical means, such as review of minefield maps, casualty data, and discussions with key informants at the community level, whereas technical survey uses manual demining, MDDS, or machines to determine or discredit reported contamination.


25 Email from Southern Craib, Programme Manager, HALO, 20 June 2008.


27 A draft IMAS on land release was being prepared by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the GICHD in 2008. By August, UNMAS had received comments on the draft and was in the process of incorporating them before sending the standards to the IMAS Review Board for approval. Email from Noel Mulliner, Technology Coordinator, UNMAS, 19 August 2008. Draft IMAS o8.20 looks at the overall land release concept/process, o8.21 looks at non-technical land release, and o8.22 will look at technical survey. Email from Tim Lardner, Mine Action Specialist, GICHD, 30 August 2008.

28 email from Noel Mulliner, Technology Coordinator, UNMAS, 19 August 2008. Draft IMAS o8.20 looks at the overall land release concept/process, o8.21 looks at non-technical land release, and o8.22 will look at technical surve.

29 “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5, A discussion paper prepared by the Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway),” Revised version, July 2008.


31 In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Mozambique blamed the LIS for leading it up blind alleys. The Cambodia LIS was not considered credible by many at the time (2003); massive land release on previously suspected land has further dimmed its relevance. In contrast, BiH continues to report significantly more contaminated area than estimated by the LIS in 2003 (1,200km²). Ethiopia, which has criticized the accuracy of its LIS, has made some use of the findings but was planning to resurvey all SHAs.

32 The increasing use of polygons—irregular shapes that follow the contours of mined areas more accurately—supports this trend. In Angola, HALO identified more than one in three of the total SHAs, but as a result of polygon mapping measured only 6.4% of the total suspect area, clearly indicating the benefits of polygon mapping in minimizing overestimates of the suspected area.
in Guinea-Bissau, an LIS was close to completion as of August 2008; and in Sudan an LIS had been completed in 13 states out of 19 suspected to be contaminated as of July 2008. A Landmine “Retrofit” Survey completed in Jordan in September 2007 concluded that 10.5 km² of suspected mined areas remained.

In Algeria, the mine action program was trying to recover from the December 2007 bombing of the UN offices that killed many, including Steve Olejas, the Chief Technical Advisor for mine action. As of August 2008, an impact survey was one of the priorities. In Colombia, the European Commission announced plans to support an LIS starting in 2008.

Mined Area Clearance in 2007

Despite continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from release by survey, Landmine Monitor believes at least 122 km² of suspected mined areas were cleared in 2007, with the destruction of 191,682 antipersonnel mines and 10,003 antivehicle mines. The largest cleared areas were by mine action programs in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Sudan, which accounted for 80% of the total recorded clearance (see table to left). In 2006, programs cleared around 125 km² of mined areas.

Battle Area Clearance in 2007

Significant battle area clearance (BAC) operations were conducted in 2007 in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka. Programs cleared at least 412 km² of battle area, although two countries alone—Afghanistan and Sri Lanka—accounted for three-quarters of the reported total. Some 100,000 submunitions—mostly in Lao PDR and Lebanon—and some 2.5 million other ERW were destroyed during the year.

Clearance of Mined Areas in 2006 and 2007 in Selected Demining Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2007 Mined Area Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>2006 (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>91.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes battle area clearance as Ethiopia has not disaggregated mined area clearance.

States Parties in Full Compliance with Article 5 Obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Year of declaration of compliance</th>
<th>Article 5 deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1994*</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Date of completion of demining program (prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty)

Deminers brief NGOs on progress made in Tajikistan.

© Tahmineh Janghorban, October 2007

31 LIS data showed that four states were particularly impacted—Blue Nile, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Kassala—but generally debunked the myth that Sudan is as highly affected as Afghanistan.

32 This represented an increase from the 2007 estimate of 9 km² based on army records.

33 Thus, for example, the 256 km² of clearance reported by Morocco are not included in this estimate.
by June 2008 the figure had risen to 37.5 km². In Serbia, NPA continued to conduct a survey of submunition contamination and impact during the reporting period. In August 2008, it was reported that Russia’s state demining agency, EMERCOM had begun clearance of submunitions at Nis airport in Serbia, with funding from the Russian government.

### Compliance with Article 5 Obligations

Ensuring full compliance with Article 5 obligations is the greatest challenge facing the Mine Ban Treaty. Nine years after the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, mine-affected states that became party to the treaty in 1999 must declare if they are not in a position to complete clearance operations before the ten-year deadline. The over-optimism States Parties expressed at the First Review Conference of the treaty in 2004 about the number of states expected to finish their obligations on time has been tempered by the flurry of extension requests submitted by August 2008. This makes a total of only 10 States Parties that have declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations (see table to left).

Around two-thirds of the total number of States Parties with 2009 Article 5 deadlines have declared that they will not be able to meet them. The table below includes the estimated area of residual contamination for each state requesting an extension as well as the length of the extension sought.

There is an apparent lack of coherence between the estimated size of contamination and the length of extension sought. Venezuela has 0.2 km² of contaminated area (equivalent to four football fields), but is seeking a five-year extension, while Yemen has 243 km² and has requested the same extension period. Even taken individually, it would seem that the rates of clearance planned in the requests for certain cases represent extremely low levels of productivity, even lower at times.

### Completion of Article 5 Obligations

On a more positive note, there were declarations of completion of mine clearance operations in 2007–2008, including compliance from France (clearance of a mined area around its ammunition storage area in Djibouti), Malawi (following a survey by NPA), and Swaziland (following technical survey of its suspected mined area).

---

### States Parties with 2009 Article 5 Deadlines Requesting an Extension, August 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Estimated mined area (km²)</th>
<th>Length of extension request sought (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad*</td>
<td>670**</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark*</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8 (initially 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Chad and Denmark are planning to make a second request once they have better determined the area of remaining contamination.
** Not including contaminated areas in the northern Tibesti region.

---

39 It was possible, but not confirmed as of August 2008, that Niger would also request an extension to its 2009 deadline. See report on Niger in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
than their past rates of productivity. Peru, for example, cleared almost 300,000 m$^2$ in its remote border region in 1999–2000, but now seeks eight years to clear only 192,000 m$^2$ in that area.

Furthermore, some of the estimates of contaminated area appear to hugely overstate the problem. Afghanistan, for example, has the world’s largest civilian mine action program for some 800 km$^2$ suspected to be affected, yet Zimbabwe’s mine problem is estimated to be the same as Afghanistan’s. The problem in BiH is more than twice that of Afghanistan. The figures for BiH and Zimbabwe lack credibility, given their histories. As the Marshall Legacy Institute concluded from its study of 50 mine-affected countries, future assessments of contamination and subsequent reporting of land release activities will have to improve dramatically and become standardized to have any meaningful use.\(^40\)

There was also a wide range of progress achieved by mid-2008 by the requesting states. Some, such as Jordan, Mozambique, and Yemen, can point to significant progress in their demining programs. Others, such as Ecuador, Peru, Senegal, and Thailand, have cleared small amounts of suspected mined area since becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty that must be considered inadequate by any measure or assessment. Neither Venezuela nor the UK has cleared a single mined area in the last nine years, which is clearly contrary to the requirement to start clearance “as soon as possible.”

**Extension Request Process**

As of August 2008, the process by which extension requests would be judged was still to be fully clarified. An analyzing group of States Parties (the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties and co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committees) has sought to agree on conclusions that will assist the Ninth Meeting of State Parties in Geneva, on 24–28 November 2008 in reaching decisions on each extension request. As of August, their work had resulted in one State Party (Peru) reducing the length of its requested period of extension, and another (Denmark) requesting a specific time frame (22 months initially), as required by the treaty, after initially failing to provide one.

The ICBL, which was asked to provide input into the process, supported the requests by Chad, Croatia, Denmark (as revised), Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Yemen, although it put forward questions for clarification on most of the requests. The ICBL had the most serious concerns about the accuracy, feasibility, or appropriateness of the requests from Ecuador, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela, and the UK, and recommended they all reduce the number of years requested. With respect to the requests by Venezuela and the UK, the ICBL has stated that “States Parties should consider carefully whether it is appropriate to grant an extension to a State Party that has not initiated clearance operations prior to the expiry of its Article 5 deadline.”

**Other Article 5 Compliance Issues**

As noted above, as of August 2008, it was still not clear in a number of States Parties whether there were residual mined areas to be cleared. The list of States Parties with Article 5 deadlines in 2009 and 2010 whose compliance is uncertain is set out in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Compliance Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Clearance complete but no formal declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Uncleared areas not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine contamination appears minimal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Gambia, which has a deadline of 1 March 2013, appears to have suffered new antipersonnel mine contamination in 2007, a spillover from violence in neighboring Senegal. The Gambia has not yet submitted an Article 7 report detailing the contamination and its extent. In contrast, in Montenegro (deadline of 1 April 2017) it is believed that mine clearance operations are complete, but no formal declaration has so far been made.

\(^{40}\) Excerpts from “Big Bang Study,” provided by email from Elise Becker, Program Manager, Marshall Legacy Institute, 21 August 2008.
Whether the Republic of Congo and Ukraine have contamination that invokes their legal responsibility under Article 5 remained to be clarified as of August 2008. In addition, neither Turkey nor Cyprus has formally accepted responsibility for clearance in northern Cyprus. A statement in June 2008 from Moldova, however, raised hopes that it has accepted responsibility for any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction.

Clearance Obligations in the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions learned lessons from the implementation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The text is more detailed as to reporting obligations in its Article 7 reporting on transparency measures, which will assist the future oversight of cluster munition clearance efforts. In particular, States Parties will be required to report on the size of areas both estimated to be contaminated and subsequently cleared, not just on the location of areas and the number of items cleared, as is the case with the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have sometimes carried out limited mine clearance and, to a greater extent, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations.\(^{41}\) In Western Sahara, for example, the Polisario Front assisted the UN mission in marking and disposing of mines, UXO, and expired ammunition. EOD teams destroyed more than 830 items of explosive ordnance between April and December 2007. In Sri Lanka, however, the TRRO Humanitarian Demining Unit, which is linked to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has not resumed clearance activities since its work halted in September 2006 due to a freeze on its financial resources by the Sri Lankan government and renewed armed conflict.

Deminer Security

Lack of security proved a major challenge for mine action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and an increasing problem in Sri Lanka during 2007–2008. In Afghanistan, the threat to security was most apparent in southern areas of the Taliban-led insurgency but it affected other areas and involved a range of other actors, including criminal groups. Three Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC) deminers were shot dead in southern Kandahar province in September 2007, and seven more were killed in March 2008; five Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) staff were shot in northern Jawzjan province; and two MDC deminers were killed in Kunduz province. In August 2008, armed persons also abducted 13 ATC deminers working in the eastern province of Paktia, releasing them a week later, but keeping their vehicles.\(^{42}\) Demining operators also lost vehicles and equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in attacks or raids by insurgent or criminal groups.

In Iraq, the National Mine Action Authority was shut down on the orders of the Council of Ministers in June 2007 as a result of political turmoil and insecurity and the May 2007 kidnap and subsequent murder of its director general. It has since reopened under a new ministry.

In Sri Lanka, the operating environment became increasingly difficult as the government imposed tighter controls on movement of people, equipment, and supplies such as fuel and explosives, which they feared might fall into LTTE hands. Operators also faced threats to the security of their deminers, who included a majority of Tamils. Operators experienced abductions of deminers in areas controlled by security forces or pro-government militias, and many deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory either left or were forcibly recruited into “local security forces”; operators also faced tight restrictions on moving Tamil deminers to tasks in different districts.

Fear of attack curtailed some other clearance activities. In Sudan, the security situation in Darfur did not permit demining activities in Western Darfur, and

---


---

However, some demining operations were also attacked by NSAGs. For example, in Afghanistan 10 deminers working for NGOs were killed in late 2007 and early 2008. See section on Demining Security.
Road verification was not conducted as planned. In the Temporary Security Zone separating Eritrea and Ethiopia, the UN reported that during December 2007 newly laid antivehicle mines destroyed a vehicle which belonged to an UN demining contractor, injuring two demining staff.

**Other Challenges for Mine Action**

Efforts continue to mainstream mine action into development.\(^43\) Yet, despite references to demining in many development plans or poverty reduction strategy papers and the existence of an online network for practitioners,\(^44\) the extent of mainstreaming on the ground still appears limited.\(^45\)

Similar “work in progress” is the issue of gender and mine action. In June 2008, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines launched a study into the issue. According to the campaign’s Coordinator Elisabeth Decrey Warner, “There is growing awareness within the mine action sector that including a gender perspective to its activities will not only allow an inclusive approach to gender equality, but also make mine action have greater and wider impact. Various mine action actors and stakeholders have developed and adapted gender policies resulting in fruitful and inspiring initiatives within different pillars of mine action. However, improvements in terms of gender equality in one area of mine action are not necessarily being replicated in others, and there are still many gaps to fill.”\(^46\) A number of female-only demining teams have been created, notably in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Sudan, as well as, most recently, in Somaliland.

\(^43\) In 2007, the GICHD developed draft guidelines on how mine action can effectively promote development and reduce poverty in affected communities. Email from Sharmala Naidoo, Linking Mine Action and Development Research Officer, GICHD, 2 September 2008; and see www.gichd.org.

\(^44\) In February 2007, the GICHD established a virtual LMAD practitioners’ network (see www.gichd.org/lmad), comprising of more than 200 mine action and development practitioners as of end August 2008. Email from Sharmala Naidoo, GICHD, 2 September 2008.

\(^45\) Exceptions include BiH, where in November 2007 Handicap International, with support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, organized a conference in Sarajevo to launch a new integrated mine action and development program. Email from Sharmala Naidoo, GICHD, 2 September 2008.

Key Developments

Recorded mine/ERW/IED casualty rates continued their steady decrease in 2007, but the decrease was markedly less significant than in previous years. Also, in 2007–2008, casualties occurred in several countries where none had ever been recorded before or not for several years. Despite the crucial need for appropriate and comprehensive casualty data collection mechanisms, little or no progress was identified during the reporting period in terms of coverage, accuracy, and usage of casualty data.

Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties in 2007

In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified 5,426 casualties caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Of these, 1,401 people were killed, 3,939 injured, and the status of the remaining 86 is unknown. These figures are by no means complete as they only include recorded casualties plus casualties Landmine Monitor was able to identify through the media. In 2006, at least 6,022 casualties were reported in 71 countries and areas.² As in 2006, the number of casualties decreased by 9% in 2007, although casualties will continue to be identified due to slow data collection (for example, in the DRC and Sudan) and problems with data management (for example, in Angola and Sri Lanka).

Despite the decreased casualty totals, casualties have never been recorded in as many states and other areas as in 2007—78 (see table below). Thirteen countries recorded casualties in 2007 where there had been none in 2006 (167 total casualties); and two countries had never before recorded casualties: the Gambia and Mali. Other countries had not recorded casualties for several years, for example Niger. The casualties in these three countries were all due to new antivehicle mine use.

Casualty Demographics

As in previous years, civilians made up the vast majority of casualties where the civilian/military status was known: 71%. Since 2005, however, the percentage of civilian casualties has decreased by 10%. This is partly due to the continuing high number and increasing percentage of casualties among security forces in Colombia (697 in 2007). If Colombia is excluded, military casualties would only account for 13% of casualties whose status is known and not 27%. Also, data for many military casualties were recorded through the media, which tend to focus on security forces killed in conflicts abroad (particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq) or on major incidents causing multiple military casualties (for example in India Pakistan, and Somalia) while neglecting civilian casualties. Casualties among non-state armed groups (NSAGs) are typically under-reported but were identified in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, and Palestine in 2007.

There was also a significant increase in humanitarian demining casualties in 2007 (120, up from 69 in 2006), partly due to an increase in the number of accidents in Lebanon. Among clearance casualties there were six women (in Afghanistan and Cambodia).

1 These figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices unintentionally detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines (whether factory- or home-made), antivehicle mines, unexploded ordnance, abandoned explosive ordnance, and victim-activated IEDs. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact number is not given; incidents clearly caused by remote-detonated mines or IEDs; and devices that were not clearly victim activated. For some countries, such as Iraq, where verification of reported incidents was particularly difficult, even stricter criteria were applied as IED incidents were only included if the device was set off by direct (hand or foot) contact.

2 In its previous report Landmine Monitor identified 5,751 casualties in 68 states/areas in 2006. However, due to slow data collection new casualties occurring in 2006 were identified in four other states (Albania, China, El Salvador, and Moldova). Several countries also sent revised casualty totals, and database analysis in Afghanistan identified 257 additional casualties.

3 In 2005, 6,873 casualties were recorded.

4 Côte d’Ivoire, France, the Gambia, Honduras, Israel, Kenya, Mali, Mongolia, Niger, Serbia, South Africa, United States, and Zambia.
Males were the largest casualty group where the gender was known (89%, 3,930); females accounted for 11% of total casualties where gender was known (467). For 19% of casualties, however, the gender was unknown (1,029). Among civilian casualties alone, the percentage of female casualties was higher, at 16% (452). In general, females were at less risk than males but, in some countries, specific livelihood activities put them at particular risk (for example, tending animals in Yemen or collecting wood/water in DRC). The number of male casualties also has an indirect impact on women, as in many traditional societies males are the primary income earners, and female-headed households are generally poorer.

Children accounted for 31% of total casualties where the age was known but, more significantly, this percentage grew to nearly half of the civilian casualties (46%). For child casualties where gender was known, 82% (976) were boys and 18% (213) were girls.

Among civilian casualties where age and gender were known, men were the largest casualty group (48%), followed by boys (36%), and women and girls (8% each). In a few countries, boys were the largest single casualty group: Chad, Kosovo and Lao PDR.

 Devices Causing Casualties

For nine out of every 10 casualties the device causing the incident was known. Of these:

- 1,440 were caused by ERW other than (cluster) submunitions (36.3%),
- 987 by antipersonnel mines (24.9%),
- 502 by antivehicle mines (12.6%),
- 452 by unspecified mines (11.4%),
- 372 by victim-activated IEDs (9.4%), and
- 216 by submunitions (5.4%).

The figures dealing with device type in this section exclude Colombia as the data is not detailed enough to merit inclusion.
Different demographics are affected differently by each device type. For antipersonnel mine casualties, 74% were adults and 26% were children. Of the adult antipersonnel mine casualties, 89% were male, including 51 deminers. For antivehicle mine casualties, 80% were adults. The only device where the adult-child distribution was roughly equal was submunitions (48% children, 52% adults). This picture is skewed by Lebanon where, due to clearance and high-risk activities undertaken out of economic necessity, the number of adult casualties was significantly higher than in other submunition-affected countries. For countries significantly affected by submunitions and where the contamination has been present for many years, children were generally the majority casualty group in 2007, for example in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Vietnam.

Children (mainly boys) were nearly 60% of total ERW casualties but only 20% of mine casualties. Among civilian ERW casualties, boys accounted for 49%, men 31%, girls 12%, and women 8%. This was also the only device category where girls accounted for significantly more casualties than women.

ERW casualties (excluding submunition casualties) were reported in 54, antipersonnel mine casualties in 37, antivehicle mine casualties in 23, victim-activated IED casualties in 13, and submunition casualties in 12.

Activity at Time of Incident

Collecting information on the activity at the time of the incident, although crucial for mine/ERW risk education purposes, is the weakest component of data collection. That said, it appears that civilian casualties occur mostly in rural areas as people go about their daily livelihood activities, often driven by economic necessity to go into areas they know to be dangerous, as in Lebanon and Vietnam. These livelihood activities can include scrap metal collection, which is a significant cause of casualties in Lao PDR, Iraqi Kurdistan, Nicaragua, and Peru.

New antivehicle mine/IED contamination did mark a shift in activities causing casualties in some places, for example in southern and southeastern Afghanistan where there was a marked increase in the number of casualties caused while traveling (20% up from 10%). Similarly, traveling was the most frequent cause of incidents resulting in new casualties in Niger.

Regional Distribution

Casualties occurred in all major regions but only increased in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa:

- 2,448 casualties in 15 countries in Asia-Pacific (down from 2,768 in 14 countries);
- 973 in seven countries in the Americas (down from 1,194 in five countries);
- 944 casualties in 24 countries/areas in Africa (down from 1,153 in 20 countries/areas);
- 689 in 13 countries/areas in the Middle East North Africa (up from 532 in 13 countries/areas);
- 238 in nine countries/areas in Europe (up from 167 casualties in nine countries/areas);
- 134 casualties in the 10 countries/areas in the Commonwealth of Independent States (down from 208 in 11 countries/areas); and
- Among VA25 countries just three (Afghanistan, Cambodia and Colombia) accounted for 38% of casualties (compared to 44% in 2006).  

* At the First Review Conference, from 29 November–3 December 2004, 25 States Parties declared responsibility for significant numbers of survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia,
A landmine survivor physiotherapist treats a child in Afghanistan.

Trends in States with 100 or More Casualties in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Casualties in 2007 and Increase or Decrease from 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>895 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>811 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>438 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>332 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>271 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>216 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>186 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>170 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>130 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>110 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>104 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>101 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>100 (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 65 countries recording casualties in both 2006 and 2007, 29 reported lower casualty rates in 2007 and three the same number. The overall decrease of casualties is largely due to the significant decreases in a few severely-mine-affected countries.

- Afghanistan: 811 down from 1,053 (due to clearance, but also under-reporting in conflict areas);
- Cambodia: 332 down from 450 (ascribed to mine/ERW risk education, sanctions on scrap metal trade, and increased community involvement in mine action);
- Colombia: 895 down from 1,167 (due to increased government control); and
- Lebanon: 130 down from 207 (due to the emergency situation in 2006).

In other cases a decrease was due to a lack of data coverage in some areas in 2007 compared to the previous year:

- Angola: 48 down from 121,
- Sri Lanka: 34 down from 64, and
- Uganda: 23 down from 50.

However, 33 countries recorded higher casualty levels, including:

- Chad: 186 up from 139 (due to escalating conflict);
- Iraq: 216 up from 99 (partly due to better data collection but also better media reporting); and
- Myanmar: 438 up from 243 (due to increased conflict).

In two countries particularly, improved data collection was the reason for increased casualty figures. For example, in Eritrea there were 70 casualties in 2007, up from 32 in 2006; and in Ethiopia there were 84, up from 34 (partly due to one-off survey activity).

Casualties continued to be recorded in 2008 with at least 61 countries recording casualties until August 2008, including three countries that did not have casualties in 2007 (Cyprus, Djibouti, and Libya). Some countries reported higher totals to August 2008 than for the entire calendar year 2007, such as BiH, Côte d’Ivoire, Jordan, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. Cluster munitions were used in the conflict between Georgia and Russia. Landmine Monitor does not include casualties that occur during strikes in casualty totals, but only those from submunitions that failed to explode upon impact. According to Human Rights Watch, at least two civilians were killed and five more injured as a result of unexploded submunitions in August 2008, but exact numbers were not known as Landmine Monitor went to print.

Data Collection

Obtaining comprehensive data on mine/ERW/IED casualties for mine action planning purposes remained challenging and no improvement in this situation was observed in 2007. Of the 78 states and areas with casualties in 2007, 48 had data collection mechanisms and 32 used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) nationally or regionally to store that data. This means that a quarter of casualties (1,358) occurred in countries/areas without a formal data collection mechanism (up from 19% in 2006). The vast majority of casualties in these countries were identified through the media and therefore data was incomplete. The most notable examples are: Algeria (78 casualties), India (170), Iran (40), and Pakistan (271). In a few cases field operators provided casualty data to Landmine Monitor, but no standard or unified data collection mechanism existed, for example in Myanmar where 249 of 438 casualties were reported by field operators.

However, the existence of casualty data collection mechanisms does not mean that these data are complete. Landmine Monitor identified only three countries/areas where casualty data can be considered complete: BiH, Cambodia and Jordan. They accounted for 392 casualties (7% down from 8%); meaning that 93% of casualties were recorded in countries with an incomplete or no data collection mechanism (92% in 2006). Landmine Monitor found additional casualties in 25 of 48 countries with data collection mechanisms (774 casualties in total).
Key Developments

Although many individual mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) risk education (RE) projects and programs have been evaluated, no agency or operator has yet sought to conduct a broader assessment of the effectiveness of RE. In terms of monitoring, the total number of beneficiaries receiving RE remained one of the few quantifiable indicators for this activity in 2007–2008. Available reporting indicated that more than 8.4 million people received direct RE in 2007, an increase from 7.3 million people in 2006, and the highest level of RE ever recorded by Landmine Monitor.

While more people seem to be benefiting from mine/ERW RE, the quantity of RE is no longer generally viewed as the decisive measure of its success. In 2007–2008, increased efforts were also made towards sustainability of RE and its integration into broader risk reduction strategies. Some programs moved from simply providing information through an educational approach to encouraging risk minimization among intentional risk-takers. However, as UNICEF stated at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the absence of hard evidence for RE’s effectiveness continues to impede efforts to improve project and program performance.

Risk Education in 2007–2008

During the reporting period, RE activities were identified in 61 countries, the same number as the previous reporting period. More than two-thirds of RE activities occurred in States Parties (42), while the remainder (19) took place in states not party. RE activities also took place in areas not internationally recognized as

Provision of RE Compared to Casualty Rates in 2007

---

1. This increase is partly explained by an expansion of certain programs but also by specific activities in response to emergency situations, such as flooding, new mine contamination, and ASA explosions. As in past years, this global total is only an estimate based on the information provided to Landmine Monitor by RE providers, who were not always able to provide exact statistics or complete information. Where possible, RE delivered through mass media was excluded, but the total almost certainly includes people receiving RE from more than one provider or on more than one occasion. According to Landmine Monitor, RE was provided to 6.4 million people in 2005, 6.25 million in 2004, 8.4 million in 2003, and 4.8 million in 2002.


3. Estonia was included in the 2006 total of 63, but has been removed due to the perceived lack of need for a significant RE program. Latvia was removed from the 2006 list because it then reported, as in 2007, that no RE programs existed and no updates were provided on the Latvian EOD School, which has previously conducted RE.

4. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Bangladesh reported some “mine-related” training activities but not enough to constitute actual RE. Kuwait reported RE activities in Form 1 of its initial Article 7 report, but it was not clear which activities were current and which were planned for the future. Moldova was not included because, although in 2007 the national Red Cross society introduced an optional school-based human rights course that included a module on landmines, it does not have a full RE program.

5. Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia (limited to Chechnya), Somalia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Vietnam.
Countries Where RE as Provided to More Than 300,000 Beneficiaries in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Reported Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,581,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>783,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>769,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>572,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>536,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>503,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>367,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>356,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>329,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RE took place in 58 countries and five areas reporting casualties in 2007.

RE was conducted in countries with severe contamination, high casualty rates, and long-established mine action programs, both in States Parties and in states not party, notably Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Lao PDR. RE was provided to more than 300,000 people each in 10 countries. Together, this accounts for nearly three-quarters of the total RE beneficiaries worldwide in 2007 (6.1 million).

In 2007–2008, emergency RE was conducted in the Gambia due to mine incidents and a refugee influx from Senegal’s restive Casamance region. Also, due to new antivehicle mine contamination, Niger took steps to begin RE, but no significant program had started by June 2008.

RE was increased in Mozambique as an emergency response to an ammunition storage area (ASA) explosion in March 2007. RE levels remained high in Lebanon due to continued (cluster) submunition and other contamination. In the remaining countries RE generally increased, where known, with the exception of a decrease of by almost half in Sri Lanka (despite the needs from the escalating conflict) and a significant decrease in Vietnam.

As part of a broader mine action program, Egypt and Libya initiated RE planning in 2008; Libya had provided RE in 2006 but not in 2007. Landmine Monitor was unable to identify RE activities in Serbia and Turkey in the current reporting period, although it had noted activities previously.

**Strategic Frameworks and Coordination**

Coordination among RE implementers (with affected communities and other mine action operators) and a measurable strategy is key to the effectiveness of RE. In 2007–2008, 24 countries and one area reported having both RE coordination and a strategy; 21 were States Parties. An additional nine countries and one area had RE coordination bodies, but no strategy. In countries with the largest RE programs, mine action centers had the lead coordination role, often with UNICEF—the UN focal point for RE—providing technical and financial support (and, in some cases, serving as the de facto coordinator). However, there was increased focus on building sustainable national RE capacity, often actively promoted by UNICEF. To this end, efforts were made to involve ministries, local authorities, and community institutions, such as schools and health centers, in RE dissemination and monitoring.

In many countries, military, police, or other security forces are reported to provide some, if limited RE, particularly in areas exposed to conflict. In India and Pakistan, the respective armies were reportedly providing awareness messages to civilians in border areas. Organizations linked to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) provided RE in Lebanon, Myanmar, and Somalia in 2007.

Coordination is only effective if information is shared between RE providers, mine action operators, and the affected communities to ensure that RE can adapt to real or emerging needs. Key indicators of effective planning include: the degree of coverage in areas with the majority of, or new, casualties; the ability to reach the greatest at-risk groups; and the ability to address trends in the causes

---

1 Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.

of casualties. For example, Sudan’s UN Mine Action Office coordinated RE through regional working groups to adjust activities according to emerging needs at the local level. However, the entry of new RE implementers reportedly caused challenges for local coordination. In BiH, a number of operators commented that coordination efforts were focused on producing strategic documents rather than on facilitating cooperation between actors. In Cambodia, a largely “one-size-fits-all” approach to RE resulted in insufficient targeting of the most at-risk groups.

In 2007–2008, some progress was made in developing and/or implementing RE standards. In 2008, Lao PDR revised the standards it developed in 2007. A specific reference to community liaison was removed even though this was the most common RE delivery method; instead, standards focused more on community participation. Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced quality assurance procedures for its national RE standards. Its standing operating procedures (SOPs) made no reference to community participation but had strict accreditation requirements for all providers.

As of August 2008, at least 31 States Parties had used Form I of the Article 7 report to report on RE, an increase of three compared to July 2007, but in several cases reporting was not relevant or measurable, or was unchanged from past years.

Challenges

In 2008, UNICEF observed some challenges for RE. Most importantly, it noted that considerable awareness-raising had occurred, but this and the often basic messages disseminated had not led to sustained behavioral change. UNICEF also saw the need to adapt RE provision to changing country situations as they evolve from emergency to development phases. This was hampered, however, by the absence of data and standardized evaluations to demonstrate RE effectiveness, and by the fact that RE was often seen as a marginal activity in comparison with other mine action components.8

In March 2008, participants at a meeting of experts on the future of RE, jointly organized by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNICEF, agreed that RE continued to be an important component of broader risk reduction efforts, and that the sector had become increasingly professional. However, participants also recognized that many RE projects continued to be poorly designed or implemented, and failed to make the requisite changes for sustainable and integrated programming. It was noted that national authorities and RE operators are responsible for monitoring and ensuring the relevance and quality of RE projects. The creation of a new “steering group” was proposed, to review developments in RE and contribute to the planned review of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) for RE.

Assessments

In 2007–2008, several RE assessments were conducted which provided some insight into the successes of RE and possibilities for improvement or change (see relevant country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor for further details):

Albania (2007)

A GICHD evaluation noted that “it is reasonable to conclude that in Albania the extensive nature of the [RE] program has reduced accidents and casualties.” However, no direct connection between RE and reduced incidents could be readily made, and it was recommended to include assurances about cleared land in RE messaging.

BiH (2007)

An evaluation of school-based RE found that, although certified RE materials were developed, RE teaching was not standardized and it was unclear how schools actually participated and what resources were used. A second evaluation found that RE SOPs were too restrictive and reduced community participation, and that community liaison failed to address the RE needs of communities where no clearance was likely in the near future. Due to low casualty rates, the small number of risk-takers, and sufficient national capacity, UNICEF support to RE activities was discontinued. Neither evaluation was able to establish a causative

relationship between RE implementation and declining casualty rates.


A GICHD needs assessment for UNICEF concluded that there was little RE knowledge in the Somali region, and that RE was urgently needed due to the high number of casualties and ongoing conflict. A community-based approach supported by external actors and applying lessons learned from other regions in Ethiopia was recommended.

**Lebanon (2007)**

An assessment for UNICEF noted that people had high RE awareness but that behavior change was unlikely if no economic alternatives were provided to risk-taking activities that generated much needed income or provided essential fuel, food, or water. It further noted that the lack of a unified strategy was a challenge, that materials and communication skills needed improvement, and that it was essential to introduce participatory techniques into the RE provided.

**Nepal (2008)**

Only 2.5% of respondents to a KAP (knowledge, awareness and practices) survey in the most affected districts reported RE activities in their communities. The survey noted that people were unaware of where explosive devices could be encountered and how to practice safe behaviors. However, it was also noted that exposure to the mine/ERW threat was moderate and communities had more urgent priorities, such as basic sanitation.

**Tajikistan (2007)**

A UNICEF evaluation found that RE activities were not adequately coordinated and unable to fully address the mine/ERW threat, partly due to incomplete casualty and survey data. It recommended that trainers providing RE in schools could expand their activities elsewhere, and that demining teams should receive RE training to build community liaison capacity.

**At-Risk Groups**

In most mine/ERW-affected countries the main at-risk groups are usually men and boys involved in outdoor subsistence activities or recreation, returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), nomads, and poor minority groups. In some countries, however, the traditional work of females brings them into mine/ERW risk situations, which requires specific targeting. In Yemen, women and girls are a high-risk group, but because of cultural factors could not be reached without support from female NGO RE trainers, who were not active in RE during the reporting period due to lack of funding.

Refugees or IDPs receive RE in camps or prior to return, for example in Thailand and Kenya. In 2007–2008, IDPs were a main focus of operators in Uganda, where RE implementers responded to increased IDP resettlement by extending activities to camps and resettlement areas in relevant districts. Due to escalating conflict in Chad, RE provision to IDPs was urgently needed, but the response fell short of what was required.

Particular groups can suddenly become priority targets for RE, as for example in Afghanistan, where alleged new mine use caused more incidents while traveling. This prompted certain operators to include travelers or truck drivers in their programs. Similarly, although no formal RE program existed in Niger, unions and some NGOs alerted their drivers about the new mine threat.

Many countries, however, including some of those with the largest RE programs, remained unable to...
identify or target those most at risk in 2007–2008. For example, many operators in Sudan noted that RE activities were carried out on the basis of perceived threat, as reliable casualty data (including the type of explosive device and activities being undertaken) was not available, which prevented specific groups from being targeted.

Intentional Risk Taking

Risk-taking behavior is often linked to economic activities. In response, an increasing number of RE implementers adopted measures that allow mitigation of risk-taking behavior for people who continued to expose themselves to mine/ERW threats even after having received RE. Strategies included a move to a broader risk reduction model with better linkages with clearance and development programs, as is said to occur in Angola. In Colombia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also adopted an integrated response, including RE and broader risk reduction approaches, seeking improved marking of mine/ERW-affected areas, as well as other humanitarian assistance (such as building wells) to reduce the socio-economic impact of mines/ERW based on the communities’ needs. In Lao PDR, a shift was made from the information and education model to a communication approach designed to stimulate behavior change through discussions of options and risk minimization for intentional adult risk-takers.

Economic development can produce the desired behavior change, as for example in Chechnya, where extensive installation of gas to homes coincided with the sustained reduction of mine/ERW casualties previously occurring while gathering firewood for fuel. In some cases, legal measures in conjunction with RE can stem intentional risk-taking activities. The reduction of casualties in Cambodia is partly attributed to continued police efforts to inform at-risk populations about scrap metal and ERW legislation and sanctions for failure to respect it. A study of scrap metal collectors/dealers in Vietnam found that creating a legal framework (in combination with economic alternatives) might induce behavioral change. It noted that scrap collectors are usually aware of the risks they are taking but that current RE methods are insufficient to bring about behavior change, because they still focus more on awareness-raising than on finding alternatives.

Adapting Messages to New Threats

In many countries, a continued rise in mine/ERW casualties might show that, while the mine threat in some places has decreased through clearance, the ERW/improvised explosive device (IED) threat, and particularly handling of ERW by young males, is a key challenge for RE messaging. Changing messages to address the specific threat is a way of targeting particular at-risk groups. In Nepal, a new locally appropriate message, “Don’t Keep Bombs in Your House” was added to the universal “Don’t Touch!” In Peru, where RE had focused mainly on people living near electricity pylons mined in the 1980s, a campaign was started in 2007 to raise awareness of the new threat of IEDs in coca fields, which had led to a significant increase in casualties.

The effectiveness of RE messages is also affected by the language used. For example, in Lebanon most materials were found to be too complicated for the low education level of the specific target population. In Afghanistan, however, high illiteracy rates are said to have little effect on RE effectiveness as leaflets are not distributed without an accompanying RE session. In Lao PDR, materials were developed in the languages of local ethnic groups, and in
Mine/ERW Risk Education

Ecuador RE messages were translated into the language of the local indigenous community. In Jammu and Kashmir in India, warnings in an official state language (Urdu) were added to mine hazard signs in 2007 after a public civil society campaign.

Coverage and Response

“Adequate” coverage means that a program was capable of providing appropriate RE for at-risk groups in known mine/ERW-affected localities and was able to respond to emerging situations. Landmine Monitor found RE broadly adequate in 23 states and four areas. However, most of these could still achieve a more comprehensive provision of services by improving responses to specific risk behaviors.

“Inadequate” means that appropriate RE was not delivered on a scale to match the threat or geographical coverage necessary. Inadequate RE was recorded in 38 countries in 2007–2008, compared to 34 countries in 2006, and in two areas in both 2007–2008 and 2006.

While the number of countries reported as providing adequate RE in 2007–2008 did not change significantly it should be noted that many, or most, RE programs operated without adequate data to recognize particular areas requiring RE or to target specific at-risk groups. Most countries use casualty data (often incomplete) or Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) results for RE planning, although in many cases LIS data is out of date or seen as inaccurate by RE implementers. In Angola, operators noted that the IDP influx and movement has changed the impact level assigned to communities; also, not all provinces were surveyed for security reasons. In Iraq and Sudan, the LIS contained no clear assessment of RE needs.

Emergency Risk Education

Emergency RE was still needed in 2007–2008, due not only to conflict, but also to particular events such as flooding or sudden casualty increases. In Sri Lanka, UNICEF and its partner organizations tried to balance existing RE priorities with new RE needs due to escalated conflict. Emergency RE was also used to address ERW contamination following ASA explosions in 2007–2008, including in Albania and Mozambique. Mozambique also needed to use emergency RE in response to flooding in some mine-affected provinces. Even in areas where there is no need for a formal RE program, residual RE capacity is useful. For example, HALO Trust no longer operates an RE program in Abkhazia, but it responded with immediate localized RE when a river brought a mine into a cleared area.
In-School Risk Education

Integrating RE into school curricula is one of the main means of making RE sustainable, and of reaching many people, including at-risk groups. The approach also has limitations, however, in targeting children who do not attend school, who often are precisely those children coming into contact with mines/ERW while conducting livelihood activities. Children, both in school and out, are also sometimes encouraged to collect scrap metal for economic gain.

A few examples of integration of RE in school curricula in 2007–2008 were:

- Albania pilot-tested integration of RE into state school curricula, mostly in mine-affected areas, but also in some of the many areas affected by abandoned explosive ordnance that have not been exposed to RE;
- in Afghanistan, the national mine action center signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Education in 2007 to include RE in the school curriculum and establish an RE department in the ministry; and
- a UNICEF pilot project for in-school RE in Tajikistan was completed in late 2007 and incorporated in Ministry of Education planning.

In some countries, however, such as Armenia, RE through military training courses was increased at the expense of humanitarian RE programs. RE was included in a secondary school military preparedness curriculum, rather than as a general health and safety issue, despite previous UNICEF assistance in teacher training and its subsequent expression of concern.

Community Reporting and Mine Action Responses

RE often tells beneficiaries to inform responsible authorities about suspected dangerous items. If most community reports of dangerous objects are investigated and discovered, mines/ERW are cleared and community trust can be maintained as the effectiveness of the RE information is affirmed. In Nicaragua, RE teams responded to 218 public reports of mine/ERW discoveries in 2007, which after verification, resulted in the destruction of 4,845 items of ordnance (164 mines and 4,681 ERW).

Conversely, if there is no response to reports of suspected dangerous items, or if the response is too slow, community perceptions of the validity of RE, and mine action, are negatively affected. In Uganda, reports of suspicious devices occasionally resulted in ad hoc clearance, but response times were long. In Afghanistan, one RE provider received 232 clearance requests in 2007. Although all requests were passed on to the area mine action center, there was no evidence that they had resulted in clearance. In Lebanon, a number of operators noted that communities were unsure to whom to report mines/ERW they encountered. An assessment by the Landmines Resource Center noted that the army did not respond to community requests to clear mines/ERW, and that community members were sometimes afraid to report mines/ERW for fear of being accused of involvement in illegal activities and arrested.

Legal Obligations to Provide Risk Education

Article 6(3) of the Mine Ban Treaty calls on each State Party “in a position to do so” to provide assistance for mine awareness programs. There is no specific requirement on affected states to provide RE to those at risk. The Convention on Cluster Munitions should provide strong support for programs in areas heavily affected by submunitions. The convention specifically obliges affected States Parties to conduct “risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants,” taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 on international cooperation and assistance. In conducting RE, States Parties are also required to take into account international standards, including the IMAS.11

---

9 Article 4(2)(e), Convention on Cluster Munitions. Article 6 provides that “each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance…to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of risk reduction education…as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.” See also, Article 5, and Technical Annex, Article 2, Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Victim Assistance

Key Developments

Victim assistance (VA) is seen as a lower priority than stockpile destruction and demining programs under the Mine Ban Treaty. While slow improvements were reported in 2007–2008, progress was largely sporadic in efforts to treat, rehabilitate and reintegrate the hundreds of thousands of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors. With one year left in the 2005–2009 Nairobi Action Plan (NAP), all States Parties, but particularly the 25 with “ultimate responsibility” for significant numbers of survivors (the “VA25”), will have to increase their efforts if the NAP is truly to have made a difference in the lives of survivors, their families, and communities.

Victim Assistance in 2007–2008

Article 6(3) of the Mine Ban Treaty provides that “each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims…” Although it is not made explicit in the treaty, it is understood that all States Parties are “in a position” to assist survivors, as well as their families and affected communities, either directly or through adequate international support. To be effective, assistance should be delivered through a holistic approach that encompasses emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and social and economic reintegration. Delivery should be based on respect for the rights of all persons with disabilities and, where possible, making use of existing infrastructure.

Understanding the Needs

In the vast majority of states, the number of mine/erw survivors and especially their needs are not adequately known (see chapter on Casualties).

During the reporting period (May 2007 to May 2008), several states sought to address this gap through improved data collection, “cleaning up” databases or survivor surveys:

- BiH started to revise and consolidate the different casualty databases held by partner organizations.
- In Jordan, the 2006–2007 Landmine Retrofit Survey significantly improved information on mine/ERW casualties as information existing in separate databases was consolidated. A disability survey was also launched in 2008.
- In Lao PDR, the launch of the Lao Victim Information System included a survey of casualties since 1964.

Knowing only the number of survivors is not sufficient to identify their needs. In too many states—especially in at least 19 VA25 states—the lack of a clear picture of survivor needs has been impeding adequate service provision:

- In Croatia, operators noted that the lack of information on survivors’ needs was a major hurdle to providing assistance, and called on government bodies to resolve the problem.

© Loren Perez, March 2008

Technicians manufacture prostheses in Kosovo.

© Cambodia CBL, September 2007

© Cambodia CBL, September 2007

Cambodian landmine survivor tends a home garden.

1 Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.
In the DRC, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database did not contain the details needed for an adequate evaluation of survivors’ needs. A needs assessment planned for 2006 was never conducted, due to lack of resources.

Mozambique stated in its Article 5 deadline extension request that some of its casualty data was “subject to confirmation” and that it does not represent “the real situation” of mine/ERW survivors in the country.

Serbia has not made progress on establishing a casualty database and made contradictory statements about even needing one.

In Uganda, progress on the national surveillance network and on inclusion of socio-economic indicators for survivors stalled.

In Yemen, while casualty data is relatively complete, the needs of survivors have not been adequately assessed and the program continued its restrictive, medical approach to victim assistance.

A number of states initiated, albeit mostly limited, needs assessments in 2007–2008:

- In Cambodia, the NGO-run Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System was to restart assistance to, and the gathering of socio-economic data on, survivors in August 2008 after a three-year suspension.

- Colombia organized meetings of survivors to better understand their needs and make them aware of the services available. These meetings were, however, limited in scope, reaching only some 180 survivors. Colombia stated that a survivor census was needed to enable better assistance to be provided.

- Lebanon started working in 2008 on a system in which each survivor has a file which includes the assistance received, to coordinate work among service providers.

- In Senegal, while data is incomplete, the mine action center unified existing mine action/casualty databases and reportedly started including assistance information in them.

- In Sudan, a survivor needs assessment in two regions indicated that most survivors wanted economic opportunities. However, casualty data contained insufficient detail and reports came in too slowly to be of use for operators.

- Tajikistan conducted a needs assessment to complete casualty data, to plan, prioritize, and monitor VA activities, and to improve stakeholder coordination.

**Emergency and Continuing Medical Care**

In 2007–2008, a medical approach to VA continued to dominate in terms of the type and quantity of services provided to survivors. Croatia, for example, noted that it “has reached an appropriate level in the provision of physical rehabilitation for people with disabilities, including mine victims, [but] provision of continuous psychosocial rehabilitation and reintegration remains weak. Preventive care is non existent, follow-up care is haphazard and scant ....” It added that there was also an “unacceptably large discrepancy between legislation which exists on paper and its implementation in real life.”

While progress in the health sector is largely unrelated to VA activities, it stands to benefit survivors, for example:

- Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health elevated the importance of disability in its strategies and achieved its objective of expanding basic health coverage to 85% of the population by 2008.

- In Azerbaijan, a state program for socio-economic reinvigoration, funded by oil revenues, resulted in the construction of 13 medical centers in 2006–2007, and four more were to be constructed in 2008. International funding also led to the construction or improvement of several medical facilities.

- In Russia (Chechnya), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) gradually ended its emergency support to Chechnya’s health sector due to vastly improved government efforts.
In Ethiopia, a unit for emergency preparedness was created in 2007 at the health ministry to develop emergency and rehabilitation services for “injury and violence victims.” Yet, while most survivors receive emergency medical care, they typically have much greater difficulty obtaining medical care on an ongoing basis. Often they have to pay for services, or cannot even afford transport to the nearest medical center. For example:

- In Colombia, while the government has the capacity to manage health services, they are unequally distributed with specialized services only in major towns. Treatment is only covered when survivors obtain services in their department of residence, even if it is unavailable or inconvenient. Delays in government reimbursements to service providers, complex bureaucracy, road blockades, long distances, and ongoing conflict further hamper civilian access to services in major towns.

- In Palestine, access to health services deteriorated due to movement and import restrictions, power cuts, public sector strikes, and ongoing conflict. Facilities were unable to treat complex injuries, because of a lack of specialists and equipment, and critically ill patients were frequently denied permission to leave Gaza for treatment.

- In Sri Lanka, medical services are weaker in mine- and conflict-affected areas, but persons with disabilities were reluctant to travel as they were required to produce a police report which details the cause of their disability. Military forces curtailed civilian movements and some hospitals in mine-affected areas were attacked during the conflict.

- In Tajikistan, the survivor needs assessment indicated that 80% of survivors needed long-term medical care, but found that the cost and long distances to district hospitals prevented access.

- In Yemen, three-quarters of persons with disabilities needed to travel outside of their communities to receive even basic health services.

Physical Rehabilitation

Physical rehabilitation still largely depends on international support. When in national hands, supply, management, and staff retention challenges were common. In Angola, none of the rehabilitation centers functioned at full capacity after international pull-out. The ICRC had to step up its assistance to existing rehabilitation centers for, respectively, reasons of access (Colombia), quality (Sudan), and funding (Yemen). In other countries there is no foreseeable end to international support. For example, in Afghanistan the ICRC noted that “the authorities showed little enthusiasm for the idea” of increased national responsibility for physical rehabilitation centers. More positively, in 2008 the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation in Cambodia presented a three-year plan to gradually take over financial responsibility for the management of physical rehabilitation services.

Survivors faced the same problems accessing physical rehabilitation services as those noted for continuing medical care above. For example:

- For 18 of 26 countries with mine casualties in 2007–2008 where the ICRC operated, it noted explicitly that the cost of services, transportation, or accommodation was an obstacle for people in need of physical rehabilitation. In many cases, the ICRC or NGOs had to cover the costs.

- In Algeria, the ICRC constructed a rehabilitation center for internally displaced persons from Western Sahara in Tindouf because they were unable to access services in Algiers or Spain.

- In Azerbaijan, while Azeris appeared to have good access to services, assistance to Chechen refugees was not provided by state facilities.

- In Iraq, while overall access to rehabilitation increased, steep increases in transport and accommodation costs prevented many people from accessing services.

- In Yemen, the ICRC needed to establish a referral system, and cover its cost, so that people from the restive Sa’ada governorate could access services in the capital Sana’a.

Psychological Support and Social Reintegration

Despite the rhetoric from several states in favor of psychosocial support, these services continued to be accorded little practical importance, and were often limited to peer support. Mental health problems were sometimes stigmatized. In Uganda, survivor organizations were the main psychosocial support providers, but
they faced challenges as their funding was blocked for administrative reasons. A few initiatives were undertaken successfully in 2007–2008. In Afghanistan, for example, a survivor organization started the first formal peer-support program for survivors and persons with other disabilities. In Sudan, national bodies and new local VA organizations conducted integrated programs with a psychosocial and a socio-economic component.

In many states, for example Yemen, survivors receive psychosocial support within the family network as it is not a priority for the VA program. Persons with disabilities, particularly women and girls, are hidden from view. In Mauritania, there are no psychosocial support programs for survivors, and mental health is not a priority or even well understood. The only mental health center is in Nouakchott and is understaffed. In Iraq, conflict has had a major impact on mental health, but psychosocial care is largely non-existent, and lacks trained staff. More positively, in Vietnam national funds were allocated for the first time to inclusive education, which allows children with disabilities to learn within ordinary schools, as part of the national disability strategy.

**Economic Reintegration**

In 2007–2008, the weakest component of VA undoubtedly remained economic reintegration. Although economic opportunities were the top priority as expressed by survivors themselves, all VA25 countries except Thailand noted that these services were the weakest component of their VA programs, ranging from limited to non-existent, and mostly carried out by NGOs.

Economic reintegration activities tended to be small scale and not focused on or tailored to the needs and educational levels of survivors, putting them in a weak position compared with other vulnerable groups. When they were conducted, activities often took no account of the labor market and lacked follow-up to ensure employment opportunities or business sustainability. While many countries had employment quotas for persons with disabilities and in some cases even sanctions for not adhering to them, implementation was poor nearly everywhere, as the following cases illustrate.

- Guinea-Bissau noted in June 2008 that economic reintegration of survivors is a challenge for the state, and even the entire society. It lacked funds for vocational training and micro-credit programs.
- In Tajikistan, 90% of survivors interviewed during survey activity indicated they urgently needed economic opportunities.
- In Yemen, for the third successive year the socio-economic component of the VA program went unfunded, and previous beneficiaries had difficulties managing their businesses.
- More positively, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Lebanon provided micro-credit consultancy services to national partners and evaluated all micro-credit projects by survivors for additional support and better returns.

**Community-Based Rehabilitation**

Most services to survivors remained center-based, and insufficiently supplemented by community-based rehabilitation (CBR). Referral mechanisms were weak to non-existent. CBR programs, which are an essential complement to national programs, are designed to improve service delivery and create equal opportunities for persons with disabilities who have limited access to services. CBR integrates all components of VA while using local resources and skills, and actively promotes empowerment and participation of persons with disabilities through the development of disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), increased community decision-making and accountability, and needs-based programming.

Some countries, such as Cambodia, Eritrea and Thailand, expanded CBR in 2007–2008, but elsewhere it was lacking. Recognizing the need for better CBR practices, the World Health Organization (WHO) started developing CBR guidelines for publication in late 2008. It presented its work during the VA experts’ parallel program at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008. The WHO noted that while CBR requires community and DPO involvement, links to the national government are also needed through a national policy, coordination body, and budget allocation. There is also a need to recognize gender equality in programs, provide management training and reward community workers (often volunteers).  

---

1 For more information, see WHO, Disability and Rehabilitation Team, “Community Based Rehabilitation,” www.who.int.
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

On 3 April 2008, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities received its 20th ratification, triggering its entry into force 30 days later. The disability convention requires the inclusion of disability issues in mainstream policy agendas, service provision, commitment of resources, capacity-building, coordination through disability focal points, monitoring, and offers a complaints mechanism through its Optional Protocol.

As of 1 September 2008, there were:
- 130 signatories to the convention, including 16 VA25 members;
- 71 signatories to the Optional Protocol, including 10 VA25 members;
- 34 ratifications of the convention, including six VA25 members (Croatia, El Salvador, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, and Thailand); and
- 20 ratifications of the Optional Protocol, including three VA25 members (Croatia, El Salvador and Peru).

Tackling Discrimination

Despite the fact that three-quarters of countries with casualties in 2007–2008 have disability legislation, there were still reports of discrimination in more than 90%. Discrimination against civilian mine/ERW survivors included the provision of pensions, with military survivors receiving considerably higher pensions, for example in Serbia.

- In Croatia, people injured during the war received pensions 10 times higher than those injured after the war;
- In Colombia, new legislation appeared to limit compensation options for survivors; and
- In Rwanda, disability pensions were only half of the minimum wage.

On a positive note, in Peru legislation was amended so that mine survivors and their families could benefit from collective compensation.

The Right of Survivors to Participate in Planning and Implementing VA Programs

It is commonly understood that in order to be effective, VA programs need to be based on the needs identified by survivors, their families, and their communities. The NAP urged states to include survivors and persons with disabilities in policy-making, implementation and monitoring. However, in many countries, DPOs lacked funding and capacity to carry out sustainable long-term plans and influence policy-making, limiting them to ad hoc activities. For example, in Afghanistan, with more than three-quarters of a million persons with disabilities, it was noted that the disability movement remained in “its infancy” due to a lack of capacity and negative societal attitudes. Persons with disabilities were unable to effectively promote their own interests.4


In December 2004, 24 States Parties’ with significant numbers of survivors (see table below) accepted that they had “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate VA to survivors, as outlined in 11 concrete actions in the NAP. In June 2008, Jordan joined what is now called the VA25 group, noting that although its total number of recorded survivors (640) “may not compare highly on a global scale, it is significant when measured against the size of the population.”5

The NAP aims to support VA through States Parties’ commitment to: enhance health services; increase physical rehabilitation; develop psychosocial support capacities; actively support socio-economic reintegration; develop and implement relevant policy frameworks; give consideration to gender and age; enhance data collection; integrate mine survivors in the work of the treaty; and ensure the contribution of relevant experts. Those in a position to do so are called on to promptly assist States Parties with a demonstrated need for external support. Under the NAP, states are also required to monitor and report regularly on progress so that “an unambiguous assessment of success or failure” can be made in 2009.6

In 2005, the VA25 group also endorsed a framework for measurable action provided by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. The questionnaire developed by the co-chairs, Nicaragua and Norway, contained four key aims:

- assessing the VA situation in each member country;
- developing SMART (specific, measurable, achievable,

In 2007–2008, Landmine Monitor identified the most progress in Afghanistan, Albania, Sudan, and Uganda. Afghanistan, as the most consistent performer in the VA25 process, reported at least partial progress on most of its objectives with 2007–2008 deadlines. The three others developed SMART and sustainable plans integrated into their disability frameworks through increased stakeholder and government involvement, while continuing to progress on earlier objectives. Afghanistan added extra components to its objectives (CBR and inclusive education), as did Sudan (coordination, survivor inclusion and resource mobilization).

It needs to be noted, however, that the achievements of these VA programs owe much to the sustained support of UN programs in which dedicated VA staff have provided coordination capacity. When such support departed, as in Uganda in late 2007, progress subsequently slowed. Other countries, such as Croatia and Thailand, largely depended on their own resources, but made less progress.

Overall, most progress was made in supporting the planning process, rather than undertaking activities to assist survivors directly. This is not surprising as a large percentage of the VA25’s combined objectives related exactly to data gathering, strategy and policy development, awareness-raising, and coordination. Of Peru’s objectives, only one was related to the implementation of activities. In Guinea-Bissau, only two of 11 objectives were activity-based. Other notable cases were Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Planning and coordination progress in 2007–2008 included:

- Of the 10 states that have improved their objectives, six did so during the current reporting period. Others, such as Nicaragua and BiH, reported revisions to their objectives but had not formally presented them to other States Parties just a year before the plans should be fulfilled.
- Of the eight states that have submitted formal plans, five did so during the reporting period. Thailand also developed a plan, but it was not available. Cambodia and Chad said their plans would be ready in late 2008. During the previous reporting period, seven states announced the development of plans, but only El Salvador formally submitted its plan.
- At least 11 VA25 countries initiated an interministerial coordination process to work on achieving their 2005–2009 objectives.

#### VA25 Countries and Estimated Number of Survivors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Survivors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>52,000–60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>238 (in Kukës)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Unknown, recorded number 159 in LIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Unknown, verified 153 between 1999-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Unknown, between 1,350 and 1,960 recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>46,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Unknown, 1,489 recorded to end 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Unknown, 5,412 recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Unknown, between 1,414 and 1,638 recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Unknown 1,138 recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Unknown, between 2,225 and 3,142 recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Unknown, at least 2,498 (but estimates as high as 84,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Unknown, at least 7,275 (LIS 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Unknown, at least 847 casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Unknown (earlier estimates of 10,000 to 30,000 now said to be unreliable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>At least 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>At least 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Unknown, estimates between 1,370 and 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Unknown, 2,711 recorded to end 2007 but estimates up to 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>At least 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Unknown, at least 1,971 according to 2001 LIS&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Unknown, at least 1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Unknown, at least 2,473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>LIS = Landmine Impact Survey

---


<sup>11</sup> The others were BiH, DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Peru, and Serbia.

<sup>12</sup> Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, DRC, El Salvador, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. Mozambique improved
Burundi did not develop objectives and Colombia’s objectives remained incomplete. Activity progress in most VA25 countries was limited to certain sectors, for example:

- improved data collection in Tajikistan and Eritrea;
- improved access to free medical services in Guinea-Bissau and expansion of emergency services in Thailand;
- improved physical rehabilitation services in Cambodia;
- improved access to and availability of inclusive education in Mozambique and psychosocial care training of CBR and hospital staff in Senegal;
- affirmative economic integration action in Eritrea and BiH;
- ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was an objective achieved by Croatia and El Salvador; and
- many countries, such as Burundi and Colombia, made progress in awareness-raising and the development of guidelines.

Progress in VA was often achieved independently of the VA25 process, and activities were often undertaken without coordinating with it. For example, disability policy was under development in Yemen but without input from the country’s VA focal point. In Ethiopia and Nicaragua, access to healthcare improved through health strategies independent of the VA process. In Peru, economic reintegration opportunities improved through partnerships with the private sector.

In some countries, progress in 2007–2008 was hampered by the continued lack of financial means, particularly in Tajikistan. Other countries reported both insufficient capacity and financial resources, such as Chad, DRC, and Guinea-Bissau. In addition, the 2005–2009 objectives were not always used to guide VA activities in 2007–2008, for example in BiH and Serbia. Colombia’s assistance program for survivors (and other conflict-injured) is not part of its stated NAP objectives.

In 2007–2008, NGOs, DPOs and survivors have been increasingly involved in the planning process, but this was often still done on an ad hoc basis. Few countries can demonstrate the systematic involvement of intended beneficiaries in the development of VA plans. Afghanistan is one of the positive exceptions.

While VA is a long-term process that will extend far beyond 2009, several states delayed their deadlines in recent revisions of the objectives. Several also set completion targets past the 2005–2009 timeframe. Angola delayed nearly all objectives to 2011. Afghanistan and Cambodia’s plans cover the period from 2008–2011/2012. BiH intended to include revised plans for fulfilling its objectives in a strategy for 2009–2019. Peru foresaw development of a VA strategy only in 2009. These delays make measuring progress by 2009 difficult, and could—and probably will—send the signal that little was achieved.

Reporting on VA25 Progress

When States Parties set their own objectives for 2005–2009, quantifiable indicators were correctly deemed essential to measure progress. While the vast majority of VA25 states included VA experts in their delegations to treaty-related meetings, and made statements in 2007–2008, they delivered status reports rather than progress reports. These statements will, as the co-chairs rightly said, produce a “body of evidence” on VA activities, but not on progress made. Review of the 2007–2008 VA statements and Article 7 reports showed that nearly all states reported activities in ways that cannot be measured, for example, mentioning the number of people receiving a particular service without noting increases/decreases or the reasons why.

States are solely responsible for defining what can be achieved, when and how, as well as self-monitoring and reporting. Discussions on how to measure VA progress towards the Second Review Conference were at center stage in 2007–2008, with the ICBL and ICRC becoming more vocal on the need for improved progress moni
toring by the states themselves. The ICRC noted that “it is rare to find a monitoring system which can track progress in the 24 [now 25] affected countries,” adding that states should take guidance from the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which stipulates the need for focal points, which can be individuals or a coordination body, and an independent monitoring mechanism.

Future of the VA25

In June 2008, the co-chairs noted that the VA25 group could grow “as more States Parties report on their responsibilities to significant numbers of survivors.” With Jordan joining this group in 2007–2008, this could encourage Iraq—one of the States Parties outside the VA25 with the largest number of survivors and a leading candidate to make it a VA26—to declare such a responsibility and receive subsequent focused support. No public announcements have been made about reducing the size of the current group, but it could be an option if a state has made sufficient progress.

In 2007–2008, Landmine Monitor also identified the first instance of the VA25 influencing states outside it, with Lebanon specifically stating it had used the co-chairs’ framework in developing its 2008 VA action plan.

VA Strategic Framework

For countries with a small mine/ERW problem, a specific VA plan is redundant, while many countries with larger numbers of mine/ERW survivors include VA as a strategic objective in mine action plans. Yet several severely-affected countries noted service gaps and duplication because of the absence of a specific strategy for VA. The mine action authority in Peru even stated that a VA strategy was needed, otherwise “the various sectors do not feel obliged to provide assistance and allocate funds for this.”

Nevertheless, only 21% of countries recording casualties in 2007–2008 had specific VA plans; nearly all were VA25 countries (88%). Ten VA25 states did not have a specific VA plan as of June 2008. Neither did the States Parties with a high number of casualties, Iraq and Turkey.

Good Practice: Linking Victim Assistance to Disability Plans

The November 2007 VA25 mid-term review report noted that although VA should be viewed as part of the overall public health, human rights, and social service frameworks, “In many instances the preparation of victim assistance objectives do not take broader national plans into consideration.” In 2007–2008, only two countries made a considerable step to ensure sustainability and integration of VA in the disability sector. Rather than developing a specific VA plan within the VA25 process, both Afghanistan and Uganda created a comprehensive disability plan assigning significant responsibilities to government bodies, and leaving final responsibility and coordination to the ministry in charge of disability.

Afghanistan’s plan was further included in the country’s national development strategy while Uganda’s plan was predominantly compiled from relevant parts of existing strategies, making disability/VA a mainstreamed issue.

Albania linked sustainability of VA to progress in the national disability strategy and VA has, for several years, been integrated into regional development strategies. In Sudan, components of the VA strategy were integrated in workplans and budgets of relevant ministries. Several other countries also made mention of the need for VA in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Tajikistan).

Of states not party with casualties, only Azerbaijan and Lebanon had a VA plan in 2008. In other states not party with a high number of casualties, progress on developing a plan stalled in 2007–2008 (Lao PDR and Sri Lanka) or was never considered (Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam). In 2007–2008, two countries started working on VA plans: Egypt and Mauritania. Development of a plan in Algeria was delayed due to the bombing of the UN compound in late 2007.

National Ownership and Sustainability

In June 2008, the co-chairs noted that, “National ownership is not a specific aim of the Nairobi Action Plan, perhaps because it should go without saying…. Nearing the Second Review Conference, national ownership and sustainability will become increasingly crucial to ensure long-term VA.

Of states reporting casualties in 2007–2008, 46 did not assign VA coordination responsibilities. In 22, VA was

Landmine survivor participates in the opening ceremony of a new survivor’s organization in Afghanistan.


“Niños son las principales victimas de campos minados en nuestro país” (“Children are the main victims of minefields in our country”), El Comercio, 6 August 2007, www.elcomercio.com.

in the portfolio of mine action authorities. In five, responsibility was divided between the mine action center and relevant ministries; for only seven was it a ministerial responsibility. Only in El Salvador was the government disability coordination body responsible for VA.

For severely mine/ERW-affected countries, this raises the question of whether mine action centers are the best place to ensure sustainability and true integration of VA in broader disability structures, even if the centers were given the mandate to delegate tasks to ministerial levels. Responsibilities for disability are often diffused in government structures, and are rarely more than a small part of a ministry’s portfolio—usually the ministry responsible for social affairs. Few countries with casualties in 2007–2008 have a separate body in charge of disability issues that has sufficient authority to bring about change. In August 2008, Afghanistan appointed a deputy minister for disability affairs. The only other such case is Uganda, which has a state minister for disability affairs.

Review of VA statements made in 2007–2008 showed that most countries with mine/ERW survivors relied quite heavily on services provided by international NGOs and external funding. At least six VA25 states mentioned explicitly that a lack of funding prevented them from achieving their VA goals. Although not exhaustive, Landmine Monitor research for 2007–2008 also indicated that in nearly 40% of countries with casualties during this period, services were carried out predominantly by international operators. In 27% of countries there was an equal share of national and international operators. Only three countries operated exclusively with national capacity in assisting its survivors (Cyprus, Poland and the United States).

While the work of international operators is invaluable, sometimes they have been substituting for the government for so long that there is an overdependence on them and decreased ownership, interest and room for action by those who are primarily responsible—the national authorities. In Nicaragua, operators noted in 2007–2008 that they had not observed progress towards national ownership or the development of a sustainable VA program. Reportedly the efficiency with which the international operator provided assistance to survivors decreased the government’s motivation to develop national capacity in this area.

Yet international agencies can add to the problem if they invest too little in capacity-building of local partners, particularly survivor organizations and DPOs. During this reporting period this was, for example, the case for survivor organizations in Uganda and Senegal. In contrast, national NGOs in Afghanistan took on substantial roles in VA implementation, training, and support to DPOs. International organizations should invest more in national capacity-building.

Some positive progress towards increased national ownership was made in 2007–2008, as several mine action programs or VA providers prepared for complete nationalization and an eventual handover of VA responsibilities to relevant government structures, such as in

Albania (by 2009), and Sudan. In Angola in July 2008, the ICRC handed over one of its largest rehabilitation programs to the Ministry of Health after 29 years, stating that the ministry should now have sufficient capacity to administer it.

**Interministerial Coordination**

Coordination between relevant ministries is a key issue for VA and was promoted within the framework of the VA25 process. In 2007–2008, it became clear that when such coordination exists, services tended to be more comprehensive and in line with other relevant strategies in a country. While some VA25 countries made progress, systematic interministerial coordination was only in place in 22% of countries with casualties in 2007–2008. In 2007, Zambia started an interministerial process to assign VA tasks and prevent duplication. In Algeria, mine action is coordinated by an interministerial committee. Among States not party, Lao PDR is a prominent example of interministerial coordination (as is the area of Abkhazia).

**Victim Assistance Obligations in the Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions is a landmark treaty for VA because, beyond the obligations in the Mine Ban Treaty, it makes the provision of VA a formal requirement for all States Parties with victims, and calls

---

17 Article 5(c) provides that: “Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in
for international assistance. It formally adopted the common understanding that the definition of a “victim” expands to the affected individual, their families and affected communities, and that VA has to be rights-based and in line with other relevant disability or development strategies. Drawing on lessons learned from the Mine Ban Treaty and the VA25 process, it specifies that VA needs to be focused, measurable, coordinated, and result-oriented. There are stipulations on the creation of national strategies, focal points, inclusion of “victims” in planning and implementation, and clear progress reporting obligations.

in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.”

Article 6(7) provides that: “Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims....”

Beneficiary Statistics

Finally, calls for increased monitoring of outputs by both affected and donor states grew louder during the reporting period. Notably, the ICRC stated that “the donor community should report more on the allocation of funds but also ensure that recipient countries provide more information on the extent to which those funds have advanced the enjoyment of rights of persons with disabilities.”

Landmine Monitor observed that three years into the NAP most states and service providers are not able to estimate how many survivors have received assistance and how, nor are they able to assess if the number of people benefiting from services increased or decreased from one year to another, or indeed since 2005. Only 23 countries used voluntary Form J to report on VA activities; almost invariably the reports did not include measurable statistical information.

Reliable beneficiary statistics are crucial to measure progress, identify gaps and duplications in VA service provision, as well as to provide effective follow-up services. In 2007–2008, some programs sought to improve data collection on VA services, such as Albania, BiH and Lebanon.

More generally, however, poor data collection and reporting mechanisms remain prevalent. Few countries have a centralized body dealing with disability statistics and services. Hospitals often do not record the cause of injury. Nearly all VA operators count sessions rather than individuals, recording the person each time a service is provided, resulting in “double-counting.” They do not distinguish between mine/ERW survivors and other beneficiaries, and do not distinguish between new patients and old patients. Nor do they record sufficient patient details. Due to the lack of cooperation between stakeholders, or of a coordinating focal point, the same people are counted by every service provider they see. For example, although only an estimated 1,100 survivors were recorded in Uganda, some 2,644 services were reportedly provided in 2007.
Key Developments

For 2007 Landmine Monitor identified more than US$430 million (some €314 million) of international funding for mine action donated by 26 countries and the European Commission (EC). This is a decrease of around $45 million (9.5%) compared to 2006. Funding was channeled to 70 recipient states and other areas. The top five recipients of mine action funding in 2007 were, in order, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Sudan, and Lebanon. Total international support for mine action for 1992–2007 was $3.75 billion.

Landmine Monitor also identified more than $117 million in national funding in 2007 by 28 mine/ERW-affected states (monetary or in-kind assistance contributed to their own mine action programs). The increase of some $33 million (39%) compared to 2006 is partially explained by more mine/ERW-affected states reporting on their support for mine action in 2007.

Introduction

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty (international cooperation and assistance) recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. Landmine Monitor reports annually on support for mine action based on monetary and in-kind assistance reported by mine- and explosive remnants of war (ERW)-affected states and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states. Landmine Monitor also reports on the estimated costs and resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling treaty obligations on the part of mine/ERW-affected states, and the priorities and strategies for mine action assistance on the part of donor states.

Landmine Monitor relies in most cases on direct requests for information from, or public reporting by, donor and mine/ERW-affected states. Thus, while Landmine Monitor seeks to provide the most complete and accurate possible account of global mine action support, its reporting is limited by the ability and willingness of states to track and report their own funding and other forms of support, and by the availability of cost estimates, budgets, strategic plans, and other financial reporting. Reporting of mine action support has been limited by the inability of some donor states to fully track their own mine action support, due to changes in their financial administration and reporting structures, as well as by a lack of information on funds contributed and funding strategies reported by many mine/ERW-affected states.

Global Mine Action Funding

Landmine Monitor distinguishes between international and national funding, which together make up global funding for mine action. For 2007 Landmine Monitor identified more than US$430 million (approximately €314 million) of international funding for mine action donated by 26 countries and the EC. This is a decrease

1 US$ value of international contributions is based on the following average exchange rates for 2007: A$1=US$0.8391, C$1=US$0.9316, RMB1=US$0.1315, DKK=US$0.1838, KRW=US$0.0072, ¥1=US$0.002, CHF1=US$0.8334, and LTL1=US$0.3981. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2008; and Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com. All annual

© Sean Sutton/MAG; December 2007
of some $45 million (approximately 9.5%) compared to 2006.

Landmine Monitor also identified approximately $117.4 million in monetary or in-kind assistance contributed in 2007 by 28 mine/ERW-affected states to their own mine action programs. This is an increase of approximately $33 million or 39% compared to 2006. Reporting and comparison of annual national funding levels remains imprecise, due to the continued absence of standard methods of tracking and reporting by mine/ERW-affected states, and because many do not make information available on their expenditures. However, more mine/ERW-affected states reported support for mine action in 2007 compared to earlier years.

Funding to Lebanon—which totaled $68.8 million in 2006 in support of emergency clearance of cluster munitions in southern Lebanon, and accounted for much of the significant rise in global funds in 2006 to an unprecedented $475 million—declined to $28.3 million in 2007, as emergency mine action needs decreased. Elsewhere funding did not remain constant: for some mine/ERW-affected states it increased, and for others it declined notably. Many states reported mine action programs delayed, scaled back, or cancelled because of a lack of international assistance. Likewise, not all donor states maintained or increased their levels of funding in 2007. Some states increased their commitments by significant amounts—in both percentage and absolute terms—but the value of contributions by some other states declined just as significantly.

The biggest contributors to mine action in 2007 were the United States ($69.8 million), Norway ($50.2 million), Canada ($45.8 million), the EC ($45.6 million), Japan ($35.5 million), the United Kingdom ($25.2 million), Netherlands ($23.4 million), Germany ($18.4 million), Sweden ($17.5 million), and Australia ($16.7 million). The largest contribution came from the EC combined with national funding by European Union (EU) member states, a total of $196.8 million (€143.6 million), as reported below. The national currencies of many mine/ERW-affected and donor states rose against the average value of the US dollar in 2007—in some cases by more than 10%—which elevated the value of some contributions in US dollar terms compared to 2006.

In national currency terms, five donor states—Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Norway, and Spain—provided more mine action funding in 2007 than they had in any previous year. Of the 20 largest donors in 2007, nine provided more funding in US dollars terms in 2007 than 2006, and 11 provided less. Those increasing their contribution were: New Zealand (107% increase), Canada (52% decrease), Slovakia (43%), the US (35%), France (33%), Italy (30%), Finland (28%), Denmark (24%), Switzerland (18%), the Netherlands (20%), Germany (10%), and Australia (9%).

### National Contributions to Mine Action

The $117.4 million funding (including in-kind contributions) in 2007 by at least 28 mine/ERW-affected states to their own mine action programs compared to more than $84 million in 2006.¹ The significant increase is attributable mainly to the greater availability of data from sources such as mine action plans, Article 5 deadline extension requests, statements to meetings of States Parties and intersessional Standing Committee meetings, and information reported directly to Landmine Monitor.

Assessment of national contributions remains limited, however, by a lack of consistent and complete reporting on national assistance. Many mine/ERW-affected states have reported annual contributions as a whole without providing breakdowns or other details for verification and comparison. Also, the absence of a standard method of valuing and reporting in-kind contributions means that states may be reporting in-kind support according to different methods and values.

Five states or other areas reporting support for mine action in 2006 did not report support in 2007: Angola, Guatemala, Kosovo, Serbia, and Somaliland. Nine states or other areas reported support in 2007 but not in 2006: Afghanistan, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal, South Korea, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Among the 19 states reporting national mine action support in both 2006 and 2007, 12 reported increases in levels of support in US dollar terms: Croatia ($3.4 million increase), Thailand ($2.3 million), Chad ($2.2 million), Sudan ($2 million), Lebanon ($1.5 million), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ($1.2 million), Azerbaijan ($1 million), Zambia ($800,000), Colombia ($200,000), Mozambique ($200,000), Peru ($100,000) and Tajikistan ($21,000). Three states—Albania, Mauritania, and Yemen—reported no change in funding levels. Four states reported decreases in funding: Cambodia ($50,000 decrease), Chile ($195,960), Rwanda ($243,000), and Jordan ($800,000).³

Fourteen mine/ERW-affected states contributed, according to their own estimates, more than 0.01% of their gross national income (GNI) to mine action in 2007: Croatia, BiH, Chad, Mauritania, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Nicaragua, Yemen, Zambia, and Azerbaijan. Croatia and BiH each contributed approximately almost 0.1% of their GNI to mine action.

---

¹ 2006 national funding revised from $84.3 million reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2007.
³ In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Jordan reported providing $3.5 million in funds in both 2006 and 2007. However, Jordan reported to Landmine Monitor providing $4.3 million in 2006.
National Mine Action Funding for 2007: $117.4 million\(^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>US$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was no recognizable pattern or trend in the types of support reported by mine/ERW-affected states. Many states reported contributions to their own mine action programs without specifying how in-kind support or funds were allocated, and often without specifying whether contributions were monetary or in-kind. There is a lack of data on national support for victim assistance (VA) which may be attributed in part to the difficulty of identifying specific VA programs within broader health and disability services. States reporting allocations to specific areas of mine action include specific types of in-kind support included: Albania, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Ecuador, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Peru, Rwanda, Serbia, Sudan (in both the north and the south), and Yemen.

International Contributions to Mine Action

Landmine Monitor identified approximately $430.6 million of international funding for mine action in 2007, donated by 26 countries and the EC. Total reported support for mine action during the period 1992–2007 is $3.75 billion.

International Mine Action Funding by Year\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount US$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992–2007</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1997</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EC funding together with national funding by EU member states totaled $196.8 million (€143.6 million) in 2007.\(^7\) Combined EC/EU member funding remained the largest source of mine action funding in 2007, as it was in 2006. Reported funding in 2007 was approximately 25% less in Euro terms than in 2006.

Fourteen states provided funding in 2007 equivalent to more than 0.001% of GNI, in descending order: Slovakia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Australia, Finland, New Zealand, and Slovenia. Among Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the UK was 15th according to this ranking; the US 20th; France 25th; and China 26th.\(^8\) No international funding for mine action was reported by Russia in 2007. More than 0.01% of GNI

---

\(^5\) Includes monetary and in-kind contributions. Colombia’s national funding is reported from June 2007 to June 2008. Figures are rounded to the nearest $100,000. Average exchange rates for 2007 vary; see list of exchange rates in this edition of Landmine Monitor for further details.

\(^6\) The 1992–2007 total and 1998 annual figure include contributions by some states for which the exact amounts are not known, and contributions by some states for which amounts for specific years are not known, including $30 million from the UAE to Lebanon during 2002–2004.

\(^7\) The total of EC and EU member states’ funding in 2007 has been calculated by adding Landmine Monitor’s estimate of EC funding in 2007 (€68,417,090) to EU member states’ mine action funding provided bilaterally or otherwise than through the EC. EU member states as of August 2008 are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

\(^8\) World Bank, “Total GNI 2007, Atlas method,” World Development Indicators Database, 1 July 2008, www.worldbank.org. For EU member states, the calculation of mine action funding as a percentage of GNI is based solely on their reported contributions bilaterally or otherwise than through the EC, individual EU member states’ contributions to mine action through the EC has not been reported.
was donated for mine action in 2007 by only Slovakia and Norway, as was the case the previous year.

**International Mine Action Funding for 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>US$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Funding by Donor States**

**United States of America**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>626.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>872.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional R&D Funding**

| 2007          | 14.4        |

The US provided $69.8 million to mine action in 30 countries and other areas in 2007, a 35% decline compared to $94.5 million to 28 recipients in 2006. Starting in fiscal year 2009, the US will integrate three separate accounts—Humanitarian Demining, International Trust Fund, and Small Arms/Light Weapons—into a single account for Conventional Weapons Destruction (NADR-CWD).

The impact of this mainstreaming of funds on prioritizing and reporting of US mine action funding beyond 2009 is not yet clear. Department of Defense mine action funds, however, are projected to be approximately stable through fiscal year 2009.11

**Norway**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>NOK (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>293.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>223.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>219.1</td>
<td>1,694.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340.7</td>
<td>2,447.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norway contributed NOK293,650,490 ($50,155,504) to mine action in 2007, a 31% increase from 2006 (NOK223,875,323 or $34,924,551). Funds were allocated to 18 countries and other areas. Norway attributed the rise in its funding in part to increased support for cluster munition-related programming. Norway also increased its funding to Lebanon in 2007, against the general decline in funds to the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the pattern of increased funding may end in the near future, as some programs are reduced (such as clearance in Jordan) and as Norwegian embassies give priority to other humanitarian aid sectors. Norway indicated that funding earmarked for mine clearance is likely to decline in line with the country’s general trend of falling contributions to mine action.11

At the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Norway outlined its priorities in funding for VA. It called for the integration of rehabilitation and reintegration programs within national health, social services, and vocational training services, and within 12

---

9 Figures add to $430.67 million as they are rounded to the nearest $100,000.
10 Total US funding and recipients based on official US data; some variation in actual expenditure occurred. For further details, see reports on individual countries and other areas in this edition of Landmine Monitor. Figures do not include VA funding; funding for war victims programs totaled an additional $10 million in fiscal year 2007, compared to $14.75 million in fiscal year 2006.
11 For details, see report on the US in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
12 2007 figures provided by email from Yngvild Berggrav, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2008. Funding figure for 1998 is converted from US$ to NOK using the average exchange rate for 1998: NOK1=US$0.1324. Original NOK figures are not available.
13 Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2008.
bilateral development agreements such as for health, education, and micro-finance. Norway cited capacity building at the national level as an explicit priority for assistance.14

Canada15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>C$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>127.6</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222.8</td>
<td>291.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional R&D Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>C$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada contributed C$49,195,671 ($45,830,687) to mine action in fiscal year 2007–2008, an increase of 50.1% compared to 2006–2007 and the highest reported annual total for Canada to date. Canada provided funding to 16 countries, including contributions to Afghanistan totaling approximately C$25.4 million ($23.7 million).

The Canadian Landmine Fund, established in 1997 as Canada’s instrument for mine action assistance, was discontinued in March 2008. Canadian mine action assistance has since been mainstreamed into development and humanitarian programs within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT). The Department of National Defence (DND) continues to support the Global Peace and Security Fund at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Canada’s Support for Mine Action,” www.international.gc.ca.

Within the new funding structure, DFAST leads initiatives in universalization, advocacy, coordination, and compliance, and works with DND to assist other states in stockpile destruction. CIDA leads in mine clearance, risk education (RE), and VA, including assistance through existing development programs.19 The mainstreaming of funds does not appear in its early stages to have had a negative impact on either funding levels or on the tracking and reporting of Canadian funds. No funding targets have been set for 2008 and beyond, but Canada reported that DFAST and CIDA were coordinating “to sustain traditional levels of funding.”20

European Commission21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>363.8</td>
<td>369.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>544.4</td>
<td>510.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional R&D Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2007, EC and EU member states together provided €166.8 million (€143.6 million) in mine action funding, compared to $240.3 million (€191.2 million) in 2006. This represents an overall decline of approximately €43.5 million compared to 2006. Among the 27 member states of the EU, funding by 11 states declined in terms of original currency in 2007 compared to 2006, while funding by five member states increased. One state, Lithuania, reported contributing funds in 2007 but not in 2006. The remaining 10 member states either did not report funding or did not provide valuations of in-kind contributions for comparison.

The EC contributed €45,631,112 (€33,280,659) in 2007, a decrease of 52% from €87.3 million (€69.5 million) in 2006. The number of countries receiving EC assistance fell to 11 in 2007, compared to 25 countries and other areas in 2006. A single commitment by the EC in late 2006 of €20 million to Afghanistan contributed to the unprecedented levels of overall funding by the EC in that year.

Statement of Norway, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008.

20 Email from Carly Volkes, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 28 August 2008.

21 2007 figures by email from Laura Liguori, Desk Officer, Directorate-General for External Relations, 19 March 2008. US$ currency calculated for total R&D funding according to 2007 average exchange rate.

22 As noted in previous years, neither the EC nor EU member states were able to provide a breakdown of how much of EC funding should be ascribed to individual member states in 2007. Therefore, it is not possible for Landmine Monitor to provide a complete picture of EU members’ mine action funding.

23 Funds decreased from Austria, Slovakia, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Germany. Funding increased on the part of the UK, Sweden, Ireland, and Belgium.
Funding in 2007, as in 2006, includes some multiyear commitments, as well as funds allocated but not disbursed during the year; it has not been possible to fully identify and separate actual disbursements during 2007. However, the mainstreaming and decentralization of EC mine action funding appears to have had a significant impact on EC funding levels in 2007. With the transfer of funding from dedicated mine action to geographic budget lines, the EC focused on development priorities as defined by recipient countries and EC delegations. The EC has encouraged recipient countries to select two or three main development priorities for funding, of which mine action is one option. This has resulted in a more outright competition for EC funds between mine action and other areas of development. Also, 2007 was the first year that countries developed Country Strategy Papers to guide funding priorities. In some cases, mine action was not defined as a priority for mine/ERW-affected states in 2007, which resulted in an absence of funding. Mine action is expected to become a higher priority in the future.24

In December 2007, members of the European Parliament proposed a resolution marking the tenth anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty, which included a call for a dedicated mine action budget line to be re-established within the EC budget. The resolution called on the EC to clarify in 2008 its intentions for future mine action funding, and to “ensure that sufficient resources are made available after 2007.” The resolution further called on the EC to maintain sufficient staff to ensure that Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes include mine action assistance needs where relevant, and to adequately track mine action funding.25

In August 2008, the EC reported that because funds were still being implemented under the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005–2007, a complete evaluation of the strategy would not be possible until 2009. Guidelines on European Community Mine Action for 2008–2013 were reportedly under development and due to be published in 2008. Based on the evaluation and the guidelines, a new approach to mine action funding will be established, with mine action fully integrated into development policies.26

Japan27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>¥ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>4176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>4323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


26 Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 August 2008.

27 2007 figures provided by email from Yasuhiro Kitagawa, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 22 May 2008, with translated information received from JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division. Non-proliferation and Science Department. Total funding prior to 1998 is converted from US$ to ¥ using the average exchange rate for 1998: ¥1=US$0.0076. Original ¥ figures are not available.

Prior to 2005 178.0 20,612
Total 278.1 32,055

Additional R&D Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>£ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>153.9</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 219.8</td>
<td>133.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional R&D Funding

2006–2007 0.4 0.2
2005–2006 3.2 1.8
Prior to 2005 11.4 7.1
Total 15 9.1

United Kingdom28

UK funding of £12,586,513 ($25,198,199) in fiscal year 2007–2008 represented an increase of 20% compared to fiscal year 2006–2007 (£10,491,251 or $19,339,572). In 2007–2008, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) reported mine action funding for 22 states and other areas, compared to 14 in 2006. The UK did not report on the rationale behind the increase in funding in 2007.

The Netherlands29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>102.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 184.2</td>
<td>156.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Netherlands contributed €17,056,776 (US$23,386,546) in funds in 2007, a 20% decline compared to 2006 (€21,433,318/$26,926,677). The Netherlands contributed funds to 10 states and other areas in 2007, compared to 15 in 2006. The Netherlands did not report on the rationale behind the decrease in funds in 2007.

**Germany**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>115.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>160.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional R&D Funding**

Prior to 2005 5.2 4.2

Germany’s funding of €113,400,957 (US$18,374,052) in 2007 was a decrease of 9.7% compared to 2006 (€14,838,320/$18,641,381), and is the lowest level of reported funding since 2001. Germany contributed to 17 states in 2007, compared to 20 states and other areas in 2006. Germany reported projecting funded in 2008 of approximately €17.6 million.

**Sweden**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>SEK (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>118.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>110.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>950.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1,266.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional R&D Funding**

Prior to 2005 25.7 188.8

In 2007, Sweden contributed SEK18,287,250 (US$26,926,677), a 7% increase compared to 2006 (SEK110,063,937 or $14,935,677). Sweden reported contributions to nine countries and other areas in 2007, the same number as in 2006. Sweden reported allocating funds to Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Sudan as four of 12 “focus countries” for Swedish support to peace and security.

**Australia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>A$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>108.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>157.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia’s funding of A$19,906,343 (US$17.6 million) in fiscal year July 2007–June 2008 represented a 9.2% decrease in Australian dollar terms on fiscal year 2006 (A$21,928,363/$16,523,022). In 2005, Australia made a five-year, A$75 million commitment to mine action. Spending to date of A$53.5 million over three years means Australia is on track to meet the commitment. Some 22% of funds contributed by Australia in 2007 were for VA, while 17% were for integrated mine action. Australia’s support was provided to seven countries in 2007, compared to 11 in 2006.

**Denmark**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>DKK (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>705.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>925.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Denmark contributed DKK65,702,278 (US$21,928,363/$16,523,022) in 2007, compared to DKK86,092,534 (A$19,906,343) in 2005, a decrease of 24%. Denmark contributed to 12 countries and other areas in 2007, compared to eight countries in 2006. Denmark’s revised mine action strategy, published in 2006, calls for integration of mine action funding as part of overall development assistance. Denmark reported that mine action should remain a continued focus in 2008.
where possible, be integrated in sector programs; Nicaragua and Mozambique were examples of where this has been accomplished.41

Switzerland42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>CHF (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>138.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Switzerland reported that the decrease in funding in 2007 resulted from funds for 2007 programs being allocated and reported in 2006, because of an availability of extra funds during that year. Funds allocated in 2006 for Sudan and Lebanon were implemented in 2007.

Switzerland reported the following areas of focus in mine action assistance: States Parties able to meet their Article 5 clearance deadlines, and mine action projects in line with Swiss policies for promotion of human security, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid. Switzerland stated that the Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency is working towards funding its own mine action projects in line with other development programs.46

Spain44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spain provided €8,558,008 ($11,733,885) in 2007, a 25% increase compared to €6,847,734 ($8,602,808) in 2006. Funds were contributed to 11 countries and other areas, including in-kind contributions through training at its International Demining Center. Spain reported that it planned to maintain its current funding levels in 2008 and, if possible, in subsequent years. Spain reported that a new mine action assistance plan, linking mine action and development goals, was in development as of August 2008.45

Belgium46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belgium’s mine action funding of €7,881,710 ($10,806,613) in 2007 was an increase of 40% compared to 2006 (€5,622,230/$7,063,208), and is the highest level of funding it has reported to date. Belgium provided mine action funding and assistance to seven countries in 2007, compared to 10 countries in 2006.

Slovakia47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($) (million)</th>
<th>(SKK million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>236.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>415.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>218.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>112.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>982.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 Email from Luis Gómez Nogueira, Head of Disarmament Unit, Sub-Department for International Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 27 August 2008.
43 Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2008.
45 Email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2008.
46 2007 figures by email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2008. Total funding for 1999–2003 is converted from US$ to CHF using the average exchange rate for 2003: CHF1=US$0.7435. Original CHF figures are not available.
Slovakia reported contributing SKK236,348,798 (€59,619,396) as the value of in-kind contributions of the Slovak Armed Forces to demining operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2007, a decrease of 43% compared to 2006 (SKK415,660,309/€14,007,752 for the same in-kind assistance).

Ireland

**Period** | **$ (million)** | **€ (million)**
---|---|---
2007 | 7 | 5.1
2006 | 4.8 | 3.8
2005 | 2.2 | 1.7
Prior to 2005 | 14.1 | 13.9
**Total** | **28.1** | **24.5**

Ireland’s mine action funding of €5,115,103 (€7,013,318) in 2007 is a 35% increase compared to 2006 (€3,790,000/$4,761,377), and its largest annual contribution reported. Ireland contributed to eight countries in 2007, compared to six countries and Somaliland in 2006. Ireland attributed increased funding to an increased availability of discretionary funds to the Political Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and to increased demand for support within geographic and thematic budget areas associated with mine action. Ireland reported an increased commitment to cluster munitions action, and stated that separate financial support by Irish Aid to the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in March 2008 freed up other funds for allocation to mine action programs. Ireland reported concentrating its funds on geographic areas and organizations in line with its national development assistance strategies, which in some cases support mine action spending.48

Finland

**Period** | **$ (million)** | **€ (million)**
---|---|---
2007 | 5 | 3.6
2006 | 6.3 | 5
2005 | 5.9 | 4.7
Prior to 2005 | 46.2 | 47.2
**Total** | **63.4** | **60.5**

Finland contributed €3,636,279 ($4,985,702) in 2007, a 28% decrease compared to 2006 (€5,046,691/$6,340,158). Funding was allocated to five countries and other areas in 2007, compared to nine countries in 2006.

**Italy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Italy’s mine action funding of €3,012,488 ($4,130,422) was a 30% decrease compared to 2006 (€4,322,741/$5,430,660). Italy contributed funds to eight countries in 2007, compared to 11 countries in 2006. Italy reported that current mine action funding occurs under three national laws: Law 58/01 (dedicated to mine action assistance); Law 189/92 (from which some mine action assistance can be allocated, such as VA); and Law 270/06 (established in response to the south Lebanon emergency). Funds earmarked for mine action under Law 58/01 remained consistent at roughly €2 million per year in 2006 and 2007, with the remaining pledges resulting from inputs from national bodies such as Italy’s Permanent Mission to the UN or Italian embassies abroad. Increased funding in 2006 compared to other years was attributed to extraordinary funding to Lebanon; Italy contributed €2,512,900 to Lebanon in 2006 and €1,371,100 in 2007. Competition with other development priorities and humanitarian emergencies was reported to strain funds available for mine action.51

**France**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional R&D Funding

| Prior to 2005 | 2.2 | 1.4 |

France reported contributing €1,744,055 ($2,391,274) for mine action in 2007, a 33% decrease compared to 2006 (€2,601,263/ $3,267,967). This included in-kind contributions and training for 26 recipient countries and areas, compared to 25 countries and other areas in 2006.53

---

48 2007 figures provided by email from Michael Keaveney, Third Secretary, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2008. Total funding for 1994–2000 is converted from US$ to € using the average exchange rate for 2000: 1=US$0.9232.

49 Email from Nicholas Twist, Deputy Director, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 28 August 2008.

50 2007 figures provided by email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 February 2008. Total funding for 1991–2000 is converted from US$ to € using the average exchange rate for 2000: 1=US$0.9232. Original ITL figures are not available.


52 Email from Manfredo Capozza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2008.

The 2007 figure was the lowest level of reported funding by France since 2004. France reported to Landmine Monitor that, because of a lack of time to collect data from embassies, some funding items may have gone unreported, and actual 2007 funding may have been greater than reported.14

### New Zealand55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>NZ$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Austria56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Austria provided €845,723 ($1,159,571) in mine action funding in 2007, a 52% decrease compared to 2006 (€1,763,506/$2,215,493). Austria contributed to three countries in 2007, compared to four countries in 2006. Despite the decrease in annual funding, there was no change in Austrian Mine Action Program policy. Reductions to certain recipient states were attributed to fluctuations in spending during program implementation and not reductions in overall commitments. Funding to Lebanon in 2006 ($502,520), however, was reported to be an extraordinary contribution.57

### United Arab Emirates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>$ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>None reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not report new international funding in 2007. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported receiving $600,000 (€437,605) from the UAE during the year for mine and cluster munitions clearance in southern Lebanon.58 In 2006, the UAE contributed $19.9 million to Lebanon through the Operation Emirates Solidarity II program.59 Although OES II-funded programs continued in 2007, costs were covered by funds provided in previous years.60 The UAE previously reported that it provided $50 million to mine action in Lebanon from 2002–2004 (annual breakdown not available). The UAE contributed $3,332,751 for Lebanon through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund in 2002–2005, including $310,000 for follow-up activities to Operation Emirates Solidarity in 2005.

### Other Mine Action Donors

China reported contributing a total of RMB6 million ($789,000) in support of mine action in 2007.61 China reported in-kind contributions in 2006 but did not provide valuations. Estimated total mine action funding to September 2008 was $7 million.

The Czech Republic contributed CZK23,867,286 ($1.2 million) to mine action in 2007.62 The Czech Republic provided CZK6,955,311 ($1,194,120) for mine action in 2006. Estimated total mine action funding to September 2008 was $4.5 million.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by Greece in 2007. Greece contributed €1.9 million ($2.4 million) in February 2006 for mine action in Iraq; the funds were pledged in July 2005. Mine action funding by Greece has totaled $12 million for 2001–2007.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by Iceland in 2007. Iceland provided $1.5 million for VA in 2005. Total mine action funding was $2.8 million from 1997–2007.

South Korea contributed $1 million to the UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund in 2007.55 South Korea did not report contributions in 2006, but

---

54 Interview with Henry Zipper de Fabiani, CNEMA, in Geneva, 6 June 2008.
57 Email from Alexander Benedict, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 20 June 2008.
58 Email from Marie-Anne Menier, Programme Officer for South Lebanon, UNMAS, 22 June 2008.
60 Email from Marie-Anne Menier, UNMAS, 22 June 2008.
61 Email from Zhang Zhi Zhong, Second Secretary, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2008.
62 Email from Jiří Svoboda, UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2008.
provided $1,050,000 in 2005. Total mine action funding as of August 2008 was $6.2 million.

Luxembourg contributed €637,943 (°874,684) to three countries as well as to global or other funding channels in 2007.25 Luxembourg provided €1,032,375 ($1,296,973) in 2006. Total mine action funding to date was $8.1 million.

Slovenia reporting contributing €506,093 ($693,904) in 2007.26 It provided $17150,099,998 ($780,520) in 2006. Total mine action funding as of August 2008 was $5.3 million.

Poland reported in-kind contributions to mine action in 2007–2008 in the form of mine clearance personnel in support of UN peacekeeping operations, but did not report a value for these contributions.24 Poland contributed a reported $7,332,815 to mine action in 2006, as well as in-kind contributions without valuations. Total mine action funding for the period 2005–2007 (excluding contributions without valuation) was $3.3 million.

**Major Recipients**

Landmine Monitor has identified international funding to 70 recipient states and other areas in 2007. This is in addition to $64.8 million in funds for regional/global mine action with no recipient state specified (or with multiple and undifferentiated recipients), and $20 million contributed to research and development. The top recipients of mine action funding in 2007 were Afghanistan (°86.3 million), Iraq (°37.3 million), Cambodia (°30.8 million), Sudan (°29.2 million), Lebanon (°28.3 million), Angola (°19.8 million), BiH (°17.1 million), Lao PDR (°12.2 million), Jordan (°11.9 million), and Colombia (°8.8 million).

**Major Mine Action Recipients in 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>US$ (million)</th>
<th>€ (million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 Email from Texas Seditenthal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 April 2008.
66 Email from Irina Gorsic, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2008.
66 Poland voluntary Article 7 Report, Form J, 14 April 2008.

Ethiopia 5.8 4.3
Belarus 5.5 4.0
Cyprus 5.5 4.0
Guinea-Bissau 4.7 3.4
Nicaragua 4.5 3.3
Vietnam 3.9 2.9
Azerbaijan 3.7 2.7
Mozambique 3.5 2.5
Serbia 2.7 2.0
Somaliand 1.9 1.4
Uganda 1.8 1.3
Abkhazia 1.8 1.3
Nepal 1.8 1.3
Thailand 1.6 1.2
Nagorno-Karabakh 1.4 0.99
Tajikistan 1.3 0.91
Albania 1.2 0.91
Yemen 1.1 0.8
Burundi 1.1 0.79

Increases of at least $5 million were seen in 2007 in Senegal (up $6.4 million), Belarus ($5.5 million), and Jordan ($5.4 million). Significant reductions in mine action funding—of at least $2 million—occurred in Ethiopia (down $2 million), Sri Lanka ($2.3 million), Mozambique ($2.7 million), Yemen ($3 million), Vietnam ($4.3 million), Angola ($28.3 million), and Lebanon ($40.5 million).

In regional terms, where recipient states or regional implementing organizations were identified, annual funding was stable in 2007 in the Asia-Pacific region ($144.4 million in 2007 compared to $150.1 million in 2006), the Americas ($15.8 million compared to $15.2 million) and Europe and Central Asia ($44.3 million compared to $46.4 million). Funding declined notably in Africa ($81.2 compared to $107 million) and the Middle East and North Africa ($94.7 million compared to $119.6 million).27

In 2007, 34 countries and other areas received at least $1 million in funding, compared to 31 countries and other areas in 2006.

**Trust Funds**

In 2007, trust funds reported receiving at least $136.6 million in mine action funding, equivalent to 32% of total donor-reported contributions.

The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, operated by UNMAS, received contributions of $93 million in 2007, compared to about $51 million in 2006, including core and multiyear funding.28

25 By US$ value of contributions, where a recipient country is specified (not including global or regional funding), except in the case of Americas, which includes general funding to Organization of American States, and Europe/Central Asia, which includes general funding to ITF.
26 Email from Julia Goehsing, Program Officer, UNMAS, 10 September 2008.
The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), based in Slovenia, received €14,572,459 in donations from 12 countries in 2007, as well as from the EC, UN Development Programme (UNDP), local authorities, government agencies, and private donors.69 The ITF received €30.8 million in donations in 2006.70 A total of €16.1 million was directed by the UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery to mine action in 25 countries.71 The fund contributed €21.5 million in funds to 23 countries in 2006.

The UNDG Iraq Trust Fund received €1 million in mine action funding from South Korea in 2007. The fund received €2.4 million in 2006.72

The UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) contributed €947,913 to mine action in Lebanon in 2007, compared to €3.6 million in 2006.73 The trust fund has a single donor, Japan.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) reported some linkage between mine action and ADB-supported projects, in particular disability programs in Afghanistan and Cambodia, but did not report specific contributions to mine action in 2007.74

Implementing Agencies, Organizations and Institutions

International funds were directed to mine action in 2007 through more than 100 agencies, organizations and institutions identified by donor states as responsible for allocation of funds to operating partners or for direct implementation of programs. Identification by donors of implementing agencies varied. Some reported the operators responsible at the local level for project implementation, others identified an international mine action operator, which may or may not have undertaken projects with local partners, and others identified the UN or another agency through which funds were dedicated to projects at the national level.75

Implementing and coordinating agencies were identified for €338.6 million of the €430.6 million in total mine action funding. Landmine Monitor identified at least 43 agencies receiving more than €1 million in international funds in 2007. These included partnerships where the specific allocation of funds between agencies was not identified: for instance, €1,832,605 was received jointly for mine action in Lao PDR by MAG and UXO Lao, each of which also received direct funding to its own programs. The €338.6 million also included contributions identified only generally by donors, where allocations through specific agencies can be assumed but were not reported.

Overall, the UN, its agencies and trust funds acted as implementers for at least €115.6 million in funds, or approximately 27% of total reported funding worldwide. Given that donor states often report mine action operators as funding recipients where support is directed through UN agencies or UN funds, the actual role of the UN in receiving, managing and implementing international mine action funds is likely to be greater than reported.

Research and Development

Landmine Monitor identified €19,980,298 (€14,572,459) in international funding by five donor states for research and development (R&D) in 2007, a decrease of approximately 21% compared to 2006.


Japan contributed ¥4,155,713 (€285,907,424) including contributions to the Japan Mine Action Service for research on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine clearance, and to the government of Cambodia for development of mine clearance equipment.76

Norway contributed €649,040 (NOK6.8 million), consisting of contributions to the Nordic Demining Research Forum and to the GICHD for R&D and operational support.

Canada contributed $339,536 (C$364,465) to the GICHD for unspecified R&D.77

Belgium contributed €436,010 (€318,000), consisting of contributions to the Belgium Royal Military Academy for EOD research, as well as contributions for unspecified R&D.78

Switzerland continued to provide general support to GICHD programs, including research and development, but R&D amounts are not consistently differentiated.

Mine Action Funding Requirements

There is not enough data on mine action funding requirements among mine/ERW-affected states to measure the funds required for Mine Ban Treaty implementation on a global scale, or to project future

72 Email from Dawn Del Rio, Senior Portfolio Manager, UNDG ITF, 27 August 2008.
73 Email from Jennifer Serunjogi, Financial Management Officer, UNTFHS, 5 September 2008.
74 Email from Robert Schoellhammer, Deputy Resident Director, ADB, 5 March 2008.
75 In its initial submission of data to Landmine Monitor, the US reported allocation of funds without identifying the implementing agency, with the exception of funds contributed to the ITF, which were earmarked by the US Department of State. In some cases the US Department of State later identified implementing agencies for specific funding items.
76 Email from Yasuhiro Kitagawa, JCBLs, 22 May 2008, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department. Japan’s bilateral contribution to Cambodia for mine-clearance equipment R&D was included in Cambodia’s 2007 recipient funding total.
77 Email from Carly Volkes, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 20 May 2008.
78 Email from Michel Peetermans, Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, 17 March 2008.
costs of maintaining mine action programs in line with treaty obligations. Reporting by mine/ERW-affected states on mine action budgets and funding requirements remains incomplete and inconsistent.

**Funding Requirements for the Article 5 Deadline Extensions**

As of August 2008, 15 countries had submitted requests to extend Article 5 deadlines: BiH, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the UK, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Thirteen of the extension requests included cost estimates for meeting mine clearance obligations within the requested extension terms. (The exceptions are Denmark, which has not yet developed a cost estimate for the final stage of its clearance initiative, but which cites $21.7 million in funding allocated to clearance so far, and the UK, which has not yet established cost estimates for demining the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.)

Four states—Denmark, Jordan, the UK, and Venezuela—have reported the capacity to fund their own clearance initiatives or to raise all required funds. The total projected cost for the remaining extension requests is approximately $2.3 billion. Of this total, Croatia’s cost estimate accounts for approximately $937 million and BiH’s estimate accounts for $550 million, each for the full ten-year extension term. Thailand’s estimate accounts for $575 million for 9.5 years. Given that the requested extension periods and projected spending vary among states, the annual funding required for implementation of the extensions ranges from a low of $163.8 million in 2018 to a high of $256 million in 2014.

Some states requesting extensions have reported national funding targets to support meeting their proposed extension deadlines. However, using reported 2007 national and international funding as a benchmark, there appears to be a large shortfall between current funding and required future funding. The 11 states in need of international support all reported national funding for mine action in 2007, totaling approximately $72.8 million, while reported international funding to these states totaled $42.1 million. (This takes into account all 2007 funding, including RE and VA, which are often difficult to differentiate from other mine action sectors, but which overall remain a small portion of mine action funding.)

The total combined national and international funding allocation of $114.9 million represents a shortfall of roughly $49 million against the least annual amount required during the extension period and of $141 million against the greatest annual amount required. Given that implementing the 11 Article 5 extension requests will cost between $163.8 million and $256 million per year—or between 30% and 47% of the combined national and international funding for mine action in 2007—the Article 5 extension process will evidently impose a considerable strain on overall mine action funding.

It is clear that significant support for mine action from both donor states and, increasingly, from affected states will continue to be needed for many years if the Mine Ban Treaty is to be fully implemented—especially for demining as well as for assistance to survivors, their families, and affected communities. Landmine Monitor hopes that future support for the obligations resulting from the Convention on Cluster Munitions will be in addition to, not instead of, support for the work that remains to be achieved under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 7 September 2007 there are 155 States Parties.

States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 4 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Austria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo (Brazzaville) 4 May 01 (a)
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Cote d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Greenland 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99

Participants in the Model Review Conference for young campaigners, Jordan.
Status of the Convention

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Burma
China
Cuba
Egypt
Finland
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya

Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tonga
Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia (20 Feb 07)
Iraq (15 Aug 07) (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait (30 Jul 07) (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro (23 Oct 06) (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 99
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Palau 18 Nov 08 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
Sao Tome e Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

Signatories
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97
Poland 4 Dec 97

States not Party
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Burma
China
Cuba
Egypt
Finland
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya

Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tonga
Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2
Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3
Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injuries or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

   e) Assistance to mine victims;

   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7
Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

   e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines
Chapter Title

accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the United Nations shall transmit the submission, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General may submit the matter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations within 28 days to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Majority of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party...
declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of
non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-
finding missions on the territory or any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if
the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appoint-
ment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the
States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after
consultations with the requested State Party, appoint
the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or
directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the
mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall
enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the
fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the
requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The
requested State Party shall take the necessary adminis-
trative measures to receive, transport and accommodate
the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the
security of the mission to the maximum extent possible
while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested
State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into
the territory of the requested State Party the necessary
equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering
information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its
arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party
of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of
its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure
that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to
speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide
information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the
fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under
its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue
could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject
to any arrangements that the requested State Party con-
siders necessary for:

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information
and areas;

b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the
requested State Party may have with regard to propri-
etary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitu-
tional rights; or

c) The physical protection and safety of the members
of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such
arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate through alternative means its compliance
with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory
of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days,
and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless
otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related
to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be
handled on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of
the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States
Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information,
including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission,
and may request the requested State Party to take mea-
sures to address the compliance issue within a specified
period of time. The requested State Party shall report on
all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States
Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or
resolve the matter under consideration, including
the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with
international law. In circumstances where the issue at
hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond
the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of
the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States
Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including
the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special
Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to
reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by
consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States
Parties present and voting.

**Article 9**

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, adminis-
trative and other measures, including the imposition of
penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity pro-
hibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken
by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

**Article 10**

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with
each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard
to the application or the interpretation of this Conven-
tion. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before
the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute
to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it
deems appropriate, including offering its good offices,
calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the
settlement procedure of their choice and recommending
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this
Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.
Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
Article 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

Article 21
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22
Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
# Appendix

## Abbreviation and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHD</td>
<td>antihandling device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP or APM</td>
<td>antipersonnel mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV or AVM</td>
<td>antivehicle mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>cluster bomb unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>community-based rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>disabled people’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRIC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Trust Fund (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Center or Mines Action Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASG</td>
<td>Mine Action Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>mine action team or Mines Awareness Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDD</td>
<td>mine detection dog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA</td>
<td>quality assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC</td>
<td>quality control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>mine/ERW risk education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Survey Action Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix / Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Executive Summary

which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Community-based rehabilitation** – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

**Community liaison** – According to IMAS, “liaison with mine/ERW affected communities to exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and UXO, to create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies. Community mine action liaison aims to ensure community needs and priorities are central to the planning, implementation and monitoring of mine action operations.”

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Explosive remnants of war** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Explosive ordnance disposal** – The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Failed cluster munition** – A cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so.

**Improvised explosive device** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device

---

**Glossary**

**Abandoned explosive ordnance** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Community-based rehabilitation** – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

**Community liaison** – According to IMAS, “liaison with mine/ERW affected communities to exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and UXO, to create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies. Community mine action liaison aims to ensure community needs and priorities are central to the planning, implementation and monitoring of mine action operations.”

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Explosive remnants of war** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Explosive ordnance disposal** – The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Failed cluster munition** – A cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so.

**Improvised explosive device** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**IMAS** – International mine action standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**IMSMA** – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

**Landmine Impact Survey** – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

**Land release** – The set of activities and methodologies intended to release previously suspect hazardous areas with the minimum possible risk.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some MACs also implement mine action activities.

**Mine/ERW risk education** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training and community mine action liaison.

**National mine action authority** – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

**Non-state armed groups** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Risk reduction** – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

**Survey** – A study of the assessment of the location and impact of mines and ERW at the local or national level. General survey focuses on the location of mined and battle areas and the type of contamination they contain. A landmine impact survey also assesses the impact of explosive contamination on nearby communities (see separate definition for landmine impact survey). Technical survey aims to confirm and identify the outer perimeters of the hazardous area using one or more demining tools and to gather other necessary information for clearance.

**Unexploded cluster munitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

**Victim** – The individual directly hit by a mine/ERW explosion, his or her family and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, casualty data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families and communities in society.
Global Maps

1. 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction
2. Global Contamination from Mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
3. Use of Cluster Munitions
4. Deadlines for States Parties with Article 5 Obligations
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction
Deadlines for States Parties with Article 5 Obligations

Countries with Article 5 Obligations

Other countries

* Argentina has declared that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. © ICBL 2008