

Landmine Monitor Report

TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD

2009

Executive Summary



International **TO BAN**
CAMPAIGN **LANDMINES**

SPECIAL TEN-YEAR REVIEW

Landmine Monitor

Toward a Mine-Free World

Executive Summary 2009



Landmine Monitor

Editorial Board

Mines Action Canada
Handicap International
Human Rights Watch
Landmine Action
Norwegian People's Aid

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Landmine Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.lm.icbl.org or email lm@icbl.org.

This report is available online at www.lm.icbl.org/lm/2009.

Preface

Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Pease agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or the air, the containers open and disperse submunitions over a wide area, putting civilians at risk both during attacks due to their wide area effect and after attacks due to unexploded ordnance.



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ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and



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after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers' fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel


Landmine Monitor report release in Geneva, Switzerland.

ICBL at a press conference in Nicaragua.

mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and clear all antipersonnel landmines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions was opened for signature on 3 December 2008 and is a legally-binding agreement prohibiting cluster munitions because of their indiscriminate area effects and risk of unexploded ordnance. The treaty also provides a framework for tackling the problems that cluster munitions have caused. For an overview of government policies and practices on cluster munitions see www.lm.icbl.org/cm/2009. The treaty obliges states to stop the use, production, and transfer of cluster munitions immediately. States must destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years of becoming party to the treaty, and clear all unexploded cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. Building on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on Cluster Munitions includes groundbreaking provisions for victim assistance, and includes those killed or injured by cluster munitions, their families and communities in the definition of a cluster munition victim. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the clearance of cluster munition remnant, risk education programs to help prevent cluster munition casualties, and for the assistance of victims.

ICBL at a regional meeting in Tajikistan.



© Harmony of the World, July 2009

The only international legislation explicitly covering ERW in general is Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). While its provisions have been recognized as insufficient to address the problems caused by cluster munitions, Protocol V does establish general responsibilities for ERW clearance, information sharing to facilitate clearance and risk education, victim assistance, and for support to mine action. Protocol V establishes a special responsibility on the users of explosive weapons to work to address the post-conflict

humanitarian problems that these weapons may cause.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and the CMC is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, and where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a coalition of more than 1,000 organizations in over 70 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children's rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL's membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in more than 70 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It is in part due to sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the

Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL's success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to join the treaty. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL's work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

In 2007, the ICBL began actively campaigning in support of the Oslo Process to negotiate a treaty prohibiting cluster munitions. This marked the first time that the ICBL engaged substantively on an issue other than antipersonnel mines. The ICBL began working with other CMC member organizations to address the cluster munition threat at the beginning of the Convention on Cluster Munitions negotiation process. The goal was to help prevent another humanitarian crisis similar to the global mine problem, because cluster munitions leave behind unexploded submunitions with effects similar to antipersonnel mines. The ICBL is dedicated to working toward the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and many ICBL member organizations are also actively campaigning against cluster munitions.

The ICBL is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Cluster Munition Coalition

The CMC is an international coalition working to protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions by promoting universal adherence to and full implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The CMC has a membership of around 300 civil society organizations from more than 80 countries, and includes organizations working on disarmament, peace and security, human rights, victim assistance, clearance, women's rights, and faith issues. The CMC facilitates the efforts of NGOs worldwide to educate governments, the public and the media about the global cluster munition problem and its solutions.

Like the ICBL, the CMC was established by a group of NGOs in response to a global problem, in this case the suffering caused by cluster munitions. From 2003 to



© Mike Kendall, February 2009

2006 the CMC called for negotiations towards new international law to address the cluster munition problem. Throughout 2007 and 2008 the CMC actively participated in the diplomatic Oslo Process facilitating and leading the global civil society action in favor of a ban on cluster munitions. This effort resulted in the adoption and signature of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008 and has been recognized as a largely preventive effort, given that only a tiny fraction of the cluster munitions in global stockpiles have ever been used.

In 2009, the CMC's priority was to conclude an intensive global ratification campaign to ensure that 30 countries ratify the convention without delay in order to bring the convention into force and begin the formal process of implementation. The CMC will also continue to campaign in countries that have not yet signed the convention to encourage them to sign the treaty as soon as possible at the UN in New York. Beyond this the CMC is preparing for the First Meeting of States Parties to the convention and working with states to ensure their early and effective implementation of the convention's obligations.

Landmine Monitor field mission in Nicaragua.

Landmine Monitor

Landmine Monitor Report 2009 is the eleventh annual Landmine Monitor report. Since 1999, each of the ten previous reports has been presented to the respective annual meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor is the ICBL's research and monitoring program and it provides research and monitoring for the CMC. It is the *de facto* monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty, a role it plans to undertake for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties' implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally, it assesses the international community's response to the humanitarian problem caused by landmines and ERW. Landmine Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the

concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. A five-member Editorial Board coordinates the Landmine Monitor system: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, and Norwegian People's Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency. The Editorial Board assumes overall responsibility for, and decision-

other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Landmine Monitor Report 2009 presents information on activities in 2008 and key developments in January–May 2009. A special ten-year review assesses progress in implementing and universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty since its entry into force on 1 March 2009. Reports cover every country in the world and eight other areas not internationally recognized as states, and include information on ban policy (policy, use, production, trade, stockpiling), mine action, casualties, risk education, victim assistance, and support for mine action. All report contents are available online at www.lm.icbl.org/lm/2009.

Unless otherwise specified all translations were done by Landmine Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. Landmine Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

Acknowledgements

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this eleventh annual Landmine Monitor report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

This report contains country and area updates researched by 60 Landmine Monitor researchers from 45 countries and other areas, selected by the Landmine Monitor Editorial Board with input from the Editorial Team. The researchers are cited separately in the List of Contributors. Landmine Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, mine action practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information.



© Tamar Gabelnick, 4 December 2008

Landmine Monitor report release in Geneva, Switzerland.



© Tamar Gabelnick, 24 November 2008

making on, the Landmine Monitor system.

Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

The Landmine Monitor report is designed to complement the States Parties' transparency reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications, to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Landmine Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 60 Landmine Monitor researchers from 45 countries and other areas, and a 20-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the ICBL's campaigning coalition and from

We are grateful to ICBL staff for their continued and crucial assistance in the release, distribution, and promotion of Landmine Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of Landmine Monitor's reporting network lies with the five Editorial Board organizations: Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon)

Cluster munition survivors at the Convention on Cluster Munitions signing conference in Oslo, Norway.

manages Landmine Monitor's production and editing, and coordinates research on support for mine action and non-state armed groups; Handicap International (Stan Brabant) coordinates research on mine/ERW risk education, casualty data, and victim assistance; Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose) is responsible for ban policy; Landmine Action (Richard Moyes) specializes in research on cluster munitions; and Norwegian People's Aid (Stuart Casey-Maslen and Atle Karlsen) coordinates research on mine action. Jacqueline Hansen manages Landmine Monitor.

The Editorial Team undertook research and initial country report edits for *Landmine Monitor Report 2009* from March to August 2009. The Editorial Team was led by five principal editors: Stephen Goose (ban policy), Stuart Casey-Maslen (mine action), Katleen Maes (casualties and victim assistance), Jenny Najar (risk education), and Anthony Forrest (support for mine action).

Stuart Casey-Maslen, Nick Cumming-Bruce, and Mark Hiznay provided final editing from July to August 2009 with assistance from Jacqueline Hansen (Program Manager); Jack Glattbach (Copy Editor); Maureen Hollingworth (Editing Consultant); Katie Pitts and Tatiana Stephens (Project Officers); Kerri West and Katherine Harrison (Ban policy team); and Carly Ackerman, Zain Esseghaier, Zachary Fellman, and Marc Gagnier (Mines Action Canada Interns).

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
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- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Ireland
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of the Netherlands
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Spain
- Government of Sweden
- Government of Switzerland
- European Commission
- Holy See
- UNICEF

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Global Maps

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3. Deadlines for States Parties with Article 5 Obligations
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Deadlines for States Parties with Article 5 Obligations



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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Table Key
States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of August 2009
Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified
States not Party: Not yet acceded

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Argentina
Bahamas	Barbados
Belize	Bolivia
Brazil	Canada
Chile	Colombia
Costa Rica	Dominica
Dominican Rep.	Ecuador
El Salvador	Grenada
Guatemala	Guyana
Haiti	Honduras
Jamaica	México
Nicaragua	Panamá
Paraguay	Peru
St. Kitts & Nevis	St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Saint Lucia	
Suriname	Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay	Venezuela
Cuba	United States

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Andorra	Austria
Belarus	Belgium	Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bulgaria	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia
France	Germany	Greece
Holy See	Hungary	Iceland
Ireland	Italy	Latvia
Liechtenstein	Lithuania	Luxembourg
Macedonia, FYR	Malta	Moldova
Monaco	Montenegro	Netherlands
Norway	Portugal	Romania
San Marino	Serbia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Spain	Sweden
Switzerland	Tajikistan	Turkey
Turkmenistan	Ukraine	United Kingdom
Poland	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Finland	Georgia	Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Uzbekistan

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Australia
Bangladesh	Bhutan
Brunei	Cambodia
Cook Islands	Fiji
Indonesia	Japan
Kiribati	Malaysia
Maldives	Nauru
New Zealand	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea
Philippines	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Thailand
Timor-Leste	Vanuatu
Marshall Islands	China
India	Korea, North
Korea, South	Laos
Micronesia	Mongolia
Myanmar	Nepal
Pakistan	Singapore
Sri Lanka	Tonga
Tuvalu	Vietnam

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria	Iraq	Jordan
Kuwait	Qatar	Tunisia
Yemen	Bahrain	Egypt
Iran	Israel	Lebanon
Libya	Morocco	Oman
Saudi Arabia	Syria	United Arab Emirates

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Benin	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Central African Rep.	Chad
Comoros	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire	Djibouti	Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gabon
Gambia	Ghana	Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	Kenya	Lesotho
Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi
Mali	Mauritania	Mauritius
Mozambique	Namibia	Niger
Nigeria	Rwanda	São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone
South Africa	Sudan	Swaziland
Tanzania	Togo	Uganda
Zambia	Zimbabwe	Somalia

Major Findings

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Mine clearance in Albania.

Major Findings: 1999–2009

- Government use of antipersonnel mines has greatly decreased over the last decade. In 1999, Landmine Monitor recorded probable use of antipersonnel mines by 15 states, compared to just two since 2007: Myanmar and Russia.
- Use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) has also decreased; at least 59 NSAGs across 13 countries have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines in the last 10 years.
- One hundred and fifty-six states—more than three-quarters of the world's states—are party to the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 39 countries, including China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, have still to join. Two of these are signatories: the Marshall Islands and Poland.
- At least 38 former producers of antipersonnel mines have stopped, leaving only 13 states as actual or potential producers.
- For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.
- The only confirmed serious violations of the treaty have been in stockpile destruction. Belarus, Greece, and Turkey missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, and all three remained in serious violation of the treaty as of September 2009.
- Eighty-six States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles, and four more are in the process. Together, they have destroyed about 44 million antipersonnel mines.
- Eleven states have cleared all known mined areas from their territory: Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Suriname, Swaziland, and Tunisia.
- Since 1999, at least 1,100km² of mined areas and a further 2,100km² of battle areas, an area twice the size of London, have been cleared in more than 90 states and other areas. Operations have resulted in the destruction of more than 2.2 million emplaced antipersonnel mines, 250,000 antivehicle mines, and 17 million explosive remnants of war (ERW).
- As of August 2009, more than 70 states were believed to be mine-affected.
- Mine and ERW risk education (RE) has evolved significantly in the last decade. Many programs have shifted from a purely message-based approach to more engaged efforts to bring about broader behavior change and risk reduction.
- Clearance, supported by RE, has resulted in a significant reduction in casualties. Casualties are at a level far below earlier estimates of more than 20,000 casualties per year, with recorded casualties down to under 5,200 in 2008.
- Despite data collection challenges, Landmine Monitor has identified at least 73,576 casualties of landmines, ERW, and victim-activated improvised explosive devices in 119 states and areas in the past 10 years.
- Total international support for mine action for 1992–2008 was US\$4.27 billion.
- Despite this high level of overall funding, over the past decade victim assistance has made the least progress of all the major sectors of mine action, with funding and action falling far short of what was needed. Most efforts remained focused on medical care and physical rehabilitation, often only when supported by international organizations and funding, rather than on promoting economic self-reliance for survivors, their families, and communities.



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Young mine survivor in Senegal.

- At the First Review Conference of the treaty, States Parties agreed that 23 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors should make special efforts to meet their needs. Throughout 2005–2009, progress among the now VA26 States Parties has been variable. Progress was most visible in coordination, rather than in implementation of actual services. Progress on activities was often unrelated to the plans the 26 countries set for themselves.

Major Findings: 2008–2009

- Only two states have used antipersonnel mines in 2008–2009: Myanmar and Russia. NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least seven countries, two fewer than the previous year.
- As few as three countries may have been producing antipersonnel mines in 2008: India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Landmine Monitor has identified 10 other producing countries, but it is not known if they were actively manufacturing mines in the past year.
- Belarus, Greece, and Turkey missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, and all three remained in serious violation of the treaty as of September 2009.
- Three countries completed stockpile destruction: Indonesia (November 2008), Ethiopia (April 2009), and Kuwait (declared in July 2009).
- In December 2008, 94 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions, and requires clearance of contaminated areas and assistance to victims and affected communities. As of September 2009, 17 states had ratified the convention, which required 30 ratifications to trigger entry into force.
- Mine-affected states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years of becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The first deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. All of the requests (which ranged from one to 10 years, the maximum period permitted for any extension period) were granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008.
- In 2009, four more States Parties (Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda) formally requested extensions for periods ranging from three to 10 years.

- In 2008, mine action programs cleared almost 160km² of mined areas—the size of Brussels—the highest total ever recorded by Landmine Monitor.
- In May 2009, Tunisia became the eleventh State Party to formally declare completion of clearance obligations under the treaty.
- There were at least 5,197 casualties caused by mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in 2008, which continued a downward trend of the last few years.
- In 2008, RE was provided in 57 states and areas, compared to 61 states and areas in 2007. RE activities increased significantly in Yemen and Somaliland, and also increased to some degree in 10 other states. In Palestine, RE decreased in 2008 but rose sharply in response to conflict in Gaza in December 2008–January 2009.
- In 2008 in at least 26 states and areas, RE programs were still being implemented without comprehensive needs assessments. In Afghanistan, for instance, which has the world's oldest mine action program, a European Union evaluation in 2008 found that RE was not based on a good understanding of the target audience.
- For 2008 Landmine Monitor identified a total of US\$626 million in funding for mine action worldwide, combining international and national funding. The almost \$518 million (some €346 million) of international funding allocated for mine action in 2008 from 23 countries and the European Commission was the highest reported total to date, surpassing the previously highest total—\$475 million in 2006.
- Funding in 2008 was channeled to at least 54 recipient states and other areas. The top five recipients of mine action funding in 2008 were, in descending order: Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Cambodia.
- In 2008–2009, there was a continued lack of psychosocial support and economic reintegration for survivors even where there were improvements to national healthcare, physical rehabilitation, or disability laws/policies. Pakistan and Sri Lanka saw deterioration of services nationwide or in certain areas because of conflict and natural disasters. The period also saw the closure of several national NGOs/disabled people's organizations, continued capacity problems for others, and persistent funding challenges.
- Other trends included the continuing handover of physical rehabilitation programs to national management and a continued increase of survivor associations and/or their capacities.



© MAC, 3 March 2009

Community liaison in Vietnam.



Ban Policy

1999–2009 Overview

More than three-quarters (156 countries) of the world's states are party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although the most recent to join (**Palau**) was in November 2007. Major powers such as **China, India, Pakistan, Russia,** and the **United States** have still to join, yet one of the treaty's most significant achievements has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by anyone has been stigmatized throughout the world.

During the course of the past decade, the use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become rare. In 1999, Landmine Monitor recorded probable use of landmines by 15 states. In the decade since then a total of 21 governments have likely used antipersonnel mines, but only four since 2004 (**Georgia, Nepal, Myanmar,** and the **Russian Federation**). This year's report, as in 2007 and 2008, confirms use by only two states: Myanmar and Russia. The normative effect of the treaty's comprehensive ban has also resulted in decreased use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Over the past 10 years, at least 59 NSAGs across 13 countries have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.

There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Landmine Monitor reported that there were serious and credible allegations that **Ugandan** forces used antipersonnel mines in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** in 2000, and that **Zimbabwean** forces used mines in the DRC in 1999 and 2000, although both strongly denied it.

The only confirmed serious violations of the treaty have been in stockpile destruction. **Belarus, Greece,** and **Turkey** missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, and all three remained in serious violation of the treaty as of September 2009. Through 2007, only four States Parties missed their stockpile destruction deadlines: **Afghanistan, Cape Verde, Guinea,** and **Turkmenistan.**

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines, but 38 have since ceased production, including four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: **Egypt, Finland, Israel,** and **Poland.** Landmine Monitor identifies 13 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: **China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US,** and **Vietnam.** In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. As few as three countries may have been producing antipersonnel mines in 2008.

A *de facto* ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s; this prohibition is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma that the Mine Ban Treaty has attached to the weapon. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 130 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that as many as 35 states not party to the treaty stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines. In addition, four States Parties are still in the process of destroying some 12 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

2008–2009 Key Developments

- Three States Parties completed stockpile destruction: Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Kuwait.
- No use, production, or transfer of antipersonnel mines was recorded by any State Party.
- States not party Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines, as did non-state armed groups in at least seven countries, including three States Parties (Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru) and four states not party to the treaty (Myanmar, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka).

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Roundtable discussion on efforts to implement the Mine Ban Treaty in Tajikistan.


ICBL Ambassador and landmine survivor addresses government delegates in Geneva, Switzerland.

- In December 2008, 94 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. The number of signatories stood at 98 as of 1 September 2009, of which 17 had ratified.

Universalization

The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later.¹ Outreach by States Parties to the treaty, the ICBL, and others has helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to many countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 156 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 25 acceded.² Thirty-nine countries are not yet States Parties, including two that signed long ago but have not yet ratified (**Marshall Islands** and **Poland**).

Ratifications and Accessions



Not a single state has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Palau acceded on 18 November 2007; the treaty entered into force for Palau on 1 May 2008. Others which have joined since the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004 are **Iraq** (adherence in August 2007), **Kuwait** (July 2007), **Indonesia** (February 2007), **Montenegro** (October 2006), **Brunei** (April 2006), **Cook Islands** (March 2006), **Haiti** (February 2006), **Ukraine** (December 2005), **Vanuatu** (September 2005), **Bhutan** (August 2005), **Latvia** (July 2005), and **Ethiopia** (December 2004). Most of these nations were stockpilers of antipersonnel mines, several were users of the weapon, and several are contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

Of the two remaining signatories, **Poland** decided in February 2009 that it would ratify in 2012, rather than 2015 as it had announced in January 2007. The **Marshall**

¹ For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March 1999) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for that state on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which it deposited its instrument of ratification with the Depositary. That state (now a party) is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and destroy antipersonnel mines in the ground in areas under its jurisdiction or control within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

² The 25 accessions include Montenegro, which technically “succeeded” to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 131 ratifications, 43 came on or before entry into force of the treaty on 1 March 1999 and 88 came afterward.



© Mary Wareham/HRW, 29 May 2009

Islands re-engaged in the Mine Ban Treaty process in 2008 by attending key treaty meetings, but it has not committed to ratify within a specific period.

For the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, a series of regional conferences was held to promote universalization and effective implementation of the treaty in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference (also known as the Cartagena Summit) in Cartagena, Colombia, 30 November–4 December 2009. Regional conferences took place in Nicaragua (February), Thailand (April), Tajikistan (July), South Africa (September), and Albania (October).

UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines is their vote on the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 63/42 was adopted on 2 December 2008 by a vote of 163 in favor, none opposed, and 18 abstentions.³ Of the 39 states not party to the treaty, 18 voted in favor,⁴ 18 abstained, and three were absent.⁵

Since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, the number of states voting in favor has ranged from a low of 139 in 1999 to a high of 164 in 2007. The number of states abstaining has ranged from a high of 23 in 2002 and 2003 to a low of 17 in 2005 and 2006.⁶ Several states that used to consistently abstain or

³ Eighteen States abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 63/42 in December 2008: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. With the exception of Nepal, none of these states have voted in favor of a pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1999. Nepal abstained for the first time in 2007, after voting in favor of the resolution in past years, except in 2004 and 2006 when it was absent.

⁴ This included two signatory countries (Marshall Islands and Poland) and 16 non-signatories: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, and UAE.

⁵ The three absent were Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Tonga. Somalia and Tonga have supported the resolution in the past, while Saudi Arabia has always been absent. Eight States Parties were also absent: Central African Republic, Chad, Fiji, Gambia, Kiribati, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.

⁶ Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38 A) – 142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77 N) – 147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54 B) – 139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33 V) – 143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24 M) – 138 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution

be absent now vote in favor, including **Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the Marshall Islands, and Morocco.**

Ten-year review by region: universalization

As of 1 September 2009, the percentage of nations in each region that were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty was as follows: Africa 98%; Europe 95%; Americas 94%; Asia-Pacific 60%; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 42%; and Middle East and North Africa 39% (see table below).

Africa: Somalia is the only country in the region that has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. By the First Review Conference in November 2004, all signatories had ratified except **Ethiopia**, and all non-signatories had acceded except Somalia. Ethiopia ratified in December 2004. Somalia voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time in December 2007.

Americas: Cuba and the **US** are the only countries in the region that have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. By the First Review Conference in November 2004, all signatories had ratified, except **Haiti**, which did so in February 2006. In February 2004, the Bush Administration completed a review of US landmine policy, announcing that the US did not intend to join the Mine Ban Treaty at any point, abandoning the objective of the previous administration to join in 2006. Cuba's policy has not changed in the past decade.

Asia-Pacific: 16 countries remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty, more than in any other region. However, since 2004, six Asia-Pacific states have joined—more than in any other region. This includes ratification by four signatories (**Brunei, Cook Islands, Indonesia, and Vanuatu**) and two accessions (**Bhutan and Palau**).

Since 2003, **China** has shown increased interest in the Mine Ban Treaty, and has voted in favor of the annual pro-ban treaty UNGA resolution since 2005. Since the First Review Conference in 2004, **India** has sent an observer to every Meeting of States Parties and every intersessional Standing Committee meeting. Since 2007, **Vietnam** has more frequently attended meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, and welcomed the efforts of others to ban the weapon.

In 2004, **Lao PDR** decided that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty at some point, but did not set a timeline. Lao PDR voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution for the first time in 2007 and did so again in 2008. **Mongolia** announced in 2004 its intention to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by 2008, but did not do so.

Commonwealth of Independent States: Five of the 12 countries in the region are States Parties. At entry into force in March 1999, only one was a State Party (**Turkmenistan**), and another two were signatories (**Moldova**

and **Ukraine**). By the First Review Conference in November 2004, there were four States Parties, as **Tajikistan** acceded in October 1999, **Moldova** ratified in September 2000, and **Belarus** acceded in September 2003. **Ukraine** ratified in December 2005. **Armenia** and **Georgia** have consistently supported the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution and attended Mine Ban Treaty meetings. **Azerbaijan** has shown greater support for the treaty in recent years, notably by submitting voluntary Article 7 reports in 2008 and 2009, and voting in favor of the UNGA resolution every year since 2005. **Kazakhstan** voted in favor of the UNGA resolution in 2007 and 2008, after abstaining every previous year.

Europe: Finland and **Poland**, which has signed but not ratified, are the only countries in the region that are not party to the treaty. By the First Review Conference in November 2004, 39 were States Parties. All of the signatories had ratified except Poland. Three of the non-signatories had acceded (**Estonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey**). **Latvia** acceded in July 2005, and **Montenegro** joined in October 2006 after its separation from Serbia. In September 2004, Finland announced that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012, six years later than its previously stated goal. In February 2009, Poland also set 2012 as the year it would join.



Flags in public places in Spain warn people of the dangers mines pose to people living in mine-affected countries.

Middle East and North Africa: Seven of the 18 countries in the Middle East and North Africa are States Parties. At entry into force in March 1999, three countries were States Parties (**Jordan, Qatar, and Yemen**) and two were signatories (**Algeria and Tunisia**). Tunisia ratified in July 1999 and Algeria in October 2001. **Kuwait** acceded in July 2007 and **Iraq** in August 2007. **Morocco** has declared itself in *de facto* compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty: it has submitted three voluntary Article 7 reports and voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution each year since 2004. **Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)** have also expressed support for the treaty and regularly voted for the UNGA resolution.

57/74) – 143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53) – 153 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2004 (Resolution 59/84) – 157 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2005 (Resolution 60/80) – 158 in favor, none against, 17 abstaining; 2006 (Resolution 61/84) – 161 in favor, none against, 17 abstaining; and 2007 (Resolution 62/41) – 164 in favor, none against, and 18 abstaining.

2008–2009 key developments by region: universalization

Africa: Somalia, the only state outside the Mine Ban Treaty in Sub-Saharan Africa, did not make any notable steps towards joining the treaty, and was absent from the pro-ban UNGA vote in December 2008. Somalia did not attend the September 2009 regional conference in South Africa for the lead-up to the Second Review Conference.

Americas: **Nicaragua** hosted the Managua Workshop in February 2009, the first in the series of regional meetings prior to the Review Conference, which neither **Cuba** nor the **US** attended. As of August 2009, the Obama Administration had not made a statement on its landmine policy.

Asia-Pacific: **Thailand** hosted the Bangkok Workshop in April 2009, the second regional meeting prior to the Review Conference. Eighteen countries participated, including non-signatories **Lao PDR**, **Myanmar**, **Singapore**, **Sri Lanka**, and **Vietnam**.



© Louisa O'Brien, March 2009

Landmine survivors and campaigners at a landmine-themed art exhibition opening in Greece.

Having signed and then ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, **Lao PDR** appeared to be moving closer to joining the Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, and the Bangkok Workshop. For the second consecutive year, it voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution in December 2008. In May 2009, Lao PDR said it was considering submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

In 2008, the **Marshall Islands** re-engaged in the Mine Ban Treaty process, including attending its first annual Meeting of States Parties in November. The **Federated States of Micronesia** said in December 2008 that it was very close to acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty; a draft resolution approving accession has been awaiting congressional approval since mid-2008.

Mongolia did not meet its stated objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008, but in mid-2009, Mongolia's Defense Minister and Foreign Minister told the ICBL that they would work to accelerate the accession process. **Vietnam** attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of

States Parties, as well as the Bangkok Workshop.

Commonwealth of Independent States: In July 2009, **Tajikistan** hosted the third regional meeting leading up to the Second Review Conference, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan attended.

Middle East and North Africa: **Egypt** attended the regional conference in South Africa but **Libya** did not. **Morocco** submitted its third voluntary Article 7 report and voted for the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution.

Ten-year review: universalization and non-state armed groups

There has been a growing awareness of the need to involve NSAGs in the global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. In the past five years, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have discussed the issue more regularly.

A significant number of NSAGs have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. This has taken place through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, signature to the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call,⁷ and most recently through the "Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines" developed by the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines.⁸

At least 59 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines over the past 10 years.⁹ The exact number is difficult to determine, since NSAGs may split into factions with different policies, go out of existence, or merge with a state.¹⁰

Since 1999, NSAGs in 13 countries have agreed to abide by either a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines or a ban on use. Geneva Call has received signatures to the Deed of Commitment from NSAGs in Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, and Turkey, as well as Western Sahara. NSAGs have agreed to a ban on use of antiper-

⁷ Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action. Geneva Call has received signatures from NSAGs in Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara.

⁸ This declaration of adherence unilaterally commits the signatory to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) (see below), as well as customary international humanitarian law rules regarding use of mines and explosive devices. As of July 2008, it had been signed by three rebel groups in the Philippines. In February 2008, the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao/Revolutionary People's Army (RPMM/RPA) was the first group to sign the declaration, followed by the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary People's Army (RPMP/RPA) (Nilo de la Cruz faction) in May 2008, and the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (MLPP) and its Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB) military wing in July 2008.

⁹ As of 2009, 39 have through the Deed of Commitment, 18 by self declaration, and 4 by Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). Prior to 2000 several declarations were issued regarding the landmine ban by non-state armed groups, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.

¹⁰ Of 17 Somali groups which signed the Deed of Commitment from 2002–2005, Geneva Call considers 10 to be active as of 2009. Four other former Deed of Commitment signatories are now part of governments which are parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and therefore bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least two other Deed of Commitment signatories in Myanmar/Burma are no longer militarily active.

sonnel mines through bilateral agreements with governments in Angola, Burundi, DRC, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, and Sudan. Four armed groups which had indicated their willingness to ban antipersonnel mines are now part of state governing structures in three States Parties: Burundi, Iraq, and Sudan.

Since the First Review Conference, NSAGs agreeing to ban antipersonnel mines include: the Juba Valley Alliance in Somalia (January 2005), the Polisario Front in Western Sahara (November 2005), the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in Turkey (July 2006), the Chin National Front/Army of Burma (July 2006), the Kuki National Organization in India (August 2006), the National Forces of Liberation (Forces Nationales de Libération) in Burundi (September 2006), the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (November 2006), three more Myanmar/Burma groups—Lahu Democratic Front, Palaung State Liberation Army, Pa'O People's Liberation Organization/Pa'O Peoples Liberation Army (April 2007), the 18 members of the United Jihad Council in Kashmir (October 2007), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (December 2007), the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao/Revolutionary People's Army in the Philippines (February 2008), the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncaya Brigade in the Philippines (May 2008), the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas/Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan in the Philippines (July 2008), plus the groups in the following section on key developments in 2008–2009.

2008–2009 key developments: universalization and non-state armed groups

In October 2008, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the “Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines.” In March 2009, in northeast India, the Zomi Re-unification Organisation signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. In April and June 2009, three factions of the Komala party (the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, the Komala Party of Kurdistan, and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan) signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

Ten-year review: use by government forces

One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. During the course of the past decade, the use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon. Landmine Monitor identified the probable use of antipersonnel mines by 15 governments in its initial report in 1999; 12 in its 2000 report; 13 in its 2001 report; 14 in its 2002 report; nine in its 2003 report; four in its 2004 report; four in its 2005 report; three in its 2006 report; two in its 2007 report; two in its 2008 report; and two in this 2009 report.



Destruction of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in northern Iraq.

© Pascal Bongard/CC, September 2008

Landmine Monitor has identified 21 governments that have probably used antipersonnel mines since 1999, but only four since 2004 (**Georgia, Nepal, Myanmar, and Russia**).¹¹ The armed forces of Myanmar and Russia have used antipersonnel mines each year over the past decade. It appears that Georgian armed forces used antipersonnel mines on occasion every year from 2001 to 2004, and again in 2006, although the government has denied using them. In **Nepal**, government forces used antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the decade-long conflict that ended in 2006. Since 1999, there have been three instances in which government forces have made very extensive use of antipersonnel mines: **India** and **Pakistan** during the period of tensions from December 2001 to mid-2002; **Russia** in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000; and **Ethiopia** and **Eritrea** in their border conflict from 1998 to mid-2000.

There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Landmine Monitor reported that there were strong and credible allegations that forces of **Uganda** used antipersonnel mines in the DRC in 2000, and that **Zimbabwe** forces used mines in the DRC in 1999 and 2000, although both denied it. In addition, a number of countries used antipersonnel mines after signing the Mine Ban Treaty, but before ratification and entry into force. **Angola** openly admitted using antipersonnel mines until 2002, **Ecuador's** Article 7 reporting on mined areas indicated that it laid mines in 1995–1998, and **Ethiopia** tacitly acknowledged use during its 1998–2000 border war. There were also credible use allegations concerning signatories **Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, and Sudan**, although all denied it.¹²

Ten-year review: use by non-state armed groups

The number of countries in which NSAGs have been using antipersonnel mines has also decreased markedly over the past decade. Landmine Monitor identified use by NSAGs in 13 countries in its first annual report in

¹¹ Since 1999 there has been confirmed use by 16 governments: Afghanistan, Angola, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and FR Yugoslavia. There is compelling evidence that five more used antipersonnel mines: Burundi, Georgia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. All five of these states denied use.

¹² For more details on government use of antipersonnel mines from 1999–2004 see *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*.

1999, then in 18 countries in its 2000 report, 19 countries in its 2001 report, 14 countries in its 2002 report, 11 countries in its 2003 report, 16 countries in its 2004 report, 13 countries in its 2005 report, 10 countries in its 2006 report, eight countries in its 2007 report, nine countries in its 2008 report, and seven countries in this 2009 report.

Since 1999, Landmine Monitor has identified NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 28 countries, as follows:

- Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda;
- Americas: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru;
- Asia-Pacific: Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka;
- Commonwealth of Independent States: Georgia (including Abkhazia) and Russia (including Chechnya, Dagestan, and North Ossetia);
- Europe: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Turkey, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia); and
- Middle East and North Africa: Iraq and Lebanon.

There have also been very sporadic and isolated incidents of new use in a number of other countries by rebel groups, criminal elements, and other NSAGs.

The rebel groups that have made the most extensive use of antipersonnel mines and mine-like IEDs since 1999 are probably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, followed by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Myanmar/Burma.

Since 2004, Landmine Monitor has identified NSAG use each year only in **Colombia, India, Myanmar/Burma, and Pakistan**. In addition, it noted NSAG use in **Iraq** in its reports issued from 2005–2008; in **Chechnya** in reports issued from 2005–2007; in **Afghanistan** in reports issued from 2007–2009; in **Peru and Sri Lanka** in reports issued from 2008–2009; and in **Burundi, Nepal, and Somalia** in reports issued from 2005–2006.

Rally encouraging India to sign the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.



© Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2009

2008–2009 key developments: use Government forces

From 2008–2009, the armed forces of **Myanmar and Russia** continued to use antipersonnel mines. Myanmar's military forces used antipersonnel mines extensively, in numerous areas of the country, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Among government forces, the security forces of Myanmar have probably been the most prolific users of antipersonnel mines in the world since 2004.

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields. In discussions with Landmine Monitor since 2006, Russian officials have declined to state that use of antipersonnel mines has stopped. Landmine Monitor will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

Thailand made a serious allegation of new use of antipersonnel mines by **Cambodia** on their border in October 2008 in an incident in which two Thai Rangers were injured. Cambodia stated that the incident occurred in a confirmed minefield on Cambodian territory, and it created a Fact Finding Commission to review the incident. It would appear from available evidence that this incident may have involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor is not able to determine who was responsible for laying the mines.

Georgia and Russia accused each other of using antipersonnel mines during their conflict in August 2008, but several investigations by Human Rights Watch found no evidence of mine use. There were also allegations, mostly by opposition forces, of use since May 2008 by the armed forces of **Armenia, Sri Lanka, and Yemen**, but Landmine Monitor could not verify them.¹³

Non-state armed groups

Use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs declined modestly in the past year. NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or mine-like IEDs in at least seven countries, including three States Parties (Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru) and four states not party to the treaty (India, Myanmar/Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). This is two fewer countries than cited in the previous edition of Landmine Monitor, with the removal of Ecuador and Iraq.

Some NSAG use may have taken place in Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to confirm from available information.

¹³ Last year, Landmine Monitor noted that knowledgeable sources in Sri Lanka who wished to remain anonymous, including those engaged in mine action activities in the field, alleged that Sri Lankan security forces used antipersonnel landmines in 2007 and 2008. Although Landmine Monitor was not able to confirm the allegations, it said it considered this the first serious charge of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Sri Lanka since the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Sri Lanka Army strongly denied the allegations when asked by Landmine Monitor.



© A. Armand/Hi, 2 March 2009

Insurgent and rebel groups have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in increasing numbers. An IED that is victim-activated (i.e. it explodes from the contact, presence, or proximity of a person) is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated (i.e. the user decides when to explode it) is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices is often in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently reported by the media, militaries and governments as “landmines.” This has led to some confusion, and Landmine Monitor has consistently attempted to determine if an IED was victim-activated or detonated by some other means.

In **Afghanistan**, new use of antipersonnel mines by the Taliban has been reported. Notably, in June 2008, there were several reports of Taliban mine use in the Arghandab district of Kandahar province. In **Colombia**, FARC continued to be the largest user of landmines in the country, and among the largest in the world, causing hundreds of casualties each year. The National Liberation Army (ELN) also used mines. In **India**, there were a few reports of victim-activated explosive weapons being used, including in Manipur in an area known to be a United National Liberation Front stronghold. Government forces reportedly recovered antipersonnel mines from other armed groups in the northeast of India during the year. In **Myanmar/Burma**, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Karenni Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, and several other NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines.

In **Pakistan**, NSAGs sporadically used antipersonnel mines in Balochistan, some districts of the North-West Frontier Province, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in attacks on Pakistani security forces and civil administration, and in sectarian, inter-tribal and inter-family conflicts. In May 2009, Taliban groups were reported to have used antipersonnel landmines in the Swat Valley. In **Peru**, remnants of Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps,” to protect illegal coca fields. In August 2008, Peru launched an offensive in Vizcatan province against the Shining Path during which members of the security forces were reportedly injured by these explosive traps. In **Sri Lanka**, as the war intensified in 2008 and 2009, culminating in the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, it appears that the LTTE laid very large numbers of antipersonnel mines in defense of its military installations throughout the north of the island. The Sri Lanka Army reportedly found many newly laid mines, IEDs, and booby-traps, especially between late November 2008 and March 2009.

In **Iraq**, insurgent forces used command-detonated IEDs extensively, but no specific incidence of victim-activated mine use was found during the year, despite documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines by Iraqi and foreign forces. In the **Philippines**, there were no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs, although some incidents in news reports appear to have involved victim-activated devices. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continued to allege use of banned explosive devices by the New People’s Army. In August 2008, the AFP also alleged use of antipersonnel mines by the MILF in North Cotabato and Maguindanao. Both the New People’s Army and MILF rejected the allegations. In **Somalia**, despite the ready availability of antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor has not identified any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines in several years by any armed organization operating in the country. Landmine Monitor analysis of news reports indicates that most if not all of the explosive attacks were command-detonated.

In **Thailand**, the insurgency in the south has made extensive use of command-detonated IEDs and there may have been isolated instances of use of homemade landmines or victim-activated IEDs. **Turkey** reported that in 2008, 158 military personnel and civilians were killed or injured by landmines laid by the PKK/Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kongreya Azad z Demokrasiya Kurdistan) /Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel). But it did not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines or IEDs, nor between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs. There were also media reports of use of antipersonnel mines, but it has not been possible to verify the nature of the devices, who laid them, or the date of placement. In **Yemen**, the government has on a few occasions accused the Al-Houthi rebels of using antipersonnel mines, but there has been no independent confirmation.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in **Afghanistan**, **Iraq**, **Niger**, **Pakistan**, **Palestine**, **Somalia**, and **Sri Lanka**.

Event at the “broken chair” outside the UN in Geneva to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty’s entry into force.

NSAGs reportedly used command-detonated IEDs in **Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.**

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines.¹⁴ Thirty-eight states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines,¹⁵ including four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: **Egypt, Finland, Israel, and Poland.** **Taiwan** passed legislation banning production in June 2006. Among those who have stopped manufacturing are a majority of the big producers from the 1970s to 1990s. With the notable exceptions of **China, Russia** and the **US**, the former biggest producers and exporters are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: **China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.** In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. As few as three countries may have been producing antipersonnel mines in 2008.¹⁶

Petition signing outside the Vatican in Italy.



© Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1 March 2009

No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period. Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor removed **Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and FR Yugoslavia** from its list of producers. **Nepal** was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories. More recently, Nepal officials have denied past or current production, and the situation remains unclear

¹⁴ There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.

¹⁵ Thirty-four States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁶ India and Pakistan acknowledge ongoing production, and it seems certain Myanmar is actively producing. South Korea reported production in 2006 and 2007, but not in 2008. China, Iran, Nepal, the US, and Vietnam have all said they are not currently producing. It is unclear if Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and Singapore are actively producing.

(see 2008–2009 key developments: production section below).

NSAGs in **Colombia, India, Myanmar/Burma, and Peru** are known to produce victim-activated improvised mines. The sophistication of such mines varies greatly. Prior to its defeat in 2009, the LTTE in **Sri Lanka** probably produced the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs.

2008–2009 key developments: production

- **China:** In April 2008, several sources in Beijing told Landmine Monitor that facilities to produce antipersonnel mines are idle, or have shut down, or have been converted for production of other products. There has been no official confirmation of this information.
- **India:** In its first ever response to a Right to Information Act (RTI) request on landmines, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that it was actively producing antipersonnel mines in 2007 and 2008, including NM-14 and NM-16 mines, as well as the APER 1B mine. Landmine Monitor is not familiar with the APER 1B mine, presumably an antipersonnel mine. India has in the past informed Landmine Monitor that it does not produce remotely-delivered mines.
- **Nepal:** In December 2008, an Army General told the ICBL that Nepal had no capacity to produce landmines, nor did it ever have such capacity. Similarly, in March 2008, an army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs, and in 2007, an army officer denied any past or current antipersonnel mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs. These comments contradicted statements made in 2003 and 2005, when Nepali officials told Landmine Monitor that Nepal produced antipersonnel mines. While it does not appear that Nepal is currently producing antipersonnel mines, the conflicting information about past production remains to be clarified. Landmine Monitor will continue to list Nepal as a producer until Nepal makes an official, formal statement that it does not produce antipersonnel mines and does not intend to do so in the future.
- **South Korea:** South Korea reported that it did not engage in any production of antipersonnel mines in 2008. In June 2008, South Korea told Landmine Monitor that a government-managed research project on alternatives to antipersonnel mines was scheduled for 2009 to 2012. A private company, the Hanwha Corporation, began production of self-destructing antipersonnel mines in 2006, manufacturing 18,900 in 2006 and 2007.
- **US:** In May 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army stated that the XM-7 Spider Networked

Munition would be procured in a configuration that only allowed command detonation. Previously, the Spider system contained a feature that would permit it to function in a victim-activated mode, making it incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. This would have constituted the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997.

- **Vietnam:** In May 2008, representatives of the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a visiting Canadian governmental delegation that Vietnam has not produced mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official also emphasized that Vietnam reserves the right to use and produce landmines in the future.

Ten-year review: production

- **Cuba:** Cuba has not provided any information about its production of antipersonnel mines. The state-owned Union of Military Industries is believed, in the absence of any denial or clarification from the government, to continue to produce antipersonnel mines.
- **Egypt:** At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, Egypt's Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister stated that the Egyptian government had imposed a moratorium on all production activities related to antipersonnel mines. This was the first time that Egypt publicly and officially announced a moratorium on production. Egyptian officials had unofficially said for a number of years that Egypt stopped producing antipersonnel mines in 1988.
- **India:** India has been actively producing antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II. In October 2000, India said that it had designed a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, for trial evaluation and prototype production. But, in August 2005, India told Landmine Monitor that it was not producing remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.
- **Iran:** The Director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines, echoing an assertion from the Ministry of Defense in 2002 that Iran had not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have since 2002 found many hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date-stamped 1999 and 2000.
- **Iraq:** Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. An Iraqi diplomat told Landmine Monitor in 2004 that all mine production capacity had been destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign. Iraq confirmed this in its initial Article 7 report in August 2008.
- **Myanmar:** In 2007, Landmine Monitor learned that Myanmar was producing blast mines based

on the US M-14 plastic mine design, in addition to the previously identified MM1 (modeled on the Chinese Type 59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine), the MM2 (similar to the Chinese Type 58 blast mine), and a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine.



© Polish Red Cross, 8 March 2009

- **Pakistan:** Pakistan has been actively producing antipersonnel mines that are compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II, including for the first time, remotely-delivered mine systems.
- **Russia:** Russia stated in December 2000 that it was decommissioning facilities for the production of antipersonnel blast mines.
- **Singapore:** In 2002, the Norwegian Petroleum Fund removed Singapore Technologies Engineering (STE) from its investment portfolio due to STE's involvement in the production of antipersonnel mines. The New Zealand Superannuation Fund divested from STE in 2006. In April 2007, the Netherlands' biggest pension fund, ABP, announced that it had stopped investing in landmine-producing companies, including STE.
- **South Korea:** South Korea reported that it did not produce any antipersonnel mines, other than Claymore mines, from 2000 to 2005. It gave assurances only command-detonated Claymores were made. It produced self-destructing antipersonnel mines for the first time in 2006, and again in 2007.
- **US:** The US cancelled planned production of two weapons that would have been inconsistent with the Mine Ban Treaty: RADAM in fiscal year 2002 and Spider with battlefield override feature in 2008.
- **Vietnam:** Vietnam began stating in 2005 that it no longer produces antipersonnel mines, but it reserves the right to do so in the future.

Campaigners distribute leaflets calling on Poland to ban landmines and cluster munitions.

Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A *de facto* ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have formal moratoria on the export of antipersonnel mines, including **China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea,** and the **US**. In December 2007, the US extended its comprehensive antipersonnel mine export moratorium, in place since 1992, for another six years, until 2014. In July 2008, Israel extended its export moratorium for another three years. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including **Cuba, Egypt,** and **Vietnam**. **Iran** also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of trafficking in antipersonnel mines. Perhaps most notably, in 2008 **Niger** discovered more than 1,000 abandoned mines on the Niger-Chad border, which it believed were lifted from minefields by smugglers for resale. Niger also initiated a program to buy mines from arms traffickers to prevent them from falling into the hands of rebels.

Awareness-raising event in France with a shoe pile representing lives and limbs lost to landmines.



© P. Crappin/Hi, 27 September 2008

Ten-year review: trade

The most disturbing developments regarding transfers of antipersonnel mines were the reports by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia that both **Ethiopia** and **Eritrea**—States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—provided antipersonnel mines to forces in **Somalia** in 2006, and possibly in other years as well.¹⁷ Both Ethiopia and Eritrea strongly denied the allegations. The Monitoring Group also reported that mines continued to be available at arms markets in Somalia.

¹⁷ Two Presidents of the Meetings of States Parties made inquiries about these reports, but the ICBL has regretted the fact that States Parties have not vigorously pursued these serious and specific allegations as potential violations of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Local inhabitants and the media have reported that antipersonnel mines are available on the clandestine market in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan. There have been reports of mines being smuggled from Afghanistan into Pakistan, and from Sudan into the DRC.

Landmine Monitor received information in 2002, 2003, and 2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were removing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines.

There were reports of attempts by representatives of Pakistan Ordnance Factories to sell antipersonnel mines to British journalists posing as representatives of private companies in both November 1999 and April 2002.

Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction (Article 4)

States Parties

As of August 2009, 149 of the 156 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have stated that they do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Eighty-six States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles.¹⁸ Sixty-three States Parties declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.¹⁹

An additional two states, Equatorial Guinea and the Gambia, have not yet formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines. One other state, Iraq, has reported uncertainty about the existence of a stockpile (see below). Four States Parties are in the process of destroying stocks: Belarus, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine.

¹⁸ New to this list are Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Kuwait. As of 31 August 2009, the following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁹ New to this list are Haiti and Palau. The following States Parties have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles (note: a number of these apparently had stockpiles in the past, but used or destroyed them prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, including Eritrea, Rwanda, and Senegal): Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu.



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States Parties collectively have destroyed about 44 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 1.6 million from May 2008 to May 2009.²⁰ In addition, treaty signatory **Poland** destroyed 651,117 antipersonnel mines in 2008. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are **Kuwait** (declared in July 2009), **Ethiopia** (April 2009), and **Indonesia** (November 2008).

Overall, compliance with this core obligation of the treaty has been impressive. Most States Parties have completed destruction far in advance of their deadlines. Through 2007, only four States Parties missed their deadlines: **Turkmenistan**, **Guinea**, **Cape Verde**, and **Afghanistan**.²¹

However, this record has been tarnished by three States Parties—**Belarus**, **Greece**, and **Turkey**—that missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008. All three remain in serious violation of the treaty.

Belarus finished destroying its 294,775 non-PFM type antipersonnel mines in 2006, but still possesses 3.37

²⁰ Turkey destroyed most of the mines, nearly 1.3 million. Greece destroyed 225,962; Kuwait 91,432; Ethiopia 32,650; and Indonesia 11,603. In addition, Iraq reported in July 2008 that it had destroyed 200,125 stockpiled antipersonnel mines since 2003, but did not indicate how many each year.

²¹ Turkmenistan reported the completion of its stockpile destruction on 28 February 2003, just ahead of its deadline, but also reported that it was retaining 69,200 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. The ICBL and a number of States Parties severely criticized this as an unacceptably high number of retained mines that constituted continued stockpiling of the weapon. In February 2004, Turkmenistan said it would destroy the mines, which it did later in the year. It turned out Turkmenistan had in fact been retaining 572,200 individual antipersonnel mines, as most of the retained mines were of the remotely-delivered type and Turkmenistan had been counting only the containers and not the mines inside. Guinea and Cape Verde had not revealed that they possessed small stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. This fact was discovered only when reports came out of the completion of destruction, in Guinea's case seven months after its April 2003 deadline, and in Cape Verde's case eight months after its November 2005 deadline. Guinea's mines were destroyed with the assistance of the US, and Cape Verde's with NATO assistance. Afghanistan was unable to meet its March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction, telling States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjsher province. The provincial authorities apparently did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. Afghanistan then finished destruction in October 2007. For more details, see Stephen D. Goose, "Goodwill Yields Good Results: Cooperative Compliance and the Mine Ban Treaty," in Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose and Mary Wareham, (eds.), *Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 105–126.

million PFM-type mines. It is in the process of finalizing a new joint project with the European Commission to complete stockpile destruction. It has not established a new completion date. **Greece** did not even begin destroying mines until November 2008, and had destroyed only 225,962 mines as of May 2009. It hoped to destroy the remaining 1.36 million mines by the end of 2009. **Turkey** destroyed 1.6 million antipersonnel mines between 2006 and April 2009, leaving a total of 1.32 million to destroy. It intends to complete destruction in 2010.

Ukraine informed States Parties in May 2009 that it was unlikely to meet its 1 June 2010 stockpile destruction deadline. It still possesses 5.95 million PFM-type mines and 149,096 POM-2 mines. It destroyed 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999 and 404,903 PMN-type mines in 2002 and 2003, as well as more than 254,000 other antipersonnel mines.

Thus, as of mid-2009, more than 12 million antipersonnel mines remained to be destroyed by four States Parties, including **Belarus** (3.4 million), **Greece** (1.4 million), **Turkey** (1.3 million), and **Ukraine** (6.1 million).

It is not clear if **Iraq** has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 report, dated 31 July 2008, Iraq stated that while it had not yet identified any stockpiles, "this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report." Its subsequent report in May 2009 did not include any information on stockpiles or destruction. Iraq stated in its July 2008 report that it had destroyed 200,125 stockpiled antipersonnel mines since 2003.

Stockpiling Destruction Deadlines

Belarus	March 2008
Greece	March 2008
Turkey	March 2008
Ukraine	June 2010
Iraq	February 2012

States not party

Landmine Monitor estimates that as many as 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile more than 160 million antipersonnel mines.²² The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: **China** (estimated 110 million), **Russia** (estimated 24.5 million), and the **US** (10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include **Pakistan** (estimated six million) and **India** (estimated four to five million).

Poland, a signatory state, declared a stockpile of 1,055,971 mines at the end of 2002, but had reduced it to 333,573 mines by the end of 2008, including the destruction of 651,117 mines in 2008.

²² Of the 39 states not party, four have stated that they do not stockpile any antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Some other states not party may not have stocks. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks. A Libyan defense official said in 2004 that Libya no longer stockpiles, but that information has not been confirmed. Bahrain and Morocco state that they only have small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

Students in the United States celebrate 10 years of Mine Ban Treaty implementation.

In 2008, **China** continued to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines that had either expired or were not compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II. It has reported destruction of more than 2 million such mines since the late 1990s. It reported in September 2008 that new techniques would allow it to accelerate the process of destroying obsolete mines.



© MAC, March 2009

Canadian campaigners celebrate the Mine Ban Treaty's successes.

In November 2008, **Russia** stated that “about 20 million anti-personnel mines” had been destroyed in “recent years.” It has apparently been destroying about one million mines per year since 2005. In November 2004, Russia for the first time revealed that it had a stockpile of 26.5 million antipersonnel mines, stating that it had destroyed 19.5 million since 2000.

In May 2008, an army official in **Vietnam** informed a Canadian delegation that Vietnam’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines will expire in a few years, and stated that Vietnam has gradually started to destroy the mines.

Non-state armed groups

Compared to a decade ago, very few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel landmines. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs have access to the mine stocks of previous regimes (such as in **Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia**).

In addition to producing their own improvised mines, NSAGs in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have also acquired mines by lifting them from the ground, capturing them, stealing them from arsenals, and purchasing them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in **Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Turkey**. Most often, Landmine Monitor identifies whether an NSAG possesses stocks through reports of seizures by government forces.

At least two NSAGs which have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment destroyed some stocks of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. In Puntland (**Somalia**), in April 2009, Mines Advisory Group and a Puntland police explosive ordnance disposal team

destroyed 78 Pakistani-made P4 mines in Bosasso. In **Iraq**, in September 2008, the PDKI destroyed 392 antipersonnel mines in Koya, northern Iraq.

Reporting on and destroying captured, seized, or newly discovered stockpiles

Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, [all States Parties will] report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information, and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.” States Parties took this a step further by agreeing to adopt a modified voluntary reporting format for reporting on these mines.

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, the following countries officially noted new discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in their Article 7 reports: **Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Republic of the Congo, Niger, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda**. In addition, there were government or media reports of discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in **Colombia, Iraq, Peru, and Turkey**, although these were not included in Article 7 reporting.

Afghanistan reported that 62,498 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2008, in 160 events in 20 provinces. It previously reported that 81,595 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2007, including many that were discovered, seized, or handed over during the year. **Cambodia** has declared that a total of 133,478 antipersonnel mines were newly found and destroyed from 2000–2008, including 13,665 in 2008.

The **Republic of the Congo** reported that on 3 April 2009 it destroyed 4,000 PPM-2 and PMN mines discovered in abandoned ammunition storage areas. **Niger** destroyed 1,772 antipersonnel mines in August and October 2008. The mines apparently came from two sources, with some discovered on the border with Chad and some purchased from traffickers. **Sudan** reported that caches containing 523 antipersonnel mines were discovered in various locations of Southern Sudan and destroyed from October–December 2008.

Since the First Review Conference in 2004, the following States Parties have reported new discoveries or seizures of mines in their Article 7 reports: **Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Republic of the Congo, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen**. There have also been official or media reports of new discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in **Algeria, DRC, Kenya, and the Philippines**, in addition to **Colombia, Iraq, Peru, and Turkey**.

It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines. States Parties should reveal in Article 7 reports the details of newly found antipersonnel landmines, depending on whether they are maintained

for a period as stockpiled mines (Form B), transferred for destruction or training purposes (Form D), actually destroyed (Form G), or retained for training purposes (Form D). This reporting should occur for discoveries and seizures made both before and after the completion of stockpile destruction programs.

Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

Ten-year review: mines retained

The ICBL, and a number of States Parties, have consistently questioned the need for live mines for training purposes. At least 23 states that once stockpiled antipersonnel mines have declared that they no longer possess any mines, even for research and training purposes. Several states have indicated that some or all of their retained mines are fuzeless.

Mines Retained for Research and Training, 2002–2008

Reporting Period	No. of States Parties reporting retained mines	No. of retained mines (approximately)	No. of States Parties reporting retained mines consumed	No. of retained mines consumed	No. of States Parties not retaining mines
2008	71	197,000	29	20,449	at least 78
2007	71	216,000	35	14,758	at least 77
2006	69	228,000	29	12,416	at least 77
2005	69	227,000	14	3,702	at least 71
2004	74	248,000	24	6,761	at least 64
2003	66	233,000	17	3,112	at least 62
2002	62	280,000	15	3,806	at least 55

Over the years, States Parties have had extensive discussions about “the minimum number absolutely necessary.” During the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and during Standing Committee discussions since 1999, most States Parties have agreed that, for those that decide to retain mines, the minimum number of mines retained should be in the hundreds or thousands or less, but not tens of thousands.

With strong urging from the ICBL, State Parties agreed at the First Review Conference in 2004 that those retaining mines should report in detail each year on the intended purposes and actual uses of those mines. In 2005, States Parties agreed to a new, voluntary Article 7 form to facilitate such reporting.

Despite these measures, the ICBL has continued to express concern in recent years that a large number of States Parties are still retaining mines, but apparently not using them for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains



Landmine Monitor report launch and treaty anniversary celebration in Nepal.

the same year after year, indicating none are consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, and no or few details are provided about how the mines are being used. Some states retain mines even though they are not known to engage in any research or training activities.

The ICBL told States Parties in April 2007 that it “is increasingly convinced that there is widespread abuse” of the Article 3 exception. It said, “It appears that many States Parties are retaining more antipersonnel mines than ‘absolutely necessary’ and are not using mines... for the permitted purposes. It is time for States Parties to think about this as a serious compliance issue, and not just a reporting or transparency issue...Some States Parties have yet to use their retained mines at all; they are

simply sitting in storage—the equivalent to continued stockpiling...Unless a State Party is clearly retaining the minimum number of antipersonnel mines, is actively utilizing the mines for the permitted purposes, and is being fully transparent about the process, there may rightly be concerns that the mines are in essence still being stockpiled and could be used for war fighting purposes.”²³

At least 15% of States Parties retaining mines in 2008 have not reported a reduction in mines retained since the treaty’s entry into force for these states. Even more states have reported consuming mines only sporadically, with many reporting no consumption for two or more consecutive years.

Since 2005, the number of States Parties not retaining mines for research and training purposes has exceeded

²³ ICBL Intervention on Article 3—Mines Retained for Training, delivered by Stephen D. Goose, Head of ICBL Delegation, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 27 April 2007.

the number choosing to retain. The total number of mines retained has decreased substantially, from about 280,000 in 2002 to about 197,000 in 2008. This has reflected not only the consumption of retained mines during training and development activities, but also the decision by many states to significantly reduce—and in some cases completely eliminate—mines retained as they have deemed the mines excessive to their needs.

At least 30 States Parties have reviewed and decided to reduce their number of retained mines, or even eliminate the mines altogether (as **Moldova** and **FYR Macedonia** did in 2006).²⁴ Among those who decided to significantly reduce their number of retained mines in 2007 and 2008 were **Algeria, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, and Zambia**.

2008 key developments: mines retained

In 2008, 71 of the 156 States Parties retained a total of more than 197,000 antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 3.

At least 78 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines for training. During this reporting period,

Workshop in Azerbaijan to encourage the government to take steps toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions.



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Haiti and **Palau** formally indicated for the first time in their initial Article 7 reports that they were not retaining any antipersonnel mines. Seven other States Parties may not retain mines, but greater clarity and confirmation of their status is needed. **Botswana, Cape Verde, and Equatorial Guinea** have never declared a number of mines retained in an Article 7 report.²⁵ **Cambodia, DRC, Nigeria, and Senegal** have declared in the past that they were not retaining any mines for research and training, but have reported information in their recent Article 7 reports that makes their status uncertain.²⁶

²⁴ States that decided to reduce the number of mines they retained include: Argentina, Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UK, Venezuela, and Zambia. Eleven of these originally intended to keep 10,000 or more mines.

²⁵ Cape Verde and Equatorial Guinea are thought not to possess any antipersonnel mines for training, but have never submitted their initial Article 7 reports formally declaring this fact. Botswana indicated in its 2001 Article 7 report, the only one it has ever submitted, that it would retain a “small quantity” of antipersonnel mines, without providing details. An official told Landmine Monitor in 2001 that this consisted of seven inert antipersonnel mines.

²⁶ Cambodia has not reported any mines retained for training, but has indicated that antipersonnel mines removed from the ground each year have been used for research and training purposes. In past years, the DRC has reported that information on mines retained for training purposes was “not applicable,” but in 2008 and 2009 it reported instead that the information was not yet available, leaving it unknown as to whether the DRC is considering retaining or has already retained an unspecified number of mines for research and training purposes. Nigeria listed 3,364 “British

Three States Parties retain more than 10,000 antipersonnel mines: **Turkey, Bangladesh, and Brazil** (ordered by number of mines retained). Together, these three states account for almost 20% of all mines retained under the treaty. A further six States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: **Sweden, Greece, Australia, Algeria, Croatia, and Belarus**. (See table below for details).

States Parties with highest number of retained mines under Article 3

State Party	No. of retained mines	No. of mines previously destroyed in 2008
Turkey	15,125	50
Bangladesh	12,500	0
Brazil	10,986	1,395
Sweden	7,364	167
Greece	7,224	0
Australia	6,785	213
Algeria	6,090	8,940
Croatia	6,038	65
Belarus	6,030	0
Total	78,142	10,830

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines.²⁷ Another 24 States Parties retain fewer than 1,000 mines.²⁸

In 2008, 29 States Parties reported retaining fewer mines than in 2007, resulting in an overall decrease of 20,449 mines.²⁹ This includes mines consumed during training and research activities, as well as reductions of mines considered excess to needs. **Algeria**, which in

made [antipersonnel] AP mines” as retained in its most recent Article 7 report, but Nigeria had previously reported destroying all 3,364 of its retained mines in 2005 and declared that it was no longer retaining mines. Senegal for the first time reported in its 2007 Article 7 report that 24 antipersonnel mines, taken from demining operations or discovered among rebel stockpiles, were used for training purposes before their destruction. It has repeated this in its 2008 and 2009 reports, identifying the same mine types each year; it is unclear if this indicates additional mines used for training or refers to the initial instance.

²⁷ Thirty-eight States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bhutan, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

²⁸ Twenty-four States Parties retain fewer than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Benin, Burundi, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Portugal, Rwanda, Togo, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.

²⁹ Twenty-nine states reported retaining fewer mines than in 2007: Afghanistan (62), Algeria (8,940), Argentina (112), Australia (213), Belgium (42), Brazil (1,395), Canada (24), Chile (70), Republic of Congo (50), Croatia (65), Czech Republic (2,156), France (8), Germany (7), Guinea-Bissau (100), Iraq (937), Ireland (3), Italy (32), Japan (392), Serbia (1,976), Slovenia (1), Spain (197), Sudan (3,059), Sweden (167), Tanzania (322), Thailand (12), Tunisia (20), Turkey (25), Ukraine (12), and Zimbabwe (50). Of these 29 states, 22 explicitly reported the number of mines consumed since 2007, while seven listed a lower total number of retained mines without any further explanation.

2007 had the second highest number of retained mines of all States Parties, destroyed 8,940 mines, leaving 6,090 remaining. **Guinea-Bissau** destroyed 100 of its 109 retained mines, indicating that no research or training activities were currently underway. **Iraq** decided to retain 297 mines, 937 less than the total previously reported. **Serbia** reported a reduction of 1,976 mines, to a total of 3,589. **Sudan**, which completed its stockpile destruction in March 2008, reported retaining 1,938 mines, which is 3,059 less than last reported. Additionally, **Brazil** and the **Czech Republic** reported consuming a significant number of mines in 2008 in the course of training activities, reducing their totals by 1,395 and 2,156 respectively.

At least 42 States Parties did not report consuming any mines for permitted purposes in 2008.³⁰ In 2007, a total of 38 states did not report consuming any mines; in 2006, 44 states; in 2005, 51 states; in 2004, 36 states; in 2003, 26 states; and in 2002, 29 states did not consume any mines.

Twelve States Parties have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry into force for that country: **Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Burundi, Cyprus, Djibouti, Greece, Indonesia, Togo, and Venezuela**. During this reporting period, several states, including **Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, and Serbia** reported a reduction in the number of their retained mines for the first time since the treaty entered into force for them.

For 2008, at least two states reported an increase in retained antipersonnel mines through the discovery of



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previously unknown stocks, including **Peru** (increase of 47) and **Mozambique** (520). Another two states—**BiH** (655) and the **United Kingdom** (UK) (294)—reported an increase in the number of mines retained without explanation.³¹

³⁰ The number cannot be precise because as of the end of August 2009, 15 states that previously declared retained mines had not submitted an Article 7 update for calendar year 2008. The 42 States Parties that did not report consuming retained antipersonnel mines in 2008 are: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Slovakia, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, UK, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

³¹ The total number of retained mines reported in Denmark's Article 7 report submitted in 2009 is one higher than last year. However, the actual total is unclear, as the types of mines listed add up to the same number as in its previous report.



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In 2008, only 18 States Parties made use of the expanded voluntary Form D in their Article 7 reports to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses on mines retained: **Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Mauritania, Portugal, Rwanda, Serbia, Turkey, and the UK**.³² However, several other States Parties provided such information on regular Form D or elsewhere in their Article 7 reports.

Afghan community leaders discuss the landmine issue and the rights of mine survivors.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 98%. This compares to 97% in 2007, 96% in 2006 and 2005, 91% in 2004, 88% in 2003, and 75% in 2002. Three States Parties have yet to submit long overdue initial reports: **Equatorial Guinea** (due 28 August 1999), **Cape Verde** (due 30 April 2002), and the **Gambia** (due 28 August 2003).

Two States Parties have submitted initial reports since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*: **Haiti** and **Palau**. Haiti submitted its initial report in March 2009, over two years late, and Palau submitted its report by its October 2008 deadline. There are no States Parties with pending deadlines for an initial report.

As of the end of August 2009, only 88 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2008. A total of 64 states had not submitted updates.³³ This equates to a compliance rate of 58%, a rate that will likely go up somewhat in the coming months.

The compliance rate for annual updates has been dropping steadily in recent years. The final rate of compli-

Disabled athletes participate in a table tennis match in Turkey during events to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty's entry into force.

³² Additionally, other states, including France, Moldova, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Tunisia, have used the voluntary Form D in past years.

³³ The 64 States Parties not submitting updates were: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé e Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, and Vanuatu.



National conference in Iraq focused on Mine Ban Treaty implementation.

ance was 62% for calendar year 2007, 64% for 2006, 71% for 2005, 74% for 2004, 79% for 2003, and 70% for 2002.

Several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports as a demonstration of their commitment to the goals of the Mine Ban Treaty.³⁴ **Poland**, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports every year since 2003, most recently in April 2009. **Morocco** submitted its third voluntary report in April 2009, and **Azerbaijan** submitted its second voluntary report in July 2009. **Mongolia** (in 2007) and **Sri Lanka** (in 2005) have also submitted voluntary reports. In these reports, only Poland and Mongolia have included information on their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, while Morocco, Azerbaijan, and Sri Lanka have not done so.³⁵ Other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including **Armenia**, **China**, and, in May 2009, **Lao PDR**.

National Implementation Measures (Article 9)

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Only 59 of the 156 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.³⁶ This is an increase of two States

³⁴ While still signatories, a number of current States Parties submitted voluntary reports, including Cameroon in 2001, Gambia in 2002, and Lithuania in 2002. Before becoming a State Party, Latvia submitted voluntary reports in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

³⁵ In May 2009, Morocco told Landmine Monitor that this was because Morocco has no stocks. Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN in Geneva, “Response to Questions from the Canadian NGO Mines Action Canada,” 18 May 2009. In December 2008, Sri Lanka told the ICBL that it would endeavor in 2009 to submit an update to its report including information on stockpiles, but it has not done so. Interview with Sumede Ekanayake, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

³⁶ A total of 59 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, BiH, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guate-

Parties in this reporting period: **Burundi** and **Togo**. Additionally, **Ireland**, which originally enacted domestic legislation to enforce the treaty in 1996, passed updated legislation in 2008 (the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Landmines Act, 2008).

A total of 26 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. **Sudan** joined this group this year. Some states have been reporting legislation is underway for a number of years without any specific updates on progress.³⁷

A total of 40 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty.³⁸ **Ethiopia** and **Ukraine** joined this category in the past year.³⁹

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 31 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴⁰

Special Issues of Concern

Since the inception of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty’s ban on assistance with prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with states not party; foreign stockpiling and transit of anti-personnel mines; the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices; and the acceptable number of mines retained for

mala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

³⁷ Legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in the following states: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Republic of the Congo, DRC, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda. Among these, only the DRC, Mozambique, Philippines, and Thailand reported specific progress in 2008, indicating that they hoped to have legislation enacted soon. Other states reported to be in progress more recently include: Brunei, Ecuador, Haiti, Kuwait, Palau, Sudan, and Vanuatu. Chile, while stating in May 2009 that it believes its existing laws to be sufficient, has also reported that it is in the process of enacting additional legislation.

³⁸ A total of 40 States Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider new legislation necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.


³⁹ Ethiopia indicated this in its 2009 Article 7 report. Ukraine is listed in this category in the draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention for the Second Review Conference, Annex X, and in the ICRC’s Article 9 table, citing information provided by its mission in October 2008.

⁴⁰ The 31 states without progress toward national implementation measures include: Angola, Afghanistan, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gambia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Iraq, Liberia, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay. Several of these states have reported legislation in progress in the past, but they have provided no recent updates, leaving it unclear as to whether work is still underway.

training purposes (see Mines Retained for Research and Training section above).

Ever since the treaty entered into force in 1999, States Parties have regularly discussed these issues at the inter-sessional Standing Committee meetings and Meetings of States Parties, and many have tried to reach common understandings, as urged by the ICBL and the ICRC.⁴¹ States Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan in 2004, and in the subsequent Progress Reports from the annual Meetings of States Parties, that there should be ongoing discussion and exchange of views on these matters.⁴²

However, too few states have expressed their views in recent years, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2. For detailed information on States Parties policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation, which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty, see past editions of Landmine Monitor.



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Article 1: Joint military operations and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances ...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity pro-

⁴¹ The Final Report and President’s Action Program agreed upon at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in September 2003 states that “the meeting called upon States Parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with respect to articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on various matters by the First Review Conference.” The co-chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention (Mexico and the Netherlands) at the February and June 2004 intersessional meetings undertook significant consultations on reaching understandings or conclusions on these issues, but a number of States Parties remained opposed, and no formal understanding was reached at the First Review Conference.

⁴² The Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009 indicates that the States Parties will “exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions.”

hibited to a State Party under this Convention.”

Initially, there was a lack of clarity, however, regarding what types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition on assistance, particularly with respect to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty. States Parties recognized the need to address ambiguities about the prohibition and over the years have shared views on policy and practice. A general, albeit informal, understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has emerged during the years of discussion.

A total of 44 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines.⁴³ Among those who have made statements consistent with this since the First Review Conference in 2004 are **Albania, Chad, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, and Yemen**. More specifically, a prevailing view has emerged that States Parties may not:

- participate in the planning for use of antipersonnel mines;
- agree to rules of engagement that permit use of the weapon;
- accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use the weapon;
- knowingly derive military benefit from the use of the weapon by others; or
- provide security, storage, or transportation for antipersonnel mines.

In terms of state practice, no State Party is known to have engaged in any of these activities since the First Review Conference but, in the period from 1999 to 2004, Landmine Monitor expressed concerns about a number of States Parties assisting with the use of antipersonnel mines by others, including **Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe** with various forces in the **DRC**; **Sudan** with militia in the south of the country; and **Namibia** with Angolan troops before **Angola** became a State Party.

Eight States Parties have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited: **Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe**. However, each country’s understanding of what constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance varies.⁴⁴ Over the years, the ICBL has raised

⁴³ Forty-four States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines: Albania, Australia, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

⁴⁴ In May 2009, Landmine Monitor produced an eight-page fact sheet, “The Prohibition on Assistance in the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1,)” that contains a summary of state practice and the views of the individual States Parties that have addressed the issue. See www.lm.icbl.org.

Thai campaigner collects signatures in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.



© ICBL, 6 March 2009

Campaigners celebrate 10 years of Mine Ban Treaty implementation in Japan.

concerns with these states about their national declarations and/or clauses in their national implementation legislation with respect to joint operations and “assist.”⁴⁵

Statements since May 2008

In November 2008, Algerian officials told Landmine Monitor that **Algeria** does not participate in joint military operations, but should it ever do so with a state not party, it will under no circumstances use antipersonnel mines.

In July 2008, **BiH** told Landmine Monitor that during joint military operations with its allies, it cannot be engaged in the process of planning and preparing military action where antipersonnel mines will be used.

Foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines

With a few exceptions, States Parties have agreed that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits “transit” and foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. With respect to transit, the main issue is whether a state not party’s aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines can pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party, including on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. Nearly all states that have addressed the issue, as well as the ICBL and ICRC, believe that if a State Party permits transit of antipersonnel mines, it is violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer.

A total of 32 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory.⁴⁶ **Canada**,

⁴⁵ A highly regarded legal commentary on the Mine Ban Treaty examined Australia’s National Declaration and a statement by Zimbabwe on the prohibition on “assist,” and concluded that “it is not clear how these interpretations can be legally sustained. Reservations are prohibited by Article 19” of the treaty. The commentary draws particular attention to Australia’s position that the treaty would allow “indirect support s uch as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” including presumably the laying of antipersonnel mines by the state not party. Stuart Maslen, *Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Volume 1, The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2004), pp. 92–95.

⁴⁶ Thirty-two States Parties prohibit transfer or foreign stockpiling:

Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least in certain circumstances. Canada has stated that it nevertheless discourages the use of Canadian territory, equipment, or personnel for the purpose of transit of antipersonnel mines. Germany and Japan view the issue in terms of the US mines stored in their countries, and maintain that because they do not exercise jurisdiction or control over the mines, they cannot prohibit transit.

With respect to foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, three States Parties required the **US** to remove US stocks on their soil: **Italy** (announced in May 2000), **Norway** (November 2002), and **Spain** (November 1999). **Tajikistan** has reported it is negotiating with Russia regarding removal of its 18,200 stockpiled mines. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in its Article 7 report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled on its territory by a state not party. However, **Germany, Japan, Qatar**, and the **UK** have stated that US antipersonnel mine stocks in their countries are not under their national jurisdiction or control, and thus not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Statements since May 2008

In March 2009, an official of **Indonesia** wrote to Landmine Monitor that “transit is also an activity that is prohibited under the Convention.”⁴⁷

At the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, **Zambia** stated its understanding that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited. In July 2007 (but not previously reported by Landmine Monitor), **Nigeria** wrote that its draft implementation legislation “prohibits transfer of anti-personnel mines through any part of the Nigerian territory.”⁴⁸

Article 2: Mines with sensitive fuzes and sensitive antihandling devices

Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, many States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC have emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine—even if it is labeled as an antivehicle mine—equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited.

However, for a small number of States Parties this remains a contentious issue. The way that States Parties agree—or disagree—on what mines are banned may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized.

At least 28 States Parties have expressed the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of

Albania, Austria, BiH, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Yemen, and Zambia.

⁴⁷ Email from Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director, Directorate for International Security and Disarmament, Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2009.

⁴⁸ Letter from Dr. Martin I. Uhomoihi, Ambassador of Nigeria to the UN in Geneva, 10 July 2007.

being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited.⁴⁹ Among those that have made statements consistent with this view since the First Review Conference are **Argentina, BiH, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, and Yemen.**

Five States Parties (**Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Japan, and the UK**) have said that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

There appears to be agreement, with some exceptions, that a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or a tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. However, the **Czech Republic** has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵⁰ **Sweden** has antivehicle mines with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Several States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and destroyed certain antivehicle mines and/or ordnance items that, when used with mines, can cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. **Belgium** has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) used as booby-traps. **Bulgaria** destroyed its stock of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. **Canada, France, Hungary, Mali, and the UK** have removed tilt rod fuzes from their inventories. The **Netherlands** and the **UK** retired from service mines with breakwire fuzes. **France** has destroyed other unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes. **Germany** and **Slovakia** have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines. **Slovakia** has prohibited the use of the Ro-3 fuze as an antihandling device.

Statements since May 2008

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, five countries spoke on Article 2: **Austria, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Zambia.**

Austria expressed its view that if a mine explodes from the presence, proximity or contact of a person, it is banned, regardless of any other purpose or design of the mine, and that States Parties should remove any such mines from their inventories and destroy them. It stated its willingness to have States Parties elaborate a formal understanding on the matter.

⁴⁹ The 28 States Parties expressing the view that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine is prohibited are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, BiH, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Kenya, Ireland, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Yemen, and Zambia. In addition, Albania has not taken a legal position, but has stated that it is destroying its antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes.

⁵⁰ The Czech Republic has also acknowledged possessing tilt rod fuzes, but has stated that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired within 15 years. Slovenia, while stating that antivehicle mines with fuzes that cause them to function as antipersonnel mines are prohibited, has also acknowledged possessing TMRP-6 mines that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes; it is considering how to deal with them.

Canada stated that any mine that can be victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and prohibited.

The Netherlands agreed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices that can explode from the unintentional act of a person.

Norway also stressed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine, that can explode from human contact, is banned. It stated, "It does not matter whether the main purpose of usage for that mine is directed toward vehicles. It does not matter whether it is called something else than anti-personnel mine." It called for the issue to be dealt with directly within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Zambia stated that it joins others in calling for a common understanding that any mine that can be set off unintentionally by a person, thereby functioning as an antipersonnel mine, is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices.

In July 2008, **BiH** told Landmine Monitor that it will consider ways to ensure that mines such as TMRP-6 antivehicle mines with tilt rods cannot be victim-activated and function as antipersonnel mines.



Workshop in India to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty's entry into force.

© Control Arms Foundation of India, 18 March 2009

Claymore and OZM-72 command-detonated mines

Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In the past, options for both means of utilization have often been packaged with the mine.

In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.

The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions. The M18A1 (produced originally by the US but also widely copied or license-produced by other countries), MON series (produced in the former USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries), and the MRUD (produced in FR Yugo-

slavia) are the most well known and widely held examples of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.

Several States Parties have extended this command and target activation distinction to a type of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent dual-use capabilities.

A total of 31 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.⁵¹

Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mines to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap. **Belarus, Denmark, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand, and Sweden** have reported on the measures taken to modify these mines in their Article 7 reports. In 2006, Belarus destroyed the victim-activated components of its 5,536 MON mines and 200,826 OZM-72 mines.

Thirty States Parties have declared that they do not possess or have destroyed Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.⁵²

The vast majority of States Parties have not declared whether their forces possess these types of mines. While the majority of these States Parties have declared that they do not possess any antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it cannot be presumed that this includes dual-use command-detonated mines.

Treaty-Related Meetings

Ninth Meeting of States Parties

States Parties, observer states, and other participants met for the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva, Switzerland from 24–28 November 2008 under the Presidency of Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland. The focus of the meeting was on the first formal decision-making regarding requests for extensions of mine clearance deadlines. Requests were granted to 15 States Parties, with the UK's most contentious. The ICBL expressed its appreciation for the fact that the extension request process was taken seriously by all States Parties, but felt that the final decisions did not always apply the same rigorous standards to all, citing the **UK** and **Venezuela**, neither of which had even begun demining operations.

While stating its grave concern that **Belarus, Greece, and Turkey** remained in serious violation of the treaty after missing their March 2008 stockpile destruction deadlines, the ICBL also expressed appreciation for the serious concerns stated by numerous States Parties about the need for those nations to urgently comply with their obliga-

tions. With the aim of preventing future instances of non-compliance, States Parties warmly welcomed a proposal submitted by **Lithuania** and **Serbia** on ensuring the full implementation of Article 4 on stockpile destruction.⁵³

Fifteen mine survivors from the ICBL delegation deplored that victim assistance remains seen as a lower priority, and urged concrete actions, citing the need for socio-economic inclusion of survivors in addition to medical assistance.

Standing Committee co-chairs and co-rapporteurs in 2008–2009

Standing Committee	Co-chairs	Co-rapporteurs
General Status and Operation of the Convention	Chile and Japan	Ecuador and Slovenia
Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies	Argentina and Australia	Greece and Nigeria
Stockpile Destruction	Italy and Zambia	Bulgaria and Indonesia
Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration	Belgium and Thailand	Peru and Turkey

The ICBL regretted that for the first time since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, no new state had joined the treaty over a 12-month period, and called on all States Parties to increase their universalization efforts. On the positive side, 22 countries not yet party to the treaty participated as observers, demonstrating the continuing spread of the international norm against anti-personnel mines.⁵⁴

The meeting produced a strong Geneva Progress Report 2007–2008, which, in addition to reviewing progress in the past year, highlighted priority areas of work for the coming year. This built on Progress Reports from the previous three years, and the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009 adopted at the First Review Conference (Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World) in November–December 2004.

New co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committees were selected for the period until the Second Review Conference in Cartagena, Colombia from 30 November to 4 December 2009, with Ambassador Susan Eckey of Norway as President-Designate.

Participation in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties was high—nearly 800 people—with a total of 125 country

⁵³ The proposal calls for States Parties to take actions if a state does not have a plan for destruction within one year of entry into force, or has not started destruction within two years. It calls for pro-active consultations by Standing Committee co-chairs, and for stockpiling states to report on progress at every annual Meeting of States Parties and intersessional meeting, as well as in Article 7 reports. Non-compliant states are urged to provide a formal communication about reasons for failure to comply, and a plan to complete destruction with an expected completion date.

⁵⁴ Some of the more notable “holdouts” attended, including China, Egypt, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Others included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and UAE.

delegations attending, including delegations from 103 States Parties. The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem. More than 150 members of the ICBL attended.

Implementation and intersessional work program

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty's provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program with its four Standing Committees, a coordinating committee, and contact groups on universalization of the treaty, Article 7, resource utilization, and linking mine action and development.

The intersessional Standing Committees met for one week in May 2009. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic sections. A separate formal session was held devoted to preparations for the Second Review Conference.

The Oslo Process and the Convention on Cluster Munitions⁵⁵

With the failure of the CCW Third Review Conference in November 2006 to adequately address cluster munitions (see below), Norway announced it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It subsequently held the first meeting of the "Oslo Process" in February 2007, where 46 states committed themselves to conclude a new international treaty banning cluster munitions "that cause unacceptable harm to civilians" by 2008. A "Core Group" of nations took responsibility for the initiative, including Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Peru.

At the first follow-up meeting in Lima, Peru, in May 2007, a draft treaty text was distributed and discussed. Additional sessions to develop the treaty took place in Vienna, Austria, in December 2007 and Wellington, New Zealand, in February 2008. A total of about 140 countries participated in at least one of these Oslo Process preparatory meetings. Regional meetings to build support for the treaty were also held in Costa Rica in September 2007, Serbia in October 2007 (for affected states), Zambia in April 2008, and Thailand in April 2008 (sponsored by the ICRC).

Formal negotiations were held in Dublin, Ireland from 19–30 May 2008. At the conclusion, all 107 of the

participating states adopted the new Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. An additional 20 states attended the negotiations as observers.

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the ICBL praised the new treaty as one that will save thousands of lives for decades to come. Like the Mine Ban Treaty, it takes an integrated approach to the cluster munition problem, and requires clearance of contaminated areas as well as assistance to survivors and affected communities. The victim assistance provisions are especially laudable and much stronger than those included in the Mine Ban Treaty. Efforts to weaken the treaty with exceptions for certain cluster munitions, and to have a transition period allowing use of banned weapons for a number of years, were defeated. The most highly criticized aspect of the new convention is a provision that could be seen by some as a loophole allowing States Parties to assist in some way with the use of cluster munitions by non-States Parties in joint military operations.



© Georgian Committee to Ban Landmines, March 2009

Georgian campaigner speaks to the media at an event where trees were planted in an area formerly contaminated by cluster submunition remnants.

In August 2008, Georgia and Russia both used cluster munitions in their conflict over South Ossetia, resulting in 70 civilian casualties and creating socio-economic harm. Around the world, CMC protests and media editorials condemned this new use of cluster munition so soon after the convention's adoption.

However, this period also saw intensive activities to ensure that as many states signed the convention in Oslo as possible. Regional conferences held in Sofia, Bulgaria (18–19 September), Kampala, Uganda (29–30 September), Xieng Khouang, Lao PDR (20–22 October), Quito, Ecuador (6–7 November), and Beirut, Lebanon (11–12 November) helped secure commitments to sign and also provided useful venues to start considering implementation.

From 3–4 December 2008—two years after the Oslo Process began—Norway welcomed states back to Oslo for the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference. Ministers and senior officials from 94 governments signed the convention at Oslo City Hall, applauded by a CMC delegation comprised of 250 campaigners from 75 countries. Another 28 countries attended but did not sign.

⁵⁵ For a detailed study, including entries on 150 countries, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice*, Mines Action Canada, May 2009.



Public meeting in an affected community in Syria.

The number of signatories had grown to 98 as of early September 2009, and 17 states had ratified. The convention will enter into force six months after the 30th ratification.

The first significant gathering of signatories was held in Berlin from 25–26 June 2009, with a focus on stockpile destruction. Regional meetings to promote the convention were scheduled in Chile from 14–15 September and in Indonesia from 16–17 November 2009. The First Meeting of States Parties is being planned for Lao PDR in late 2010.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II

CCW Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the 1996 protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 93 states were party to Amended Protocol II as of September 2009. Two states, **Georgia** (8 June 2009) and **Jamaica** (25 September 2008), joined since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*. Just 11 of the 93 have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: **China, Finland, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US**.⁵⁶ Thus, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 11 countries as the remainder are held to the higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II took place in November 2008, with an informal meeting of experts in April 2009.

The nine-year deadline for states that chose to defer compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines and the requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines, as provided in the Technical Annex, was 3 December 2007. **China, Latvia, Pakistan, and**

Russia deferred on detectability, while **Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine** deferred on self-destruction and self-deactivation.⁵⁷

In its September 2007 Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, China stated that it had met its December deadline to comply with the protocol's technical specifications. In November 2007, China stated that it had made technical modification to or destroyed stockpiled antipersonnel mines which failed to meet the requirements of the protocol. It has provided few additional details.

Pakistan stated in November 2007 that it had made all the necessary technical changes to be compliant with the protocol, but it provided no details.

A Russian official said in November 2007, "By the end of this year a set of measures to implement requirements of the Protocol...will be nearing its completion. In particular, a national system of technical requirements to land mines, including anti-personnel ones, will be finalized and adopted for practical application, a planned disposal of obsolete types of mines is being carried out..."⁵⁸ Russia has not subsequently announced completion of the work, and over the years has provided few details about how it is complying with the technical requirements of the protocol.

Latvia's deferral is presumably irrelevant since it already destroyed its stockpile as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has retained some mines for training purposes. Belarus was obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008, but has not yet complied (See Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction section above). Ukraine is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010.

Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War is intended to address the post-conflict dangers posed by unexploded ordnance and abandoned ordnance. It was adopted in November 2003 and entered into force on 12 November 2006. As of August 2009, 60 states had ratified the protocol. Fourteen states ratified Protocol V since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*: **Belarus, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Jamaica, Mali, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, the UAE, and the US**. The first annual meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva in November 2007 and the second in November 2008, with informal meetings of experts in July 2008 and April 2009.

⁵⁷ Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and US. The Mine Ban Treaty required Belarus, Greece and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and UK have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.

⁵⁸ Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2007.

⁵⁶ Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to CCW Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory, it cannot do anything contrary to the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.

Cluster Munitions

At the Third CCW Review Conference held in Geneva from 7–17 November 2006, States Parties rejected a proposal to begin negotiations within the CCW on a “legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions” and instead agreed to a weak mandate to continue discussions on ERW, with a focus on cluster munitions, in 2007.

CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts met for one week in June 2007 with the sole substantive topic being cluster munitions. However, the outcome was again weak, with a statement that the Group “without prejudice to the outcome, recommends to the [November 2007 Meeting of States Parties] to decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument. Striking the right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the decision.”

During the week-long November 2007 meeting, a proposal from the European Union to negotiate in 2008 a legally-binding instrument that prohibits cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians was rejected. States considered several ever-weaker proposals to begin negotiations on cluster munitions in 2008, and settled for an agreement to “negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of

cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations.” The mandate did not specify that negotiations should lead to a new legally binding protocol, or include any kind of prohibition, and had no timeline.

Meetings were held in accordance with the mandate from 14–18 January, 7–11 April, 7–25 July, and 1–5 September 2008. By the end of the September session, the chairperson had developed a draft protocol text, but there were still wildly divergent views on the need for a protocol and what it should contain. States Parties were unable to reach an agreement at the annual meeting of States Parties in November 2008, but decided to extend the mandate and hold a negotiating session from 16–20 February, and 14–17 April 2009.

However, States Parties remained far apart on key issues, even after an additional informal session held on 17–21 August 2009. Following that session, the chairperson produced a new draft protocol, presented in his personal capacity, for possible consideration at the annual meeting of States Parties. Most observers felt there would be little chance to conclude a new protocol at the annual meeting from 12–13 November 2009, and the main issue would be whether to extend the work again into 2010.



© CIREC, March 2009

Landmine survivors and their families celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty's entry into force in Colombia.

Mine Action

1999–2009 Overview

Since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999, at least 1,100km² of mined areas and a further 2,100km² of battle areas have been cleared in more than 90 countries and other areas. Operations have resulted in the destruction of more than 2.2 million emplaced antipersonnel mines, 250,000 antivehicle mines, and 17 million explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Key Mine Action Terminology

A **mined area** contains antipersonnel or antivehicle mines or a mix of the two; such areas often also include items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

A **battle area** is an area of combat affected by ERW but which does not contain mines. ERW includes both UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance.

Battle area clearance may involve only a visual inspection of a suspected hazardous area by professional clearance personnel, but is more often an instrument-assisted search of ground, i.e. using UXO detectors.

Clearance of mined areas refers to physical coverage of an area to a specified depth using manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and/or machines to detect and destroy (or remove for later destruction) all explosive devices found.

Land release means release of contaminated land through survey or clearance.

Survey in mine action means a formal process to identify areas containing mines or ERW.

Suspected hazardous area means an area suspected—but not confirmed—to contain mines and/or ERW.

In 2008 alone, mine action programs cleared almost 160km² of mined areas, the highest total ever recorded by Landmine Monitor. In May 2009, Tunisia formally declared

that it had completed its clearance obligations under the treaty, the eleventh State Party to do so. The 10 others are Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Suriname, and Swaziland.¹

Yet significant challenges remain in the ongoing struggle against landmines. Mine-affected states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years of becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty.² The first deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions.³ In 2009, four more States Parties (three with 2010 deadlines and one, Uganda, whose deadline expired on 1 August 2009) formally requested extensions for periods ranging from three to 10 years.⁴ By contrast, at the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, States Parties pledged that by the Second Review Conference in 2009 “few, if any, States Parties” would require an extension to their treaty deadlines.⁵

¹ Fulfilling the requirements of Article 5 does not mean that a country is “mine-free,” a status that very few countries actually achieve. It is a statement that all known mined areas have been cleared of antipersonnel mines to humanitarian standards, and that all reasonable efforts have been made to identify all mined areas within a state’s jurisdiction or control. Thus, a small residual mine threat may be believed to exist even after a declaration of compliance with Article 5 has been made thus requiring the affected state to maintain the capacity to deal quickly with any residual contamination that may be discovered.

² Jurisdiction means sovereign territory while control of territory means areas occupied by a state outside its sovereign territory.

³ In accordance with the treaty, BiH, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the UK, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all made requests for an extension to their Article 5 deadlines ranging from one to 10 years, the maximum period permitted for any extension period (though more than one extension period can be requested). All of these requests were granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008.

⁴ These four states are: Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda.

⁵ Nairobi Action Plan, Action #27, “Final Report of the First Review Conference,” 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

© Tamar Gabelnick/ICBL, October 2008

Moroccan military deminers demonstrate clearance techniques.



© Mike Kendall, September 2008

Tempest machine supports mine clearance efforts in Ecuador.

Mine detection dogs at work in the DRC.

Scope of the Problem

With the Mine Ban Treaty already in force for 10 years, a reliable determination of the size of the global landmine problem still does not exist. Early estimates of the numbers of mines laid were merely speculative and often proved to be wildly inaccurate. Similarly, surveys, particularly some Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS), have overestimated the size of contaminated areas. Nonetheless, a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination in both mined areas and battle areas does now exist, with many earlier estimates reduced significantly, largely as a result of more widespread land release procedures.⁶

Mine contamination

As of August 2009, more than 70 states were believed to be mine-affected, as well as seven areas not internationally recognized. In the past year Landmine Monitor has removed two states from the list: the Gambia and Tunisia.⁷ Although any estimate should be treated with caution, Landmine Monitor believes that less than 3,000km² of land worldwide⁸ was mine contaminated as of August 2009. Increasingly, data gathering efforts are—rightly—seeking to define more accurately the perimeters of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)⁹ and to ensure there is sufficient evidence of contamination for these SHAs to be entered into national mine action databases.

Mine clearance

Advances are being made in demining efficiency¹⁰ with standard mine clearance tools that are rudimentary but practical. The primary clearance technique remains the manual deminer equipped with a metal detector proceeding slowly along one-meter-wide lanes. When a



© Arne Hodalic/ITF, February 2009

signal is heard, the deminer must stop and either the deminer or a colleague must carefully excavate the object to determine if it is an item of explosive ordnance or a harmless piece of metal. The overwhelming majority of signals lead to innocuous metal fragments being discovered (e.g. nails, barbed wire, and tin cans).¹¹ This painstaking process—repeated thousands of times a day around the world—is why mine clearance is expensive and time consuming.¹² The key to cost efficiency is minimizing the overall area to be cleared through good initial survey and ongoing refinement of the clearance plan for a minefield.¹³

Other demining tools—especially mine detection dogs (MDDs)¹⁴ and machines—are widely used in mine action programs, particularly to contribute to more efficient land release rather than as a sole clearance tool.¹⁵ In Rwanda, for example, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) redeployed a MineWolf machine from its Sudan program in August 2008 to prepare approximately half a square kilometer of mine-suspected land for manual clearance by National Demining Office demining teams. At the end of the project in December 2008, the use of the machine meant that only 15,303m² (3% of the SHA, equivalent to about three football fields in size) needed to be physically cleared.¹⁶

⁶ Land release encompasses the range of techniques that ensure the efficient release of formerly suspect mined or battle areas other than purely by clearance, particularly technical survey. In addition, non-technical survey and database clean-up can lead to the cancellation of SHAs that are not in fact contaminated.

⁷ The Gambia has been removed from the list as there is no evidence of residual contamination following an accident in December 2007. Tunisia has a residual threat from mines laid by NSAGs, but has reported completing clearance of all confirmed mined areas. Zambia has not yet been removed from the list although a nationwide survey of contamination had not found any mined areas as of August 2009 as it has still formally to declare completion of its Article 5 obligations.

⁸ An area roughly the size of Luxembourg.

⁹ According to the IMAS on land release, a SHA refers to “an area suspected of having a mine/ERW hazard. A SHA can be identified by an impact survey, other form of national survey, or a claim of presence of explosive hazard.” UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 1. Often, these are very rough estimates represented by a large circle in the national database that overestimates the size of a SHA. In Afghanistan, for example, the results of polygon surveys—more accurate delineation of the perimeter of a SHA—by HALO in its area of operations in 2007 prompted the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) to plan such surveys in most of the rest of the country in 2008–2009. MACCA reported in April 2009 that polygon surveys had resulted in a 9% reduction in the total estimated SHA. Email from MACCA, 31 March 2009; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 86.

¹⁰ The term demining encompasses survey, mapping, marking, community liaison, and post-clearance handover as well as physical clearance itself.

¹¹ HALO in Afghanistan and HALO and MAG in Cambodia are using the Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System metal detector, which has ground penetrating radar incorporated to reduce the number of false signals. The detectors are considered effective and raise productivity, but they are also expensive and complex to use. See reports on Afghanistan and Cambodia in this edition of *Landmine Monitor*; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 35.

¹² The use of a metal detector in mineralized soil (soil with high metal content) or along railway lines is generally not feasible and other approaches must be used, sometimes requiring prodding. Prodding, by which a metal rod is carefully inserted into the ground at a 30 degree angle to check for mines, is more dangerous than the use of a metal detector as the risk of accidental detonation of a mine or item of explosive ordnance is significantly higher. Raking is a technique used in sandy soil, which has proved effective in a number of mine action programs, notably Jordan, Somaliland, and Sri Lanka.

¹³ It would appear that some organizations have done this well but that many others have been exceedingly wasteful.

¹⁴ MDDs locate mines through sense of smell, believed to be the vapor from explosives. Concerns persist, however, in certain quarters about their ability to consistently detect all explosive devices in a given area.

¹⁵ Their use as a sole clearance tool remains controversial because of concerns that mines are missed. In addition, machines cannot be used on steep inclines or rocky ground, and dogs do not function effectively in extreme temperatures.

¹⁶ Uganda has calculated that use of a machine on several of its remaining SHAs will save about one year of manual clearance time.

© Shushira Chonherichob, April 2009



Demining demonstration in Thailand.

Mine-affected states and other areas as of August 2009¹⁷

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe	CIS	Middle East & North Africa
Angola	Argentina	Afghanistan	Albania	Armenia	Algeria
Burundi	Chile	Cambodia	BiH	Azerbaijan	Egypt
Chad	Colombia	China	Croatia	Georgia	Iran
DRC	Cuba	India	Cyprus	Kyrgyzstan	Iraq
Congo, Republic of	Ecuador	Lao PDR	Denmark	Moldova	Israel
Djibouti	Nicaragua	Myanmar	Greece	Russia	Jordan
Eritrea	Peru	Nepal	Montenegro	Tajikistan	Lebanon
Ethiopia	Venezuela	Korea, North	Serbia	Uzbekistan	Libya
Guinea-Bissau		Korea, South	Turkey	<i>Abkhazia</i>	Morocco
Mauritania		Pakistan	UK	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Oman
Mali		Philippines	<i>Kosovo</i>		Syria
Mozambique		Sri Lanka			Yemen
Namibia		Thailand			<i>Palestine</i>
Niger		Vietnam			<i>Western Sahara</i>
Rwanda		<i>Taiwan</i>			
Senegal					
Somalia					
Sudan					
Uganda					
Zambia					
Zimbabwe					
<i>Somaliland</i>					
21 states and 1 area	8 states	14 states and 1 area	10 states and 1 area	8 states and 2 areas	12 states and 2 areas

Clearance in 2008

Despite continuing problems in distinguishing true mine clearance from release by survey, Landmine Monitor believes at least 158km² of suspected mined areas were cleared in 2008,¹⁸ resulting in the destruction of 476,875 antipersonnel mines and 99,466 antivehicle mines.¹⁹ Greater precision is not possible due to the poor quality of reporting in a number of cases.²⁰ The largest areas of land were cleared by mine action programs in eight coun-

tries—Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen—which accounted for more than three-quarters of the total recorded clearance (see table below).²¹ Mine clearance in 2008 increased compared to 2007, when programs cleared at least 122km² of mined areas.

Mined area clearance in selected states in 2008

State	Mined area clearance (km ²)
Afghanistan	51.5
Cambodia	37.9
Croatia	12.2
Angola	8.3
Yemen	5.2
Ethiopia	4.5
Iraq	4.5
Sudan	4.1

Compliance with Article 5 obligations

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but

¹⁷ This table includes states and other areas with confirmed mined areas. States with a residual mine problem are not included, such as Belarus, Honduras, Kuwait, Poland, Ukraine, and, since its declaration of compliance with Article 5, Tunisia. The precise extent to which the Republic of the Congo, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Niger, Oman, and the Philippines are mine-contaminated remained unclear as of August 2009. Both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are mine-affected, and so both are included in the list. It is believed that both Djibouti and Montenegro have completed mine clearance, but this has not been formally confirmed so they remain on the list. Affected areas not internationally recognized as states are in italics.

¹⁸ Equivalent to an area roughly twice the size of Paris. This figure excludes the area said to have been cleared in Iran, which has reported conducting more than 2,000km² of mine clearance in 2008.

¹⁹ The high total of items destroyed in 2008 is largely explained by reporting by Iran of clearance of more than 77,000 antivehicle mines. It is likely, therefore, that previous years significantly under-reported the number of items cleared.

²⁰ Thus, for example, the 412km² of clearance reported by Morocco are not included in this estimate because, although there are said to be 10,000 deminers engaged in a massive clearance effort, they only have 400 detectors and sets of personal protective equipment and clearance appears to include a very significant amount of release by survey.

²¹ This excludes the 27.5km² of land reportedly cleared by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces as the quality of clearance and the extent of area cleared have not been independently verified.



Mined area outside a prison in Peru.

© Mike Kendall, September 2008

not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. Ensuring full compliance with these mine clearance obligations is arguably the greatest challenge facing States Parties.

States Parties reporting compliance with treaty clearance obligations

State Party	Year of reported compliance	Article 5 deadline
Bulgaria	1999	2009
Costa Rica	2002	2009
El Salvador	1994	2009
France	2008	2009
Guatemala	2006	2009
Honduras	2005	2009
FYR Macedonia	2006	2009
Malawi	2008	2009
Suriname	2005	2012
Swaziland	2007	2009
Tunisia	2009	2010

Since the last edition of Landmine Monitor and as of August 2009, one State Party declared fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations: Tunisia. This makes a total of only 11 States Parties that have declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations (see table below). At least three other States Parties could also be in a position to report formally they had fully complied with those obligations at the Second Review Conference in November 2009: Albania and Rwanda (both with 2010 deadlines) and Zambia (2011 deadline). Furthermore, Montenegro (deadline of 1 April 2017) is believed to have completed mine clearance operations, but no formal declaration has so far been made as suspected area still needs to be surveyed. The situation in Djibouti, whose deadline expired on 1 March 2009, remains unclear, ostensibly due to an unresolved border conflict with Eritrea.²²

There has also been significant progress in demining over the past 10 years in areas and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, notably in China, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco,

Nepal, and Sri Lanka, as well as in Taiwan. Georgia and Libya have recently expressed a willingness to engage in further mine clearance operations on their territory.

Against this, 19 mine-affected States Parties have either missed their deadlines or have formally declared that they are not in a position to complete clearance operations before the Treaty's 10-year deadline. One State Party, Uganda, declared at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 that it would meet its 1 August 2009 deadline, only to submit a three-year extension request on 19 August.²³ Until States Parties decide on its request, Uganda will be in violation of the provisions of Article 5. Of particular concern, two of the four States Parties that formally requested an extension to their Article 5 deadlines in 2009 were unable to provide reliable figures for the extent of contamination (see table below).

States Parties requesting an extension to their Article 5 deadline in 2009

State	Estimated area of mine contamination (km ²)	Length of extension request sought (in years)
Argentina	13	10
Cambodia	672 (estimated)	10
Tajikistan	14.4 (estimated, partial)	10
Uganda	0.26	3

In the case of Cambodia, a state that has had a mine action program since 1992, its initial extension request stated that available data did not permit a reliable estimate to be made and noted that a new survey would begin to determine the remaining contamination.²⁴ The ICBL suggested that Cambodia follow the approach taken by Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe: to request a shorter period to conduct the relevant survey and data analysis, and then make a second request properly informed by a reliable assessment of mined areas. For Tajikistan, survey of SHAs is ongoing and the mine action center has noted that its final estimate of contaminated area may increase.

Several States Parties granted extensions in 2008 have since made disappointing progress.²⁵ BiH failed to meet the first target set by its extension request, namely that by 2009 it was to have reduced the estimated area of contamination to 1,573km². To achieve this, BiH should have released 165km² of SHAs in 2008, but it achieved only a little over half of this amount (85km²) of which only just over 3km² was through clearance.²⁶ Moreover, the extent of the remaining task remains unclear and the assumptions on which completion within 10 years are based appear unrealistic when compared with past performance.²⁷

Mine clearance in Albania.



© Fatbardh Qaushi/DCA, May 2008

²³ Uganda Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2009.

²⁴ Cambodia Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009.

²⁵ Moreover, certain extension requests were poorly prepared, suggesting an under-performing mine action program.

²⁶ BiH Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 26.

²⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 180–181.

By mid-2009, Thailand was already having difficulty meeting the goals it had set out in its extension request. The rate of demining by the national mine action center in the first half of 2009 (1.3km²) was well behind what was needed to achieve the projected annual rate (43km²), while the estimated area of contamination had actually increased as a result of survey (from 528km² to 562km²).

The request by Croatia estimated that at the beginning of its extension period in March 2009 it would have 944km² of suspect land, meaning that it would reduce its total SHA through clearance and technical survey by 53km² in 2008.²⁸ Yet Croatia missed the target by 10.5km², releasing a total of 42.5km² in 2008 and bringing the total SHA down to 954.5km², still far in excess of probable contaminated area.²⁹

Ecuador and Peru have continued to make slow progress in clearing SHAs along their common border (both were granted eight-year extensions by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties).³⁰ Both the United Kingdom and Venezuela, which were granted a 10-year and a five-year extension, respectively, have still to initiate formal clearance operations.

Future compliance with Article 5 deadlines is likely to be similarly disappointing. Based on progress to date, Landmine Monitor believes that the following States Parties are not on track to comply with the treaty by their respective deadlines: Mauritania (2011); Algeria (2012); Chile (2012); DRC (2012); and Eritrea (2012). In some cases, the problem is inadequate funding; more often, delays in initiating a program, poor management, and insufficient political will are the root causes. Colombia (with a 2011 deadline) will almost certainly remain contaminated with mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) as security concerns have prevented the safe clearance of some areas. Among States Parties with later deadlines, Iraq is a particular concern. Less than a year after it became party to the treaty as one of the world's worst affected countries, Iraq not only had done nothing to mobilize resources needed to address its contamination but had even suspended all clearance outside Kurdish areas, raising serious concerns about the extent to which political leaders understood the severity of the problem or their treaty obligations.

In certain cases, there has been a lack of progress in demining contested borders (particularly in the case of Thailand/Cambodia, and Tajikistan and its neighbors): this is partly a result of a lack of clear delineation or demarcation of borders. Jordan, on the other hand, informed the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 that, although a dispute over the border with Syria had not been fully resolved, the two countries had agreed demining could proceed unhindered.³¹

²⁸ Ibid, p. 306.

²⁹ Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, Head of Department for Planning and Analysis, Croatian Mine Action Center, Sisak, 9 February 2009.

³⁰ Ecuador cleared 6,215m² of mined areas, leaving 517,312m² of mined areas to be cleared, while Peru cleared 1,155m² of mined areas on the border with Ecuador, leaving 192,000m² of mined areas as well as some mined areas surrounding national infrastructure inside the country.

³¹ Statement of Jordan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine

Some States Parties have not yet acknowledged that they are legally obliged by the treaty to clear areas they control outside their sovereign territory.³² As of August 2009, neither Turkey nor Cyprus had formally accepted responsibility for clearance in northern Cyprus, which is occupied by Turkish forces. A statement in June 2008 from Moldova, which had raised hopes that it had acknowledged its responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction, was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³³

UXO removal in the DRC.



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Finally, the extent of any mined areas containing anti-personnel mines in four states with Article 5 deadlines in 2009 and 2010 remained unclear (see table below); none has so far formally reported mined areas containing anti-personnel mines or requested an extension.

States Parties with Article 5 deadlines in 2009 and 2010 whose compliance is uncertain³⁴

State	Compliance issue
Djibouti	Clearance of known mined areas complete but no formal declaration of compliance; possible new contamination from combat with neighboring Eritrea
Niger	Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed
Namibia	Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed
Philippines	Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed



Female deminer in Lao PDR.

© Marcus Q. Rhinelandt, January 2009


Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009

³² See Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which lays down the obligation to clear areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party; and Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

³³ See report on Moldova in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

³⁴ See the relevant reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor for details.

Clearing cluster submunitions in Lao PDR.



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Explosive remnants of war contamination

With firm action having been taken to address the global threat from mines, today ERW still represents a huge challenge, with tens of millions of items of UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) contaminating countries affected by armed conflict.³⁵ For example, Lao PDR and Vietnam are still massively contaminated as a result of US bombing campaigns four decades ago, although no credible estimates of the full extent of contamination currently exist.

The adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 highlighted a specific threat that Landmine Monitor has reported on for many years—that of cluster munition remnants, especially unexploded submunitions.³⁶ Although the full extent of contamination is still to be determined, survey and clearance operations in 2008 and 2009 revealed at least 27 states and three areas with some degree of unexploded submunition contamination on their territory, as set out in the table below. It is hoped that reporting under the new convention once it enters into force will clarify the global extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants.³⁷

³⁵ There are also a small number of states (for example, Albania, Republic of the Congo, and Kenya,) in which UXO contamination has occurred as a result of military training or the undesired explosion of ammunition in an ASA. AXO can result from a lack of proper ASA management and control.

³⁶ The convention defines cluster munition remnants as including the following: unexploded submunitions, unexploded bomblets (submunition dropped from a fixed-wing dispenser), failed cluster munitions (i.e. the canister failed to disperse the submunitions as intended during deployment), and abandoned cluster munitions.

³⁷ Certain states have already clarified the extent of the area affected by cluster munition remnants. In Serbia, for example, NPA's general survey of submunition contamination, conducted between 9 November 2007

Battle Area Clearance

Battle area clearance (BAC) seeks to clean former combat areas of ERW.³⁸ BAC tends to be far quicker than mine clearance for two main reasons. First, in certain circumstances visual inspection of an area may be sufficient, sometimes without the need to conduct instrument-assisted search of the surface. Second, even when sub-surface clearance is deemed necessary, it does not need such sensitive detectors as are used for mine clearance: BAC seeks to detect far greater quantities of metal than occur in common antipersonnel mines and it does not normally have to leave an area metal free. Accordingly, operations endure far fewer false positive signals from harmless metal fragments and coverage of SHAs tends to be far quicker than mine clearance as a result.

Battle area clearance in 2008

Despite problems in ensuring that BAC is not double reported (i.e. sub-surface clearance is repeated in surface clearance figures), Landmine Monitor believes at least 270km² of battle areas were cleared in 2008, resulting in the destruction of more than 48,000 unexploded submunitions³⁹ and some 2.3 million other items of ERW. The largest areas cleared by mine action programs in Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Lao PDR, which together accounted for 80% of the total recorded BAC (see table below).⁴⁰ BAC in 2008 decreased compared to 2007, when programs reported clearance of at least 412km² of battle areas.

Battle area clearance in selected states in 2008

State	BAC (km ²)
Afghanistan	121.1
Lao PDR	55.2
Iraq	14.5
Lebanon	10.0
Georgia	7.9

and 30 November 2008, identified 105 “deployment zones” where cluster munitions were used and 390 polygons or suspect areas covering a total of 30.7km². These affected 28 communities in 16 municipalities. Mauritania has reported plans to conduct survey over 6km² of SHA reported to contain cluster munition remnants. See, further, the respective reports on these two states in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

³⁸ Thus, as mentioned above, BAC is conducted on areas that do not contain a mine threat. Care must be taken in making this determination: casualties occurred in Lebanon, for example, as a result of BAC being conducted on land that was, in fact, contaminated with mines.

³⁹ The actual total is probably much higher as Vietnam did not report comprehensive figures for the destruction of cluster munition remnants, and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Sudan, and Uganda did not disaggregate cluster munition clearance figures from other ERW. Full or partial cluster munition clearance figures were reported for the following states: Albania, Croatia, DRC, Georgia, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Serbia, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Zambia, as well as the areas of Kosovo and Western Sahara.

⁴⁰ Reported figures for the Sri Lanka Army of 121km² (which resulted in the destruction of only 121 items of UXO) are not included in this total as it has not been possible to verify the clearance.

States and other areas affected by cluster munition remnants as of August 2009⁴¹

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe	CIS	Middle East & North Africa
Angola Chad DRC Congo, Republic of Mauritania Sudan Uganda Zambia	Argentina	Afghanistan Cambodia Lao PDR Vietnam	Albania BiH Croatia Montenegro Serbia UK <i>Kosovo</i>	Azerbaijan Georgia Russia Tajikistan <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Iraq Kuwait Lebanon Syria <i>Western Sahara</i>
8 states	1 states	4 states	6 states and 1 area	4 states and 1 areas	4 states and 1 areas

Clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party “undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control” as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after becoming party. Should cluster munitions be used after the treaty enters into force for a particular state, that state is required to fulfill the same clearance obligations “as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants.” Upon fulfilling either of these obligations, the relevant State Party is required to make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.⁴²

Negotiations for the convention benefited from the experiences in implementation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The text is far more detailed as to reporting obligations in its Article 7 reporting on transparency measures, which will assist the future oversight of cluster munition clearance efforts. In particular, States Parties will be required to report on the size of areas both estimated to be contaminated and subsequently cleared, not just on the location of areas and the number of items cleared, as with the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁴¹ Zambia has been added to the list of affected states since last year based on a nationwide survey by NPA, which found two areas containing unexploded submunitions. Guinea-Bissau has been removed from the list as it is reported that the last known cluster munition remnants were destroyed by a UK commercial demining operator, Cleared Ground Demining, in August 2008. Israel has also reported clearing all unexploded submunitions fired by Hezbollah into Israel during the August 2006 conflict in Lebanon. Whether Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, and Saudi Arabia remained contaminated was unclear as of August 2009, so they have not been included in the list. As noted above, both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are affected by cluster munition remnants, and so both are included in the list. Affected areas not internationally recognized as states are in italics. There may be contamination from cluster munition remnants resulting from training or testing in a number of other states, including Chile, Jordan, and the US.

⁴² Article 4.1, Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Clearance obligations under Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V

Under Article 3 of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), after the “cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible,” each State Party and party to an armed conflict⁴³ is required to “mark and clear, remove or destroy explosive remnants of war in affected territories under its control.”⁴⁴ In addition, the users of explosive ordnance are placed under a special responsibility to record their use of these weapons, and to provide data and assistance for the clearance of any resulting UXO in territory that they do not control.



Removing UXO scattered during an ammunition storage facility explosion in Albania.

Land Release

If the mine and ERW problem⁴⁵ is to be addressed efficiently, national authorities will have to develop transparent systems to reduce SHAs to confirmed mined areas. As the International Mine Action Standards

⁴³ Including NSAGs.

⁴⁴ Article 3.2, CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

⁴⁵ Land release principles are also applicable to battle areas, including areas affected by cluster munition remnants, but procedures tailored to battle areas are to be elaborated in a separate IMAS. Telephone interview with Havard Bach, Head, Operational Methods Section, GICHD, 11 September 2009.

(IMAS) on land release state: “on some occasions, land has been subjected to full clearance unnecessarily.”⁴⁶ Any land that is not contaminated but is physically cleared represents inefficiency and a potentially huge waste of resources for a national demining program.⁴⁷


lowed.⁵² In particular, any land confirmed to be contaminated must be fully cleared to humanitarian standards to meet the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, and the process of land release by both technical and non-technical means must be accountable and follow applicable mine action standards.⁵³

Techniques

The IMAS on land release describes the approach as “an evidence-based information assessment process that can help determine with confidence which land needs to be cleared and which does not.”⁵⁴ It adds new terms—and potentially new interventions—to the mine action lexicon (and therefore also to the mine action database). The term “Confirmed Hazardous Area” (CHA) refers to “an area identified by a non-technical survey in which the necessity for further intervention through either technical survey or clearance has been confirmed.” The term “Defined Hazardous Area” (DHA) refers to “an area, generally within a CHA, that requires full clearance. A DHA is normally identified through thorough survey.”⁵⁵ Thus, a SHA should be subjected to non-technical survey to either confirm or discredit suspicions of the presence of mines. If no—or possibly scant⁵⁶—evidence is found, the land is cancelled. If, on the other hand, evidence of contamination is found, the area is normally defined as a CHA⁵⁷ and is then subjected to technical survey. Technical

Dealers weigh scrap metal, including ERW components, which have the potential to cause injury or death, in Lao PDR.

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In part, land release is a recognition that some surveys have led to excessive estimates of the size and number of SHAs.⁴⁸ Due to the efforts of many, particularly the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), which has spearheaded the development of land release processes along with the government of Norway and others, there is now a better understanding that an array of techniques in addition to full clearance can enable SHAs to be addressed efficiently and with a high degree of safety for both program personnel and the intended beneficiaries.⁴⁹ These techniques include better information gathering and verification, and greater use of high-quality non-technical⁵⁰ and technical survey.⁵¹

Care must be taken, however, when applying land release to ensure that certain basic principles are fol-

Mine clearance in the DRC.



© Ayman Semour, October 2008

Moroccan military deminers demonstrate clearance techniques.

⁴⁶ UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. v.

⁴⁷ That is not to suggest that this applies to all countries or demining organizations. A number of these have consistently insisted on the importance of careful survey and mapping of SHAs prior to clearance.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway), “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5,” Discussion paper (Revision), July 2008.

⁴⁹ HALO stresses the efficiency of a four-stage approach to addressing SHAs: 1. Good non-technical survey. 2. Find the mines, using technical survey/clearance. 3. Clear from the inside out to the limit of the threat. 4. Hand over to local people. Email from Christian Richmond, Desk Officer, HALO, 3 September 2009.

⁵⁰ Non-technical survey is defined by the relevant IMAS as survey which involves “collecting and analysing new and/or existing information about a hazardous area. Its purpose is to confirm whether there is evidence of a hazard or not, to identify the type and extent of hazards within any hazardous area and to define, as far as is possible, the perimeter of the actual hazardous areas without physical intervention. A non-technical survey does not normally involve the use of clearance or verification assets. Exceptions occur when assets are used for the sole purpose of providing access for non-technical survey teams. The results from a non-technical survey can replace any previous data relating to the survey of an area.” UNMAS, “IMAS o8.21: Non-Technical Survey, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, pp. 1–2.

⁵¹ IMAS defines technical survey as “a detailed intervention with clearance or verification assets into a CHA, or part of a CHA. It should confirm the presence of mines/ERW leading to the definition of one or more DHA and may indicate the absence of mines/ERW which could allow land to be released when combined with other evidence.” UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 2.



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⁵² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 32.

⁵³ Three IMAS address land release: UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009; UNMAS, “IMAS o8.21: Non-Technical Survey, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009; and UNMAS, “IMAS o8.22: Technical Survey, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009. All are available for download at: www.mineactionstandards.org.

⁵⁴ UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵⁶ According to the IMAS, “Before land can be released from suspicion, it should be established, with a sufficiently high level of confidence, that there is no longer any evidence that the area contains any explosive hazards. This confidence can only be gained after all reasonable efforts to investigate whether mines/ERW are present have been made... ‘All reasonable effort’ may, at one extreme, only be the conduct of a non-technical survey which finds absolutely no evidence of mines/ERW... However, if the non-technical survey confirms some evidence of mines/ERW, it would be reasonable to expend more effort to gain more confidence about which areas are free of mines/ERW and which are not. In this case, ‘all reasonable effort’ may mean that a technical survey or clearance should be conducted.” UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 5.

⁵⁷ In certain circumstances, the evidence may be sufficient to define the area of contamination and this DHA is then subjected to full clearance.

survey then reduces the CHA to a DHA, which is then subjected to full clearance.⁵⁸ All stages of the land release process must be carefully documented.


Achievements

A paper by Norway in July 2008 concluded that: “States Parties [to the Mine Ban Treaty] should acknowledge that land reassessment and release through non-technical means, when undertaken in accordance with high quality national policies and standards that incorporate key principles highlighted in this paper, is not a shortcut to implementing Article 5.1 but rather is a means to more expediently release, with confidence, areas at one time deemed to be ‘mined areas’.”⁵⁹ The concept of land release was formally endorsed by the Ninth Meeting of State Parties,⁶⁰ and an increasing number of States Parties have been employing land release principles to improve program performance.

Information Management

Reliable land release (and efficient demining overall) benefits from effective information management.⁶¹ This begins with systematic, high-quality data gathering, a fundamental pre-requisite that has too often been lacking in mine action, despite the huge sums of money donors have contributed to the sector. It also benefits a sector receiving more than half a billion dollars annually to report accurately and promptly on its achievements.⁶² In Angola, for instance, the National Demining Institute, despite having 2,000 operational staff across the country, was unable to provide detailed reporting on its demining activities in 2008, as in 2007, because its data management system was said to be not functioning properly.

The primary mine action information management software remains the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), managed by GICHD. This is the standard database software for mine action, used by some 50 demining programs around the world, but it remains the subject of criticism. Some blame the software while others suggest the operators are at fault. Certainly, the old adage of “poor data in, poor data out” will



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always apply.⁶³ In a number of instances, however, notably in Cambodia and Lao PDR, accessing data from the latest version of IMSMA has proved challenging.⁶⁴

Nicaraguan army demining briefing.

Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups

During the last 10 years NSAGs have sometimes carried out limited mine clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. NSAG mine clearance or EOD has taken place in Colombia, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and Sri Lanka, as well as in Western Sahara.

In Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan undertook mine clearance through the Northern Iraq Mine Action Program, supported by UNOPS, from 1997 until the 2004 integration of the Kurdish groups into the Iraqi Interim Government. Also in northern Iraq, the Hawpar organization, linked to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party has carried out limited clearance in 2007 and 2008 with support from NPA. In Lebanon, Hezbollah volunteers cleared a possibly large number of submunitions after the armed conflict in 2006. In Southern Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army undertook mine clearance through the Operation Save Innocent Lives initiative supported by UNICEF from 1997 until the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the formation of the Government of National Unity. In northern Sri Lanka, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization Humanitarian Demining Unit, which was linked to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), undertook clearance activities in cooperation with international clearance organizations between 2002 and 2006.

In 2008 in Myanmar/Burma, the Karen National

⁵⁸ For a flowchart of the process, see UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 3.

⁵⁹ Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway), “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5,” Discussion paper (Revision), July 2008.

⁶⁰ See Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway), “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5,” APLC/MSP.9/2008/WP.2, 2 October 2008; and “Final Report of the Ninth Meeting of States Parties,” 28 November 2009, Paragraph 31.

⁶¹ As IMAS state, “Proper management procedures, including adequate decision-making mechanisms, recording, training, monitoring and adjustment, are essential requirements of the process.” UNMAS, “IMAS o8.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 6.

⁶² The quality of reporting is uneven but is generally poor. Strictly, the Mine Ban Treaty only requires reporting on locations of areas cleared and the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed; good practice demands far more detailed reporting, as a minimum: the size as well as the location of areas released; the form(s) of clearance or other means used to release the land, disaggregated by area, and all devices encountered and destroyed.

⁶³ As Landmine Monitor noted last year, it is surprising that data recording and entry has been so difficult in several programs that have received extensive international support and assistance. In Somaliland, for example, the problems are so significant that as of late 2008 the IMSMA database had not been effectively updated since 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 22.

⁶⁴ In March 2009, GICHD reported that it would be making changes to IMSMA “to enhance the support that information management can provide to national mine action centres and other mine action partners.” See GICHD, “GICHD Information Management Programme – Changes,” March 2009, www.gichd.org.



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Removing UXO scattered during an ammunition storage facility explosion in Albania.

Union, which controls small amounts of territory in the east of the country, was provided with metal detectors for mine clearance and trained in their use. Also in Myanmar, the Chin National Front/Army stated to the NGO Geneva Call that it had cleared mines from three sites along Myanmar's border with India during 2008.⁶⁵

Deminer Security

In recent years, armed violence has inflicted losses on demining operators, who have also lost staff as well as vehicles and equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in attacks or raids by insurgent or criminal groups.

In Afghanistan, deminers and support staff have been kidnapped and killed since 2007. In May 2008, three security guards and a logistics clerk were killed and a driver wounded in an attack by insurgents. In July, gunmen kidnapped 16 deminers working for the Mine Detection and Dog Centre in eastern Paktia province but released them after the intervention of local community leaders. The same month, separate attacks took place on the Danish Demining Group compound in Balkh province and on deminers returning from clearance, fatally wounding one supervisor. In May 2009, a HALO Trust vehicle was damaged in a vehicle-activated improvised explosive device explosion, slightly injuring several staff.

In Iraq, political instability and insecurity have periodically halted clearance. In June 2007 the National Mine Action Authority was shut down after the kidnap and subsequent murder of its director general. Work resumed from April until December 2008, when the Ministry of Defense suspended clearance in all parts of Iraq, except the north, on grounds of security and the need to vet personnel engaged by demining operators (due to their access to mines and/or explosive ordnance).

In Sri Lanka, demining launched in 2002 became

⁶⁵ The Chin National Front/Army signed Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment in August 2006. The Turkish PKK and its People's Defense Forces militia signed Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment in July 2006. Signatories agree to prohibit use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action. The clearance activities of both groups were reported as compliance with their pledges under the Deed of Commitment.

more difficult after 2007 and largely came to a halt due to increased armed conflict, including mine use, until May 2009. In 2008, operators experienced abductions of deminers in areas controlled by security forces or pro-government militias, while some deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory were forcibly recruited into local militias.

In Senegal, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) attacked an army mine clearance unit killing three and injuring seven in 2005. In 2006, an army demining unit accompanied by Moroccan soldiers was attacked by the MFDC resulting in the death of two soldiers and leaving 14 injured. In 2008, Senegal requested an extension of its Article 5 deadline citing, among other things, deminer security as a reason for its inability to clear the mines in time.

In Sudan, several operators and UN agencies reported increased insecurity since 2006 when the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army ambushed a team from the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action near Juba, killing two deminers. Several other demining organizations halted operations due to movements of NSAGs or armed conflict in their areas. In January 2007, an Indian peacekeeper in Southern Sudan was killed and two others wounded while escorting a mine clearance team. In 2008, insecurity prevented survey activities taking place in Western Darfur.

The Future of Mine Action

The next few years may come to be seen as the high water mark of demining. In most countries, the mine threat is being reduced significantly and better demining approaches and procedures have widely—though not always—increased both productivity and effectiveness. Redoubled efforts to complete mine clearance in all affected states, whether party to the treaty or not, remains a priority. Significant resources—from both national and international sources—will continue to be needed for many years. And the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions will surely see major inroads into global contamination from unexploded submunitions.



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Mine clearance in the DR.

Children running on land recently cleared of mines in Sri Lanka.

Casualties and Data Collection

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Mine survivor in the DRC.

1999–2009 Overview

Landmine Monitor has identified at least **73,576 casualties** in **119 countries/areas** in the past 10 years. The total number of survivors worldwide is not known but is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands. This figure includes at least **5,197 casualties** caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in **2008**, slightly fewer than the 5,473 casualties recorded in 2007. This decrease was markedly less than in most previous years of the past decade. As before, these figures were incomplete due to inadequate or non-existent data collection.

Casualties from 1999–2008

Despite data collection challenges, Between 1999 and the end of 2008, Landmine Monitor collected information on 73,576 recorded mine/ERW/IED casualties in 119 countries and areas, of which 17,867 were killed, 51,711 injured, and 3,998 of unknown status.¹

While tragically high, the number of casualties in the past decade is incomplete because it includes only recorded casualties. There was certainly under-reporting throughout the decade due to the lack of adequate data collection mechanisms worldwide, a lack of retrospective data collection, and under-reporting of certain groups of casualties, such as foreign nationals, refugees or internally displaced persons, non-state armed groups (NSAG), or ethnic minorities. Mine/ERW casualties during conflicts are also under-reported.

Also, many countries with mine/ERW contamination transitioned out of conflict prior to 1999, meaning that most of their casualties would also have occurred before 1999, for example in **Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Lao PDR,**

¹ These figures only include casualties occurring on a country's territory, and only include some of the many casualties among soldiers, peacekeepers, deminers or humanitarian workers from many other countries, for example Australia, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or the United States.

Mozambique, Nicaragua, Syria, or Vietnam.

A regional breakdown of the total global casualties recorded by Landmine Monitor from 1999–2008 is set out in the table below.

Casualties by Region, 1999–2008

Region and no. of states	No. of states with casualties	No. of casualties
Asia-Pacific (40)	21	33,627
Africa (48)	32	16,390
Middle East and North Africa (18)	17	8,558
Americas (35)	14	7,202
Commonwealth of Independent States (12)	12	4,628
Europe (42)	23	3,171
Total	119	73,576

Most casualties (49,617 or 67%) occurred in 82 States Parties. Among States Parties, nine in every 10 casualties happened in the so-called VA26 countries (44,694).² Some 26% of total casualties during the decade happened in just two countries: **Afghanistan** (16%) and **Cambodia** (10%). In states not party and areas not internationally recognized there were 23,755 casualties.³

Recorded casualties reduced gradually throughout the decade from more than 8,000 per year between 1999 and 2003, to just over 7,000 in 2005, and fewer than 5,500 per year since 2007.

Among the **VA26 countries**, 71% of casualties where

² This is the informal name given to the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors, and, therefore, with the greatest responsibility to act but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. For further details, see the Victim Assistance chapter.

³ In Poland, the only Mine Ban Treaty signatory with casualties, 204 casualties were reported between 1999 and 2008.

the civil/military status was known were civilians and 2% were humanitarian deminers. Additionally, 24% were security forces (the majority in **Colombia**), and 3% were paramilitary or NSAGs.

When the age was known, 68% of casualties were adults and 32% were children. The vast majority of casualties were male (90%) and men made up the largest casualty group (63%), followed by boys (27%), then women and girls (5% each).


Some 44% of casualties were caused by ERW (excluding cluster munitions), 30% by antipersonnel mines, 13% by unspecified mines, 10% by antivehicle mines, 2% by cluster submunitions, and the remainder by victim-activated IEDs (less than 1%).⁴

At least 34% of casualties where the activity at the time of the incident was recorded occurred during livelihood activities. Some 20% of casualties happened by directly interacting with an explosive device and 18% occurred while traveling.

States with 1,000 casualties or more from 1999–2008

State	Total 1999–2008
Afghanistan	12,069
Cambodia	7,300
Colombia	6,696
Iraq	5,184
India	2,931
Russia	2,795
Angola	2,664
Somalia	2,354
Myanmar	2,325
Lao PDR	2,295
Pakistan	1,969
Ethiopia	1,947
Sudan	1,748
Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC)	1,696
Vietnam	1,545
Sri Lanka	1,272

Casualties in 2008 by Civilian/Military Status



Casualties in 2008⁵

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 5,197 recorded casualties caused by mines, ERW and victim-activated

⁴ These figures do not include casualties from explosive devices, such as cluster munitions, at the time of attacks. They do include casualties from ERW and from mines during conflict.

⁵ Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines (whether factory or home-made), antivehicle mines, unexploded ordnance, abandoned explosive ordnance, victim-activated IEDs and vehicle-activated IEDs. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers are not given; incidents clearly caused by remote-detonated mines or IEDs; and devices that were clearly not victim-activated. Also not included are people killed or injured while manufacturing devices. For some countries, such as Iraq or India, where verification of reported incidents was particularly difficult, even stricter criteria were applied as IED incidents were only included if the device was set off by direct (hand or foot) contact.

IEDs.⁶ Some 1,266 people were killed, 3,891 injured, and the status of 40 people was unknown. Casualties in 2008 were recorded in fewer countries and areas than in 2007: 75 compared to 78. Ten countries with recorded casualties in 2007 did not record any casualties in 2008, most notably Mauritania, which had recorded casualties every year since 2000.⁷ Seven countries that did not record casualties in 2007 suffered casualties in 2008,⁸ including Libya, where Landmine Monitor identified casualties for the first time since 1999 (despite regular but unconfirmed reports of high casualty rates). Casualties again occurred in Mali, which recorded its first-ever casualties in 2007, and in Niger, which had not recorded casualties for several years before 2007.

In earlier years there was an average annual decrease of at least 9%, but casualty rates in 2008 were 5% lower than 2007.⁹ It is even possible that 2008 will be the first year since 2005 in which there is no decrease in the casualty rate compared to the previous year. This is because 2008 casualty figures only include casualties recorded in formal data collection mechanisms and identified by Landmine Monitor through other means, which are incomplete in nearly all countries (see Data collection section below). Additionally, data collection is slow in many countries/areas, meaning that casualties are “discovered” long after the incident date.¹⁰

Casualty demographics

In 2008, some 61% of casualties (where civilian/military status was known) were civilians (2,821 of 4,611).¹¹ While civilians still make up most casualties, as a percentage of total casualties they continued to decrease from 71% in 2007 and 81% in 2005.¹² This is mainly due to the high number of military casualties in **Colombia** (507) and **Myanmar** (508). Other reasons were possible over-reporting of military casualties in the media and major incidents causing multiple military casualties. In total, there were 1,694 casualties among security forces, with Colombia and Myanmar accounting for 60% of these casualties.

⁶ This figure is the number of casualties recorded in formal data collection mechanisms and/or identified by hospitals, NGOs, or through the media. The actual number of casualties is certainly higher, as many countries do not have data collection mechanisms, data collection is not nationwide, does not include all groups of the population, or is hampered by security or geographic difficulties.

⁷ The 10 countries without new casualties were Albania, Armenia, Chile, France, Gambia, Honduras, Latvia, Mauritania, Namibia, and South Africa.

⁸ The seven countries with new casualties were Bangladesh, Cyprus, Greece, Libya, Malaysia, Moldova, and Montenegro.

⁹ Landmine Monitor Report 2008 identified 5,426 casualties in 78 countries and areas in 2007. Due to slow data collection and data verification the total of 5,426 was revised to 5,473, with changes in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Chad, Colombia, Georgia, Jordan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Niger, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.

¹⁰ For example in 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 256 additional casualties for 2006 in Afghanistan alone compared to data available in 2007. This data was made available to Landmine Monitor only in mid-2008. Casualty updates for 2008 have already been received from several countries, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad and Colombia in early September 2009, which could not be included due to the incomplete nature of the data provided.

¹¹ The civilian/military status of 586 casualties was unknown.

¹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 53.

States and other areas with mine/IED/ERW casualties in 2008¹³

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe	CIS	Middle East & North Africa
Angola	Colombia	Afghanistan	BiH	Azerbaijan	Algeria
Burundi	El Salvador	Bangladesh	Croatia	Belarus	Egypt
Chad	Nicaragua	Cambodia	Cyprus	Georgia	Iran
Côte d'Ivoire	Peru	China	Greece	Kyrgyzstan	Iraq
DRC	US	India	Montenegro	Moldova	Israel
Eritrea		Indonesia	Poland	Russia	Jordan
Ethiopia		Korea, South	Serbia	Tajikistan	Kuwait
Guinea-Bissau		Lao PDR	Turkey	Ukraine	Lebanon
Kenya		Malaysia	<i>Kosovo</i>	<i>Abkhazia</i>	Libya
Mali		Mongolia		<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Morocco
Mozambique		Myanmar/Burma			Syria
Niger		Nepal			Yemen
Rwanda		Pakistan			<i>Palestine</i>
Senegal		Philippines			<i>Western Sahara</i>
Somalia		Sri Lanka			
Sudan		Thailand			
Uganda		Vietnam			
Zambia					
Zimbabwe					
<i>Somaliland</i>					
19 states and 1 area	5 states	17 states	8 states and 1 areas	8 states and 2 areas	12 states and 2 areas

There were 96 demining casualties in 14 countries in 2008, a 20% decrease compared to 2007, when there were 120 casualties.¹⁴ By far the most clearance casualties occurred in **Afghanistan** (51 casualties, 53% of all demining casualties in 2008), followed by **BiH** (eight, but 30% of total mine/ERW casualties in that country), **Iran** (eight), and **Cambodia** and **Iraq** (seven each). The drop is largely due to a sharp decrease in demining casualties in **Cambodia** (seven, down from 17 in 2007) and **Lebanon** (one, down from 16). Just one female demining casualty was recorded in **Mozambique**. In addition, among the total military casualties, 12 were conducting clearance when the incident occurred.

The vast majority of casualties where the gender was known were male (3,754, or 91% of 4,115), 361 were female (9%). The gender of 1,082 recorded casualties was unknown (21%, compared to 19% in 2007). For civilian casualties only, females made up 12% of casualties (309 of 2,478 where the gender is known). Females were the majority casualty group in three countries (**Bangladesh**, **Mozambique**, and **Rwanda**), but this was related to specific incidents causing multiple casualties and not to a pattern of activities putting women at particular risk.


In **Lao PDR**, **Nepal**, **Somaliland**, and **Yemen**, the percentage of female casualties was significantly higher

than the 2008 average, because certain livelihood activities that women typically engage in put them at higher risk. For example, in **Yemen** women traditionally tend the animals or collect water, food or wood. In both **Lao PDR** and **Nepal**, women are more extensively involved in scrap-metal collection or related activities.


Children accounted for 28% of casualties where the age was known (1,184 of 4,214). For some 19% of people, no age information was known (983). For civilian casualties only, children constituted 41% of casualties where the age was known.¹⁵ Nearly three-quarters of child casualties were boys (869) and 193 were girls; the gender of 122 child casualties was not known. In an increasing number of countries and areas, boys were the single largest casualty group: **Chad**, **El Salvador**, **Eritrea**, **Jordan**, **Lao PDR**, **Nepal**, **Somalia**, **Somaliland**, **Sudan**, and **Yemen** (compared to just three countries in 2007: **Chad**, **Kosovo**, and **Lao PDR**). In **Afghanistan**, nearly half of all civilian casualties were boys, a significant increase compared to 2007.

For all adult casualties, 93% were men (2,828 of 3,030), but less than half of these men were civilians (1,358 or 48% of adult male casualties). Some 5% of casualties were women (164), including 137 civilians (84% of adult female casualties).¹⁶

Casualties in 2008 by Gender



Casualties in 2008 by Age



¹³ IED refers to victim-activated improvised explosive device.

¹⁴ The 14 countries with demining casualties included Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen.

¹⁵ This equals 1,040 civilian child casualties of 2,566 civilian casualties where the age was known. In addition to this there were a few child soldier casualties and several children for whom the civilian/military status could not be determined.

¹⁶ For 38 adults no gender details were known.

Campaigners receive a briefing at a rehabilitation facility in Peru.

Devices causing casualties

In more than one-quarter of cases, the device that caused the casualty was unknown (1,342). For the 3,078 cases where the device type was known:¹⁷

- antipersonnel mines caused 715 casualties (23%), a decrease compared to 25% in 2007;
- antivehicle mines caused 440 casualties (14% up from 13% in 2007);
- unspecified mines caused 486 casualties (16% up from 11% in 2007);
- cluster munitions caused 125 casualties (4% down from 5% in 2007);¹⁸
- other ERW caused 1,227 casualties (40% up from 36% in 2007); and
- victim-activated IEDs caused 80 casualties (below 3%, down from some 10% in 2007).¹⁹



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ERW casualties (excluding those caused by cluster munitions) occurred in 49 states/areas, antipersonnel mines casualties in 31 countries, antivehicle mines casualties in 19, victim-activated IEDs in 10, and cluster munitions casualties in nine.

Where age was known, most antipersonnel mine casualties were adults (80%).²⁰ Nearly all adult antipersonnel mine casualties were men (94%), including 54 deminers. Civilians were most affected by antipersonnel mines in **Cambodia, Myanmar, and Pakistan**. Similarly, most casualties caused by antivehicle mines were adults (88%), and 95% of these were men. Civilians traveling were at particular risk from antivehicle mines in **Afghanistan and Pakistan**.

As in previous years, cluster munitions were the only device type where the child-adult ratio was 50-50. **Lao PDR** was the only severely affected country where children constituted the largest group of cluster munition casualties. In **Cambodia**, which is less-affected by unexploded submunitions than Lao PDR, children also made up the largest group of cluster munitions casualties.

When looking at ERW other than cluster munitions, the majority of casualties were children (57%).²¹ When the gender was known, some 45% of ERW casualties were boys, 42% men, 9% girls and 4% women. Boys were particularly affected by ERW in **Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Lao PDR, Nepal, Sudan, and Yemen**.

Activity at time of incident

While in many cases crucial information about the activities being carried out by casualties at the time of the mine/ERW incident is lacking, Landmine Monitor was able to collect this type of information for 3,617 (or 70%) of the casualties it identified. Due to the large percentage of military casualties, “security” was the most common type of activity (1,305), although security forces were also involved in incidents, for example while traveling, carrying out clearance, tampering with devices, and handling devices.


The second most common activity at the time of incidents was traveling (516), most often caused by antivehicle mines (44%) or antipersonnel mines (23%).

This was followed by tending animals (247), standing near/passing by during an incident (207), playing/rec-


²⁰ 556 of the 692 antipersonnel mine casualties whose age was known.

²¹ 640 of 1,117 ERW casualties where the age was known, excluding cluster munitions.

Casualties in 2008 by Device



Casualties in 2008 by Age and Device




¹⁷ As in all previous years, casualties from Colombia (777) were also excluded, because casualties are incorrectly labeled as caused by antipersonnel mines.

¹⁸ As in all previous years, this does not include direct casualties from cluster munition strikes.

¹⁹ An additional five casualties were caused by an IED that was vehicle-activated, thus functioning as an antivehicle mine.

recreation (197) and collecting food/wood/water (182). All livelihood activities combined resulted in 651 or 18% of casualties for whom activity information is known;²² 92% of those carrying out livelihood activities were civilians (602). Some 56% of casualties occurring during livelihood activities were adults and 44% were children. Most livelihood casualties were caused by mines (311), usually antipersonnel mines (210). But children were much more at risk from ERW during livelihood activities. These figures exclude those deliberately dealing with explosive devices for economic gain.

Activities involving people who, intentionally or unintentionally, interact directly with explosive devices caused 452 casualties. These include 188 people tampering, 145 people handling explosive devices (excluding demining accidents), 88 people collecting scrap metal, 29 playing and two burning explosive devices. It needs to be noted that many casualties among those fishing or tending animals probably also involved deliberate handling of explosive devices. This could explain why children were at more risk from ERW than from mines while conducting livelihood activities. Three-quarters of casualties in which the device was handled were caused by ERW, and casualties were usually male (85%). The largest casualty group was boys (45%), followed by men (40%), girls (10%), and women (5%). Boys are particularly at risk in **Cambodia** and **Nepal** (where girls were also at high risk). Scrap metal collection became an increasing problem among men in **Egypt**.



© Gretchen Murphy/LSN Vietnam, 21 June 2009

Other activities causing casualties were coca eradication (68 in **Colombia**) and portering/forced labor (eight in **Myanmar**).

²² This increases to 28% when excluding the casualties resulting from "security" activities from the total number of casualties where the activity at the time of the incident is known.


Regional distribution

Casualties were recorded in every region of the world in 2008 (see table below). There were significant increases in the Asia-Pacific region and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Region	2008		2007	
	No. of casualties	No. of countries / areas with casualties	No. of casualties	No. of countries / areas with casualties
Africa	705	20	954	24
Asia-Pacific	2,813	17	2,495	15
Americas	805	5	982	7
Commonwealth of Independent States	155	10	118	10
Europe	178	9	238	9
Middle East and North Africa	541	14	686	13

The 26 States Parties responsible for significant numbers of survivors accounted for 55% of total casualties in 2008 (2,867) and just two of these countries (**Afghanistan** and **Colombia**) accounted for 34% of total casualties (1,769).

Casualties in 2008 by Region



In 2008, 35 countries recorded increased casualties compared to 2007, in some cases significantly, for example in **Egypt** (40 up from 25), **Iraq** (263 up from 216), and **Pakistan** (341 up from 271).

- **Afghanistan** also saw the first increase in casualties since 2005 making it the country with the highest number of casualties in 2008 (992 up from 842).
- In **Georgia** casualties increased due to the 2008 conflict (to 26 up from three the previous year).
- In **Myanmar** the increase was due to access to information about military casualties (721 up from 438).
- In 37 countries there were fewer casualties in 2008 than in 2007, for example in **Chad**, **Nepal**, and **Vietnam**.
- **Cambodia** continued the downward trend started in 2006 (269 down from 352 in 2007); the 2008 rate is only 31% of the 2005 rate when 875 casualties were recorded.

Survivor in Vietnam makes fish hooks as part of a socio-economic reintegration project.

Persons with disabilities make shoes at a rehabilitation facility in Peru.

- In **Colombia** the decline in casualties started in 2007 continued (777 down from 904), the first time since 2005 that it is not the country with the most casualties.
- In **Lebanon**, for the first time since the 2006 conflict, casualties returned to levels similar to 2005 (28 down from 130 in 2007 and 207 in 2006).
- In many other countries, however, decreased casualty rates were at least partly attributable to worse data collection, for example in **Burundi**, **Ethiopia**, and **Namibia**.²³

Trends in States with 100 or More Casualties in 2008

State	Casualties in 2008	Casualties in 2007
Afghanistan	992	842
Colombia	777	904
Myanmar	721	438
Pakistan	341	271
Cambodia	269	352
Iraq	263	216
Chad	131	188
Somalia	116	74
Lao PDR	100	100
Turkey	100	101

New casualties in 2009

Casualties continued to be recorded in 2009, in at least 59 countries and areas as of September 2009, including three countries where no casualties had been recorded in 2008 (**Albania**, **Japan**, and **Uzbekistan**).²⁴ In **Chechnya**, **Guinea-Bissau**, and **Western Sahara** the recorded totals were almost as high or higher than the annual total for 2008.

Egyptian campaigner meets with a landmine survivor.



© Ayman Sarour, 2008

²³ In three countries (Israel, Lao PDR, and Syria) there were just as many casualties in 2008 as in 2007.

²⁴ In 2009, Landmine Monitor identified five new ERW casualties, one killed and four injured in two incidents in Okinawa, Japan. Three of these casualties occurred on 24 March 2009, in the worst incident since 1974. A US marine was killed and another marine and sailor were injured while disposing of ordnance at an US military facility. Eric Talmadge, "60 years after Second World War, Okinawa still rife with bombs," *The Canadian Press*, 3 May 2009.



© Mike Kendall, September 2008

Data Collection

In 1999, Landmine Monitor noted that, "Concrete information on mine victims remains difficult to obtain" and "seriously lacking."²⁵ In 1999, most available information was patient information from ICRC rehabilitation programs, thus not actual casualty data. Landmine Monitor also noted that data collection methods "can do more harm than good if they proliferate and are not closely linked to action that is tangible to the survivor community."²⁶

In 2009, it is accepted that comprehensive casualty data is crucial to understanding the scope of the challenges and the needs of survivors. The main purpose of casualty (and service) data collection is its use for planning purposes, not only for victim assistance but also other mine action tasks (such as clearance and mine/ERW risk education).

While data collection has improved since 1999, Landmine Monitor has reported consistently throughout the decade that mine/ERW casualties are certainly under-reported because of inadequate data collection mechanisms, inaccessible terrain, conflict, under-reporting of fatal casualties, fear, or political sensitivities.

Still, 28 of 75 countries/areas with casualties in 2008 did not have formal data collection mechanisms, including some with persistently high casualty figures, for example **Iran**, **Myanmar**, and **Pakistan**, or to a lesser extent **Algeria**, and **Uganda**. These 28 countries accounted for 1,408 casualties in 2008 (or 27% of the total—up from 25% in 2007 and 19% in 2006), which Landmine Monitor mainly identified through media reports. The remaining 47 countries/areas had data collection systems, and 29 of these used the Information Management System for

²⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 19.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Mine Action (IMSMA) to store data collected.²⁷

However, even when data collection mechanisms existed, these were incomplete in the vast majority of countries (43). Only in **Cambodia, Jordan, Kosovo, and Tajikistan** could casualty data for calendar year 2008 be considered “complete.” These accounted for 306 casualties (6%) in 2008, meaning that 94% of casualties in 2008 were recorded in countries with incomplete or no data collection (up from 93% in 2007 and from 92% in 2006). Another country with complete data collection, **Albania**, recorded casualties in 2009. Through media, hospital or NGO information, Landmine Monitor identified additional casualties that were not recorded in 28 of the 47 countries with data collection mechanisms in 2008 (955 or 18% of total casualties).

When data collection mechanisms exist, the most common problems were: limited geographic and demographic coverage; a lack of standard methodology, terminology or types of information collected; a lack of useful detail on devices, demographics, socio-economic indicators, or activities; a lack of capacity impeding proactive data collection; poor quality control and verification; and multiple actors collecting overlapping and contradictory data in separate databases. Further problems are that casualty data is insufficiently linked to contamination or victim assistance data, data is not shared for planning

purposes or linked to referral mechanisms, resulting in data collection for compilation purposes rather than the provision of assistance.

Conclusion

Although recorded casualties have decreased significantly over the past five years, the number remains unacceptably high—there were still more than 5,000 recorded casualties in 2008. This is a far cry from the common estimate of 26,000 per year in the 1990s—even if it is not possible to gauge the accuracy of that estimate. For we will never know exactly how many people were killed or injured by mines or ERW returning to Afghanistan, gathering food in Angola, or growing rice in Cambodia. What is certain is that casualty data collection still remains inadequate in many countries. It is a fundamental responsibility of states to assist those most directly affected by mines and ERW, and a pre-requisite to such assistance is an accurate determination of the number of survivors as well as the dependants of those who did not survive.



Landmine survivor speaks with an NGO worker in Colombia.

© Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, 2009

²⁷ In comparison *Landmine Monitor Report 2003*, p. 40, reported that, “Of the 65 countries, and seven areas, reporting new mine casualties in 2002–2003, only 25 countries and four areas report using IMSMA, or other databases, to record casualty data. Of those, only 18 countries and two areas provided Landmine Monitor with full year data.”



Risk Education

© Benoit Darrieux/HI, July 2009

1999–2009 Overview

Mine and explosive remnants of war risk education (RE) has evolved significantly since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999 as many programs have shifted from a purely message-based approach towards efforts to bring about broader behavior change and risk reduction. Overall, there has been a marked—though not universal—shift from “mine awareness” in 1999 to “mine/ERW risk education” in 2008.¹ Influencing risk-taking behavior is very challenging, however, as it is often related to complex economic, cultural, and social factors.

RE seeks to reduce incidents caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices, and explosive remnants of war (ERW).² When done well, RE involves a combination of actions: raising awareness of the threat, working with communities to identify ways to reduce risk and promote behavior change, providing information to clearance operators (and sometimes even contributing to demining prioritization), identifying development interventions to reduce risk, and contributing to victim assistance by supporting casualty data collection and providing information to survivors about services.

Broader risk reduction approaches were identified within RE programs in at least six states in 2008 (**Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam**). In these states, programs worked with communities to explore alternative behaviors, improve input into clearance decision-making, and link with other development sectors to decrease the impact of mines and ERW. Similarly, the support of RE to mine action through community liaison has increased. In **Vietnam**, it has made

clearance more efficient, and in **Angola** it has contributed to land release.

Effective programs are based on a solid understanding of the target groups for RE, and why they are at risk.³ According to Landmine Monitor’s review, thorough analysis has unfortunately been lacking in almost all RE programs. Indeed, in 2008 in at least 26 states and areas, RE programs were still being implemented without comprehensive needs assessments.⁴ In **Afghanistan**, for instance, which has the world’s oldest mine action program, a European Union evaluation in 2008 found that RE was not based on a good understanding of the target audience.⁵

Risk education briefing in Somaliland.



Mine warning sign in the DRC.

© Anne Hodalic/ITF, February 2009

¹ The term “education” reflects a change from simple awareness-raising of the threat—people in affected areas are often already aware there is a problem—to engaging with communities in a dialogue about the problem and possible solutions.

² The reference to ERW as well as mines recognizes the fact that UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance causes as many, if not more, casualties than mines in most affected states/areas.

³ For instance, a 2006 study by MAG and UNICEF in Lao PDR challenged the common assumption that people engage in dangerous livelihood activities through lack of choice, and found that: “[W]hile contributing factors of voluntary exposure were often rooted in poverty, it was rarely perceived by communities or individuals as the only option. More commonly, intentional UXO risk-taking was found to be based on a rational decision-making process involving weighing the potential costs and benefits of a range of available options.” Jo Durham, “Needs Assessment in Lao PDR,” *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 11.1, Summer 2007.

⁴ No needs assessments have been conducted in the last three years in the following states and areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, DRC, Croatia, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Mauritania, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Somaliland, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Needs assessments were conducted in only limited geographical areas in Chad, Iraq, Mozambique, and Somalia.

⁵ Paul Davies and Bruce Todd, “Mid Term Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan – Final Report,” EU Programme for Afghanistan, April 2009, p. 62.

States and other areas with RE in 2008

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe	CIS	Middle East & North Africa
Angola Burundi Chad DRC Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Guinea-Bissau Kenya Mali Mauritania Mozambique Rwanda Senegal Somalia Sudan Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe <i>Somaliland</i>	Colombia Ecuador El Salvador Nicaragua Peru	Afghanistan Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar/Burma Nepal Sri Lanka Thailand Vietnam <i>Taiwan</i>	Albania BiH Croatia Cyprus Poland <i>Kosovo</i>	Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Russia Tajikistan <i>Abkhazia</i> <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Algeria Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Lebanon Syria Yemen <i>Palestine</i> <i>Western Sahara</i>
19 states and 1 area	5 states	8 states and 1 area	5 states and 1 areas	5 states and 2 areas	8 states and 2 areas

Risk Education in 2008

In 2008, RE was provided in 57 states and areas, compared to 61 states and areas in 2007. RE activities increased significantly in Yemen and Somaliland, and also increased to some degree in 10 other states.⁶ In Palestine, RE decreased in 2008 but rose sharply in response to conflict in Gaza in December 2008–January 2009.

A decrease in RE due to reduced funding or capacity was reported in 10 states.⁷ Activities decreased in several states and areas in line with a reduced need for RE: **Abkhazia, Burundi, Kenya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Nicaragua**. In **Mozambique** the number of RE beneficiaries reportedly decreased, but there was greater integration of RE activities with clearance activities.

There were no RE programs in several states, although contamination and casualty data indicated that there was probably a need: **China, Republic of the Congo, India, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Philippines, Rwanda, and Turkey**. In **Myanmar**, several needs assessments have been conducted in the past few years, but only limited RE activities have been undertaken due to the ongoing conflict.

In most other states and areas, the level of RE remained the same as in 2007, or data for 2008 were not available for comparison.

⁶ Ten states with increased RE included: BiH (though it still represented a decrease from 2006), DRC, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mali (in response to an incident), Peru, Tajikistan, and Somalia.

⁷ Ten states with decreased RE due to funding or capacity included: Angola, Chad, Chile, El Salvador, India, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Risk education targeting

Information about who is at risk, and why, should be analyzed from contamination data, casualty data, landmine impact surveys, and knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) surveys. Casualty data has shown that the overwhelming number of incidents result from engagement in livelihood activities, particularly farming, herding, and collecting food, fuel, water, building materials, and scrap metal for sale. Scrap metal collection was reported as a risk activity in at least 14 states and areas.⁸ In **Lao PDR** it caused 32% of casualties in 2008.

Traveling (including crossing borders, sometimes illegally, as in **Greece** and **Thailand**) results in casualties, as does tampering either to defuze ordnance or because of



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⁸ Scrap metal collection was reported in: Albania, Algeria, BiH, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen.

Risk education seminar in India.

curiosity, particularly among children and young adults. The majority of casualties were men, although in some states women and children made up a significant proportion of casualties (see Casualty data section above).

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are particularly vulnerable, whether in the place they are displaced to, while traveling, or on their return home. In 2008, RE programs targeting refugees and IDPs were reported in at least 19 states.⁹ In 2008, in **Cyprus** and **Greece**, illegal immigrants became mine casualties.

People are also at risk when hazardous areas are unmarked, or where marking is inadequate or not maintained, as is the case in a large proportion of states, for example in **Angola** and **Turkey**. Areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, such as in south **Lebanon**, are very difficult to mark.

In many states, needs assessments, including KAP surveys, are conducted as part of ongoing information-gathering during RE activities. In 2008, assessments and surveys for nine states were made available to Landmine Monitor: in Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, northern Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Serbia, Somalia, and Vietnam. Only three—**Ethiopia**, **Nepal**, and **Somalia**—suggested that people lacked awareness or knowledge.¹⁰ Most research found that people were generally aware of the risks posed by mines/ERW but still engaged in dangerous behavior.

In **Serbia**, for instance, high-risk behavior was reported in more than 90% of surveyed contaminated areas. According to a 2009 report by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), inhabitants of affected communities "seem to underestimate the threat" from unexploded submunitions.¹¹ The "frequency of incidents is such that the probability of activating unexploded submunitions will rise with the growing needs of the population to use the blocked land."¹²

In northern **Iraq**, a UNICEF/Handicap International (HI) survey said that general knowledge about mines and UXO was good and most affected people had participated in at least one RE session. Even so, some of their knowledge was still rather superficial (for example about marking signs and evacuation procedures from a minefield) and some impacted villages had not yet received RE. In some districts women were usually "less knowledgeable" than males (but also less exposed to the risk). Children, thanks to the schools program, were usually "more knowledgeable" than adults.¹³

⁹ There were RE programs for IDPs and refugees in: Afghanistan, Croatia, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Georgia, Greece, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia.

¹⁰ GICHD, "A Needs and Capacities Assessment for MRE in Somali Region, Ethiopia," Geneva, 20 May 2008; UNICEF/Centre for Research on Environmental Health and Population Activities, "Knowledge, Attitude and Practice Survey: Improvised Explosive Devices, Landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War," Short version, Nepal, January 2008, p. 13; and Washington Okeyo, "KAP Survey Report 2008," HI, November 2008, p. 2.

¹¹ NPA, "Report on impact of unexploded cluster submunitions in Serbia," January 2009, p. 45.

¹² Ibid, p. 48.

¹³ UNICEF/HI, "MRE Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey in Northern Iraq 2008: Impact Monitoring Report," 2008, p. 76.

Methods of implementing risk education

Although there has been an increase in integrated efforts, RE in 2008 often focused on the dissemination of simple messages about the threat, rather than an integrated effort to reduce risk-taking behavior. These messages continued to be delivered in a number of ways: by teams hired for the purpose; community-based methods, through the training of community leaders, religious leaders, or churches; integration into the school curriculum; mass media; and the distribution of materials.

While most programs acknowledged the importance of 'communication-for-behavior-change' within a broader risk reduction strategy, only a minority was able to turn theory into practice during 2008. **Angola** used a solution-based methodology in which NGOs worked with community focus groups to discuss the mine/ERW problem and identify solutions. Participatory rural appraisal techniques such as community mapping and seasonal calendars were applied. **Cambodia** used livelihood/integrated mine action approaches, law enforcement, and monitoring of the scrap metal trade to reduce risk.



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In **Colombia**, the ICRC and Colombian Red Cross conducted risk reduction activities to ensure communities had safe access to important resources such as water, schools and agricultural land. **Lao PDR** adopted a behavior-change-communication approach in 2008 based on discussions of options and minimizing risk for intentional adult risk takers. A foundry project implemented by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Lao PDR conducted safety training for scrap metal collectors. In **Sri Lanka**, RE teams acted as a link to emergency relief agencies. In **Vietnam**, the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation launched a project to reduce the risk of scrap metal collection by setting up 28 "safe holding areas."

In at least 24 states and areas, community liaison, particularly links between affected communities and demining, was reported to take place.¹⁴ The level and type

Risk education in Angola.

¹⁴ The 24 states/areas with some form of community liaison were: Abkhazia,



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Risk education workshop in the DRC.

of links varied from country to country. In **Angola**, for example, RE organizations liaised closely with provincial mine action centers and provided information to communities on how to report contamination and casualties. MAG's community liaison teams were mainly engaged in survey in support of land release and impact assessments. In **BiH**, Community Integrated Mine Action Plans involved communities in decision-making. In **Vietnam**, MAG reported that its community liaison capacity, established in late 2007, had led to an improvement in clearance productivity by approximately one-quarter, as a result of improved quality of information and trusted reporting structures developed with stakeholders.¹⁵ At least four states operated hotline numbers for civilians to report contamination.¹⁶

About half of all RE programs in 2008 could be described as community-based.¹⁷ Community members, often volunteers, were trained (usually by NGOs, but also by national authorities) to disseminate RE messages, and often to act as mine action focal points, providing information about contamination and casualties, and sometimes feeding into local priority-setting. Some programs included child-to-child methods.¹⁸ In at least 15 states and areas, the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies delivered RE and engaged in mine action through their volunteer networks.¹⁹

RE was implemented directly by the mine action centers in only a few cases, and then often by military


Teaching children about the dangers of mines in Angola.

personnel.²⁰ In several states the army and police were involved in the dissemination of RE messages. In a small number of cases, RE was also reported to be conducted alongside clearance by the clearance teams themselves:²¹ in **Moldova** and **Poland** this was the only type of RE provided.

In **Vietnam**, district mobile communication teams operating in 2008 were funded by UNICEF, and while a UNICEF evaluation commended the project as an innovative experiment, it concluded that the project was "not a cost effective, efficient or appropriate vehicle for disseminating messages to the public."²²

School-based RE is an effective way of reaching many children, and integrating RE into existing structures can make it more cost effective and sustainable. By 2008, RE had been integrated into the curriculum in 13 states and areas²³ and was conducted in schools in at least 15 other states and areas.²⁴ However, school-based RE has its limitations and, therefore, cannot be used as the sole tool for RE. School-based RE is essentially a one-way provision of information and in some states children are not even the primary target group, based on analysis of risk. In **BiH** school-based RE did not appear to be fully functional, and in **Vietnam** UNICEF found that results in schools without RE in the curriculum were indistinguishable from those where it was included. In some states efforts to integrate RE fully into the curriculum were unsuccessful, due to a lack of resources or commitment from education ministries (though some school-based RE was still conducted).²⁵

RE messages were sometimes integrated with other non-mine action messages and other sectors: in **Sri**



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Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen.

¹⁵ Email from Ruth Bottomley, Community Liaison Manager Southeast Asia, MAG, 23 July 2009.

¹⁶ Examples of states with hotlines for civilians: Ecuador, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, and Vietnam.

¹⁷ States/areas with community-based RE programs: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Nepal, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Somaliland, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁸ Child-to-child methodology uses children and youth as a resource in RE.

¹⁹ Red Cross and Red Crescent RE activities in: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Western Sahara (Moroccan Red Crescent Society).

²⁰ Mine action center RE in: Chad, Eritrea, northern Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

²¹ RE alongside clearance in, for example, Albania, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

²² Centre for Community Empowerment CECM, "UNICEF Vietnam Support to Mine Risk Education," Evaluation report (draft), 20 August 2008, p. vii.

²³ RE integrated into curriculum in: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad (in 2009), Eritrea, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nepal (in 2009), Sudan, Vietnam, and Zambia.

²⁴ RE conducted in schools in: El Salvador, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, and Uganda.

²⁵ Efforts to integrate RE into curriculums were not successful in: Albania, Angola, Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.

Lanka with child protection messages; in Nepal as part of a social mobilization program; in Angola with HIV/AIDS messages; in Senegal with child protection and stress management/conflict prevention; in Afghanistan with disability advocacy; and in a number of states with small arms and light weapons (SALW) messages.

Emergency risk education

Emergency RE was conducted during and after conflict in 2008 in Chad, Georgia, Somalia, and Sri Lanka, and in early 2009 in Gaza. Other states that reported emergency RE were Nepal and the DRC.

Legal obligations to provide risk education

Article 6(3) of the Mine Ban Treaty calls on each State Party “in a position to do so” to provide assistance for mine awareness programs. There is no specific requirement on affected states to provide RE to those at risk.²⁶ The Convention on Cluster Munitions provides stronger support for programs in areas affected by unexploded submunitions; it specifically obliges affected States Parties to conduct “risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants,” taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 on international cooperation and assistance.²⁷ In conducting RE, States Parties are also required to take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).²⁸

Measuring the impact of risk education

Evaluations of RE programs were conducted in at least six states in 2008,²⁹ and several needs assessments also provided information on the effectiveness of RE programs. All evaluations recommended a greater focus on behavior change interventions and less emphasis on conventional information dissemination, with a better understanding of the target audience as none of the programs in question were assessed as doing this effectively or sufficiently. Other recommendations included better planning, implementation of standards, making RE sustainable, and using lessons learned from elsewhere.

According to a joint article by UNICEF and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “as with all mine-action activities, [for RE] dis-

tinguishing between outputs and outcomes has proven elusive.”³⁰ In other words it is easier to measure the number of people attending RE sessions, or the number of posters distributed, than it is to measure behavior change or whether RE is the determining factor in a reduction of casualties. Several evaluations reported that although it is difficult to measure the impact in a short period of time, the projects had resulted in behavior change. However, a review by Landmine Monitor of RE programs over the last 10 years provides next to no examples of where baseline data on knowledge, attitudes, and practice has been collected and then used as an indicator of change.³¹



© Noe Falk Nielsen, 29 May 2008

In many states, statements were issued in 2008 to the effect that RE has contributed to the reduction of incidents.³² Yet a correlation between casualty figures and RE activities, while an important indicator, is not sufficient alone to show the effectiveness of an RE program, as other factors may result in a reduction in casualties such as clearance, community awareness through the occurrence of incidents, or population movements. The Centre for Community Empowerment’s (CECEM) RE evaluation in Vietnam in 2008 admitted that “it is difficult to determine causality of association between UNICEF’s MRE program and its project aim of reducing the incidence and severity of injuries caused by UXO/landmines,” but believed that “UNICEF can claim due credit for contributing towards a decline in mortality and morbidity rates linked to UXO/mines in recent years.”³³ In BiH, however,

Risk education for internally displaced persons in Somalia.



© Mike Kendall, September 2008

Ecuadorian children with a schoolbag containing risk education messages.

²⁶ The July 2009 draft of the Cartagena Action Plan to be adopted by the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty called on States Parties to: “Provide mine risk reduction and education programmes to communities at risk that are in coherence with national standards and the International Mine Action Standards, age-appropriate and gender-sensitive, tailored to their needs, and integrated into education systems, mine action, relief and development activities.” “A Shared Commitment, Draft Cartagena Action Plan 2010 – 2014, Ending The Suffering Caused By Anti-Personnel Mines,” Geneva, 17 July 2009, p. 4, Action 18.

²⁷ Article 4(2)(e), Convention on Cluster Munitions. Article 6 provides that “each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance... to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of...risk reduction education...as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.”

²⁸ Article 4(3), Convention on Cluster Munitions.

²⁹ There were evaluations in: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Lao PDR, and Vietnam.

³⁰ Sharif Baaser, Eric M. Filippino, and Hugues Laurence, “Mine-risk Education in Mine Action: How is it Effective?” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 13.1, Summer 2009, p. 45.

³¹ This is partly because evaluations often recommend better data collection, as there often was no baseline information to work with. Additionally, even if information is contained in assessments or surveys, it is often not updated systematically to reflect changes in information so that it remains useful for planning.

³² In the following states the national authorities and/or RE operators made statements in 2008 to the effect that RE had resulted in a reduction in casualties, or this statement was made in evaluations: Afghanistan, Albania, Chad, Ecuador, the Gambia, Georgia, Jordan (though overall there was an increase in ERW casualties in 2008), Mozambique, Nicaragua, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, and Sri Lanka.

³³ CECEM, “UNICEF Vietnam Support to Mine Risk Education,” Evaluation report (draft), 20 August 2008, p. iv.

neither of two major evaluations in 2007 identified a causal relationship between RE implementation and casualty rates.³⁴

While beneficiary numbers are useful to show the extent of RE activity, alone they do not provide an indicator of its effectiveness. They say nothing about the quality of RE and whether it is targeted to at-risk groups, and are usually not compared with the number of people at risk. Moreover, it is very difficult to gather accurate beneficiary numbers, particularly when, as is usually the case, RE is conducted through community volunteers or integrated in other institutions, such as schools or the health sector. A much better indicator of the effectiveness of RE is the extent of reporting of contamination by the public. In several states this was noted as a positive indicator for the RE programs.³⁵



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Risk education for returned refugees in Angola.

Risk education coordination, management, and capacity-building

In the overwhelming majority of concerned states and areas, RE in 2008 was managed and coordinated by national authorities. In a small handful, UNICEF was the *de facto* coordinator, or played a significant role in coordination and management.³⁶ In Somalia, UNDP and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency managed RE.

In some states technical advisors were placed with the national authorities by the UN or an NGO.³⁷ The ICRC provided support to the many national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies conducting RE. In at least nine other states, UNICEF, the ICRC and international NGOs provided some capacity-building support through coordination meetings and funding.³⁸

Other methods of capacity-building included study

³⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 170.

³⁵ Reporting by the public was noted in, for example, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka.

³⁶ UNICEF had a key role in, for example, DRC, Iraq, Nepal, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Vietnam.

³⁷ For instance, in Lao PDR by MAG, Uganda by DDG, and in Eritrea and Jordan by UNICEF.

³⁸ There was UNICEF, ICRC, and NGO capacity-building in, for example, Angola, Chad, Columbia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, and Senegal.

visits (for instance, UNICEF supported Iraqi managers to visit Cambodia, and Eritrean managers to visit Kenya). International organizations provided short courses or training workshops to mine action centers and NGO personnel.³⁹ In a number of states, international NGOs partnered with national NGOs to build capacity, as in Angola, the DRC, and Vietnam.

The provision of international expertise, however, does not guarantee that best practices based on lessons learned over 10 years of RE are being put in place. Thus, an International Mine Risk Education Advisory Group was set up in 2008 to help disseminate best practices, and it had met twice by August 2009. New resources developed for use at an international level include the “Mine and ERW Risk Education: a project management guide” by GICHD in November 2008 and an “Emergency Mine Risk Education Resource Kit” developed by UNICEF in 2008.⁴⁰

The IMAS for RE were under revision as of September 2009. In 2008, the IMAS or national standards were reported as being used in at least 12 states.⁴¹

Risk Education from 1999 to 2008

In 1999, RE programs were identified in just 14 states: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sudan, and Yemen. Other limited mine awareness activities, mainly material distribution and the delivery of messages through the mass media, were identified in a further 21 states and areas.⁴² Over the last ten years, the number of states where RE has been conducted has increased significantly, to 57 in 2008, as has the level of activity within these states.

The understanding of the most effective way of delivering RE has changed since 1999. Back then, the prevailing assumption was that incidents took place because people were unaware of the risk from mines and ERW. In 1999, *Landmine Monitor* stated that, “The local population must learn how to live their daily lives in mine and UXO infested areas until the threat is removed.”⁴³ In Cambodia, a significant number of people had received RE by 1999, but *Landmine Monitor* reported that, “it is evident given the number of accidents that result from tampering with mines that many people lack or have incorrect knowledge about the dangers of mines/UXO,

³⁹ There were international organization courses in: BiH, Somalia and Sri Lanka.

⁴⁰ According to UNICEF, since its production the Emergency MRE Toolkit has been used to develop an MRE intervention in Gaza (2008–2009), Pakistan (2009), and by UNICEF in the Philippines (September 2009). Email from Judy Grayson, Senior Adviser, Landmines and Small Arms Cluster, Child Protection Section, UNICEF, 14 September 2009.

⁴¹ IMAS or national standards were used in: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia.

⁴² RE activities were also identified in: Albania, Belarus, Burundi, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Jordan, Namibia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Western Sahara, the former Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.

⁴³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 22.

especially children.”⁴⁴ The use of mass media and posters were highlighted as an important component of RE.⁴⁵

By 2000, Landmine Monitor stated that RE, “is a community-level education program that seeks to provide (or generate) viable alternatives to high-risk behavior to populations living or working in, or traveling through, mine-affected areas. It works best on the basis of two-way information exchange, learning from communities how they survive the daily threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and working cooperatively to identify how the risk of death and injury can be minimized. Mine awareness is frequently confused with public information about the effects of mines and UXO. Such information campaigns are extremely valuable but do not in a strict sense constitute mine/UXO awareness programs.”⁴⁶ Landmine Monitor emphasized the importance of needs assessments and the gathering of baseline data to understand the target audience,⁴⁷ and questioned the effectiveness of the use of mass media and posters.⁴⁸ This understanding of RE is the one that has prevailed over the last 10 years, and is the one reflected in the IMAS for Mine Risk Education (MRE) which were first released in December 2003. The number of programs that have adopted this approach has grown, though, as Landmine Monitor 2009 research has shown, many have failed to do so sufficiently.



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The Future of Risk Education

In order for RE to effectively contribute to casualty reduction through behavior change, and to support clearance activities and victim assistance, a number of areas need to be strengthened. First and foremost, all RE programs that seek to be effective should be based on a thorough understanding of the needs of the target audience, and greater effort should be invested in needs assessments, not just to know activity at the time of incident, but to understand the reasons for risk-taking (economic, social,



Mine awareness school campaign in Kosovo.

© Blurrin Haskelli, March 2009

cultural), and how behavior change or risk reduction strategies can address this.

Greater efforts will need to be exerted to ensure best practices are put in place and to share lessons learned from RE programs across the world. International advisors should have the appropriate skills, experience, and expertise, and more effort should be made to transfer knowledge and experience across mine/ERW-affected states. New projects are frequently established that fail to take on the lessons learned in other programs. Good resources have been produced, and their use should be promoted.

For RE to become more effective in changing behavior, reducing risk, and reducing the number of casualties, programs need to be more systematically evaluated, using appropriate evaluation methodologies and indicators and, where recommendations are made, they should be implemented. Thus, evaluations in 2008 in **Cambodia**, **Eritrea**, and **Vietnam** recommended the implementation of behavior-change strategies. Other states and areas, which have not had adequate evaluations, would likely benefit from similar approaches.

While it is true that evaluating behavior change is very difficult, it must be acknowledged that the majority of programs have not made efforts to do this. Programs in at least 28 states and areas have not been evaluated for at least three years, including some dealing with significant mine and UXO problems such as **Angola**, **Iraq**, **Sudan**, and **Yemen**.⁴⁹

In the next few years, the need for RE will probably decrease in most cases as a result of clearance, and stand-alone RE programs will no longer be required in many. Programs should increasingly look at integration into national structures to ensure sustainable and more cost-effective ways of implementing RE. This includes linkages with other messages, for example on SALW.

Finally, effective rapid-response emergency capacities need to remain in place. While conducting RE during conflict is challenging, a number of programs have been able to carry out emergency RE interventions with some success, such as in **Afghanistan** (2001–2003), **Sudan** (2005), **Nepal** (2006–2007), and **Gaza** (2008–2009).

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 403.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 23.

⁴⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 33.

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 35–36.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 34–35.

⁴⁹ Programs without evaluations for at least three years include: Angola, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nepal, Palestine, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. States with smaller RE programs that have not been evaluated in the last three years are: Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Syria.



Victim Assistance

© Soriyeen Men/HI, 12 December 2008

During the Mine Ban Treaty's first decade, victim assistance (VA) has made the least progress of all the major sectors of mine action, with both funding and the provision of assistance falling far short of what was needed. This is despite the treaty's promise in Article 6.3 that, "each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims..."

At the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November–December 2004, States Parties reaffirmed their promise to do "their utmost" to assist survivors by agreeing to undertake a set of actions to improve services, strengthen coordination, and ensure participation of survivors in decisions that affect them from 2005–2009.¹ Yet, by May 2009, the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration indicated that this promise had not been fulfilled. According to the co-chairs, "The challenges faced in 2009 are to a large extent identical to those faced in 2004 and likely will be the same as those to be faced in 2014."²

Certainly, VA coordination has improved and there is greater awareness of survivors' needs, but service provision has not improved significantly, particularly in the last five years. While many survivors have received some form of assistance through the years, services have had too many gaps, and been too unsystematic and unsustainable to improve the living conditions of most in any

lasting way. Most efforts remained focused on medical care and physical rehabilitation, often supported by international organizations and funding, rather than on promoting economic self-reliance for survivors, their families, and communities.

At the First Review Conference, States Parties agreed that 23 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors should make special efforts to meet their needs. Throughout 2005–2009, progress among these now 26 States Parties has been variable, with some countries actively engaging and others hardly at all. Progress was mostly visible in coordination aspects, rather than in implementation of actual services, even by those who made significant advances, as many of the so-called VA26's objectives related to data collection, strategies, awareness-raising, and coordination. Progress on activities was often unrelated to the plans the 26 countries set for themselves.

UXO survivor and her friends in Cambodia.



Campaigners visit a prosthetic workshop in Thailand.

© Shushira Chonhenchob, 1 April 2009

¹ "Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines: Revised Draft Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009," APLC/CONF/2004/L.4/Rev.1, 5 November 2004, Actions 29–39. The 11 concrete actions include pledges to increase and improve medical, rehabilitation, psychosocial and economic reintegration services, as well as casualty data collection capacities and legal frameworks. Additionally, States Parties were called upon to allocate sufficient resources, include survivors and experts in relevant discussions, and report regularly on progress.

² Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, "Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention—Priorities and challenges during the period 2010–2014," Geneva, 29 May 2009, p. 8.

At the Second Review Conference in November 2009, States Parties are expected to renew, if not reinforce, their political commitment to "ensure the full and effective participation and inclusion" of the "victims."³ Yet these individuals—hundreds of thousands of men, women,

³ "A Shared Commitment, Draft Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines," Geneva, 17 July 2009, p. 4. Victim in this context means the directly-affected individuals, their families, and their communities.

and children across more than 120 countries—need more and better assistance, not more unfulfilled promises, and they need it now.



© Semsiri Ingavani/IPS, 23 November 2008

Interview with a survivor in Thailand.

Survivor Inclusion

According to the Nairobi Action Plan, States Parties need to “ensure effective integration of mine victims in the work of the Convention.”⁴ The draft Cartagena Progress Review notes that, “States Parties have come to recognise the importance of the inclusion and active participation of mine victims and other persons with disabilities” in VA.⁵

Drawing on lessons from the Mine Ban Treaty, the negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions involved survivors more extensively, contributing to stronger VA obligations. Many States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have joined the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in which participation of persons with disabilities was underscored by the call “nothing about us without us.” In practice, however, only a few Mine Ban Treaty States Parties (for example, **Afghanistan, Albania, Tajikistan, and Uganda**) have fulfilled their commitment to involve survivors in planning, implementation, and monitoring of VA activities at local, national, regional, or international levels.

From 2000–2001, “raising the voices of landmine survivors” was one of the key themes at intersessional Standing Committee Meetings. In 2003–2004, Croatia, as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, encouraged the participation of survivors in State Party delegations to improve coordination with civil society and was one of very few delegations to Meetings of States Parties to

regularly include a survivor from 2005–2009.

Most survivors participating in international meetings were sponsored by civil society, such as the Raising the Voices program run by Landmine Survivors Network and its successors, or the ICBL VA focal point network.⁶ Civil society-organized survivor participation culminated in the Survivor Summit in November 2004 bringing together survivors from 30 countries and government representatives to discuss survivors’ needs. They submitted a declaration to the First Review Conference reiterating that governments should do more to ensure the rights and needs of survivors are met, and that survivors should be included in decision-making.⁷

At the national level, assessing survivors’ needs by consulting them directly is key to increasing both effectiveness and efficiency of services. Yet a survey of more than 1,500 survivors published by Handicap International (HI) in September 2009 found that just one in five respondents thought that survivors were included in VA/disability coordination and only one in four thought that VA plans were based on the needs of survivors. The study noted that 38% of respondents believed that survivors were involved in implementation of activities, but added that, “this percentage is likely too high as many respondents were NGO, DPO [disabled people’s organizations] or survivor organization members.”⁸

At international meetings, States Parties reported regularly on VA, although this was often not accompanied by the provision of regular information domestically, resulting in a lack of information on services and on VA achievements among survivors. The HI study noted that just 17% of survivors thought that they received regular information on VA/disability achievements:⁹ “When asked if they had a final comment, survivors most often said that this survey was an opportunity to get people to finally ‘Listen to Us’.”¹⁰

Landmine Monitor has found that while some countries made efforts to include survivors in activities, this was not systematic and was hampered by the limited means and capacities of survivor organizations or DPOs.

Afghanistan made concerted efforts to include survivors in workshops, though DPOs and survivors noted that coordination with the government remained difficult and that more activist organizations were often excluded. In **Colombia**, most survivors were not aware of their rights or services available to them, and occasional “survivor meetings” of the mine action program reached only a few of them. After initially excluding survivor organizations, **El Salvador** included them in VA work as of mid-2007, though most survivors still felt excluded as improved planning had done little to improve their daily lives. In

⁶ Between 2000 and 2004, 62 survivors from 37 countries/areas participated in the Raising the Voices program, which later became Widening the Voices, and Expanding the Voices.

⁷ “The Survivor Summit Declaration,” www.icbl.org.

⁸ HI, “Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak out on Victim Assistance,” Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 232 (hereinafter HI, “Voices From the Ground”).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ “Final Report, First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 101.

⁵ “Draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction: 2005–2009,” Geneva, 17 July 2009, p. 24.

Uganda, stakeholders said the main achievement since 1999 had been the increased autonomy of survivor associations. However, the government was unable to assist the national umbrella organization; blocked international funding hindered associations' activities; and logistical challenges made it difficult for associations, particularly from the west, to participate in meetings.

Victim Assistance Implementation

2008–2009: A status quo?

From 2008–2009, there was a continued lack of psychosocial support and economic reintegration even where there were improvements to national healthcare, physical rehabilitation, or disability laws/policies. The global economic crisis was cited for setbacks in placing survivors in jobs, for example by government representatives in **Serbia** and by survivors themselves in **Thailand**. Some countries, such as **Pakistan** and **Sri Lanka**, saw deterioration of services nationwide or in certain areas because of conflict and natural disasters.

Other trends included: the continuing handover of physical rehabilitation programs to national management and a continued increase of survivor associations and/or their capacities. On the downside, this period also saw the closure of several national NGOs/DPOs, continued capacity problems for others, and persistent funding challenges.

Understanding the needs

Accurate data about the number of survivors and their needs is critical to VA. Mostly, even countries with relatively complete casualty data continued to lack usable information about survivors' needs or services received. As in previous years, certain states aimed to improve this type of information through surveys or data consolidation, such as **Chile** or **Lao PDR**. A number of states (e.g. **India**) conducted disability surveys which could indirectly improve services relevant to mine/ERW survivors. **Azerbaijan** initiated a needs assessment of persons with disabilities and started offering skills development services as a result. **Thailand** completed a comprehensive casualty survey and needs assessment establishing the baseline for future planning and implementation of services.

Elsewhere, delays in setting up disability or injury surveillance mechanisms were cited as a reason for not collecting information on survivors' needs. At the same time, a few states made progress in VA entirely dependent on better data, notably in **Angola**, **Croatia**, and **Serbia**. As of 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina (**BiH**) had not completed the casualty data revision project planned since 2006, and data on VA services, which had previously been available, had not been collected. In **Cambodia**, a survivor survey was shelved because it was deemed discriminatory towards other persons with disabilities by external technical advisors. This survey was one of Cambodia's main 2005–2009 objectives to mitigate the negative impact of the continued lack of disability information on VA.

Emergency and continuing medical care

Improvements in medical care received by survivors were nearly always the result of efforts to improve healthcare for all, thus also benefiting survivors. As in earlier years, these gains were unrelated to VA planning, and were part of large-scale international development assistance or post-conflict reconstruction programs (**Ethiopia**, **Iraq**, and **Lao PDR**), improved economic situations (**Armenia**, **Azerbaijan**, and **Chechnya**), or more socially-oriented government programs (**Nicaragua**).

Notable exceptions in 2008–2009 were in **Albania**, where improvements to emergency medical care were based on the needs of survivors in its mine-affected northeast region and resulted from strategic VA planning; and **Thailand**, where general emergency medical services were expanded to reach adequate coverage, which was at the same time coherent with VA needs and plans.

Sometimes, infrastructure improvements happened but states lacked the capacity to utilize these improvements to enhance service provision, as in **Angola**. Conflict damaged or prevented the maintenance of medical systems in several countries (**Pakistan**, **Somalia**, and **Sri Lanka**). Conflict also prevented survivors from accessing existing facilities, such as in the Casamance region (**Senegal**) and the Kivu region (**Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **DRC**).

Physical rehabilitation

From 2008–2009, as in all previous years of the last decade, steady advances were made to physical rehabilitation. Services improved because of increased availability (new facilities or increased production), as in **BiH**, **Jordan**, and **Western Sahara**. In other cases, more



Survivor receives assistance at a rehabilitation center in Slovenia.

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efficient management and planning, sustained training and on-the-job capacity-building, or the establishment of minimum standards and curricula led to advances (**Afghanistan** and **El Salvador**). In **Nicaragua**, the government restructured the management of physical rehabilitation, began developing a national plan specifically for physical rehabilitation, and increased national funding.

Transition to national structures continued (**Azerbaijan**, **Ethiopia**, and **Tajikistan**), and a number of handovers prior to 2008–2009 were evaluated positively (for instance, the Juba Teaching Hospital in **Sudan**). Elsewhere, a deterioration of services in 2008–2009 was directly linked to the reduction of international support and the failure of national players to increase their role accordingly, such as **Algeria**. Despite a handover process started in 2001, none of the **Angolan** rehabilitation centers were fully functional—and services had deteriorated to levels worse than 2005—after the last international operator departed in August 2008. Some said the handover to national ownership was insufficiently prepared; many experts thought the main reason was a lack of Ministry of Health interest.

Some countries were able to operate solely on national capacity (**Armenia**, **Chile**, **Croatia**, and **Thailand**). In many more countries improvements to services remained heavily dependent on international support. While a three-year handover of rehabilitation services in **Cambodia** was initiated in mid-2008, the government achieved less than 50% of its targets for 2008 and international operators guaranteed all services. International operators expected that the government would not be capable of managing the sector by the end of 2010 as foreseen, although international funding for NGOs was decreasing. In **Guinea-Bissau**, the only operating physical rehabilitation center, which was NGO-run, lacked personnel for most of 2008 and its production decreased by 50% compared to 2007, despite increased international support.

Rehabilitation facility treating mine/ERW survivors in Slovenia.



© Ame Hodalic/ITF, December 2008

Most services remained centralized although a few countries sought to increase the number of mobile workshops and outreach services, such as **El Salvador** and northern **Sudan** (albeit planned since 2005). The HI survivor study revealed that, in **Albania**, few survivors thought they could access services closer to home, even though a new center opened by early 2008 and a repair

unit had been upgraded.¹¹ In **Iraq**, although rehabilitation centers were made operational nationwide so that patients would not have to travel great distances, fewer people came to the centers due to transport costs, insecurity, and a lack of information about the availability of services.

Psychological support and social reintegration

Despite a chronic lack of psychosocial support services for survivors, government institutions often failed to address the issue, leaving this type of assistance to family or friends, local NGOs, and DPOs or survivor organizations. The latter gradually gained more attention and some managed to expand activities, but for the vast majority of organizations, sustainability remained precarious due to a lack of financial support or capacity-building. Moreover, 2008–2009 saw the closure of several well-established survivor organizations citing financial and sustainability issues (**Serbia**), and reduced capacity due to management changes (**Peru**).

In **BiH**, **El Salvador**, and **Ethiopia**, existing survivor networks previously depending on the NGO Survivor Corps were transitioning to national organizations and in doing so expanded the scope of their work. In **Cambodia**, self-help groups continued to multiply, although coordination or exchanges of lessons learned between groups or the NGOs supporting them did not happen. Also, the groups' primary function was financial rather than psychosocial, and some were contribution-based, thereby excluding many survivors.¹² The only remaining survivor NGO in **Croatia** closed in 2008, following the closure of the largest one, the Croatian Mine Victim Association, in 2007.

In countries such as **Burundi** and **Senegal**, international NGOs provided psychosocial services but usually targeted all war-traumatized people, or increasingly focused on other groups of war victims rather than mine/ERW survivors, for example rape victims in the **DRC**.

Economic reintegration

The HI survey noted that 85% of survivors thought that they were the last to get jobs.¹³ Indeed, few advances were made to increase survivors' access to education and vocational training, to help secure employment, or to receive sufficient pensions. Many countries recognized economic reintegration as an absolute priority, but also acknowledged making the least progress in this area (**Afghanistan**, **El Salvador**, and **Serbia**). Others reported that economic reintegration projects were postponed or ended due to lack of funds (**Guinea-Bissau**).

Elsewhere, VA programs remained more focused on medical interventions and failed to recognize the importance of economic reintegration, for example in **Yemen**. Two long-term international funding commitments (to 2011) enabled national NGOs to boost eco-

¹¹ Ibid, p. 25.

¹² This means that a survivor needs to be able to make monthly (or other) payments into the group's fund in order to be able to make use of the group's support.

¹³ HI, "Voices from the Ground," Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 235.

conomic reintegration activities in **Sudan**. However, most were small-scale pilot projects, not all were reselected for second-phase contributions, and insufficient attention was given to following training programs with work opportunities.

Some countries reported advances in economic reintegration opportunities through the disability sector or, at least, adhered to the theory of integrating survivors in broader disability and development projects, for example in **India** and **Nicaragua**. Even when measures to this effect were taken, they did not necessarily lead to increased opportunities for mine/ERW survivors, since they were only one among many vulnerable groups seeking to receive assistance. The general economic slowdown in 2008–2009 further reduced economic prospects.

In some countries pensions increased, such as **El Salvador** and **UK. Croatia** established a department for persons with disabilities within the national employment agency and gave financial incentives to those employing persons with disabilities. In 2009, however, a government representative reported that employment rates remained low and that persons with disabilities were often fired as soon as companies' financial benefits ended.

Laws and public policy

New disability laws, policies, and/or coordination structures were developed in many countries, such as **Afghanistan, Montenegro, BiH, China, Namibia, and South Korea**.¹⁴ Elsewhere, legislation had been pending for so long that it was in need of adjustment by the time of approval (for example, in **Cambodia**). In other countries, legislative changes intended to benefit survivors remained pending for most of the last decade, for example in **Eritrea** and **Guinea-Bissau**. In other cases, the development of new legislation had an adverse effect, making the legal framework too complex, laws mutually exclusive, or reducing the number of sources for assistance. **Colombia**, for example, aimed to mainstream complex compensation mechanisms because survivors could not navigate the bureaucracy. While bureaucracy remained complex, a new decree actually limited access to services because the time to apply was reduced, documentation requirements were made stricter, and funding channels reduced.

Much of this legislative activity was the result of countries starting to align their disability legislation with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD); this effort should benefit survivors as well as other persons with disabilities.¹⁵ Sometimes survivors have been mentioned as a specific target group, for example in **Sudan**. It is still too early to determine if these laws will be enforced and positively impact survivors.

¹⁴ Of the 75 countries with casualties in 2008, 62 had specific or general legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. Legislative efforts were pending in two more (Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau).

¹⁵ As of 15 September 2009, there were 142 signatories to the UNCRPD, and 66 ratifications. In addition, 85 states signed the Optional Protocol and 44 ratified it. Of the so-called VA26, 17 signed the UNCRPD (16 on 1 September 2008) and 10 ratified it (six on 1 September 2008); 13 signed the Optional Protocol (10 on 1 September 2008) and seven ratified it (three on 1 September 2008). See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 43.



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1999–2009: Decade of known and unresolved challenges

Information and understanding about survivors have improved significantly since 1999. Since then, however, *Landmine Monitor* reported the same unmet challenges to VA service provision, i.e. that in the vast majority of countries “one or more aspects of [VA] were inadequate to meet the needs of mine survivors.”¹⁶

The conclusion in 2009 can only be that, although there is better knowledge and more services, this has failed to impact survivors in a systematic way. In the 2009 HI survey, survivors reached similar conclusions: just over 25% found they received more services in 2009 than in 2005 and 28% thought that services were better in 2009 compared to 2005.¹⁷

Survivor challenges

Survivors did not receive the assistance they needed when they needed it due to access, cost, availability, bureaucratic, and discrimination challenges.

Already in 2001, it was noted that most resources were dedicated to medical and physical rehabilitation;¹⁸ in 2009 economic reintegration and psychosocial support remained neglected. HI's survey found that from 2005–2009, survivors saw most progress in medical care (36%). Apart from being virtually non-existent, psychosocial services remained under-valued and stigmatized.¹⁹

Since 1999, better national legislation and an increasingly strong international framework (with the UNCRPD), has resulted in increased disability awareness among the general public and legislators. In prac-

Cluster munition survivor at a rehabilitation center in Lao PDR.

¹⁶ See for example *Landmine Monitor Report 2003*, p. 1, 43. *Landmine Monitor Report 2003* states there was inadequate services in 48 of 61 countries in 2002; *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 47. *Landmine Monitor Report 2004* states there was inadequate services in 53 of 66 countries with casualties in 2003–2004; *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 52. *Landmine Monitor Report 2005* states there was inadequate services in 51 of 58 countries with casualties in 2004–2005; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 59. *Landmine Monitor Report 2007* states that only around one-quarter of services in countries with casualties were adequate.

¹⁷ HI, “Voices from the Ground,” Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 230.

¹⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 41.

¹⁹ HI, “Voices from the Ground,” Brussels, 2 September 2009, pp. 230–231.

tice, disability legislation remained poorly implemented, budgets not allocated to disability strategies, and activities virtually not monitored. Recourse to action if rights were not respected was often unavailable, bureaucratic procedures complicated, and compensation payments not worth their while. The lack of legislative enforcement was most felt in the areas of economic opportunities and physical accessibility.



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Survivors survey in Thailand.

Economic reintegration was the area where nearly a quarter of survivors in the HI study saw deterioration.²⁰ Programs remained limited in number of beneficiaries, geographic coverage, and timeframe, and were mainly operated by NGOs with fluctuating funding. Programs did not meet market demands or survivors' needs and training was not followed by job placement or business opportunities. Vocational training required educational levels many survivors did not have, did not cater to the aging survivor population, and was not inclusive of family members. Survivors were often not granted loans because they were considered high-risk groups and employment quotas were not enforced.

Almost everywhere, basic (mostly medical) services in 2009 were available at the community level. In contrast, specialized services remained, as noted in 2002,²¹ centralized in urban areas far away from the mine-affected rural areas where most survivors live. Community-based rehabilitation increased though it remained limited. Rural facilities had difficulties coping with emergency and trauma situations and emergency transport or fast response times were inadequate, despite road and infrastructure improvements in many countries. This led the ICRC in 2009 to call for more investment in emergency services in affected areas because too many casualties "never become survivors."²²

Whereas basic services are often free, specialized or follow-up care usually are not, especially for the unin-

²⁰ Ibid, p. 231.

²¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*, p. 45.

²² "Proposals for the Cartagena Action Plan: compilation of key issues highlighted by the ICRC during the Standing Committee Meetings and the First Preparatory Meeting," provided by email from Camilla Waszink, Policy Adviser, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 9 June 2009.

sured, nor are costs of transportation, accommodation, or accompaniment by a caregiver. NGOs have increased their efforts in providing transport and accommodation, sometimes with local authorities, although these efforts only cover the identified beneficiaries and are often by reimbursement, which does not solve survivors' initial financial problems. Many survivors' economic situation does not allow them to be away from home or work for a long time, causing them to postpone or forego essential treatment. Long waiting lists further complicate the situation.

Despite calls for a holistic approach to VA, many actors focus on one aspect, do not refer systematically to other types of services, and teams in centers are not multi-disciplinary. Referral systems were often non-existent or deficient. A lack of awareness about available services, as well as bureaucratic obstacles to survivors receiving them, further exacerbated already significant difficulties for survivors. Overall, services for military survivors remained better than those for civilians.

Operator challenges

Most operators have had to face significant challenges in delivering assistance to mine/ERW survivors. First, while steady progress has been made in training physical rehabilitation staff, nurses, and first-aid responders since 1999, professionals trained in trauma care or formal psychological support, and teachers educated in disability issues, remained uncommon. Increased technical and management training was still needed for many staff, DPOs, and government stakeholders. Qualified staff, particularly specialized professionals, are usually concentrated in urban centers. Retaining well-trained staff has also proved to be a problem, particularly when programs were handed over to national management, or when competing with neighboring countries, the private sector, or NGO salaries.

Infrastructure, equipment, and supply shortages remained more common in rural areas, even though they were also a challenge in urban facilities. Cost issues were a particular problem for continuing medical care and physical rehabilitation (often requiring purchase of equipment and goods from abroad).

Increasingly, minimum standards and guidelines have been developed for the physical treatment and care of survivors, and also for mental health, though their systematic implementation as well as the sharing of lessons learned remains a challenge. VA continued to be carried out without sufficient casualty and service data. When data exists, it is not always used for planning, shared, or stored centrally, as evidenced by the difficulties of the VA26 countries in compiling statistical information for the Cartagena Progress Review.

International cooperation

The draft Cartagena Progress Review noted that, "a lack of financial resources and/or technical support continues to limit the potential for progress in some States Parties to develop and/or implement plans...States Parties in a

position to do so are obliged to provide assistance..."²³

Throughout 1999–2009, VA remained the smallest component of mine action funding, despite calls for increased and sustainable funding to match the long-term nature of VA/disability assistance. Increasingly, handovers and NGO pullouts were hurried by donor fatigue, even when national entities were only slowly increasing their contributions and lacked the financial resources to continue programs after international organizations had withdrawn.

Of the 20 countries with significant numbers of survivors which responded to an open question on their expectations for VA from 2005–2009, 18 had expected to receive increased financial and technical assistance, and 14 felt they had not received such support. Just one in seven donors deemed international contributions to VA sufficient, most often citing the continuing high levels of need and competing public health priorities in many recipient countries. Nevertheless, they added that unless affected countries could cover their own VA needs in 10 years or less, they would never be fully able to.²⁴

Victim Assistance Strategic Framework

2008–2009: cementing slow-paced progress

In 2008, Landmine Monitor stated that, with one year left, the VA26 States Parties²⁵ would have to increase their efforts if they truly wanted to make a difference in the lives of survivors in 2005–2009.²⁶ In 2008–2009, most progress was made in the following countries:

- **Albania**, the most consistent performer on VA from 2005 to 2009, completed or made significant progress towards all its objectives.
- **Afghanistan** and **Sudan** both started implementing their action plans and could demonstrate significant advances even though a good number of objectives remained unachieved.
- **Tajikistan** for the first time received funding sufficient to further its needs-based plan, although it had been able to maintain some small-scale activities and consistent coordination throughout 2005–2009.
- **Thailand's** improvements were based on finding a more appropriate VA coordination body and increased prioritization.
- **Jordan** made a promising start by identifying a focal point with a significant mandate, starting

²³ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, "Status of implementation of the Convention in relation to victim assistance," Geneva, 26 May 2009, p. 3.

²⁴ HI, "Voices from the Ground," Brussels, 2 September 2009, pp. 227–228.


²⁵ Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

²⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 39.

stakeholder consultations on how to effectively integrate VA into the disability sector while still ensuring that the special needs of survivors are met.

- **Cambodia** finalized its VA/disability action plan in February 2009, though operators have indicated the plan is too broad and may be unrealistic given current government capacity.
- In **Nicaragua**, the more socially-oriented government made progress in the health and disability sectors. This benefited survivors but was unrelated to VA planning.
- The **Peruvian** mine action center focused more on VA in 2009 by expanding the VA committee and holding regular meetings, though the benefits had yet to be felt by survivors.

Deterioration was seen in **Yemen** during the reporting period because the mine action program's VA department was forced to scale back its operations due to reduced national funding. The funds given were earmarked for clearance. As the program did not link with the disability sector, it was unable to identify funding and assistance alternatives, creating a dire situation for survivors solely dependent on the VA department. **Iraq** expected to have a VA focal point by the Second Review Conference but remained largely unengaged despite indicating in July 2008 that it was responsible for a significant number of survivors.



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For the remainder of the VA26 countries, activities continued, though the status quo appears largely to have prevailed.

- **Burundi**, **Chad**, and **Guinea-Bissau** were unable to make progress due to incessant capacity and funding gaps.
- In **Senegal**, the mine action center was unable to raise funding for VA and did not know which ministry it had to turn to for disability issues.
- Despite elaborate plans and well-established disability structures, progress in **Uganda** remained hindered by funding blockages and the lack of a technical advisor in 2008.

Landmine survivors discuss income generation opportunities with a shopkeeper in Afghanistan.

- In **Angola, BiH, El Salvador, and Mozambique** the main obstacle was a lack of authority by the coordinating body (often combined with funding/capacity constraints).
- Progress in the **DRC and Ethiopia** was hampered by continued ambiguity about who was in charge of coordination and a lack of government backing, among other reasons.
- In **Colombia** the VA coordinating body focused on planning rather than implementation, while in **Serbia** the focus was purely on physical rehabilitation.
- In several cases a lack of political will or involvement was noted, as in **Croatia or Eritrea**.



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Egyptian landmine survivor.

1999–2009: coordination successful while implementation failed?

The co-chairs noted in May 2009 that “Of course the most identifiable gains have been process-related...”²⁷ This is confirmed in the draft Cartagena Progress Review which lists developing objectives/plans, establishing coordination mechanisms, and VA/disability expert participation at international meetings among the main successes for 2005–2009. In 2004, Landmine Monitor similarly concluded that the main progress since 1999 had been awareness-raising.²⁸

Increased state participation

Whereas in 1999 international NGOs and the ICBL dominated the VA discourse, in more recent years the co-chairs gradually succeeded in engaging affected and donor states on VA, although interventions were usually “one-off” or just listed international NGO activities. More importantly since 2005, States Parties started to send appropriate people from health or social affairs ministries or from the disability sector to discuss VA at Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings. Whereas in 2004 just

²⁷ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of implementation of the Convention in relation to victim assistance,” Geneva, 26 May 2009, p. 2.

²⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 47.

two of 19 statements were given by VA/disability experts, by 2009 this increased to 15 of 22.²⁹ Some government experts have continuously participated from 2005–2009, although for most states the expert changed frequently and/or was present irregularly.

Already in 1999, the establishment of national coordination bodies was seen as necessary to bring together stakeholders and improve services.³⁰ A 2002 UN Mine Action Service consultation concluded that national coordination and planning was a key priority to ensure adequate assistance.³¹ Affected countries were encouraged to report more often and to use the so-called 4P’s format (plans, priorities, progress, and problems). By 2004, at least 22 States Parties had started developing VA action plans, including at least 13 of the future VA26, some of whom still did not have complete plans as of 2009.³²

Narrowing the focus to 26 states

Although all States Parties have a commitment towards survivors, the primary responsibility for the period 2005–2009 was placed on affected states. Because of significantly different development, contamination, and political contexts, affected countries should be directly in charge of determining the goals they wanted to achieve by the next milestone Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2009. Since 2004, “this responsibility is most pertinent”³³ for 23 (now 26) States Parties declaring responsibility for significant numbers of survivors, but also with the “greatest needs and expectations for assistance.”³⁴

During 2005–2009, these 26 countries participated in an informal process to ensure more measurable action³⁵ by committing to:

- assess their VA situation;
- develop SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) objectives to be achieved by 2009;
- create plans to achieve the objectives; and
- identify resources to realize the plans.³⁶

²⁹ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of implementation of the Convention in relation to victim assistance,” Geneva, 26 May 2009.

³⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 32.

³¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2003*, p. 65.

³² Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, pp. 62–63 (those without plans in italics).

³³ “First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction – Final Report,” APLC. CONF/2004/5, Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, p. 33.

³⁴ Ethiopia became the 24th State Party shortly after the First Review Conference, Jordan the 25th in 2007, and Iraq the 26th in 2008.

³⁵ They received “process support” for this from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Implementation Support Unit Victim Assistance Specialist Support through in-country visits, requested by all of the 26 States Parties except Eritrea, distance support (for example via email), outreach to other relevant organizations, and assistance with workshop organization.

³⁶ Kerry Brinkert, “Making Sense out of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Obligations to Landmine Victims,” GICHD, Geneva, 31 March 2006.

These states were also encouraged to set up inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. Their main tool was a questionnaire provided by the co-chairs in 2005. No other States Parties and just one state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty (Lebanon) have used the questionnaire to guide their activities.

Throughout 2005–2009, progress among the VA26 has been variable, with some countries actively engaging and others hardly at all. Progress was mostly visible in coordination aspects, rather than in implementation of services, even by those who made significant advances, as many of the VA26's objectives related to data collection, strategies, awareness raising and coordination. Progress on activities was often unrelated to the plans the 26 countries set for themselves. In many cases, achievements owed much to sustained UN support or to continuity in the VA focal point position. Gaps in capacity and financial means have been reported throughout the period.

Between 2005 and July 2009:

- **22 of the 26** States Parties presented the scope of their problem and objectives, although the latter were often not SMART and incomplete;³⁷
- **13** countries convened workshops on VA and/or action plans, which did not always lead to the development of plans or better coordination;³⁸
- **12** states refined their objectives to make them SMART-er, which sometimes meant making objectives less ambitious, extending timeframes, or removing specific beneficiary targets;³⁹
- **12** countries developed inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms to implement action plans; in at least 50% of these countries, these mechanisms are not functioning;⁴⁰
- **10** developed VA/disability plans. Because of the slow pace in developing them, most plans did not cover the first part of the 2005–2009 timeframe and extend past 2009;⁴¹
- **seven** countries implemented plans, though several only started in 2008–2009 because of the time taken to develop and/or approve plans and a lack of financial means;⁴²
- **six** “have reported progress in the achievement of specific objectives;”⁴³

³⁷ Burundi, Chad, Iraq and Jordan did not present this, although the latter two joined the informal process more than half-way through.

³⁸ Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.

³⁹ Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda.

⁴⁰ Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, El Salvador, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. The coordination body is not functioning in Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, and El Salvador.

⁴¹ Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

⁴² Afghanistan, Albania, Sudan, Thailand, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen.

⁴³ Afghanistan, Albania, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan and Yemen; see “Draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction: 2005–2009,” Geneva, 17 July 2009, p. 24.

- **three** states adequately monitored progress made against the plan (Albania, Sudan, and Tajikistan); and
- just **two** report on progress systematically (**Albania** and **Tajikistan**).



Albanian mine survivor.

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Reporting

It was recognized in the first years of Mine Ban Treaty implementation that better VA reporting was needed to assess progress. The development of Form J of the Article 7 reports started in 1999–2000 and the (ultimately blank) Form J was adopted in 2001. Since then, the need to further develop progress indicators has been a recurrent theme. As of 2009, the challenge of measuring progress, particularly in states' own reporting, has not been remedied even though the questionnaire of the co-chairs was to serve as a baseline for “an unambiguous assessment of success or failure” by the Second Review Conference.⁴⁴

Very few states have adequate monitoring mechanisms. A review of VA statements and Article 7 reports in 2008–2009 by Landmine Monitor showed clearly that states' reports were usually unrelated to objectives or plans, did not clarify progress compared to previous years, or explain the impact of activities on survivors.

The focus on the VA26 also made statements from other affected states increasingly infrequent throughout 2005–2009, even though some, such as **Algeria** or **Turkey**, struggled with a significant VA challenge. In May 2009, the ICRC stated, “We urge States [P]arties at the Review Conference to call for the development of more

⁴⁴ “Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,” Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, p. 6.

standardized and rigorous reporting and monitoring of the implementation of victim assistance commitments,” adding that this was “essential to maintaining a focus on victim assistance beyond the Review Conference and demonstrating that it is an area of implementation that merits increased investment.”⁴⁵



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Landmine survivor works as a truck driver in Egypt.

National Commitment and Capacity

In June 2008, the co-chairs noted that national ownership was “not a specific aim of the *Nairobi Action Plan*, perhaps because it should go without saying...”⁴⁶ More national ownership means improved VA coordination, ideally by the relevant ministries assessing needs and developing strategies adapted to local realities; placing organizations under national management; and increasing national budgets and abilities to mobilize external resources.

Since 2004, the co-chairs aimed to “work intensively, on a national basis with relevant States Parties in order to reinforce national ownership and ensure [...] long-term sustainability.”⁴⁷ VA became more effective when there was an ongoing, active involvement of national coordination bodies. Better coordination also helped to ensure participation of key stakeholders, more balanced priority-setting, better defined responsibilities, and increased accountability. Dialogue remained flawed when strategies were developed by one key player, often an expatriate, without consulting others, meaning that plans were not realistic nor had a broad base of support.

Even when coordinating bodies existed this did not mean that they could coordinate without assistance, or could do so systematically. Their merit was often limited to awareness raising or liaison, without much effect on

activity implementation. Giving the VA focal point or coordinating body more authority, as happened in **Afghanistan**, **Azerbaijan**, and **Thailand**, is a sign of increased ownership. The most common problems related to the lack of a mandate to direct other relevant government partners; competing claims of who is in charge; a lack of continuity in the coordination position; a lack of ministerial budgets; and a lack of political will. Responsibility for VA was often scattered among several bodies, just one of many competing priorities, or not integrated with the broader disability sector.

In 2001, *Landmine Monitor* noted that “it is essential that the international community focuses on local capacity-building...”⁴⁸ Increased government involvement has resulted in VA no longer being ‘a mere NGO program’ with national NGOs and DPOs increasingly participating and some sustainable handovers of programs to national authorities. Yet sustained international support remained indispensable in many more countries. In **Eritrea**, UNDP noted in 2004 that the “most comprehensive [VA] program in the world”⁴⁹ could be established, though activities seem to have halted as soon as Eritrea requested its UN technical advisors leave in mid-2005 and very little has been done since to assist mine/ERW survivors there.⁵⁰

In 2008–2009, international operators noted in several countries that no handover could be foreseen in the near future because of a lack of government capacity and/or will. In other places, transitions were hastened by decreasing funding or long-planned handover processes were not successful due to a lack of government interest, funding or capacity, directly impacting availability and quality of services (see Physical rehabilitation section above).

Sometimes, international operators have been substituting for the government for so long that there is an overdependence on them and decreased ownership, interest, and room for action by those who are primarily responsible—the national authorities. Additionally, there is increasing awareness that international operators have not invested sufficiently in training local counterparts.

As a result, nearly all the VA challenges listed in the draft Cartagena Progress Review relate to a lack of national commitment and capacities, mainly:

- non-prioritization of, and weak capacity to address disability issues and a lack of national ownership or interest to tackle VA/disability issues when faced with other competing priorities;
- weak state structures lacking bureaucratic, human resource, technical, and financial capacity to develop, implement, and monitor objectives, national plans, and legislation;
- inadequate resources to build government capacity; and
- inadequate long-term international assistance to remedy the national challenges.⁵¹

⁴⁵ ICRC, “Notes for ICRC intervention under the agenda item ‘Towards the Second Review Conference and beyond,’” Geneva, 29 May 2009.

⁴⁶ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Towards the Second Review Conference,” Geneva, 6 June 2008.

⁴⁷ “Draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction: 2005–2009,” Geneva, 17 July 2009, p. 23.

⁴⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 43–44.

⁴⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 431.

⁵⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 413.

⁵¹ “Draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention on the

Conclusion: Victim Assistance to 2014

It is hard to explain why assistance to mine and ERW survivors has been poorly supported in the past, particularly when donors have been generous to other mine action sectors. One factor is that VA has been the “least developed of the Convention’s core aims.”⁵² Additionally, throughout the past decade VA has been seen as a complicated field dependent on broader development, poverty reduction, public health, social services, and legislative efforts, requiring a long-term commitment for which concrete results might not be directly or visibly measurable. Improving VA is of course a difficult task when public health systems are beset with problems, especially in war-torn or developing societies. In providing VA, however, states are also reinforcing broader human rights, public health, and promoting social inclusion of vulnerable groups.

While the Mine Ban Treaty was the first conventional weapons treaty to include victim assistance provisions, more advanced VA frameworks are now provided in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UNCRPD. Combined with the clear lack of implementation progress, the Mine Ban Treaty will need a strong and implementation-oriented action plan to ensure more success in 2010–2014.

Synergies should be sought with both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and UN the UNCRPD which aim to provide a more systematic, sustainable approach to VA, bringing it into the broader disability and development context. The stricter obligations of both new treaties pave the path for more measurable action. The States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty can again lead the way by implementing a concrete 2010–2014 Cartagena Action Plan in which survivors can access comprehensive services, fully exercise their rights, and participate in decisions when and where needed.

Prohibition of the Use, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction: 2005–2009,” Geneva, 17 July 2009, pp. 25–26.

⁵² Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Priorities and challenges during the period 2010–2014,” Geneva, 29 May 2009.



Support for Mine Action

© Steen Wetlesen, 27 September 2008

For 2008 Landmine Monitor identified a total of US\$626.5 million in funding for mine action worldwide, combining international and national funding. International funding increased significantly, while national funding decreased slightly compared to 2007. Total international support for mine action for 1992–2008 was \$4.27 billion.

Landmine Monitor identified roughly \$517.8 million (some €351.7 million) of international funding allocated for mine action in 2008 from 23 countries and the European Commission (EC). This is an increase of approximately \$87.9 million (20%) compared to 2007 and the highest reported total to date, surpassing the previously highest total—\$475 million in 2006—by some \$43 million (9%). In national currency terms, 16 donors increased funding in 2008 compared to 2007, while six decreased funding. (The Czech Republic reported funds in Euros in 2008, but in Koruna in 2007.) Funding in 2008 was channeled to at least 53 recipient states and other areas. The top five recipients of mine action funding in 2008 were, in descending order, **Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Cambodia.**

Landmine Monitor also identified at least \$108.7 million (€73.8 million) in national funding (monetary or in-kind assistance contributed to their own mine action programs) in 2008 by 22 states affected by mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW). This is a decrease of roughly \$8.7 million (7%) compared to 2007.


Introduction

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty (international cooperation and assistance) recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. Landmine Monitor reports annually on support for mine action based on monetary and in-kind assistance reported by mine/ERW-affected states and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states. Landmine Monitor also reports on the estimated costs and resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling treaty obligations on

the part of mine/ERW-affected states, and the priorities and strategies for mine action assistance on the part of donor states.

Children running on land recently cleared of mines in Sri Lanka.

International Mine Action Funding 1996–2008 (US\$ million)



Landmine Monitor relies in most cases on responses to requests for information from, or public reporting by, donor and mine/ERW-affected states. While Landmine Monitor seeks to provide the most complete and accurate possible account of global mine action support, its reporting is limited by the ability and willingness of states to track and report their own funding and other forms of support, and by the availability of cost estimates, budgets, strategic plans, and other financial reporting.

Although several mine-affected countries have reported annual national funding for at least two consecutive years, reporting and comparison of annual national funding levels remains imprecise. A continued absence of standard methods of tracking and reporting by mine/ERW-affected states and, in some cases, a lack of information available on actual expenditures, makes overall annual comparisons difficult.

The biggest contributors to mine action in 2008 were the EC (\$89.5 million), the United States (\$85

million), Japan (\$51.6 million), Canada (\$43.1 million), Norway (\$36.7 million), the Netherlands (\$28.2 million), Germany (\$26.7 million), the United Kingdom (\$24.9 million), Spain (\$20.4 million), Sweden (\$18.9 million), and Australia (\$18.2 million). The largest contribution came from the EC combined with national funding by European Union (EU) member states, a total of \$264.2 million (€179.4 million), as reported below.

As in 2007, changes in the average exchange rates between national currencies and the US dollar in some cases had a significant effect on the US dollar value of international contributions to mine action. The average exchange value of the Euro, for example, increased by roughly 7% in US dollar terms in 2008 compared to 2007, affecting the US dollar value of contributions by 10 of the 20 largest international donors; and as a result of the decline of the British pound in relation to the US dollar, UK contributions fell in US dollar terms during 2008 despite rising in UK pound terms.

National Contributions to Mine Action

At least 22 mine/ERW-affected states contributed \$108.7 million in funding (including in-kind contributions) to their own mine action programs during 2008, compared to roughly \$117.4 million in 2007. Of the 15 mine-affected states submitting Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2008, 11 reported national funding during 2008, totaling \$77,430,891. Of the four states submitting Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2009, two reported national funding in 2008, totaling \$2.37 million (see Funding Article 5 deadline extensions section below).

Eight countries (**Afghanistan, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania, Rwanda, South Korea, and Uganda**) reported national funding in 2007 but did not report funds in 2008. Together, these countries represented \$20.9 million in national funding in 2007, though of this total, \$18.2 million was contributed by Iraq alone. Two countries (**Cyprus and Somalia**) newly reported national funding in 2008. Together, these countries represent \$158,219 in reported national funds.

Among the 20 states reporting national mine action support in both 2007 and 2008, 10 reported increases in levels of support in US dollar terms: **Chile** (\$9.4 million increase), **Azerbaijan** (\$4.1 million), **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (BiH) (\$2.5 million), **Cambodia** (\$650,000), **Thailand** (\$550,470), **Mozambique** (\$263,270), **Yemen** (\$100,000), **Albania** (\$65,000), **Peru** (\$45,414), and **Tajikistan** (\$9,000). Three states—**Lebanon, Jordan, and Zimbabwe**—reported no change in funding levels. Seven states reported decreases in funding: **Croatia** (\$325,335 decrease), **Colombia** (\$390,500), **Nicaragua** (\$400,000), **Chad** (\$479,418), **Senegal** (\$623,000), **Zambia** (\$824,844), and **Sudan** (\$2,565,120).

Eleven mine/ERW-affected states contributed, according to their own estimates, more than 0.01% of their gross national income (GNI) to mine action in 2008: **Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Jordan,**

Lebanon, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen.¹

National Mine Action Funding for 2008: \$108.7 million²

Donor	(US\$ million)	(€ million)
Croatia	45.3	30.8
BiH	16.2	11.0
Chile	10.6	7.2
Azerbaijan	6.3	4.3
Lebanon	5.5	3.7
Sudan	4.9	3.3
Yemen	3.6	2.4
Jordan	3.5	2.4
Thailand	3.3	2.2
Chad	2.0	1.4
Cambodia	1.8	1.2
Mozambique	1.6	1.1
Peru	1.0	0.7
Columbia	0.9	0.6
Nicaragua	0.6	0.4
Tajikistan	0.6	0.4
Senegal	0.3	0.2
Albania	0.3	0.2
Zambia	0.2	0.1
Cyprus	0.1	0.1
Somalia	0.01	0.01
Zimbabwe	0.01	0.01

It is assumed that, globally, national funding is under-reported. Assessment of national contributions remains limited by a lack of consistent and complete reporting on national assistance, and by the absence of a standard method of reporting and applying monetary value to in-kind contributions.

International Contributions to Mine Action

Landmine Monitor identified approximately \$517.8 million (€351.7 million) of international funding for mine action in 2008, donated by 23 countries and the EC.³ Of this, at least \$1.4 million was contributed in support of the negotiation and adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including funding for advocacy and regional conferences and workshops.⁴

¹ GNI data for Somalia and Zimbabwe is not available.

² Includes monetary and in-kind contributions. Table does not add to \$108.7 as figures are rounded to the nearest \$100,000. Average exchange rates for 2008 vary; see list of exchange rates in this edition of Landmine Monitor for further details.

³ Reporting does not enable a disaggregation of funding by mine action activity. There was almost no identified funding specifically for cluster munitions in 2008.

⁴ The total does not include funding to mine action in countries and other areas affected by cluster munitions, as donor reporting to these recipients was variously identified for cluster munitions, landmines, and ERW.

International Mine Action Funding by Year⁵

Period	Amount (US\$ million)
2008	518
2007	431
2006	475
2005	375
2004	392
2003	339
2002	324
2001	237
2000	243
1999	219
1998	187
1992–1997	529
Total for 1992–2008	4,268

EC funding together with national funding by EU member states totaled \$264.2 million (€179.4 million) in 2008.⁶ Combined EC/EU member funding remained the largest source of mine action funding in 2008, as it was in 2007. Reported EC/EU funding in 2008 was approximately 25% more in Euro terms than in 2007, and 34% more in US dollar terms.

In national currency terms, three donor states—**Sweden, Spain, and Italy**—provided more mine action funding in 2008 than they had in any previous year.⁷ **New Zealand's** contribution of NZ\$3.7 million in 2008–2009 almost matched its previously highest contribution, in 2004–2005). Of the 20 largest donors in 2008, 16 provided more funding in US dollars terms in 2008 than 2007, and four provided less. Those increasing their contribution were: **Italy** (138% increase), **Austria** (132%), the **EC** (96%), **Spain** (74%), **Finland** (47%), **Germany** (45%), **Japan** (45%), **New Zealand** (31%), **Switzerland** (26%), the **US** (22%), **Denmark** (21%), the **Netherlands** (21%), **Australia** (9%), **Sweden** (8%) and **Ireland** (3%). **Saudi Arabia**, which did not report funding in 2007, provided \$1.5 million in 2008. Donors with decreased contributions were: **Norway** (27%), **Canada** (6%), **Belgium** (3%), and the **UK** (1%). **Slovakia**, which was among the 20 largest donors in 2007, did not report funding in 2008.

⁵ The 1992–2007 total and 1998 annual figure include contributions by some states for which the exact amounts are not known, and contributions by some states for which amounts for specific years are not known, including \$50 million from the UAE to Lebanon in 2002–2004.

⁶ The total of EC and EU member states' funding in 2008 has been calculated by adding Landmine Monitor's estimate of EC funding in 2008 (€60,758,061) to EU member states' mine action funding provided bilaterally or otherwise (not including that provided through the EC). EU member states as of August 2009 are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

⁷ Three donor states—Czech Republic, Japan and the Netherlands—reported some funding items in US\$, which have been converted to national currencies using the relevant average annual rates; see list of exchange rates in this edition of Landmine Monitor for further details.

The 15 states which provided funding in 2008 equivalent to more than 0.001% of GNI, in descending order, were: **Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Canada, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Spain, Slovenia, and Japan.** Among Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the **UK** was 16th according to this ranking; the **US** 20th; and **France** 23rd.⁸ No monetary funding for mine action was reported by **China** or **Russia** in 2008. No donors contributed more than 0.01% of GNI in 2008.

International Mine Action Funding for 2008: \$517.8 million

Donor	(US\$ million)	(€ million)
EC	89.5	60.8
US	85	57.7
Japan	51.6	35.0
Canada	43.1	29.3
Norway	36.7	24.9
Netherlands	28.2	19.2
Germany	26.7	18.1
UK	24.9	16.9
Spain	20.4	13.9
Sweden	18.9	12.8
Australia	18.2	12.3
Switzerland	15.1	10.3
Denmark	14.7	10.0
Belgium	10.5	7.1
Italy	9.8	6.7
Finland	7.3	5.0
Ireland	7.2	4.9
Austria	2.7	1.8
New Zealand	2.6	1.8
Saudi Arabia	1.5	1.0
Luxembourg	1.2	0.8
Czech Republic	1.0	0.7
Slovenia	0.6	0.4
France	0.4	0.3

Funding by Donor States

EUROPEAN COMMISSION⁹

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	89.5	60.8
2007	45.6	33.3

⁸ World Bank, "World Development Indicators Database; Total GNI 2008, Atlas method," 1 July 2009, www.worldbank.org. For EU member states, the calculation of mine action funding as a percentage of GNI is based solely on their reported contributions bilaterally or otherwise (not including that provided through the EC); individual EU member states' contributions to mine action through the EC has not been reported.

⁹ Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Desk Officer, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; and statement of the EC, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29 May 2009.

2006	87.3	69.5
2005	47.7	38.3
Prior to 2005	363.8	369.5
Total	633.9	571.4

Additional R&D Funding

2005	1.4	1.1
Prior to 2005	35.7	50
Total	37.1	51.1

In 2008, EC and EU member states together committed \$264.2 million (€179.4 million) in mine action funding, compared to \$196.8 million (€143.6 million) in 2007.¹⁰ This represents an overall increase of approximately \$67.4 million (€35.8 million) compared to 2007.¹¹ Among the 27 member states of the EU, 16 reported mine action funding in 2008 independent of EC funding mechanisms.¹² Of these, 12 reported funding increases in terms of original currency, while four reported declines in funding.¹³ The remaining 11 member states either did not report funding or did not provide valuations of in-kind contributions.

The EC contributed €60,758,061 (\$89,472,321) in 2008. This consisted of €21,758,061 (\$32,040,921) in funds disbursed in 2008, and €39 million (\$57,431,400) in commitments made in 2008 to future mine action projects in countries which could include: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, BiH, Colombia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Nepal, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Serbia.¹⁴ The amount of funds disbursed decreased by 25% compared to €33,280,659 (\$45,631,112) in 2007, but total 2008 funding, including both disbursements and funds committed to future projects, increased by 45% compared to the previous year.

No country-specific allocations have been made from the overall commitment; in May 2009 the Directorate-General for External Relations stated that the funding commitment would be applied to "planned activities to be defined at a later stage."¹⁵ Although Landmine Monitor reports EC funding on the basis of annual commitments, actual EC disbursements for 2008 remain undetermined

¹⁰ As noted in previous years, neither the EC nor EU member states were able to provide a breakdown of how much of EC funding should be ascribed to individual member states in 2008. Therefore, it is not possible for Landmine Monitor to provide a complete picture of EU members' mine action funding.

¹¹ 2007 funding figures are based on the average 2007 exchange rate: €1.3711.

¹² EU member states as of August 2009: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. EU, "Gateway to the European Union," europa.eu.

¹³ The Czech Republic retains the Koruna as its national currency, but reported 2008 funding in Euros. For comparison of 2007 and 2008 funding, values have been converted according to the average exchange rate for 2008: €1=CZK24.9898.

¹⁴ Statement of the EC, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29 May 2009

¹⁵ Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009.

and subject to change until the finalization and release of funds by the EC, and may be subject to revision.¹⁶

Eleven countries actually received funds from the EC in 2008, totaling €21,758,061 (\$32,040,921). All of these countries are also among the 14 for which the EC reported commitments in 2008 to future mine action projects. The EC contributed to mine action in 11 countries and other areas in 2007.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA¹⁷

Period	(\$ million)
2008	85.0
2007	69.8
2006	94.5
2005	81.9
Prior to 2005	626.4
Total	957.6

Additional R&D Funding

2008	13.6
2007	14.4
2006	13.8
2005	13.2
Prior to 2005	132.8
Total	187.8

The US provided \$85 million to mine action in 32 countries and other areas in 2008, a 22% increase compared to \$69.8 million to 30 recipients in 2007. Starting in fiscal year 2009, the US has integrated three separate accounts—Humanitarian Demining, International Trust Fund, and Small Arms/Light Weapons—into a single account for Conventional Weapons Destruction (Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Conventional Weapons Destruction, NADR-CWD). The transition to a combined account did not evidently affect US funding levels for mine action; however, long-term funding projections have not been reported.

JAPAN¹⁸

Period	(\$ million)	(¥ million)
2008	51.6	5,318
2007	35.5	4,176
2006	25.3	2,944
2005	39.3	4,323
Prior to 2005	178.05	20,612
Total	329.7	37,373

¹⁶ Ibid, 12 June 2009.

¹⁷ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington, DC, July 2009, www.state.gov.

¹⁸ Email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department.

Additional R&D Funding

2007	4.2	489
2006	9.1	1,058
2005	7.4	811
Prior to 2005	13.6	1,555
Total	34.3	3,913

In 2008, Japan contributed ¥5,318,480,480 (\$51,589,261) compared to ¥4,175,698,717 (\$35,493,439) in 2007, an increase of approximately 27% in Yen terms. Japan gave funds to 13 countries in 2008, compared to 17 in 2007.

CANADA¹⁹

Period	(\$ million)	(C\$ million)
2008	43.1	46.0
2007	45.8	49.2
2006	28.9	32.8
2005	20.5	24.8
Prior to 2005	127.6	185
Total	265.9	337.8

Additional R&D Funding

2007	0.3	0.4
2006	1.1	1.2
2005	2.8	3.4
Prior to 2005	13.5	17.6
Total	17.7	22.6

Canada contributed C\$45,969,874 (\$43,124,339) to mine action in fiscal year 2008–2009, a decrease of 7% in Canadian dollar terms compared to 2007–2008 (C\$49,195,671/\$45,830,687). Canada provided funding to 13 countries, including contributions to Afghanistan totaling approximately C\$28.7 million (\$27 million).

Canadian funding remained roughly stable between 2007 and 2008, as the dedicated Canadian Landmine Fund, in place from 1999 to March 2008, was replaced by funding structures integrated within Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In May 2009, Canada reported that the “vast majority” of new funds are provided by CIDA, in order to align mine action funding with development priorities and to support the Millennium Development Goals. As a result of the new funding structures, Canada reported that mine action funds have been difficult to access for countries outside CIDA’s geographic areas of priority, and for mine action projects unrelated to field activities, such as advocacy.²⁰

From November 2008 to August 2009, Canada chaired the Contact Group on Linking Mine Action and Development.

¹⁹ Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009.

²⁰ Statement of Canada, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29 May 2009.

NORWAY²¹

Period	(\$ million)	(NOK million)
2008	36.7	206.6
2007	50.2	293.7
2006	34.9	223.9
2005	36.5	235
Prior to 2005	219.1	1,649.9
Total	377.4	2,609.1

Additional R&D Funding

2007	\$649,040	3.8
2006	\$618,421	4
2005	\$333,833	2.3
Total	1,601,294	10.1

Norway contributed NOK206,631,608 (\$36,656,447) to mine action in 2008, an approximately 30% decrease in Norwegian kroner terms from 2007 (NOK293,650,490/\$50,155,504). Funds were allocated to 17 countries and other areas. The decline in funds is in line with statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2008, that the pattern of increased funding in previous years may end in the near future, as some programs were reduced (such as clearance in Jordan) and as Norwegian embassies give priority to other humanitarian aid sectors.²²

In a statement to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Norway reported that it will continue to provide “a high level” of mine action assistance in the future, and will consider multi-year funding arrangements with selected partners to ensure stable funding to mine action programs. It called on both donor states and mine-affected states to develop mine action methods that “can be sustained over time... when cooperation and assistance parameters change.”²³

From November 2008 to August 2009, Norway chaired the Contact Group on Resource Mobilization.

THE NETHERLANDS²⁴

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	28.2	19.2
2007	23.4	17.1
2006	26.9	21.4
2005	19.3	15.5
Prior to 2005	114.6	102.9
Total	212.4	176.1

The Netherlands contributed €19,172,459 (\$28,233,363) in funds in 2008, a 12% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€17,056,776/\$23,386,546). The

²¹ Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009.

²² Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2008.

²³ Statement of Norway, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²⁴ Email from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009.

Netherlands contributed funds to 11 states and other areas in 2008, compared to 10 in 2007.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, the Netherlands outlined five principles guiding its mine action funding policy: geographic spread, with emphasis on the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Western Balkans, and Afghanistan; effectiveness and socio-economic impact of programs; capacity-building; application of the International Mine Action Standards principles and procedures; and additional support to other mine action sectors. The Netherlands reported that at least €10 million of its contributions in 2008 were channeled through NGOs.²⁵

GERMANY²⁶

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	26.7	18.1
2007	18.4	13.4
2006	18.6	14.8
2005	21.1	17
Prior to 2005	122.9	115.6
Total	207.7	178.9

Additional R&D Funding

2007	5.2	4.2
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Germany's funding of €18,148,899 (\$26,725,921) in 2008 was an increase of 35% in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€13,400,957/\$18,374,052). Germany contributed to 21 states in 2008, compared to 17 states and other areas in 2007. Germany's funding for 2008 exceeded its earlier projection of €17.6 million.

In May 2009, Germany reported contributing a total of \$100 million to the EC budget for mine action, in addition to its direct assistance to mine action. Germany projected donations in 2008 and 2009 totaling \$46 million. In allocating funds, Germany reportedly has no geographic areas of priority, but focuses support on States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁷

In a statement on mine clearance in May 2009, Germany stressed the importance for mine-affected states to take national ownership of their mine action programs, and to build up "efficient and sustainable local capacities" in mine action.²⁸

UNITED KINGDOM²⁹

Period	(\$ million)	(£ million)
2008–2009	24.9	13.5
2007–2008	25.2	12.6
2006–2007	19.3	10.5

²⁵ Statement of the Netherlands, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

²⁶ Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009.

²⁷ Statement of Germany, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DfID, 17 March 2009.

2005–2006	21.4	11.8
Prior to 2005	153.9	98.9
Total	244.7	147.3

Additional R&D Funding

2006–2007	0.4	0.2
2005–2006	3.2	1.8
Prior to 2005	11.4	7.1
Total	15.0	9.1

UK funding of £13,451,597 (\$24,945,987) in fiscal year 2008–2009 represented an increase of 7% in British pound terms compared to fiscal year 2007–2008 (£12,586,513/\$25,198,199). In 2008–2009, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) reported mine action funding for 20 states and other areas, compared to 22 in 2007–2008.

SPAIN³⁰

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	20.4	13.9
2007	11.7	8.6
2006	8.6	6.8
2005	1.9	1.5
Prior to 2005	8.2	6.6
Total	50.8	37.4

Spain provided €13,886,118 (\$20,448,697) in 2008, a 62% increase in Euro terms compared to €8,558,008 (\$11,733,885) in 2007. Funds were contributed to 15 countries and other areas, including in-kind contributions through training at its International Demining Center, compared to 11 countries and other areas in 2007.

SWEDEN³¹

Period	(\$ million)	(SEK million)
2008	18.9	124.5
2007	17.5	118.3
2006	14.9	110.1
2005	11.7	87.6
Prior to 2005	114.9	950.4
Total	177.9	1,390.9

Additional R&D Funding

Prior to 2005	25.7	188.8
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In 2008, Sweden contributed SEK124,458,455 (\$18,905,239), a 5% increase in SEK terms compared to 2007 (SEK118,287,250 or \$17,506,513). Sweden reported contributions to eight countries and other areas in 2008, compared to nine in 2007.

³⁰ Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

³¹ Email from Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.

AUSTRALIA³²

Period	(\$ million)	(A\$ million)
2008–2009	18.2	21.3
2007–2008	16.7	19.9
2006–2007	16.5	21.9
2005–2006	8.9	11.7
Prior to 2005	66.2	104.4
Total	126.5	179.2

Australia's funding of A\$21,263,137 (\$18,152,340) in fiscal year July 2008–June 2009 represented a 7% increase in Australian dollar terms from fiscal year 2007–2008 (A\$19,906,343 or \$16,703,412). In 2005, Australia made a five-year, A\$75 million commitment to mine action. Having spent A\$60.3 million over four years, Australia remains on track to meet its five-year commitment. Australia's support was provided to seven countries in 2008, the same number as in 2007.

As of November 2008, Australia projected contributions in 2008–2009 totaling roughly A\$8.8 million, which was surpassed by actual contributions.³³

SWITZERLAND³⁴

Period	(\$ million)	(CHF million)
2008	15.2	16.3
2007	12	14.4
2006	14.1	17.6
2005	12.1	15.1
Prior to 2005	67.8	91.3
Total	121.2	154.7

Switzerland's 2008 mine action funding of CHF16,341,060 (\$15,108,944) was a 13% increase in Swiss franc terms compared to 2007 (CHF14,407,760 or \$12,007,427). Switzerland funded 14 countries and areas in 2008, the same number as in 2007. The 2008 total includes CHF8.4 million (\$7,766,640) in support to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Swiss funding for GICHD totaled \$6.8 million in 2007, \$6.4 million in 2006, \$6 million in 2005, \$6.1 million in 2004, \$5.23 million in 2003, \$4.35 million in 2002, \$3.3 million in 2001, and \$2.3 million in 2000, totaling some \$48.3 million from 2000–2008.

Switzerland's mine action strategy for the period 2008 to 2011 calls for maintenance of funding levels around CHF16 million per year. Switzerland prioritizes integration of mine action funding within peace and development programs.³⁵

³² Emails from Caroline Mulas, Mine Action Coordinator, AUSAID, 22 June 2009; and Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, AUSAID, 21 July 2009.

³³ Statement of Australia, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

³⁴ Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.

³⁵ Statement of Switzerland, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

In a statement to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Switzerland called for additional efforts by States Parties to improve mechanisms for technical assistance and exchange of information, and called on States Parties fulfilling obligations under Article 5 to strengthen cooperation at the regional level to develop joint mine action strategies.³⁶

DENMARK³⁷

Period	(\$ million)	(DKK million)
2008	14.7	74.6
2007	12.1	65.7
2006	14.5	86.1
2005	11.3	67.7
Prior to 2005	98.5	705.5
Total	151.1	999.6

Denmark contributed DKK74,630,000 (\$14,664,795) in 2008, compared to DKK65,702,278 (\$12,076,079) in 2007, an increase of 14% in Danish krone terms. Denmark contributed to nine countries and other areas in 2008, compared to 12 countries in 2007.

BELGIUM³⁸

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	10.5	7.1
2007	10.8	7.9
2006	7.1	5.6
2005	6.5	5.2
Prior to 2005	27.5	25.7
Total	62.4	51.5

Additional R&D Funding

2008	0.5	0.3
2007	0.4	0.3
2006	0.9	0.7
2005	0.6	0.5
Prior to 2005	9.2	7.4
Total	11.6	9.2

Belgium's mine action funding in 2008 of €7,145,951 (\$10,523,127) was a decrease of 9% in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€7,881,710 or \$10,806,613). Belgium provided mine action funding and assistance to 10 countries in 2007, compared to seven countries in 2007.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.

³⁸ Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

ITALY³⁹

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	9.8	6.7
2007	4.1	3
2006	5.4	4.3
2005	4.5	3.6
Prior to 2005	52	48.6
Total	75.8	66.2

Italy's mine action funding of €6,662,587 (\$9,811,325) was a 121% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€3,012,488 or \$4,130,422). Italy contributed funds to 12 countries in 2008, compared to eight countries in 2007.

FINLAND⁴⁰

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	7.4	5.0
2007	5.0	3.6
2006	6.3	5.0
2005	5.9	4.7
Prior to 2005	46.2	47.2
Total	70.8	65.5

Finland contributed €4,982,526 (\$7,337,268) in 2008, a 37% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€3,636,279 or \$4,985,702). Funding was allocated to six countries and other areas in 2008, compared to five countries and other areas in 2007.

IRELAND⁴¹

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	7.2	4.9
2007	7.0	5.1
2006	4.8	3.8
2005	2.2	1.7
Prior to 2005	14.1	13.9
Total	35.3	29.4

Ireland's mine action funding of €4,900,000 (\$7,215,740) is a 4% decrease in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€5,115,103 or \$7,013,318). Ireland contributed to six countries and one area in 2008, compared to nine countries in 2007.⁴²

³⁹ Email from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.

⁴⁰ Email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009.

⁴¹ Email from David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009.

⁴² *Landmine Monitor Report 2008* reported eight recipient countries of funding from Ireland, adjusted here to nine. Countries receiving funds were Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Somalia, and Uganda.

AUSTRIA⁴³

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	7.2	4.9
2007	7.0	5.1
2006	4.8	3.8
2005	2.2	1.7
Prior to 2005	14.1	13.9
Total	35.3	29.4

Austria provided €1,823,320 (\$2,685,021) in mine action funding in 2008, a 116% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€845,723 or \$1,159,571). Austria contributed to six countries in 2008, compared to three countries in 2007.

NEW ZEALAND⁴⁴

Period	(\$ million)	(NZ\$ million)
2008–2009	2.6	3.7
2007–2008	2	2.7
2006–2007	0.9	1.3
2005–2006	0.9	1.3
Prior to 2005	11.5	20.1
Total	17.9	29.1

New Zealand reported contributions totaling NZ\$3,705,000 (\$2,649,446) during fiscal year July 2008–June 2009, an increase of 35% in New Zealand dollar terms compared to 2007–2008 (NZ\$2,740,981 or \$2,018,733). As well as its global funding, New Zealand reported the value of its funding to Egypt, and its support to four other countries, but without providing valuations.

FRANCE⁴⁵

Period	(\$ million)	(€ million)
2008	0.4	0.3
2007	2.4	1.7
2006	3.3	2.6
2005	3.8	3.1
Prior to 2005	24.8	25.8
Total	34.7	33.5

France reported contributing €300,994 (\$443,244) for mine action in 2008, an 83% decrease in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€1,744,055 or \$2,391,274). This included in-kind contributions and training for mine-affected states. As of August 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported to Landmine Monitor that complete funding data for 2008 was unavailable. In 2007 France

⁴³ Email from Daniela Krejdl, Humanitarian Aid, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2009.

⁴⁴ New Zealand Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

⁴⁵ Email from Pascale Lespinard, Commission pour l'Élimination des Mines Antipersonnel, 31 July 2009.

reported a similar absence of data from its embassies, and stated actual 2007 funding may have been greater than reported.

Other mine action donors

Saudi Arabia contributed \$1.5 million to mine action in Lebanon in 2008.⁴⁶

Luxembourg contributed €800,488 (\$1,178,799) to five countries in 2008.⁴⁷ Luxembourg provided €637,943 (\$874,684) in 2007. Total mine action funding to date was \$9.3 million.

The **Czech Republic** contributed €703,986 (\$1,036,689) to mine action in 2008.⁴⁸ The Czech Republic provided CZK23,867,286 (\$1.2 million) for mine action in 2007. Estimated total mine action funding to August 2009 was \$5.5 million.

Slovenia reported contributing €379,736 (\$559,199) in 2008.⁴⁹ It provided €506,093 (\$693,904) in 2007. Total mine action funding as of August 2009 was \$5.9 million.

Poland reported in-kind contributions to mine action in 2008–2009 in the form of mine clearance personnel in support of international peacekeeping operations, but did not report a value for these contributions.⁵⁰ Poland reported in-kind contributions without valuations in 2007. Total mine action funding for the period 2005–2008 (excluding contributions without valuation) was \$3.3 million.

China reported in-kind contributions to mine action during 2008 but did not report valuations. China contributed a total of RMB6 million (\$789,000) in support of mine action in 2007. Estimated total mine action funding to August 2009 (excluding in-kind assistance without valuation) was \$7 million.

The **United Arab Emirates** (UAE) did not report new international funding in 2008. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported receiving \$600,000 (€437,605) from the UAE during 2007 for mine and cluster munitions clearance in southern Lebanon. Total mine action funding to August 2009 was \$69.9 million.

Slovakia did not report international funding in 2008. Slovakia's in-kind assistance to mine action in Iraq, via contributions of the Slovak Armed Forces, ended in 2007. Slovakia continued to provide in-kind assistance to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but did not report a value for its contributions in 2008. In-kind assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan totaled SKK236,348,798 (\$9,619,396) in 2007. Total reported funding to date is roughly \$34.5 million.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by **Greece**

in 2008. Greece last reported contributing €1.9 million (\$2.4 million) in February 2006 for mine action in Iraq. Mine action funding by Greece has totaled \$12 million for 2001–2008.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by **South Korea** in 2008. South Korea contributed \$1 million to the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund in 2007. Total mine action funding as of August 2009 was \$6.2 million.


Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by **Iceland** in 2008. Iceland last reported providing \$1.5 million for victim assistance in 2005. Total mine action funding was \$2.8 million from 1997–2008.

Major Recipients

Landmine Monitor has identified international funding totaling \$386.8 million (€262.6 million) to 53 recipient states and other areas in 2008, down from 70 recipients in 2007. This is in addition to \$130.4 million (€88.5 million) in funds for mine action for which no recipient state is specified (or with multiple and undifferentiated recipients), and \$14.1 million (€9.6 million) contributed to research and development.⁵¹

The top recipients of mine action funding in 2008 were **Afghanistan** (\$105.2 million), **Sudan** (\$39.1 million), **Iraq** (\$35.9 million), **Lebanon** (\$28.2 million), **Cambodia** (\$28.1 million), **BiH** (\$23.6 million), **Angola** (\$22.1 million), **Ethiopia** (\$18.9 million), **Lao PDR** (\$12.7 million) and the **Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC** (\$12.4 million).

Mine Action Recipients in 2008⁵²



Increases of at least \$5 million were seen in 2008 in **Afghanistan** (up \$19 million), **Ethiopia** (\$13.1 million), **Sudan** (\$9.9 million), **Georgia** (\$8.7 million), **BiH** (\$6.5 million), and the **DRC** (\$6.5 million).

⁴⁶ Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Saudi Arabia donates to demining operation in South Lebanon," Washington, DC, 9 April 2008, www.saudiembassy.net; and Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Saudi Arabia donates \$1 million to UN De-mining Program in Lebanon," Washington, DC, 20 November 2008, www.saudiembassy.net.

⁴⁷ Email from Daniel Gengler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2009.

⁴⁸ Czech Republic Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J. The Czech Republic reported funding in both US\$ and € for 2008. Values have been converted using the average annual US\$–€ exchange rate for 2008.

⁴⁹ Email from Gregor Kaplan, Security Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2009.

⁵⁰ Poland Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

⁵¹ Global and Other" funding includes €39 million in EC commitments during 2008 for which specific amounts to recipient countries have not yet been determined.

⁵² Figures are rounded to the nearest 0.1% and do not add to 100%.

Mine Action Recipients Receiving \$1 Million or More in 2008⁵³

Country/Area	(US\$ million)	(€ million)	Country/Area	(US\$ million)	(€ million)
Afghanistan	105.2	71.5	Albania	5.8	3.9
Sudan	39.1	26.6	Somaliland	4.4	3.0
Iraq	35.9	24.4	Palestine	3.8	2.5
Lebanon	28.2	19.1	Mozambique	3.2	2.2
Cambodia	28.1	19.1	Serbia	2.6	1.8
BiH	23.6	16.0	Chad	2.1	1.5
Angola	22.1	15.0	Tajikistan	1.9	1.3
Ethiopia	18.9	12.8	Azerbaijan	1.7	1.2
Lao PDR	12.7	8.6	Nicaragua	1.5	1.0
DRC	12.4	8.4	Nagorno-Karabakh	1.5	1.0
Colombia	9.1	6.2	Kosovo	1.1	0.8
Georgia	8.7	5.9	Burundi	1.1	0.7
Sri Lanka	8.2	5.6	Nepal	1.1	0.7
Vietnam	7.6	5.2	Burma	1.0	0.7
Jordan	6.9	4.7	Yemen	1.0	0.7
Croatia	6.6	4.5			


Significant reductions in mine action funding—of at least \$2 million—occurred in **Azerbaijan** (down \$2 million), **Cambodia** (\$2.7 million), **Nicaragua** (\$3 million), **Guinea-Bissau** (\$4 million), **Jordan** (\$5 million), **Somalia** (\$5.5 million), **Belarus** (\$5.5 million), **Cyprus** (\$5.5 million), and **Senegal** (\$7.3 million).⁵⁴

In regional terms, where recipient states or regional implementing organizations were identified, annual funding increased, most notably in Africa (\$118.1 million in 2008 compared to \$81.2 million in 2007), followed by Asia-Pacific (\$166.3 million in 2008 compared to \$144.4 million in 2007) and Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (\$54.5 million in 2008 compared to \$44.3 million in 2007).⁵⁵ Funding declined in the Middle East and North Africa (\$77.5 million in 2008 compared to \$94.7 million in 2007) and the Americas (\$14.2 million in 2008 compared to \$15.8 million in 2007).

In 2008, 31 countries and other areas received at least \$1 million in funding, compared to 34 countries and other areas in 2007. States and other areas directly receiving funds in 2007 but not in 2008 were: **Algeria**, **Belarus**, **Burkina Faso**, **Cameroon**, **Central African Republic**, **Chechnya**, **Republic of the Congo**, **Cyprus**, **Djibouti**, **Ecuador**, **Gabon**, **Guinea**, **Indonesia**, **Kyrgyzstan**, **Madagascar**, **Malawi**, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, **Thailand**, **Togo**, **Tunisia**, and **Zambia**.⁵⁶ States and other areas

directly receiving funds in 2008 but not in 2007 were: **Armenia**, **Eritrea**, **Georgia**, **Palestine**, the **Philippines**, and **Rwanda**.

2008 International Mine Action Funding by Region (\$ million)⁵⁷



Trust Funds

Landmine Monitor has identified at least \$140.7 million contributed to mine action via international trust funds in 2008, compared to \$136.6 million in 2007.

The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, operated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), received \$92.5 million in 2008, compared to about \$93 million in 2007, including core and multiyear funding.⁵⁸

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), based in Slovenia, received \$34

⁵³ Mine-affected countries and other areas receiving at least \$1 million. Figures are rounded to the nearest \$100,000.

⁵⁴ In some cases international funds committed in prior years may have been to applied programming in 2008.

⁵⁵ In its regional comparison of funding in 2007, Landmine Monitor reported funds to Europe and Central Asia, here reported as Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

⁵⁶ Donors reported funding to joint mine action programming on the Ecuador-Peru border in 2008, but no funding was reported exclusively to Ecuador.

⁵⁷ By US\$ value of contributions, where a recipient country is specified (not including global or regional funding), except in the case of Americas, which includes general funding to the Organization of American States, and Europe/Central Asia, which includes funding to the ITF.

⁵⁸ UNMAS, "Voluntary Trust Fund: Status as at 1 May 2009," 1 May 2009, www.mineaction.org.

million in donations from 13 countries in 2008, as well as from the UN and its agencies, local authorities, government agencies, and private donors.⁵⁹ The ITF received \$25.7 million in donations in 2007.

The UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery received contributions totaling \$14.2 million in 2008, compared to \$16.1 million in 2007. Funds were directed to mine action in 13 countries, and to regional workshops in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁶⁰

Implementing agencies, organizations and institutions

International funds were directed to mine action in 2008 through nearly 100 agencies, organizations, and institutions identified by donor states as responsible for allocation of funds to operating partners or for direct implementation of programs.⁶¹ As in 2007, some donors reported the operators responsible at the local level for project implementation, others identified an international mine action organization, which may or may not have undertaken projects with local partners, and others identified the UN or another agency through which funds were dedicated to projects at the national level.⁶²

Implementing and coordinating NGOs, trust funds, and other agencies were identified for approximately \$387 million of the \$518 million in total mine action funding. Landmine Monitor identified at least 39 agencies receiving more than \$1 million in international funds in 2008. These included contributions identified only generally by donors, where allocations through specific agencies can be assumed but were not reported. Overall, the UN, its agencies, peacekeeping operations and trust funds acted as implementers for at least \$142.7 million in funds, or some 28% of total reported funding worldwide.

Research and Development

Landmine Monitor identified \$14,110,068 (€9,581,738) in international funding by two donor states for research and development (R&D) in 2008, a decrease of approximately 29% compared to 2007 (\$19,980,298 or €14,572,459).

The US Department of Defense spent \$13.63 million on humanitarian demining R&D projects in fiscal year 2008, compared to \$14.4 million in fiscal year 2007.⁶³

Belgium contributed \$480,068 (€326,000), consisting of contributions to the Belgium Royal Military

Academy for demining research, as well as to the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining to support testing of demining equipment.

Switzerland continued to provide general support to GICHD, including R&D, but R&D amounts are not consistently differentiated from non-R&D funding.

Japan did not report funding for R&D in 2008. Assistance by Japan to R&D in recent years, carried out under a five-year project (2002–2006) of the Japan Science and Technology Agency and a six-year project (2002–2007) of the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization, concluded in 2007.⁶⁴ Japanese funding for R&D totaled roughly \$4.2 million (¥488,907,424) in 2007.

Funding Article 5 Deadline Extensions

Fifteen countries submitted requests to extend their Article 5 deadlines in 2008: BiH, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the UK, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Of these, four states (Denmark, Jordan, the UK, and Venezuela) reported the capacity to fund their own clearance initiatives or to raise all required funds, while 11 expressed the need for international assistance. As of July 2008, the total projected cost for the 11 extension requests requiring international funding was approximately \$2.26 billion through 2019.

Between August and November 2008, five states—Ecuador, Mozambique, Peru, Thailand, and Zimbabwe—submitted revised extension requests including budget projections. (Yemen submitted a revised extension request in November 2008, but with no changes to its budget projections.) Of these, two reported reduced cost estimates: Mozambique (\$28.4 million, down from \$32 million); and Thailand (\$528.9 million from \$575 million). Two states reported increased cost estimates: Ecuador (\$16.7 million, up from \$10.6 million), and Peru (\$25.9 million from \$17.9 million). Zimbabwe withdrew its original budget of \$45.5 million and submitted a three-year cost estimate of \$6.9 million, to complete the first phase of its extension plan, after which it will provide a plan and budget for the remaining tasks. As a result of all budget revisions, the total projected cost for states submitting Article 5 extension requests in 2008 declined by some \$66 million, from \$2.26 billion to roughly \$2.19 billion through 2019.

Four additional states submitted Article 5 extension requests between January and August 2009: Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda. All have expressed the need for international assistance in completing their clearance obligations, and all included cost projections in their extension requests. The projected costs for these requests total roughly \$595 million, with Cambodia's request accounting for \$307.4 million, Argentina's for \$250 million, Tajikistan's for \$32.6 million, and Uganda's for \$5.2 million.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Email from Yasuhiro Kitagawa, JCBL, 2 September 2009.

⁶⁵ Argentina's Article 5 deadline Extension Request covers clearance of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which is also covered in the UK's extension request. The UK request, however, does not include cost estimates

⁵⁹ ITF, "Annual Report 2008," Ljubljana, p. 22.

⁶⁰ Email from Maria Vardis, Advisor and Inter-Agency Liaison, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 22 September 2009.

⁶¹ This excludes direct bilateral funding to governments and government agencies in mine-affected states, and funding via UN peacekeeping missions.

⁶² In its initial submission of data to Landmine Monitor, the US reported allocation of funds without identifying the implementing agency, with the exception of funds contributed to the ITF, which were earmarked by the US Department of State. In some cases the US Department of State later identified implementing agencies for specific funding items.

⁶³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Research and Development Descriptive Summary, Humanitarian Demining, PE: o603920D8Z," February 2008, www.defenselink.mil.

Taking together the revised 2008 extension requests and extension requests newly submitted between January and August 2009, the projected costs for all Article 5 extension requests total roughly \$2.78 billion for the period 2009–2019. Given that the timelines and annual budgets of each extension request are different, the annual projected costs for all extension requests are as follows:

Total annual cost estimates for Article 5 deadline extension requests (as of August 2009)⁶⁶

Year	Total cost (US\$ million)
2009	253.3
2010	297.7
2011	302.4
2012	295.7
2013	292.5
2014	302.3
2015	278.1
2016	256.9
2017	237.1
2018	222.5
2019	68.4

Cost projections for 2009 represent 40% of all international and national funding reported for 2008, for all mine action sectors, and 49% of all international funds reported for the year. The projected costs, as shown above, average approximately \$300 million for 2011–2014 before decreasing each after that until 2019 when \$68.4 million of international assistance will be sought for Article 5 extension requests. It is assumed the annual needs for 2015–2019 will increase until 2014 as future extension requests are approved, before declining for the remainder of the period.

Given that other states will in all likelihood submit Article 5 extension requests, and that victim assistance obligations are not included in the majority of plans contained in Article 5 extension requests, it is likely that mine action funding will need to increase over the next five to 10 years. This will challenge not only fulfillment of the extension plans themselves, but also assistance to other mine action sectors, such as risk education, stockpile destruction, training, and victim assistance, and to mine/ERW-affected states that do not require an Article 5 deadline extension.

for completion.

⁶⁶ Figures are rounded to the nearest \$100,000.

Status of the Convention



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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)

Risk education workshop in the DRC.

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 October 2009 there were 156 States Parties.

States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussaleem 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98

Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo (Brazzaville) 4 May 01 (a)
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Cote d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99

Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
 Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
 Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
 Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
 Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
 Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
 Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
 Indonesia (20 Feb 07)
 Iraq (15 Aug 07) (a)
 Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
 Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
 Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
 Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
 Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
 Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
 Kuwait (30 Jul 07) (a)
 Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
 Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
 Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
 Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
 Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
 Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)
 Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
 Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
 Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
 Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
 Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
 Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
 Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
 Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
 Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
 Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
 Montenegro (23 Oct 06) (s)
 Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
 Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
 Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
 Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
 New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
 Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
 Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
 Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
 Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
 Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
 Palau 18 Nov 08 (a)
 Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
 Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
 Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
 Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
 Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
 Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
 Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
 Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
 Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
 Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01

Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
 San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
 Sao Tome e Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
 Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
 Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
 Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
 Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
 Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
 Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
 Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
 South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
 Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
 Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
 Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
 Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
 Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
 Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
 Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
 Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
 Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
 Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
 Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
 Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
 Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
 Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
 Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
 Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
 Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
 United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
 Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
 Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
 Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
 Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
 Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
 Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

Signatories

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97
 Poland 4 Dec 97

States not Party

Armenia	Micronesia
Azerbaijan	Mongolia
Bahrain	Morocco
Burma	Nepal
China	Oman
Cuba	Pakistan
Egypt	Russian Federation
Finland	Saudi Arabia
Georgia	Singapore
India	Somalia
Iran	Sri Lanka
Israel	Syria
Kazakhstan	Tonga
Korea, North	Tuvalu
Korea, South	United Arab Emirates
Kyrgyzstan	United States
Lao PDR	Uzbekistan
Lebanon	Vietnam
Libya	

18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
 - a) To use anti-personnel mines;

- b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
 - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2

Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible

but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
 - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
 - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
 - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
 - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
 - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines

destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to

the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party

declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
- b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
- c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days,

and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

- a) The operation and status of this Convention;
- b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
- c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
- d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
- e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
- f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

- a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
- b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
- c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
- d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as

the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

Article 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Appendix

Abbreviation and Acronyms

AHD	antihandling device	ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
AP or APM	antipersonnel mine	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum	IDP	internally displaced person
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	IED	improvised explosive device
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development	IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
AV or AVM	antivehicle mine	IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance	IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network (UN)
BAC	battle area clearance	ISU	Implementation Support Unit
CBU	cluster bomb unit	ITF	International Trust Fund (Slovenia)
CBR	community-based rehabilitation	LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons	MAC	Mine Action Center or Mines Action Canada
CD	Conference on Disarmament	MACC	Mine Action Coordination Center
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	MAG	Mines Advisory Group
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	MASG	Mine Action Support Group
DCA	DanChurchAid	MAT	mine action team or Mines Awareness Trust
DDG	Danish Demining Group	MDD	mine detection dog
DfID	UK Department for International Development	NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
DPO	disabled people's organization	NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
EC	European Commission	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office	NGO	non-governmental organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	NSAG	non-state armed group
ERW	explosive remnants of war	OAS	Organization of American States
EU	European Union	OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
FY	Fiscal year	OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
GNI	Gross National Income	QA	quality assurance
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	QC	quality control
HI	Handicap International	RE	mine/ERW risk education
HRW	Human Rights Watch	SAC	Survey Action Center
		SADC	Southern African Development Community
		SHA	suspected hazardous area

SMART goals	specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound goals
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	US Agency for International Development
UXO	unexploded ordnance
VA	victim assistance
WHO	World Health Organization

Glossary

Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detec-

tion dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

Community liaison – According to IMAS, “liaison with mine/ERW affected communities to exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and UXO, to create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies. Community mine action liaison aims to ensure community needs and priorities are central to the planning, implementation and monitoring of mine action operations.”

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Failed cluster munition – A cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so.

Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device

(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

IMAS – International mine action standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

IMSMA – The UN's preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

Landmine Impact Survey – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

Land release – The set of activities and methodologies intended to release previously suspect hazardous areas with the minimum possible risk.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some MACs also implement mine action activities.

Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training and community mine action liaison.

National mine action authority – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as

a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Risk reduction – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

Survey – A study of the assessment of the location and impact of mines and ERW at the local or national level. General survey focuses on the location of mined and battle areas and the type of contamination they contain. A landmine impact survey also assesses the impact of explosive contamination on nearby communities (see separate definition for landmine impact survey). Technical survey aims to confirm and identify the outer perimeters of the hazardous area using one or more demining tools and to gather other necessary information for clearance.

Unexploded cluster munitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

Victim – The individual directly hit by a mine/ERW explosion, his or her family and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, casualty data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families and communities in society.



Cover photo © Nasret Rezayee, 23 March 2009

Farid Ahmad repairs bicycles in Kabul, Afghanistan, but dreams of becoming a doctor. The 16 year old lost his leg at age three after detonating a mine left in an abandoned tank where he was playing. His family was displaced because of conflict and they were unable to afford the medical care he needed. After returning to Afghanistan he joined the family bicycle repair business. He realized that "there are many disabled people in Afghanistan and we need to work hard and show people our abilities, which is not easy." Farid would like to study to become a doctor to help lift his family out of poverty and help his community.

TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD

The Landmine Monitor initiative is coordinated by an Editorial Board of five organizations: Mines Action Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, and Norwegian People's Aid, Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency.



Landmine Monitor Report Annual Report 2009

Landmine Monitor Report 2009 is the eleventh annual report by Landmine Monitor, an unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition.

Landmine Monitor collects information and assesses the international community's response to the global landmine, cluster munition, and explosive remnants of war problem, especially with regard to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Since 1999, Landmine Monitor has assessed and reported annual progress in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. *Landmine Monitor Report 2009* presents information on activities in 2008 and key developments from January to May 2009. It also includes a special ten-year review of progress since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999. Reports cover every country in the world and eight other areas not internationally recognized as states, and include information on ban policy, mine action, casualties, risk education, victim assistance, and support for mine action.

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