Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Policy

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation, but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, and directives from Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.[1]

Turkey submitted its eighth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2011, covering calendar year 2010.[2] The report includes voluntary Form J with information on casualties and victim assistance.

Turkey participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011 and in the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, where it provided updates on its stockpile destruction process.

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Turkey submitted its annual report required by Article 13 in April 2011. Turkey is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

In June 2011, Turkey restated its strongly held view that engagement by NGOs with armed non-state armed groups with respect to the Mine Ban Treaty requires the prior consent of the relevant State Party.[3]

Production and transfer

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the transfer of mines in January 1996. Its production facilities were then gradually phased out of service.[4] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. It imported mines from Germany and the United States (US).

Use

Turkish Armed Forces

Even prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces on 26 January 1998.[5] However, in 2010 there were serious allegations of at least two instances of use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In April 2010, the Turkish newspaper Taraf published a document allegedly belonging to the 23^rd Gendarmerie Division Command indicating that on 9 April 2009, members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sirnak province.[6]

In the second incident, seven Turkish soldiers were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca on 9 May 2009.[7] The Turkish Army alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009, the Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before the detonation.[8] An investigation by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish Commander.[9] The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff Military Prosecutor’s Office.[10] 

In September 2010, a report on the incident to the Military’s Prosecutor’s Office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the emplacement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish Martial Court.[11] General Es was however released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony.[12] In October 2011, a second expert’s report found that General Es ordered the planting of mines in 2009 in the area where the explosion took place in May 2009.[13]

Under the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey must take every measure to prevent the use of antipersonnel mines, including the application of penal sanctions. The ICBL has called on Turkey to investigate the use allegations and undertake measures to prevent further use.[14] It has also emphasized the need to establish the origin of the mines used, which could have been lifted from the ground and re-emplaced, or taken from stocks retained for training purposes.[15] In recent Mine Ban Treaty meetings, Turkey has stated that it cannot comment on the mine use allegations while the judicial proceedings are underway.[16]

PKK/Kongra Gel

Turkish officials have continued to accuse the PKK/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines.[17] According to Turkey’s latest Article 7 report, in 2010, 26 military personnel and civilians were killed and 78 wounded by landmines laid by the PKK/Kongra Gel. This was an increase from 25 killed and 58 injured by landmines laid by this group in 2009, but it was still significantly lower than the casualty numbers for 2007–2008.[18] In 2010, two PKK members who laid a mine which caused the death of four civilians in Batman in August 2010 were sentenced to 20–24 years in prison.[19]

Turkey’s transparency reports do not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), nor do they distinguish between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs.[20]

According to the Turkish General Staff, a total of 132 mines were recovered or disarmed from 1 January to 3 December 2010. The types and locations of the mines were not specified.[21] Turkey has not specifically reported on recovered mines and their disposition in its transparency reports.

The Monitor has not been able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of the use of antipersonnel mines by the PKK/Kongra Gel or of specific incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines.

Previously, the PKK/Kongra Gel had admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices which can be activated by a person or a vehicle.[22] In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the PKK had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. In April 2010, Geneva Call stated that in light of the allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish forces, which were originally attributed to the PKK, an independent verification mission to determine whether banned antipersonnel mines were used by the PKK was needed.[23]

Stockpiling and destruction

Turkey did not meet its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline to complete destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. Turkey is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty until stockpile destruction is completed. Turkey has reported that its munitions disposal facility was not officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.[24] 

Turkey has stated that in 2004, when it became a State Party, it had a stockpile of 2,973,481 antipersonnel mines.[25] In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy. It subsequently destroyed 94,111 mines in 2006, 250,048 mines in 2007, 913,788 mines in 2008, and 972,524 in 2009.[26] In 2010, it destroyed 707,697 antipersonnel mines.[27] In its 2011 transparency report, Turkey stated that 2,938,060 mines had been destroyed in total.[28] In June 2008, Turkey told States Parties that it had removed and destroyed the fuzes of all remaining mines.[29] It said, “Those remnant parts of the anti-personnel mines cannot be used. This is an important and irreversible step accomplished within the destruction process, the stockpiled landmines are not useable.”[30]

In the first half of 2011, Turkey declared that 631 stockpiled ADAM artillery projectiles (each containing 36 mines) or a total of 22,716 ADAM mines had been transferred for destruction.[31] On behalf of Turkey, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) signed a contract in November 2010 with Spreewerk Lübben GMBH, a company in Germany, to destroy the ADAM mines as Turkey’s Munitions Disposal Facility cannot complete this task. Destruction of the first ADAM mines began in Germany in March 2011 and in June 2011 Turkey stated that it expected destruction of the mines to be completed by 31 August 2011.[32] However, as of October 2011, Turkey had not announced the completion of the destruction program.

In the past Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in 2007 it reported that M18 mines were removed from stockpile destruction list, due to their “specific technical features” and “will not be used as victim activated.”[33] In 2008, officials said that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed.

Mines retained for research and training

On becoming a State Party in 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes.[34] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2011, Turkey reported that it currently retains 15,100 mines for training, as well as for research on a modification project for mine-proof boots.[35]

Turkey continues to retain the largest number of antipersonnel mines among States Parties. It has said that the “large size, as well as the different types of mine action units, necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes.”[36] 

Turkey said in June 2010 that “these mines which are held for permitted purposes will be subject to review, once the stockpile destruction process comes to an end.”[37] Similarly, in May 2006, it stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”[38] In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”[39]

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In both 2010 and 2011, Turkish officials informed the Monitor that Turkey’s position on joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions had not changed from the position previously articulated in 2009.[1] In March 2009, Turkey said it shares the “humanitarian concerns behind the efforts limiting the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and was “not making use of cluster munitions.” Turkey, however, stated that its primary aim was to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and, “for the time being, [it was] not considering to sign the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[2]

In early August 2011, a government official informed the Monitor that, “Turkey no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[3]

Turkey is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but missed its antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction deadline in 2008. It has declared, however, that it will complete the destruction of its remaining antipersonnel mines by the end of August 2011.

Turkey has also expressed its support for cluster munitions to be addressed within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[4]

Turkey attended several of the diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but participated in both the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and in Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 as an observer only and thus did sign the convention.[5]

Turkey has shown interest in the convention despite not joining. It attended an international conference on the convention in Santiago, Chile, in June 2010. Turkey attended the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR in November 2010 as an observer and made a statement on its Armed Forces Rehabilitation Centre, which is also open to civilians and provides assistance to victims of mine and explosive remnants of war. Turkey also noted its work on victim assistance in the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty.[6] Turkey did not participate in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011.

CMC member, the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey, has continued its work to garner domestic support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[7]

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Turkey is a party to the CCW, but has not ratified CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. Turkey actively engaged in the CCW deliberations on cluster munitions in 2010 and the first half of 2011. For many years, Turkey has repeatedly argued in favor of a CCW instrument on cluster munitions on the basis that it would include the major users and producers.

In August 2010, Turkey reaffirmed its willingness to work to reach a consensus on a CCW protocol on cluster munitions and said it did not agree that a protocol would be counter-productive for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[8] In September 2010, Turkey maintained that the CCW’s objective was not to pursue a total ban on cluster munitions and asserted that the use of cluster munitions would remain legitimate.[9]

In November 2010, Turkey supported a continuation of CCW work on cluster munitions, noting “we have come a long way,” but also appealing to CCW participants to “rise above political differences and not turn a deaf ear” to the prospect of a CCW protocol that “will make a difference on the ground.”[10]

In February 2011, Turkey acknowledged that the chair’s draft text could “be improved,” but said “even as it stands it will make a difference of the ground” and be complementary to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11]

Throughout CCW work in 2010 and the first half of July 2011, Turkey continued to oppose the inclusion of a definition of cluster munition victims in the draft chair’s text that would match that of the Convention on Cluster Munitions on the grounds that combatants that are casualties from the “legitimate use of cluster munitions…cannot legally be described as victims.”[12]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In June 2010, a government official informed the Monitor that “Turkey does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.”[13] In early August 2011, a government official informed the Monitor that, “Turkey no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[14]

A US Department of State cable issued in February 2008 and made public by Wikileaks in May 2011 states that, “there exists a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Turkish armed forces [but] Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all out war.’”[15]

In March 2009, Turkey stated that it “is not making use of cluster munitions.”[16] It is not known if Turkey used cluster munitions in the past.[17]

In the past, Turkey has produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions; and it currently has a stockpile.

According to its website, the Turkish company Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) produces an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile which contains self-destructing M85 dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[18] MKEK has also produced, under license from the US, M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions.[19] It is unclear if this latter projectile is still in production.

The firm Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions.[20] Turkey sold 3,020 of the TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates in 2006–2007.[21]

A media article in August 2008 reported that Turkey and Pakistan were looking at potential cooperation in the “production of cluster bombs with 300–400 bomblets each for different missions,” as well as “the sale and production of 122 millimeter short-range and long-range multiple rocket launcher ammunition.”[22]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each with 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995.[23] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers.[24] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. The US announced in October 2004 its intent to transfer to Turkey two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons, each with 145 submunitions.[25] In September 2005, it announced the proposed sale of another 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW.[26]

Slovakia reported the export of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007.[27]

Contamination and Impact

Mines

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Mines were laid from 1956–1959 along 510km of the border with Syria, and on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq to prevent illegal border crossings, and around security installations.[1] It has been stated that all the mines laid on the Turkish side of Turkey’s borders with Greece, Bulgaria,[2] and Georgia have been cleared.[3]

Turkey reported in 2011 that a total of 977,407 mines remained emplaced on its territory at the end of 2010, 2,010 less than at the end of the previous year. Most mines were along the border with Syria (613,766 mines), followed by the borders with Iran (194,755), Iraq (69,046), and Armenia (21,856). Turkey reported another 77,984 mines were emplaced at various locations inside the country.[4] A notice of intention to call tenders for clearance of minefields on the Syrian border published by the Ministry of National Defense in March 2011 said they totaled 212km².[5]

Mines were also emplaced by government forces during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[6] Turkey’s Armed Forces General Staff reported continuing to find PKK mines in 2009 and 2010, but did not specify whether they were victim-activated (and therefore mines or command-detonated devices.[7]

During the 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus, Turkish armed forces emplaced minefields to create a barrier on the northern side of the buffer zone that divides the island, and in areas adjacent to the buffer zone.[8] The UN identified 26 minefields laid by Turkish forces in the buffer zone.[9] Most of the minefields have been maintained since then.[10]

Cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war

Turkey is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily unexploded ordnance, but has not identified the affected areas. Reports by the Human Rights Foundation say the areas most affected are Batman, Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, and Van.[11] There is no evidence of any problem with cluster munition remnants.

Mine Action Program

Key institutions and operators

There is not yet a national mine action authority or mine action center in Turkey. In March 2010, Minister of National Defense Vecdi Gönül told parliament that the government had set up a Top Project Board (TPB) to oversee mine action and a Project Implementation Board (PIB) to act as a national mine action center. The TPB would include representatives of the ministries of agriculture, finance, foreign affairs, internal affairs, and rural affairs, with other ministries participating when necessary. The ministry was said to be preparing a directive setting out the respective responsibilities of the TPB and PIB.[12] The government said in June 2011 that the initiative is “still in an initial process.” It said the Prime Minister had instructed all government departments involved to prepare to participate and that the Ministry of Defense was coordinating preparations.[13]

Turkey is developing plans for mine clearance on its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common border.[14] Turkey says the border accounts for most of the mines emplaced on its territory and its clearance is therefore its “priority.”[15] Officials observe it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.[16]

Turkey’s President ratified Law No. 5903 on demining of minefields along the Syrian border on 16 June 2009. The law stipulates that initially the Ministry of National Defense will invite tenders for demining, and if this process does not work the Ministry of Finance will have the minefields cleared through the “service procurement method” (the meaning of this is not clear). According to the law, if this method also fails, the government will invite companies to tender for demining in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.[17]

The law also provided for the possibility of “requesting the services of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency [NAMSA].”[18] Turkey said in June 2011 it had concluded a “sales agreement” with NAMSA providing for quality management and technical support.[19] A NAMSA advisor in Ankara provides technical support on such issues as tendering procedures and contract management.[20]

Turkey reported in June 2010 that the Ministry of National Defense was “taking the necessary steps for a comprehensive programme” of border clearance,[21] and in March 2011 it announced on its website that tenders would be invited for clearance of the 911km-long Syrian border divided into six separate areas with a total mined area of 212km².[22] Officials say these six areas represent the entirety of mine contamination on the Syrian border, but reported that in some of the six areas demarcation of the border is disputed by Syria and that clearance work would start in the other areas. The government had initially planned to set a deadline of June 2011 for tender submissions but later extended it. Officials told the ICBL in May that Turkey’s intention was still to start clearance in 2011.[23]

Minister of National Defense Gönül confirmed in 2010 that after clearing its border with Syria, Turkey planned to clear its other borders.[24] Turkey submitted a proposal to the European Union in 2010 seeking financing for a €50 million (about US$66 million) project[25] “Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity Through de-mining of the Eastern Borders of Turkey.” The project provides for clearing Turkey’s Armenian border of all remaining mines covering an area of 1.64km² and to clear three areas on its border with Iran north of Lake Van covering 6.4km², 3.5km², and 1.5km², respectively. Under the proposal, Turkey would call for tenders at the end of 2012 or early in 2013 and expected work to start in 2013. Turkey planned to submit a proposal to clear the southern part of the border with Iran in 2012.[26]

Land Release

In the past, demining in Turkey has been conducted by the Specialized Mine Clearance Unit of the Turkish army, using manual and mechanical means.[27]

Mine clearance in 2010

Turkey’s latest Article 7 report stated 25,092 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in mined areas in 2010, up from 22,782 the previous year, and a big increase from the 999 mines reportedly destroyed in 2008.[28] The locations and area cleared were not specified. Turkey has not included in its Article 7 reports the destruction of antipersonnel mines emplaced by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, but the Turkish General Staff website has reported clearance of IEDs. In 2010, it reportedly destroyed a further 132 antipersonnel mines.[29]

In March 2011, Nokta Yatirim Limited Company reported it had demined Gaziantep Karkamış antique city, clearing an area of 663,800m² and destroying 1,200 mines.[30]

Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014.

Turkey has been slow to fulfill its obligations under Article 5 and has not reported in sufficient detail on either the remaining contamination or the clearance it has undertaken to date. In June 2010, Turkey said that “the Ministry of National Defense is taking the necessary steps for a comprehensive programme and timelines of clearance, in collaboration with NAMSA, to comply with the deadline set for 2014.”[31]

Under Action Point 17 of the Cartagena Action Plan, adopted by the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties undertake to, “Provide annually, in accordance with Article 7, precise information on the number, location and size of mined areas, anticipated particular technical or operational challenges, plans to clear or otherwise release these areas, and information on the areas already released, disaggregated by release through clearance, technical survey and non-technical survey.”

Turkey has initiated plans for clearance of its border minefields, but it remains unclear whether it will be able to complete these tasks by March 2014. Moreover, Turkey has made no announcement of any plans to clear the 77,984 mines it has identified are emplaced within its borders.[32] Turkey also still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet its treaty requirements, including areas under its control in northern Cyprus.[33]

Other Risk Reduction Measures

Turkey undertakes little mine/ERW risk education (RE). In 2007, the Minister of Internal Affairs summed up RE activity by commenting that, “the citizens in the region are being warned periodically that they should inform the security forces when they encounter suspicious things.”[34]

Some mine warning signs have been placed near settlements between Nusaybin and Midyat in the southeastern province of Mardin, according to Turkish media reports.[35]

Casualties Overview

The Monitor analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 94 new casualties due to mines/victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Turkey in 2010. Of the total, 41 were civilians, including 26 children, and the rest were security personnel including at least two paramilitary “village guards.”

Three of the civilian casualties were women and two were girls. Most child casualties (19 or 73%) occurred due to ERW incidents, often involving children playing with the explosive item. Several of these ERW incidents occurred near military installations including a gendarmerie station, a military dump, and next to a military firing range. One casualty occurred while crossing the border with Iran and three child casualties happened while grazing animals near the border with Iraq. All other casualties occurred in areas of special security operations.[1]

Analysis of IMFT data identified at least 95 casualties in 2009[2] and 100 casualties for 2008.[3]

The government of Turkey reported 104 mine casualties (26 killed; 78 injured) for 2010. No details on military status, gender, or age were provided in the reporting. This represented an increase from the 83 mine casualties Turkey reported for 2009,[4] but was still lower than the 158 mine casualties reported for 2008.[5]

The total number of mine/IED and ERW casualties is unknown, but there have been at least 6,360 casualties from mines alone since 1984. According to a media report in April 2009, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984; 1,269 people were killed (625 security personnel; 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people were injured (the number of civilians compared to the security personnel injured was not reported) in mine incidents.[6] Turkey reported 4,083 mine/ERW casualties, including 834 people killed and 3,249 injured, as of the end of 2010.[7]

In 2008, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 casualties of mines (mostly civilians) along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s (more than 3,000 killed; 7,000 injured).[8]

Victim Assistance

By April 2010, at least 5,091 people were reported to have been injured by mines in Turkey since 1984.[9]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts to assess the needs of mine/ERW survivors in Turkey were reported in 2010. There was no system in place to collect data on mine survivors or their needs. The Prime Ministry Administration for Disabled People office collects data on all persons with disabilities, but did not distinguish the cause of disability or mine/ERW survivors.[10] The European Commission (EC) reported that a lack of data and research on persons with disabilities, more broadly, remained a barrier to informed policymaking in Turkey.[11]

The Diyarbakir Bar Association collected information on mine/ERW casualties in the affected regions and continued to offer assistance to mine survivors who are eligible due to their financial circumstances.[12] The Human Rights Association collected records on survivors and casualties’ families who contact the organizations’ branches for assistance; information collected includes needs. Among the 13 branches in affected areas, 42 mine/ERW survivors or people killed, were registered in 2010.[13]

In February 2011, Ufuk Uras, one of the Member of Parliament for Istanbul, asked follow up questions in parliament about the situation for mine/ERW survivors including: “Which health, social and economic assistance has been provided to mine victims” and how many survivors had accessed that assistance.[14] The time period from a response had expired by the time parliament stopped sessions to prepare for an election.

In 2006, Turkey had reported that it was initiating a program of transition to an international injury classification system that would include mines and ERW.[15] No further progress was reported as of mid-2011.

Victim assistance coordination

The Administration for Disabled People, under the Prime Minister, is responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The main functions of the Administration for Disabled People are coordinating between national and international institutions, formulating disability policy to promote the full participation into society and equality of people with disabilities, and defining and solving problems faced by disabled people.[16]

Until late 2010, the Administration for Disabled People had not been informed about the issue of victim assistance and Turkey’s responsibilities to survivors under the Mine Ban Treaty. Although the Administration had not previously been aware, or involved, in victim assistance or issues relating to mine/ERW survivors, its representatives acknowledged that the role was within its existing mandate.[17]  In 2010, the Administration for Persons with Disabilities was reported not to have been active in the mine-affected regions.[18]

In April 2011, the IMFT held a workshop to launch the first mine/ERW Turkish Victims’ Network. The workshop was attended by survivors and family members of people injured and killed as well as volunteers and lawyers who would together make up the network. A plan for 2010 with objectives to address the needs of survivors and concerns of the Victims’ Network was drawn up. The objectives and concerns were presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Administration for Disabled People at a meeting in May 2011.[19]

Article 7 reporting on victim assistance is updated by Turkey annually, but only addresses casualties who receive treatment at military medical facilities. Article 7 (and Convention on Conventional Weapons Article 13) reporting did not include information on services available to civilian mine/ERW survivors or survivors injured in previous years.[20] Turkey made statements on victim assistance at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in November and the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2010, as well as the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011. These statements all referred to the services available at the main military rehabilitation center in Ankara. No reporting addressed progress or challenges in relation to the victim assistance actions of the Cartagena Action Plan. In 2010, Turkey served as one of the co-chairs of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance.

Survivor inclusion

Survivors reported that they were not included in planning or implementation of services relevant to their needs.[21] IMFT held survivor participation meetings during 2010 in Diyarbakır, Mardin, and Şanlıurfa and launched a Turkish Victim’s Network, including survivors and family members, on 24 April 2011.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2010[22]

No significant changes in the accessibility or quality of services were reported for 2010. Mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities in affected areas did not have access to the same level of services as other persons with disabilities in larger cities in Turkey.[23]

All persons with disabilities have the right to access free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. Those without social insurance can apply for a special “green card” to be eligible for what were previously free services in 2008. However, in 2010, those persons with disabilities eligible for the “green card” medical insurance still had to contribute to part of their medical expenses, eliminating the availability of free services.[24] Regulations in the Healthcare Application Notice, issued by the Social Security Organization of Turkey, restricted access to medicines, equipment, and mobility devices for persons with disabilities, even when deemed necessary by medical professionals.[25]

Healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected region (other than the largest cities) are underfunded, have inadequate staff levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergency or ongoing medical needs.[26] In some cases civilian survivors were evacuated by military aircraft; however, emergency transportation for survivors was not consistent.[27]

Rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors was limited to centers in Ankara and Dicle. There was a significant need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to be established locally in provinces (other mine/ERW affected provinces). There was also a need to establish facilities, which could address the needs for child survivors.[28] Holders of the “green card” could only apply for new prostheses every five years, which was detrimental to the rehabilitation of child mine/ERW survivors.[29]

The Dicle University Research Hospital prosthetics center remained the only such center for all mine-affected regions. Financial constraints had prevented survivors from reaching the Dicle University Research Hospital prosthetics center in 2009; with no progress to improve access reported in 2010. Dicle University also had a dedicated research department for disability issues, but it was not fully functional due to a lack of staff.[30]

Institutions promoting social inclusion remained dispersed and weak. Further measures were needed to increase the employability of persons with disabilities in both the public and private sectors, including promotion of alternative methods of employment. In February 2011, amendments were made in the Public Servants Law (657) on the employment quota for persons with disabilities allowing funding for positions to meet the quota, which was not fully implemented by May 2011; and on working conditions. [31]

The Diyarbakir Lawyers’ Bar Association established a new mine commission within the association; the commission was yet to be fully operational as of May 2011. As had been the case with a similar commission that operated until 2007, the new mine commission was to assist survivors in accessing services and compensation through the law 5233 on compensation.[32] However, to receive free legal assistance from Lawyers’ Bar Associations, survivors must pass a means test that excludes even the poorest, if they own any assets, such as a small holding of land for subsistence farming.[33]

Survivors called for a review of the compensation process to ensure timely and appropriate outcomes since often a case expires (after five years) before a decision on compensation is granted.

In early 2011, members of the National Medical Association of Turkey started a group to address mine issues, including advocating for the needs of survivors.[34]

A need for specific policies to address the social support needs of child mine/ERW survivors was identified.[35] No progress was reported.

The Disability Act (2005) states that all existing public buildings and roads, pavements, pedestrian crossings, open and green areas, sports areas, and similar social and cultural infrastructure serving the public must be made suitably accessible for people with disabilities by 2012. However, almost no progress was reported and only a limited pilot project was undertaken.[36] Physical barriers to access to public buildings were a particular problem. Access to basic rights including education, health, social, and public services for persons with disabilities were still critical issues, despite existing legislation.[37]

As a result of a referendum in September 2010, an amendment to the Constitution made positive discrimination in favor of persons with disabilities possible. The Government prepared a draft proposal establishing an anti-discrimination and equality board. There was a strategy paper on accessibility and a related national action plan but these had not been adopted by the end of 2010.[38]

Turkey ratified the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 28 September 2009.[39]