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Ban Policy (part 2)

( Stockpiles | Retention | Transparency | National Implementation Legislation | Interpretive Issues | Timeline of Use)

Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction

Global stockpiles

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 91 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the following table.[98] At least 23 of these states have destroyed their stockpiled cluster munitions, while 13 States Parties are in the process of destruction.

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions

States Parties	Signatories	Non-Signatories
Afghanistan	Angola	Algeria	Mongolia
Austria	Canada	Argentina	Morocco
Belgium	Central African Rep.	Azerbaijan	Oman
BiH	Colombia	Bahrain	Pakistan
Botswana	Congo, Rep. of	Belarus	Poland
Bulgaria	Guinea	Brazil	Qatar
Chile	Indonesia	Cambodia	Romania
Côte d’Ivoire	Nigeria	China	Russia
Croatia	South Africa	Cuba	Saudi Arabia
Czech Republic		Egypt	Serbia
Denmark		Eritrea	Singapore
Ecuador		Estonia	Slovakia
France		Ethiopia	Sudan
Germany		Finland	Syria
Guinea-Bissau		Georgia	Thailand
Honduras		Greece	Turkey
Hungary		India	Turkmenistan
Iraq		Iran	Ukraine
Italy		Israel	United Arab Emirates
Japan		Jordan	United States
Macedonia FYR		Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan
Moldova		North Korea	Venezuela
Montenegro		South Korea	Yemen
Mozambique		Kuwait	Zimbabwe
Netherlands		Libya
Norway
Peru
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
33 (14 current)	9 (6 current)	49 (48 current)

Note: Countries in italics report no longer possessing stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by non-signatories

It is not possible to make a valid global estimate of quantities in stockpiles as most non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions have not disclosed detailed information on the types and quantities they hold.

One exception in the reporting period was Slovakia, which publicly disclosed a stockpile totaling 899 cluster munitions of various types in its January 2014 action plan for accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[99] Georgia once possessed a significant stockpile of 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing 320,375 submunitions according to information released on the destruction of obsolete weapons in 2013.[100]

Previously, only the US had disclosed the size of its stockpile, when it said it had “more than 6 million cluster munitions” in 2011.[101] Greece and the Ukraine have disclosed partial figures.[102]

Stockpiles possessed by States Parties

A total of 33 States Parties have stockpiled cluster munitions at some point in time, of which 19 have already destroyed their stockpiles. Fourteen States Parties are preparing to begin, or are in the process of, stockpile destruction: BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Japan, Mozambique, Peru, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

According to available information, at one point 29 States Parties stockpiled more than 1.4 million cluster munitions containing 177 million submunitions, as shown in the following table.

Cluster munitions and explosive submunitions declared by States Parties[103]

State Party	Quantity of Cluster Munitions	Quantity of Explosive Submunitions
Austria	12,672	798,336
Belgium	115,210	10,138,480
BiH	445	148,059
Botswana	510	12,900
Bulgaria	6,909	173,161
Chile	249	25,896
Côte d’Ivoire	68	10,200
Croatia	7,235	178,785
Czech Rep.	480	16,400
Denmark	42,176	2,440,940
Ecuador	117	17,199
France	34,856	14,923,621
Germany	552,608	63,297,553
Hungary	289	4,000
Italy	5,113	2,849,979
Japan	14,011	2,029,469
Macedonia FYR	2,426	39,980
Moldova	1,385	27,050
Montenegro	353	51,891
Mozambique	290	22,656
Netherlands	191,471	25,867,510
Norway	52,190	3,087,910
Peru	675	86,200
Portugal	11	1,617
Slovenia	1,080	52,920
Spain	8,362	308,245
Sweden	370	20,595
Switzerland	205,894	12,203,035
UK	190,828	38,758,898
Total	1,448,283	177,593,485

Note: Italics indicate states that no longer possess stockpiles.

Stockpiles possessed by signatories

Three signatories have completed destruction or have stated they no longer stockpile cluster munitions:

• Colombia destroyed its stockpile of 72 cluster munitions containing 10,832 submunitions during 2009.[104]
• The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had voluntarily destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and now has no stockpiles on its territory.[105]
• The Republic of Congo declared in September 2011 that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory.[106]

In 2012, Canada reported a stockpile of 12,597 cluster munitions containing 1.1 million explosive submunitions.[107] In April 2014, it said that stockpile destruction was due to commence the following week and be completed by September 2014.[108]

Five signatories have acknowledged stockpiling cluster munitions but have not provided information on their stocks or plans for their destruction:

• Angola has yet to make an official declaration that all stocks of cluster munitions have been identified and destroyed, but in 2010 stated that its entire stockpile had been destroyed and its armed forces no longer possessed cluster munitions.[109]
• Guinea’s stockpile status and plans for its destruction were not known as of 31 July 2014.
• Indonesia has acknowledged having a stockpile of cluster munitions, but the size and precise content is not known.
• A Nigerian official confirmed in April 2012 that Nigeria has a stockpile of BL-755 cluster bombs.[110]
• South Africa has stated that its “relatively small stockpile of obsolete cluster munitions” has been earmarked for destruction.[111]

No stockpiles

Confirmation by States Parties and signatories in transparency reports that they do not possess stockpiles is as important as a declaration of stockpiles. A total of 35 States Parties have confirmed never stockpiling the weapon, most critically through a direct statement included in its transparency report.[112] Since August 2013, Andorra, Australia, Iraq, Liechtenstein, and Swaziland have made such a declaration in the reporting period.

Stockpile destruction

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

A total of 22 States Parties have declared the destruction of more than 1.16 million cluster munitions containing nearly 140 million submunitions as of July 2014, as shown in the following table.[113] This represents the destruction of 80% of the total stockpiles of cluster munitions and 78% of the total number of explosive submunitions declared by States Parties.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties

State Party (year completed)	Cluster Munitions	Explosive Submunitions
Austria (2010)	12,672	798,336
Belgium (2010)	115,210	10,138,480
BiH	441	147,967
Chile (2013)	249	25,896
Côte d’Ivoire (2013)	68	10,200
Croatia	159	13,830
Czech Republic (2010)	400	16,400
Denmark (2014)	42,176	2,440,940
Ecuador (2004)	117	17,199
France	20,659	8,055,708
Germany	513,770	52,748,768
Hungary (2011)	289	4,000
Italy	4,604	2,482,896
Japan	8,718	999,682
Macedonia FYR (2013)	2,426	39,980
Moldova (2010)	1,385	27,050
Montenegro (2010)	353	51,891
Netherlands (2012)	191,543	25,862,158
Norway (2010)	52,190	3,087,910
Portugal (2011)	11	1,617
Slovenia (2011)	1,080	52,920
Spain	4,762	232,647
Sweden	291
UK (2013)	190,828	32,275,586
Total	1,164,401	139,532,061

Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction.

Prior to the convention’s entry into force for States Parties, a total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing just more than 78 million submunitions were destroyed by Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK.[114]

Destruction completed

Nineteen States Parties have declared that they no longer stockpile cluster munitions, of which 16 have provided information on the number and/or types of munitions destroyed, as detailed in the previous table. Three States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction are not listed in the table due to lack of information:

• Honduras stated in December 2007 that it does not possess cluster munitions and officials said that a stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munitions were destroyed in previous years.[115] It has yet to provide its Article 7 report formally declaring no stocks.
• Afghanistan again stated in April 2014 that all its stockpiles of cluster munitions were destroyed before the convention entered into force for Afghanistan.[116] But it has declared numbers of munitions under the stockpile destruction section of its Article 7 reports, indicating that significant destruction occurred in 2005–2011 and in 2012 and 2013.[117] The destroyed munitions do not appear to be stockpiled weapons under the jurisdiction and control of the Afghan government, but rather a combination of cluster munitions that had been abandoned by other combatants in the past and recently discovered, failed cluster munitions, and unexploded submunitions. These are all considered cluster munition remnants under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not stockpiled cluster munitions.
• Iraq has similarly declared that it does not stockpile any cluster munitions, but at the same time it has used the stockpiling section of its Article 7 reports to list 92,092 munitions destroyed from 2003–2013 (prior to the convention’s entry into force) and 6,489 munitions destroyed in 2013, but these are likely weapons or remnants destroyed in the course of clearance.[118]

Four States Parties completed stockpile destruction in the reporting period, all years in advance of their treaty-mandated deadlines:

• On 12 July 2013, Chile completed its stockpile destruction six years in advance of its 1 June 2019 deadline;
• On 25 October 2013, FYR Macedonia completed its stockpile destruction five years in advance of its 1 August 2018 deadline;
• On 17 December 2013, the UK completed its stockpile destruction five years in advance of its 1 November 2018 deadline; and
• On 20 March 2014, Denmark completed its stockpile destruction more than four years in advance of its 1 August 2018 deadline.

Destruction underway

In 2013, 10 States Parties destroyed more than 130,000 cluster munitions and 24 million submunitions, as detailed in the following table.

Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2013

State Party	Cluster Munitions Destroyed	Explosive Submunitions Destroyed
Chile	249	25,896
Côte d'Ivoire	68	10,200
Denmark	22,271	1,395,309
France	14,525	5,792,049
Germany	69,334	7,858,532
Italy	2,328	1,460,592
Japan	8,718	999,682
Macedonia FYR	2,414	39,584
Sweden	291
UK	10,632	6,483,312
Total	130,830	24,065,156

Note: Italics indicate States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction.

Germany and the UK again accounted for the majority of cluster munitions destroyed in 2013, as they did in 2012 and 2011. France placed in a close third as its destruction program reached a greater capacity. Japan and Switzerland began physical destruction of their stocks in 2013.

At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013, several States Parties reaffirmed that they will complete destruction well in advance of their treaty mandated deadlines. Germany confirmed it is on track to complete the destruction of its remaining stocks in 2015.[119] Italy stated that the destruction processes would be completed “as soon as possible” and “well in advance” of the treaty’s deadline, but did not indicate if the objective would be met before 2015.[120] Japan said that its stockpile should be destroyed by the end of 2015.[121] France said it is working to complete stockpile destruction by 2018, if not in advance of the deadline.[122]

Sweden has said previously that it intends to complete destruction of the stockpile by the end of 2014.[123]

All other States Parties with cluster munitions stockpiles have committed to complete destruction within the eight-year deadline required by the convention and several provided updates on their destruction efforts in the reporting period.

Destruction costs

More than US$15 million has been spent on stockpile destruction by States Parties BiH, Croatia, Denmark, Moldova, Norway, and Spain.

Historically, at least $216 million has been allocated or estimated as necessary for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions by States Parties France (€20.2 or $26.8 million), Germany (€41.4 million or $55.0 million), Japan (JPY ¥2.8 billion or $28.7 million), Switzerland (CHF40 million or $43.2 million), and the UK (£40 million or $62.6 million).[124]

In April 2014, Peru requested international cooperation and assistance to destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions by the deadline provided by the convention.[125] Guinea-Bissau has also requested technical and financial assistance for its stockpile destruction.

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Retention

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of and training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of counter-measures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

The CMC and at least three dozen States Parties believe that no compelling reason exists to retain live cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for these purposes.

Retention by States Parties

As of July 2014, 10 States Parties—all from Europe—retained cluster munitions for training and research purposes. It is not clear if their holdings constitute the “minimum number absolutely necessary” as required by the convention for the permitted purposes. The initial quantity of cluster munitions (and submunitions) retained, the quantity retained at the end of calendar year 2013, the quantity used or “consumed” for permitted purposes, and types are listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions retained for training[126]

State Party	Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)			Types of cluster munitions (individual submunitions)
Country (date of initial declaration)	Retained Initially	Retained in 2013	Consumed in 2013
Germany (2011)	685 ( 62,580)	657 (59,555)	28 (3,025)	Projectiles: DM602, DM632, DM642/DM642A1, DM602. (MUSA, KB44, STABO, MIFF, MUSPA, BLU-3/B, DM1383, M77, Mk.1)
Spain (2011)	711 (16,652)	354 (8,380)	302 (6,342)	MAT-120, ESPIN-21 projectiles BME-330, CBU-100 bombs
Netherlands (2011)	272 (23,545)	276 (24,347)	0 (0)	CBU-87 bomb, Mk.-20 Rockeye bomb, M261 rocket, M483 projectiles. (Mk.-1)
Belgium (2011)	276 (24,288)	226 (19,888)	7 (616)	M483A1 projectile
Switzerland (2013)	138 (7,346)	138 (7,346)	--	Projectiles KaG-88, KaG-90, KaG-88/99, MP-98
France (2011)	55 (10,284)	9 (4,095)	0 (858)	(KB-1, SAKR, M93, 9N22)
Italy (2012)	3 (641)	3 (641)	--	Bombs RBL-755, Mk.-20 Rockeye
Denmark (2011)	170 (-)	0 (3,634)	--	(DM1383, DM1385)
Czech Rep. (2011)	0 (796)	0 (100)	0 (193)	(AO-2.5, AO-10, PTAB-25)
Sweden (2013)	0 (125)	0 (125)	--	(MJ-1, MJ-2)

Note: The quantity totals may include individual submunitions retained, which are not contained in a delivery container.

Germany still retains the largest number of submunitions of any State Party. The CMC has expressed concern at the retention of such high numbers of cluster munitions and submunitions and asked if Germany’s training program is large enough to require the consumption of so many submunitions. In April 2014, Germany reported that “a review on consumption of retained [cluster munitions] with the aim of reduction is ongoing.”[127]

Use of retained cluster munitions

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that States Parties maintain detailed annual reporting on past use of retained cluster munitions to ensure they are being kept only for permitted purposes. In the reporting period, five States Parties reduced the number of cluster munitions in the course of training Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel and other research:

• Belgium consumed seven M483A1 artillery projectiles and 616 submunitions in explosive ordnance disposal training and research in 2013.[128]
• The Czech Republic reported using 193 submunitions for the training of its armed forces in cluster munitions detection and clearance techniques in 2013.[129] In April 2014, it declared the retention of 100 submunitions, which is a small fraction of the 796 submunitions initially retained in 2010.
• France destroyed 288 KB-1 and KB-2 submunitions, 568 submunitions from SAKR rockets, and two individual 74mm 9N22 submunitions were consumed over the course of 2013.[130]
• Germany consumed a total of 28 cluster munitions and 3,125 submunitions during EOD training in 2013.[131]
• Spain consumed 302 ESPIN-21 cluster munitions and 6,342 submunitions in the course of EOD training and research in 2013.[132] It has decreased the initial amount of cluster munitions retained by more than half since 2011.

Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland did not consume any cluster munitions in training or research during 2013.

Denmark, Czech Republic, and Sweden have indicated that they are retaining individual submunitions only.

No retention

Two States Parties that initially retained cluster munitions have since destroyed those retained stocks and not replaced them as of July 2014:

• Australia declared the retention of two cluster munitions and 276 explosive submunitions from the former Soviet Union in its initial Article 7 report provided in September 2013.[133] In the updated annual report provided in April 2014, Australia declared the destruction of both cluster munitions and the 276 explosive submunitions in September 2013.[134]
• The UK destroyed its retained submunitions by demolition in 2012 due to “concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”[135] In April 2014, the UK affirmed that in the future it may retain “a small number” of submunitions for permitted purposes.[136] Its 2013 and 2014 Article 7 reports state that the “UK has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”[137]

Three States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions—Chile, Croatia, and Moldova—have declared the retention of inert items that have been rendered free from explosives and no longer qualify as cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

In their transparency reports, in statements and letters, and in their national implementation legislation, most States Parties have expressed the view that there is no need to retain any live cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for training in detection, clearance and destruction techniques, or for the development of counter-measures. This includes 17 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions in the past.[138]

Most signatories have indicated they are not retaining any cluster munitions for training or research purposes, including Canada and Colombia.

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Transparency Reporting

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency measures report no later than 180 days after the convention’s entry into force for that State Party and an updated report by 30 April each year thereafter. The CMC encourages states to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.[139]

Initial reports

According to the UN website as of 28 July 2014, a total of 65 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report as required by Article 7 of the convention, representing three-quarters (77%) of States Parties for which the obligation applied at that time.[140] This compliance rate is largely unchanged from previous years.[141]

Eighteen States Parties are late in submitting their initial Article 7 transparency reports, as listed in the table below. Of these states, nine had submission deadlines in 2011, three were due in 2012, three were due in 2013, and one was due in 2014.

State Parties with overdue initial Article 7 reports (as of 28 July 2014)

Bolivia	30 March 2014
Cameroon	30 June 2013
Cape Verde	28 October 2011
Chad	28 February 2014
Comoros	30 June 2011
Cook Islands	30 July 2012
Dominican Republic	28 November 2012
El Salvador	28 December 2011
Fiji	30 April 2011
Guinea-Bissau	28 October 2011
Honduras	28 February 2013
Mali	30 May 2011
Nauru	28 January 2014
Niger	28 January 2011
Panama	28 October 2011
Togo	29 May 2013
Trinidad and Tobago	28 August 2012
Tunisia	28 August 2011

One State Party has a pending deadline for its original reporting obligation: Saint Kitts and Nevis on 28 August 2014.

Annual updated reports

After submitting their initial Article 7 report, States Parties are required to provide an updated report by 30 April of each year covering the previous calendar year. States Parties with no changes since their previous report can complete a simple cover page indicating no change, while others can provide updated information using only the cover page and relevant forms.

As of 28 July 2014, 10 States Parties that have provided initial reports had not delivered an annual update since the initial report: Antigua and Barbuda, Burundi, Hungary, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, and Sierra Leone.

As of 28 July 2014, 21 States Parties that have provided initial reports had not provided the most recent annual update due by 30 April 2014.[142]

Voluntary reports

States not party to the convention may submit voluntary reports as an interim step toward ratification or accession, or at least as an indication of support for the convention. Three signatories and one other area have provided voluntary initial Article 7 transparency reports: Canada (in 2011, 2012, and 2013), DRC (in 2011, 2012 and 2014), Palau (in 2011), and Western Sahara (in 2014).

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National Implementation Legislation

Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires States Parties to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.”[143] The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

As of 31 July 2014, 22 States Parties are known to have enacted specific legislative measures to implement the convention, while 26 States Parties have indicated that their existing national laws are sufficient to implement the convention. Another 19 States Parties are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention. The status of national implementation measures was unknown or unclear in another 13 States Parties, most of which have not submitted an initial transparency report as required by the convention.[144]

National implementation legislation by States Parties

National implementation laws

The 22 States Parties that have enacted legislation to implement the convention are listed in the table below. Most enacted legislation prior to ratifying, often by combining the legislative process for approval of implementation and ratification.

States Parties that have enacted national legislation

State Party	Year enacted
Australia	2012
Austria	2008
Belgium	2006
Cook Islands	2011
Czech Republic	2011
Ecuador	2010
France	2010
Germany	2009
Guatemala	2012
Hungary	2012
Ireland	2008
Italy	2011
Japan	2009
Liechtenstein	2013
Luxembourg	2009
New Zealand	2009
Norway	2008
Samoa	2012
Spain	2010
Sweden	2012
Switzerland	2012
UK	2010

Two states adopted legislation before the convention was concluded in May 2008 (Austria and Belgium), two adopted legislation in 2008 prior to signing the convention in December (Ireland and Norway), while four adopted legislation in 2009, four in 2010, three in 2011, five in 2012, one in 2013, and none in 2014.

No countries started the process of implementing legislation during the reporting period. In November 2013, Spain’s Congress of Deputies approved additional legislative measures to its 2010 penal code amendment, which were awaiting Senate approval as of June 2014.[145]

Existing law deemed sufficient

At least 26 States Parties have indicated that they view their existing laws as sufficient to implement the convention: Albania, Andorra, BiH, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iraq, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovenia, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

Seven States Parties were added to this list in the reporting period:

• A BiH official said in September 2013 that “all the necessary legislation is in place.”[146] Previously, officials indicated that BiH was considering national legislation to enforce the ban convention.
• Chile cited its ratification legislation under national implementation measures in its Article 7 report.[147]
• Costa Rica declared that “according to Article 7 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica, the Convention on Cluster Munitions constitutes supreme law and is made applicable through Law 8921 promulgated 16 December 2010.”[148]
• Iraq cited its 2012 ratification law in its initial Article 7 report provided in June 2014.[149]
• Mauritania cited its ratification legislation, Law 2011-050, in its Article 7 report.[150] In April 2014, a government official said that international treaties ratified by Mauritania are automatically incorporated into the domestic law so there is no need for new or amended legislation specific to cluster munitions.[151]
• Peru cited its ratification law under national implementation measures in its Article 7 report.[152]
• Senegal reported in April 2014 that “it is not necessary to put in place legislation or regulation because Senegal is not a country affected by cluster munitions.”[153] Senegal cited its ratification legislation in its Article 7 report.[154]

Legislation under consideration

At least 19 other States Parties have said that they are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention: Afghanistan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ghana, Grenada, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Togo, and Zambia.

National implementation legislation by signatories

Signatories including Canada, Chad, Colombia, Iceland, Republic of the Congo, DRC, South Africa, and Uganda are among those that have expressed their intent to enact implementation legislation.

During the reporting period, Canada’s implementation legislation (the “Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions”) was reintroduced to the House of Commons as Bill C-6 on 25 October 2013, approved on 19 June 2014, and was awaiting Senate approval as of 31 July 2014.[155] The draft implementation legislation has been strongly criticized by the CMC, Mines Action Canada (MAC), and others, particularly the section dealing with “interoperability” or relations between States Parties and states that have not joined the convention, including during joint military operations.

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Interpretive Issues

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on some important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC has urged States Parties and signatories to declare their views on the following special issues of concern so that common understandings can be reached:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions (“interoperability”);
2. The prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and
3. The prohibition on investment in production of cluster munitions.

A significant number of States Parties and signatories to the convention have declared their views on these matters, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and in direct communication with the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws have been enacted that provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yet, as of 31 July 2014, 33 of the 84 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions still had not declared their views on even one of these interpretive issues.[156]

In addition, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in late 2010 and 2011 show how the US, despite not itself participating in the Oslo Process, attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, especially with respect to interoperability.[157] The cables also show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of States Parties, including Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain. US cluster munition stocks have been removed from Norway and the UK.

Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to…assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. Article 21 was strongly criticized by the CMC for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 says that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate a State Party’s obligations under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party and to encourage them to join the convention. Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

The CMC position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.[158]

States Parties Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK have indicated support for the contrary view that the Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21.

The CMC has described Australia’s Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 as “extremely problematic” because it allows Australian military personnel to assist with cluster munition attacks by states not party—a provision that runs counter to the convention’s prohibition on assistance—and contravenes Article 9 requiring penal sanctions for activities prohibited by the convention. In a statement issued upon Australia’s ratification in October 2012, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, “With this legislation, it is now an offence to use...and also to encourage others to engage with these dangerous weapons…The Convention and the Act will also apply to Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel during military operations and ADF personnel serving alongside the defence forces of States not party to the Convention.”[159]

Japan has been reluctant to publicly discuss its views on Article 21, but in a June 2008 State Department cable, a senior Japanese official apparently told the US that Japan interprets the convention as enabling the US and Japan to continue to engage in military cooperation and conduct operations that involve US-owned cluster munitions.[160]

Signatory Canada is in the process of considering draft implementation legislation that contains extensive provisions on interoperability. Section 11 of Canada’s draft implementing legislation on “Joint Military Operations” would permit Canadian Armed Forces and public officials to “direct or authorize” an act that “may involve” a state not party while that state is performing activities prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The bill would also permit Canadian forces and public officials to “expressly request” use of cluster munitions by a state not party if the choice of weapons is not within the “exclusive control” of the Canadian Armed Forces.[161] The original text of Section 11(1)(c) would have also allowed Canadians themselves to use, acquire, possess, or transfer cluster munitions if they are temporarily assigned to the armed forces of a state not party, but during a committee hearing on 10 December 2013, the word “using” was deleted from that clause of the bill at the proposal of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[162]

Transit and foreign stockpiling

The CMC has stated that the injunction to not provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as a ban on the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. It has also said that the convention should be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 34 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[163]

States Parties that have indicated support for the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention, include Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.

In addition, signatory Canada’s draft legislation does not explicitly address transit or foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions but could be read to implicitly allow these activities.[164] In May 2013, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that “The Canadian Forces would also prohibit, as a matter of policy, the transportation of any cluster munitions aboard Canadian assets.”[165]

US stockpiling and transit

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US has removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories. The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[166] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[167]

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in five other States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain), as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:

• A US cable dated December 2008 states, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[168] Some International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops operating in Afghanistan have been equipped with cluster munitions, but the current status of any possible stockpiles is not known.
• According to a December 2008 cable, Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany.[169] Germany has not yet publicly expressed clear views on the convention’s prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions.
• In a November 2008 cable, the US identified Italy, Spain, and Qatar as states of particular concern with respect to interoperability since “they are states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[170] Spain reported in 2011 that it is in the process of informing the states not party with which it cooperates in joint military operations of its international obligations with respect to the prohibition of storage of prohibited weapons on territory under its jurisdiction or control.[171]
• A December 2008 cable states that Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them.”[172] Japan maintains that US military bases in Japan are under US jurisdiction and control, so the possession of cluster munitions by US forces does not violate the national law or the convention.
• According to a cable detailing the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the “U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),” until US cluster munitions are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime, “they are considered to be under U.S. title, and U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[173]
• According to a May 2007 cable, the US may store clusters munitions in Kuwait.[174]

Disinvestment

A number of States Parties and the CMC believe that the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts constitutes a prohibition on investment, both direct and indirect, in the production of cluster munitions.

A total of nine States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions, as shown in the following table.[175]

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party	Year enacted
Belgium	2007
Ireland	2008
Italy	2011
Liechtenstein	2013
Luxembourg	2009
Netherlands	2013
New Zealand	2009
Samoa	2012
Switzerland	2013

Belgium was first to enact disinvestment legislation in 2007, followed by Ireland in 2008, Luxembourg and New Zealand in 2009, Italy in 2011, Samoa in 2012, and Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in 2013.

In addition, at least 26 States Parties and signatories to the convention have provided their view that investment in cluster munitions production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention: Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, France, Ghana, Guatemala, the Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, the UK, and Zambia.

There were a few developments concerning disinvestment in the second half of 2013 and first half of 2014:

• Denmark announced at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2013 that the government “is currently investigating the possibilities nationally for further engaging private investors in pursuing the objectives of the [Convention on Cluster Munitions].” It also informed States Parties of the former Minister of Business and Growth’s request to the Council on Social Responsibility to provide “recommendations on requirements and possibilities to effectively strengthen efforts for responsible investment in relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[176] Despite several years of campaigning by Danish NGOs that have also worked to stop Danish financial institutions from investing in companies that produce cluster munitions, the government appears to have reverted to supporting the non-binding recommendations approach contained in its 2010 “Guide on Responsible Investment.”[177]
• Ghana informed States Parties in September 2013 that it “considers investments in the production of cluster munitions a form of assistance that is banned by the Convention.”
• Luxembourg in September 2013 called on other States Parties to follow its example as a country that has gone further than the provisions of the convention to prohibit financing of cluster munitions production in its national legislation.[178]
• Liechtenstein promoted its domestic legislation prohibiting, both directly and indirectly, the financing of cluster munitions production at the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2013.[179]

A few states have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, and other states have withdrawn and/or banned investments in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition production and promote socially responsible investment in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

CMC member NGOs and national stakeholders have continued to call on governments to legislate against investment in cluster munition producers and to provide clear guidance to financial institutions and investors on the issue of investment in cluster munition producers.[180] The CMC’s Stop Explosive Investments campaign initiative, launched in 2009, continued its efforts in the reporting period.[181]

In 2013 and 2014, CMC co-founder and member PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi) released two significant reports on disinvestment: a report on examples of positive practice stemming from legal prohibitions on investments in cluster munitions in April 2014 and an update of a report on the status of global investment in cluster munition production in December 2013.[182] The 2013 updated report identifies a number of financial institutions in eight States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) which have guidelines on investment in cluster munitions production not previously listed in the 2012 edition produced in cooperation with FairFin (formerly Netwerk Vlaanderen).[183]

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Timeline of cluster munition use[184]

Date	Location		Known details of use
2014	Ukraine		In eastern Ukraine in early July, remnants of a 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rocket and a 9N235 fragmentation submunition were identified from photographs reportedly taken at Kramatorsk, while remnants of at least eight 220mm 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets and at least three 9N210 or 9N235 submunitions were identified in Slavyansk.
2014	South Sudan		In Jonglei State, the UN found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions by a road 16 kilometers south of Bor in the week of 7 February, in an area not known to be contaminated by remnants before that time.
2013		Myanmar	Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in northern Kachin state has claimed that the Myanmar army used cluster munitions against KIA forces in an attack near the town of Laiza 26 January. Photographs show remnants of an M1A1 cluster adapter and 20-pound fragmentation bombs.
2012–2014	Syria		At least 249 cluster munitions were used in 10 of Syria 14 governorates in the period from mid-2012 to July 2014. Seven types of cluster munitions—including air-dropped bombs, dispensers fixed to aircraft, and ground-launched rockets—have been used and at least nine types of explosive submunitions.
2012	Sudan		In Southern Kordofan state, bordering South Sudan, there were two allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan involving a Chinese Type-81 DPICM in Troji on 29 February and a Soviet-made RBK-500 cluster bomb and AO-2.5RT explosive submunitions in Ongolo on 15 April.
2011	Libya		Libyan government forces used MAT-120 mortar-fired cluster munitions, RBK-250 cluster bombs with PTAB-2.5M submunitions, and 122mm cargo rockets with an unidentified type of DPICM. Intact submunitions were found in an arms depot hit by NATO air strikes.
2011	Cambodia		Thai forces fired artillery-delivered cluster munitions with M42/M46 and M85 type DPICM submunitions into Cambodia during border clashes near Preah Vihear temple.
2009	Yemen		In southern Abyan governorate, the US used at least one TLAM-D cruise missile with BLU-97 submunitions to attack a “training camp” on 17 December. The northern Sada’a governorate bordering Saudi Arabia is contaminated by cluster munitions used in late 2009 during fighting by the government of Yemen, armed Houthi rebels, and Saudi Arabia. The user responsible is not clear, but remnants include US-made CBU-52 cluster bombs and BLU-97, BLU-61 and M42/M46 submunitions as well as Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs.
2008	Georgia		Russian and Georgian forces used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions found by deminers include the air-dropped AO-2.5RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210, and rocket-delivered M85.
2006	Lebanon		Israeli forces used surface-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.
2006	Israel		Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.
2003	Iraq		The US and the UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions, in the three weeks of major combat.
Unknown	Uganda		RBK-250-275 bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.
2001–2002	Afghanistan		The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.
1999	Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)		The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in what is now Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania. FRY also used cluster munitions.
1998–2003	DRC		Deminers have found BL755 bombs, BLU-63 cluster munitions, and PM-1 submunitions.
1998–1999	Albania		Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and NATO forces conducted six aerial cluster munition strikes.
1998	Ethiopia, Eritrea		Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport and dropped BL755 bombs in Gash-Barka province in Eritrea. Eritrea used cluster munitions in two separate strikes in Mekele, including at a school.
1998	Afghanistan/Sudan		In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, at a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, and at non-state armed group (NSAG) training camps in Afghanistan.
1997	Sierra Leone		Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian peacekeepers in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) used BLG-66 Beluga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu denied these reports.
1996–1999	Sudan		Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.
1995	Croatia		An NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers in an attack on the city of Zagreb on 2–3 May. Additionally, the Croatian government claimed that Serb forces used BL755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.
1994–1996	Chechnya		Russian forces used cluster munitions against NSAGs.
1992–1997	Tajikistan		ShOAB and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces in civil war.
1992–1995	BiH		Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.
1992–1994	Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan		Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in Nagorno-Karabakh. Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and AO-2.5. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.
1992–1994	Angola		Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB and AO-2.5 RT submunitions in various locations.
1991	Iraq, Kuwait		The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.
1991	Saudi Arabia		Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions against Iraqi forces during the Battle of Khafji.
1988	Iran		US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.
1986–1987	Chad		French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.
1986	Libya		US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on 25 March. On 14–15 April, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.
1984–1988	Iran, Iraq		It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped bombs in 1984. Iraq reportedly used Ababil-50 surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets during the later stages of the war.
1983	Lebanon		US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs against Syrian air defense units near Beirut in Lebanon.
1983	Grenada		US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.
1982	Falkland Islands/Malvinas		UK forces dropped 107 BL755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.
1982	Lebanon		Israel used cluster munitions against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.
1979–1989	Afghanistan		Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.
1978	Lebanon		Israel used cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.
1977–1978	Somalia		Contamination discovered in 2013 in Somali border region. Submunitions found include PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh, but the party that used the weapons is unknown.
1975–1988	Western Sahara, Mauritania		Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against an NSAG in Western Sahara. Cluster munition remnants of the same types used by Morocco in Western Sahara have been found in Mauritania.
1973	Syria		Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against NSAG training camps near Damascus.
1970s	Zambia		Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang'ombo.
1965–1975	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam		According to a Handicap International (HI) review of US bombing data, approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia in 1969–1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR in 1965–1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped in Vietnam in 1965–1975.
1939–1945	Italy, Libya, Malta, Palau, Solomon Islands, USSR, the UK, possibly other locations		Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by belligerent parties during World War II in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific.

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[98] The number of stockpiling states has increased since it was first estimated a decade ago as new information has become available and as governments have clarified current and past possession of cluster munitions. In May 2002, HRW identified a total of 56 states that have stockpiled cluster munitions. HRW, “Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,” 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.

[99] 602 122mm AGAT rockets, 67 M26 rockets, 95 RBK cluster bombs and 3,303 submunitions, and 135 KMG-U dispensers. Explanatory note, “Draft Action Plan for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Slovak Republic under the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM2014Banf15. Attached in letter No.590.736/2014-OKOZ from Miroslav Lajčák, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs to Sarah Blakemore, Director, CMC, 25 April 2014.

[100] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

[101] Statement of the US, Fourth Review Conference, CCW, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf101. Previously, in 2004, the US reported the stockpile consisted of nearly 5.5 million cluster munitions containing nearly 730 million submunitions. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.”

[102] Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of the Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine’s Defense Capability,” Geneva, 1 April 2011, Slide 2.

[103] Other stockpilers Guinea-Bissau and Honduras have not submitted their initial Article 7 reports as of 28 July 2014, although Honduras has indicated it no longer stockpiles cluster munitions. Afghanistan and Iraq have completed destruction, but are not listed in the table due to lack of clarity on their reporting of destroyed cluster munitions. (See Stockpile destruction section.)

[104] Letter from Sonia Matilde Eljach Polo, Director of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of External Relations, 19 April 2012; and response to Monitor questionnaire by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2010. The CB-250K bombs were produced by Chile and each contains 240 submunitions. The ARC-32 bomb is apparently a 350kg weapon containing 32 anti-runway submunitions produced by Israel.

[105] Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf105.

[106] Statement of Republic of Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/09/cl_congo.pdf. In 2011, clearance personnel destroyed cluster munitions remnants and PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh submunitions from an arms depot that was bombed during the 1997–1998 conflict. Cluster munitions were also apparently part of weapons stockpiles destroyed in 2008–2010 with the assistance of UK-based humanitarian demining organization Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Email from Lt.-Col. André Pampile Serge Oyobe, Head of Information Division, Ministry of Defense, 13 July 2010.

[107] In April 2012, Canada reported a stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles, containing total of 1,108,800 DPICM submunitions (806,208 M42 and 302,328 M46). Canada, voluntary Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2012.

[108] Statement of Canada, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, April 2014. Notes by the CMC.

[109] CMC meetings with Maria Madalena Neto, Victim Assistance Coordinator, Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH, International Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Santiago, 7–9 June 2010. Notes by the CMC/HRW. Neto later confirmed this statement, noting that the Air Force led a task force responsible for the program. Email from Maria Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, 13 August 2010.

[110] Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf110. Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Nigeria Air Force possesses British-made BL-755 cluster bombs. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 843.

[111] Statement of South Africa, UN Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons, New York, 18 October 2010. In December 2008, South Africa also said that a “relatively small stockpile of outdated cluster munitions” had been “earmarked for destruction.” See statement by Charles Nqakula, Minister of Defence, Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008.

[112] Albania, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Grenada, Guatemala, Ireland, Holy See, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Uruguay, and Zambia have made definitive statements, either in transparency reports or in interventions at official meetings. However, some States Parties did not indicate if they possess stockpiles, but simply indicated “not applicable” or “none” in the form or left the form blank. The CMC has urged all states to clearly indicate in their next reports that there are no cluster munitions stockpiled under their jurisdiction and control, including by stating a more unequivocal response such as “zero.”

[113] This includes the information submitted by States Parties on a voluntary basis for those cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed before entry into force.

[114] These numbers of munitions reported destroyed by these nations prior to entry into force are included in this table and more information is available in the Monitor country profiles. Switzerland is not listed in the table as it has yet to report on munitions destroyed under the ban convention, but it has declared the destruction prior to entry into force—between 1997 and 2000—of 3,999 cluster bombs and 587,853 submunitions. Switzerland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 June 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf114; and email from François Garraux, Arms Control and Disarmament Policy, Federal Department of Defense, 23 August 2011.

[115] Statement of Honduras, Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, 5 December 2007. Notes by the CMC/Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); HRW meetings with Honduran officials, San José, 5 September 2007, and Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

[116] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 April 2014. Notes by the CMC.

[117] The initial Article 7 report details the destruction between 2005 and 2011 of over 271,000 submunitions of various types. Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 August 2012. The May 2013 Article 7 report details the destruction of 724 munitions and submunitions discovered during 2012 and provides a more thorough accounting of the destruction of the various submunitions between 2005 and 2011, listing five types of munitions that were not included in the initial report. The report states that Afghanistan “has not officially announced completion of stockpiled Cluster Munitions programme however the Ministry of Defence verbally confirms that there is not any stockpile of cluster munitions left with Afghan National Forces.” This would appear to indicate that while there are not any stocks under the jurisdiction and control of national forces, the government anticipates that it may discover additional stocks abandoned by other combatants in the past. Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B Part II, 19 May 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf117.

[118] Iraq, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf118.

[119] Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf119a.

[120] Statement of Italy, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14f120.

[121] Statement of Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf121. The 2011 announcement by Nammo stated that the stockpile destruction program would conclude by February 2015 at the latest. Nammo press release, “Nammo Awarded Contract to Demilitarize Cluster Munitions for Japan,” August 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14banf121a.

[122] Statement of France, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf122.

[123] Utrikesutskottets bettkesuts 2011/12:UU7, eNedrustning, icke-spridning och konventionell rustningskontroll samt Sveriges tilltrrs till konventionen om klusterammunition”Utrikesutskottets bettkesuts 20ort 2011/12:UU7, “Disarmament, non-proliferation and conventional arms control and Sweden’s accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions”), 23 February 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf123; statement of Sweden, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2011; and FMV document 10FMV1726-7:1, dated 10 February 2011.

[124] Average exchange rate for 2013. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2014, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5a/current/default.htm.

[125] Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2014, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/04/Peru.pdf.

[126] Please see the individual 2013 ban policy country profiles online for more information on retention, including specific quantities for each type retained.

[127] Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf127.

[128] Belgium, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitoCMM14Banf128.

[129] The 193 submunitions comprised of 94 AO-2.5, 57 AO-10, 40 PTAB-2.5, and 2 ZAB-2.5T. Czech Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf129.

[130] France, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, pp. 62–64, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf130.

[131] Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf127.

[132] Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form C, 5 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf132.

[133] Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 September 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf133.

[134] Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 11 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf134.

[135] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf135.

[136] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings Geneva, 7 April 2014, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2014/04/UK.pdf.

[137] UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf137b; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf135.

[138] Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, Peru, Portugal, and Slovenia.

[139] A small number of states are not providing definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable” in response to particular information requests. States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” in the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J to report on actions to promote universalization and to discourage use of cluster munitions by states not party, cooperation and assistance, or to report on other important matters such as positions on interpretive issues. Austria, Belgium, DRC, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Zambia have utilized Form J in their initial Article 7 transparency reports.

[140] Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia.

[141] The compliance rate is a slight improvement on the 70% compliance rate reported one year ago by Cluster Munition Monitor 2013, but similar to the “three-quarters” compliance rate recorded by Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013.

[142] Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chile, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Republic of Moldova, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Uruguay.

[143] For recommendations of best practice in this field, see HRW and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, “Fulfilling the Ban: Guidelines for Effective National Legislation to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2010; and ICRC, “Model Law, Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.”

[144] Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Monaco, Nauru, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago.

[145] In November 2013, Spain’s Congress of Deputies adopted an amendment to the country’s 1998 implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty (Law 33/1998) to add the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[146] Statement by Ivica Dronjic, Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of BiH to the UN in Geneva, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 12 September 2013. BiH has declared its ratification law under national implementation measures for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 August 2011. The subsequent Article 7 report indicates no change to the national implementation measures declared in 2011.

[147] Chile, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, September 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf147.

[148] Costa Rica, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf148.

[149] Iraq, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf118.

[150] Mauritania, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report, Form A, 18 March 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf150b.

[151] CMC meetings with Lt.-Col. Alioune Ould Mohamed El Hacen, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD), Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, Geneva, 8 and 15 April 2014.

[152] Resolución Legislative que aprueba la Convención sobre Municiones en Racimo (Legislative Resolution approving the Convention on Cluster Munitions), No. 29843, 15 March 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14BanF152a. On 25 April 2012, Decree 021-2012 approving ratification was signed and published in the official journal El Peruano the next day. Decree No. 021-2012-RE, 26 April 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14BanF152b.“Ref. 464960,” El Peruano, 26 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 August 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf152b.

[153] Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 2 April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf153.

[154] Senegal’s National Assembly unanimously approved Law No. 14/2010 to ratify the convention on 23 June 2010. Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 3 October 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14f154.

[155] House of Commons of Canada, “Bill C-6: An Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf24.

[156] States Parties that have not publicly expressed a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mauritania, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Panama, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

[157] As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions originating from 100 locations for the period from 2003 to 2010. Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 had reviewed cables released by Wikileaks as of early August 2011, a total of 57 US diplomatic cables from 24 locations. See, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf157a.

[158] At least 35 States Parties and signatories have previously stated their agreement with this view: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2012), pp. 34–35; CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

[159] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Department of Defence press release, “Australia ratifies global treaty to ban cluster munitions,” 17 October 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf159.

[160] “Oslo convention on cluster munitions will not prevent U.S.-Japan military operations,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO1748 dated 25 June 2008, released by Wikileaks on 16 June 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf160.

[161] Senate of Canada, “Bill S-10: An Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf161.

[162] Statement by David Anderson, Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf162.

[163] A total of 32 States Parties and signatories have previously said transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited: Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29; ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21; and HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26.

[164] In Canada’s bill, the prohibition on transfer (Section 6c) applies only if there is intent to transfer ownership (not mere physical movement), which arguably means that transit of cluster munitions through Canada could be permissible. Section 11(2) of the proposed legislation would allow Canadian forces to transport the cluster munitions of a state not party during joint military operations. According to a senior government official, the bill “does not allow stockpiling of cluster munitions on Canada’s territory, including by a State not party to the Convention, as it prohibits all forms of possession.” Email from John MacBride, Senior Defence Advisor, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 9 July 2012.

[165] House of Commons official report (Hansard), Volume 146, Number 258, 29 May 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf165.

[166] Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In November 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf166.

[167] According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a US cable dated 17 December 2008, the US stockpile in Norway was believed to consist of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See “Norway raises question concerning U.S. cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf167.

[168] “Demarche to Afghanistan on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf168.

[169] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” “MFA gives reassurances on stockpiling of US cluster munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf169. See also “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf169a.

[170] The cable states, “Rome should note that cluster munitions are stored at Aviano and Camp Darby.” “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf170.

[171] Spain, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 27 January 2011.

[172] “Consultations with Japan on implementing the Oslo convention on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf172.

[173] “Cluster munitions: Israeli’s operational defensive capabilities crisis,” US Department of State cable dated 18 April 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf173.

[174] The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” With respect to the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See “Follow-up on UAE response to Lebanese request for emergency aid,” US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, bit.ly/MonitorCCM14Banf174.

[175] Italy’s Law No. 95 bans financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention, a provision that supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has advocated for a separate, more detailed law.

[176] Statement of Denmark, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013. The Council’s report, published in March 2014, did not however recommend to the government a mandatory prohibition on investment in cluster munitions producers, despite strong opposition from the Council’s NGO members. Elias C. Lundström, “Nej til forbud mod klyngebomber” (“No to ban on cluster munitions”), Jyllands-Posten, 13 March 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf176.

[177] Email from Rune Saugmann, Chairman of Denmark Against Landmines, 24 July 2014.

[178] Statement of Luxembourg, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.

[179] Statement by Stefan Barriga, Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the UN in New York, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 68th session, 11 October 2013.

[180] The CMC launched the Stop Explosive Investments initiative in 2009. See, www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org.

[181] In 2013, FairFin and PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi) ended their cooperation in producing the report entitled “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a Shared Responsibility.” PAX published the 2013 edition, dated December 2013, which is built on the previous editions published in conjunction with FairFin.

[182] PAX, “Banning Investments in Cluster Munitions Producers; National Legislation,” April 2014, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf182; IKV Pax Christi, “December 2013 Update: Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” December 2013, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf182b; and CMC, “Over US$24 Billion Invested in Cluster Bomb Producers Worldwide: Financial Institutions and Governments Urged to Stop Explosive Investments,” 12 December 2013, www.stopclustermunitions.org/news/?id=4561.

[183] IKV Pax Christi and FairFin, “Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility,” June 2012, bit.ly/MonitorCMM14Banf183.

[184] For more detailed information, please see the relevant Cluster Munition Monitor country profile online at: www.the-monitor.org.