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Mine Action

© Till Mayer / Handicap International, November 2013 -- Children walk by a landmine-contaminated area in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2014, the country was granted a second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, committing to clear all known mined areas by 1 January 2021.

The international mine action community has made significant strides toward putting an end to the suffering caused by antipersonnel mines. As of October 2014, 28 states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999, and more do so with every passing year. While the amount of clearance dropped in 2013, the ICBL believes that more than 200km² of mined area could be cleared annually and that the remaining antipersonnel mine threat could be removed in almost every State Party within 10 years if operators, donors, and national authorities employ the right resources in the right way.

Summary of Progress in 2013–2014

As of October 2014, 56 states and four other areas still have an identified threat from antipersonnel mines. Of the 56 affected states, 32 are party to the Mine Ban Treaty. A further six States Parties had either suspected or residual mine contamination.

Three States Parties formally declared completion of clearance of all known mined areas in 2013: Bhutan, Hungary, and Venezuela, bringing the total to 28 plus one other area. In the first half of 2013, Greece had reported that its verification efforts in a previously mined area in Rhodes had been completed in March 2013. Burundi announced in April 2014 that it had completed survey and clearance of its remaining suspected mined areas and reiterated this announcement in June 2014. Jordan reported completion of clearance in 2013, but it appears that it still has mined areas containing antipersonnel mines to release and therefore should seek a further extension to its Article 5 deadline.

Six States Parties—Chad, Mozambique, Niger,[1] Serbia, Sudan, and Turkey—submitted deadline extension requests in 2013 that were approved at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013. Germany withdrew its extension request submitted in April 2013 having found no mines in an area previously reported as having suspected contamination.[2] A further four States Parties submitted Article 5 deadline Extension Requests in 2014 that were subsequently approved at the Third Review Conference: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.[3] In addition, Ethiopia had indicated that it would submit an extension request, but this has not yet been received as of 1 November 2014.[4]

In 2013, mine action programs released at least 185km² of mined areas[5] through clearance and survey. In 2012, mine action programs released at least 200km² of mined areas.

Mine-Affected States and Other Areas

As of October 2014, 56 states and four other areas still have an identified threat from antipersonnel mines. In most cases (32) contamination is on territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.

Mine-affected states and other areas with confirmed mined areas as of October 2014

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Angola Chad Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Eritrea Ethiopia Mauritania Mozambique Niger Senegal Somalia South Sudan Sudan Zimbabwe Somaliland	Argentina* Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Peru	Afghanistan Cambodia China India Lao PDR Myanmar North Korea Pakistan South Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Vietnam	Armenia Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Croatia Cyprus Georgia Kyrgyzstan Russia Serbia Tajikistan Turkey United Kingdom (UK)* Uzbekistan Kosovo Nagorno-Karabakh	Algeria Egypt Jordan** Iran Iraq Israel Lebanon Libya Morocco Palestine Syria Yemen Western Sahara

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas
** Jordan reported completion of clearance in 2013, but it also reports ongoing survey and clearance of areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines

States and other areas with suspected or residual mine contamination

In addition to states in which mine contamination is confirmed, a further six states—all of which are party to the Mine Ban Treaty—have either suspected or residual mine contamination. These States Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. In cases when they are unable to complete this work within their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain in compliance with the treaty.

States with suspected or residual contamination as of October 2014

Africa	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Djibouti Namibia	Palau Philippines	Moldova	Oman

Extent of contamination

The Monitor does not publish a global table of mine contamination by state because it believes that many of the estimates cited by states are far higher than the true extent of contamination. Instead, an order of magnitude for contamination as of October 2014 is given.

Today, massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the Monitor as more than 100km²) is believed to exist only in Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Turkey, and very probably also in Iraq. Heavy antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 20km² and up to 100km²) is believed to exist in several states: Angola, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.[6] The situation in Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam is not known, but may also be heavy. Other states have either medium contamination (more than 3km² and up to 20km²) or light (up to 3km²).

Mine clearance in 2013

There are continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) or land release by survey, in large part because of the poor quality of record-keeping and reporting.[7] However, the Monitor has determined that at least 185km² of mined areas were cleared in 2013 (compared with at least 200km² in 2012), with the destruction of approximately 275,000 antipersonnel mines and 4,500 antivehicle mines. This global clearance figure is conservative and understates the extent of clearance due to the fact that several states do not report while others do not disaggregate clearance figures.[8] The largest total clearance of mined areas was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted for 75% of recorded clearance.

Major mine clearance programs in 2013

State	Mined area cleared (km²)	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed
Afghanistan	60.1	19,181	752
Algeria	5.5	76,283	0
Angola	3.8	3,820	861
Azerbaijan	4.7	10	117
Cambodia	45.9	21,618	498
BiH	1.9	1,700	100
Croatia	32.3	1,771	775
Iraq*	5.3	8,552	323
Israel	2.2	34,006	122
Jordan	1.2	238	24
Sri Lanka	6.4	72,296	287
South Sudan	4.9	845	215
Sudan	2.6	1,053	254
Tajikistan	0.9	22,486	3
Thailand	0.3	2,142	60
Zimbabwe	0.8	6,052	0
Total	178.8	272,053	4,391

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold
* Only partial results were obtained for Iraq, so the true clearance figures are higher

Over the past five years, approximately 200km² of mined area has been cleared to international standards each year. Overall, five years of clearance operations have resulted in the clearance of approximately 973km² of mined area and the destruction of more than 1.48 million antipersonnel mines and 107,000 antivehicle mines as well as countless items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Mine clearance in 2009–2013 (km²)

Year	Mined area cleared	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed
2013	185	275,000	4,500
2012	200	240,000	9,300
2011	190	325,000	29,900
2010	200	388,000	27,000
2009	198	255,000	37,000
Total	973	1,483,000	107,700

Within the next five years, the Monitor believes that 24 States Parties and 16 states not party, as well as four other areas, are fully capable of completing clearance.

States and other areas fully capable of clearance by end of 2019

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
DRC Eritrea Ethiopia Mauritania Mozambique Niger Senegal South Sudan* Sudan* Zimbabwe Somaliland	Argentina** Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Peru	China India Pakistan South Korea* Sri Lanka	Armenia Croatia Cyprus* Georgia* Kyrgyzstan Russia Serbia Tajikistan Turkey* UK** Uzbekistan Kosovo Nagorno-Karabakh	Algeria Egypt Jordan Iran Libya Morocco Palestine Yemen* Western Sahara

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas in italics
* Clearance subject to adequate security and control of territory, but all mined areas under effective control can be cleared (or have been cleared, such as in the case of Cyprus)
** Without prejudice to the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the UK on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, if the UK clears the islands in accordance with its international obligations, Argentina’s legal obligations under Article 5 will also be complete

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties have specific international legal obligations to find, clear, and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas within a defined time period. Twenty-eight states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999,[9] and more do so with every passing year. In 2013, Bhutan, Hungary, and Venezuela completed clearance of all known areas containing antipersonnel mines. Germany declared it was in compliance with Article 5 after verifying that there were no antipersonnel mines in an area previously reported as suspected of contamination.[10] Greece, which had already declared completion of Article 5 obligations in 2009, completed verification of a suspected area without finding any contamination. Similarly, Burundi, which had reported additional suspected mined areas after declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2011, announced that its subsequent survey and clearance efforts in 2014 had been completed.[11] In addition, Montenegro has still formally to report completion of its Article 5 obligations.

States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999

Albania Bhutan Bulgaria Burundi Congo Costa Rica Denmark France FYR Macedonia

Gambia Germany Greece Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Honduras Hungary Malawi Montenegro

Nicaragua Nigeria Rwanda Suriname Swaziland Tunisia Uganda Venezuela Zâmbia

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires each State Party to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. Ensuring full compliance with these mine clearance obligations is one of the greatest challenges faced by States Parties to the treaty.

Thirty-eight States Parties, as set out in the table below, were confirmed or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines as of October 2014 and therefore had obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East & North Africa
Angola Chad Djibouti DRC Eritrea Ethiopia Mauritania Mozambique Namibia Niger Senegal Somalia South Sudan Sudan Zimbabwe	Argentina Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru	Afghanistan Cambodia Palau Philippines Thailand	BiH Croatia Cyprus Moldova Serbia Tajikistan Turkey UK	Algeria Iraq Jordan Oman Yemen
15 States Parties	5 States Parties	5 States Parties	8 States Parties	5 States Parties

Six states listed above have not declared that they have (or still have) Article 5 obligations, but the Monitor believes they may be mine-affected and thus their fulfillment of their treaty obligations may be in doubt: Djibouti,[12] Namibia,[13] Moldova,[14] Oman,[15] Palau,[16] and the Philippines.[17]

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012 and submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012.[18] However, Jordan acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced.”[19] Verification and clearance continued in 2012 in the Jordan Valley as well as along the northern border with Syria. Jordan said it expected verification efforts to continue for a further two years.[20] Jordan stated at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference that an additional 4.5km² remains to be verified in the Jordan Valley while its verification work on its northern border has been suspended since February 2013 in light of the conflict in Syria.[21]

States Parties and Article 5 deadline extensions

Significant challenges remain in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty’s survey and clearance obligations; the number of Article 5 deadline Extension Requests that have been made far exceed the number of States Parties that have declared completion of their Article 5 obligations.

As mentioned above, in accordance with Article 5 states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years under Article 5.3.

However, in accordance with Action 27 of the Nairobi Action Plan adopted at the First Review Conference in 2004, States Parties committed to “strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension.”[22] The Cartagena Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2009 went further, stating that extensions should only be needed “due to exceptional circumstances.”[23] These are clear indications that States Parties believe that deadline extensions should be the exception and not the rule. Considering the high percentage of states granted, or seeking, deadline extensions—some for the second, third, and in one case, fourth time—as well as the number that will likely need extensions in the future, the ICBL has called on States Parties to act with greater urgency in fulfilling their clearance obligations, and has noted that the trend toward requesting extensions has been disappointing.[24]

As of October 2014, 33 States Parties in total have requested deadline extensions since 2009, of which only seven have reported completion of their Article 5 obligations: Congo, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Venezuela. Seven States Parties have requested multiple extensions since 2009: Chad (three extensions), Denmark (two extensions), DRC (two extensions), Eritrea (two extensions), Mozambique (two extensions), Yemen (two extensions), and Zimbabwe (four extensions). Of these, DRC, Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe submitted deadline extension requests in 2014.

Of the 32 States Parties with outstanding Article 5 clearance obligations[25] (not including those States Parties deemed by the Monitor to have suspected or residual risk of contamination), a highly disappointing 72% (23) have current deadline extensions in place.[26]

An overview of the status of Article 5 deadline extensions*

States Parties	Original deadline	Extension period	Deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2013	10 years	1 March 2023	Unclear
Algeria	1 April 2012	5 years	1 April 2017	On track
Angola	1 January 2013	5 years	1 January 2018	On track
Argentina	1 March 2010	10 years	1 March 2020	No change since extension requested
BiH	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track
Cambodia	1 January 2010	10 years	1 January 2020	Not on track
Chad	1 November 2009	14 months (1st extn.) 3 years (2nd extn.) 6 years (3rd extn.)	1 January 2020	Not on track
Chile	1 March 2012	8 years	1 March 2020	On track
Colombia	1 March 2011	10 years	1 March 2021	Not on track
Congo	1 November 2011	14 months	1 January 2013	Completed
Croatia	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track
Cyprus	1 July 2013	3 years	1 July 2016	Unclear
Denmark	1 March 2009	22 months (1st extn.) 18 months (2nd extn.)	1 July 2012	Completed
DRC	1 November 2012	26 months (1st extn.) 6 years (2nd extn.)	1 January 2021	Unclear
Ecuador	1 October 2009	8 years	1 October 2017	Not on track
Eritrea	1 February 2012	3 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)	1 February 2020	Unclear
Guinea-Bissau	1 November 2011	2 months	1 January 2012	Completed
Jordan	1 May 2009	3 years	1 May 2012	Completion announced but ongoing verification work reported
Mauritania	1 January 2011	5 years	1 January 2016	On track
Mozambique	1 March 2009	5 years (1st extn.) 10 months (2nd extn.)	31 December 2014	On track
Nicaragua	1 May 2009	1 year	1 May 2010	Completed
Peru	1 March 2009	8 years	1 March 2017	Unclear
Senegal	1 March 2009	7 years	1 March 2016	Not on track
Serbia	1 March 2014	5 years	1 March 2019	Unclear
Sudan	1 April 2014	5 years	1 April 2019
Tajikistan	1 April 2010	10 years	1 April 2020	Unclear
Thailand	1 May 2009	9.5 years	1 November 2018	Not on track
Turkey	1 March 2014	8 years	1 March 2022	Not on track
UK	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Unclear
Venezuela	1 October 2009	5 years	1 October 2014	Completed
Yemen	1 March 2009	6 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)	1 March 2020	Unclear
Zimbabwe	1 March 2009	22 months (1st extn.) 2 years (2nd extn.) 2 years (3rd extn.) 3 years (4th extn.)	1 January 2018	Unclear

* Niger is not included on this list because its extension request was granted in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state’s Article 5 deadline

Many of the States Parties granted extensions to their Article 5 deadlines have since made only limited progress and risk not being able to complete the plans they put forward along with their extension requests. The ICBL has called on states that have fallen significantly behind the benchmarks they laid out in their extension requests to submit revised plans to States Parties.[27]

Risks to Deminers

In addition to the hazards faced during clearance operations (see Casualty demographics section in the Casualties and Victim Assistance chapter), demining operators remain at risk of attacks and abductions in some areas where non-state armed groups operate, especially in Afghanistan and more recently in Mozambique, Senegal, and Somalia.

In Afghanistan, insurgency and criminality continued to pose the main threat to deminers, although the number of security incidents dropped from 53 in 2012 to 39 in 2013. Eight mine action staff were killed and four injured in security incidents in 2013, compared with six killed and 10 injured in 2012. Mine action teams suffered a number of abductions by anti-government elements or criminals.[28] In March 2014, an adult and a child were killed during an attack by extremists on the guesthouse of the demining and development organization, Roots of Peace.[29] In January 2014, 57 HALO Trust deminers were abducted by the Taliban near Herat, but subsequently released after a few hours.[30]

In November 2013, two deminers with Handicap International were shot by Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) members in an attack on a convoy travelling through Sofala Province, Mozambique.[31]

An attack by a suicide bomber and armed attackers on a UN compound in Mogadishu, Somalia in June 2013 by al-Shabab militia resulted in the deaths of three deminers from Mechem.[32]

Amid ongoing instability and internal conflict in Yemen in June 2013, six deminers and three soldiers were kidnapped by armed insurgents in the southern province of Abyan.[33]

In May 2013, 12 demining personnel from Mechem were held prisoner at a camp run by the Movement for the Democratic Forces of Casamance in Guinea-Bissau for several weeks, prompting an order from Senegalese authorities to halt all survey and clearance operations in the country.[34]

Maputo Action Plan: Addressing Mine Action Challenges

Challenges in mine clearance

The Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014 in Maputo, Mozambique offered a timely opportunity for States Parties to review and report on the progress made toward completion of their clearance obligations under Article 5.[35] The Review Conference also provided opportunities for recommendations to be made on improving the performance of mine action programs and for states to reinvigorate their commitment to the clearance of mined areas on their territory.

Despite the progress in mine clearance over the last 15 years, States Parties, international organizations, and civil society remained concerned that mine action activities had been hindered by a general lack of political will, poor surveys to accurately identify the extent of mine contamination, the continued use of outdated baseline surveys, an over-willingness to rely on extension requests, continued clearance of areas that are not contaminated, and poor data management.

In a statement to the Third Review Conference, the ICBL lamented that Article 5 implementation had been a “rocky road” despite generous support from states, innovation among mine action practitioners, and a raft of tools and methodologies available for effective land release. In line with its “Completion Challenge” issued at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013[36] in which all affected states were challenged to complete their Article 5 obligations within 10 years, the ICBL stated that:

If efforts are well-directed to areas of actual mine contamination, we should be left with only a handful of affected states in five years’ time. Out of this handful of states, we are confident that every State Party with contamination can finish clearing their known mined area by 2025, barring armed conflict that prevents access, if operators, donors, and national authorities employ the right resources in the right way.[37]

In order to achieve this, the ICBL noted that states need to re-intensify their efforts through prioritizing mine action at a political level and within their development goals and national budgets. The ICBL further stated that national mine action centers should focus mine clearance efforts on actual contamination through the effective use of survey and rigorous information management.[38]

A report by clearance operator Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), entitled “Clearing the Mines” highlighted these concerns, noted that the primary obstacle to effective and efficient clearance of mined areas was the lack of political will.[39] It further stated that low-quality survey had been “perhaps the single biggest obstacle to faster and better mine clearance,”[40] and that without an accurate estimate and assessment of the extent of the mine contamination, states and operators had compounded the problem through the application of costly and time-consuming full clearance activities, thereby slowing land release and wasting valuable resources. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) also noted that the lack of clarity on the level of contamination was a “consequence of poor survey and weak information management practices.”[41] The NPA report outlined the architecture of an effectual and efficient mine action program while emphasizing the need for an effective survey capacity, accurate data management, gender-mainstreaming, and good governance.

The report also assessed and ranked the performance of national mine action programs according to 10 criteria: problem understood; target date for completion of clearance; targeted clearance; efficient clearance; national funding of program; timely clearance; land release system; national mine action standards; reporting on progress; and improving performance.[42] Each criterion received a score based on a scale of one to ten; the average of the combined scores for each criterion gave the overall program performance scoring. The results of the exercise showed that, of the 30 states assessed, half fell short in their mine action performance with a ranking of “poor” or “very poor.”[43] A further third was rated as “average” or “average and improving”[44] while just four received a rating of “good” or “good and improving.”[45] The lowest ranked countries were South Sudan, Senegal, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Chad. States with the highest ranked programs were: Algeria, Mauritania, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Croatia.[46]

Also of concern to a number of participants at the Third Review Conference was both the number and the poor quality of Article 5 deadline Extension Requests. Ireland noted with concern the “lack of specific timelines and detail in requests;”[47] Norway emphasized that the majority of extension requests had been unnecessarily caused by “overblown estimates of suspected mined areas” and that, with the developments in land release techniques, the challenges that lead to extensions requests are largely of a political and organizational nature, rather than technical.[48] During the high-level segment at the Third Review Conference, both Algeria and Japan voiced their concern over the number of states requesting deadline extensions. A report by the Analyzing Group highlighted several issues, including that there was a general lack of consistency with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) within the extension requests and that several requests had not clearly provided annual benchmarks and milestones. It further stated the importance of regular reporting to States Parties of progress made and of updating work plans.[49]

Responses to meet the challenges in the Maputo Action Plan

The need to address such issues was recognized by States Parties at the Third Review Conference and subsequently embodied in the Maputo Action Plan (MAP) Actions 8–12 in which States Parties with ongoing mine clearance obligations agreed to “commit to intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.”[50] In order to complete their Article 5 obligations as soon as possible and no later than by their respective clearance deadlines, States Parties with ongoing mine clearance obligations agreed to:

8. …undertake all reasonable efforts to quantify and qualify its remaining implementation challenge as soon as possible, and report this information through its Article 7 transparency report by 30 April 2015 and annually thereafter. This information should identify the precise perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain anti-personnel mines and therefore require clearance, and that are suspected to contain anti-personnel mines and therefore require further survey. This information is to be incorporated into national demining plans and relevant broader development and reconstruction plans.

9. …ensure as soon as possible that the most relevant land-release standards, policies and methodologies, in line with the United Nations’ International Mine Action Standards, are in place and applied for the full and expedient implementation of this aspect of the Convention. These land release methodologies will be evidence-based, accountable and acceptable to local communities, including through the participation of affected communities, including women, girls, boys and men, in the process…

11. …apply the recommendations endorsed by the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties as contained in the paper “Reflections on the Article 5 Extension Process” on ensuring that high-quality requests for extended mine clearance deadlines continue to be submitted, that high-quality analyses of these requests continue to be prepared, and that cooperative engagement of Article 5 implementing States Parties continues after requests have been granted.[51]

The Third Review Conference also decided to establish the Committee on Article 5 Implementation and thereby replace the Standing Committee on Mine Action.[52] The mandate of the new committee is to review and report to States Parties on relevant information on Article 5 implementation, seek clarity when necessary, and provide advice and support in a cooperative manner to States Parties on the fulfillment of their obligations to report on Article 5 implementation. The committee is also mandated to analyze and report to States Parties on Article 5 deadline Extension Requests, and to continue to engage with those States Parties granted an extension to their clearance deadline on the implementation of their commitments contained in the requests.[53] The ICBL expressed its hope that with a mandate to pay greater and more systematic attention to Article 5 implementation, increased focus would be given to the efforts of mine-affected States Parties in responding to and overcoming the challenges noted in mine clearance.[54]

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[1] Niger submitted its request in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state’s Article 5 deadline.

[2] Germany, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/A838DA4E60D93E1DC1257CD000442E9D/$file/Germany+2013.pdf.

[3] APLC/CONF/2014/CRP.1, Final Draft Document, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 27 June 2014, pp. 6–10, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.

[4] In its statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance on 9 April 2014, Ethiopia stated that it would request a two-year extension of its clearance deadline, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/4_ARTICLE_5_EXTENSION_SUBMITTED_2014_-_Ethiopia.pdf. By June 2014 at the Third Reference Conference, however, a request had not yet been received: “Report on the Analysis of Requests for Extensions to Article 5 Deadlines,” Third Review Conference, Maputo, 23 June 2014, pp. 1 and 2, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Article5-analysis-report-23Jun2014.pdf.

[5] The term “clearance of mined areas” refers to physical clearance to humanitarian standards of an area to a specified depth using manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and/or machines to detect and destroy (or remove for later destruction) all explosive devices found.

[6] According to the Landmine Monitor’s assessment of actual antipersonnel mine contamination.

[7] For example, states as well as certain demining operators sometimes report cancellation by non-technical survey (NTS) as clearance. Furthermore, despite reported release of large areas of land, conducting NTS of possibly contaminated areas does not constitute land release, according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

[8] Far greater land release is achieved through cancellation by NTS or reduction by technical survey (TS) than by physical clearance. Some states do not disaggregate clearance from cancellation by NTS or reduction by TS. Where states have not disaggregated clearance data, the Monitor has not included their reported figures.

[9] States Parties that have completed their Article 5 obligations are listed in the table “States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999.” In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

[10] Statement of Germany, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2014, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/13MSP/day3/11b_ARTICLE_5_COMPLETED_-_Germany.pdf.

[11] Burundi had previously declared itself “mine-free” at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 2011. Burundi subsequently reported the discovery of new suspected mined areas at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties. Following technical and non-technical survey in 2013, Burundi reported at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in April 2014 that all areas had been cleared of mines as of one day before its official Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2014. Burundi reiterated their achievements at the Third Review Conference but, as of 31 October 2014, has had not yet submitted a voluntary declaration of completion as recommended by States Parties at the 7th Meeting of States Parties, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-MC/5_ARTICLE_5_OTHER_STATES_PARTIES_-_Burundi.pdf.

[12] Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

[13] Despite a statement by Namibia given at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

[14] Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC_june08/Speeches-GS/SCGS-Universalization-2June08-Moldova-en.pdf.

[15] Oman may have residual mine/UXO contamination stemming from a 1964–1975 internal conflict. The Mine Ban Treaty enters into force for Oman on 1 February 2015 and its initial report declaring any mined areas will be due by 31 July 2015.

[16] Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 in which it declared for the first time that it had areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. In its 2012 Article 7 report, Palau reported suspected contamination in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge). In May 2013, Palau reported that two mine clearance operators were working in Palau to clear UXO, including land and sea mines, but that it faced a “bottle neck from the government permitting bodies due to lack of Standard Operating Procedures and the technical knowledge to review and approve clearance methodologies.”

[17] The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

[18] “Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction,” submitted by Jordan, 4 December 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may12/Speeches-MC/2_ARTICLE_5_COMPLETED_-_Jordan.pdf.

[19] “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines,” Press Release, Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 24 April 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/press-releases/PressRelease-Jordan-24Apr2012.pdf.

[20] Statement of Jordan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 May 2013, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-MC/6_ARTICLE_5_DISCOVERED_AFTER_DEADLINES_-_Jordan.pdf.

[21] Statement of Jordan, Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 24 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Jordan.pdf.

[22] “Final Report, Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99: Part III: “Ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines: the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.nairobisummit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC1/prep_mtgs/2nd_prep_june04/draft_action_plan_en.pdf.

[23] “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-personnel Mines,” 11 December 2009, p. 4, www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf.

[24] “ICBL Comments on Mine Clearance,” Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/12MSP/day3/10bi_ARTICLE_5_OTHER_STATES_PARTIES_COMMENTS_-_ICBL.pdf.

[25] See table on “Mine-affected states and other areas with confirmed mined areas as of October 2014.”

[26] Contaminated States Parties still within their initial deadlines include: Ethiopia (2015), Iraq (2018), South Sudan (2021), and Somalia (2022).

[27] Statement by ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/12MSP/day3/10bi_ARTICLE_5_OTHER_STATES_PARTIES_COMMENTS_-_ICBL.pdf.

[28] Email from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA), 11 February 2014.

[29] K. Sieff and S. Salahuddin, “Taliban attacks guesthouse of U.S. based charity,” The Washington Post, 28 March 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/taliban-attacks-western-guest-house-afghan-officials-say/2014/03/28/d28af42c-b681-11e3-a7c6-70cf2db17781_story.html.

[30] “Kidnappers release Afghan mine clearance workers,” The Guardian, 21 January 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/21/kidnappers-seize-57-afghan-mine-clearance-workers.

[31] “Mozambique: Sofala tensions hinder demining,” AllAfrica, 10 December 2013, www.allafrica.com/stories/201312110647.html.

[32] “Somalia: Five foreigners including three South Africans confirmed dead in Mogadishu attacks,” AllAfrica, 19 June 2013, www.allafrica.com/stories/201306200092.html.

[33] “Yemeni tribesman kidnap 3 army soldiers, 6 demining workers,” Aden Tribune, 18 June 2013, www.adentribune.com/yemeni-tribesmen-kidnap-3-army-soldiers-6-demining-workers/.

[34] “Demining on hold in Senegal’s Casamance region,” IRIN, 24 May 2013, www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98094.

[35] Eighteen affected States Parties reported on their Article 5 implementation efforts: Afghanistan, Algeria, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and the UK.

[36] See ICBL website for the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-meetings/review-conferences/the-third-review-conference-of-the-mine-ban-treaty.aspx.

[37] ICBL, Statement to the 3rd Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 24 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_ICBL.pdf.

[38] Ibid.

[39] NPA, “Clearing the Mines: Report by the Landmine Monitor Mine Action Team for the Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty,” June 2014, www.npaid.org/Media/20_Files/Mine-action/Mine-Action-Team-Report-for-the-Third-MBT-Review-Conference.

[40] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[41] GICHD, Statement to the 3rd Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 24 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_GICHD.pdf.

[42] NPA, “Clearing the Mines: Report by the Landmine Monitor Mine Action Team for the Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty,” June 2014, p 12.

[43] Angola, BiH, Chad, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK).

[44] Chile, Colombia, DRC, Jordan, Mozambique, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

[45] Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Croatia, and Mauritania.

[46] NPA, “Clearing the Mines: Report by the Landmine Monitor Mine Action Team for the Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty,” June 2014, p. 13.

[47] Statement of Ireland, Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Ireland.pdf.

[48] Statement of Norway, Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Norway.pdf.

[49] “Report on the Analysis of Requests for Extensions to Article 5 deadlines, 2013–2014,” Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 23 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Article5-analysis-report-23Jun2014.pdf.

[50] “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf.

[51] Maputo Action Plan, pp. 2–3. See also APLC/MSP.12/2012/4, “Reflections on the Article 5 Extension Process,” www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=APLC/MSP.12/2012/4.

[52] APLC/CONF/2014.CRP.1, Draft Final Document, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf

[53] APLC/CONF/2014/WP.6, Proposed decision related to the implementation machinery, 2 June 2014, pp. 3–4, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Proposed-decision-implementation.pdf.

[54] Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.