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Comments Received by Landmine Monitor

Pages: << | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | >> | Sort by: Date / Country

Country: Chechnya
Date Received: 19 Jun 2001

NOÇYUN RESPUBLIKA NOXÇIYÇÖCHECHEN REPUBLIC OF ICHKERIAMINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

June 19, 2001

The Honourable Jody Williams
Ambassador
ICBL International
williams@icbl.org

Ms. Mary Wareham
Coordinator
Landmine Monitor
wareham@hrw.org

Ms. Zarema Mazaeva
Coordinator of the Chechen Committee
The International Humanitarian Movement
"Refugees Against Landmines"

The Position of the Chechen Government on the Problem of Antipersonnel Mines

The position of the Chechen government has already been voiced by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1998, an announcement was made expressing support for the Ottawa process and the readiness of the Chechen Republic to sign the Ottawa Convention of 1997 on Prohibition of Use, Accumulation and Manufacture of antipersonnel Mines.

But, very regretfully, as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation and the renewal of military actions on the territory of the Chechen Republic, now the active, wide-scale use of antipersonnel mines of various types and other explosive devices by the Russian army is again taking place. All of this is widely applied in the Chechen Republic along with other kinds of arms forbidden by the international conventions including, according to latest reports of American experts, some serious suspicions of the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons.

The indiscriminate, wide-scale ground and remote mining of the territory of the Chechen Republic by the Russian armed forces has already had catastrophic and long-term humanitarian consequences.

The Chechen Army does not have and has never had antipersonnel mines in its arsenal, although army diversionary groups and guerrilla groups carrying out the struggle against the occupying regime rather frequently use, predominantly against armour, various kinds of self-made explosive devices. However, as a way to improve the efficient use of resources with the goal of defeating the armour of the opponent, all explosive devices used by the Chechen side are radio-controlled and are therefore unable to cause damage to civilians. The Chechen Army, even if it so desired, cannot allow itself the "luxury" of unlimited expenditure of explosives. In addition, the political tasks of the Chechen armed forces include the protection of its own population against a genocide policy of the Russian army, and we simply do not have reason to use antipersonnel mines. As a counterbalance to this, last year the Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, "boasted" about its "achievements", declaring that they planted half a million mines against "the Chechen terrorists " (http: // www.chechenpress.com/news/ru/06_2001/12 _19_06.shtml). It is logical to assume that these "achievements" by the present time should have already at least tripled. According to the Joint Staff of the Chechen Army, there are already approximately 1,800,000 antipersonnel mines on the territory of our small country.

We believe that you should take an interest in the supply of explosives on the Chechen side. As mentioned above, the Russian army places mines everywhere in the Chechen territory. Overabundance of these mines and the constant danger of them has compelled the leadership of the Chechen Armed forces to generate special mine-clearing divisions and has thus collected trophies of explosives in self-made shells of the defeated opponent. Similar experience of mine clearing and the production of explosives have found wide application among the governmental and guerrilla divisions all over the Chechen Republic. It can be concluded that this technology resolves both the problem of shortages of ammunition on the Chechen side and how to effectively defeat the armour of the opponent. However, it is necessary to stipulate that this handicraft technology cannot be considered sufficient in a context of the resolution of the problem of mine clearing on the territory of the Chechen Republic because, at best, due to the absence of maps of the mine fields, it promotes the cleanup of mines of only an insignificant part of roads and footpaths.

The Chechen Republic has no factories for making mines and consequently it is impossible to call the manufacturing of radio-controlled self-made explosive devices a real industry. The Chechen armed forces and a home guard for the protection of the peaceful population of the Chechen Republic against destruction, mockery, humiliation and plunder, not having military resources equivalent to Russias, must apply self-made explosive devices which are produced directly before usage.

We are seriously concerned about the situation in the Chechen Republic regarding the danger of mines to civilians. Moreover, it is a result not only of the present war, but also of military actions in 1994-1996. The Chechen government regards the mine situation in our country as extremely dangerous and as having catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

The absence of special services in the Chechen Republic for making records of mine victims does not allow for us to have the exact information about the number of victims, as in the last war and so to the current one. As a result of application of mines in Chechen territory in war of 1994-1996 thousands of people have suffered, especially children. In addition, injured people were deprived of opportunities to receive adequate medical and psychological rehabilitation because of the most difficult economic situation in Chechnya in the post-war period. This situation is aggravated many times over with the continued use of mines in the current war. According to Ministry of Health of the Chechen Republic, 8,000 people now require prosthetics. But taking into account that in recent months the number of traumas were predominantly mine-explosive traumas, it is supposed that prosthetics are needed by 14,000-16,000 people. These people are deprived opportunities to receive basic medical aid.

We are sure that without the special attention of international governmental and non-governmental organizations there will be no exit from this catastrophic situation in the Chechen Republic. We believe that international organizations should play a major role in the resolution of this crisis.

First is it is necessary to promote an immediate suspension of the war. Only this, in our view, would stop the inhumane process of further mining in territory of the Chechen Republic.

The second step is to adopt an international program of humanitarian mine clearing on territory of the Chechen Republic.

And, the third step is to provide assistance to innocent victims of this brutal war.

The government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is now considering the necessity of preparing a plan for a National program on humanitarian mine clearing in the territory of our country as well as for creating programs to educate children and for the rehabilitation of victims (The Center for the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped). The creation of a special agency for gathering information on victims of mines and other explosive devices is on the working plan for rehabilitation programs for victims and for humanitarian mine clearing.

However, as mentioned above, even after the termination of the war we are not capable of coping with a mine problem on our own and we require the help of international organizations in order to implement programs for the destruction of mines, humanitarian mine clearing, and the rehabilitation of victims. In addition, the absence of maps of minefields will inhibit the process of mine clearing on the territory of our country after the end of the war.

We see the implementation of such programs as being through the close cooperation of Chechen and international non-governmental organizations. These programs should be commissioned at once after the termination of war, and it is necessary to start developing them right away.

In the conclusion, allow me to express hope for the development of our cooperation in a name of building a world free from wars and mines!

My contact information: 215 Constitution Ave, NE, Suite 210, Washington, DC 20002. Tel and Fax: 202-544-2871. E-mail: Lyomaus@aol.com

Sincerely yours,

Lyoma Usmanov
The Representative of the Chechen Government to the United States

Country: China
Date Received: 04 May 1999

LM Discussion with Peoples Republic of China Delegation

Maputo, Mozambique

4 May 1999

LM: Paul (MAC) and Mary (HRW)

"The stockpile figure is exaggerated."

Country: China
Date Received: 10 Apr 2000

April 10, 2000

Dear Ms. Yukika Sohma and Yukie Osa,

We have received your letter requesting our comments on your last edition of Landmine Monitor 1999 as well as detailed information on China's efforts on mine clearance activities and assistance to landmine casualties. We have given serious consideration to your letter and would like to make the following comments and response.

It is obvious that you attached importance to reflecting China's policy and position on the issue of landmines in your report. For that purpose, you must have done a lot of work and consulted relevant sources. We are grateful for your efforts in this regard. We appreciate the responsible attitude you adopted by quoting the exact statements made by Chinese officials in various occasions and the relevant section from the White Paper on China's National Defense. Meanwhile, we also noted that Landmine Monitor 1999 quoted some remarks of assessment or speculation by agencies from other countries or individuals on China's production, transfer, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). It is our view that such an approach is not appropriate. We can not but feel regretful for that. We strongly hope that you exclude such groundless views or statistics out of speculation in Landmine Monitor 2000 in a responsible manner.

We understand that the objective of Landmine Monitor 2000 is to accurately reflect the policy and position on the issue of landmines of all countries, including China. China's policy on the issue of landmines is as follows:

"China has always attached great importance to accidental injury to civilians caused by landmines. It supports proper and rational restrictions placed on the use and transfer of landmines. At the same time, the Chinese government holds that, in addressing the problem of landmines, especially that of APLs, due regard should be given to both humanitarian concerns and legitimate military means, including the use of APLs, according to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. As a developing country with long borders, China has to reserve the right to use APLs for self-defense on its own territory pending an alternative to replace APLs and the presence of security and defense capability."

After outlining the above-mentioned policy, your report may then proceed to enumerate the actions taken by China based on that policy, including the activities cited in Landmine Monitor 1999. For example, in April 1996, China announced a moratorium on the export of APLs which are prohibited by the Amended Landmine Protocol annexed to the CCW Convention. In 1998, China ratified the Amended Landmine Protocol. In that same year, China donated US$100,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance and sponsored an international mine clearance training course in China in cooperation with the UN. It has also decided to contribute some equipment for mine detection and clearance to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance, earmarked to some mine-affected countries. It has successfully launched two large-scale demining operations in Sino-Vietnamese border areas. China is not a State Party to the Ottawa Convention.

You also requested us to provide detailed information on China's mine clearance activities in Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Therefore, we attach herewith Postwar Demining Operations in China (1992-1999) and China's National Report to the First Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices Annexed to the CCW. These two reports contain detailed information on China's mine clearance activities and mine clearance assistance. Please draw the relevant information from these two reports into the Landmine Monitor 2000.

China attached importance to assistance to mine victims and has made tremendous efforts in this area. However, we have been engaged only in actual assistance work so far instead of making them known to other countries. We are yet to conduct a comprehensive compiling of the statistics in this regard. The departments concerned in the Chinese government are trying to gather relevant information. Once available, the information will be publicized in due time.

WANG Xiaolin
Third Secretary
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
People's Republic of China

Country: Colombia
Date Received: 22 Jul 1999

EMBAJADA DE COLOMBIA

Washington, DC

July 22nd, 1999

Ms. Mary Wareham
Senior Advocate, Arms Division
Human Rights Watch
1630 Connecticut Avenue NW #500
Washington D.C. 20009

Dear Ms. Wareham:

I really appreciate your sending me a copy of the Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World and its Executive Summary wich, I am sure, will provide an important means to indicate the global effectiveness on landmine banning.

Cordially,

Luis Alberto Moreno

Ambassador

Country: Colombia
Date Received: 22 Sep 2003

English (Spanish below):

DM/DPM No. 29088

Bogotá D.C., July 30, 2003

Mrs. MARY WAREHAM
Coordinator of Global Research
Land Mines Monitor
Washington, DC

Dear Coordinator:

This is pertaining to your note on the 15th of this month, related to the mining of Munchique Hill by the National Army. While reiterating the Government of Colombia’s undeclinable commitment to the full application of the Ottawa Convention, most attentively I would like to inform you that the type of mine used in this mining operation was the Claymore mine; the utilization is controlled by command and not by a traction fuse. According to the definitions contained in Article 2 of the Convention these mines are not considered anti-personnel mines and thus their use is not prohibited.

In addition, I would like to point out that the mined fields of Munchique Hill have been perfectly demarcated and marked, in order to avoid any danger to the civilian population.

Cordially,

CAROLINA BARCO
Minister of Foreign Relations
________________________________________

Spanish:

DM/DPM No. 29088

Bogotá D.C., 30 de julio de 2003

Señora
MARY WAREHAM
Coordinadora de Investigación Global
Monitor de Minas Terrestres
Washington, D.C.

Señora Coordinadora:

En atención a su nota del 15 de los corrientes, relacionada con el minado del Cerro Munchique, por parte del Ejercito Nacional, y al reiterar el indeclinable compromiso del Gobierno de Colombia con la plena aplicación de la Convención de Ottawa, muy atentamente me permito informar a usted que en dicha operación de minado se utilizaron minas tipo Claymore, de utilización controlada por medio de comando y no por espoleta de tracción, las cuales, de acuerdo con las definiciones contenidas en el Artículo 2 de la Convención, no son consideradas como minas antipersonales y, por lo tanto, no son de uso prohibido.

Adicionalmente, me permito señalar que los campos minados en el Cerro Munchique han sido perfectamente demarcados y señalizados, buscando así evitar cualquier peligro para la población civil.

Cordialmente,

CAROLINA BARCO
Ministra de Relaciones Exteriores

Country: Colombia
Date Received: 05 Nov 2012

English (Spanish below):

MPC No. 1224

Geneva, November 2nd 2012

KASIA DERLICKA

ICBL Director

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Dear Ms Director:

Attached you will find the Colombian Government’s answer to particular observations included in the Cluster Munitions Monitor 2012 and the Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”. A courtesy translation is also enclosed.

Cordially,

Alicia Arango Olmos

Ambassador

_____________________________________

DAPM/GDS NO. 85623

Bogota, D.C., October 25th 2012

KASIA DERLICKA

Executive Director

International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)

Geneva

Subject: Comments to the “Cluster Munitions Monitor 2012” and the Fact Sheer “Victim Assistance since Entry into Force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”

Ms. Director:

Allow me to refer to the publication Cluster Munitions Monitor 2012 that mentions Colombia in the following terms:

“Of the 30 states with casualties that therefore have responsibility for cluster munitions victims, ten are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Montenegro, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) and sic have signed, but not yet ratified the convention (Angola, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq and Uganda). Compared to 29 states with casualties reported in 2011, this is an increase of one country (Colombia).”

And the reference published in the Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since Entry into Force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” of September 2012, in which express that Colombia and other 30 States have reported to have victims of Cluster Munitions.

In this regard, I want to reiterate that Colombia does not report victims of this kind of weapons, according with the Convention provisions and the information of the use of cluster munitions in our country. Therefore, it is not accurate to mention that there has been an increase of the number of counties with victims of cluster munitions in 2012, if this reference is due to Colombia.

We will briefly mention the following precisions in regard to this issue:

The Santo Domingo case is the only event that is being called to have used Cluster munitions. However, as the Cluster Munitions Monitor declared in 2009:

“There are reports that a Colombian helicopter used a World War II-ear dispenser of United States origin, more akin to a weapons rack that a modern cluster bomb, to drop several 20lb (9kg) fragmentation bombs during an attack on the village of Santo Domingo in 1998. These weapons are not considered cluster munitions under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The CMC has received information from Colombian military sources that Colombia stockpiles four types of cluster munitions:… and, AN-M41 “cluster adapter” (the weapon delivery system used in the attack on Santo Domingo mentioned above.) [10]…

[10]:CMC meeting with the Colombian delegation to th Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions, Quito, 7 November 2008. Notes by CMC. Human Rights Watch and Land mine Action are unfamiliar with the ARC 32 bombs, and are not aware of any of the technical details about them. It is unclear is these weapons are banned under the convention.”

In addition, the fact Sheet entitled “Cluster Munitions in America and the Carebian”, of November 2008 prepared by Human Rigths Watch, refered to the issue in the same sense.

In the various Jurisdictional proceedings in the Santo Domingo case there were evidence that the armament used at that time did not have the characteristics of the cluster munitions.

The event which is claimed to have used cluster munitions occurred in 1998. A decade before having an international political and jurisdictional condemnation of the use of this kind of armament. The Cluster Munitions Convention was adopted May 30th 2008 and entered into force the 1st of August of 2010. In that order of ideas, the prohibition in the use of cluster munitions, as described in the Convention, apply (not retroactively) to States that were willing to bind themselves under this international agreement.

Colombia is a signatory state of the Cluster Munitions Convention and according to the Vienna Convention is our commitment not to contravene the objective of this international instrument. Our country will be bind internationally 6 months after it has ratified the Convention, according with Article 26 of the Treaty.

Nevertheless in 2009, the National Government destroyed all its arsenals even before the Convention entered into forced and before Colombia ratified it. This means that Colombia does not have this kind of weapons. Colombia has fulfilled the obligation to destroy cluster munitions, as states in the article number 3 of the convention, before the deadline of 8 years. There were two public events in which participated international organizations, the diplomatic corps, NGOs, and others, with the aim of destroying this kind of ammunition. In addition to this, the Colombian experience has been shared in the following meetings: Berlin Conference on Arsenal Destruction in 2009 and the International Conference of Chile in 2010.

There has not been an increase in the victims reported in 2011, since there weren’t any calamities related to the use of the weapons. It is inappropriate to register a past claimed event occurred 14 years ago as a new case. This creates mistakes on victim’s databases.

Finally, it is important to reiterate the commitment of the Colombian State wit the integral attention and socioeconomic reincorporation of all victims of in-humanitarian weapons, regardless of the type of armament. As you already know in Colombia there are fatalities due to the indiscriminate use of Antipersonnel Mines and Improvised Explosive Devises used by illegal armed groups.

Cordially,

SONIA MATILDE EL JACH POLO

Director of Political Multilateral Affairs

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia

_______________________________________________________

Spanish:

DAPM/GDS NO. 85623

Bogotá, D.C., 25 octubre de 2012

Doctora

KASIA DERLICKA

Directora Ejecutiva

Campaña Internacional para la Prohibición de las Minas (ICBL)

Ginebra

Asunto: Comentarios al “Cluster Munition Monitor 2012” y al Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since Entry into Force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”

Señora Directora:

De manera atenta me permito referirme a la publicación: Cluster Munition Monitor 2012, en especial a la alusión que se hace sobre Colombia, en los siguientes términos:

Así como a la referencia publicada en el Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since Entry into Force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, de septiembre 2012, en la cual se afirma que Colombia, junto con otros 30 Estados, ha reportado tener victimas de Municiones en Racimo.

Sobre el particular, de manera atenta me permito reiterar que, de acuerdo con las provisiones de la Convención y la información sobre uso de municiones en racimo en el país previo a su compromiso con el instrumento, Colombia no reporta victimas de municiones en racimo. En este sentido, es incorrecto asegurar que ha habido un incremento en el número de países con victimas reportadas en el año 2012, si esta referencia se debe a Colombia.

En este orden de ideas, me permito hacer las siguientes precisiones:

El único evento en el que se alega el presunto empleo de municiones en racimo es el caso de Santo Domingo. Sin embargo, tal como el mismo Cluster Munition Monitor afirmó en su edición de 2009:

Adicionalmente, en la Hoja Informativa Regional, titulada “Municiones en Racimo en América y el Caribe”, de noviembre de 2008, preparado por Human Rights Watch se había hecho referencia pública en el mismo sentido.

En el curso de las diferentes actuaciones jurisdiccionales desplegadas por los hechos ocurridos en Santo Domingo, se aportaron pruebas tendientes a evidenciar que el armamento empleado no responde a las características de una munición en racimo.

El evento de presunto empleo de municiones en racimo ocurrió en 1998. Una década antes de que hubiese una condena internacional politica y juridica al uso de este tipo de armamento. La Convención sobre Municiones en Racimo fue adoptada el 30 de mayo de 2008 y entró en vigor internacional el 1 de agosto de 2010. En consecuencia, la prohibición a las municiones en racimo, tal y como están definidas en la Convención, aplica a partir de su vigencia (no de manera retroactiva) para los Estados que hayan manifestado su voluntad de obligarse en virtud de este acuerdo internacional.

Colombia es Estado signatario de la Convención sobre Municiones en Racimo y, en virtud de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derechos de los Tratados, su obligación es no contravenir el objeto y fin de dicho instrumento internacional. Nuestro país sólo estará obligado internacionalmente seis meses después del depósito del instrumento de ratificación, de conformidad con el articulo 26 de la Convención.

No obstante lo anterior, en 2009, antes de la entrada en vigor internacional y sin haber ratificado la Convención, el Gobierno Nacional destruyó la totalidad de sus arsenales, compromiso para le cual tenia un plazo de 8 años de acuerdo con el articulo 3 de la Convención, es decir, que nuestro país está libre de municiones en racimo. Se destaca que hubo dos eventos públicos de destrucción a los cuales se invitó al Cuerpo Diplomático, Organismos Internacionales, Organizaciones No Gubernamentales, entre otros. Adicionalmente, la experiencia colombiana en materia de destrucción de arsenales ha sido compartida en el marco de las siguientes reuniones: Conferencia de Berlin sobre Destrucción de 2009 y la Conferencia Internationale de Chile de 2010.

No hay un aumento frente a las victimas reportadas en 2011, dado que en dicho año no ocurrieron siniestros en nuestro país por este tipo de armas. Es improcedente registrar un presunto evento ocurrido hace 14 años como un caso nuevo. Esto genera imprecisiones en los datos sobre victimas.

Finalmente, es importante reiterar el compromiso del Estado Colombiano con la plena atención y reincorporación socioeconómica de cualquier victima de armas de impacto humanitario, independientemente del tipo de artefacto que la haya afectado, que como es de su conocimiento, en el caso colombiano se producen por el uso indiscriminado de minas antipersonal y explosivos improvisados utilizados por parte de los grupos armados ilegales.

De la señora Directora, muy atentamente,

SONIA MATILDE EL JACH POLO

Directora de Asuntos Políticos Multilaterales.

Country: Colombia
Date Received: 10 Dec 2012

English (spanish below):

DCHONU NO. 1373

Geneva, December 04 of 2012

MARY WAREHAM

Final Editor

Cluster Munition Monitor

Geneva

SUBJECT: Memorando DAMP/GDNP No79477-Cluster Munition Report

Ms. Mary Wareham:

I write to you to in order to submit the response of the Government of Colombia to your communication of the 19 November 2012 related to the Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 and the Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munition”.

In this response, the Government of Colombia expresses its appreciation for your kind response and your suggestion to modify the references contained in the Cluster Munition Monitor and the Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munition”, which alleged Cluster Munition victims in Colombia. However we consider that this drafting does not clarify the country’s situation, nor attends the comments exposed in our initial answer.

To give the more transparency to the reader about the national situation, the Government of Colombia appreciates that the letter send to Kasia Derlicka, Director of the International Campaign for the Cluster Munitions Prohibition, is included in the annexes. In order to give more clarity about the statement made in both publications.

It is important to stress that in the past editions the Cluster Munitions Monitor recognized that in the Santo Domingo’s case, Cluster munitions were not used and there is not any study or statement of an authority referring to the use of this armament.

Sincerely,

Carlos Enrique Valencia Muñoz

Encargado de Negocios, a.i.

___________________________________________

Spanish:

DAPM/GDNP No. 7913

Bogotá, D.C., 26 noviembre de 2012

Señora

MARY WAREHAM

Editora Final

Cluster Munition Monitor

Ginebra

Asunto: Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 y la Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munition”.

Señora Editora:

En relación con su comunicación del 19 de noviembre de 2012, agradecemos su respuesta y sugerencia de modificación a las referencias contenidas en el Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 y la Fact Sheet “Victim Assistance since the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munition” sobre las presuntas victimas de municiones en racimo en Colombia. Sin embargo, consideramos que esta redacción no aclara la situación del país ni atiende los argumentos expuestos en nuestra respuesta inicial.

En este sentido, y con el fin de dar claridad al lector sobre la situación nacional, el Gobierno de Colombia agradecería que la carta que le dirigimos a la Directora de al Campaña Internacional para la Prohibición de las Minas Antipersonal (ICBL), Kasia Derlicka, haciendo claridad frente a las aseveraciones hechas en ambas publicaciones, sea incluida como anexo a las mismas.

Es importante destacar que en pasadas ediciones el Cluster Munition Monitor había reconocido que en el caso de Santo Domingo no se usaron municiones en racimo y que no hay un estudio ni pronunciamiento de una autoridad señalando que se trató de ese armamento.

De Usted, muy atentamente,

SONIA MATILDE EL JACH POLO

Directora de Asuntos Políticos Multilaterales

Country: Cuba
Date Received: 19 Jun 2000

Statement of the Directorate of Multilateral Affairs of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor researcher, sent by email, 19 June 2000.

ATT.NOEL STTOT.

Cuba is not a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Landmines because, for the time being, it is not possible for it to fulfill the responsibilities deriving from that international legal instrument and mainly because the possession and use of antipersonnel landmines form part of the country's defense doctrine called "Peoples War".

The defense concept of the Republic of Cuba is the result of the Cuban people's willingness to defend its sovereignty and independence constantly threaten by the manifest hostility of nine Administrations of the United States of America, which have planned, promoted, encourage, supported, and carried out a vast number of aggressive and subversive actions against the Cuban people and Government.

However, on several occasions, the Cuban Government has publicly expressed that it understands and shares the humanitarian concerns caused by the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of antipersonnel landmines.

Likewise, Cuba has expressed its full support to the humanitarian efforts made by the international community to prevent or mitigate the effects of the indiscriminate use of this kind of weapons.

Although anonymously at times, Cuba has contributed in an actual and effective fashion to these humanitarian efforts: hundreds of Cuban volunteer doctors have provided and continue to provide medical assistance and treatment for thousands of persons injured by antipersonnel landmines in various parts of the world, including areas devastated by internal armed conflicts.

At present, just to cite an example, thousands of Cuban medical doctors are serving in 14 countries located in different geographical zones, such as Central America, the Caribbean and Africa as part of the Comprehensive Healthcare Delivery Program, whereby Cuba provides these nations with solidary medical cooperation.

In Cuba, there are national regulations to control the use of antipersonnel landmines and of all the other kinds of weapon the country has.

Decree Law No. 52 on the Control of Firearms and License Procedures has been enacted since 1982. The licenses are issued to those persons meeting the established requirements, mainly those engaged in crime prevention duties.

The weapons intended for the protection and security of the State-owned economic entities are given on the basis of the values to be protected.

On 17 June 1998, the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba passed Decree Law No. 186 on Work Safety and Security Systems that, in accordance with its Article 1: ".... is aimed at establishing and monitoring Work Safety and Security Systems and related services".

Chapter VII of the aforementioned Decree Law establishes the following regulations, among others, for firearms and equipment of the members of the Service for Security and Protection:

Article 37: Security Enterprises and Groups are authorized to possess, use and custody firearms and personal equipment for their intended purposes, seeking prior approval from the Ministry of Interior and in accordance with standing legal provisions and regulations.
Article 38: Firearms are used only for the protection of the objectives and services they are intended to; thus prohibiting any kind of transfer, change of location or use for purposes other than the ones for which they were authorized, without prior approval from the Ministry of Interior.

More recently, on 16 February 1999, with the passing of Law No. 87, which modified the Penal Code, the national legislation regarding the illegal trafficking in arms, among many other issues, has been reinforced.

Article 11 of the aforementioned Law amends Articles 211 and 212 of the Penal Code sentencing any person who -- without legal authorization -- acquires, carries or possess a firearm to 2-5 year prison terms and to 3-8 year imprisonment if the person manufactures, sells or in any way facilitates another the possession of a firearm.

Article 11 also includes penalties ranging from three to eight-year prison terms for the first case and four to ten-years imprisonment for the second crime, if it is about a type of firearm for which no license is granted.

Chapter 2, Article 346 of the same Law, when referring to money laundering, provides from five to twelve years imprisonment to any person who acquires, exchanges or transfers any of his/her resources, properties or rights, or to any person pretending to carry out the aforementioned operations knowingly or not, or rationally supposing -- based on the occasion or circumstance in which the operation is conducted -- that these resources, properties or rights directly or indirectly derive from activities related to the illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons or persons or organized crime.

There is no a retail network in Cuba for weapons sale, including antipersonnel landmines, to legal or natural persons.

Cuba has neither exported nor is exporting mines and it has publicly expressed it. In 1996, United Nations Secretary General published a Report (A/51/313), dated 28 August 1996, under the provisions of Resolution 50/70 O of the United Nations General Assembly, entitled "Moratorium on the Export of Antipersonnel Landmines". This Report contains information provided by the Cuban Government expressing that Cuba has neither exported nor is exporting mines.

The Cuban Government has given convincing evidence of its readiness to participate actively in international negotiations for the implementation of a regime for the comprehensive ban on exports of all kinds of mines.

It is well known that there are mines planted in the perimeter surrounding the illegally occupied Guantnamo Naval Base; these mines were laid after the United States of America had deployed its own landmines in this illegally occupied area.

Little is known, however, about the real reasons compelling Cuba to lay and maintain those mines.

The international community has information on the hostile and aggressive actions the Government of the United States of America has carried out against Cuba for more than 30 years. Nevertheless, we consider there is still a lot to be said about such actions.

Between July 5-20, 1999, in the Civil and Administrative Court of Law at the Provincial People's Court in the City of Havana, there were public hearings of the compensation lawsuit for damages filed by the Cuban people against the Government of the United States of America.

Tens of witnesses and a number of evidence were presented in the hearings. The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces was in charge of giving expert opinions about two of the principal allegations made in the Lawsuit. One of them was related to the use of the Guantnamo Naval Base as an instrument of the United States Government's aggressive policy towards the Cuban Government and people. (1)

Below are some excerpts of the aforementioned expert opinion that illustrate how the Guantnamo Naval Base of the United States of America, located in the Bay of Guantnamo has been used as an instrument of the aggressive policy of the United States towards Cuba and how from this place they it has caused irreparable harm to the Cuban people.

"The agreement for the establishment of the Guantnamo Naval Base, ever since it was signed, took an entirely illegal nature. The shameful Platt Amendment, imposed to Cubans and accepted only under penalty that U.S. intervention troops would not leave the country, caused that still effective Treaty to be signed under blatant and arrogant pressure, giving it an illegal nature and fully justifying the our peoples claim for the usurped territory. "

" the troops stationed in this U.S. military facility were used by the previous governments more than once as instruments for internal repression. In 1912, the troops billeted in the base overstepped their limits to quench the uprising of the Color Independent Party. Five years later, on the occasion of the uprising of the Liberal Party, several groups of US marines took positions outside the base, under the pretext of protecting the water supply lines from the free Cuban territory."

The establishment of new relations between both countries 1st January 1959 marks the moment when the contradictions accumulated for many years regarding the illegal presence of the Guantnamo Naval Base became fully evident. These new relations polarized the increasingly aggressive policy by US Administrations and the determined Cuban stance vis-a-vis the challenge posed by the North."

Later on, the expert opinion states that just before 1959 when the last stage of the Cuban Revolution led by actual President, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, was being waged up in the Eastern mountains, " the Guantnamo Naval BASE was used by the United States to clandestinely supply weapons and munitions to Batista's Army in its last waning days (2) even though it had been prohibited by the U.S. Congress..."

"After the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 and as part of the US-launched offensive to increase its presence in its overseas territories, the Base was a choice scenario for the increase of US interference... a historical average of 15 US ships, over 50% of them war ships, performing military exercises and maneuvers everyday inside the bay or near its service areas located to the South of that facility, even using live munitions with the corresponding risk for sea transportation."

"Ground troops were gradually increased and, under the questionable designation of defensive forces, their number rose to around 2,500 troops in peacetime, because its reinforcement have been always planned for times of conflict, as it happened in the days of the Missile Crisis in 1962, when the total troops ready for action reached 5,800."

"For instance, on May 1980 during the military exercise Solid Shield, a scheduled reinforcements in the Base was around 1,200 marines; in 1984, as part of Ocean Venture-84, around 600-strong military personnel was transferred to the Base. In October 1991, for defense exercise DEFEX 2/91, the facility received around 600 additional marines."

"Traditionally, the US military leadership was bent on demonstrating that the training of its troops inside the Base had an eminently defensive nature. They even called their main military exercises Defense Exercise - DEFEX.

However, there is clear evidence revealing the real nature the military training inside the Base. One of the pages in the US Marines Field Regulations (Staff Action, FMFM 3-1, DE 1979) for the training of Staffs in Combat, shows a representative diagram with the idea of training inside the Guantnamo Naval BASE."

"The systematic acts of provocation from the Base, mainly by US military personnel, were part and parcel of US aggressions against Cuba since 1st January 1959."

"After the mercenary invasion in Bay of Pigs (April 1961), US military planners dedicated their time to find new aggressive options against Cuba. On 9 March 1962 they submitted to the consideration of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, a broad catalogue of "Reasons to Justify a US Military Invasion in Cuba."

This catalogue is part of a large group of documents declassified by the American government relative to the investigation of President Kennedys assassination. These files are called "Select Documents on Cuba" and contain a vast volume of information on actions planned by the United States with the purpose of fabricating a pretext to militarily intervene in Cuba.

We will make reference to those documents directly related to the Guantnamo Naval Base:

Incidents credibly simulating an attack:

Circulate (many) rumors. Use clandestine radio broadcast.
Land Cuban troops in uniform, "on the U.S. side of the fence", to simulate an attack on the Base.
Capture alleged Cuban saboteurs inside the Base.
Start riots (by alleged Cubans) near the main entrance to the Base.
Blow up explosive devices inside the Base and damage some of its facilities.
Burn aircraft inside the Base and make it look a sabotage act.
Fire mortar shells at the Base and damage some facilities.
Capture alleged storm troops approaching the Base from the sea or the city of Guantnamo.
Capture groups of militia harassing the Base.
Sabotage a vessel docked in port causing great fire.
Sink a vessel near the entrance to the port. Stage funeral of the victims. They could be around 10.

PRINCIPAL ACTS OF PROVOCATION FROM GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE SINCE 1962

PRINCIPAL ACTS OF PROVOCATION	TOTAL
Throwing objects
Shots fired at our territory
Aiming weapons at our territory
Verbal offenses and lewd gestures
Other acts of provocation
TOTAL

PRINCIPAL VIOLATIONS FROM GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE SINCE 1962.

TYPES OF VIOLATION	TOTAL
Violations of ground limits
Violations of air space
Violations of jurisdictional waters
TOTAL

The Cuban Government has denounced these acts in an opportune and systematic manner to the Government of the United States of America.

"In a Note Verbale dated 20 March 1962, the U.S. Government was notified of the occurrence of 12 acts of provocation taking place just from 3-5 March in the Guantnamo Naval Base. Those acts included firing shots and directing verbal offenses against the Cuban personnel."

"The Cuban Government, in a Note Verbale to the Swiss Embassy, dated 4 April 1961, denounced the perpetration of 48 violations of our air space near the Guantnamo Naval Base taking place between 15 February and 15 March 1961."

"In a Note Verbale addressed to the Czech Embassy, dated 2 January 1962, the U.S. authorities were given a summary of 101 violations of Cuban air space and jurisdictional waters between June and November 1962, most of them originating from the Guantnamo Naval Base."

It is necessary to point out that we have not made use of all the data contained in the Evidence Report because it would make this work too long. However, we consider that the information made public herein sheds some clear light as to why Cuba has been compelled to adopt defensive measures to protect the territory and people near the Guantnamo Naval Base.

In a separate Evidence Report submitted for the purpose of the same Judicial Proceeding by the Ministry of Interior of Cuba, it is clearly shown how the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America encouraged and directed the activities of terrorist groups and individuals in the Cuban territory in the 1960s, occasionally giving them shelter in the Guantnamo Naval Base.

We should highlight that the Cuban landmines sowed in the perimeter surrounding the Guantnamo Naval Base have an exclusively defensive nature. They are intended to prevent violations and acts of provocation, as well as to guarantee peace and safety in the areas adjacent to the Base. These mines also serve the military purpose of preventing U.S. troops from expanding with impunity the perimeter they occupy illegally and from launching offensive actions into the Cuban territory.

Cuban mine fields are duly marked, fenced and guarded to ensure the protection of civilians, as stipulated by Protocol II (Amended) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Several diplomats accredited to Cuba as well as other foreign personalities have been able to visit on various occasions the surroundings of the Guantnamo Naval Base and observe the area occupied by the Base and the defensive measures adopted by the Cuban side.

Lastly, we should note that the alleged removal of U.S. landmines from the Guantnamo Naval Base completed by the end of 1999, as announced by the U.S. Government, is a measure of relative importance since that country has the necessary troops and means to quickly restore the deactivated minefields if it so wishes or deems it appropriate. They can even use more high-tech mines having a greater destructive power than the ones formerly planted around Guantnamo Naval Base.

On the other hand, there is the U.S. war arsenal that could be used against Cuba in the event of a military invasion, wreaking infinitely more havoc than anti-personnel landmines.

CUBAS HEALTHCARE POLICY FOR THE HANDICAPPED

In Cuba, there is a free and universal healthcare system and the gains accomplished by the Cuban medicine enjoy worldwide renown.

The Cuban Revolution has built new hospitals and 21 medical schools to train thousands of high-skilled physicians. Only in the last few years, despite the financial constraints facing our country, the number of medical graduates has increased to 30,000.

In spite the economic, financial and trade blockade imposed by the United States of America on Cuba, preventing among other things the sales of medicines and the transference of medical technologies to our country, Cuba has been able to keep its infant mortality rates down reaching an all-time low (7.4 per 1000 live births) in 1999, one of the lowest rates in the world.

In the 1960s policies to address the handicapped were implemented, reaching important goals in 1983-1993 in the fields of prevention, rehabilitation, social integration and equal opportunities for the disabled.

The care for this social group has been a constant concern of the Cuban government since 1 January 1959. The National Plan of Action for the Care of the Disabled has been outlined on a yearly basis, and a strict control for its compliance is observed by State institutions.

The financial support that the Cuban government has provided for the purchase of devices to assist in the patients social reinsertion and rehabilitation has increased dramatically.

For instance, financing grew threefold between 1996 and 1997 for the purchase of orthopedic devices. In 1998, that figure increased five times. Likewise, assistance for the visually, hearing and mentally impaired has grown significantly.

At present, a nationwide survey is being conducted for the care of deaf and blind patients.

It is important to note that the aforementioned expenses have been made in hard currency, albeit one of the characteristics of the Cuban economy during these years of crisis has been the lack of this type of currency.

Below are some figures illustrating the care of disabled patients in two specialized institutions in Havana between 1995 and 1998:

National Rehabilitation Center, "Julio Daz" Hospital

National Center for Neurologic Restoration (CIREN)

YEARS	NUMBER OF PATIENTS TREATED

CUBAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS ON DISARMAMENT

The Republic of Cuba is State Party to 11 of the 18 International Instruments relative to Disarmament applicable to it.

Cuba has taken part in the UN Registry of Conventional Weapons since the establishment of this specialized forum, reporting every year that it has not imported or exported none of the types of weapons included in the 7 categories contained in the Registry.

Cuba is currently considering, according to effective constitutional provisions, the possibility to ratify Protocol II (Amended) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

(1)-Evidence Report submitted bythe Revolutionary Armed Forced. The Cuban People Files Lawsuit againstthe Government of the United States of America for Damages. EdicionesVERDE OLIVO, Havana, Cuba, 1999.

(2)-General FulgencioBatista led a military coup on 10 March 1952 establishing adictatorship in Cuba that lasted until 1 January 1959 when the CubanRevolution triumphed

Country: Dominican Republic
Date Received: 26 Sep 2001

The following text was included in the Dominican Republic's MBT Article 7 transparency report, submitted 26 September 2001.

COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL INFORME MONITOR DE MINAS 2000

Si se acepta como válida la idea de que el Monitor de Minas no es un Sistema de verificación técnica ni un mecanismo de inspección oficial del Tratado para la Prohibición de las Minas de 1997, no hay dudas de que es un poderoso instrumento para pedir cuentas a los Gobiernos en relación con sus obligaciones sobre las Minas Antipersonal.

Esta importante iniciativa, especialmente de los actores no gubernamentales, constituye una valiosa guía complementaria a los informes de los Estados Parte, que nos permite contar con la más amplia información posible por países y regiones en todo el planeta tras el objetivo de un mundo sin minas.

Uno de los grandes aportes del Monitor de minas, entre otras cosas, es que no sólo facilita la transparencia y la cooperación, que de por si son variables esenciales para lograr el citado objetivo, sino que promueve y facilita el debate de la mayor parte de la comunidad internacional organizada en relación con la Política de cada Estado sobre la Prohibición, Empleo, Producción, Transferencia, Almacenamiento, remoción, así como la orientación y asistencia a los supervivientes de las Minas.

Otras de las bondades del Monitor de las Minas 2000, es que logra superar las posibles lagunas habidas en el primer informe anual de la Primera Reunión de los Estados parte de la Convención de OTTAWA, como también evaluar y sistematizar las informaciones inicialmente recopiladas a fin de garantizar métodos de investigación y mecanismos de información comunes para el Monitor.

En conclusión, podemos señalar que este último informe Monitor de Minas Terrestres es la expresión de un extraordinario esfuerzo colectivo que permite exponer ante la opinión pública mundial con objetiva profundidad y detalles los peligros que rigurosas estadísticas por país y región.

Asimismo, entendemos que el Monitor de Minas, a pesar de los éxitos obtenidos respecto de su primera edición, es un proceso dinámico que tendrá que actualizarse permanentemente, corrigiendo y mejorando, tal y como se expresa en la parte introductoria del mismo.

Country: Ecuador
Date Received: 01 Dec 2008

Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines regarding the Ecuador chapter of the Landmine Monitor Report 2008

Download: EcuadorLetterReyes.pdf (401.19 kB)