South Korea has not
signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While acknowledging the humanitarian
consequences of antipersonnel mines, the ROK is one of the governments that has
been most vocal in insisting on the legitimacy and military necessity of
continued use of antipersonnel landmines. The ROK has said it must retain mines
until there is no longer a threat from North Korea, or until an effective
alternative to antipersonnel mines is found. In his remarks to the United
Nations General Assembly on 17 November 1998, Ambassador Lee See-young said that
although the ROK was not in a position at present to subscribe to the total ban,
due to its unique security situation, it would be able to accede to the Ottawa
Convention if and when a durable peace mechanism was established on the Korean
peninsula or a viable alternative to antipersonnel mines was
developed.[1]
South Korea attended all of the treaty preparatory meetings of the Ottawa
Process, the negotiations in Oslo, and the treaty signing conference in Ottawa
in December 1977, but in each case only as an observer. South Korea did not
endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It was one of
only ten governments to abstain on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/45,
passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an
international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the
small number of states to abstain on the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting
the December treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33
welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging its full realization and
inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in
Mozambique.
South Korea recognizes the humanitarian crisis caused by antipersonnel mines.
According to a 1997 policy statement: “The Republic of Korea fully shares
the concerns of the international community over the scourge of antipersonnel
landmines. We are well aware of the fact that the proliferation of APLs and
their indiscriminate and irresponsible use have caused a great deal of
sufferings and casualties, particularly among civilian population. Therefore we
agree with the emerging consensus that the international community must stop
this.... [Korea has] sympathy with the efforts of the international community to
contain, minimize, and if possible to stop the tragic humanitarian consequences
of APLs.”[2]
The ROK maintains however, that it has a “unique situation that
prevents her from fully subscribing to the complete ban on the use of APLs....
The ROK cannot at this time fully endorse international efforts to ban APLs
until the North Korean military threat is diffused or an equally effective
alternative to APLs becomes
available.”[3]
The ROK position is that mines are needed both as a deterrent, and for their
combat value. “The use of APLs on the Korean peninsula has been an
essential element in deterring the possible aggression. It has helped prevent
the recurrence of another devastating war.... Mining along the north-south
invasion routes would work to slow down and break up a North Korean attack....
Minefields have been an indispensable component of our defensive barrier
system.... APLs have thus served as a powerful deterrent to military
adventurism in Korea and will continue to do
so.”[4]
These arguments were made forcefully by the ROK and by the United States
during the Oslo treaty negotiations, when the U.S. formally proposed an
exception in the treaty for mine use in Korea. But they were rejected by the
almost ninety other governments participating. Negotiators, including some of
the closest military allies of the U.S. and ROK, believed that the exception
would undermine the treaty in a fundamental way, and that others would then
insist on their own geographic exceptions.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines argued that, “While the
geopolitical situation in Korea may be unique, the requirement for and impact of
the use of AP mines is not.... The case cannot be made that only in Korea does
the military utility of AP mines outweigh the humanitarian
costs.”[5]
Several former commanders of joint U.S.-ROK forces in South Korea have stated
that antipersonnel mines can be safely eliminated from the
ROK.[6] Mr. Lee Yang Ho, a
former ROK Minister of National Defense, has suggested that North and South
Korea should get rid of their landmines
jointly.[7]
South Korea is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its
Landmine Protocol, though the government has told the National Assembly that it
would like to accede to the CCW and amended Protocol II in
1999.[8] It is a member of the
Conference on Disarmament, and has expressed a willingness to join efforts to
negotiate an AP mine transfer ban in the
CD.[9]
Production
South Korea has produced two antipersonnel mines,
both of which are copies of the U.S. M18A1 Claymore mine. The Korean
designations are K440 and KM18A1; the K440 is slightly larger. The K440 is made
by Daewoo Corporation, the KM18A1 by Korean Explosives Ltd. They are
directional fragmentation mines that are usually used in a command detonated
mode, but can also be used with
tripwires.[10] According to the
ROK Ministry of National Defense, a total of 10,721 M18A1s were produced from
1995-1997.[11]
Transfer
There is no evidence that the ROK government has
ever exported antipersonnel mines. On 28 September 1995, the government
announced a formal one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines,
which was extended in 1996. In 1997, the government decided to extend the
moratorium for an indefinite
period.[12]
South Korea imported 40,324 AP mines from the United States from 1969 to 1992
when a U.S. export moratorium went into effect. The final purchase was 31,572
ADAM mines from 1986-88, for $4.07 million. These are so-called
“smart” mines that self-destruct in four to forty-eight hours. They
are fired from artillery. South Korea is one of only a handful of nations to
which the U.S. provided these mines. The U.S. shipped 1,035 non-detectable M14
blast mines in 1970, and more than 7,000 M-18A1 Claymore mines from
1969-1973.[13]
Stockpiling
The number of antipersonnel landmines in the South
Korean stockpile is a military secret. In a meeting with the ICBL in February
1998, Vice Minister of Defense Lee Jung-rin said that Korea has twice the amount
of deployed landmines held in
stock.[14] It is commonly
asserted that one million mines are deployed by the ROK in the Demilitarized
Zone. The U.S. government has publicly stated that the U.S. is stockpiling
approximately one million M14 and M16 “dumb” (non-self-destructing)
mines in Korea. (See U.S. country report for details).
Use
Landmines were used extensively by all combatant
armies during the Korean War. According to U.S. Army documents, it was the
U.S., not North Korea, which introduced mines en masse into Korea and the U.S.
lost control of the weapon shortly thereafter. U.S. minefields were easily
breached during the Korean War, sending U.S. troops retreating through their own
unmarked minefields. More U.S. Army mine casualties in Korea were caused by
U.S. defensive minefields than by the enemy’s mines. The main source of
landmines for the enemy in Korea was captured U.S.
mines.[15]
There are an estimated one million mines planted by the ROK and the U.S. in
the Demilitarized Zone.[16]
Mines were also allegedly planted in large numbers in 1962 during tensions
surrounding the Cuban missile
crisis.[17] Landmines may also
be planted by the ROK and the U.S. around their military facilities and
strategic locations elsewhere in the
country.[18]
The Landmine Problem
The government maintains that antipersonnel mines
do not pose a danger to civilians in South Korea. “The actual mined area
on the Korean Peninsula is restricted to the 155-mile Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
The minefields there are fenced and clearly marked. They are thoroughly mapped
and carefully documented. And they are also closely monitored by military
personnel twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Civilian access is
completely denied. What happened in Angola, Cambodia and some other places in
the world has not happened and will not happen in
Korea.”[19]
Yet, casualties do still occur, mainly near the DMZ. A 1993 U.S. State
Department report said, “The Republic of Korea still has a problem with
landmines from World War II and from the Korean Conflict,” and notes that
uncleared mines are located “along the inter-Korean border and in areas in
which Korean War battles
occurred.”[20]
Many of the casualties in recent years have occurred due to flooding or
landslides caused by heavy rains that wash landmines out of minefields or
storage sites and into areas frequented by civilians. In one incident in August
1998, it was reported that 200 M14 antipersonnel mines had been swept away by
rains.[21] In April 1999, the
ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly said that only 59 of 321 landmines washed
away by rain storms in 1998 have been
recovered.[22]
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
In April 1999, the ROK Air Force started removing
thousands of landmine laid in and around four of the Air Force’s defense
units in the outskirts of Seoul for fear they may be washed away in heavy
monsoon rains during the
summer.[23] This is the first
phase of a clearance effort that will remove mines from 10 air defense units,
seven in Seoul and one each in Pusan, Kangwon and North Cholla provinces. ROK
Lt. Col. Chung Sang-jong reportedly said that “Removing the landmines
would require more guard personnel to protect the bases, but the decision comes
in a bid to prevent possible damage to civilians when mines are washed away in
heavy rains.”[24]
There are no humanitarian mine clearance programs in South Korea. Since the
early 1960s there have been cases where civilians, especially farmers, have
tried to clear mines from fields; some became victims. There are no mine
awareness education programs in South Korea.
One Korean lawmaker has estimated that it would take US$10 billion to clear
the mines in the DMZ.[25]
The ROK government has contributed $300,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund
for Assistance in Mine
Clearance.[26] In 1998, the ROK
contributed to mine action in Cambodia, Tajikistan, and
Ethiopia.[27]
Landmine Casualties
The government has claimed that antipersonnel mine
“use in Korea has not caused any civilian casualties and inflicted
suffering on their lives.... In Korea, the use of APLs has not caused and is not
likely to cause civilian
suffering.”[28]
Yet, according to the official records of the Korean Military Office, there
were seventy-eight mine victims between 1992 and 1997, including twenty-nine
civilians.[29] Records from
previous years were destroyed after being kept for five years. These numbers
apparently only include those who lodged claims with the Korean government which
those who step on mines in areas not considered mined have a right to do. As a
result of lawsuits, the government made reparations totaling $213,000 to five
landmine victims from 1992 to
1997.[30]
The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines has talked to many mine survivors who
did not make legal claims because they were reluctant to make trouble with the
military authorities, or were afraid they would lose. Recognizing the shortage
of reliable data, the Korean Campaign estimates that, dating back to the war,
there have been more than 1,000 civilian mine victims, and 2,000-3,000 military
mine victims in South Korea.
The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines has undertaken a search for mine victims
throughout the country. It has interviewed 27 victims or their relatives;
records of the interviews are available.
Mine accidents occurred while civilians were walking on a beach, picking wild
vegetables, fruit and herbs, gathering firewood, working in a melon field, a
bean field, a rice field, hunting, wading in streams, and other activities.
According to the Korean Campaign, mine incidents have occurred in:
* Paengnyong-do. Paengnyongdo is an island in the north-westernmost point
in South Korea. The government laid landmines on the northern beach of the
island. There have been about 27 victims, including civilians. One of the
residents testified that 7 civilians were hurt by landmines and 6 of them had
died as a result. There are no warning signs or barriers.
* Marine camp in Jinchon-ri. Several accidents have occurred here. There is
a mined area with no guards, no signs and no barriers.
* Papyong-myon, Paju-city, Keyongki-do. This area is near the DMZ. Many
mines were laid in this area and they have often been washed away by rain. Once
there was a landmine accident in Inchon-city which was presumed to have occurred
due to flow from this area. 11 victims are recorded.
* Nogok-ri village. Mines were planted here in the early 1960s, including
some in private fields. More than 10 victims live in this village.
*Daekwang-ri village. Every summer landmines carried away by rain plague
this village. More than 10 victims live in this village.
* Baekhak-myon, Yonchon-kun, Keyongki-do. Workers in fields encounter mines
that have been washed out of the minefields by flooding.
* Haean-myon, Yanggu-kun, Kangwon-do. A man working at the government office
for 30 years could recall 24 mine victims in that time. This is very close to
the DMZ.
* Daema-ri, Chorwon-kun, Kangwon-do. On 30 August of each year, villagers
hold a memorial ceremony for victims of landmines. The population is about 900
and there have been between 40 and 50 mine victims over the past 30 years.
* Saengchang-ri, Kimhea-eup, Chorwon-kun, Kangwon-do. There are about 25
victims in a population of 500.
The Korean Campaign is compiling a record of landmine incidents, which
currently has about 100 entries and is available to interested readers. Below
are some recent incidents:
6 April 1998: Songnam-city, Keyongki-do, landmines laid near the air
base were carried away to the valley by rain.
22 April 1998: Doshin-ri, Shinseo-myon, Yonchon-kun, Keyongki-do, Mr.
Kim, Ju-Kwon (62) was killed by a landmine at the foot of a Yawolsan mountain
while picking wild vegetables.
20 May 1998: Woisungdong-ri, Wonnam-myon,Chorwon-kun, Kangwon-do,
three soldiers killed and one injured by landmine in the DMZ area.
July 1998: Byekje-dong, Dukyang-ku, Koyang-city, Keyongki-do,
landmines were carried away by rain.
July 1998: Galgok-ri, Pobwon-eup, Paju-city, Keyongki-do, landmines
were carried away by rain.
1 August 1998: Galgok-ri, Pobwon-eup, Paju-city, Keyongki-do, the army
informed that landmines laid in 1980s were carried away by rain.
6 August 1998: Tongduchon-city, Keyongki-do, US army storage site was
flooded and ten containers with landmines were carried away.
7 August 1998: Byekje-dong, Dukyang-gu, Koyang-city, Keyongki-do, army
storage site was flooded, landmines washed away.
8 August 1998: Wonchang-dong, Seo-ku, Inchon-city, at the beach of the
island Seodo, Mr. Shin, Dong-sun (45) stepped on a landmine carried by rain.
9 August 1998: Jangheung-myon, Yanggu-kun, Keyongki-do, at the rest
place in Songchu valley, a antitank landmine was found.
10 August 1998: Anjung-ri, Paengseong-eup, Pyongtaek-city, landmines
were carried away by rain at the air base.
10 August 1998: Hyunduk-myon, Pyongtaek-city, landmines were carried
away by rain at the air base.
10 August 1998: Jangheung-myon, Yangju-kun, Keyongki-do, at the army
storage site, landmines carried away by rain.
10 August 1998: Dukjung-ri, Eunhyun-myon, Keyongki-di, the air force
reported that landmines were carried away by rain.
12 August 1998: Ganeung3-dong, uijongbu-city, Keyongki-do, at a
position near the air base, three landmines found and collected.
13 August 1998: Haean-myon, Yanggu-kun, Kangwon-do, Mrs. Baek,
Chun-Oak (62) stepped on a landmine at the edge of a stream.
28 August 1998: Byekje-dong, Dukyang-gu, Koyang-city, Mr. Baek,
Young-Gil (37) found a landmine at a residential area.
12 October 1998: Anheung-myon, Taean-kun, Chungchongnam-do, Mr. Han,
Kwang-Seok (36) stepped on a landmine while working on a telephone line at the
Scientific Research Institute for National Defense.
[1] United Nations General
Assembly, Press Release GA/9505, 17 November 1998.
[2] ROK Foreign Ministry
statement, “Banning Antipersonnel Landmine: Republic of Korea’s
Security Situation Must Be Given Special Consideration,” undated but
1997.
[5] ICBL Statement to Oslo
Diplomatic Conference, “Say No to the US Demand for a Korea
Exception,” September 1997.
[6] Such statements from
several former commanders are contained in ICBL, “Report on Activities,
Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Antipersonnel
Landmines,” November 1997.
[7] Response to the National
Defense Committee of the National Assembly, 6 August 1996.
[8] ROK Ministry of National
Defense, Statement to National Assembly, October 1998.
[9] Ministry of National
Defense, response to Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines, 19 February 1999.
[10] Eddie Banks,
Brassey’s Essential Guide to Antipersonnel Landmines (London:
Brassey’s, 1997), p. 201; Jane’s Military Vehicles and Logistics
1993-94, p. 226.
[11] Ministry of National
Defense materials, September 1997.
[13] Data for exports prior
to 1969 is not available. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command
(USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached
statistical tables; U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military
Sales of Antipersonnel Mines FY 1983-1993, as of 11 August 1993.
[14] “Anti-Landmine
Crusader Williams Receives Cold Shoulder from Korea,” Korea Herald,
4 February 1998.
[15] Human Rights Watch and
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, “In Its Own Words: The U.S. Army
and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” July 1997.
[16] Yonhap (Seoul),
“Cost of Clearing DMZ Landmines,” 28 October 1999, citing Korean
lawmaker; Korea Herald, 3 October 1997, citing another lawmaker; Susan
Feeney, “Deadly Zone,” Dallas Morning News, 1997; MSNBC
internet news service, 25 August 1997; Hankyoreh daily newspaper, 27
August 1997.
[17] The Korea Campaign to
Ban Landmines was told by a former battalion commander that they laid ten of
thousands of landmines in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis.
[18] Jungang Daily News, 18
January 1999, claims U.S. troops have laid tens of thousands of mines around
important military installations. See also, Bae, Myong-Oh, National
Politics, Issue 56, March 1998.
[19] Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Statement, “Banning Antipersonnel Landmine,” 1997.
[20] U.S. Department of
State, “Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared
Landmines,” July 1993, p. 113.
[21] Xinhua, “Over 10
tons of Ammunition Lost in Rains,” 7 August 1998.
[22]"Air Force removing
thousands of landmines,” Korea Herald, 2 April 1999.
[25] Yonhap (Seoul),
“Cost of Clearing DMZ Landmines Estimated at $10 Billion,” 28
October 1998, citing Rep. Lim bok-jin.
[26] “Assistance in
Mine Clearance: Report of the Secretary-General,” U.N. General Assembly
A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29. According to the Korean Campaign to Ban
Landmines, another $75,000 was pledged in 1998.
[27] Statement by HE Mr. Lee
See-young, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United
Nations, at the Plenary Meeting of the 53rd Session of the UN General Assembly,
New York, 17 November 1998.
[29]Korea Herald, 3
October 1997, citing Defense Ministry report to the National Assembly, indicates
35 killed and 43 wounded since 1992, including 29 civilian victims. Another
source indicates the Defense Ministry acknowledges 36 casualties since 1992,
less than half civilians, Voice of America, Korea/Landmines, 3 March
1998. Another puts the total at 41 military and civilians killed and 46 injured
from 1992-September 1998, Yonhap (Seoul), 28 October 1998.
[30] The Korean Campaign has
details on the victims and the claims. See, Ministry of National Defense,
“The Present Condition of State Reparation,” 9 July 1998.