Key
developments since May 2001: Myanmar’s military has continued laying
landmines inside the country and along its borders with Thailand. As part of a
new plan to “fence the country,” the Coastal Region Command
Headquarters gave orders to its troops from Tenasserim division to lay mines
along the Thai-Burma border. Three rebel groups, not previously identified as
mine users, were discovered using landmines in 2002: Pao People’s
Liberation Front, All Burma Muslim Union and Wa National Army. Thirteen rebel
groups are now using mines.
MINE BAN POLICY
Myanmar’s ruling State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Myanmar abstained from
voting on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in
November 2001. SPDC delegates have not attended any of the annual meetings of
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty or the intersessional Standing Committee
meetings. Myanmar declined to attend the Regional Seminar of Stockpile
Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines and other Munitions, held in Malaysia in
August 2001. Myanmar did not respond to an invitation by the government of
Malaysia to an informal meeting, held on the side of the January 2002
intersessional meetings in Geneva, to discuss the issue of landmines within the
ASEAN context (other ASEAN non-signatories, such as Vietnam, did attend).
Myanmar was one of the two ASEAN countries that did not participate in the
seminar, “Landmines in Southeast Asia,” hosted by Thailand from
13–15 May 2002.
However, two observers from the Myanmar Ministry of Health attended the
Regional Workshop on Victim Assistance in the Framework of the Mine Ban Treaty,
held in Thailand from 6-8 November 2001, sponsored by Handicap International
(HI). One health officer attending the meeting acknowledged that if Myanmar
joined the mine ban it would be a good preventative health
measure.[2]
Nongovernmental Organizations
Nonviolence International’s (NI) Southeast
Asia office launched a Mine Ban Advocacy and Research Program focused on Burma
in 2000. This program has consistently sought to engage political authorities of
the government, the opposition National League of Democracy, and the numerous
armed non-state actors (NSAs) in Burma. NI has published the Landmine Monitor
report in the Burmese language every year since 1999 and distributed it both
within the country and along its border regions where the mine problem is
particularly severe. NI has developed a special kit to educate and encourage
unilateral cessation of mine use by the armed ethnic or political organizations
operating in Burma.
PRODUCTION, TRANSFER, STOCKPILING
Myanmar has been producing at least three types of
antipersonnel mines: MM1, MM2, and Claymore-type
mines.[3] The MM2 blast mine
reportedly will be fitted with a delay fuze, which activates the mine 30 minutes
after it has been laid.[4]
Myanmar is not known to have imported or exported any antipersonnel mines
during the reporting period. The Myanmar government will release no official
information about the types and quantities of antipersonnel mines it stockpiles.
As previously reported in Landmine Monitor, Myanmar has obtained and used
antipersonnel mines of Chinese, Israeli, Italian, Russian, United States, and
unidentified manufacture.[5]
Additionally, another mine found in significant quantities in Burma, and still
used by government forces, is the LTM-76 antipersonnel mine. Experts have told
Landmine Monitor that these are likely to be decades-old mines of
Indian-manufacture.[6] The
Indian Ministry of External Affairs denies any transfer of such mines in the
past, and states that there are no such mines in the current inventory of the
Indian Army.[7]
USE
Myanmar’s military force, the Tatmadaw, has
continued laying landmines inside the country and along its borders with
Thailand. As part of a new Tatmadaw plan to “fence the country,”
the Coastal Region Command Headquarters gave orders in April 2001 to its troops
from Tenasserim division to lay mines along the Thai-Burma border. According to
a government soldier, since the last week of April 2001, the following troops
are responsible for laying landmines: Infantry Battalion (IB) 273 for eastern Ye
Phyu township, IB 25 for eastern Tavoy township, IB 285 for eastern Thayetchaung
township, IB 103 for eastern Palaw township, IB 17 for eastern Tenasserim
township, IB 224 for eastern Bokepyin township, and IB 228 for eastern Kawthaung
township.[8]
Government troops laid mines in Pa-an and Dooplaya district in Karen
state.[9] In a joint operation
with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Tatmadaw laid mines as part
of offensive operations in Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) areas of Karen
State.[10] SPDC bases in
southern Shan State across the border from Chaing Rai have reportedly had their
perimeters mined.[11]
Previous Landmine Monitor reports documented use of mines by the Na Sa
Ka (Myanmar’s border security force) on the Bangladesh-Burma border, and
even inside Bangladesh. However, this practice may have abated or even ended in
the past year, according to a Bangladesh border security force (BDR) official
and a Burmese rebel leader. The BDR official said that the situation had
improved thanks to several meetings between the officials of the border security
forces of the two countries.[12]
A leader of an armed opposition group in Arakan, Burma, said, “The cause
behind Burma’s not planting new mines this year is the fact that Burma has
been facing international criticism for its mines activities. The Burmese
authority has also understood that we remove mines planted by them. It does not
mean that the whole border area is mine-free. We only de-mine our passage with
the help of our own experts with some mine-sweeping equipment. Another cause of
it may be that we had minimal activities within Burma this
year.”[13]
Nevertheless, in March 2002 there were several newspaper reports of mine use
by Na Sa Ka forces, and an armed opposition group leader told Landmine Monitor
that on 17 March 2002, Na Sa Ka men were seen carrying basketfuls of mines to
the no-man’s land and emplacing
them.[14]
NON-STATE ACTORS
Burma has a large number of armed political
organizations operating within its borders. According to one source, there are
38,700 men under arms from opposition groups or former opposition
groups.[15] Thirteen armed
rebel groups admit that they use antipersonnel mines. Some groups claim not to
use mines in offensive operations. In mid-2001 the Lahu National Organization
declared a no-mine-use policy and issued a command to its soldiers to neither
use nor acquire antipersonnel
mines.[16]
NSA-PRODUCTION, TRANSFER, STOCKPILING
Several armed militias are capable of building
blast and fragmentation mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Former DKBA combatants verified their involvement in producing handmade
mines, as well as receiving factory-made mines from the Burmese
Army.[17]
These same DKBA combatants also alleged that they purchased mines and
components from Thai businessmen who operate logging concessions in
DKBA-controlled areas close to
Myawaddy.[18] Even more
disturbing, another armed group leader claimed to have been approached in late
2001 by a local Thai military commander offering antipersonnel mines for
sale.[19] Thailand is a State
Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and sale or transfer of antipersonnel mines by a
Thai national is prohibited.
Several armed groups admit to having antipersonnel mine stockpiles, though
none will reveal quantities. Since the publication of Landmine Monitor
Report 2001 in September 2001, four more ethnic armed groups have been
discovered to maintain stockpiles: National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN); United Wa State Army (UWSA); Wa National Army (WNA); and All Burma
Muslim Union (ABMU),[20] as well
as a cluster of smaller organizations in southern Karen State who field a few
combatants under the banner of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB
Column).[21]
NSA-USE
At least thirteen ethnic and rebel armed groups
are believed to use antipersonnel mines. Three armed groups, not previously
identified as mine users, were discovered using landmines in 2002: Pao
People’s Liberation Front (PPLF); All Burma Muslim Union; and Wa National
Army. The DAB Column organizations have also admitted to use of antipersonnel
mines.[22]
Ten NSAs named in last year’s report have continued to use
antipersonnel mines: Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO); Chin National Army
(CNA); Shan State Army (SSA); United Wa State Army (UWSA); Karenni Army (KA);
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA);
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF); People’s Defence Forces
(PDF); and Myiek-Dawei United Front. One former mine user, God’s Army, is
now out of operation.
The Karen National Liberation Army is believed to maintain at least two
extensive minefields in the Pa-an district of Karen State; the KNLA states that
the mines are necessary to protect internally displaced Karen people (estimated
to be in the hundreds of thousands) from attacks by the Burmese
Army.[23] It appears that KNLA
use of mines may have increased during the reporting period. Mines in
Tenasserim division, according to the Karen Human Rights Group, regularly cause
casualties among government army
patrols.[24] The government
issued landmine warnings to alert its soldiers after suffering twenty-four
casualties in nineteen incidents from 19 February to 7 April
2001.[25]
Shan State Army reportedly mined areas around its bases straddling the border
between Thailand and Burma in those areas of Shan State that are adjacent to
Chaing Rai Province of
Thailand.[26]
A former second commander of a DKBA battalion estimated 1,000 mines had
passed through his hands to his soldiers during the previous six
years.[27] People in three
villages in Myawaddy township claimed to have heard detonations daily starting
October 2001, after the DKBA planted many hundreds of mines, in reprisal for an
ambush by the KNLA. By the following month, a villager and two Buddhist monks
had stepped on mines in separate incidents, in which one of the monks
died.[28]
The DKBA also controls a timber concession area by surrounding it with
antipersonnel mines. Thai businessmen obtain permission to cut the forest from
the DKBA, and the DKBA place mines to deter attacks upon their revenue base by
the rival KNU, while simultaneously preventing the businessmen from unilaterally
enlarging their concession
area.[29] A mine planted near
an abandoned sawmill in the DKBA-controlled area injured a 19-year-old Karen
girl while she was looking for bamboo shoots in May
2001.[30] She said she saw some
signs saying, “Don’t go further into the jungle,” but had
ignored them.
In Karenni State, some mines are allegedly laid in paddy fields, which
prevents villagers from farming crops and, instead, leads them to grow opium
which requires less space and which is taxed by the NSAs in the
area.[31] According to one
insurgent, mines are also laid near methamphetamine manufacturing factories in
southern Shan States at Namsan and Hsi Hseng, in order to prevent people from
going near the
factories.[32]
In April 2001, a woman and her daughter were reportedly killed by an
antipersonnel mine near a commercial mining concession in Mote Hso, Tavoy
province, while they were en route to
Thailand.[33]
LANDMINE PROBLEM
Nine out of fourteen states and divisions in Burma
are mine-affected, with a heavy concentration in eastern
Burma.[34] The Dawna mountain
range and Moi riverside close to the Thai-Burma border is reportedly heavily
mined.[35] Some mountains in
Karen State, formerly used as fire bases by the Karen National Liberation Army,
have been “no go” areas for over a decade due to severe mine
infestation.[36] Areas to the
north, east, and south of Papun and to the west, south, and north of Myawadi are
heavily mine-affected.[37]
Mines are laid close to areas of civilian activity by the Burmese Army,
allegedly to prevent people from returning to their native villages after a
forced eviction during counterinsurgency
campaigns.[38] Interview records
with mine survivors show more than 14 percent are injured within half a
kilometer from the center of a village. The same records reveal 63 percent of
civilian survivors had been to the area often before they stepped on
mines.[39]
Antipersonnel mines planted by both government forces and ethnic armed groups
injured and killed not only enemy combatants, but also their own troops,
civilians, and animals. Interviews with mine survivors reveal that more than 40
percent of the Karen National Liberation Army mine casualties were
self-inflicted (injury or death while laying, lifting, or stepping on their own
mines, or those of their
comrades).[40] A survey by
Handicap International reports six percent of all survivors interviewed for
their survey were laying or lifting mines at the time of
incident.[41]
No systematic marking of mined areas is done within Burma. In some cases,
mine victims witnessed some indicators, such as a dead body, cross-cut in a
tree, parts of mines and
wires,[42] or vague warnings
such as the sign seen by the victim quoted above. Although combatants have
repeatedly told Landmine Monitor researchers that they give “verbal
warnings” to civilians living near areas which they mine, no single
civilian mine survivor interviewed by Nonviolence International during the past
three years has ever mentioned or reported the issuance of verbal warnings.
MINE CLEARANCE AND MINE RISK EDUCATION
No humanitarian demining activities have been
implemented in Burma.[43] At
least one commercial mine clearance company is believed to have been in the
country for verification prior to the construction of the Yadana Gas Pipeline.
Mine clearance by the Burmese Army for some commercial ventures is believed to
have taken place. Some rebel groups and villagers remove mines with any
equipment available. In Karen State, a group of villagers carried out
clearance with a simple consumer quality metal detector and a
rake.[44] Several rebel groups
have mine detection
equipment.[45]
Although mine detection equipment of UK, French, South Korean, and domestic
manufacture is possessed by military engineers within the Burmese
Army,[46] some frontline troops
have allegedly been ordered to undertake clearance using sharpened bamboo probes
to seek and clear suspected mined
areas.[47]
Mine risk education is not currently available to ordinary people in Burma.
Handicap International has run a Mine Risk Education program in three refugee
camps in Thailand along the Burma border since June
2001.[48] The target audience
is Burmese refugees in Thailand. This program is financially supported by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
A workshop to educate some Myanmar government agencies about landmine risk
was organized under the auspices of the Human Rights Committee of Myanmar, which
operates within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The workshop took place in
Rangoon on 18-20 February 2002. The Mines Advisory Group provided the key
resource person and trainer for the workshop, which was attended by 40
representatives of the police, fire brigades and Myanmar Red Cross, and was
funded by AusAID (Australian
government).[49] The Mines
Advisory Group stated that the attendees were to further instruct communities in
mine-safe behavior[50]. Also in
February 2001, Asian Landmine Solution (ALS), a commercial demining company,
gave a technical briefing on humanitarian demining to three agencies operating
within the country: Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), Swiss Aid, and
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies.[51] However, the
government of Myanmar does not currently allow any international aid agency to
set up programs in mine affected areas.
Atrocity Demining
Burmese Army units operating in areas suspected of
mine contamination near the Thai border have repeatedly been accused of forcing
non-Burman ethnic local people, or anyone compelled to serve as a porter for the
military, to walk in front of the soldiers to detonate any mines. (See
Landmine Monitor Reports 1999-2001). According to a Burmese Army defector,
on 21 April 2001 in Tennaserim division, three prisoner porters, 22-year-old
Aung Hsan Nyunt, 26-year-old Maung Maung Than, and 20-year-old Ko Hsan, were
allegedly forced to walk in front of soldiers in suspected mined areas; they
were later killed during a firefight between the Burma Army and a guerrilla
group.[52] A March 2002 report
claims that in Papun and Nyanglebin Districts of Karen State civilians were
seized during counterinsurgency operations by the Burmese Army and used as human
minesweepers.[53] According to
the survey by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), more than seven percent of interviewed
refugees identified “forced to walk on minefields” as a source of
trauma.[54] Landmine Monitor
cannot verify these reports, but notes that the consistent behavior reported by
different sources over the past four years is extremely disturbing.
A newly reported practice demands those taken to porter for the military to
manually clear mines without adequate training or tools. A former porter who
escaped from Burmese Army service told the Landmine Monitor researcher that he
was forced to seek mines using a long sharpened bamboo prod, piercing the ground
and removing any found mines by
hand.[55] According to the
KNLA, in September 2001, during a joint military operation, SPDC and DKBA troops
seized forty villagers in Thaton district and forced them to work clearing
landmines in this
manner.[56]
LANDMINE CASUALTIES
Although landmine casualties appear to be
increasing, especially during the last five to six years, the total number of
landmine casualties in Burma remains unknown. Systematic collection of data
remains difficult, especially in relation to those who are killed rather than
injured in an incident.[57]
However, there were reports of new casualties in 2001: between 19 February and 7
April, 24 soldiers were killed or injured in landmine
incidents;[58] in April, a woman
and her daughter were killed by an antipersonnel mine in Tavoy
province;[59] in May, a
19-year-old Karen girl was injured by a mine planted near an abandoned sawmill
in the DKBA-controlled area;[60]
and in November, in separate incidents, a villager and two Buddhist monks
stepped on mines and one of the monks
died.[61]
According to the Thailand Landmine Impact Survey data, in two of the highest
mine-incident provinces adjacent to Burma, Burmese mine casualties increased
from 14 in the period June 1999 to May 2000, to 30 in the period June 2000 to
May 2001.[62] The casualty data
of Thailand’s Landmine Impact Survey includes many Burmese survivors
residing in Thailand.[63] Data
from the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency medical clinic
in Mae La refugee camp, on the Burma/Thai border, recorded 17 mine casualties
sent to Thai hospitals for surgery between June and December
2001.[64]
Handicap International conducted a mine casualties survey focused on mine
survivors in Tak Province, Thailand, including refugees living in three
camps.[65] It recorded 132
casualties between 1959 and 1995, nine casualties in 1996, 14 in 1997, 16 in
1998, 11 in 1999, 22 in 2000, and ten in the first two months of 2001. All but
one of the 214 landmine survivors interviewed were Burmese. Handicap
International revealed that in three of the largest refugee camps on the
Burma/Thai border covered in their survey, 10 percent of all disabled persons
were victims of landmines.[66]
The survey was funded by UNHCR.
A survey conducted by Nonviolence International (NI) reveals a similar
increase in mine casualties between 1996 and
2000.[67] Interviews of
landmine survivors now residing in Thailand and Bangladesh reveal that 40
percent were civilians at the time of incident. Survivors under 16 years
comprise six percent of all survivors interviewed, yet half of these were
conducting military activities at the time of the incident. Twelve child
soldiers were found from the interviews, which account for 11 percent of
military mine casualties in the
survey.[68] Data from an NSA
medical unit collected in three townships in Nyaunlaybin District, Karen State
also reveals an increase in mine casualties between 1996 and 2000; one casualty
was recorded in 1996 and twelve in
2000.[69] Landmine Monitor
research has found that the number of casualties within an NSA’s own
group, by their own mines, to be higher than what the NSAs sometimes publicly
admit.
All surveys reported that the majority of mine casualties are male (94
percent in NI survey, 95 percent in HI survey, 93 percent in the Landmine Impact
Survey, and 96.6 percent in IRC/CDC); and the majority were engaged in military
activities at the time of the incident (61 percent in NI, 61.5 percent in HI, 52
percent in Landmine Impact Survey, and 65 percent in
IRC/CDC).[70]
The pan-ethnic medical organization, Back Pack Health Worker Teams
(BPHWT),[71] conducted a survey
in several internally displaced communities in Karen State from January to June
2001. The survey used a cluster sampling method and covered 776 households. Of
those households in which a person above five years of age had died during the
previous year, five percent of deaths were reported to have been caused by
landmines.[72]
Limited information is available on landmine casualties in 2002. Handicap
International has established a reporting system with Thai border hospitals in
order to improve data collection on landmine casualties in Tak province. In the
period January to April 2002 nineteen new casualties were reported, including
two people killed and seventeen injured. Fourteen of the casualties were the
result of incidents on the Burma side of the
border.[73]
SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE
Availability of medical care depends on where the
incident occurred, with an average of 12 hours elapsing before first medical
attention, according to interviews by Nonviolence
International.[74] After the
emergency care, the survey by Handicap International showed that 77 percent of
landmine survivors were hospitalized in Thailand, while 23 percent were
hospitalized in Burma.[75] A
survey by NI shows similar results: 63 percent were hospitalized in Thailand, 27
percent in Burma, and 4 percent in
Bangladesh.[76]
Survivor assistance for Burmese mine casualties comes from three main
sources: assistance from the public health system; assistance available from
non-state sources; and assistance from neighboring states as many members of
mine-affected communities have fled the country to seek asylum, or are in rebel
controlled areas.
Survivor Assistance Within Myanmar
Survivor assistance continues to be marginal due
to the neglect and impoverished state of the medical system in
Myanmar.[77] A mine survivor who
received medical treatment in Myawaddy governmental hospital said it had cost
nearly 100,000 kyat (around US$105); being unable to pay, he sent sacks of rice
harvested from his farm
instead.[78] Military casualties
from within the Burmese Army are eligible to receive treatment in military
hospitals in Myanmar, although some have reported having to wait unless they pay
a bribe.[79]
Physical rehabilitation and prosthetics are available to landmine survivors
within Myanmar through the National Rehabilitation Centers (NRC), provided they
can travel to the workshops. The ICRC runs a joint program with the NRCs to
provide rehabilitation and prosthetic devices at five centers, two of which are
run by the Ministry of Defense and three by the Ministry of Health. There are
two centers in Rangoon, and one Mandalay, Maymyo, and
Yenanthar.[80] The Myanmar Red
Cross registers and refers amputees to the centers while the ICRC covers the
costs of transport, lodging, and food during the time needed for a fitting. The
ICRC organizes regular refresher courses for technicians, and has trained
orthopedic surgeons from Mandalay Hospital in basic prosthetics. The ICRC and
Myanmar Red Cross will open a new center for prosthetic production and
rehabilitation in Hpa-An, a capital of Karen State, later in
2002.[81] Prostheses are
provided for free through these hospitals, though in one case, a mine survivor
paid 50,000 Kyats (around US$53), while waiting for their prostheses for food
and accommodation fees, during a 20-day stay in the National Rehabilitation
Center, and additional transport costs for an attendant who helped the survivor
to travel.[82]
The ICRC is the only assistance organization directly involved in physical
rehabilitation programs with the government. Orthopedic devices produced with
ICRC assistance represent 80 percent of the total national production. In 2001,
the ICRC program provided 1,539 prostheses to mine survivors. This accounted
for 72 percent of total prosthetic/orthotic production in its joint programs
with the Ministries of Health and Defense. Of 14 ICRC Prosthetic/Orthotic
programs worldwide in 2001, Myanmar accounts for the third highest number of
mine survivors receiving prostheses, after Afghanistan and
Angola.[83]
NGOs provide some vocational training to disabled people in Myanmar. The
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan in Rangoon has been providing training in
tailoring and hair cutting since March 2000; over 150 people have received
training, of which about 20 percent are landmine
survivors.[84] A vocational
workshop for disabled people organized by Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC) was
held in Rangoon on 19-29 November 2001. All 45 participants were from Kayah
State, including at least two landmine survivors.
Survivor Assistance Within NSA Areas or Among the Internally Displaced
In areas close to its borders where ethnic-based
militias may control or access territory, some minimal care is provided by their
relief and medical arms.[85]
The BPHWT also provides some emergency care for casualties in NSA-controlled
areas of Mon, Karen, Karenni, and Shan
States.[86] The Trauma Care
Foundation runs three “jungle clinics” inside the country to provide
primary medical care.[87]
Available medical care remains poor to non-existent as it relies on mobile
medical staff being in the area at the time of need. Low numbers of medical
staff, rugged terrain, and the normal chaos and insecurity of civil war means
luck is a major factor in receiving trained medical care. International NGOs
active in refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border have not pursued provision of
cross-border medical care in NSA-controlled areas due to the presence of
landmines.[88]
The Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) maintains a
prosthetic workshop in a KNU-controlled area. Medical organizations such as
BPHWT refer mine survivors to CIDKP’s
workshop.[89] Through the
assistance of Maryknoll Thailand, a building for a vocational rehabilitation
program was built in Mae La Potah, in Karen ethnic area, but it was burned to
the ground by a military attack prior to
use.[90]
Survivor Assistance Available to Burmese Mine Survivors in Neighboring
States
In areas near its borders, the security situation
and poor internal facilities drive some Burmese to seek access to services in
neighboring states. The Mae Tao Clinic, which is located near the Thai-Burma
border, as well as Médecins Sans Frontières, the International
Rescue Committee, American Refugee Committee, Aide Medicale International, and
Malteser Germany, all provide emergency medical referral of war injury survivors
who arrive at their facilities in refugee camps to hospitals in
Thailand.[91] The cost of
medical treatment varies according to the extent of the injury, but on average
costs over 20,000 Baht (US$454) per
person.[92] The cost of
transportation alone prohibits some Burmese from seeking medical care in
Thailand. To go from mine-affected Pa-an district to Mae Sot, Thailand, a
distance of 40 kilometers, costs 5,000 Kyats (around US$5) each way, which is
more than two months wages for
farmers.[93] In some cases,
those who could not reach any medical attention try to treat themselves with
herbal leaves.[94]
Both Thai and international organizations continue to provide prosthetics for
refugees in Thailand. Handicap International operates four prosthetic workshops
in refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border. Vocational training is available
at two refugee camps, provided by the Karen Handicapped Welfare Association in
Mae La camp, and the Disabled People’s Rehabilitation Team in Nu Po camp;
both run candle making, sewing, and mechanics training for disabled people.
These local groups are financially supported by Handicap International. The Mae
Tao clinic also runs a sewing training program for the disabled. Three of the
instructors are landmine amputees.
Some Burmese migrants to Thailand who are landmine survivors cannot access
official assistance offered by international organizations if they are not
accepted into an organized refugee camp. Since April 2001, the Mae Tao Clinic in
Thailand, which specializes in assisting Burmese migrants, has operated a
prosthetics section. During 2001, it provided 28 free prostheses, 70 percent of
which were for landmine survivors; it also provided training in prosthetics for
six people from Burma’s ethnic minority areas. The prosthetic section was
funded by Clear Path International in
2001.[95] In the Sangkhlaburi
area close to the Thai-Burma border, a joint project by Nonviolence
International, Handicap International, the River Kwai Christian Hospital, and a
local organizer, provided 28 prostheses for illegal Burmese immigrants in 2001,
with funding from individuals in Belgium and Japan.
The International Rescue Committee in Mae Hong Son and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention conducted a mental health assessment in three
Karenni refugee camps in May-June 2001, focusing on the general camp population
and on landmine survivors. The results of the study showed that refugees injured
by landmines have high prevalence rates for non-specific psychological problems:
depression (59 percent) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (10
percent).[96] The IRC provides
a counseling service in the refugee camps; it is not known how many mine
survivors benefit from this
service.[97]
Less medical care is available on the Bangladesh-Burma border. In one case, a
Bangladeshi mine survivor from near the Burma border went through five clinics
and hospitals until he reached an NGO, Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for
Trauma Victims (BRTC), who provided him treatment at a private hospital in the
capital that had enough facilities and skill to treat mine
injuries.[98]
DISABILITY POLICY AND PRACTICE
No disability law exists in Myanmar. Landmine
Monitor was told that a disability policy exists, but no one could give details
of the content of the policy, even in institutions serving disabled persons.
There is an initiative by Disabled People International (DPI) Thailand for
improvement of the environment for persons with disabilities in Myanmar. DPI
organized a First National Leadership Seminar for People with Disabilities in
Rangoon from 20-22 February 2002, funded by the Japan Foundation. Acknowledging
the lack of a clear disability policy, either in existence or implementation,
DPI submitted a declaration from the seminar, encouraging the government to
establish and implement disability
laws.[99]
Two observers from the Ministry of Health attended the South East Asia
Regional Conference on Victim Assistance, held in Thailand from 6-8 November
2001, sponsored by Handicap International.
[1] The military junta now ruling the
country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups within the
country still prefer to use the name Burma. In this report, Myanmar is used when
referring to the policies and practices of the State Peace and Development
Council, and Burma is used
otherwise. [2] Their opinion was voiced
during an informal discussion with a Landmine Monitor researcher. The observers
were Dr. Tin Win Maung, a director of Medical Care at the Myanmar Ministry of
Health, and Dr. Ye Hlaing, a director of the Institute of Paramedical Sciences
in Mandalay. [3] For further details on
landmines of Myanmar manufacture, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000 and 2001.
Claymore mines have allegedly been used with victim activation/tripwire fuzing.
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
518-519. [4] Interview with the Free
Trade Union of Burma, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November
2001. [5] Landmine Monitor Report 2001,
p. 519. [6] One expert identified the
LTM-76 as Indian-manufactured because: “1. the colourings and markings
are identical to British munitions before 1975, which both India and Pakistan
used. 2. the ‘DI’ marking on the mine is also found on many India
munitions. This indicates the arsenal from which the weapon comes from--in this
case the Dum Dum Arsenal in India.”
[7] Fax to Landmine Monitor researcher
from Sheel Kant Sharma, Jt. Sec. (D&ISA), Indian Ministry of External
Affairs, 2 January 2002. [8]
Information provided to Landmine Monitor on a confidential basis by an SPDC
soldier, April 2001. This comprises all border townships in southern Burma,
which are adjacent to Ratchburi, Phetburi, Prachuapkirikhan, and Chumpon
Provinces of Thailand. [9] Interview
with an SPDC military engineer, July 2001. Also, telephone interview with a
foreign missionary, Bangkok, 13 February 2001; and, Statement of Karen Human
Rights Group’s at a monthly meeting of the Committee for Coordination of
Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand, Bangkok, 13 February
2001. [10] DKBA is a former section of
the Karen National Union, but split from the latter, operating at times in
alliance with, and with the support of, the Burmese Army since
1992. [11] Email correspondence with
humanitarian aid worker in the Shan community, who heard this from Burmese Shan
refugees interviewed arriving from Mong Yawn, 4 April
2002. [12] LM-Bangladesh interview with
Lt. Col. Reza Noor, Commanding Officer, Naikongchari BDR, Naikongchari BDR camp,
16 January 2002. [13] LM-Bangladesh
interview with a leader of an NSA of Arakan, Bangladesh-Burma border, 18 January
2002. [14] LM-Bangladesh interview with
leaders of the NSAs of Arakan and cross-border traders, Bangladesh-Burma border,
26 and 27 March 2002; Abdul Kuddus Rana, “Na Sa Ka has planted mines
along Myanmar border anew,” Prothom Aloo (The First Light), 25 March 2002,
p. 5; Bandarban reporter, “Na Sa Ka again planted landmines along
Bandarban border,” Ittefaque (Way of Events), 24 March 2002,
p.1. [15] International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001, (London: Oxford University
Press, 2001). Although some of these groups have verbal agreements to cease
armed hostility, a formal ceasefire has been signed with only one group. All
groups maintain their arms and no further actions on a peace accord are being
pursued. [16] Interview with U Aye
Maung, LNO General Secretary, Chaing Mai Province, 5 September
2001. [17] Interview with former
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army members, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November
2001. [18]
Ibid. [19] Interview with ethnic group
leader, Chaing Mai, Thailand, November
2001. [20] Interview with a rebel
officer, 5 September 2001; interview with a leader of an ethnic group, 6
September 2001. For information on NSAs involvement in landmine use, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp.
474-476. [21] The DAB Column is the
armed wing of political opposition organizations including the Democratic Party
for a New Society, the People’s Patriotic Party, and
others. [22] Interviews with the
leadership of various ethnic and rebel groups. These took place at locations in
Chaing Mai, Mae Hong Son, Mae Sariang, Mae Sot Kanchanaburi, and Sangkhlaburi,
Thailand between September and November
2001. [23] Interview with Karen Human
Rights Group member, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November
2001. [24] Karen Human Rights Group
(KHRG), “ A Strategy of Subjugation: The Situation in Ler Mu Lah township,
Tenasserim division,” December 2001, p.
3. [25] Interview with a SPDC military
officer, April 2001. [26] Email
correspondence with humanitarian aid worker in the Shan community, who heard
this from Burmese Shan refugees arriving from Mong Yawn, 4 April
2002. [27] Interview with former
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army members, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November
2001. [28] Email correspondence with
FTUB, 27 November 2001 and interview with FTUB members, Mae Sot, 28 November
2001. [29] Interview with ex-DKBA
commander, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November
2001. [30] Interview with Naw Mya Win,
Mae Tao Clinic, Thailand, 18 September
2001. [31] Interview with insurgent who
arrived directly from southwest Shan State, Mae Hong Son, Thailand, May
2001. [32] Ibid. At least three
civilians were reported to have been injured by mines in these
“off-limit” areas in 1998 and
1999. [33] Interview with insurgent who
arrived directly from southwest Shan State, Mae Hong Son, Thailand, May
2001. [34] Chin State, Kachin State,
Karen State, Karenni State, Mon State, Pegu division, Rakine State, Shan State,
and Tenasserium division. [35] Interview
with ex-DKBA commander, 30 November 2001. Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. [36] Interview with former ABSDF
commander, Chaing Mai, Thailand, 22 March 2002. He stated that these mountains
were former guerrilla bases, but were mined heavily when they were forced to
abandon them to prevent government forces from using
them. [37] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. This data has been collected through direct interviews with 192 landmine
victims from Burma by Nonviolence International between 1999-2002.
[38] Karen Human Rights Group,
“Fight, Hunger and Survival; Repression and Displacement in the Villages
of Papun and Nyaunglegin District,” October 2001, pp.
53-57. [39] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. [40]
Ibid. [41] Handicap International,
“Mine Casualties Survey Report Tak Province, Thailand,” August
2001. [42] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. [43] Some NSAs and the Tatmadaw
conduct military demining. In some cases, NSAs remove SPDC mines then re-deploy
them. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 522 for
detail. [44] Photographic evidence given
to Landmine Monitor during interview with the chief prosthetic technician of the
Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November
2001. [45] Photographic documentation
from various sources, all undated, showing NSAs involved in detection and
lifting operations with electronic
detectors. [46] Andrew Selth,
“Landmines in Burma: The Military Dimension,” Working Paper No. 352,
Australian National University Strategic & Defense Studies Center, Canberra,
November 2000, pp. 18- 19. [47]
Interview with an SPDC military officer, April
2001. [48] Handicap International,
“Mine Casualties Survey Report; Tak Province Thailand,” August
2001. [49] The workshop included The
Ottawa Convention, Humanitarian Mine Action, Descriptions of Mines and UXO,
International Safety Messages, Rescue and Warning Signs, Training Methods,
Working with Social Groups, Psycho-Social Affects of
Disability. [50] Email to Landmine
Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 22 July
2002. [51] Interview with organizations
that participated in the briefing, 27 February
2001. [52] Interview with Burmese Army
defector, 24 April 2001. [53] A Relief
Team (FBR), “Burma Reports: Burma Army Attacks on Villages and IDPs in
Northern Karen State,” March 2002, received by Landmine Monitor through
email on 23 May 2002. [54] International
Rescue Committee and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Mental
Health Assessment among Karenni Refugees in 3 Camps in Mae Hong Son,”
Thailand, August 2001. [55] Interview
with a former porter who served for SPDC military during February and March
2001. Interview was conducted on 21 April
2001. [56] Karen National Union Press
Release No 49/2001, 27 September 2001. Available at KNU website:
www.tawmeipa.org. [57] Handicap
International, “Mine Casualties Survey Report; Tak Province
Thailand,” August 2001; Nonviolence International, “Analysis of the
Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report, 2002; and reports from KNU
medical unit submitted to Landmine Monitor in November
2001. [58] Interview with a SPDC
military officer, April 2001. [59]
Interview with insurgent who arrived directly from southwest Shan State, Mae
Hong Son, Thailand, May 2001. [60]
Interview with Naw Mya Win, Mae Tao Clinic, Thailand, 18 September
2001. [61] Email correspondence with
FTUB, 27 November 2001 and interview with FTUB members, Mae Sot, 28 November
2001. [62] These figures, only for mine
victims from Burma, taken from Thailand’s Landmine Impact Survey data,
were extracted from the database at the Thailand Mine Action Center by Landmine
Monitor researchers. [63] For detail of
the Thailand Landmine Impact Survey, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p.
489. [64] Statistics on War Injuries
from MSF, provided to Landmine Monitor, 15 March 2002. In the same period in
2000, 16 mine casualties were transferred. Information was not available for the
full year as data for some months had been
lost. [65] Handicap International,
“Mine Casualties Survey Report; Tak Province Thailand,” August
2001. [66] Ibid., pp.
E5-6. [67] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. NI’s survey shows five casualties in 1996 and 23 in 2000. The
survey, started in 1999, is ongoing and includes data obtained from landmine
survivors as well as from mine-affected communities. NI has attempted to include
other agencies in the data collection process and is negotiating with
Myanmar’s Ministry of Health to develop a Mine Incident Surveillance
Database within the National Rehabilitation Hospitals. NI’s survey
received financial support from the Canadian government, Open Society Institute,
and the ICBL’s Landmine
Monitor. [68] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. [69] Report from a Karen medic,
received by Landmine Monitor in November
2001. [70] The figures from the Landmine
Impact Survey data were extracted from the database at the Thailand Mine Action
Center by the Landmine Monitor researchers. Statistics for mine casualties sent
for emergency surgery from the MSF border clinic for 2000-2001 are 97 percent
male, 3 percent female (MSF data was sent to Landmine Monitor 15 March 2002, but
is missing some months of 2001 due to data
loss). [71] Back Pack Health Worker Team
consists of 60 small groups who travel in ethnic-controlled areas of Burma with
medicines, food and tools for emergency care in
backpacks. [72] Backpack Health Worker
Team Program, Summary of Descriptive Analysis of Water, Sanitation and Mortality
Survey, January-June 2001. [73] Fax to
Landmine Monitor Thailand from Saowaluk Sae-Tang, Mine Risk Education Project
Manager, Handicap International, Mae Sot, 15 May
2002. [74] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. [75] Handicap International,
“Mine Casualties Survey Report; Tak Province Thailand,” August 2001,
pp. E12-13. [76] Nonviolence
International, “Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,”
Internal Report, 2002. [77] See also
Landmine Monitor Report 2001,
pp.524-526. [78] Interview with a
landmine survivor in Mae La Refugee Camp, 19 March 2002. He was hospitalized
from 20 March 2001 until the end of May
2001. [79] Interview with Dr. Cynthia
Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November
2001. [80] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation
Programmes, Annual Report 2001, ICRC, Geneva, 4 April
2002. [81] ICRC (Geneva), Special
Report, Mine Action 2001, July 2002, p.
25. [82] Interview with a landmine
survivor, Rangoon, November 2001. [83]
ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes, Annual Report 2001, ICRC, Geneva, 4
April 2002. [84] Email to Landmine
Monitor from Yukie Osa, AAR Japan, 19 June
2002. [85] Interviews with 54 landmine
survivors by Nonviolence International show that 26 percent of mine victims who
received medical care inside Burma went through either mobile clinics or ethnic
group’s frontline medical
team. [86] Some foreign missionary aid
groups also provide services. [87]
Landmine Monitor interview with a member of Trauma Care Foundation, 18 January
2002; Annual Report 2001 of Trauma Care Foundation. The Norwegian government
supports the foundation with its
activities. [88] Comment from an MSF
member at the Committee for Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in
Thailand, 13 March 2002. [89] Interview
with a coordinator of BPHWT, 18 March
2002. [90] Interview with Dr. Cynthia
Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 13 March
2002. [91] MSF referred 30 mine
casualties to Mae Sod hospital in Thailand from April 2001 to November 2001,
according to the MSF office in Mae Sod, 10 December
2001. [92] Email correspondence with MSF
office in Mae Sot, 22 March 2002. [93]
Interview with Dr. Cynthia Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand,
28 November 2001; Burma Fund, “Humanitarian Crisis, Aid and Governance of
Burma,” April 1999. [94]
Nonviolence International, “Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in
Burma”, Internal Report by Michiyo Kato,
2002. [95] Interview with Dr. Cynthia
Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 13 March
2002. [96] International Rescue
Committee and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Mental Health
Assessment among Karenni Refugees in 3 Camps in Mae Hong Son,” Thailand,
August 2001. The survey covers 58 landmine survivors in the three refugee
camps. [97] The IRC in Thailand,
http://www.theirc.org/where/index.cfm?locationID=42 (accessed 28 June
2002). [98] Interview with a landmine
survivor by Landmine Monitor Bangladesh researcher, January
2002. [99] The declaration, written in
Burmese, was submitted to the leaders of the Myanmar government and stated that
participants would “cordially welcome a law for the
disabled.”