Key developments since May 2003: Myanmar’s military and at
least 15 rebel groups have continued to use antipersonnel mines; there are some
indications of increased mine warfare. There were new reports of
“atrocity demining,” with civilians used as human minesweepers in
front of Army troops. Three armed opposition organizations with military
activities inside Burma have publicly forsworn use of antipersonnel mines by
signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment: the Arakan Rohingya National
Organization, the National United Party of Arakan, and the National Socialists
Council of Nagaland (based in India). There has been an expansion of mine risk
education activities in 2003 and 2004. Unlike in past years, in 2003 and 2004
Myanmar showed some interest in landmine-related events. United Nations
agencies became more engaged in landmine issues related to Myanmar in 2003 and
2004. In April 2004, the ICBL and Nonviolence International launched a new
campaign, “Halt Mine Use in Burma.”
Key developments since 1999: Government forces and armed ethnic
groups have used antipersonnel mines regularly and extensively throughout the
period. In 1999, Landmine Monitor identified ten rebel groups using landmines;
the number grew to 15 by 2004. Myanmar remains one of the few countries still
producing antipersonnel mines. There has been no humanitarian mine clearance
carried out. Government forces have been accused each year of using
“human minesweepers,” forcing civilians to walk in front of troops
to blow up mines. There is no systematic collection of information about mine
casualties, but there is evidence that Myanmar is among the countries with the
highest number of casualties each year. The ICRC resumed its joint physical
rehabilitation programs with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense,
and with the Myanmar Red Cross in June 1999. In 2002, a new physical
rehabilitation and prosthetic center was opened at Hpa-an in Karen State.
Mine Ban Policy
Myanmar’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has not
acceded to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[1] It did not
participate in any of the Ottawa process meetings, the treaty negotiations, or
the signing conference. After voting in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly
resolution calling on governments to pursue an international agreement banning
antipersonnel landmines, Myanmar has abstained from voting on every pro-Mine Ban
Treaty UN General Assembly resolution, including Resolution 58/53 in December
2003.
Myanmar did not attend any international or regional landmine meeting from
1996 to 2002. In 2003, Myanmar showed some interest in landmine-related events.
Representatives of the Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations in
Geneva met with a Landmine Monitor researcher and UN Mine Action Service staff
on the margins of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings
in February 2003.[2] A delegate
of the Myanmar Red Cross/Ministry of Home Affairs attended the seminar
“APMs: Are They Worth It?” held in Bangkok in August 2003, where the
delegate stated that the problem of insurgency was preventing Myanmar from
joining the Mine Ban Treaty.[3]
In September 2003, two representatives from the Myanmar Embassy to Thailand
attended the opening session of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty, the first time representatives of Myanmar officially observed any
Mine Ban Treaty event.[4] A
government representative was present at the Humanitarian Mine/UXO Clearance
Technology and Cooperation Workshop in Kunming, China on 26-28 April
2004.[5]
Speaking to the UN General Assembly on behalf of the ASEAN member states, the
Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations stated in October
2003, “We take note of the convening of the Fifth Meeting of States
Parties [to the Mine Ban Treaty] in Bangkok, Thailand...the first time the
meeting was held in Asia. We call upon the international community to provide
the necessary assistance to mine-affected countries to ensure their access to
material equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance and
increased humanitarian assistance for victims of
landmines.”[6]
However, the government remains difficult to approach, and repeated requests
by Landmine Monitor during the past three years for information from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Yangon have gone unanswered.
In January 2000, the pro-democracy Committee Representing the People’s
Parliament (CRPP) endorsed the mine ban as its policy, stating it will
“recommend to the People’s Parliament, as soon as it is convened, as
a matter of immediate national concern, accession to the [Mine Ban]
Convention.”[7]
The United Nations became more engaged in landmine issues related to Myanmar
in 2003 and 2004.UN agencies undertook an internal review in early
2003to examine possible ways to implement their mandate in relation to
the landmine crisis within the
country.[8] On 17 February
2003, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Rangoon hosted a briefing
session on the landmine crisis in Myanmar, with participation by Nobel Peace
Laureate Jody Williams and ICBL Coordinator Liz
Bernstein.[9] UNICEF appointed
in mid-2003an officer looking at issues affecting children in conflict,
and landmines are high on the
agenda.[10] In its April 2004
resolution, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged Myanmar to consider as a
matter of high priority becoming a party to the Mine Ban
Treaty.[11]
In April 2004, the ICBL launched a new campaign, “Halt Mine Use in
Burma,” which seeks to engage all relevant parties in the country in talks
to stop mine use out of humanitarian concern and as a first step toward a total
landmine ban. Nonviolence International’s (NI) Southeast Asia office has
translated and published the Landmine Monitor report in the Burmese language
every year since 1999 and distributed it both within the country and along its
border regions, where the mine problem is particularly severe. NI launched a
Mine Ban Advocacy, Research and Action Program focused on Burma in 2000, which
has consistently attempted to engage the ruling military authorities, the
opposition National League of Democracy, and the numerous armed non-state actors
(NSAs) within the country in dialogue and action on a landmine
ban.[12] After the
re-commencement of talks on cessation of hostilities between the SPDC and the
Karen National Union in December 2003, the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines
urged both sides to acknowledge the landmine problem and take action on it in
the context of any cessation of hostilities
agreement.[13]
Use
Myanmar’s military forces and armed ethnic groups have used landmines
extensively throughout the long-running civil
war.[14] Public health workers
in Loo Plei Township of Karen State told Landmine Monitor that 2002-2003 saw
more military activity and an increase in mine use compared to the 2000-2001
period.[15] In August 2003 the
Myanmar Army together with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) launched a
military operation dubbed “Power Over the Land” against the Karen
National Liberation Army (KNLA). During this military campaign large numbers of
landmines were laid by all sides. Myanmar Army units were ordered to lay
antipersonnel mines along infiltration routes used by the
KNLA.[16] Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
reported that as a result of the fighting they were treating more war wounded,
especially landmine
casualties.[17]
As detailed in previous editions of Landmine Monitor Report, both
Myanmar’s regular army forces (known as the Tatmadaw) and its special
western border force (known as Na Sa Ka) have used antipersonnel
mines.[18] They have used mines
for typical military purposes such as to protect their military camps and to
block infiltration routes, but have also used them frequently in civilian areas,
on roads and on footpaths. The Myanmar Army has allegedly planted mines near
villages in order to prevent people from returning after the army forcibly
evicted them during counterinsurgency
campaigns.[19] Some Karen
villages in Pa-an District had to move three times after each previous
settlement was burned and mined. In those areas, villagers were able to identify
six different types of mines that were frequently
used.[20]Villagers
living in Karenni state were advised by the SPDC that they had laid mines on
certain footpaths.[21]
In the Tenasserim Division, Myanmar’s military forces were reported to
have laid mines along the Thai-Burma border in 1999, 2000, and
2001.[22] In 2001, Thailand
accused Myanmar forces and the United Wa State Army of laying mines inside
Thailand.[23] Bangladesh
accused Myanmar forces of planting mines inside Bangladesh’s territory in
1999 and 2000.[24] Landmine
Monitor is not aware of any such allegations by Thailand or Bangladesh since
2001.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Myanmar produces the MM1, which is modeled after the Chinese Type 59
stake-mounted fragmentation mine, the MM2, which is similar to the Chinese Type
58 blast mine, and a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine. Landmines
are produced at the Myanmar Defense Products Industries No. 4 plant in Pyay
(Prome) in central Burma.[25]
The Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of Myanmar exporting
antipersonnel mines or components, although some were offered for sale to
Bangladesh in late 2003.[26]
Myanmar authorities have, in the past, stated that they had a policy of no
export,[27] but have not adopted
a formal moratorium or ban. Myanmar’s military forces have transferred
arms, including landmines, to the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army in the
past.[28]
The Myanmar government will release no official information about the types
and quantities of antipersonnel mines it stockpiles. As previously reported in
Landmine Monitor, Myanmar has obtained and used antipersonnel mines of Chinese,
Indian, Italian, Soviet, United States, and unidentified
manufacture.[29]
Non-State Actors Use
Burma has a large number of armed political organizations within its
borders.[30] In the past five
years, Landmine Monitor has identified 15 armed opposition groups that use
antipersonnel mines.[31] Among
them are the Shan State Army; Karenni Army; Karen National Liberation Army; All
Burma Students Democratic Front; People’s Defence Forces; Myiek-Dawei
United Front; Wa National Army; Pao People’s Liberation Front; Chin
National Army; All Burma Muslim Union, as well as a cluster of smaller
organizations in southern Karen State who field a few combatants under the
banner of the DAB Column.[32]
Other armed groups that use landmines, but currently have non-hostility pacts
with the ruling authorities, include the United Wa State Army and the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army.[33]
Another group with a non-hostility pact, the New Mon State Party, recommenced
mine warfare in 2002 during armed confrontation with a splinter faction, the
Hongsawatoi Restoration Party, which also used
mines.[34]
In addition to those 15 armed groups, there are allegations that the Kayin
New Land Party and the Karenni State Nationalities Peoples’ Liberation
Front have used mines within Karenni (Kayan) State, but Landmine Monitor has
been unable to verify the
information.[35]
In 2003, the most widespread use of mines by armed opposition groups was
likely by the Karen National Liberation Army. The KNLA laid large numbers of
landmines withdrawing from attacks by the Myanmar Army. One KNLA commander
said, “We retreated, but that does not mean we lost our land. This is
because we have used mines to defend ourselves. To come into our base means they
will have to face
danger.”[36]
In October 2003, National Democratic Front General Secretary Zing Cung told
Landmine Monitor that landmines were essential for their survival in the face of
army attacks on their
territory.[37]
None of the 15 armed groups known to have used mines have indicated that they
are willing to halt use. However, three armed organizations, all with military
activities inside Burma, have publicly forsworn use of antipersonnel mines by
signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment (DoC). All are on Burma’s
western frontier with Bangladesh or India. The National Socialists Council of
Nagaland, which claims to represent people straddling the India-Burma border,
signed the DoC on 21 October 2003. The Arakan Rohingya National Organization
(ARNO) and the National United Party of Arakan, which together make up the
Arakan Independence Alliance, the largest anti-junta military alliance on the
Bangladesh-Burma border, committed to the DoC on 5 December 2003. Upon signing,
ARNO’s president stated, “Many people have been killed or injured by
these mines, and the mined areas are not marked. Most victims have no access to
treatment or
assistance.”[38]
A member of the Karen National Union attended as an observer the
“Looking Back, Looking Forward Workshop on Engaging Non-State Actors in a
Landmine Ban” organized by the ICBL Non-State Actors Working Group and
Geneva Call in Bangkok, Thailand on 13 September 2003.
NSA-Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Several armed groups are capableof making a variety of antipersonnel
mines, including blast mines, fragmentation mines, and Claymore-type
mines.[39] In April 2004,
ethnic militiamen in Karen State showed Landmine Monitor a
“homemade” plastic mine with an anti-tilt mechanism to prevent
removal by the enemy. While some armed groups admit to having antipersonnel
mine stockpiles, or components for making antipersonnel mines, none will reveal
quantities. One NSA military commander revealed that his group had purchased
enough explosives from another NSA to make mines for another ten years at a cost
of 300 Thai Baht (US$7) per kilogram. He said it cost an average of $1 per mine
for explosive and other
components.[40]
At least several hundred landmines in NSA arsenals have come from lifting
SPDC-laid mines, or from SPDC stocks seized during
operations.[41] Other
factory-manufactured landmines have been obtained from the clandestine arms
market.
Former DKBA combatants confirmed DKBA involvement in producing handmade
mines, as well as receiving factory-made mines from the Myanmar Army. These same
DKBA combatants also alleged that they purchased mines and components from Thai
businessmen who operate logging concessions in DKBA-controlled areas close to
Myawaddy.[42]
In addition to the groups identified above as landmine users, there may be
others that have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. The Kachin Independence
Army is believed to still possess antipersonnel mines, although it is not known
to have used any since agreeing to a cessation of hostilities in 1993.
ARNO, the National United Party of Arakan, and the National Socialists
Council of Nagaland should reveal the number of mines in their stockpiles, if
any, in conformity with the Geneva Call Deed of
Commitment.[43] ARNO has
admitted possession of an antipersonnel mine stockpile.
Landmine Problem
Nine out of fourteen states and divisions in Burma are mine-affected, with a
heavy concentration in eastern Burma. Antipersonnel mines have been laid in
states bordering Thailand, and along much of the land border between Bangladesh
and Burma. A few scattered areas of the India/Burma border are also
landmine-polluted.
The Dawna mountain range and Moi riverside close to the Thai border is
reportedly heavily mined. Some mountains in Karen State, formerly used as
firebases by the KNLA, have been “no go” areas for over a decade due
to severe mine infestation. Areas to the north, east, and south of Papun and to
the west, south, and north of Myawadi are heavily mine-affected, as well as
areas in the Dooplaya District of Karen State bordering on Thailand. Mines were
laid in Mon State as fighting took place between two armed organizations within
the Mon community. Mines were laid around the Halochanee Refugee Camp near the
Thai border. Hillsides surrounding the Lawpita hydroelectric power station in
central Karenni state have been mined to secure it from attack by rebel groups.
The Yadana Mountain in central Karenni State has also been heavily mined by
rebel and Myanmar Army units, both of whom run gem mines on the
mountain.[44]
The Army has often laid mines close to areas of civilian activity. According
to interviews with civilian mine survivors over a number of years, more
than 14 percent were injured within half a kilometer from the center of a
village, and 63 percent had been to the area often before they stepped on a
mine.[45] An NGO worker who
visited villages in Hpa-an district with public health officials in 2004stated that there were mined areas within a five-minute walk of all villages
visited.[46]
A mission from the Myanmar Ministry of Home Affairs sent in late 2003 to
inspect sites proposed for border area development by Thailand’s Prime
Minister reported that the area was devastated by landmines and extensive mine
clearance would need to take place prior to any development of the
area.[47] Thai contractors who
were hired to work on a controversial dam on the Salaween river opposite Mae
Hong Son province of Thailand have reportedly not been able to move their
equipment across the border due to mine infestation of the
area.[48]
In a 2002 research project in Pa-an District of Karen State, 30 heads of
households were interviewed about the location of dangerous mined areas. Only
five of them, all male, said that they knew the dangerous areas, even though the
entire village regularly entered mined areas for foraging and
farming.[49]
Neither the government nor non-state actors conduct systematic marking of
mined areas. There are some isolated examples. In early 2004, a traveler on the
road from Hpa-an to Myawaddy reported seeing signs posted on a minefield. The
signs were on both sides of the road and simply said “Mines,” in
Burmese. One area in Tongoo District that was mined by the Army was posted with
a red and white hand-painted sign by the local military
personnel.[50] Although
combatants have repeatedly told Landmine Monitor researchers that they give
“verbal warnings” to civilians living near areas which they mine, no
civilian mine survivor interviewed by Nonviolence International mentioned or
reported the issuance of verbal
warnings.[51]
Mine Clearance and Mine Risk Education
No humanitarian demining activities have been carried out in
Burma.[52] Some rebel groups
and villagers remove mines with any equipment available. In Karen State,
a group of villagers carried out clearance with a simple consumer-quality
metal detector, a rake, machetes, and by
hand.[53] Several rebel groups
have mine detection
equipment.[54] An evangelical
Christian aid organization runs a training course on “render safe”
procedures and mine removal in Karen
State.[55]
Although mine risk education (MRE) is rarely available to ordinary people in
Burma, there has been an expansion of MRE activities in 2003 and 2004. In
February 2004, the International Committee of the Red Cross made an assessment
to determine whether to begin an MRE program. UNICEF held an internal meeting
in October 2003to discuss the possibility of launching an MRE program
within the country, but has made no determination on when or how to do so.
The Myanmar Red Cross and UK-based Mines Advisory Group reproduced in
mid-2003 a series of MRE posters used in Cambodia, and under the auspices of the
Ministry of Home Affairs held a mine risk reduction workshop in Moulemein, Mon
State, in June 2003 for 40 participants, including teachers, midwives, nurses,
teachers, religious students and members of the police force. MAG held two
previous workshops in Rangoon in 2003 and
2002.[56]
Since 2002,Nonviolence International has been running an advanced
mine risk education program to train MRE trainers in Karen State. In 2003, 60
public health medics were trained, and they have begun to undertake mine risk
education in mine-affected villages in Dooplaya and Hpa-an Districts of the
state.[57] NI found that that
80 percent of trainees felt threatened by landmines in their daily lives and 53
percent had accidentally entered mine
areas.[58]
In late November 2003, 5,500 Burmese refugees living in refugee camps in
Thailand participated in events for a “No Mine Day” promoted by
Handicap International.[59]
Another 1,400 participated in the “100,000 Hands Against Landmines”
events prior to the September 2003 Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine
Ban Treaty in Bangkok.
Handicap International has run a mine risk education program in three refugee
camps in Thailand along the Burma border since June 2001. The target audience
is Burmese refugees in Thailand.
Atrocity Demining
SPDC military units operating in areas suspected of mine contamination have
repeatedly been accused of compelling non-combatant civilians to serve as
porters for the military, and to walk in front of patrols to detonate landmines
which may lay on the road or path (see Landmine Monitor Reports
1999-2003). People who are forced to do this activity are seized in rural
areas from their paddy fields, or in urban areas from tea shops and markets;
others are taken from the prisons.
In mid-2003, a community leader witnessed people dragging a tree trunk by
ropes ahead of a unit of Army soldiers in order to detonate landmines on a path
outside Papun town in northern Karen
State.[60] During a major
offensive launched by the Army against the Karen National Liberation Army in
August 2003, an increasing number of people fleeing forced portering and forced
minesweeping entered Thailand. A prisoner taken for military portering stated,
“On our trip from Mae Pleh to the Burmese Army base I saw many dead
porters from stepping on landmines. This scared me and I did not want to end
like this.”[61] He fled
in the night after being told he would be made to clear landmines the following
day. Other porters who fled from the same military operation tell of numerous
casualties both in the military and among the porters. Photographs of people
killed by landmines, allegedly while portering, have also been delivered to
Landmine Monitor.
In an interview broadcast by BBC radio in September 2003, a man told his
story of being forced to walk in front of Army units and being left for dead
after he detonated a landmine. Cattle traders found him and smuggled him to
Thailand, where he received treatment for his
injury.[62] In the October 2003
military assault by the Army on the KNLA’s 7th Brigade
Headquarters, 300 prisoners were forced to serve as porters and human
minesweepers, according to some who later escaped and fled to Thailand. They
said at least three of the porters died from landmine blasts during the
assault.[63] Villagers in
northern Karen State reported that the military used villagers to sweep for
mines rather than equipment because this would deter the rebels from laying
them.[64]
According to a survey in Burmese refugee camps conducted by a humanitarian
aid organization, more than seven percent of interviewed refugees identified
being “forced to walk on minefields” as a source of trauma in their
lives in Burma.[65] Another
survey among the same refugee population by Danish doctors in 1998 and 1999
received numerous reports of human
minesweeping.[66] Forced labor
to clear mines in Burma was also documented in a report issued by the
International Labor
Organization.[67]
Landmine casualties appear to be increasing, especially during the last five
to six years; however, systematic collection of data remains difficult,
especially in relation to those killed rather than injured in an incident. Most
of the areas in which landmines have been laid extensively are still
experiencing armed conflict.
The total number of landmine casualties in Burma remains unknown. A senior
medic working for the Karen National Union stated that according to KNU records
the number of people killed or injured by mines, including combatants and
civilians, is in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 per
year.[69] A Burmese medical
doctor stated that the national landmine casualty rate at the height of the
internal war in the mid-1970s was 4,000 per
year.[70] Using disparate data
sources in 2000, Landmine Monitor researchers estimated a landmine casualty rate
of 1,500 people per year.[71] A
1994 report by the US State Department provided a similar
estimate.[72] This would
indicate that the number of new mine casualties in Burma each year has remained
at a very high level for a decade or longer, and that each year Burma suffers
among the highest number of mine casualties of any country in the world.
Limited data, mostly on mine casualties assisted by NGOs or in refugee camps
or hospitals on the Thai-Burma border, give an indication of the scope of the
problem. In January 2003, six people traveling in Karen state in the township
of Bu Tho were injured when a mine hung in a tree
exploded;[73]and in May,
four people were killed and eight injured, including two porters and ten
soldiers, when four mines exploded during an alleged mine-laying operation in
southeastern Burma.[74] In
November, two Shan people were killed and four others injured after stepping on
a landmine in Thon District of Shan
State.[75] Since 2001,
Médecins Sans Frontières has treated or transferred for treatment
at least 107 landmine casualties from the Mae La refugee camp on the Burma-Thai
border: 51 war-injured (86 percent mine-injured) in 2003; 47 in 2002; and at
least 17 in 2001.[76] Since
2000, the Mae Sot Hospital in Tak province has admitted at least 316 Burmese
landmine casualties: 63 in
2003;[77] 103 in 2002; 84 in
2001; and 66 in 2000.[78] Since
2002, the ICRC War Wounded Program assisted around 70 mine casualties, including
about 55 in 2003 and 15 in
2002.[79]
According to three surveys completed in recent years, the majority of mine
casualties are male (94 percent in NI survey, 95 percent in HI survey, and 96.6
percent in IRC/CDC), and the majority are engaged in military activities at the
time of the incident (61 percent in NI, 61.5 percent in HI, and 65 percent in
IRC/CDC).[80] Civilian
casualties mostly occur while engaged in normal daily activities, such as
collecting food in the forest, cutting and collecting firewood, and traveling to
another place.[81] The majority
of mine incidents, 80 percent, occur during the dry season, when it is easier to
move or travel.[82]
Landmine Monitor has interviewed ten Army landmine survivors within Burma;
seven were aged between 15 and 17 years at the time of the incident, and all but
one remain in the Army.[83]
Military medics have stressed the importance of quickly reaching
landmine-injured soldiers so that they do not kill themselves after being
injured by a landmine.[84]
Domestic and wild animals, including buffalo, tigers, wild pigs and dogs,
also fall victim to landmines. A bull elephant died from its injuries after
stepping on an antipersonnel landmine in Shan State in late
2003.[85] One village in Loo
Plei Twp in Karen State reportedly lost up to 20 cattle in 2003 alone in
landmine incidents.[86] At
least 26 elephants have reportedly been killed by landmines along the
Bangladesh-Burma border,[87] and
up to 90 are believed to have been killed or injured along Burma’s border
with Thailand. The Friends of the Asian Elephant Hospital in Thailand has
treated nine survivors but they believe that many more die each year. All
mine-injured elephants were involved in logging in
Burma.[88]
Casualties from unexploded ordnance (UXO) were reported to Landmine Monitor
for the first time in 2003. Several children died when an unexploded rifle
grenade found in a field detonated, and a villager and child died after
tampering with an unexploded mortar shell. During MRE training in Karen State,
40 percent of public health medic trainees reported knowing of someone killed or
injured by UXO.[89]
Survivor assistance continues to be marginal due to the neglect of the
medical system by the military
rulers.[91] According to limited
interviews with landmine survivors within Burma, military survivors receive
better treatment than civilians and are more likely to have post-injury
employment opportunities.
Availability of medical care depends on where the mine incident occurs, with
an average of 12 hours elapsing before first medical attention. After emergency
care, the majority of known landmine survivors are hospitalized in
Thailand.[92] Survivor
assistance for Burmese mine casualties comes from several sources: the public
health system; assistance available from non-state sources; assistance available
in non-SPDC controlled areas; and assistance available in neighboring states. In
areas near its borders, the security situation and poor internal facilities
drive some Burmese to seek medical services in neighboring states. The Mae Tao
Clinic, which is located near the Thai-Burma border, as well as Médecins
Sans Frontières, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), American
Refugee Committee (ARC), Aide Medicale International (AMI), and Malteser Germany
(MHD), all provide emergency referral in Thailand for war-injured arriving at
their refugee camp
facilities.[93]
In 2002 and 2003, the ICRC supported local health care centers in the areas
affected by fighting to improve the quality of care available to the sick and
war-wounded, including mine casualties. Seven hospitals were rehabilitated in
Karen, Mon and Shan states, and a health care center was rebuilt in Mong Pu On.
The ICRC also covered the cost of treatment for war-wounded in Burma and
Thailand.[94] In 2003, of the
76 war-wounded were treated either in Burma or in Thailand, 70 percent were
injured by mines; 20 people were treated in 2002, including 15 mine
survivors.[95]
Physical rehabilitation and prosthetics are available to landmine survivors
through the National Rehabilitation Centers (NRC). The ICRC resumed its joint
programs with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense and with the
Myanmar Red Cross in June 1999. There are two prosthetics workshops in Rangoon,
one in Mandalay, Pyinoolwin, Yenanthar, and Hpa-an. The Hpa-an center in Karen
State was set up jointly by the ICRC and the Myanmar Red Cross in 2002. Many of
the amputees attending the new center had been without prosthetic services for
more than ten years; 73 percent were mine survivors. In 2003, the Outreach
Prosthetic Program referred 724 amputees from remote and border areas to
prosthetic centers. Prostheses are provided free-of-charge. The ICRC also
provides on-going training for technicians and physiotherapists. Two
technicians, supported by the ICRC, from the MoH and Defense Medical Services,
returned in October 2003 after the completion of three years training at the
Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics; six other students are currently
enrolled with two expected to graduate and return at the end of 2004.
The ICRC is the only assistance organization directly involved in physical
rehabilitation programs with the government. Since 1999, the ICRC-supported
centers produced 7,138 prostheses (4,682 for mine survivors), and 2,972
crutches; 2,177 prostheses (1,527 for mine survivors) and 1,922 crutches were
produced in 2003. Compared globally, Myanmar ranks second to Afghanistan in the
number of artificial limbs the ICRC provides for mine
survivors.[96]
From 17-23 January 2004, the Prosthetics Foundation of Thailand held a
prosthetics workshop at the border town of Tachilek in Shan State, Burma. The
workshop fitted 300 prostheses to 184 war-injured; the majority of amputees were
mine survivors.[97]
NGOs provide some vocational training to persons with disabilities in
Myanmar. The Association for Aid and Relief, Japan in Rangoon has been providing
vocational training in tailoring and hairstyling since March 2000; over 291
people have graduated, including 48 landmine
survivors.[98] The Myanmar
Council of Churches (MCC) regularly conducts vocational training programs for
persons with disabilities in different States and Divisions in Myanmar, and some
trainees are mine survivors.
In areas close to its borders where ethnic-based militias may control or
access territory, some initial care is provided by the relief and medical
sections of ethnic organizations. A study of first care by Nonviolence
International revealed that seven percent of both civilian and military mine
survivors received care from civil health services operated by the ethnic
organization in control of the
area.[99] The Back Pack Health
Worker Teams (BPHWT) run independent medical missions into NSA-controlled areas
of Mon, Karen, Karenni, and Shan States, as do some other private organizations,
to provide public health education and emergency care, including amputation
surgery for mine
casualties.[100]
The Trauma Care Foundation Burma (TCFB) has established a “chain of
survival” network within sections of Burma not controlled by or accessible
to the SPDC to improve pre-hospital survival for war-injured. Since 2001, at
least 774 people completed the three-day Village First Helpers (VFH) training
course. In 2002, the TCFB reported that 52 percent of all cases of war injuries
registered by medical services in ethnic controlled areas were first treated by
VFH graduates, up from 15 percent in 2001. The TCFB also runs a Basic Life
Support Training Program and an Advanced Life Support Training Program for
medics operating in conflict areas. Since 2001, at least 397 medics completed
the basic course and 41 completed the advanced course that enables them to teach
the VFH and Basic
techniques.[101]
Available medical care remains unpredictable as it relies on mobile medical
teams being in the area at the time of need. Trained medical care is difficult
to obtain in the rugged terrain, amid the chaos and insecurity of civil war.
International NGOs active in refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border have
reportedly not engaged in cross-border medical care in NSA-controlled areas due
to the presence of
landmines.[102]
The Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) maintains a
prosthetic workshop in the Kho Kay area of Karen State. Medical organizations
such as BPHWT sometimes refer mine survivors to CIDKP’s workshop.
Disability Policy and Practice
No disability law exists in Myanmar, and while Landmine Monitor was told that
a disability policy exists, no one could give details of the content of the
policy, even institutions serving persons with disabilities. In February 2002,
Disabled People International (DPI) Thailand organized the First National
Leadership Seminar for People with Disabilities in Rangoon. Acknowledging the
lack of a clear disability policy, either in existence or implementation, DPI
submitted a declaration from the seminar, encouraging the government to
establish and implement disability
laws.[103] Questions to the
Myanmar authorities as to whether there has been any follow-up on these
recommendations remain unanswered.
[1] The military junta now ruling the
country changed its name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups within the
country still prefer to use the name Burma. In this report, Myanmar is used when
referring to the policies and practices of the State Peace and Development
Council, and Burma is used
otherwise. [2] Myanmar did not
participate in the intersessional meetings itself. Counsellor Daw Aye Aye Mu
said she saw no obstacle to Myanmar’s participation in Standing Committee
meetings, but no representatives attended the May 2003, February 2004, or June
2004 sessions. [3] The seminar for
civil society, media and academics was an initiative of the Asian Disaster
Preparedness Center in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Royal Thai Government and the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines leading up to
the Fifth Meeting of States
Parties. [4] Second Secretary Moe
Naing Aung and Counsellor U Hla Pe Tan attended the formal opening of the
meeting, and one further afternoon session, but told Landmine Monitor they had
“no instructions” from the capital regarding their
participation. [5] U Thet Win of the
Consulate General of Myanmar in Kunming attended the meeting, but made no public
interventions. [6] Statement by U Mya
Than, Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations in Geneva, on
behalf of the ASEAN member states, to the First Committee, UN General Assembly,
New York, 14 October 2003. [7]
Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines Press Release, 1 March 2000. None of the
candidates elected in the 1990 elections have been allowed to take their seats
in Parliament. In 1998, representatives of the major elected parties formed the
Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP) to attempt to carry
out their legal mandate. [8] Interview
with the United Nations Resident Representative, Rangoon, November
2003. [9] See Landmine Monitor Report
2003, p. 563. [10] Since mid-2003,
this officer at UNICEF’s SE Asia and the Pacific Regional Office has
organized consultations between UNICEF and other partners on the landmine
situation in Burma, and assessments of the need for mine risk education programs
have taken place. [11] United Nations
Economic and Social Council, “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,”
E/CN.4/2004/L.34, 9 April 2004. [12]
See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
624-625. [13] The press release called
for both parties to clearly and unambiguously mark their minefields on the date
of the commencement of a ceasefire, refrain from laying mines, and seek the
assistance of United Nations agencies to develop and implement mine action. TCBL
Press Release, Bangkok, 1 March
2004. [14] Based on a mission in March
2003, the UN Commission for Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Myanmar concluded
that “all parties to the conflict used landmines.” Interim report
of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of
human rights in Myanmar, to the United Nations General Assembly, 5 August 2003,
A/58/219, point 61. [15] Landmine
Monitor discussions with public health workers trained in Mine Risk Education at
a Nonviolence International training program, Mae Sot, Thailand, 3 October
2003. [16] Information provided by
Myanmar military officers, September and October
2003. [17] Oral reports by MSF and
ICRC representatives at the Coordinating Committee Serving Displaced Persons in
Thailand (CCSDPT) meetings attended by Landmine Monitor researchers, Bangkok, 10
September and 8 October 2003. The CCSDPT is the NGO coordination organization
for humanitarian relief efforts aiding refugees on the Burma-Thai border.
[18] Previous editions of Landmine
Monitor Report have identified the units responsible and the locations of most
significant use. [19] Karen Human
Rights Group, “Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts: The SPDC’s Dry
Season Offensive Operations,” 5 April 2002, pp.
1-3. [20] Chutimas Suksai,
“Participatory Research on Sources of Insecurity in Gho Kay village, Karen
Liberated Area, Burma, 2002.” Research was conducted in late 2002 for the
Small Arms Survey (Geneva) and Nonviolence International. The six were described
by the villages as 1) Round, tubular, landmines manufactured by China; 2)
Plastic landmines which can remain active for three years; 3) Tubular landmine
manufacture in Russia; 4) Round landmines manufactured in China, 5) Claymore
mines; and 6) traps hidden in hay and rice stacks which explode when
disturbed. [21] Military order
published on 17 March 2002 by the Strategic Operations Command Group, Southern
Command HQ. Copy provided by Karen Human Rights Group to Landmine
Monitor. [22] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2000, p. 470, and Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 625. Military units
responsible for the antipersonnel mines laid in 2001 were also
identified. [23] Interviews with
officials at the Thai Foreign Ministry; Wassana Nanuam, “Wa took the hill
to protect drug plants,” Bangkok Post, 12 May
2001. [24] See Landmine Monitor Report
2001, p. 433. [25] Claymore mines have
allegedly been used with victim activation/tripwire fuzing. The Type 59 copy has
been modified with a weather cap. [26]
“Dhaka, Yangon eye defence pairing,” The Daily Star, Dhaka, 21
September 2003. A twelve-member Burmese military delegation visited Bangladesh
in September 2003. The delegation was headed by Lt. Gen. Aung Hwe from the
Defense Ministry in Rangoon. [27]
Myanmar’s UN Representative U Mya Than stated, “Myanmar is
supportive of banning exports, transfers and indiscriminate use of APLs,”
Explanation of Vote on Anti-Personnel Mines, undated document, 52nd UN General
Assembly, 1996. Also see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p.
469. [28] Interview with former DKBA
commander, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November 2001. Transfers by the SPDC to
the DKBA appear to have ceased in
2000. [29] “Myanmar’s
Forgotten Minefields,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 10,
October 2000; “Landmines in Burma: The Military Dimension,” Working
Paper No 352, Australian National University Strategic & Defense Studies
Centre, November 2000. The mines include: Chinese Types-58, -59, -69, -72A;
Russian POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMN, PMD-6; US M-14, M-16A1, M-18, Indian/British
LTM-73, LTM-76. [30] According to one
source, there are more than 45,000 men under arms in ethnic and rebel groups.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2003-2004
(London: Oxford University Press), p. 166. Although some of these groups have
verbal agreements to cease armed hostility, a formal ceasefire has been signed
with only one group. All groups maintain their arms and no further actions on a
peace accord are being pursued. [31]
Most of these groups acknowledged using antipersonnel landmines in interviews
conducted by Landmine Monitor in Thailand, Bangladesh, India, and Burma between
1999 and 2004. Landmine Monitor has confirmed use through interviews with
refugees, migrants, humanitarian aid workers and religious and medical
personnel. [32] The DAB column is an
armed wing for political opposition organizations involved in the Democratic
Alliance of Burma, including the Democratic Party for a New Society, the
People’s Patriotic Party, and others.
[33] About a dozen armed
organizations have agreed, verbally, to cease hostility with the SPDC. Although
frequently referred to as “ceasefire” groups, none has signed a
ceasefire leading to a negotiated settlement. All maintain their arms, including
their antipersonnel landmines, which are sometimes used for internal clashes, or
for other purposes. [34] Possession or
use of mines by the groups listed above was determined during interviews by the
Landmine Monitor with the leadership of various ethnic and rebel groups. These
meetings took place at locations in Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son, Mae Sariang, Mae
Sot Kanchanaburi, and Sangkhlaburi, Thailand, between 2001 and
2003. [35] The Landmine Monitor has
received several reports from people within Karenni State claiming unspecified
armed groups were laying landmines, and the mines were laid in the areas under
activity of these two organizations. Additionally, the Rohingya Solidarity
Organization has been removed from Landmine Monitor’s list of NSAs using
mines in Burma, as it appears to be operating only within
Bangladesh. [36] Remarks of KNLA Lt.
Col. Phaw Doh, broadcast on DVB Radio, 24 October
2003. [37] Interview with General
Secretary Zing Cung, 3 October 2003. Formed in 1976, the NDF is a military
alliance comprised of nine anti-Rangoon armed ethnic political
organizations. [38] See Geneva Call
press releases: “National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Nagaland), the
largest armed group in the India sub-continent, commits to no use of
anti-personnel mines,” 17 October 2003; “Burmese rebel groups commit
to ban antipersonnel (AP) mine,” 5 December 2003. Available at www.genevacall.org
. [39] During an assessment mission
for Nonviolence International’s Mine Risk Education program in April 2004,
N.I. was shown a stockpile of NSA-manufactured Claymore mines, a plastic mine
with an anti-handling device, and a variety of Improvised Explosive Devices.
Nonviolence International report (internal), April
2004. [40] Interview with indigenous
military commander, April 2001. [41]
Estimate from photographic evidence of mines in the possession of different
NSAs, taken by Landmine Monitor researchers on different occasions over the past
three years. [42] Interview with
former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army members, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30
November 2001. [43] In mid-2004,
Geneva Call was in the process of distributing a stockpile verification form to
NSAs that had signed the Deed of Commitment. Once received, the NSA is
requested to reveal its stockpile quantities in 90 days’
time. [44] See Landmine Monitor Report
2003, pp. 565-566, for more details and for sources of information regarding
mined areas. [45] Nonviolence
International, “Impact of Landmines in Burma 2002,” Bangkok,
September 2002. [46] Interview with
NGO worker, 20 April 2004. The NGO worker showed Landmine Monitor researchers
photographs of the minefields. [47]
Report related verbally to Landmine Monitor on 17 March 2004 on the outcome of
the mission by members of Ministry of Home Affairs to a border area just north
of Myawaddy in Karen State. [48]
Oral intervention at CCSDPT meeting, Bangkok, October
2003. [49] Chutimas Suksai,
“Participatory Research on Sources of Insecurity in Gho Kay village, Karen
Liberated Area, Burma, 2002.” Research was conducted in late 2002 for the
Small Arms Survey (Geneva) and Nonviolence
International. [50] Interview with
Karen Human Rights Group, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001. Also, Landmine
Monitor has a photograph of a sign posted on a tree in Toungoo District near
Kler Lah (Bawgali Gyi) village, that (in Burmese) warns: “Do not cut the
trees. There are
landmines.” [51] Nonviolence
International, “Impact of Landmines in Burma 2002,” Bangkok,
September 2002. [52] Some NSAs and the
Tatmadaw conduct military demining. In some cases, NSAs remove SPDC mines and
then re-deploy them. [53] Photographic
evidence given to Landmine Monitor during interview with the chief prosthetic
technician of the Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001. In
another case, villagers in Nyaung Lay Bin district of Karen State returned to
their homes after fleeing an offensive to find it mined. They removed over 100
mines themselves, and then re-laid the mines close to a military base. Email
from a human rights worker, 22 February
2001. [54] Photographic documentation
from various sources, all undated, showing NSAs involved in detection and
lifting operations with electronic
detectors. [55] Video documentation of
the activities of the Free Burma Rangers provided to Landmine Monitor in early
2004. [56] Email from Tim Carstairs,
Policy Director, MAG, 4 October
2004. [57] Public health medics with
the Backpack Health Worker Program, in the Karen Health and Welfare Department,
and in some other ethnic health groups, were trained in techniques to
disseminate mine risk messages and find their way out of a minefield or remove
mine victims from a suspected mined area. Information provided by Nonviolence
International to Landmine Monitor in February
2004. [58] Nonviolence International
survey of trainees for MRE. The activity which took them into the mined areas
was most commonly travel or flight as a refugee, and most extricated themselves
by moving backward out of the
area. [59] Handicap International
Thailand, “Annual Report 2003.”
[60] Interview with community leader,
Hpa-an, October 2003. [61] This
incident of forced portering took place in mid-September when the person was
picked out of Thayawaddy Prison, along with 50 other persons, by the military.
After crossing into Thailand with four other escaped porters to seek refuge,
they were interviewed by aid workers on 20 October 2003. Interviews were passed
to Landmine Monitor. [62]
“Outlook programme” BBC World Service, aired 21 September
2003. [63] Email communication with
escaped porters, 20 October 2004. [64]
See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p.
567. [65] International Rescue
Committee and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Mental Health
Assessment among Karenni Refugees in 3 Camps in Mae Hong Son,” Thailand,
August 2001. [66] Hans Draminsky
Peterson, et al., “Results of Medical Examination of Refugees from
Burma,” Danish Medical Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 3, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316;
Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., “Human Rights Violations in Burma/Myanmar
in 1999,” Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999; Danish Medical
Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March
2000. [67] International Labor
Organization, “Forced Labor in Myanmar (Burma),” Geneva, 2 July
1998. [68] For more details on
reported mine casualties in Burma, see Landmine Monitor Report 2003, pp.
567-569, and Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
630-632. [69] A senior medical officer
stated that this figure is recorded in non-public records kept by the KNU.
Landmine Monitor interview in Mae Sot, November
2003. [70] A Burmese surgeon now
residing in the United States, but previously working in the National Hospital
system in Burma, stated that over a three-year period 12,000 landmine casualties
occurred on several frontlines in
Burma. [71] Estimate compiled by using
partial medical records obtained from a hospital in Karen State, combined with
records from the National Rehabilitation Center in Rangoon and the number of new
prostheses given to new mine survivors. Estimate assumed 30 percent of mine
casualties die before receiving any medical
attention. [72] US Department of
State, “Hidden Killers: The global landmine crisis,” December 1994,
p. 18. [73] Undated internal report
provided to Landmine Monitor by the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen
People in Mae Sot, Thailand, 22 March
2003. [74] “4 killed, 8 injured
in land mine blast in Myanmar,” Associated Press, 26 May
2003. [75] Cheum News No. 39, 17
November 2003 (Thai language). [76]
Data from the Emergency Medical Referral unit of Médecins Sans
Frontières; email from Dr Eugenie d’Alessandro, Field Coordinator,
Médecins Sans Frontières, Mae Sot, 27 March
2003. [77] Fax from Sushira
Chonhenchob, Disability and Development Manager, HI-Thailand, 1 March 2004. The
initial data for 2003 may be revised upward as records are
reviewed. [78] Mae Sot Hospital data
supplied to Handicap International. Discrepancies exist with current statistics
and data originally provided to Landmine Monitor in previous
years. [79] Letters from ICRC Regional
Delegation, 27 February and 19 April 2004; interview with Marcus Geisser, ICRC
Delegate, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 31 December
2002. [80] See Landmine Monitor Report
2002, pp. 631 and 634. [81]
Nonviolence International, “Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in
Burma,” Internal Report, 2002, p.
9. [82] Landmine Monitor analysis of
incidents by month, from statistics collected at the Mae Sot hospital by
Handicap International. [83]
Interviews conducted during travels within Burma by Landmine Monitor researchers
between 1999 and 2003. [84] Landmine
Monitor interview with military medics, Mae Sot, Thailand, 4 February
2004. [85] Photographic evidence was
sent to Landmine Monitor by medics in Shan State in October
2003. [86] Reported by a Karen Health
and Welfare officer during Mine Risk Education training conducted by Nonviolence
International in Mae Sot, 3 October
2003. [87] Mizzima News Group, 22
October 2000. [88] Interview by Next
Step Productions at the Friends of the Asian Elephant (FAE) hospital in Lampang,
Thailand in September 2003; information from Friends of the Asian Elephant
display at Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok, Thailand, September 2003.
FAE estimates that only about 10 percent of the elephants stepping on mines that
they know about have reached their
facility. [89] These stories and
several other reports of encountering UXO were recorded in a survey of trainees
for Nonviolence International’s Mine Risk Education program during 2003
and 2004. [90] For more information
see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp.
632-634. [91] Nonviolence
International, “Myanmar’s Expenditures on the Military, Health and
Education,” Special Report, August
2002. [92] Nonviolence International,
“Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma,” Internal Report,
2002. [93] For more details on
assistance available in neighboring states see Thailand report in this edition
of the Landmine Monitor Report. [94]
ICRC, “Annual Report 2003,” Geneva, June 2004, p. 146; “Annual
Report 2002,” June 2003, p.
159. [95] Letters from ICRC Regional
Delegation, 27 February and 19 April 2004; interview with Marcus Geisser, ICRC
Delegate, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 31 December
2002. [96] ICRC Physical
Rehabilitation Programs, “Annual Report 2003,” 9 March 2004, pp. 13,
18-20, and 26; “Annual Report 2002,” June 2003; “Annual Report
2001,” 14 April 2002; “Annual Report 2000,” 31 March
2001. [97] Television news reports in
Thailand on 23 January 2004 and subsequent interview with Krianglit
Sukcharoensin of the Royal Prosthetics
Foundation. [98] Fax reply from
AAR-Japan, 28 November 2003. [99]
Nonviolence International, “Impact of Landmines in Burma 2002.” The
survey included interviews with 192 landmine
survivors. [100] BPHWT is a program of
humanitarian assistance run out of the Mae Tao Clinic and consists of 60 small
groups who travel in ethnic-controlled areas of Burma with medicines, food and
tools for emergency care in
backpacks. [101] Trauma Care
Foundation, “Burma: Chain of Survival-Pre Hospital and Trauma Management
Program Report 2002;” interviews with TCFB, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 31
December 2002. [102] Comment from
representative of MSF at the Committee for Co-ordination of Services to
Displaced Persons in Thailand, 13 March
2002. [103] The declaration, written
in Burmese, was submitted to the leaders of the Myanmar government and stated
that participants would “cordially welcome a law for the disabled,”
according to an attendee from Thailand, Ltc. Topang Kulkhanchit, Regional
Development Officer for Disabled Peoples International Asia-Pacific, Bangkok, 12
June 2003.