Key developments since May 2004: Russian forces continued to use
antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. The rebels who seized the school in Beslan,
North Ossetia, in September 2004 with disastrous consequences emplaced both
antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices throughout the school.
Russia for the first time disclosed the number of antipersonnel mines in its
stockpile is 26.5 million, of which 23.5 million are subject to destruction by
2015. Approximately 19.5 million antipersonnel mines were destroyed or disposed
of between 2000 and November 2004. Russia is planning to spend some 3.33
billion rubles (US$116 million) for new engineer munitions, including
alternatives to antipersonnel mines, from 2005 to 2015. Russia ratified CCW
Amended Protocol II on 2 March 2005. According to media reports, in 2004 the
Russian National Corps of Emergency Humanitarian Operations cleared more than
30,000 UXO in the Russian Federation; in clearance through July 2004, this
included 2,842 landmines. A local commercial company completed a contract to
demine the island of Sakhalin of explosive ordnance in December 2004, clearing
over 25 million square meters and destroying more than 500 pieces of explosive
ordnance.
Mine Ban Policy
The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its
long-held reservations to joining the treaty include its perception of the
utility of antipersonnel mines and the lack of viable alternatives, and the
financial difficulties in destroying the country’s considerable stockpile
of antipersonnel mines within four years, as required by the
treaty.[1 ]In January 2005, Russia
told the Conference on Disarmament that a “mine-free world remains our
goal. We support in principle the idea of joining the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel
Mines and on Their Destruction. But it can be done only when we find ourselves
capable to fulfill our obligations.... Progress towards a mine-free world
should be realistic, phased and based on maintaining the necessary level of
stability.”[2 ]
Russia did not attend the First Review Conference in Nairobi in
November-December 2004. It was absent from meetings of the intersessional
Standing Committees in Geneva in June 2004 for the first time since 2000.
Russia has abstained since 1996 on each annual UN General Assembly resolution
supporting a global ban on antipersonnel landmines and the Mine Ban Treaty,
including UNGA Resolution 59/84 on 3 December 2004.
CCW Amended Protocol II
Russia is a State Party of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW). After submitting Amended Protocol II to the State Duma in May 2000,
Russia finally ratified it on 2 March 2005. Amended Protocol II entered into
force for Russia on 2 September 2005.[3 ]Russia exercised the option to defer for nine years compliance with
Amended Protocol II’s requirements for self-destruction and
self-deactivation of remotely delivered antipersonnel mines and for
detectability of low metal content antipersonnel
mines.[4]
At the parliamentary hearings on the ratification of the protocol, Minister
of Defense Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia “fully complied” with
the provisions of the protocol between 2000 and 2004. He said ratification
“meets the interests of [Russia] and doesn’t undermine its national
security...It will let us carry out disposal of outdated landmines at a minimal
expense and obtain more modern engineer munitions.” He also admitted that
“effective national defense based on [antipersonnel] mines will never be
possible.”[5 ]According to a
Foreign Ministry official, Amended Protocol II remains a “sufficiently
effective mechanism of ‘reconciling’ humanitarian and military
interests, making the conduct of combat actions more humane and reducing the
number of innocent victims and their
sufferings.”[6]
Russia submitted a series of declarations with its ratification instrument
that will guide its national implementation of Amended Protocol II. With
respect to Article 3, subparagraph 10 (c)—which deals with possible use of
alternatives to mines as a precaution to protect civilians from the effects of
mines—the Russian Federation understands “alternatives” to
mean “non-flying devices and technologies, which are not antipersonnel
mines and may temporarily disable, paralyse or indicate the presence of one or
several persons without causing irreversible harm to
them.”[7 ]
With respect to Article 5, subparagraph 2 (a)—which requires that
non-remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines be placed within a perimeter-marked
area—Russia declares, “The line of the State border designated in
the locality may be considered as the marking (designation) of part of the
perimeter of a mined area within the border zone when there are active and
repeated attempts to traverse it by armed intruders or when military, economic,
physical and geographic, or other conditions make it impossible to use armed
forces. The civilian population will be informed in good time about the danger
of the mines and will not be allowed into the mined
area.”[8]
Implementation of Amended Protocol II will require amendments to federal
legislation that will establish administrative and criminal liability for
violations of its provisions.[9 ]The cost of implementation of Amended Protocol II, budgeted at RUB3.33
billion (about US$116
million)[10 ]will be covered by the
federal budget and consists of two main components. Research and development of
new engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines, is
budgeted at RUB790 million ($27.41 million), of which one-third has been spent
in previous years. Production of those munitions, and maintenance of the new
stockpiles, is budgeted at RUB2.54 billion ($88.14 million) during the next 10
years.[11]
Production and Transfer
Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992,
including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4 and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines
(POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100 and MON-200). Russia has stated that
it stopped production of blast mines in
1997.[12]
The Russian Federation has been conducting research on modifications to
existing landmines, development of new landmines, and alternatives to landmines
since at least 1997.[13 ]Russia
continues to budget for research, development and production of new engineer
munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel
mines.[14]
Russia has had a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are
not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices since 1 December
1994. The moratorium formally expired on 1 December 2002, but Russian officials
have stated repeatedly that it is still being observed. Most recently, in
November 2004, the Defense Minister said that Russia is abiding by the
moratorium on the export and transfer of antipersonnel mines that fall under the
restrictions of Amended Protocol II.[15 ]Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type
of antipersonnel mines since 1994.
Stockpiling and Destruction
In November 2004, the Minister of Defense revealed that Russia had 26.5
million antipersonnel mines in stock. This was the first time Russia has
released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its
stockpiles. The Minister stated that in 2000 Russia retained 46 million
antipersonnel mines, but had destroyed or disposed of about 19.5 million of them
between 2000 and November 2004.[16 ]
The Minister further said that approximately 23.5 million of the remaining
26.5 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines were subject to destruction or
disposal between 2005 and 2015. He noted that Russia spends some RUB150-180
million per year ($5-$6 million) on the disposal of outdated antipersonnel mines
and those mines falling under the restrictions of Amended Protocol
II.[17 ]
Landmine Monitor initially estimated that Russia possessed a stockpile of
60-70 million antipersonnel mines, the world’s second
largest.[18 ]After Russia reported
that it had destroyed 16.8 million antipersonnel mines from 1996 to 2002,
Landmine Monitor reduced its estimate of Russia’s stockpile to 50 million
antipersonnel mines in 2003.
Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, such as Tajikistan and
Georgia (Abkhazia), maintain antipersonnel mine stockpiles. In February 2003,
Tajikistan, which is party to the Mine Ban Treaty, officially declared that
Russian forces stockpile 18,200 antipersonnel mines on Tajik territory and that
bilateral negotiations concerning the disposition of these stockpiles were
ongoing.[19 ]
Use
Russia has used mines on a regular basis since 1999, primarily in Chechnya,
but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.
Russia has generally argued that its mine usage has been necessary to stop the
flow of terrorists, weapons and drugs, and has been in full compliance with CCW
Amended Protocol II.[20 ]
On 1 September 2004, a terrorist group of at least 32 persons seized a
school in Beslan, North Ossetia, taking 1,128
hostages.[21 ]The hostage-takers
emplaced both antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
throughout the school, including a gymnasium crowded with over 1,000 children
and their parents. Various sources have indicated that the mines used included
PMN blast mines and MON-50, MON-100, OZM-72 and POMZ fragmentation
mines.[22 ]At least 127 IEDs with
makeshift shrapnel (screws, nuts, bolts, etc.) were reportedly laid in the
school, some in command-detonated mode and some with pressure or tripwire
fuzes.[23 ]IEDs, including at least
two hung from the gymnasium ceiling, and mines were connected with detonation
wires to make an integrated explosion
chain.[24 ]Apparently an
inadvertent first explosion caused a chain of detonations and collapsed the
gymnasium ceiling, killing and injuring
many.[25]
According to data released by Valeriy Federov, a member of the parliamentary
commission investigating the Beslan events, 330 people were killed as a result
of the seizure of the school, the IED and mine explosions, and the subsequent
siege of the school. The dead included 186
children.[26]At least 727 hostages
were injured, most of them from mine and IED explosions and the collapse of the
ceiling.[27 ]Afterward, Russian
explosive ordnance disposal teams located and destroyed approximately 70
antipersonnel mines and a 50-kilogram IED.
In Chechnya, both sides continued to use antipersonnel mines during this
Landmine Monitor reporting period. However, the Ministry of Interior Affairs
reported that the number of losses among Interior Forces personnel due to mine
incidents from January to March 2004 fell by half, as compared to the same
period in 2003.[28 ](See the
Chechnya report in this edition of Landmine Monitor).
Russian forces have used mines extensively in Chechnya since the renewal of
armed conflict in September 1999. Federal troops have laid mines around and
leading up to bases, checkpoints, commanders’ offices, government
buildings, factories and power plants; on roads and mountain paths in the
rebel-dominated south; in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu; in the
estuary of the River Sunzha; along various
borders.[29 ]Russian officials have
repeatedly claimed that all minefields are mapped, marked, and removed when
troops relocate.[30 ]These
assertions have been contradicted by statements from both civilians and military
officers.
In addition to Chechnya, there appears to have been a considerable increase
in rebel mine attacks in Dagestan, especially in May-June 2005. According to
the Minister of Interior of Dagestan, Lieutenant-General Adilgerei
Magomedtagirov, 58 terrorist acts (bombings) have been committed in Dagestan
since the beginning of 2005, 40 of them committed in Makhachkala, the capital of
Dagestan.[31 ]
Landmine and ERW Problem
The Russian Federation and other countries making up the former Soviet Union
were heavily contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a result of
World War II. Large quantities of UXO have been removed annually since 1946.
This mine/UXO contamination, together with substantial quantities of abandoned
munitions in some areas, results in Russia having a considerable mine/ERW
(explosive remnants of war)
problem.[32]
Mines and UXO remain a major problem in Chechnya due to their continued use
by both sides in the conflict.[33 ]Over the past three years, mine incidents have also been reported in other
republics, notably
Ingushetia,[34 ]Dagestan[35 ]and
North Ossetia.[36 ]
Explosive remnants of war, including abandoned ordnance, remain an acute
problem in Dagestan, specifically in Novolaksk, Botlikh and Buynaks districts,
which were scenes of combat in 1999. More than 1,500 unexploded artillery and
mortar shells, an unknown number of landmines, eight 500-kilogram and ten
250-kilogram bombs are said to have been cleared. In Novolaksk district, 860
hectares of the most fertile land remains unused due to the risks posed by ERW.
Local authorities claim that complete clearance of ERW in these areas will take
a further five to six years.[37 ]
Mine Action Coordination and Planning
Mine clearance remains the responsibility of three governmental bodies: the
Engineer Forces (Ministry of Defense or MoD); demining brigades of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs; the Russian National Corps of Emergency Humanitarian
Operations (Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources).
The Russian National Corps deals mainly with unexploded aircraft bombs. Main
responsibility for mine clearance lies with the MoD Engineer
Forces.[38 ]
Non-governmental enterprises also conduct demining activities, such as the
Uniexpl and Fort companies in Moscow and the Iskatel company in St. Petersburg.
Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of MoD Engineer
Forces.[39 ]
It has not been revealed how the Russian authorities prioritize and plan
mine/ERW clearance, or how they store and use relevant data. The division of
responsibilities between planned clearance and response activities such as
explosive ordnance disposal, and between state and private clearance capacities,
has not been reported.
In 2004, Landmine Monitor reported that estimates of the time needed to deal
with the mine/ERW problem have lengthened in recent years, from 10-15 years in
1998, to 15-20 years in 2003. The latter estimate required that “all
means and resources are
utilized.”[40]
Official statistics of demining accidents are not publicly available.
Information on mine accidents and incidents is occasionally reported in the
media. In 2004, no demining accidents were reported during clearance of ERW
from World War II battlefields in the Russian Federation, with the exception of
Chechnya.
Quality assurance is the responsibility of the three government bodies
responsible for mine
clearance.[41]
Survey and Assessment
No information has been obtained of any surveys of mined areas in the
Russian Federation taking place during the reporting period. The
ERW-contamination in former World War II battlefields in parts of Russia was
subject to survey and assessments in previous decades. Areas contaminated with
antipersonnel mines and UXO are generally well known, including the regions of
Pskov, Novgorod,
Leningrad,[42 ]Moscow and Volgograd
(formerly Stalingrad). One Russian official stated that tens of thousands of
pieces of World War II ordnance are removed from Russian territory
annually,[43 ]while another put the
figure at 100,000.[44 ]
Mine and ERW Clearance
Media reports claimed variously that in 2004, the total number of UXO
cleared by the Russian National Corps in the Russian Federation reached
35,000[45]or
33,304.[46]This included at least
2,224 ERW near Luga village in the Smolensk region
alone.[47]In the Novgorod region,
3,818 ERW, including 23 aircraft bombs, were cleared by demining teams of the
Russian National Corps in January to August
2005.[48]According to the website
of the Corps, clearance in 2004 through July included 2,842
landmines.[49]
Engineers from the Corps also conducted clearance of the Rzhev range near
St. Petersburg and Tuters Island in the Finnish Bay on the Baltic
Sea.[50 ]Joint clearance operations
were said to have been carried out on 10 August to 1 September 2005 with
military engineers of the Leningrad military district and Swedish Rescue
Services Agency (SRSA). More than 200,000 square meters of Tuters Island
was surveyed and 30,399 explosive objects were detected and cleared. According
to media reports, six fortifications located quite deeply under the surface are
to be further surveyed by joint demining teams in
2006.[51]SRSA claims that the
survey and clearance project was funded by Swedish SIDA with some SEK1.9 million
($258,574).[52]
Media reports claim that from January through September 2004, military
engineers of the Leningrad Military district cleared 16,295 ERW in the
northwestern federal region.[53 ]From July to September 2004 alone, the demining teams cleared 7,116 ERW,
including 3,910 artillery projectiles, 1,638 mortar shells, 741 landmines, 358
anti-aircraft projectiles, and 182 hand
grenades.[54]
In the first eight months of 2005, according to the press service of the
Leningrad Military District, 16 demining teams totaling more than 40 military
engineers cleared 18,365 explosive devices, including 708 in St. Petersburg and
its vicinity. Most ERW were detected and cleared in Leningrad and Pskov
regions.[55 ]
Also in 2005, military engineers of the Siberian Military District were
continuing to clear artillery depots near the Gusinoye Ozero settlement in
Buryatiya. The depots were set on fire by lightning in 2001, and the resulting
detonations spread artillery projectiles over a radius of up to 30 kilometers.
Over the last four years, the local population has been collecting scrap metal
from unexploded munitions in the area, resulting in the deaths of five people,
including three children. It was estimated in July that clearance of the area
would continue until the end of 2005 and cost a total of RUB60 million ($2.08
million).[56]
There have also been media reports of disposal of recent explosive devices,
particularly in the Northern Caucasus region. According to remarks attributed
to Arkadiy Yedelev, Chief of the Regional Operational Staff for the
Counter-Terrorist Operation in the Northern Caucasus, in January to August 2005,
some 1,143 caches with explosive ordnance were located and destroyed, and more
than 600 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detected and cleared, and 162 mine
attacks prevented.[57 ]Other
reports on the proliferation of explosives in the Russian Federation come from
the Federal Security Service in St. Petersburg and Leningrad region, where they
confiscated 640 kilograms of explosives and 15 ready-to-use explosive devices
and cleared three emplaced IEDs during
2004.[58]
In June 2004, engineers from the National Corps took a training course in
Spain, at the International Demining Center of the Military Engineer Academy.
The course aimed to teach safe methods of demining in accordance with NATO
standards. It is planned to integrate these methods into the demining practices
of the Corps.[59]
In 2002, the Russian Uniexpl commercial demining company, in affiliation
with the British-based consortium European Landmine Solutions, won an
international tender to clear the island of Sakhalin of explosive ordnance.
From 2002 to December 2004, Uniexpl deminers cleared over 25 million square
meters, destroying more than 500 pieces of explosive ordnance. Uniexpl reports
that the operation was carried out in full compliance with the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and without
casualties.[60 ]
In view of increased terrorist activity and casualties during the clearance
of IEDs, several groups in Russia started to develop high-tech demining
machinery. In September 2004, specialists at the South Ural State University in
Chelyabinsk region and the Kalibr Scientific Industrial Complex designed a
high-tech demining robot, Bogomol-3. The robot is to be supplied to demining
units of the Federal Security Service, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Defense.[61 ]In November 2004, the
Kovrov Electro-Mechanical Plant started the production of the Varan demining
robot, which was designed by specialists from Russia’s leading technical
school, Bauman State Technical University, for safe clearance of landmines, IEDs
and other explosive
ordnance.[62]
Mine risk education (MRE) in the Russian Federation has been incorporated
increasingly within more general information campaigns advising people how to
minimize the risks from terrorist attacks. In the Soviet era, MRE was given to
children and adults in mine-affected
areas.[64]
In February 2004, the Russian-based Foundation for Effective Policies
launched an internet project, the National Portal for Counteracting Terrorism,
Antiterror.Ru, to provide the general public with comprehensive information on
how to ensure personal safety in mined and terrorist environments. The project
gives special attention to the safety of children, with a section for
schoolteachers that informs them how best to prevent children from injury from
various hazards, including mines and explosive
ordnance.[65]
Specialists from Chelyabinsk Technical University conducted pilot MRE
courses in a Chelyabinsk school in April 2005, after studying the protection of
city schools in Israel from terrorist attack. The project seeks to provide
teachers and students with information on how to protect themselves; if
successful, it may be extended to all schools in
Chelyabinsk.[66]
In 2005, military engineers from the MoD conducted a number of MRE courses
in St. Petersburg.[67]
Funding and Assistance
No information is available on how much Russia spent in 2004 on clearance,
nor on any funding or assistance received by Russia.
In 2004-2005, Russia provided practical assistance to some of its neighbors.
Russian engineering forces were deployed in February 2004 to demine and remove
abandoned explosive ordnance at the former Russian ammunition depot in Sagarejo,
western Georgia, prior to handing over the site to Georgian authorities in
2006.[68 ]In 2005, Russian
engineers carried out survey and demining of the railway between Ochamchira
(Abkhazia) and Zugdidi (Georgia). On 2 July 2005, it was agreed to carry out a
joint mine survey of the Psou-Ingur area in order to allow a railway connection
between Russia and Georgia through Abkhazian
territory.[69 ]
Mine/ERW Casualties
There is no comprehensive official information on mine/ERW casualties in
Russia. However, casualties continue to be reported in parts of the Russian
Federation, particularly in Chechnya, and in other areas as a result of mines
and ERW. In 2004, more than 400 new mine/UXO/IED casualties were reported in
Chechnya. (See Chechnya report in this edition of Landmine Monitor for more
information.) In August 2004, four special forces’ officers were injured
when their armored military truck exploded on a remote-controlled landmine near
a special forces base in Makhachkala in
Dagestan.[70 ]In Georgia on 31
August 2004, a Russian peacekeeper was reportedly killed in a landmine explosion
in the South Ossetia region.[71 ]
In July 2005, two people were killed after a World War II landmine exploded
near the city of Volgograd.[72 ]
The total number of casualties in Russia over time is not known, but there
are believed to be significant numbers of survivors from casualties caused by
mines and UXO left from World War II, the 1980s war with Afghanistan and the
conflict in Chechnya. From 1999 to December 2003, more than 2,500 mine
casualties, including at least 600 killed and 1,700 injured, were recorded
amongst Russian federal forces in
Chechnya.[73 ]According to the
Dagestan Ministry of Civil Defense, since 1999 UXO has killed 28 and injured 115
local residents in the Botlikh district
alone.[74]
On 9 April 2005, two Russian tourists were injured when their vehicle hit a
landmine in Nepal.[75]
Survivor Assistance and Disability Policy and
Practice[76]
Russian military medical practice has accumulated much experience in the
treatment of blast injuries, and medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation
and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia.
Medical assistance is also provided by the Zaschita (Protection) All-Russian
Center of Catastrophe Medicine, including mobile hospitals in Chechnya, under
the Russian Federation Ministry of Health.
The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine
Survivors and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics,
also assist mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation assistance,
vocational training and socioeconomic reintegration.
The All-Russian Public National Military Foundation focuses its efforts on
the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya.
Many international agencies and local and international NGOs are working to
strengthen the health infrastructure in Ingushetia and other regions of the
Northern Caucasus. (See Chechnya report for more information on survivor
assistance).
The International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of War Veterans,
Participants of Local Conflicts, and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005 supports
war veterans and veterans’ organizations in about 17 countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. As of 23 August 2004, 276,914 people had
received assistance under the program at a total cost of $1.7 million; 3,640
people received medical rehabilitation, 1,370 received prostheses, 9,765
received other rehabilitation support, and 649 received wheelchairs. Medicines
and medical aid were provided to more than 260,000 people. In addition, 460
disabled veterans received vocational training in the fields of economics,
management and marketing, and 20 research studies were conducted in
medico-social
rehabilitation.[77 ]
However, the available assistance and rehabilitation services are inadequate
to meet needs. Every year about 25,000 former military personnel are recognized
as disabled, 16 percent of them as the result of combat trauma. According to
the All-Russian Public Organizations of Disabled Veterans of the Afghan War, 50
percent of respondents do not have enough money to support their daily needs, 91
percent face problems in employment, 88 percent had not received any vocational
retraining, and 91 percent did not receive any financial subsidies or
compensation. About half had not received hospital or sanatorium treatment
since being disabled.[78 ]The
situation has reportedly worsened considerably since the adoption on 4 August
2004 of the Law on Monetary Benefits, which entered into force on 1 January 2005
and replaces various benefits for the disabled with financial compensation.
According to Nikolai Ryzhkov, member of the State Duma, the law will adversely
affect the most vulnerable layers of the Russian
society.[79]
The rights of mine survivors and other persons with disabilities are
protected under the 1995 Federal Law on Social Security of Disabled. The
Ministry of Labor and Social Development is responsible for all disability
issues.
[1 ]See, for example, Vladimir P.
Kuznetsov, “Ottawa Process and Russia’s Position,” Krasnaya
Zvezda Daily, 27 November 1997; Maj. Gen. Alexander Averchenko, Ministry of
Defense, “Making the Ottawa Convention a Reality: Military
Implications,” in proceedings of the Regional Conference on Landmines and
Explosive Remnants of War, organized by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, Moscow, 4 November 2002, pp. 43-49. See also Landmine Monitor Report
2000, pp. 835-836.
[2 ]Statement by Amb. Leonid
Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Plenary Meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January 2005.
[3 ]Russia attended the Sixth
Annual Meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2004, as an
observer.
[4]Declaration submitted with
ratification to the UN, http://untreaty.un.org, accessed 20 July 2005.
[5 ]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on ratification of Amended Protocol
II, Moscow, 23 November 2004.
[6]Statement by Sergei Kislyak,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, parliamentary hearings on ratification of
Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004.
[7 ]Declarations submitted with
ratification to the UN, http://untreaty.un.org, accessed 20 July 2005.
[8]Other declarations include
understanding of cultural property and the availability of mine detection
equipment. Declarations submitted with ratification to the UN,
http://untreaty.un.org, accessed on 20 July 2005.
[9 ]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings, 23 November 2004.
[10 ]Average exchange rate for
2004: US$1 = RUB28.8170, Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory.
[11]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on ratification of Amended Protocol
II, 23 November 2004.
[12]Statement by Russia, Third
Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
In January 2005, Russia said it had not developed, produced or supplied to its
Armed Forces blast mines for more than nine years. Statement by Amb. Leonid
Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Plenary Meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January 2005.
[13 ]Maj. Gen. Alexander
Averchenko, “Traditional and New Tasks,” Amreysky Sbornik
Magazine, No. 1, 1997.
[14]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings, 23 November 2004.
[15 ]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings, 23 November 2004.
[16 ]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings, 23 November 2004. As noted in
previous editions of Landmine Monitor Report, Russian officials have given
different totals for destroyed stocks. In January 2005, an official said over
seven million stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed. Statement by
Amb. Leonid Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation,
Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January 2005.
[17 ]Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings, 23 November 2004.
[18 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809. Landmine Monitor based the original estimate
on a published report in the Russian military trade press, and interviews with
Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as
knowledgeable officials from other governments. It is possible that the
original estimate may have been based on total holdings in the former Soviet
Union, and not just the Russian Federation. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties
Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and signatory
Ukraine, collectively inherited 17.7 million antipersonnel mines from the former
Soviet Union. That total is derived from State Party Article 7 reports and
Ukraine’s voluntary declaration.
[19 ]Tajikistan Article 7 Report,
Form B, 3 February 2003.
[20 ]See for example the
statement by Amb. Anatoly Antonov to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts,
“On the Landmines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM),” Geneva,
18 November 2003.
[21 ]In a letter published on
the internet, Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility.
“Excerpts: Basayev claims Beslan,” BBC News, 17 September
2004.
[22 ]Many types of mines could be
clearly seen in television footage of the event.
[23 ]Testimonies of the hostages
given to a number of mass media sources. For example: “127 Home-made
Explosives Laid in Beslan School,” Novosti Rossii, 9 September
2004; Kommersant (daily), #169, 11 September 2004 ; Andrei Medeveded,
“The Forced Siege,” Vesti TV news, 3 September 2004.
[24 ]Andrei Chistyakov,
“The Former Hostage Says the Gymnasium was Mined in the First
Place,” Vesti TV news, 3 September 2004.
[25]Kommersant (daily),
#169, 11 September 2004. Some of the surviving hostages said the terrorists
made a child in the gymnasium stand on a pressure-release fuze connected to an
IED and the first explosion happened after the child stepped off the
pressure-release fuse because of fatigue. Others said the first explosion
happened when the terrorists were rearranging the set of mines.
[26]Interfax news
agency interview with Valeriy Federov, 14 March 2005.
[27 ]Report of the General
Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov to President Vladimir Putin, cited by Interfax
news agency and Rossiyskaya Gazeta (daily), 9 September 2004. [28 ]Information provided to
Landmine Monitor by sources in the Ministry of Defense.
[29 ]See past editions of
Landmine Monitor.
[30 ]See for example report of
Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Maj. Gen. A. Nizhalovskii,
during a virtual roundtable discussion of engineer equipment in military
operations in Chechnya. Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June
2000, pp. 35-40.
[31 ]Report by RIA-Novosti
information agency, 4 July 2005,
http://lenta.ru/news/2005/07/04/makhachkala.
[32]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1100.
[33 ]See the report on Chechnya
in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
[34 ]“Death Toll from Truck
Explosion in Ingushetia Reaches Five,” Interfax, 30 July 2003.
[35 ]“Military truck
explodes on land mine in southern Russia, injuring four,” Associated
Press, 23 August 2004.
[36 ]“Police bus hits land
mine in South, three officers killed,” St. Petersburg Times, 19
June 2003.
[37 ]Musa Musaev, “How to
Prevent Unknown Threat,” Severnyi Kavkaz (regional newspaper, north
Caucasus), #17, 27 April 2004,
http://sknews.ru/arc/_SK/2004/18/nomer/crim.htm.
[38 ]Presidential Decree #1010 of
13 November 1995, “On Russian National Corps for Emergency Humanitarian
Operations.”
[39 ]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1101.
[40]IPPNW-Russia,
“Materials of the First International Conference on APMs in Russia-CIS,
27-28 May 1998,” Moscow, 1998, p. 30; presentation by Russian Ministry of
Defense to anti-terrorism meeting, April 2003.
[41]Presidential Decree #1010 of
13 November 1995, “On Russian National Corps for Emergency Humanitarian
Operations.”
[42 ]The city of Leningrad was
renamed St. Petersburg but the region that includes the city is still called
Leningrad.
[43 ]Statement of Alexander
Konuzin, UN Security Council, New York, 13 November 2003.
[44 ]Statement of Amb. Anatoly
Antonov, Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the
CCW, Geneva, 26 November 2003.
[45]“During 2004, 175
emergency situations were recorded in the North-West of Russia,” Regnum
news agency, 21 December 2004, www.regnum.ru/news/379802.html.
[46]“29,500 people died in
Russia in the result of emergency situations and catastrophes,”
RIA-Novosti, 6 December 2004,
http://rian.ru/incidents/20041206/752129.html.
[47]“A good harvest was
collected in the Roslavl district of the Smolensk region,” Regnum,
25 October 2004, www.regnum.ru/news/348218.html.
[48]“Artillery projectiles
of WWII were found in the Novgorod region,” RIA-Novosti, 7
September 2005, http://rian.ru/incidents/20050907/41327220.html.
[49]Data accessed at the
internet site of the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster
Resources, www.mchs.gov.ru/print.html?fid=1092920817730730&cid=.
[50 ]Data from the website of the
Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources www.mchs.gov.ru, accessed 29 August 2005.
[51]“Mine clearance of the
Bolshoi Tuters island in the Finnish Bay completed,” RIA-Novosti, 1
September 2005, http://rian.ru/defense_safety/20050901/41267477.html; see also
“Sappers of the Leningrad Military District have cleared more than 18,000
explosive remnants of WWII since the beginning of the year,” MoD Press
Service release, 6 September 2005,
www.mil.ru/releases/2005/09/060825_10896.shtml.
[52]Information provided by
Rickard Hartmann, Head of Mine Action, SRSA, Geneva, 20 September 2005. Average
Foreign Exchange Rates for 2004, www.federalreserve.gov/release: US$1 =
SEK7.348. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3
January 2005.
[53 ]“More than 7,000
explosive objects surveyed and cleared by military engineers in the third
quarter of 2004,” Regnum, 5 October 2004,
www.regnum.ru/news/336340.html.
[54]“More than 7,000
explosive objects surveyed and cleared by military engineers in the third
quarter of 2004,” Regnum, 5 October 2004,
www.regnum.ru/news/336340.html.
[55 ]“Sappers of the
Leningrad Military District has cleared more than 18,000 explosive remnants of
WWII since the beginning of the year,” MoD Press release, 6 September
2005, www.mil.ru/ releases/2005/09/060825_10896.shtml.
[56]“The territory of
exploded artillery depots in Buryatiya will be cleared by the end of the
year,” Regnum, 12 July 2005, www.regnum.ru/news/482842.html.
[57 ]“231 rebels eliminated
in Chechnya since the beginning of 2005,” RIA-Novosti, 12 September
12 2005, http://rian.ru/defense_safety/20050912/41373323.html.
[58]“More than 640 kilos
of explosives confiscated in St. Petersburg and Leningrad regions since the
beginning of the year,” Regnum, 17 December 2004,
www.regnum.ru/news/378073.html.
[59]“Engineers of the
Ministry of Emergency Situations, Disasters and Catastrophes take training
course in Madrid,” 1 June 2004, www.mchs.gov.ru/print.html?fid=1086083908053013&cid.
[60 ]Uniexpl demining activities
chart, www.uniexpl.com/menu2.htm,
accessed on 29 August 2005.
[61 ]“A unique robotic
sapper has been developed in Chelyabinsk,” Interfax-Urals news
agency, 1 September 2004, http://mfit.ru/defensive/pub_avn/pub_1862.html.
[62]“The Kovrov
Electro-Mechanical Plant started mass production of mine clearance
robots,” Interfax, 9 November 2004,
http://mfit.ru/defensive/pub_avn/pub_1923.html.
[63 ]For MRE in Chechnya and
north Caucasus, see the report on Chechnya in this edition of Landmine
Monitor.
[64]See Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, p. 738.
[65]See www.antiterror.ru.
[66]“Lessons Against
Terrorist Attacks,” article on the Chelyabinsk.Ru socio-political portal,
5 April 2005.
[67]“Sappers of the
Leningrad Military District has cleared more than 18,000 explosive remnants of
WWII since the beginning of the year,” MoD Press release, 6 September
2005, www.mil.ru/releases /2005/09/060825_10896.shtml.
[68 ]“Russian Servicemen to
Clear Mines in Georgia,” Interfax (Tbilisi), 27 February 2004;
interview with Konstantine Gabashvili, Chairman, Georgian Parliamentary
Committee on Foreign Relations, Tbilisi, 24 May 2005. See also the report on
Georgia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
[69 ]“Kavkazskiy
uzel,” information agency, 5 July 2005, www.peacekeeper.ru.
[70 ]“Military truck
explodes on land mine in southern Russia, injuring four,” Associated Press
(Makhachkala), 23 August 2004.
[71 ]“Two Reported Dead
After Georgia Land Mine Explosion,” Associated Press (Tbilisi), 31
August 2004.
[72 ]“World War II landmine
explosion leaves two dead in Russia,” Agence France-Presse
(Moscow), 3 July 2005.
[73 ]For more information, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1104.
[74]Musa Musaev, “How to
Prevent Unknown Threat,” available in Russian at http://sknews.ru/arc/_SK/2004/nomer/crim.htm.
[75]“Nepal landmine blasts
kill 6, injures 28, including 2 Russians,” PTI (Kathmandu), 10
April 2005.
[76]For more information, see
Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1105-1106; Landmine Monitor Report
2001, pp. 907-908.
[77 ]Letter to Landmine Monitor
(IPPNW-Russia) from Prof. Galina Z. Demchenkova, Doctor of Medical Science,
Deputy Chairman of the Committee for War Veterans Affairs under the CIS Council
of Heads of Governments, 24 August 2004.
[78 ]Vladimir Kovalkov,
“Functionaries’ “Care” about the Invalids of Combat
Actions,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, #25 (434), 8 July 2004,
http://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2004-12-03/1_care.html.
[79]Rossbalt information
agency, 3 December 2004, www.rosbalt.ru/2004/12/4/187935.html.