Key developments since May 2005: South Korea reported a stockpile of
407,800 antipersonnel mines, instead of the two million it indicated previously.
South Korea produced Claymore-type mines for the first time since 2000. It
exported Claymore mines to New Zealand in December 2005. South Korean troops
started clearance of three minefields in the Civilian Control Zone and seven
military bases in the south. In 2005, there were at least 10 new landmine
casualties.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea—has not acceded to the
Mine Ban Treaty. In October 2005, South Korea explained its abstention on the
vote on the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution in the UN General Assembly:
“As repeatedly stated and emphasized in previous occasions, the Republic
of Korea fully shares and supports the spirit and objectives of the Ottawa
Convention. We have no doubt that this important Convention does, and will
continue to, play a central role in alleviating human sufferings caused by
irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. However, the
unique security situation on our part of the world still does not allow us to
adhere to the Convention. And this is the only reason that we cast a vote of
abstention yearly on this draft
resolution.”[1]
South Korea did not attend as an observer the Sixth Meeting of States
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005 or
the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and May
2006.
South Korea is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and
its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It attended the Seventh Annual Conference
of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2005, and submitted its
2005 Article 13 annual report for Amended Protocol II. It also participated in
the meetings of the CCW Group of Government Experts dealing with antivehicle
mines and explosive remnants of war during 2005 and 2006.
Production, Transfer, and Use
South Korea’s delegate told the UN in October 2005, “The
Republic of Korea currently does not produce or export anti-personnel
mines.”[2] However, the South
Korean company Hanwha produced about 3,300 Claymore mines (KM18A1) in
2005.[3] Previously, South Korea had
informed Landmine Monitor that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines,
including Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, from 2000-2004.
South Korea has in the past produced two types of Claymore antipersonnel
mines, designated KM18A1 and K440.[4] The government has never made a policy statement or enacted legal measures
prohibiting production of antipersonnel mines; thus, Landmine Monitor has
continued to list South Korea as a producer.
In response to a question about whether the government was engaged in
research on alternatives to antipersonnel mines, South Korea said that the
Defense Ministry’s Agency for Defense Development has conducted research
on “the controlled explosion of landmines by remote
operation.”[5]
South Korea states that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite
extension of its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines since
1997.”[6] However, the
moratorium does not include Claymore-type
mines.[7] In December 2005, the
Hanwha Corporation sold to New Zealand about 1,050 Claymore mines valued at
about US$126,700.[8] South Korea is
not known to have exported any type of antipersonnel mine in the past. South
Korea did not import any antipersonnel landmines in
2005.[9]
The government stated that there was not any new use of antipersonnel mines
in 2005.[10] In 2005, US Forces in
Korea transferred command and control over mine-laying during wartime to the
South Korean military. Mine-laying is one of ten specific missions the US is
slated to hand over to South Korean troops by the end of
2006.[11] According to one report
citing an official with the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, there will be no
change in the role of Korean and US forces carrying out the missions, but they
would now come under Korean command.[12]
Stockpiling
In May 2006, South Korea provided more details on its stockpile of
antipersonnel mines than ever before. Surprisingly, it maintained that the
military stockpiles only 407,800 antipersonnel mines, including 382,900
non-self-destructing mines (M2, M3, M14, M16 and M18) and 24,900
self-destructing mines (M74).[13] Previously, the government stated that it holds a stockpile of about two
million antipersonnel mines.[14]
The US military stockpiles approximately 1.1 million M14 and M16
antipersonnel mines for use in any future resumption of war in
Korea.[15] US Army documentation
indicates that the US stores nearly half of those mines in the continental
United States, not in South Korea.[16] However, the South Korean government in February 2003 told Landmine
Monitor that the entire US stockpile of non-self-destructing mines is in the
ROK.[17]
Most of the US landmine stockpile is part of the more extensive War Reserve
Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) munitions stored in South Korea but kept under
US title and control, then made available to US and South Korean forces during
hostilities. In early 2005, it was reported that the US had notified the South
Korean military that it will terminate WRSA-K “by December
2006.”[18] On 30 December
2005, President George Bush signed Public Law 109-159, authorizing the transfer
of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which
the WRSA-K program will be
terminated.[19] The items are to be
sold to South Korea “at least equal to fair market
value.”[20] The law states
that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall
be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of
Defense.”[21] As required by
the law, the Secretary of Defense certified that nothing in the WRSA-K is of
utility to the United States, and that all items are eligible for transfer to
the ROK.[22]
The Pentagon is to determine which items to offer to South Korea, and it is
not clear if antipersonnel mines will be among the items offered. It is also
not clear how any sale would be permitted under the comprehensive US prohibition
on transfer of antipersonnel mines in effect since 1992. In January 2006, a
South Korean defense ministry spokesperson was reported as stating, “We
will negotiate the issue with all of the options on the table when the US
Department of Defense makes an official offer to us on items they want to
sell.” The offer was reportedly expected to be made in March
2006.[23]
In addition to the non-self-destructing mines, the US military also holds in
South Korea a substantial number of self-destructing, scatterable antipersonnel
mines. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US holds 40,000
Gator, 10,000 Volcano and an unknown number of MOPMS
mines.[24]
Landmine and UXO Problem
The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately
adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined
areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the
1960s, 1978 and 1988.[25] In May
2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines are planted in the southern
part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ and about 8,000 mines in 25
military sites in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, over
an area about 3 million square meters, below the
CCZ.[26] Unexploded ordnance (UXO)
is also present in many parts of the country, another legacy of the Korean
War.
In April 2004, South Korea had told Landmine Monitor that in total 91 square
kilometers of land in the country are
mined.[27] This was a
significantly smaller amount than reported by the Ministry of National Defense
to the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee in 2003, which
included some 90.7 square kilometers of unconfirmed mined areas and 21.8 square
kilometers of confirmed mined areas. The ROK Army defines unconfirmed
minefields as areas that are suspected to be mined, but for which there are no
maps or other reliable information; it marks them with “Unconfirmed
Minefield Danger”
signs.[28]
Mine Action
South Korea has undertaken limited demining in the DMZ and CCZ but has
concentrated most effort on demining military bases in rear areas. Clearance
operations are conducted mostly by the South Korean army and by a commercial
demining company, Korea Mine Action Group
(KMAG).[29]
In May 2006, South Korea informed Landmine Monitor that 300 mines had been
removed from four “unchecked” military sites in the southern part of
the DMZ by about 20,000 soldiers, and 8,500 mines were removed from seven
military sites in the rear area below the CCZ by about 18,000 personnel in six
mine clearance teams.[30] South
Korea’s CCW Article 13 report submitted on 11 October 2005 stated that
demining of the seven military bases started in March 2005 and was expected to
finish in 2006; it added that demining had started on three
“unidentified” minefields in the south of the CCZ where operations
were expected to continue until 2009.[31] In May 2005, South Korea had said that the army planned to begin demining
operations gradually in 15 unconfirmed mined areas in the southern part of the
CCZ in 2005.[32]
Mine clearance occurred in the DMZ and CCZ in 2002-2003 in order to
reconnect the cross-border Donghae highway and railway line linking the South
with North Korea and to allow installation of power
cables.[33] In 2004, the army
deployed 6,300 troops on demining military sites in rear areas and completed
demining nine sites. It said that all mines would be removed from 39 rear area
military sites by the end of
2006.[34]
The Ministry of National Defense operates two kinds of mine risk education
(MRE) programs, one for the army and the other for civilians. The Military
Academy regularly educates army cadets and military officers on the dangers of
mines. Before the army undertakes any demining action, it informs local people
of the danger of mines and its clearance plans; it also holds meetings to
provide specific information on landmines to the local
people.[35]A Korean graduate
student confirmed that civil affairs officers at military bases provide MRE as
standard procedure, adding that local residents have been living in the mine/UXO
affected areas for generations, “so they know where to look out.”
[36]
Funding and Assistance
About KOR6 billion (just under US$600,000) was spent by the government on
mine clearance in South Korea in
2005.[37]
South Korea also made donations to mine action in other countries during
2005. It contributed $1,050,000, significantly less than the donation of $3.15
million in 2004 which had represented a major increase. The 2005 contribution
is approximately the same as the combined total of all contributions given in
years previous to 2004 ($1.06
million).[38]
In 2005, South Korea contributed to the following:
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF):
$30,000 for ITF activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia.[39]
UN Development Programme (UNDP) Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention
and Recovery: $20,000 to Mozambique for mine risk education in Gaza and
Maputo.[40] In 2004, South Korea
contributed $150,000 to the UNDP Trust Fund for mine action in Eritrea,
Mozambique and Laos.[41]
UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund: $1 million of South
Korea’s contribution to the UNDG Trust Fund in 2005 was pledged for
demining operations in Iraq.[42]In
2004, South Korea provided $3 million for demining activities through the trust
fund.[43]
In addition, South Korea provided Lebanon with in-kind support consisting of
five 28-seater vehicles for mine risk education and victim assistance activities
in 2005.[44]
Landmine Casualties
In 2005, there were at least 10 new landmine casualties, including one
person killed and nine injured.[45] This is an increase from 2004, when there were at least three people
injured in landmine incidents.[46] The government reported that one soldier was killed and three injured in
mine incidents; six civilians were injured; and at least four incidents were
caused by M14 antipersonnel mines. On 3 March 2005, an army officer was killed
in a mine explosion at a military outpost in
Gyeonggi-do.[47] On 19 May, three
civilians working at a military base in Chulwon near the DMZ were injured when
they accidentally entered a
minefield.[48] Two women were
injured in separate M14 landmine incidents in Gyeonggi-do on 7 July and 29
September.[49]
Reportedly, there are on average 10 new landmine casualties annually in the
DMZ.[50]
Landmine Monitor does not have information on casualties in the Republic of
Korea in the first months of 2006.[51] In Sri Lanka, a South Korean business person was injured with two Sri
Lankans in a landmine incident on 19 April
2006.[52]
There is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.
Between 1999 and 2005, at least 59 new mine casualties were recorded. The
Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) estimates that more than 1,000 civilians
and 2,000 to 3,000 military personnel have been killed or injured since the war.
All records of landmine incidents are kept by the military police departments
and the Criminal Investigation Center of the Ministry of National Defense. It
is not clear whether regular police accept any reports of mine incidents from
the mine survivor or relatives
directly.[53]
Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice
South Korean civilian mine survivors are eligible for government
compensation through the State Compensation Act. Medical bills for civilian
mine survivors are covered by the National Medical Insurance system. It seems
very few survivors are actually receiving any government benefits. In 2005,
KCBL claimed that the national compensation law has several limitations,
including that a suit to claim compensation must be lodged within three years of
the mine incident.[54] However, two
successful compensation claims were filed and paid in 2005 for a total of
$73,380 by the Ministry of National
Defense.[55]
Soldiers injured while on duty receive a pension and free medical services
from the Veterans Hospital, in accordance with the Veterans’ Pension Act
and the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support for Persons of Distinguished
Service to the State. The government also provides preferential treatment for
military survivors, such as tax cuts and employment advantages for their
children.
[56]
In September 2005, KCBL submitted a draft Special Act for Compensation of
Mine Victims to the National Congress, and as of April 2006 the legislation was
pending. The draft Special Act includes provision for compensation without the
current limitations for mine survivors and the families of those
killed.[57]
South Korea has legislation to protect the rights of people with
disabilities: the 1989 Welfare Law for Persons with Disabilities; the 1990 Act
for the Promotion of Employment of Persons with Disabilities; and the 1994
Special Education Promotion Law.[58]
Discrimination against people with disabilities in employment, education, or
the provision of other state services is illegal. The government made efforts
to address issues of access for persons with disabilities, and although many
public facilities remained inadequate, nearly all subway stations were equipped
with elevators, wheelchair lifts, or
both.[59]
[1] Republic of Korea,
“Explanation of Vote (EOV) on Draft Resolution L. 56,” undated, but
28 October 2005. The remarks were made after the vote on the resolution in
First Committee. South Korea also abstained on the final vote in the full
General Assembly on 8 December 2005 on UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80.
[2] Ibid. [3] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. It is
not known if the Claymore mines are produced with the tripwire option (which is
prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty) or only for command-detonation (which is not
prohibited by the treaty). [4] There has been conflicting
information about possible production of a copy of the US M16 antipersonnel
mine. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 680-681. [5] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [6] Statement by Park Hee-Kwon,
Minister-Counselor, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, Geneva, Seventh
Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the CCW,
Geneva, 8 March 2004. [7] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. South Korea has stated this
previously. [8] Ibid. The government of New
Zealand confirmed the sale and confirmed that the Claymores were equipped only
for command initiation by electrical means; they will be used for “command
initiated exercises.” Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Defence of
New Zealand, to Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch/Landmine Monitor, 31 May 2006.
[9] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [10] Ibid. [11] “US to Hand
Counterfire Command to South Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 22 September
2005; Kim Hyung-jin, “S. Korea to take over US command against NK
artillery attacks,” Yonhap News Agency, 21 September 2005;
“Forces compete during mine-laying training,” Stars and
Stripes, 7 November 2004; “Border Troops Trained in
Mine-Laying,” Korea Herald, 8 November 2004. [12] “US to Hand
Counterfire Command to South Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 22 September
2005. [13] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. The M74
mines are typically used with the Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System
(GEMSS). [14] Response to Landmine Monitor
(KCBL) from Col. Gi-Ok Kim, Director, International Arms Control Division,
Ministry of National Defense, 13 May 2003. In May 2005, the ROK stated that,
“there are about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are
buried,” and the government estimated one million buried mines. Response
to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York,
25 May 2005. Landmine Monitor reported that the stockpile includes 960,000 M14
mines that were made detectable before July 1999 in order to comply with CCW
Amended Protocol II, and that South Korea also holds unknown numbers of
self-destructing mines, apparently including more than 31,000 US ADAM
artillery-delivered mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 544. [15] Response to Landmine Monitor
from ROK Mission to UN, New York, 14 April 2004; see also Landmine Monitor
Report 1999, p. 333. [16] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, pp. 681-682; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333. [17] Response to Landmine Monitor
from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 26 February 2003. [18] “U.S. Told Seoul of
Plans to Dump Ammo Stocks,” Digital Chosunilbo, 8 April 2005. See
also, Sung-ki Jung, “Seoul Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve
Stocks,” Korea Times, 3 January 2006. [19] Public Law 109-159, An Act
to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies,
Korea, December 30, 2005, Page 119 Stat. 2955-2956. See also, Sung-ki Jung,
“Seoul Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve Stocks,” Korea
Times, 3 January 2006. The law, section 1(a)(2), says that the items
available for transfer are: “munitions, equipment, and material such as
tanks, trucks, artillery, mortars, general purpose bombs, repair parts, barrier
material, and ancillary equipment if such items are—(A) obsolete or
surplus items; (B) in the inventory of the Department of Defense; (C) intended
for use as reserve stocks for the Republic of Korea; and (D) as of the date of
the enactment of this Act, located in a stockpile in the Republic of Korea or
Japan.” [20] Public Law 109-159, Section
1 (a) (3). [21] Public Law 109-159, Section
1 (c) (2). [22] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor (HRW) by the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 May
2006. [23] Sung-ki Jung, “Seoul
Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve Stocks,” Korea Times, 3
January 2006. [24] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. In its May 2006
response, the government indicated that information on US stocks is
classified. [25] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1022. [26] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. The ROK response refers to
the CCZ as the Military Control Zone. [27] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 14 April 2004. [28] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1022. [29] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 776. [30] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [31] CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Forms B and E, 11 October 2005. [32] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 25 May 2005; see Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 776. [33] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 776. [34] Ibid. [35] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [36] Email from Jae Hyun Park,
Graduate School of Political Science and International Relations, Korea
University, 17 May 2006. [37] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. Average exchange rate for
2005: US$1= KOR1023.75, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve,
“List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. [38] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 776. [39] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006; ITF, “Annual
Report 2004,” p. 15. [40] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006; interview with Lutful Kabir,
Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 7 March 2006. [41] UNDP, “Mine Action
Contributions to UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and
Recovery,” 20 April 2006. ROK reported only $100,000 to Landmine Monitor
in 2004. [42] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006, 9 May 2006; UNDG Iraq Trust
Fund, “January 2006 Newsletter,” l6/1, p. 1. [43] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 776; UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and UNDP, “Summary Progress
Report and Lessons Learned on the first year activities of the United Nations
Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF): 1 July 2004 to 30 June
2005,” p. 13. [44] National Demining Office,
Lebanon Mine Action Program, “Annual Report 2005,” Annex A. [45] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [46] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 777. [47] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [48] “Three injured in land
mine blast near Korean Demilitarized Zone,” YONHAP News Agency
(Chulwon), 19 May 2005. [49] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [50] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 778. [51] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [52] “Three injured in
Lankan landmine attack,” Associated Press (Vavuniya), 21 April
2006, www.ndtv.com, accessed 21 April
2006. [53] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006; Landmine Monitor Report
2005, p. 778; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024. [54] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 778; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024. [55] Response from the Permanent
Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. [56] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 778. [57] Information provided by
KCBL, www.kcbl.or.kr. [58] For details of the
legislation, see www.dredf.org/international/lawindex.html. [59] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Republic of Korea,”
Washington DC, 8 March 2006.