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Republic Of Korea, Landmine Monitor Report 2006

Republic Of Korea

Key developments since May 2005: South Korea reported a stockpile of 407,800 antipersonnel mines, instead of the two million it indicated previously. South Korea produced Claymore-type mines for the first time since 2000. It exported Claymore mines to New Zealand in December 2005. South Korean troops started clearance of three minefields in the Civilian Control Zone and seven military bases in the south. In 2005, there were at least 10 new landmine casualties.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea—has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In October 2005, South Korea explained its abstention on the vote on the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution in the UN General Assembly: “As repeatedly stated and emphasized in previous occasions, the Republic of Korea fully shares and supports the spirit and objectives of the Ottawa Convention. We have no doubt that this important Convention does, and will continue to, play a central role in alleviating human sufferings caused by irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. However, the unique security situation on our part of the world still does not allow us to adhere to the Convention. And this is the only reason that we cast a vote of abstention yearly on this draft resolution.”[1]

South Korea did not attend as an observer the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and May 2006.

South Korea is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It attended the Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2005, and submitted its 2005 Article 13 annual report for Amended Protocol II. It also participated in the meetings of the CCW Group of Government Experts dealing with antivehicle mines and explosive remnants of war during 2005 and 2006.

Production, Transfer, and Use

South Korea’s delegate told the UN in October 2005, “The Republic of Korea currently does not produce or export anti-personnel mines.”[2] However, the South Korean company Hanwha produced about 3,300 Claymore mines (KM18A1) in 2005.[3] Previously, South Korea had informed Landmine Monitor that it had not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, from 2000-2004.

South Korea has in the past produced two types of Claymore antipersonnel mines, designated KM18A1 and K440.[4] The government has never made a policy statement or enacted legal measures prohibiting production of antipersonnel mines; thus, Landmine Monitor has continued to list South Korea as a producer.

In response to a question about whether the government was engaged in research on alternatives to antipersonnel mines, South Korea said that the Defense Ministry’s Agency for Defense Development has conducted research on “the controlled explosion of landmines by remote operation.”[5]

South Korea states that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of its moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines since 1997.”[6] However, the moratorium does not include Claymore-type mines.[7] In December 2005, the Hanwha Corporation sold to New Zealand about 1,050 Claymore mines valued at about US$126,700.[8] South Korea is not known to have exported any type of antipersonnel mine in the past. South Korea did not import any antipersonnel landmines in 2005.[9]

The government stated that there was not any new use of antipersonnel mines in 2005.[10] In 2005, US Forces in Korea transferred command and control over mine-laying during wartime to the South Korean military. Mine-laying is one of ten specific missions the US is slated to hand over to South Korean troops by the end of 2006.[11] According to one report citing an official with the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, there will be no change in the role of Korean and US forces carrying out the missions, but they would now come under Korean command.[12]

Stockpiling

In May 2006, South Korea provided more details on its stockpile of antipersonnel mines than ever before. Surprisingly, it maintained that the military stockpiles only 407,800 antipersonnel mines, including 382,900 non-self-destructing mines (M2, M3, M14, M16 and M18) and 24,900 self-destructing mines (M74).[13] Previously, the government stated that it holds a stockpile of about two million antipersonnel mines.[14]

The US military stockpiles approximately 1.1 million M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines for use in any future resumption of war in Korea.[15] US Army documentation indicates that the US stores nearly half of those mines in the continental United States, not in South Korea.[16] However, the South Korean government in February 2003 told Landmine Monitor that the entire US stockpile of non-self-destructing mines is in the ROK.[17]

Most of the US landmine stockpile is part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) munitions stored in South Korea but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and South Korean forces during hostilities. In early 2005, it was reported that the US had notified the South Korean military that it will terminate WRSA-K “by December 2006.”[18] On 30 December 2005, President George Bush signed Public Law 109-159, authorizing the transfer of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program will be terminated.[19] The items are to be sold to South Korea “at least equal to fair market value.”[20] The law states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”[21] As required by the law, the Secretary of Defense certified that nothing in the WRSA-K is of utility to the United States, and that all items are eligible for transfer to the ROK.[22]

The Pentagon is to determine which items to offer to South Korea, and it is not clear if antipersonnel mines will be among the items offered. It is also not clear how any sale would be permitted under the comprehensive US prohibition on transfer of antipersonnel mines in effect since 1992. In January 2006, a South Korean defense ministry spokesperson was reported as stating, “We will negotiate the issue with all of the options on the table when the US Department of Defense makes an official offer to us on items they want to sell.” The offer was reportedly expected to be made in March 2006.[23]

In addition to the non-self-destructing mines, the US military also holds in South Korea a substantial number of self-destructing, scatterable antipersonnel mines. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US holds 40,000 Gator, 10,000 Volcano and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.[24]

Landmine and UXO Problem

The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, 1978 and 1988.[25] In May 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines are planted in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, over an area about 3 million square meters, below the CCZ.[26] Unexploded ordnance (UXO) is also present in many parts of the country, another legacy of the Korean War.

In April 2004, South Korea had told Landmine Monitor that in total 91 square kilometers of land in the country are mined.[27] This was a significantly smaller amount than reported by the Ministry of National Defense to the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee in 2003, which included some 90.7 square kilometers of unconfirmed mined areas and 21.8 square kilometers of confirmed mined areas. The ROK Army defines unconfirmed minefields as areas that are suspected to be mined, but for which there are no maps or other reliable information; it marks them with “Unconfirmed Minefield Danger” signs.[28]

Mine Action

South Korea has undertaken limited demining in the DMZ and CCZ but has concentrated most effort on demining military bases in rear areas. Clearance operations are conducted mostly by the South Korean army and by a commercial demining company, Korea Mine Action Group (KMAG).[29]

In May 2006, South Korea informed Landmine Monitor that 300 mines had been removed from four “unchecked” military sites in the southern part of the DMZ by about 20,000 soldiers, and 8,500 mines were removed from seven military sites in the rear area below the CCZ by about 18,000 personnel in six mine clearance teams.[30] South Korea’s CCW Article 13 report submitted on 11 October 2005 stated that demining of the seven military bases started in March 2005 and was expected to finish in 2006; it added that demining had started on three “unidentified” minefields in the south of the CCZ where operations were expected to continue until 2009.[31] In May 2005, South Korea had said that the army planned to begin demining operations gradually in 15 unconfirmed mined areas in the southern part of the CCZ in 2005.[32]

Mine clearance occurred in the DMZ and CCZ in 2002-2003 in order to reconnect the cross-border Donghae highway and railway line linking the South with North Korea and to allow installation of power cables.[33] In 2004, the army deployed 6,300 troops on demining military sites in rear areas and completed demining nine sites. It said that all mines would be removed from 39 rear area military sites by the end of 2006.[34]

The Ministry of National Defense operates two kinds of mine risk education (MRE) programs, one for the army and the other for civilians. The Military Academy regularly educates army cadets and military officers on the dangers of mines. Before the army undertakes any demining action, it informs local people of the danger of mines and its clearance plans; it also holds meetings to provide specific information on landmines to the local people.[35] A Korean graduate student confirmed that civil affairs officers at military bases provide MRE as standard procedure, adding that local residents have been living in the mine/UXO affected areas for generations, “so they know where to look out.” [36]

Funding and Assistance

About KOR6 billion (just under US$600,000) was spent by the government on mine clearance in South Korea in 2005.[37]

South Korea also made donations to mine action in other countries during 2005. It contributed $1,050,000, significantly less than the donation of $3.15 million in 2004 which had represented a major increase. The 2005 contribution is approximately the same as the combined total of all contributions given in years previous to 2004 ($1.06 million).[38]

In 2005, South Korea contributed to the following:

  • International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF): $30,000 for ITF activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.[39]
  • UN Development Programme (UNDP) Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery: $20,000 to Mozambique for mine risk education in Gaza and Maputo.[40] In 2004, South Korea contributed $150,000 to the UNDP Trust Fund for mine action in Eritrea, Mozambique and Laos.[41]
  • UN Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund: $1 million of South Korea’s contribution to the UNDG Trust Fund in 2005 was pledged for demining operations in Iraq.[42] In 2004, South Korea provided $3 million for demining activities through the trust fund.[43]

In addition, South Korea provided Lebanon with in-kind support consisting of five 28-seater vehicles for mine risk education and victim assistance activities in 2005.[44]

Landmine Casualties

In 2005, there were at least 10 new landmine casualties, including one person killed and nine injured.[45] This is an increase from 2004, when there were at least three people injured in landmine incidents.[46] The government reported that one soldier was killed and three injured in mine incidents; six civilians were injured; and at least four incidents were caused by M14 antipersonnel mines. On 3 March 2005, an army officer was killed in a mine explosion at a military outpost in Gyeonggi-do.[47] On 19 May, three civilians working at a military base in Chulwon near the DMZ were injured when they accidentally entered a minefield.[48] Two women were injured in separate M14 landmine incidents in Gyeonggi-do on 7 July and 29 September.[49]

Reportedly, there are on average 10 new landmine casualties annually in the DMZ.[50]

Landmine Monitor does not have information on casualties in the Republic of Korea in the first months of 2006.[51] In Sri Lanka, a South Korean business person was injured with two Sri Lankans in a landmine incident on 19 April 2006.[52]

There is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea. Between 1999 and 2005, at least 59 new mine casualties were recorded. The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) estimates that more than 1,000 civilians and 2,000 to 3,000 military personnel have been killed or injured since the war. All records of landmine incidents are kept by the military police departments and the Criminal Investigation Center of the Ministry of National Defense. It is not clear whether regular police accept any reports of mine incidents from the mine survivor or relatives directly.[53]

Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice

South Korean civilian mine survivors are eligible for government compensation through the State Compensation Act. Medical bills for civilian mine survivors are covered by the National Medical Insurance system. It seems very few survivors are actually receiving any government benefits. In 2005, KCBL claimed that the national compensation law has several limitations, including that a suit to claim compensation must be lodged within three years of the mine incident.[54] However, two successful compensation claims were filed and paid in 2005 for a total of $73,380 by the Ministry of National Defense.[55]

Soldiers injured while on duty receive a pension and free medical services from the Veterans Hospital, in accordance with the Veterans’ Pension Act and the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support for Persons of Distinguished Service to the State. The government also provides preferential treatment for military survivors, such as tax cuts and employment advantages for their children. [56]

In September 2005, KCBL submitted a draft Special Act for Compensation of Mine Victims to the National Congress, and as of April 2006 the legislation was pending. The draft Special Act includes provision for compensation without the current limitations for mine survivors and the families of those killed.[57]

South Korea has legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities: the 1989 Welfare Law for Persons with Disabilities; the 1990 Act for the Promotion of Employment of Persons with Disabilities; and the 1994 Special Education Promotion Law.[58]

Discrimination against people with disabilities in employment, education, or the provision of other state services is illegal. The government made efforts to address issues of access for persons with disabilities, and although many public facilities remained inadequate, nearly all subway stations were equipped with elevators, wheelchair lifts, or both.[59]


[1] Republic of Korea, “Explanation of Vote (EOV) on Draft Resolution L. 56,” undated, but 28 October 2005. The remarks were made after the vote on the resolution in First Committee. South Korea also abstained on the final vote in the full General Assembly on 8 December 2005 on UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. It is not known if the Claymore mines are produced with the tripwire option (which is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty) or only for command-detonation (which is not prohibited by the treaty).
[4] There has been conflicting information about possible production of a copy of the US M16 antipersonnel mine. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 680-681.
[5] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[6] Statement by Park Hee-Kwon, Minister-Counselor, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, Geneva, Seventh Session of the Group of Governmental Experts of the State Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 8 March 2004.
[7] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. South Korea has stated this previously.
[8] Ibid. The government of New Zealand confirmed the sale and confirmed that the Claymores were equipped only for command initiation by electrical means; they will be used for “command initiated exercises.” Letter from Hon. Phil Goff, Minister of Defence of New Zealand, to Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch/Landmine Monitor, 31 May 2006.
[9] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[10] Ibid.
[11] “US to Hand Counterfire Command to South Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 22 September 2005; Kim Hyung-jin, “S. Korea to take over US command against NK artillery attacks,” Yonhap News Agency, 21 September 2005; “Forces compete during mine-laying training,” Stars and Stripes, 7 November 2004; “Border Troops Trained in Mine-Laying,” Korea Herald, 8 November 2004.
[12] “US to Hand Counterfire Command to South Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 22 September 2005.
[13] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. The M74 mines are typically used with the Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMSS).
[14] Response to Landmine Monitor (KCBL) from Col. Gi-Ok Kim, Director, International Arms Control Division, Ministry of National Defense, 13 May 2003. In May 2005, the ROK stated that, “there are about twice as many landmines in stockpile as those that are buried,” and the government estimated one million buried mines. Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 25 May 2005. Landmine Monitor reported that the stockpile includes 960,000 M14 mines that were made detectable before July 1999 in order to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II, and that South Korea also holds unknown numbers of self-destructing mines, apparently including more than 31,000 US ADAM artillery-delivered mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 544.
[15] Response to Landmine Monitor from ROK Mission to UN, New York, 14 April 2004; see also Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333.
[16] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 681-682; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333.
[17] Response to Landmine Monitor from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 26 February 2003.
[18] “U.S. Told Seoul of Plans to Dump Ammo Stocks,” Digital Chosunilbo, 8 April 2005. See also, Sung-ki Jung, “Seoul Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve Stocks,” Korea Times, 3 January 2006.
[19] Public Law 109-159, An Act to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies, Korea, December 30, 2005, Page 119 Stat. 2955-2956. See also, Sung-ki Jung, “Seoul Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve Stocks,” Korea Times, 3 January 2006. The law, section 1(a)(2), says that the items available for transfer are: “munitions, equipment, and material such as tanks, trucks, artillery, mortars, general purpose bombs, repair parts, barrier material, and ancillary equipment if such items are—(A) obsolete or surplus items; (B) in the inventory of the Department of Defense; (C) intended for use as reserve stocks for the Republic of Korea; and (D) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, located in a stockpile in the Republic of Korea or Japan.”
[20] Public Law 109-159, Section 1 (a) (3).
[21] Public Law 109-159, Section 1 (c) (2).
[22] Information provided to Landmine Monitor (HRW) by the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 May 2006.
[23] Sung-ki Jung, “Seoul Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve Stocks,” Korea Times, 3 January 2006.
[24] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 25 May 2005. In its May 2006 response, the government indicated that information on US stocks is classified.
[25] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1022.
[26] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. The ROK response refers to the CCZ as the Military Control Zone.
[27] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 14 April 2004.
[28] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1022.
[29] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 776.
[30] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[31] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Forms B and E, 11 October 2005.
[32] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 25 May 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 776.
[33] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 776.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[36] Email from Jae Hyun Park, Graduate School of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, 17 May 2006.
[37] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1= KOR1023.75, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[38] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 776.
[39] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006; ITF, “Annual Report 2004,” p. 15.
[40] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006; interview with Lutful Kabir, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 7 March 2006.
[41] UNDP, “Mine Action Contributions to UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,” 20 April 2006. ROK reported only $100,000 to Landmine Monitor in 2004.
[42] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006, 9 May 2006; UNDG Iraq Trust Fund, “January 2006 Newsletter,” l6/1, p. 1.
[43] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 776; UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and UNDP, “Summary Progress Report and Lessons Learned on the first year activities of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF): 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005,” p. 13.
[44] National Demining Office, Lebanon Mine Action Program, “Annual Report 2005,” Annex A.
[45] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[46] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 777.
[47] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[48] “Three injured in land mine blast near Korean Demilitarized Zone,” YONHAP News Agency (Chulwon), 19 May 2005.
[49] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[50] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 778.
[51] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[52] “Three injured in Lankan landmine attack,” Associated Press (Vavuniya), 21 April 2006, www.ndtv.com, accessed 21 April 2006.
[53] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 778; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024.
[54] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 778; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1024.
[55] Response from the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
[56] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 778.
[57] Information provided by KCBL, www.kcbl.or.kr.
[58] For details of the legislation, see www.dredf.org/international/lawindex.html.
[59] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Republic of Korea,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006.