Key developments since May 2005: The US government spent over $95
million in fiscal year 2005 on humanitarian mine action programs, compared to
over $109 million in fiscal year 2004, the biggest change being a significant
decrease in special funding being allocated to mine action in Iraq. The
Pentagon requested $1.3 billion for research on and production of two new
landmine systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between
fiscal years 2005 and 2011; these systems appear incompatible with the Mine Ban
Treaty. Congress ordered a Pentagon study of the possible indiscriminate
effects of Spider, thereby deferring the Pentagon’s decision expected in
December 2005 on whether to produce Spider.
Mine Ban Policy
The United States has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its position has
not changed since the Bush Administration announced its policy on the weapon in
February 2004: “The United States will not join the Ottawa Convention
because its terms would have required us to give up a needed military
capability.” The new policy also states, “Landmines still have a
valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military
operations.... No other weapon currently exists that provides all the
capabilities provided by
landmines.”[1]
The new US policy has sought to reframe the focus from antipersonnel mines to
both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and characterizes landmines according
to their active lifespan or persistence: “The United States has committed
to eliminate persistent landmines of all types from its
arsenal.”[2]The use of any
type of landmine, antipersonnel or antivehicle, that self-destructs and
self-deactivates is permitted indefinitely without any geographic restriction.
The use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines is permissible until 2010,
but only in Korea. The use of non-self-destructing antivehicle mines will be
allowed globally until 2010, but only after presidential authorization. The use
of low metal content (non-detectable) non-self-destructing landmines was banned
on 3 January 2005.[3]
On 8 December 2005, the US was one of 17 states that abstained from voting on
UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80 supporting the universalization and full
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained on each annual pro-ban
UNGA resolution since 1997.
The US did not attend as an observer the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to
the Mine Ban Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005. In a press
release to announce that it would not participate, the State Department urged
all states to “ban the use of all non-detectable landmines; revise their
policies on the continued use of persistent anti-vehicle mines; negotiate a ban
on the sale or export of all persistent mines, including anti-vehicle mines; and
increase their funding for mine
action.”[4]A US representative
attended and made a statement at the June 2005 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional
Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, but the US did not participate in the
intersessional meetings in May 2006.
The US is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and
ratified Amended Protocol II on landmines on 24 May 1999. It attended the
Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2005,
but has not submitted an annual national report for 2005, as required under
Article 13. At the CCW Conference of States Parties in November 2005, the US
castigated states for their failure to adopt a new protocol on mines other than
antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM); the US in recent years has taken the lead in
promoting a new protocol.[5]
The US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) continued its advocacy efforts in
2005 and 2006. It issued several action alerts on efforts to block a resumption
of US antipersonnel mine production.[6]The USCBL also promoted increased US funding of mine clearance programs,
supporting a successful House floor amendment in June 2006 by Rep. Stephen Lynch
(D-MA) to add US$10 million to the State Department’s humanitarian
demining budget.[7]The USCBL
promoted the Washington DC premiere of a documentary on landmines entitled
Disarm that filled the 400-seat American Film Institute theatre on 31 May
2006.[8]On 16 May 2006, the USCBL
issued a press release deploring the lack of progress on US landmine policy in
the 10 years since the first major statement on landmines by President
Clinton.[9]Among the various
activities undertaken in 2005 and 2006 by USCBL members, on 3 November 2005 the
UN Association-USA’s Adopt-A-Minefield and Landmine Survivors Network held
an event in Chicago featuring double amputee Farah
Ahmedi.[10]
Use
The last recorded use of antipersonnel mines by the United States was in the
first Gulf War in 1991.[11]Landmine Monitor is unaware of any credible allegations or reports that US
forces have used antipersonnel mines in combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq
or elsewhere in this reporting period (since May
2005).[12]In October 2005, a US
State Department official affirmed that US forces did not use antipersonnel
mines in 2003 or subsequently during the ongoing
conflict.[13]
The extent to which US forces in Afghanistan, Iraq or elsewhere may exercise
jurisdiction or control of existing mined areas, or utilize them for military
benefit, and therefore incur obligations under CCW Amended Protocol II, is not
known. Among those obligations would be to ensure the effective exclusion of
civilians from those mined
areas.[14]
Matrix
According to a media report, the US Army planned to deploy to Iraq a new
remote-controlled munition activation system called Matrix in May 2005. A total
of 25 Matrix systems were reportedly being sent to Iraq for use by units of the
Army’s Stryker Brigade.[15]The US has not confirmed if the Matrix systems were deployed or if they
have been put to use in the field. Matrix is a new system designed to allow an
operator equipped with a laptop computer to remotely detonate lethal and
non-lethal Claymore mines by radio signal from a distance. Matrix is an
adaptation of the technology developed under the Spider program (see
below).[16]According to a State
Department official, Matrix is a command and control system, and “not a
landmine.”[17]
Production
The United States has not produced any type of antipersonnel mine since 1997.
However, in August 2005, Human Rights Watch reported that the “Bush
Administration appears poised to resume the production of antipersonnel
mines.”[18]The new landmine
policy announced in February 2004 stated, “The United States will continue
to develop non-persistent anti-personnel and anti-tank
landmines.”[19]
According to budget documents released in February 2006, the Pentagon
requested $1.3 billion for research on production of two new landmine
systems—Spider and Intelligent Munitions System—between fiscal years
2005 and 2011. This includes $349.5 million for research and $952.5 million for
production, with a total of $312.7 million for Spider and $989.3 million for
Intelligent Munitions System. [20]
It appears these new landmines will have a variety of ways of being
initiated, both command-detonation (that is, when a soldier decides when to
explode the mine, sometimes called “man-in-the-loop”) and
traditional victim-activation.[21]Any victim-activated mine is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
Spider
The Spider Networked Munitions System is the result of the Non-Self-Destruct
Alternative (NSD-A) program. The Spider system consists of a control unit
capable of monitoring up to 84 hand-emplaced unattended munitions that deploy a
web of tripwires across an area. Once an enemy touches a tripwire, a
man-in-the-loop control system allows the operator to activate either lethal or
non-lethal effects.[22]
Spider contains a “battlefield override” feature that removes the
man-in-the-loop and allows for activation by the target (or victim). In the
words of the Pentagon, “Other operating modes allow Spider munitions to
function autonomously without Man-in-the-Loop control (i.e. target activation),
if necessary, to respond to the combat environment; the operator can regain
control of the munitions at any
time.”[23]In an earlier
report to Congress, the Pentagon stated, “Target Activation is a software
feature that allows the man-in-the-loop to change the capability of a munition
from requiring action by an operator prior to being detonated, to a munition
that will be detonated by a target. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Service Chiefs, using best military judgment, feel that the man-in-the-loop
system without this feature would be insufficient to meet tactical operational
conditions and electronic
countermeasures.”[24]This
feature makes the Spider system incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty.
The decision whether to produce Spider was scheduled to be taken by the
Pentagon in December 2005, with the first units to be produced in March 2007.
However, Congress delayed the decision by including a provision in the fiscal
year 2006 defense appropriations bill, passed on 31 December 2005, that requires
the Secretary of the Army to conduct a review of new landmine technologies and
report on the possible indiscriminate effects of these new systems before any
production decision is made. It was the inclusion of the “battlefield
override” feature in Spider that led Congress to request the
study.[25]
The Appropriations Committee report accompanying the bill stated, “The
Committee supports the non-self-destruct landmine alternative and the
Intelligent Munitions System. The intent in initiating these programs was to
develop technologies to replace anti-personnel landmines that cannot distinguish
between an innocent civilian and an enemy combatant. For this reason, the
Committee believes it is essential that these systems be designed to utilize a
man-in-the-loop, discriminating capability. The Committee, however, is
extremely concerned about a proposed optional feature that could enable such
systems to be activated indiscriminately by the victim. The Committee,
therefore, directs the Secretary of the Army to conduct a review of the
potential indiscriminate effects of such a feature, and to submit a report to
the congressional defense committees detailing the findings of this review prior
to any full rate production decision for these systems. The report shall also
detail plans for carrying out these
programs.”[26]
A February 2006 article in Inside the Army, quoting military officials
working on the Spider program, said that Spider was currently completing its
final developmental test, with a “low-rate initial production decision
review” expected to be completed in March 2006, and operational testing
slated to begin in January
2007.[27]
A total of $301 million is budgeted to produce 907 Spider systems, and
another $11.8 million for continued
research.[28]This projected
procurement figure for Spider released in the FY 2007 budget request represents
a 45 percent reduction in quantity (from 1,651) and 22 percent reduction in cost
(from $388 million) from the figures projected in the FY 2006 budget. The US
Army spent $135 million between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 to develop
Spider.[29]Textron Systems
Corporation in Wilmington, Massachusetts and Alliant Techsystems in Plymouth,
Minnesota are jointly developing Spider. Day and Zimmerman in Parsons, Kansas,
and General Dynamics in Taunton, Massachusetts, are primary subcontractors.
Intelligent Munitions System
The Intelligent Munitions System (IMS) is a new program combining three
landmine alternatives programs—the Self Healing Minefield, Mixed Systems
Alternative, and Antipersonnel Landmine-Alternative (APL-A) programs—into
one research and development program. A total of $172 million of research and
development funding was spent on those three programs between fiscal years 1999
and 2004.[30]
According to budget documentation, the IMS is “an integrated system of
effects (lethal, non-lethal, anti-vehicle, anti-personnel, demolitions),
software, sensors/seekers, and communications that may be emplaced by multiple
means and is capable of unattended employment for the detection, classification,
identification, tracking and engagement of selected targets.” The
Pentagon further states, “IMS utilizes sensors linked to effects and is
controlled over robust communications in either an autonomous mode or via
Man-in-the-Loop control.”[31]The terms “unattended employment” and “autonomous
mode” appear to be synonymous with victim-activation, and like Spider,
would make this system incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty.
A total of $989 million has been requested for IMS development and production
activities between fiscal years 2005 and 2011, including $337.8 for research and
$651.6 for production.[32]This is
a decrease from the $1.3 billion projected for FY 2005-2011 in last year’s
budget. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Bloomington, Minnesota
and Textron Systems Corporation in Wilmington, Massachusetts, are developing IMS
prototypes. The decision to produce IMS is scheduled for 2008, with the first
units to be produced in 2009.
Stockpiling
The US stockpiles 10.4 million antipersonnel mines and 7.5 million
antivehicle mines, the third largest landmine stockpile in the world after China
and Russia. The stockpile has 2.8 million non-self-destructing landmines,
including 1.16 million M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines and about 403,000
Claymore mines.[33]Mixed systems
that contain both self-destructing antipersonnel and antivehicle mines
constitute 11 percent of the overall stockpile.
The M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines are for use in any future resumption of
war in Korea. US Army documentation indicates that the US stores nearly half of
those mines in the continental United States, not in South
Korea.[35]
Transfer
US law has prohibited the export of antipersonnel mines since 23 October
1992. This moratorium has been extended several times, most recently until 23
October 2008. In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in July
2004, the US announced its intent to pursue negotiations on an international ban
on the sale or export of non-self-destructing landmines in the
CD.[36]There has been no progress
since that time.
Most of the US landmine stockpile in South Korea is part of the more
extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K), munitions stored in
South Korea but kept under US title and control, and made available to US and
South Korean forces during hostilities. On 30 December 2005, President George
Bush signed Public Law 109-159, authorizing the transfer of items in the WRSA-K
to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program will
be terminated.[37]The items are to
be sold to South Korea “at least equal to fair market
value.”[38]The law states
that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall
be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of
Defense.”[39]As required by
the law, the Secretary of Defense certified that nothing in the WRSA-K is of
utility to the United States, and that all items are eligible for transfer to
South Korea.[40]
The Pentagon is to determine which items to offer to South Korea, and it is
not clear if antipersonnel mines will be among the items offered. It is also
not clear how any sale would be permitted under the comprehensive US prohibition
on transfer of antipersonnel mines in effect since 1992.
Mine Action Assistance
The US government spent a total of over $95 million in fiscal year 2005 on
humanitarian mine action programs in 23 countries, including nearly $12 million
provided to Iraq. The fiscal year 2005 total represents a decrease of $14
million from the previous fiscal year. The most significant factor of the
reduced contribution in fiscal year 2005 was a funding decrease from an expanded
allocation in fiscal year 2004 of special funding through the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund.[41]Fiscal
year 2005 spending represented the second highest US contribution to date, after
fiscal year 2004.
US Mine Action Funding Fiscal Years 2004-2007 ($ millions)
The estimate for FY 2006 funding is $98 million, with a $13 million increase
in State Department NADR funding for mine action in
Iraq.[47]In some official
publications and public remarks by officials, the US government has cited
different figures for its mine action
funding.[48]According to the
Department of State, the US has provided over $1 billion in mine action funding
since FY 1993.[49]The following
annual totals for fiscal years 2004 to 2006 provided by the Department of State
reflect some of this variance: FY 2004, $133.83 million; FY 2005, $95.67
million; and FY 2006, $101.12
million.[50]
Mine Action Funding by Country, Fiscal Year
2005[51]
Afghanistan
13,700,000
Iraq
11,840,000
Albania
1,000,000
Laos
2,500,000
Angola
6,172,000
Lebanon
3,770,000
Azerbaijan
3,983,000
Mozambique
2,336,000
Bosnia & Herzegovina
3,373,000
OAS (Nicaragua)
1,766,000
Cambodia
4,100,000
Serbia & Montenegro
1,000,000
Chad
1,169,000
Sri Lanka
2,700,000
Chile
735,000
Sudan
2,500,000
Croatia
2,300,000
Thailand
8,000
Ecuador
507,000
Vietnam
2,850,000
Eritrea
2,800,000
Yemen
750,000
Georgia
3,000,000
Ecuador received funds in FY 2005 and did not in FY 2004. Countries that
received funds in FY 2004 and not in FY 2005 included Armenia, Jordan, Peru,
Senegal and Tajikistan.
Survivor Assistance Funding
The primary vehicle for US government funding for landmine survivor
assistance is the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund administered by the US
Agency for International Development (USAID). Expenditures for landmine
survivors are not separated out from those for war victims overall, thus it is
not possible to give a precise value to US spending on mine survivor assistance
programs. The Leahy War Victims Fund supports programs, primarily managed by
NGOs, for the physical rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration of those
with landmine and other war-related injuries.
Since 1989, the Leahy War Victims Fund has provided over $125 million in
support for victims of war in 30 countries. In fiscal year 2004, the funding
totaled $11.93 million, of which $3.9 million was allocated to multi-country
programs. The estimated budget for fiscal year 2005 is $14.4
million.[52]Projects in the
following countries received support from the Leahy War Victims Fund in FY
2005:
Leahy War Victim Fund, Allocations for Fiscal Year 2005
Afghanistan
700,000
Senegal
500,000
Angola
651,000
Sri Lanka
500,000
Cambodia
2,825,000
Uganda
500,000
Laos
700,000
Vietnam
750,000
Lebanon
500,000
Multi-country
6,774,000
Funding for survivor assistance is also provided through the International
Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF). In calendar year
2005, approximately $980,130 of US Department of State funding was spent on mine
victim assistance programs in the Balkans via
ITF.[53]Approximately $497,227 was spent in calendar year
2004.[54]
In fiscal year 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
contributed funding of $3.15 million to Landmine Survivors Network (LSN). This
was the only portion of CDC mine action funding allocated for survivor
assistance.[55]Of the total fiscal
year 2005 funding to LSN, $1,093,934 (or 35 percent) was allocated in varying
amounts to LSN country programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique and Vietnam. The CDC provided LSN
with the same amount ($3.15 million) in fiscal year
2004.[56]
Landmine Casualties
The US military uses the term improvised explosive device (IED) to describe
nearly all explosive devices encountered by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In reporting casualties, US military officials make no distinction between
target-activated or command-detonated
IEDs.[57]
According to Department of Defense casualty reports, between 1 January 2006
and 31 May 2006, 137 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks in
Iraq, including seven in vehicle-born IED
incidents.[58]In 2005, 445 US
military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs in Iraq. Of those, 32
were the result of vehicle-born IED attacks. In 2004, 238 US military personnel
were killed by IEDs in Iraq. Additionally, seven US military personnel were
killed by landmines and four by unexploded ordnance.
Between 1 January 2006 and 31 May 2006, 10 US military personnel were killed
in Afghanistan as a result of IED
attacks.[59]Over the course of
2005, 16 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs in
Afghanistan. Six US military personnel died as a result of landmines and one
death was attributed to unexploded ordnance.
[1] US Department of State,
“Fact Sheet: New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian
Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers,” 27 February 2004. [2] Ibid. [3] US Department of State, Office
of the Spokesperson, “Media Note: United States Bans Non-Detectable
Landmines,” 3 January 2005. [4] US Department of State, Office
of the Spokesperson, “Media Note: Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the
Ottawa Convention Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” 28 November 2005. [5] Statement by US Delegation, CCW
Annual Conference of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2005, notes by HRW.
[6] USCBL Action Alert, “Urge
Congress to Block New Landmine Production,” 12 September 2005. [7] Press Release by Congressman
Stephen F. Lynch, “House Approves Lynch Amendment to Increase Funding for
Landmine Removal Programs,” 12 June 2006, www.house.gov. See also letter from USCBL to
Congressman Jim Kolbe, Chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, 9 May 2006, www.uscbl.org. [8] DCist, “Mining for
Change: Local Filmmakers Take on Landmines,” 2 June 2006, www.dcist.com. [9] USCBL Statement, “Ten
Years Later, The U.S. Is No Closer to Mine Ban,” 16 May 2006. [10] In 2005, the 17-year-old
Afghan landmine survivor won Good Morning America and Simon &
Schuster’s “The Story of My Life” contest. See Farah Ahmedi
and Tamim Ansary, The Story of My Life: An Afghan Girl on the Other Side of
the Sky (New York: Simon & Schuster, April 2005). [11] The US apparently did not
use landmines in Yugoslavia (Kosovo) in 1999, in Afghanistan since October 2001,
or in Iraq since March 2003. It reserved the right to use antipersonnel mines
during each of these conflicts, and deployed antipersonnel mines to the region
at least in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. The United States last used landmines
in 1991 in Kuwait and Iraq, scattering 117,634 of them mostly from the air.
[12] One press article reported
interviews with Iraqi citizens claiming that US personnel have laid mines near
civilian homes. Dahr Jamail and Arkan Hamed, “A Town Becomes a
Prison,” Inter Press News Service (Siniyah, Iraq), 20 January
2006. [13] Email to Landmine Monitor
(MAC) from H. Murphey McCloy, Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 4 October 2005. [14] The US has never reported in
its annual national reports submitted under CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13
any measures to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from known mined
areas under its jurisdiction or control during combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Protective minefields from the Soviet era are incorporated into
the perimeter defense at locations US forces occupy in Afghanistan. [15] Michael Peck, “Stryker
Brigade in Iraq Will Protect Bases with Remote-Controlled Mines,”
National Defense Magazine, March 2005. [16] HRW Briefing Paper,
“Back in Business: U.S. Landmine Production and Exports,” August
2005. In late February 2005, HRW raised questions about the potential harm
these mines could pose to civilians. One question related to how a soldier
would be able to make a positive identification of his target from great
distances. A second question was whether civilians themselves could
inadvertently detonate the mines, rather than a soldier operating the system.
The original technology behind Matrix was designed with a feature, sometimes
called a “battlefield override switch,” that substituted activation
by a victim for detonation by command. HRW, “U.S.: New Landmines for Iraq
Raise Fears of Civilian Risk,” Press Release, 28 February 2005. [17] Open Letter to USCBL from
Richard Kidd, Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, 24 June 2005. The full
quotation reads: “Furthermore, neither the Matrix command and control
system (Matrix is not a landmine) nor the Spider
self-destructing/self-deactivating short-duration landmine contributes now, or
will contribute, to the global landmine problem.” [18] HRW Press Release,
“U.S.: Pentagon Poised to Resume Production of Antipersonnel Mines,”
3 August 2005; HRW Briefing Paper, “Back in Business: U.S. Landmine
Production and Exports,” August 2005. [19] US Department of State,
“Fact Sheet: New U.S. Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004. [20] The totals for fiscal years
2005 to 2011 are compiled from Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial
Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activities 4 and
5,” February 2006, pp. 735-741; Office of the Secretary of the Army
(Financial Management and Comptroller), “Committee Staff Procurement
Backup Book, FY 2007 Budget Submission, Procurement of Ammunition, Army,”
February 2006, pp. 410-416. [21] US officials have noted that
self-destruct features will limit the time that mines will be able to be in a
victim-activated mode and that enhancements to the current technology will
continue to be researched and developed. US Department of State, “Fact
Sheet: New U.S. Policy on Landmines,” 27 February 2004. [22] Office of the Secretary of
the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of
the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget
Activities 4 and 5,” February 2004, pp. 1096-1101; Office of the Secretary
of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Committee Staff
Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Procurement of Ammunition,
Army,” February 2004, pp. 406-411. [23] Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Annual
Progress Report: U.S. Department of Defense Removal and Destruction of
Persistent Landmines and Development of Landmine Alternatives,” December
2004, p. 7. [24] Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Progress
on Landmine Alternatives, Report to Congress,” 1 April 2001, p. 11. [25] USCBL, “Congress
Blocks New Landmine Production, Requires Pentagon to Review Indiscriminate
Effects of New Weapons Before Production,” January 2006. [26] US Senate Report 109-141 to
accompany H.R. 2863, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,
2006,” pp. 189-190. [27] “Spider Munition
Program to Enter Operational Testing Next Year,” Inside the Army,
Vol. 18, No. 5, 6 February 2006. [28] Office of the Secretary of
the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Committee Staff
Procurement Backup Book, FY 2007 Budget Submission, Procurement of Ammunition,
Army,” February 2006, pp. 410-416. The actual costs for Spider for FY
2005 were $12.1 million, the estimated costs for FY 2006 are $27.5 million, and
the requested funds for FY 2007 are $85.9 million. [29] Office of the Secretary of
the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of
the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget
Activities 4 and 5,” February 2006, pp. 735-741. [30] Ibid, pp. 939-947; Office of
the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller),
“Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2006/2007 Budget Submission,
Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” February 2005, pp. 425-428. [31] Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Annual
Progress Report: U.S. Department of Defense Removal and Destruction of
Persistent Landmines and Development of Landmine Alternatives,” December
2004, p. 8. [32] Office of the Secretary of
the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of
the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget
Activities 4 and 5,” February 2006, p. 736. The actual costs for Spider
for FY 2005 were $36 million, the estimated costs for FY 2006 are $40.6 million,
and the requested funds for FY 2007 are $81.9 million, all for research and
development. [33] The current US policy
regarding use of Claymore mines with tripwires is unclear. Under the Clinton
administration policy, and according to existing army field manuals, use of
Claymores with tripwires is restricted to Korea. However, Pentagon and State
Department officials have not responded to questions as to whether this
continues to be the case under the Bush landmine policy. [34] Information provided by the
US Armed Services in the Spring/Summer of 2002 cited in US General Accounting
Office, “GAO-02-1003: MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on U.S. use of Land
Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” September 2002, Appendix I, pp. 39-43. [35] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2002, pp. 681-682; Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 333. [36] UN Office in Geneva, Press
document, “Conference on Disarmament Hears Statement by United States on
Landmines and Fissile Material,” 29 July 2004. Canada noted that the 42
CD member states that are part of the Mine Ban Treaty “will not be in a
position to enter negotiations on a lesser ban, aimed at arresting trade in one
category of antipersonnel mines alone but implying the acceptability of trade in
other categories of these weapons.” Statement by Amb. Paul Meyer, Canada,
Conference on Disarmament, 29 July 2004. [37] Public Law 109-159, An Act
to authorize the transfer of items in the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies,
Korea, December 30, 2005, page 119, stat. 2955-2956. See also, Sung-ki Jung,
“Seoul Seeks Partial Purchase of US War Reserve Stocks,” Korea
Times, 3 January 2006. The law section 1(a)(2), says that the items
available for transfer are: “munitions, equipment, and material such as
tanks, trucks, artillery, mortars, general purpose bombs, repair parts, barrier
material, and ancillary equipment if such items are—(A) obsolete or
surplus items; (B) in the inventory of the Department of Defense; (C) intended
for use as reserve stocks for the Republic of Korea; and (D) as of the date of
the enactment of this Act, located in a stockpile in the Republic of Korea or
Japan.” [38] Public Law 109-159, section
1 (a) (3). [39] Public Law 109-159, Section
1 (c) (2). [40] Information provided to
Landmine Monitor (HRW) by the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 May
2006. [41] The US Department of State
reported that in fiscal year 2005 the significant decrease in special funding
for Iraq from the previous fiscal year was due to the accomplishment of
humanitarian mine action capacity-building goals. Email from H. Murphey McCloy
Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 22 July 2006.
[42] US Department of State,
Bureau of Resource Management, “FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification
for Foreign Operations,” 13 February 2006, p. 170.
[43] Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, “Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid,
Defense Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Estimate,” February 2006, p. 807.
[44] US Department of State,
Bureau of Resource Management, “FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification
for Foreign Operations,” 13 February 2006, p. 175.
[45] Office of the Secretary of
Defense, “Research and Development Descriptive Summary, Humanitarian
Demining, PE: 0603920D8Z,” February 2006, p. 291.
[46] US Department of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction,” January 2006, pp. I-26 to I-27. [47] The additional $13 million
for mine action is being reprogrammed from funding allocated for electricity and
water rehabilitation in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. US Department
of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Section 2207 Report on Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction,” January 2006, pp. I-26 to I-27. [48] There are a number of
reasons for this difference. One factor is the figures cited by Landmine
Monitor do not include annual funding of approximately $10-11 million dedicated
to war victim assistance programs, which are accounted for separately in
Landmine Monitor under the survivor assistance section. Additionally, Landmine
Monitor’s knowledge is limited regarding some programs within the US
government, like those within USAID, that have some element of mine action
included within a larger international assistance program, but are not
identified as such or do not receive specific mine action appropriations. [49] Statement by James F.
Lawrence, Deputy Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, Standing Committee on Mine
Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 14 June
2005. [50] Email from H. Murphey McCloy
Jr., Senior Demining Advisor, US Department of State, 22 July 2006. Other
reporting of US mine action funding can be found in: US Department of State,
“To Walk the Earth in Safety,” (sixth Edition), June 2006. [51] US Department of State,
“FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,”
13 February 2006, pp. 173-174; Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
“Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) and Humanitarian Mine Action
(HMA) Programs of the Department of Defense: Fiscal Year 2005,” February
2006, p. 807. The following US funding amounts differ in country reports:
Albania $2,041,700; Cambodia 5,925,000; Bosnia and Herzegovina $4,891,828;
Croatia $2,709,551; and Mozambique $4,688,264. These amounts were included in
reports based on information in emails from H. Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior
Demining Advisor, US Department of State, July 2006. [52] US Department of State,
“To Walk the Earth in Safety” (sixth edition), June 2006,
pp. 49-53. [53] Email from Luka Buhin,
Project Manager, ITF, 30 May 2006. [54] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 913. [55] Email from Michael P. Moore,
Grants Specialist, LSN, 29 May 2006; email from Michael Gerber, CDC, 7 March
2006. CDC reported providing total mine action funding of $4,125,000 in fiscal
year 2005. [56] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 913-914. [57] Telephone interviews with
military public affairs officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Washington, DC) and Central Command (Tampa, Florida; Baghdad, Iraq; and Kabul,
Afghanistan), 10 June 2004. [58] This figure is accurate as
of 7 June 2006. Figures derived from an examination of official US Department
of Defense casualty reports, www.defenselink.mil/releases/. [59] Ibid.
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