Chechnya

Mine Ban Policy, Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

Chechen separatists proclaimed independence from Russia in September 1991 and adopted the name Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Both Russian forces and Chechen forces used mines, sometimes extensively, during the “First Chechen War” from December 1994 to 1996 and the “Second Chechen War” from 1999 to the present. Russian Federation forces seized the capital of Grozny in 2000 and subsequently installed a pro-Moscow Chechen regime.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any recent statements on landmine policy by the insurgency. A Chechen military officer told Landmine Monitor that all rebel mines were either obtained from the Russian military or were left over from the first war in Chechnya.^[1] Chechen rebels are expert in the production and deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In describing explosive device incidents, media reports and other sources often use the terms IED, mine, bomb and explosive interchangeably, and rarely distinguish between antipersonnel and antivehicle devices.

Russian forces discovered numerous weapons caches in 2006 and 2007 in Chechnya with mines, IEDs and materials used in the construction of IEDs, such as plastic explosives, detonators and artillery shells. The Russian Federal Security Service stated that in 2006, Russian forces had discovered more than 200 IEDs in caches.^[2] Some examples of reported seizures which included landmines follow:

• In July 2006 police seized unspecified types of mines from at least three different weapons caches in Starogladkovskaya, Shelkovskoi district, in Argun City, and in the village of Koshkeldy, Gudermesskiy District.^[3]
• On 14 October 2006, 64 ready-to-use antipersonnel mines were found near the Khankala-Grozny road.^[4]
• On 8 December 2006 Chechen police forces discovered 52 PFM-1 antipersonnel mines in Oktyabrsky district of Grozny.^[5]
• On 21 February 2007 a weapons cache with a MON-50 antipersonnel mine was identified.^[6]
• On 2 March 2007 Chechen police discovered a cache in Nozhai-Yurt district which contained a PMN-2 antipersonnel mine and a MVZ-57 fuze.^[7]
• In May 2007 an arms cache containing 16 mines and a mine detector of “foreign make” was found in the forest six kilometers from Serzhen-Yurt in Shali region.^[8]
• On 26 May 2007 Chechen police seized a cache with nine antipersonnel mines.^[9]
• On 12 June 2007 a weapons cache discovered southwest of Paraboch in Shelkovskoi district contained five antipersonnel mines and fuzes for command-detonation.^[10]

Use by Chechen Rebels

Chechen rebels continued to use explosive devices extensively. Given the lack of precision in terminology and reporting noted above, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which victim-activated antipersonnel mines or IEDs are being used. It appears that, in most instances, the rebels have used command-detonated IEDs targeting vehicles.

The Director of the Federal Security Service in Chechnya provided statistical data on Chechen IED use to media sources which stated that, in 2006, Russian forces had discovered and cleared more than 60 IEDs prepared for explosion.^[11] Another official source said that Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior personnel had discovered and cleared more than 150 IEDs planted on the routes of federal convoys in 2006.^[12]

Use by Russian Forces

In June 2006 Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continue to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields. They said, “Antipersonnel mines are used to protect facilities of high importance.” They insisted that all use of antipersonnel mines “complies with Amended Protocol II,” that “all necessary documentation for minefields is retained,” and that all minefields “are fenced and the civilian population informed.” They indicated mines are used by forces of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Border Guards. They said Russian forces “do not use antivehicle mines” in Chechnya because the rebels “have no vehicles.”^[13]

Russian forces employed both hand-emplaced and remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines extensively with the resumption and intensification of war in 1999 and 2000. In recent years, as the conflict evolved into more classic guerrilla warfare, there has been great reduction in the use of remotely-delivered and hand-emplaced landmines by Russian forces.^[14]

Landmine and ERW Problem

Chechnya is heavily contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), but there are still no official estimates of the full extent of the contamination.^[15] In April 2007 a media report quoted the Ministry of Emergencies for Chechnya as claiming that “6,000 hectares of land [60 square kilometers] constitute a threat to the population.”^[16] The UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007 quotes the Engineering Department of the North Caucasus Military District as confirming that “123 formal minefields of all types have been laid in Chechnya since the start of the conflict” and that “all parties to the conflict have used mines around checkpoints, temporary positions and military bases.” The report also estimates that 15 percent (about 40 tons) of all ammunition used in the fighting for Grozny did not explode.^[17] Improvised explosive devices were also found.^[18]

According to media reports, Russian and Chechen officials from the Ministry of Emergencies and experts have estimated that it will take at least 10 years to clear Chechnya of all mines, because they lack both technical experts and records of mined areas.^[19]

The impact of mines and ERW is said to go beyond the physical harm to include “serious economic and psychosocial effects on residents and internally displaced persons.”^[20] Contamination is said to be also found on farmland, including cultivated areas and pastures.^[21] Adverse conditions force some people to engage in risky activities such as collecting food or firewood from the forest and scrap metal from unexploded ordnance (UXO).^[22] UNICEF reported that some 3,061 civilians (including 753 children) had been killed or injured by landmines and UXO in Chechnya between 1995 and the end of October 2006.^[23]

Mine Action Program

There is no national mine action authority in the Russian Federation. UNICEF continues to act as the focal point for mine action-related activities in the Northern Caucasus; this includes ensuring that activities implemented by UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs are coordinated.^[24]

UNICEF reported that during the first three months of 2007 it conducted two meetings with delegates of the Chechen parliament and the Russian Ministry of Emergencies (EMERCOM).^[25] Discussions focused on action needed by the Chechen government to reduce the mine/UXO threat as well as the creation of a “Mine Information Center” as an important preparatory step to the establishment of a Government-led mine action center. Coordination meetings chaired by UNICEF brought together the UN Development Programme (UNDP), ICRC, Danish Refugee Council, Voice of the Mountains and Let’s Save the Generation to review ongoing activities. A mine action workshop for Chechen officials was proposed in order to raise their awareness of the problem.^[26]

UNICEF uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to store data on mine incidents; version 4 was due to be installed in June 2007.^[27] The ICRC also continued to collect mine-related data.^[28]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

Although conversations have been ongoing since 2006 with Russian and Chechen officials regarding mine action, there has been an absence of “tangible progress towards the launch of a comprehensive humanitarian mine/UXO clearance program.”^[29] As a consequence, the UN’s strategy for mine action 2006-2010 in Chechnya includes the following objectives:

• the government taking responsibility for mine action, including creation of a mine action center and humanitarian demining;
• improvement of data gathering and analysis;
• further provision of mine risk education;
• physical rehabilitation of mine/UXO survivors; and,
• strengthening of public advocacy.^[30]

According to the UN, an Action Plan for Clearance produced in 2006 by the Chechen Ministry of Emergencies planned for the training of local deminers; the time and conditions for the training were under discussion as of mid-November 2006.^[31] The training of local deminers had not yet taken place as of August 2007 as the Ministry of Emergencies was still waiting for permission from the central authorities.^[32]

Demining

Mine/ERW clearance in Chechnya continues to be carried out by the Engineer Forces of the Ministry of Defense, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and EMERCOM.^[33] The main responsibility for mine clearance remains with the Engineer Forces; the Russian National Corps deal mainly with unexploded aircraft bombs.^[34]

In June 2006 Russian officials informed Landmine Monitor that “all necessary documentation for minefields is retained,” and that all minefields “are fenced and the civilian population informed as per Amended Protocol II obligations.”^[35] However, Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm the marking of hazardous areas. Previously, it was reported in 2005 and 2004 that minefields and areas contaminated with UXO are not marked in Chechnya.^[36] Media reports have also stated that mined areas are not marked and that there are no maps.^[37] Furthermore, a military commander was quoted as saying that “the demining process is very much complicated by the absence of minefield maps and the fact that the soil is generally heavily infested with metal fragments which make metal detectors ineffective.”^[38]

Mine/ERW Clearance

Russia reported in September 2006 that it had conducted clearance operations in Chechnya since 2005, however, details of the amount of land cleared and mines/ERW detected and destroyed were not included in the report.^[39] A media source quoted the Internal Troops Commander-in-Chief of the General Army, Nikolai Rogozhkin, as stating that during 2006, “bomb squads disarmed almost 200 landmines and over 10,000 explosive articles.”^[40] Another media article reported that the Caucasus Military District Headquarters had published a report on the performance of bomb squads in Chechnya in 2006, stating that “military engineers discovered and disarmed 23,959 explosive devices on the territory of the Southern Federal Region in 2006 (including bombs and artillery pieces of WWII vintage and modern devices); roaming teams of military engineers disarmed 29 landmines that gunmen had planted on the routes used by the troops, information on how many landmines detonated under federal convoys is, of course, not available. It is common knowledge in the meantime that the majority of federal casualties in Chechnya fell victim to explosive devices.”^[41]

Military demining is said to be conducted regularly by deminers from the Federal Forces to allow its troop movements.^[42]

A humanitarian demining mission to Chechnya by an EMERCOM demining team took place in early 2007, at the request of the Chechen government and the President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov. The demining staff included 34 engineers and five mine detection dogs; their main task was to survey and clear about 62 hectares (62,000 square meters) of agricultural land near Oktyabrskoye in Grozny district and Khambi-Irzi; these areas were selected by Chechen authorities. From early March to the end of May 2007 the team destroyed 412 explosive devices.^[43]

Mine Risk Education

In 2006 as in previous years mine risk education (MRE) in Chechnya was implemented by Danish Demining Group (DDG) with the support of Danish Refugee Council (DRC), ICRC and UNICEF through its local partners Voice of the Mountains, Let’s Save the Generation, Chechen Drama Theater and schools and local authorities, reaching more than 110,000 people.

UNICEF coordination responsibilities in Chechnya include MRE, and the 2006 inter-agency workplan for the North Caucasus included MRE as a key component, particularly in the absence of a humanitarian demining program in Chechnya; key objectives were exposure of more of the at-risk population to MRE, and reduced casualties.^[44] However, reporting by MRE implementers in 2005 and 2006 did not allow measurement of progress towards these objectives, and in 2006 for the first time since 2000 the substantial annual declines in casualties ended; casualties increased from 20 in 18 incidents in 2005 to 30 in 20 incidents in 2006.^[45] ICRC reported that the increase was primarily due to deliberate risk-taking for economic reasons.^[46] It may also be explained by increased population movements and construction activity.^[47] In 2006-2007 construction workers and people undertaking livelihood activities in likely mine/UXO hazard areas received targeted MRE.

UNICEF estimated that some 80,000 people received MRE in Chechnya in 2006, including 17,295 direct recipients (13,588 children). An additional eight safe-play areas were constructed with UNICEF support in 2006, bringing its total to 31.^[48] In 2006 DDG/DRC carried out MRE with 11 instructors, reaching over 30,000 people directly in 2006.^[49] DDG/DRC suspended operations in Chechnya for almost a month from February to March 2006 due to security concerns.^[50] ICRC built an additional 20 safe-play areas in mine-affected communities during 2006, bringing its total to 35, and organized the painting of ‘danger mines’ murals in schools in affected districts. It held a two-day regional seminar on MRE for journalists and provided expertise to Chechen authorities and organizations involved in mine action.^[51]

MRE has been included in the curriculum of secondary schools since 2002. In 2007 UNICEF focused on strengthening the quality of the MRE school course.^[52]

Public dissemination included a mine awareness game show broadcast on the Chechen state television organized by Let’s Save the Generation.^[53] ICRC and DDG/DRC also engaged in media campaigns and other means of public information dissemination.^[54]

Landmine/ERW Casualties^[55]

In 2006 Landmine Monitor identified at least 45 new mine/ERW/IED casualties, including 16 killed and 29 injured. Within this total, UNICEF recorded 30 new civilian casualties in 20 incidents (nine killed and 21 injured). At least 10 casualties were children (seven boys and three girls) and two were women. Twelve casualties were caused by ERW, 11 by antipersonnel mines, three each by antivehicle mines and IEDs; one casualty was caused by an unknown device.^[56]

This was an increase from 2005 (24 casualties) but a continued decrease from every year between 1999 and 2004.^[57] However, the UNICEF-supported data collection system does not include casualties among combatants or Chechen civilian casualties in neighboring republics, therefore it is unlikely to be fully representative.^[58] Landmine Monitor media analysis identified at least one police and 14 military casualties in eight victim-activated mine/ERW/IED incidents (seven killed and eight injured); 11 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, two by a cluster submunition, one by an unspecified mine, and one by unknown ERW.^[59]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2007. UNICEF recorded 10 civilian casualties in Chechnya by June; further details were not provided. In addition, media reported seven civilian UXO casualties in Chechnya by June 2007.^[60] Seven military casualties were also reported in 2007 while handling or disarming a MON-100 directional fragmentation mine (five killed, two injured). Another soldier was injured by an IED made of landmine parts.^[61]

In addition to reports of casualties from victim-activated IEDs and ERW, command-detonated devices cause a large number of military casualties.

Data Collection

In 2006 data collection by means of 15 people (referred to as “letterboxes”) continued in all administrative districts of Chechnya; these people work in agencies with access to mine/UXO incident information such as hospitals and local administrations. The local NGO Voice of the Mountains is responsible for transferring casualty data to the IMSMA database and for analysis, dissemination and use of the data. After adopting the letterbox approach in 2005 UNICEF ended the support of active casualty data collection by partner organizations it had provided since 2001.^[62] In February 2007 the Voice of the Mountains database manager participated in a two-week data management training course at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.^[63]

ICRC casualty data was verified by UNICEF in early 2006 and ICRC continued to collect data through supported services.^[64] Handicap International collects data from rehabilitation specialists to compile statistics on disability. ^[65]

In 2006 UNICEF, in cooperation with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), undertook an in-depth analysis of casualty data from 1994 to 2005. Findings included: most injuries during traveling or performing livelihood activities were caused by landmines, while most injuries while playing were caused by UXO. Children were more likely to be injured by UXO than adults, and therefore had more upper body injuries and upper limb amputations. The study also found a high casualty rate compared to other heavily mine-affected countries in 2000, the year with the most casualties in Chechnya, with 6.6 mine/UXO casualties per 10,000 of the population.^[66]

The total number of casualties is not known. The IMSMA database records some 3,064 mine/ERW/IED casualties from the beginning of 1994 to the end of 2006 (702 killed and 2,362 injured).^[67]

Survivor Assistance

Health facilities in Chechnya have been devastated by ongoing conflict since 1994. Access to healthcare is limited and the quality of services is insufficient, lacking basic and specialized medical equipment and physical infrastructure.^[68] Many people with war-related disabilities, including mine survivors, have suffered from a prolonged lack of access to surgical services.^[69] Primary healthcare remains reliant on international support as do orthopedic services and other assistance for mine survivors. Rehabilitation services lack resources, equipment, and skilled staff.^[70] It is estimated that some 7,000 people in Chechnya require prosthetic or orthopedic assistance.^[71]

Psychosocial support and economic reintegration opportunities remain limited and are mainly carried out by NGOs. Only some 16 percent of children with disabilities in Chechnya have access to education.^[72]

Government bodies responsible for assistance to people with disabilities lack the capacity to carry out all their responsibilities; disabled peoples’ organizations in Chechnya have few resources and people with disabilities lack information on available services.^[73]

In 2006 the Chechen Pension Fund recorded more than 67,000 people with disabilities, including nearly 20,000 children.^[74] Government-funded pensions and welfare benefits increased in 2006 but remained inadequate; however, they were paid “more or less regularly” in 2006 unlike previous years.^[75]

In June 2007 the Chechen President signed a resolution introducing an employment quota stipulating that people with disabilities must make up two to four percent of the workforce of organizations with more than 100 employees.^[76]

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework

UNICEF includes victim assistance in its coordination responsibilities. The 2006 inter-agency workplan included victim assistance under the strategic objective: “Increase in the percentage of survivors benefiting from physical, psychosocial and vocational support.” Responsibilities were divided as follows: UNICEF provides vocational training, psychosocial rehabilitation and recreational activities primarily to child mine/ERW survivors and other children with disabilities. The World Health Organization is tasked with addressing the needs of adults and Handicap International supports the needs of civilian survivors generally. UNICEF and ICRC provide training for technicians from the Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Center.^[77]

At least 809 people with disabilities, including 699 survivors, received assistance in 2006. Within this total, ICRC-supported hospitals admitted 45 people injured by mines/ERW. The Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Center provided at least 163 prostheses for mine/ERW survivors (77 percent of the total produced) and one orthosis.^[78] Handicap International provided 10 disabled people with prosthetic assistance.^[79] UNICEF supported services to 490 child mine/UXO survivors.^[80] The Chechen branch of the All-Russian Society for the Disabled provided vocational training courses for some 100 children with disabilities with UNICEF support.^[81]

ICRC continued to provide support to the emergency medical system in Chechnya: major structural repairs were carried out in three hospitals, and thirteen hospitals and the Grozny blood bank received other support. Surgeons from Chechnya attended an ICRC war-surgery seminar in St. Petersburg in 2006.^[82]

In July 2006 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) began providing free reconstructive surgery for patients with disabilities caused by trauma, including corrective surgery for landmine/ERW injuries. MSF provided training and equipment to the neurosurgery and trauma wards of Hospital No. 9 in Grozny.^[83]

The Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Center provides physical rehabilitation for people with disabilities including mine survivors. The ICRC reported that the center continued to receive sufficient funding from authorities to purchase materials and components in addition to ICRC support in 2006.^[84] However, in December 2006 people with disabilities in Chechnya complained to regional authorities about the low quality of prostheses produced by the center.^[85] ICRC reported there was a lack of professional knowledge among center staff.^[86] ICRC and UNICEF supported the training of center technicians, and the ICRC provided the center’s staff with specialized workplace-based training. UNICEF supported prosthetics training for two of the center’s technicians in Makhachkala, Dagestan.^[87] In 2006 the production of devices for mine/ERW survivors decreased compared to 2005.^[88]

Despite an agreement between the ICRC and the Azeri Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Chechen refugees with disabilities were reportedly often denied access to public medical services in Azerbaijan.^[89] In 2006, 10 Chechen refugees made unsuccessful applications to the ministry to receive assistance at the Baku Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center.^[90]

In 2006 Handicap International helped to increase the capacity and quality of service in 20 rehabilitation facilities and provided training in disability issues for rehabilitation specialists, community workers and others. HI opened an information resource center for people with disabilities in December 2006. Ten people with disabilities received prosthetic assistance.^[91]

UNICEF supported child survivors with a variety of services; Voice of the Mountains registers children supported by UNICEF and monitors the quality of products supplied by the Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Center. In 2007 UNICEF ended its support to the Psychosocial Rehabilitation Center, which received funding from the World Health Organization.^[92]

The Chechen branch of the All-Russian Society for the Disabled provided vocational courses to children with disabilities with UNICEF support.^[93]

Funding and Assistance

In 2006 international donations totaling $1,334,902 (€1,062,567) for mine action in Chechnya were reported by six countries and the European Commission (EC), an increase of 36 percent from 2005 ($982,124 provided by three countries).^[94] Donors reporting funding in 2006 were:

• Denmark: DKK1 million ($168,300) to DDG for MRE;^[95]
• EC: €150,000 ($188,445) to UNICEF for MRE;^[96]
• France: €156,251 ($196,298) for victim assistance;^[97]
• Germany: €234,484 ($294,582) to UNICEF for MRE and victim assistance;^[98]
• Slovenia: SIT799,998 ($4,160) for mine action and coordination;^[99]
• Sweden: SEK1,207,937 ($163,917) to Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) for unspecified mine action;^[100]
• Switzerland: CHF400,000 ($319,200) to UNICEF for mine action.^[101]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Chechnya received 95 percent ($1,263,771) of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006.^[102] UNICEF received funding of $1,074,877 for mine action in Chechnya and surrounding regions through the Portfolio in 2006, from donations by the EC, USAID, Germany, Switzerland, UK, and the UK and Netherlands national committees of UNICEF.^[103]