Senegal

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. On 3 August 2005, the president signed the Law on the prohibition of antipersonnel mines.^[1] The law makes production, purchase, sale, stockpiling, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines a criminal offense.^[2] The president signed two implementation decrees on 18 August 2006, establishing a national mine action authority and a mine action center.

Senegal submitted its annual updated Article 7 report covering calendar year 2007, due 30 April 2008. It has submitted eight previous reports.^[3]

Senegal attended the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, where it made a statement on mine clearance. Senegal participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance, and provided an overview of its Article 5 extension request.

Senegal has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, Senegal has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.^[4]

Senegal is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Senegal attended the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2007, but did not submit an annual transparency report as required under Article 13. Senegal is not party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Senegal participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 and adopted the final treaty text.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Government authorities claim that Senegal has never used antipersonnel mines inside or outside the country, and in its Article 7 reports Senegal has consistently stated that it has never produced, possessed or stockpiled mines, even for training purposes.^[5]

However, in April 2007 Senegal reported that 24 antipersonnel mines were used for training purposes before their destruction in August and September 2006. It stated that the mines were either taken from demining operations or discovered among rebel stockpiles, and that the defuzed mines were used to instruct deminers.^[6]

Sporadic armed conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal has continued between government forces and elements of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC).^[7] There have continued to be civilian casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor has not seen any direct allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by the MFDC in this reporting period.

In May 2008, a bus detonated an antivehicle mine near the village of Lefeu, killing one and injuring 20. A Senegalese army officer claimed the mine was laid by the MFDC in response to recent army activity in the area. A local police officer reported that the mine was recently laid, based on the heavy traffic along the road where the detonation occurred.^[8]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Senegal is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of fighting between the Senegalese army and MFDC in Casamance, an area located south of the Gambia and stretching to the border with Guinea-Bissau, comprised of the Ziguinchor and Kolda regions.^[9] A peace accord was signed in December 2004, although fighting has continued sporadically, in particular with an MFDC splinter group led by Salif Sadio.^[10] Senegal has reported that “since the signature of the agreement, the situation has generally been calm throughout Casamance and there has been a relative absence of armed violence between the parties, although the MFDC’s armed groups have not abandoned their bases.”^[11]

The extent of the problem has been broadly captured by the Emergency Landmine Impact Survey of Casamance (ELISC), conducted by Handicap International (HI) in October 2005 to May 2006. The ELISC recorded 149 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) over an area of 11km² of land and 63km of roads or tracks affecting 93 communities (containing 7% of the population).^[12] Eight of the SHAs were only suspected to be contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO).^[13]

According to the survey, areas most affected were the region of Ziguinchor (72 SHAs) and Sédhiou department in Kolda region (58 SHAs), although contamination was also found in the Oussouye and Bignona departments in Ziguinchor region as well as the department of Kolda.^[14] In July 2008, Senegal reported that the districts of Diattacounda (Sédhiou department), Niaguiss, and Nyassia (both Ziguinchor department), between the Senegal river and the border with Guinea-Bissau, were the most highly contaminated.^[15] For the most part, contamination was said to be the result of nuisance mining by armed groups.^[16]

The ELISC did not fully capture the extent of contamination, however. In its Article 7 report for 2006, Senegal noted that certain areas had not been accessible to the survey teams due to security concerns.^[17] This was said to be particularly the case with communities along Senegal’s borders with Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia.^[18] Similarly, several villages were found inhabited by the survey teams and were therefore not included in the ELISC. According to Senegal, “there is no doubt that not all the contaminated areas have yet been discovered.”^[19]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

On 18 August 2006, the National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention was designated as the national mine action authority for Senegal by presidential decree. Its responsibilities were defined as overseeing the work of the national mine action center and adopting a national mine action strategy. It includes representatives of the presidency and government ministries; it is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[20]

On the same day, a second decree established the Senegal National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines du Sénégal, CNAMS).^[21] CNAMS is responsible for operational implementation of Senegal’s mine action strategy and serves as the secretariat to the National Commission. The director of CNAMS was appointed by decree in January 2007.^[22]

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) supports the mine action program in Senegal with funding and technical advice (see below section on integration of mine action). Its Chief Technical Advisor left at the end of June 2008 and had not been replaced as of late July.^[23]

Status of strategic mine action planning

In November 2007, the National Commission and the CNAMS drafted a national mine action strategy. The strategy, which was annexed to both Senegal’s initial and revised Article 5 deadline extension requests,^[24] “reaffirms the civilian, neutral and humanitarian character of the program and covers the period 2007–2015.”^[25] It aims, among other things, to eliminate the threat from mines and ERW by 2015, to demine the affected areas accompanied by development activities, and to strengthen the framework of coordination between mine action actors.^[26]

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction and development

The two strategic objectives of the Senegal Mine Action Strategy are to c Demining ontribute to the re-establishment of human security and peace-building, and to support the restarting of socio-economic and local development activities.^[27] In 2003, the government had drafted its Programme for Restarting Social and Economic Activities in Casamance (Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance, PRAESC), which included, as a central component, demining. In this regard, the government of Senegal asked for assistance from UNDP in the establishment of a mine action program, which is being carried out through the Project of Assistance to Mine Action in Casamance (Projet d’Assistance à la Lutte antimines en Casamance).^[28]

Demining

HI is the only humanitarian demining operator in Senegal.^[29] In 2007, with funding from the United States Department of State, HI recruited, trained and equipped the first civilian Senegalese demining team. On 1 February 2008, the team, composed of a team leader, eight deminers including two women, two paramedics and two community liaison officers, was deployed on a pilot demining operation in Kandialang, on the outskirts of Ziguinchor, the capital of Ziguinchor region (see below).^[30]

The Senegalese Army has performed “operational” demining since 1996.^[31] In late 2006, without consulting CNAMS or the National Commission, Senegalese army personnel supported by about 500 Moroccan soldiers entered Casamance to conduct demining operations, and were attacked by an MFDC splinter faction. Two Senegalese personnel were killed and 14 others were injured. In February 2007, the ICBL wrote to the director of CNAMS to express its concern about the operations and was assured that the “episode”^[32] was over. In April 2007, Senegal reaffirmed its 2006 decision to create a civilian mine action program: “because of the potentially sensitive nature of the demining operations in Casamance, the Government of Senegal had decided to create a civilian, neutral and humanitarian program that would work in close cooperation with all the stakeholders.”^[33]

Identifying hazardous areas

The ELISC referred to above was conducted by HI under the supervision of UNDP and was said to be in accordance with the Survey Working Group protocols for a Landmine Impact Survey, but adapted to the local context.^[34] It is the basis for planning of demining operations in the absence of follow-up technical surveys, although technical survey “will obviously be used in the framework of clearance operations in Casamance.”^[35]

As of early 2008, the only technical survey conducted had been in Kandialang (Ziguinchor), which determined that no contamination existed, despite the ELISC report, and the land was due to be handed over to the local community by the CNAMS.^[36] Based on the recommendations of the general survey in Boutoute (Ziguinchor), technical survey followed, detecting contamination, which led to systematic clearance.^[37]

Marking of affected areas

According to Senegal’s extension request, there is little marking in Casamance that meets international standards. Some informal warning signs have been emplaced by local villagers.^[38]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

As of July 2008, the only humanitarian demining in Casamance had taken place in Kandialang, an area close to Ziguinchor, and the community of Boutoute. Since the beginning of demining operations several mines were found and neutralized.^[39] According to HI, “as civilian humanitarian demining is new in Senegal, everything is going very slowly, in parallel to peace negotiations between the government and the…MFDC which have yet to be completed.”^[40]

The armed forces had reported conducting operational demining jointly with a Moroccan army engineering battalion in December 2006 and January 2007 in the controversial operation referred to above. According to Senegal, the operations enabled some 165km of roads to be demined. Between 10 and 21 May 2007, the army indicated that they alone had cleared 3.3km in Mpack (Ziguinchor). Between 10 and 15 March 2008, the army claimed to have demined a further 11.4km of roads in Bissine and Niadiou, both in Ziguinchor department.^[41]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Senegal is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Despite the protracted delays in setting up a demining program, in April 2007 Senegal expressed its determination “to respect its undertakings set out in Article 5 of the Convention and to ensure the destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control within the prescribed deadlines, i.e. March 2009, to the extent possible.”^[42]

In April 2008, Senegal submitted a request for an extension of seven years to its Article 5 deadline. In May 2008, the ICBL delivered a critique of Senegal’s initial Article 5 deadline extension request both to Senegal and to the analyzing group of states tasked with reviewing States Parties’ extension requests. The critique stated that: “Senegal has made limited progress in meeting its Article 5 obligations, with almost no land cleared to date to humanitarian standards. While the conflict with the MFDC made it difficult to begin demining operations before the end of 2004, if the national authority and mine action center had been set up earlier, demining operations might have been able to begin much more quickly after the end of the conflict.”^[43]

In July 2008, Senegal submitted a revised extension request but maintained the request for seven years to 1 March 2016, although it noted that it was “possible, by virtue of the relatively small-scale contamination, to finalize demining activities on its territory for 2015.”^[44] This was dependent on the positive evolution of the peace process and improved security in the affected areas. Senegal claimed that following the signature of peace accords with the MFDC in December 2004, the government had done “everything in its power” to put in place the necessary mine action structures and to try to respect its obligations under Article 5.^[45]

ICBL’s critique concluded that: “Given the level of estimated contamination, an extension of seven years seems to be excessive, especially in light of the lack of a technical survey to better define the extent of the problem. An extension of four years appears more reasonable. During this time, Senegal needs to conduct technical survey of all its SHAs to identify and then revise its strategic plan (and therefore any subsequent extension request) accordingly.”^[46]

In a “draft” document dated 27 May 2008, Senegal declared that the ICBL assessment “does not appear to take sufficient account of the political and diplomatic aspects that are [an] integral part of the development of a mine action programme, in particular in a volatile post-crisis context that inevitably delays implementation of the foreseen technical activities. Senegal is consequently reaffirming its wish to request a seven-year extension to enable it to complete its national strategy as planned and comply with its commitments under article 5 of the Convention.”^[47]

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2007, one new mine casualty was reported by authorities and operators in Senegal; a man was injured while traveling on foot in Djireuk (Oussouye department, Ziguinchor region).^[48] However, the US Department of State noted that “Landmines severely injured four children during the year.”^[49] These casualties could not be confirmed.

The 2007 casualty rate decreased sharply compared to 2006 (18 casualties), however, casualties might be under-reported due to incomplete data collection.^[50] UNICEF and HI attribute the casualty decrease to the success of mine/ERW risk education (RE). The casualty rate is linked with the volatile security situation, refugee return and new mine use.

Casualties were reported at an increased rate in 2008, with at least 23 casualties in three incidents to June 2008 (one person killed and 22 injured). On 1 May, 20 people were injured and one killed when a Gambian-registered bus drove over a mine on the way to the Gambia.^[51] CNAMS only recorded 15 casualties for this incident, but media reports provided detailed accounts of 21 casualties.^[52]

Data collection

Casualty data collection remained incomplete in Senegal. It was expected that data collection would improve once CNAMS was operational.^[53] In 2007, CNAMS unified casualty databases held by different organizations and the information was entered into Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).^[54] Information is collected through RE committees, the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ASVM), Kolda and Ziguinchor hospitals, HI, local authorities, and the army.^[55] Reportedly CNAMS also started collecting data on assistance provided to survivors.^[56]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Senegal remains unknown and contradictory. The CNAMS database included records on 731 casualties (161 killed and 570 injured) between 1988 and 1 January 2008. Of these, 535 were civilians, including at least 50 women and 18 children; 196 were military.^[57] ASVM has 80 members registered, all mine/ERW survivors.^[58]

The number of persons with disabilities in Senegal is unknown. HI estimates that 2% of the population is disabled.^[59]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

During 2007, there were no significant changes to mine/ERW RE methods, coverage and at-risk groups. However, in August 2007, HI ceased its RE activities due to a lack of commitment from the authorities.^[60] In 2007, at least 179,345 people received some form of RE, including at least 32,400 children in the Ziguinchor and Kolda regions in Casamance. Some 625 people were trained to disseminate RE messages.

Strategic framework and capacity

CNAMS is responsible for overall coordination, monitoring and reporting of RE activities to the National Commission.^[61] In November 2007, CNAMS developed a mine action strategy, including RE. The methods envisioned are direct RE sessions in communities, community liaison in conjunction with clearance activities and radio broadcasting. Target groups are affected communities, IDPs and refugees, with a particular focus on children.^[62] Activities are to be implemented in cooperation with UNICEF and ASVM, with UNICEF continuing to provide technical and/or financial support.^[63]

Until the end of its program in August 2007, HI continued to conduct community liaison and community-based RE in 88 affected communities in the regions of Kolda and Ziguinchor through schools, village assemblies and local associations, as well as local mine committees (Comités de Prévention des Incidents par Mines). HI reported that in 2006–2007 a total of 298,937 people were reached (75,617 boys, 49,134 girls, 90,332 men and 83,854 women). Annual data for 2007 was not provided but previously HI reported reaching 152,842 people in 2006.^[64]

ASVM provided RE to 32,400 children in 60 schools in the second half of 2007 in Nyassia and Niaguis (Ziguinchor), as well as in the outskirts of Ziguinchor. In addition, AVSM also reached some 850 people with awareness-raising events in 30 villages in Casamance. Activities were financed by UNICEF.^[65] The local NGO Kabonkétoor provided RE on mines and small arms/light weapons (SALW) to rural populations in Diouloulou, Djignaki, Niaguis, Sindian, and Tendouck in Ziguinchor region.^[66] CNAMS conducted some ad hoc RE while visiting returnee villages.^[67]

In 2007, UNICEF continued to integrate mine, ERW, and SALW RE activities in stress management and conflict prevention projects targeting rural areas where incidents were recorded in previous years. A community-based component was developed in partnership with the Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women Entrepreneurship, and Micro Finance and a school component was developed with the Ministry of Education. In 2007, 375 teachers received RE training and students from 500 selected schools received RE, as well as 250 village leaders or elected representatives. Following the recommendations of a 2005 evaluation, UNICEF stated that it had adapted its RE strategy to make it more responsive to community needs.^[68]

In 2007–2008, the Nova Scotia Gambia Association (NSGA) provided RE to Senegalese refugees in the Gambia following a refugee influx due to increased conflict in Casamance.^[69]

Victim Assistance

Senegal recognizes that assistance to mine survivors is still largely insufficient in terms of medical aid, psychological support and socio-economic reintegration. At least 80% of mine/ERW survivors live in rural areas in the regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda, where services are more limited than elsewhere in Senegal.^[70] Victim assistance (VA) initiatives are integrated into the framework of the rehabilitation and reintegration of persons with disabilities in general.^[71] However, it was reported that projects aimed at assisting survivors were “winding down”^[72] and that no funding had been secured for VA activities for 2007–2009.^[73] Several programs earmarked to assist persons with disabilities offered services to other vulnerable populations, reducing resources for persons with disabilities.^[74]

Casualties are usually evacuated by the army.^[75] Mine/ERW casualties are treated free of charge at the Kolda and Ziguinchor regional hospitals, which both have emergency and continuing medical care services. If needed, casualties are transferred to national hospitals outside of Casamance.^[76]

Physical rehabilitation services, including physiotherapy and mobility devices, are available in the cities of Dakar, Kolda and Ziguinchor (at the hospital and through mobile units). A lack of material and financial resources limited the quality and quantity of assistance.^[77] Prostheses and walking appliances are not generally free of charge; the average cost of medical care and a prosthetic device is $700 and unaffordable to most survivors.^[78]

Psychosocial support services remain limited and are mainly carried out by NGOs, but in 2007 the government reported that hospital and community-based rehabilitation (CBR) staff had been trained in providing psychosocial support. With the support of HI, a psychiatrist from Dakar reportedly continued to visit Casamance (three times in 2007–2008) and mine/ERW survivors could obtain free counseling, psychotherapy and debriefing sessions.^[79]

Ziguinchor Regional Hospital records indicated that most mine/ERW survivors were unemployed or self-employed but in need of assistance.^[80] Economic reintegration and education programs for persons with disabilities are integrated in poverty reduction and development strategies, but services, mainly provided by NGOs, remained inadequate.^[81] The government operated schools for children with disabilities and covered vocational training costs for persons with disabilities at the regional vocational training centers. There is a regional vocational training center in Ziguinchor, but it needs strengthening.^[82] Three mine survivors were employed at CNAMS in 2007.^[83]

The government operates the five-year national plan for CBR;^[84] the CBR network in Casamance provides psychosocial and medical services, and economic assistance.^[85]

The protection of the rights of persons with disabilities is inscribed in the constitution and was reportedly enforced.^[86] However, social discrimination persisted, especially against disabled women.^[87] Legislation mandated that 15% of new civil servant jobs be reserved for persons with disabilities, but an additional bill is needed to make the law operational.^[88] In 2007, an interministerial committee on disability took steps to strengthen the rights of persons with disabilities, including national guidelines.^[89] On 25 April 2007, Senegal signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. The ratification process was said to be ongoing as of June 2008;^[90] Senegal had not ratified either instrument as of 31 July 2008.

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Senegal is one of 25 State Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[91] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Senegal presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005.^[92] These objectives are not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). Senegal has not formally presented revised objectives or plans.

At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Senegal’s VA expert outlined planned activities under the national mine action strategy. These include: updating the casualty database; technical support to AVSM; finding ways to produce and repair mobility devices; lobbying for health-cost coverage and education for mine/ERW survivors; and identifying means and partners to support income-generating activities.^[93] No clear timeframes or responsibilities were assigned. The objectives do not seem to provide for comprehensive VA, as issues are addressed very broadly (economic reintegration, education and physical rehabilitation) or not addressed at all (psychosocial support, emergency medical care and laws/public policies).

More than halfway into the 2005–2009 timeframe, Senegal does not appear to have made significant progress in VA. In 2008, ASVM stated that the issue remained a low priority for the government and that no funds had been allocated.^[94] HI added that VA remained “unstructured.”^[95]

Victim assistance strategic framework

CNAMS is responsible for overall coordination, monitoring and reporting of VA activities, and VA is an integral part of the revised mine action strategy (2007–2009).^[96] CNAMS was not intending to implement VA activities directly, but to work through partners. CNAMS needs an estimated budget of $400,000 per year between 2007 and 2009 for coordination and to support implementation of activities (see above). No funding had been allocated or identified as of June 2008. The CBR program had a budget of CFA1 million ($2,474) for VA.^[97] Associations working with mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities noted the lack of civil society involvement in VA planning.^[98]

The VA objectives in the revised mine action strategy are in line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and with PRAESC.^[99]

The Ministry of Family, National Solidarity, Women Entrepreneurship, and Micro Finance is responsible for disability issues at the national level and through its regional services for social action.^[100]

Assistance activities

It is unknown how many persons with disabilities and mine/ERW survivors received assistance in 2007.

The Ziguinchor Regional Hospital provided medical and physical rehabilitation assistance to two mine survivors in 2007, and to nine more between January and June 2008.^[101] The hospital’s mobile unit provided follow-up services and repairs of prosthetic devices for 20 mine/ERW survivors in rural areas between July and August 2007; a second outreach mission was conducted in April–May 2008.^[102] The Kolda Regional Hospital did not assist mine/ERW survivors in 2007 and through to June 2008.^[103]

In March 2008, the Senegalese Association for the Support of the Creation of Socio-Economic Activities (Association Sénégalaise pour l’Appui à la Création d’Activités Socio-économiques) and ASVM organized a fundraising event for mine/ERW survivors, reportedly collecting CFA35 million ($85,750).^[104] The funds will go to survivor identification, education and socio-economic activities.^[105]

In 2007, HI continued to provide direct and indirect assistance to conflict victims and persons with disabilities in Ziguinchor and Kolda regions. The project was scheduled to end in August 2008.^[106]

In 2007, UNICEF continued to support local organizations providing psychosocial support to mine/ERW survivors and those injured during the conflict.^[107] In April 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) resumed direct activities in Casamance; operations had been suspended following the death of an ICRC delegate in a mine incident in 2006. In 2007, three health centers in Casamance received indirect ICRC support through the Senegalese Red Cross Society and national health authorities.^[108]

Support for Mine Action

Senegal has provided a cost estimate for completion of mine clearance obligations totaling $27,460,000 (€20,027,715) for the period 2009–2015.^[109] Cost projections were based in part on UNDP cost estimates for the demining program in Casamance, with a budget of $13 million over two and a half years. Because Senegal’s mine action program was in its infancy in 2007, it stated as of April 2008 that it was too early to provide budget details.^[110] The National Commission has responsibility for allocating and managing resources to ensure effective use of mine action funds.^[111]

National support for mine action

Senegal reported an annual contribution of $960,000 as of October 2007, including funds for rehabilitation facilities.^[112] No funding was reported for 2006. In May 2008, Senegal reported that it had contributed $300,000 in both 2007 and 2008 to support the operations of the mine action center. It stated that, although its Article 5 extension request does not refer to an increase in national funding, such an increase may take place, and the level of national funding for the period from 2009 to 2015 had not yet been determined. Senegal stated that during this period, national funding would “certainly not decrease but will most probably increase with the development and progress of the [demining] programme.”^[113]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, five countries and the European Commission (EC) reported providing $7,305,406 (€5,328,135) to mine action in Senegal. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was approximately 690% more than reported in 2006. The EC contributed in excess of $5.4 million in funding in 2007, but did not contribute funds in 2006, accounting for much of the overall increase in funds. Funding at the 2007 level exceeds the estimated annual costs of the 2009–2015 mine action plan (which average about $4.6 million per year, with at most $6.1 million projected for 2011).^[114]

In May 2008, however, Senegal stated that a significant portion of funds pledged in 2007 were not yet available for spending on mine action. Project documents were still in preparation by UNDP and the EC to allow the release of EC funds. Senegal reported that Spain had announced €4 million in new funding to Senegal, but had not yet officially confirmed the contribution or negotiated with Senegal any terms for its use, including the areas of mine action for which the funds were intended or allowed. Senegal further stated that no Canadian funds had been committed in 2008, and US funding to HI for mine clearance (see table below) had been “disrupted by the donor before the deminers could be deployed in the field.” Senegal stated that the only funds “effectively available” for mine clearance as of May 2008 were €277,000 contributed by Belgium (see table below, reported by Belgium as €266,710).^[115]

Senegal had previously reported receiving $7,767,000 in international funding as of October 2007, for technical assistance, impact assessment, development strategy, and humanitarian demining. Senegal listed Belgium, Canada, EC, France, South Korea, Sweden, the US, and UNDP as funders, but did not provide a breakdown of funds received by contributor.^[116]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Senegal: Monetary^[117]

2007 International Mine Action Support: In-Kind^[118]

HI reported receiving €300,000 from Spain for VA between 2006 and 2008.^[119] Spain has not reported funding since 2006 to HI programs in Senegal.