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Sub-Sections:
Sudan, Landmine Monitor Report 2008

Sudan

State Party since

1 April 2004

Treaty implementing legislation

None adopted

Last Article 7 report submitted in

August 2008

Article 4 (stockpile destruction)

Deadline: 1 April 2008

Completed: 31 March 2008

Article 3 (mines retained)

Initially: 10,000

August 2008: 4,997

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW

Estimated area of contamination

Unknown

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

Deadline: 1 April 2014

Likelihood of meeting deadline

Unclear

Demining progress in 2007

Mined area clearance: 5.9km2 (2006: 1.34km2)

Battle area clearance: 18.3km2 (2006: 6.44km2)

Road clearance: 917km (2006: 814km)

Mine/ERW casualties in 2007

Total: 91 (2006: 140)

Mines: 23 (2006: 46)

Submunitions: 4 (2006: 2)

Other ERW: 45 (2006: 25)

Unknown devices: 19 (2005: 67)

Casualty analysis

Killed: 28 (20056: 38)

Injured: 63 (2006: 102)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

2,700

RE capacity

Adequate

Availability of services in 2007

Unchanged—inadequate

Progress towards victim assistance (VA25) aims

Slow

Mine action funding in 2007

International: $29,201,406 (2006: $28.9 million)

National: $7.5 million (2006: $5.5 million)

Key developments since May 2007

Reported clearance increased significantly in 2007. Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its treaty deadline. As of April 2008, national legislation was reportedly in the process of approval by the government. An evaluation of the UNDP support to capacity building in Sudan, completed in February 2008, found no clear vision of the mine action program in Sudan after 2011. The Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 13 states as of July 2008.

Background

Following a three-year peace process, the Government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. An interim implementation period of six years will last until July 2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south will be held. Sudan is now ruled by the Government of National Unity (GONU)—an entity containing the former ruling party, the National Congress, SPLM/A, and others—and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). On 24 March 2005, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1590 to monitor implementation of the CPA and establish a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). On 1 January 2008, the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established, with the mandate to support the implementation of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and any subsequent peace agreements in the region.[1]

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004. The CPA incorporates previous agreements between the government and SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines. An agreement reached on 31 December 2004 states that the “laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited.”[2]

Sudan has yet to adopt national implementation legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty, or any measures to enforce antipersonnel mine prohibitions.[3] In November 2007, Sudan reported that it had drafted domestic mine action laws that were being reviewed by the Ministry of Justice.[4] As of April 2008, national legislation was reportedly in the process of approval by the government.[5]

Sudan submitted its annual Article 7 report in August 2008, covering calendar year 2007. Prior to the submission deadline of 30 April 2008, Sudan submitted an interim letter to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit regarding completion of its stockpile destruction obligations.[6] Sudan has submitted four previous Article 7 reports.[7]

Sudan participated in the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, where it made a statement during the general exchange of views, as well as statements on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim assistance, and cooperation and assistance. Sudan participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2008, where it made statements on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim assistance, and cooperation and assistance. Two victim assistance experts were included in the delegations at each of these meetings.

Sudan has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.

Sudan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but signed the convention on 10 April 1981. It participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 and adopted the final treaty text.

Production, Transfer and Use

Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[8] Landmine Monitor has not received any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the government, the SPLA, or other forces anywhere in Sudan since early 2004.[9]

While there were no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in 2007 and early 2008, increased conflict in the Darfur region has resulted in new explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in previously cleared areas.[10] As noted below (see Landmine/ERW Problem section), the UN has recorded one suspected mined area in Darfur. It is not known when mines were laid. Many groups remain outside the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, which prohibits mine use and requires some cooperation on mine action for the factions which signed it.[11]

Stockpiling and Destruction

Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 April 2008. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied in accounts by Sudan leading up to and following stockpile destruction events in 2007 and 2008.

In its February 2006 Article 7 report, Sudan declared a total of 14,485 antipersonnel mines of eight types held in the stockpiles of the army and the SPLA, and stated that 5,000 mines of various types would be retained for training purposes by the Engineer Corps of the Sudan Armed Forces.[12] In its May 2006 and April 2007 Article 7 reports, Sudan declared a total of 4,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines of 18 types, all under the control of GONU, and an additional 10,000 mines of unspecified types to be retained for training purposes, with GONU and GOSS each retaining 5,000 mines.[13]

Sudan carried out an initial stockpile destruction event on 30 April 2007 in northern Sudan, at which 4,488 mines were destroyed.[14] In June 2008, during the intersessional meeting in Geneva, Sudan provided a breakdown of the numbers, types and origins of mines destroyed at the April event, as well as the number and types of mines retained for training purposes. Nine types of mines were reported destroyed. A total of 805 mines of six types were retained.[15] In its Article 7 report submitted in August 2008, Sudan revised its breakdown of mines destroyed in the April 2007 event, reporting the same number in total but only eight types of mine destroyed, as follows:

Antipersonnel Mines Destroyed in Sudan, 30 April 2007[16]

#

Type of Mine

No. Destroyed

1

PMN

300

2

M14

200

3

PRM M35

100

4

PPm2

855

5

Valmara V69

300

6

PMD-6

1,780

7

TS-50

100

8

POMZ-2

853

Total

4,488

Antipersonnel Mines Destroyed in Sudan, 31 March 2008[17]

#

Type of Mine

Origin

Total No. in Stock

No. Destroyed

1

PMN

Russia

731

731

2

Type 72

China

175

175

3

Type TS-50

Italy

3

3

4

Type MN 21

Russia

1

1

5

POMZ-2

former Yugoslavia

4,400

4,400

6

Type No. 4

Israel

180

180

7

Type R2 m2

South Africa

93

93

8

M14

United States

19

19

9

PMN2

East Germany

22

22

10

Type 69

Russia

180

180

11

Type PMA2

Yugoslavia

264

264

12

Type PRB-35

Belgium

3

3

13

Type AUPS

Yugoslavia

1

1

14

PROM-1

Unknown

2

2

15

Unknown

Italy

4

4

Total

6,078

6,078

On 31 March 2008, a second destruction event took place in Southern Sudan, at which an additional 6,078 mines were destroyed.[18]

The April 2007 destruction event was attended by members of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), GONU ministers, foreign diplomats, UN officials, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), civil society organizations, and the media.[19] The March 2008 event was attended by GOSS ministers and SPLA officers in addition to the above.[20]

The origin, types, and numbers of mines destroyed in these two events, as reported by Sudan in its Article 7 report submitted in August 2008 and June 2008 statement to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, did not match the data provided in Sudan’s earlier Article 7 reports.

In an April 2008 letter to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Sudan stated that, of a total stockpile of 15,566 antipersonnel mines, it had destroyed 10,566 and retained 5,000. Sudan stated that the adjusted figure of 15,566 mines (rather than the 14,485 mines previously reported) was the result of additional mines stockpiled by SPLA forces not being previously included in inventories.[21]

Sudan has indicated that it expects additional stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be identified and destroyed, given the difficulties of doing a comprehensive inventory and collection of all the stockpiled antipersonnel mines belonging to all former combatants in Sudan. At the March 2008 destruction event, the GOSS Minister of Interior expressed his hope to “gather again to destroy even bigger number of mines than today.” Later that day he repeated this statement to Landmine Monitor.[22] On 1 April 2008, one day after the destruction event, a stock of 10 boxes of Type 69 antipersonnel mines was found.[23]

Mines Retained for Training Purposes

In April 2008, shortly after the completion of stockpile destruction, Sudan reported retaining 5,000 mines of unspecified types “for the purposes of research and [the] demining training process.”[24] In June 2008, it reported retaining 4,979 mines, again without specifying types.[25] In August 2008, Sudan reported retaining 4,997 mines of eighteen types, without specifying numbers retained for each type. The list provided is evidently provisional, as Sudan stated “Details of each type of mine and the quantities are being sorted out and will be reported in the next report.”[26] It is not clear whether the differences in the reported numbers of mine retained are accounted for by consumption of mines in training or research between April and August 2008. Previously, Sudan had indicated it would keep 10,000 mines under the Article 3 exception.[27]

Sudan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

The head of the Southern Sudan Mine Action Centre has stated that all mines retained for training and research purposes are held under the authority of GONU and are not accessible to mine action authorities or operators in Southern Sudan. Mines required for training purposes in Southern Sudan must be obtained from sources other than GONU stocks, at least until the 2011 referendum on the status of Southern Sudan, at which time common access to stocks may result from the establishment of joint or cooperative government.[28]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Sudan is contaminated with mines and ERW, especially as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the Government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the SPLA. The struggle ostensibly ended with the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005, although violence in the first half of 2008 raised fears of a return to conflict.[29] Sudan’s borders with Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Uganda are all considered mine-affected, with some mines having been laid as long ago as World War II.[30]

The precise extent of contamination remains unclear, with UN and national authorities previously estimating that 19 of 25 Sudanese states were contaminated.[31] However, the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), which is being conducted on a state-by-state basis, and a number of ad hoc assessments, have given a better indication of the problem.[32] As of December 2007, the national database–the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)–had recorded 1,427 dangerous areas impacting 190 communities in 18 states.[33] Survey and clearance results indicated that almost three-quarters of the areas identified as of end December 2007 were located in Southern Sudan.[34] The violence in 2008 centered on the town of Abyei resulted in new ERW contamination. In response to the confrontation, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) deployed a team to conduct emergency survey and clearance of the new unexploded ordnance (UXO); as of August, the team had completed battle area clearance (BAC) in the town.[35]

In Darfur region, there is a “moderate” problem with ERW, mainly UXO,[36] although ERW contamination of previously cleared areas is re-occurring and requires continuous attention.[37] (Cluster) submunitions, which were located in one isolated area, have been cleared.[38] Only one suspected mined area has been registered in Darfur. Located in Southern Darfur state, the area has been prioritized for clearance.[39] The extent of the problem in Western Darfur state and on the border with Chad, both areas of ongoing conflict, was not known as of April 2008, due to security concerns.[40]

In addition to continuing casualties (see below, Landmine/ERW Casualties section), mines and ERW contaminate agricultural land, livestock-grazing areas, land used for collecting firewood and producing charcoal, access routes, and connection roads.[41] Fear of mines and ERW has resulted in extensive road closures. More broadly, according to the UN, contamination also obstructs delivery of humanitarian aid, hinders the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and impedes reconstruction, development and peace-building.[42]

As of July 2008, the LIS had been completed in 13 states: Blue Nile, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Gedaref, Kassala, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Red Sea, Sennar, Unity, Warrab, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Equatoria.[43] The total number of communities impacted by mines and UXO was 202 (23 high, 64 medium, and 115 low impact), affecting an estimated 1.3 million people, with an additional 550,000 returnees expected to come back to the impacted communities. The total number of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was 442, covering an estimated 54km2 with a further 324 UXO spot tasks.[44]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

The coordinating and managing institutions in Sudan are the NMAA and the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA, also referred to as the SSDC, the Southern Sudan Demining Commission), with technical assistance from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNMAO.[45]

The NMAA[46] includes a National Mine Action Committee; a General Secretariat; the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), based in Khartoum; and the Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Center, based in Juba, Central Equatoria state.[47] While the NMAA’s responsibilities are clearly defined,[48] mine action legislation that would determine the SSDA’s terms and conditions of service, and regulations to govern its work, was still under development in March 2008.[49]

UNMAO planned to continue providing training and other support to the NMAA and the mine action centers until the end of the CPA’s six-year interim period, 2011, and by then to have handed over all the functions needed for the mine action program.[50] On 25–28 February 2008, a Strategic Planning Workshop on Transition was held in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss the transition of the Sudan Mine Action Programme to full national ownership. Participants included NMAC, the SSDA, the Humanitarian Affairs Commission, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNDP, and Sudanese mine action NGOs. The workshop ended with a formal agreement on the process towards a transition framework and a series of time-bound milestones were set. The next workshop on transition was scheduled for May 2008.[51]

The offices of NMAC and the SSDA have been established, equipped, and staffed and are operational. Staff, who number about 25 at NMAC and 40 at the SSDA, have received training from UNDP, UNMAO, Cranfield University, and the GICHD. Capacities to fulfill the key responsibilities of planning, coordination, information management, reporting, and quality assurance of mine action are said by UNMAO to be “emerging gradually.”[52] According to UNDP, “understanding” among NMAC and SSDA staff has improved in the coordination and management of mine action, and they have assumed “partial responsibility” for planning and coordinating mine action activities in their respective areas of jurisdiction. Further capacity-building efforts were planned for 2008.[53]

There are three regional mine action offices in Sudan. Mine action activities in the north are coordinated by the Northern Regional Mine Action Office in Kadugli, South Kordofan state, and supported by three sub-offices in Kadugli; Ed Damazin in Blue Nile state; and Kassala. Coordination in Southern Sudan is by the Juba-based South Regional Mine Action Office, supported by sub-offices in Juba, Malakal in Upper Nile state; Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal state; Yei in Central Equatoria state; and Rumbek in Lakes state.[54] In western Sudan, an office in Al Fasher in Northern Darfur state coordinates the work of two sub-offices in Al Fasher (for Northern Darfur state) and in Nyala (for Southern Darfur state). A third sub-office was due to be opened in El-Geneina for Western Darfur state by end May 2008.[55]

National mine action legislation and standards

As of April 2008, there was no detailed legislation regulating mine action in Sudan.[56] According to UNMAO, a draft has been prepared in Arabic by GONU and presented to the Ministry of Justice for review. The process of developing mine action legislation for mine action in Southern Sudan has “just begun.”[57]

The legislative framework for mine action in 2007 continued to be provided by the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement, presidential decrees setting up the NMAA and the SSDA, UNMIS’s mandate for mine action, and the National Mine Action Policy Framework and Mine Action Strategic Framework.[58]

National mine action technical guidelines and standards which cover demining, risk education, and information management are developed and maintained by UNMAO on behalf of the national authorities. Most of the organizations operating in Sudan are said to have been accredited and to be operating in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and national standards.[59]

Status of strategic mine action planning

The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006–2011, adopted in 2006, serves as the key strategic planning document for mine action in Sudan. Strategic goals for mine action include:

  • continued emergency mine/ERW clearance and survey in high-priority areas;
  • mapping of SHAs;
  • strengthening national mine action institutions;
  • expanding national mine action operational capacities;
  • national mine action planning and budgeting;
  • mobilizing national and international funding;
  • planning and implementing the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities;
  • integration of mine action into national recovery and development plans; and
  • ensuring that Sudan honors its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties.[60]

According to UNMAO, all mine action projects and activities are designed and implemented in support of this framework’s objectives.[61] Once the LIS is completed across the country (scheduled for June 2009), the findings will be used to support further long-term strategic planning.[62]

For 2008, the framework called for completion of emergency route survey and route verification/clearance of all secondary suspected/mined roads in order to facilitate free and safe movement of UN peace support mission personnel, returnees, and for reconstruction and development projects. It also called for technical survey of all high-priority dangerous areas to define minefield boundaries and reduce the total suspected area by about 40% by end 2008.[63] Also in 2008, UNMAO was intending to develop a transition plan, identifying milestones for the handover of responsibilities for mine action coordination to the SSDA.[64]

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction and development

The UN and national authorities are trying to integrate mine action with relief, reconstruction, and development efforts through a joint priority-setting process with GONU and GOSS.[65] Previously, it was reported that “slow progress” had been made towards integration with development efforts,[66] but support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance has occurred through the opening of primary and secondary routes.[67]

Mine action evaluations

Two evaluations were conducted in 2007. There was an evaluation of the UN Voluntary Trust Fund support for the mine action program in Sudan, commissioned by UNMAS in March 2007.[68] The results of this evaluation were not known as of June 2008.

A second evaluation was commissioned by UNDP to evaluate its mine action program development and capacity-building project.[69] Conducted by the GICHD, the evaluation emphasized the important contribution of mine action to broader processes and programs in Sudan, including peace-building and restoration of internal security, return of displaced persons, and delivery of humanitarian assistance. It stressed that mine action was one of the fields in which GONU and GOSS cooperated most effectively with one another and with the international community.[70]

It also, however, found no clear vision of the future make-up and functioning of the mine action program in Sudan after 2011. There is no long-term plan that clarifies what type of mine action capacities will be required following the departure of UNMIS, and how to build those capacities.[71] It concluded there was a clear requirement for continued UNDP efforts to assist national authorities in developing the capacities needed to plan and manage a national program.[72]

Demining

Mine action activities in Southern Sudan are restricted by the weather, with most demining operations suspended during the wet months of July to September. Insecurity related to the Lord’s Resistance Army[73] and other armed group activity, as well as security-related difficulties have also hampered demining activities.[74] The security situation in Darfur did not permit activities in Western Darfur, and road verification was not conducted as planned.[75] Another constraint is that contractors are responsible for securing their own explosives for demolition, which is time-consuming and difficult.[76]

A wide range of military and civilian demining operators remained operational in Sudan in 2007, involving 18 bodies and organizations, including: the national humanitarian demining contingent (a network of Joint Integrated Demining Units, JIDUs); five military demining companies within the UN peacekeeping contingents (from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan); five international NGOs (DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, Norwegian People’s Aid, Mines Advisory Group, and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action); two local NGOs (Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service and Nuba Mountain Mine Action Sudan); and five commercial demining companies (ArmorGroup, Mechem, MineTech International, RONCO, and The Development Initiative).[77]

The national demining contingent, the JIDUs, represents the bulk of the local demining capacity in Sudan, comprising manual and mechanical clearance assets.[78] According to the GICHD, however, the fact that the JIDUs are engaging in demining for infrastructure reconstruction without being accredited in a manner compliant with IMAS could have “serious repercussions.”[79] In 2008, a further 120 deminers, to add to the 110 already employed, were being trained at the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi, Kenya. Further capacity development of NMAC and the SSDA in various management fields was planned by UNDP for 2008 as well as the establishment of six field offices.[80]

After overcoming unspecified “obstacles” in the second quarter of 2007, DanChurchAid (DCA) continued its operations in the Nuba Mountains with a focus on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) with one multi-task team and three risk education teams.[81]

Even though Danish Demining Group (DDG) experienced security-related problems in Southern Sudan in 2007, four of its EOD/survey teams were operational by December 2007 on three tasks (Kajo Keji and Nimule since October 2007, and Loa in Magwi County since December).[82]

As of March 2008, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was working in three states: Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, and Jonglei. In 2007, it focused on clearing agricultural land and support to resettlement of IDPs in Yei and Juba. As of January 2008, NPA had five survey teams, including one all-female team also trained to conduct Task Impact Assessments. NPA also had four manual teams, including one all-female team, two EOD teams, one BAC team, one mechanical team, four mine-proof vehicles, and one medical team.[83]

In 2007, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) focused on supporting the return and rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs, and on conflict-affected communities. MAG’s response is said to be integrated, involving community liaison, risk education, technical survey and minefield marking, manual demining, stockpile destruction, and EOD.[84] As of June 2008, MAG had operational bases in three states in Southern Sudan and two in the north, working in partnership with Operation Save Innocent Lives and the Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR). MAG operates with 15 teams carrying out mine clearance, EOD, and disposal of abandoned caches of small arms and light weapons with the necessary permission from the SPLA/SSDC.[85]

In May 2007, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) finalized its project of support to UNDP disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts. FSD has also provided support for the purchase of project vehicles and equipment.[86] In 2007, following support from FSD to develop its technical and managerial capacities, the Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS) became the first national NGO accredited by UNMAO.[87]

The local NGO, Nuba Mountains Mine Action Sudan, is the first national NGO conducting clearance to receive a grant from UNMAS. It used a ground preparation machine to support manual clearance teams and, as of March 2008, was deployed in Blue Nile state, Northern region, to support the UNMIS Pakistani military demining company.[88]

World Food Programme (WFP) supports the Emergency Road Repair and Mine Clearance of Key Transport Routes in Sudan project which aims to repair and clear nearly 3,000km of key trunk roads in Southern Sudan, along with links to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda between 2004 and 2009. The project used three supervising engineering companies, two commercial construction companies and German Technical Cooperation International Services. Mine action services are performed by RONCO and MAG.[89]

ArmorGroup mine action teams have been deployed in support of the Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Office in Juba, with operations primarily conducted to survey areas, roads, and minefields in and around Juba, Malakal, and Wau.[90]

In March 2008, MineTech won a new contract to clear mines in Sudan. MineTech was operating in the Darfur region, in Juba, and Kassala, in the east near the Eritrean border.[91]

In April 2008, a demining training course for the Sudanese military, sponsored by the Chinese government, started in Nanjing, Jiangsu province. About 20 military officers from the north and south of the country participated in the six-week training course in China at the University of Science and Technology of the People’s Liberation Army.[92]

Identifying hazardous areas

As noted above, the LIS had been completed in 13 states as of July 2008. LIS data showed that four states were particularly impacted: Blue Nile, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Kassala.[93]

In total, by end 2007 technical survey had covered 19,050km of road (8,186km in 2007[94]) and identified and marked 81 minefields totaling almost 15.5km2 (in 2007 alone, 49 minefields spanning 14.2km2 were identified).[95] In February 2008, UNMAO reported on 907km of road assessed in 2008 and identified six previously unknown mined areas totaling an estimated 185,885m2.[96]

Demining in 2007[97]

Demining operators

Mine clearance (km2)*

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed**

ArmorGroup

1.06

64

34

23,633

Bangladesh demining company

1.14

221

276

17,651

Cambodia demining company***

0.26

1,071

685

277

DCA

0.02

6

0

1,240

DDG

0

22

7

492

Egypt demining company

0.03

3

0

163

FSD

1.41

138

37

1,173

FSD (SIMAS)

0.01

11

0

0

Kenyan demining company

0.06

24

18

2,304

MAG

0.58

551

59

264,161

NMAC

0

45

71

607

NPA

0.98

449

98

3,914

Pakistan demining company

0.03

87

1

761

RONCO

0.24

22

2

23

TDI

0.09

0

1

1

Total

5.91

2,714

1,289

316,400

* No information on BAC was provided by UNMAO. NMAC claims 18.26km2 of BAC.

** No distinction is made between AXO and UXO in demining reporting by UNMAO.

*** According to Ke Kim Yan, Commander in Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), as of June 2008 Cambodian deminers had cleared 57,542,488m2 of areas in Sudan.[98] It is not known how these clearance figures have been calculated and they almost certainly include huge amounts of land released other than by clearance.

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

A total of 24km2 of affected areas were demined in Sudan in 2007, three times more than in 2006. The national program also assessed 8,186km of roads and cleared an additional 917km of roads. A total of 9,103km of roads were opened through both assessment and clearance.[99] UNMAO reported the destruction of 2,714 antipersonnel mines, 1,289 antivehicle mines, and 316,400 items of UXO.[100]

In June 2007, the JIDUs completed their clearance of the Babanusa-Wau railway line linking the north and south of the country; the line was officially handed over to the Sudan Railway Corporation on 2 July 2007 allowing its reconstruction to begin. A total of 13 antipersonnel mines, three antivehicle mines, and approximately 2,500 pieces of explosive ordnance and ammunition were found and destroyed during clearance operations.[101]

A second task was completed in late October 2007 and included verification and clearance of a total of 234.7km of high priority roads. Roads were handed over to the National Highway Authority on 10 November 2007 for reconstruction. A total of 144 antivehicle mines, 34 antipersonnel mines, and approximately 20,000 items of explosive ordnance/ammunition were found and destroyed.[102]

More than one-third of all antipersonnel mines and half of all antivehicle mines were found and destroyed by the Cambodian demining company in 2007. MAG found more than 83% of all UXO destroyed in 2007. NPA’s UXO clearance included the destruction of 287 submunitions.[103]

In 2007, UNMAO quality assurance teams conducted 484 quality assurance visits to mine action projects in Sudan which resulted in 13 operations halted and 30 assessed as not of acceptable quality.[104] From January to February 2008, 165 quality assurance visits had been conducted, of which one resulted in stopping operations and 10 resulted in a judgment that the work was not of acceptable quality.[105]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Demining in 2003–2007

Year

Mine
clearance
(km2)

Battle area clearance
(km2)

2007

5.91

18.26

2006

1.34

6.44

2005

0.71

0.56

2004

0.29

0.17

2003

0.47

0

Total

8.72

25.43

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014. From 2003 through 2007, the total mine and ERW clearance figure was 34.15km2, 71% of which was achieved in 2007 alone.[106] The higher productivity has been explained by an increase in national funding, securing international funding on time, and an expansion in local capacity. Until the extent of the mine problem in Sudan is fully quantified, however, progress toward Article 5 compliance remains difficult to assess.

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, Sudan outlined the need for additional capacity development and funding support from the international community in order to fulfill the obligations set by the Mine Ban Treaty.[107] Other constraints noted previously by the UN and mine action operators are the rainy season, security issues, and delays in funding.

As far as the government contribution to mine action is concerned, mine action has been included in the national budget at the level of GONU and GOSS, and funds were allocated to mine action in 2006 and 2007. Salaries and benefits for about 80 management staff, and all operations and JIDU field deployments are covered by the national budget. In addition GONU has procured US$1 million of equipment to equip its national teams.[108]

Sudan is in the process of increasing its resources to mine action. As an indication of its long-term commitment, mine action has been included in the five-year national development strategy with a National Mine Action Strategic Framework already developed and passed by the parliament.[109]

Landmine/ERW Casualties[110]

Casualties by Age and Gender

Men

Boys

Girls

Unknown age

Total

20

31

9

31

91

Casualties by Device Type

Antipersonnel mines

Antivehicle mines

ERW*

Unknown devices

Total

19

4

49

19

91

*Includes 4 submunition casualties.

In 2007, there were at least 91 new mine/ERW casualties, including 28 people killed and 63 injured in 48 incidents. Most of the casualties were civilian; seven were military/police and three clearance staff. More than half of the casualties where the age was recorded were children (40). However, this figure could be significantly higher as the age of 31 casualties was unknown.

Where age information was available, ERW was the main cause of casualties among children (30) while adults were mostly injured by antipersonnel mines. For 40 casualties the activity at the time of the incident was unknown. Tampering was the main cause of casualties where the activity was known (21), mostly involving ERW and causing 18 child casualties (14 boys). The second most common activity was playing/recreation (eight), also causing predominantly child casualties (seven).

Most casualties occurred in Northern Darfur (21), followed by Central Equatoria (20), and Western Bahr El Ghazal (19).[111] ERW incidents occurred predominantly in Western Bahr El Ghazal state and Darfur region, while 12 of the 19 antipersonnel mine casualties occurred in Central Equatoria state. Five states recording casualties in 2007 did not have casualties in 2006 (Eastern Equatoria, Gedaref, Red Sea, Southern Darfur, and Western Darfur). Six states with casualties in 2006 did not report casualties in 2007. Only one of the casualties in 2007 reported receiving mine/ERW risk education, and four reported knowing the area they entered was dangerous.[112]

Among the demining casualties, one was a Pakistani deminer from Pakistan’s military demining company, one was from RONCO, and one from Mechem; all were injured. An accident with an SPLA deminer injured by an antipersonnel mine in a minefield in Malakal could not be confirmed and was not included in IMSMA.[113]

In 2007, there were significantly fewer casualties than in 2006 when 140 new mine/ERW casualties (38 killed and 102 injured) were recorded.[114] UNMAO data also showed that the 38 fatalities were fewer than the 57 reported for the year before.[115] This is due to the exclusion of an incident causing 23 fatal casualties in Kassala state in November 2006. As of June 2008, UNMAO had not obtained sufficient information to include this incident. Unverified casualties from Southern and Western Darfur also remained excluded.[116]

The decreased casualties in 2007 could be partly due to increased survey activity in 2006 (leading to a higher coverage), and a lack of access in Darfur region. In some parts of the country the casualty decrease can be explained by mine clearance progress, such as in Upper Nile state.[117] Ultimately, the 2007 casualty figures are likely to prove higher, as in previous years, due to slow data collection and the lack of a universal data collection system.[118]

In 2007, there were some changes in the casualty profile and incident location and activity. For the first time, children comprised the majority of casualties where age was recorded, and most incidents were due to tampering/playing with ERW and caused multiple casualties. The percentage of ERW casualties compared to mine casualties continued to grow. In 2007, 54% of casualties were from ERW, compared with 25% in 2006 and 20% in 2005. The increase is due to an increase in casualties in Darfur, where ERW are the leading cause of casualties, and to better reporting on the type of device causing an incident.

Linked to the increase in ERW casualties was the increased percentage of tampering casualties in 2007. In 2006, playing/recreation and traveling were the main causes of incidents. In 2007, casualty rates remained constant in states traditionally reporting the highest numbers of casualties (Central Equatoria and Western Bahr El Ghazal) due to high population movements.[119] Casualties in Kassala state decreased sharply with only three casualties reported in 2007 compared with 44 in 2006; this was due to temporary loosening of movement restrictions in 2006.[120] While the overall reporting for Darfur region has improved, more casualties were reported in Northern Darfur in 2006 due to ongoing survey activity.[121]

For several years, it was expected that the number of mine/ERW casualties would increase as IDPs and refugees return home. Returnees and IDPs may have kept casualty rates constant in some states, but no marked increases were reported in receiving states in 2007, probably due to mine/ERW risk education efforts.[122]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008, with at least 23 casualties as of 20 May, including nine people killed and 14 injured. One casualty was registered as military and one was a Bangladeshi deminer injured in Juba, Central Equatoria state, on 3 January.[123] Twelve of the casualties were children (one girl, 11 boys). Antivehicle mines and unknown devices each caused eight casualties, ERW five, and an antipersonnel mine and unspecified mine each caused one casualty. Most casualties occurred in Kassala state (nine) and only one casualty was reported in Southern Darfur state. However, more casualties from Darfur region were expected as investigations of incident status were not possible due to security concerns and logistics.[124] Casualty figures did not correspond with reports of new antivehicle mine use noted by the UN.[125]

Data collection

There is no nationwide casualty data collection mechanism in Sudan. An unknown number of casualties remain unreported due to the size and inaccessibility of the country, security limitations,[126] and population movements.[127]

UNMAO maintains casualty data in the central IMSMA database in Khartoum; two regional modules and seven read-only versions have been installed. IMSMA will be installed in El Fasher state to cover Darfur region.[128] The Khartoum office provides detailed casualty data analysis upon request.[129]

Information is gathered through UNMAO staff, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Women and Children’s Care, UN agencies, disabled people’s organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and various NGOs.[130] However, data collectors do not use the same reporting and information gathering methods and have varying data collection capacities. Often, the data collected does not contain the necessary detail for meaningful analysis, or it cannot be synchronized with the IMSMA system. Reportedly, the IMSMA database is under revision for this reason and UNMAO is continuing to enter various data formats received into IMSMA.[131] Synchronization of the available databases by December 2008 was one of the National Strategic Framework’s main objectives.[132] This objective has been postponed since 2005, but in 2008 partners were contacted to provide information.[133]

In 2007, some progress was made in identifying the device type causing each incident, but there continued to be insufficient detail in recording personal details, locations, activities, and whether the person had received mine/ERW risk education. Information about the incident location was not entered systematically or accurately.[134] Operators noted that the database was not considered to be updated or accurate. For example, Handicap International (HI) noted that while no casualties were recorded between September 2005 and February 2007 in Jonglei state, local sources reported four separate incidents in 2006.[135] Access to casualty data is also hampered by movement restrictions in eastern Sudan.[136]

The ICRC and the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) also maintain a database of survivors receiving services at the rehabilitation centers; they have registered more than 11,000 persons with disabilities, including an unspecified number of mine/ERW survivors. Synchronization of the database with IMSMA failed due to incompatibility of several fields. The UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process also collects some casualty data.[137]

Data sharing improved due to better stakeholder coordination.[138] However, casualty data was not used for planning purposes as it lacked sufficient details and came in too slowly for operators in the field. As of June 2008, UNICEF and UNMAO were still trying to establish a surveillance mechanism at the Ministry of Health (ongoing since 2005).[139] In July 2008, UNICEF planned to let an expert from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) make an assessment of data collection and surveillance systems, after which injury surveillance in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal state, would start.[140]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Sudan remains unknown. Until the end of December 2007, 4,077 casualties had been recorded, including 1,366 people killed and 2,711 injured. Of these 2,278 were adults, 631 were children and the age of 1,168 was unknown. Most casualties were male (3,430) and 526 were female (121 unknown). Most casualties occurred in Western Bahr El Ghazal (1,147) followed by Central Equatoria (852), Southern Kordofan (589), and Kassala (421). The most common activities at the time of the incident were traveling (1,089), military activity (772), and 888 were unknown.[141]

Ongoing survey activity will provide a more comprehensive picture of the number of mine/ERW casualties and their needs in Sudan. In 2007, the International Sisterhood Charity Organization (ISCO) and the Sudan Evangelical Mission (SEM) conducted a survivor needs assessment in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal, and Juba, Central Equatoria.[142] Data collectors used the standard IMSMA forms and the data was entered into IMSMA. In total, 1,548 casualties were identified, including 933 survivors, of whom 71% were permanently disabled (667).[143]

The LIS completed in 10 states identified 95 casualties within the two years preceding the survey, and 1,158 older casualties (664 killed and 494 injured). Most recent casualties occurred in Kassala (32), Eastern Equatoria (28), and Central Equatoria (20) states. Most older casualties were recorded in Eastern Equatoria (498), Central Equatoria (320), and Kassala (227) states. The LIS data will be synchronized with IMSMA.[144]

No reliable statistics on persons with disabilities were available, but disability questions have been included in the national census which started on 22 April 2008 and had not been completed as of June 2008.[145] The South Sudan War Disabled, Widows and Orphans Commission started collecting disability information in Juba, Central Equatoria, in April 2008.[146] By 28 May 2008, it had identified 2,112 persons with disabilities.[147]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

In 2007–2008, mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities were carried out on the basis of perceived threat, as reliable and complete casualty data was not available.[148] Even though UNMAO was not able to profile RE beneficiaries in 2007,[149] it reported that the at-risk populations were reached. As in 2006, RE activities and capacity continued to expand in Sudan resulting in more people reached.[150]

Efforts were focused on IDPs and returnees in host, transit, and recipient locations. This has been the case since 2005 when it was first anticipated that the influx of IDPs and returnees to Southern Sudan would result in increased casualties. Especially in the north of the country Sudan, the focus on people returning under the process of organized and voluntary returns increased. In Southern Sudan no major changes in approach were reported; most operators continued to conduct emergency programs. Other identified at-risk groups are youth and adult males who are most likely to tamper with ERW, as well as children.[151]

Although operators adapt their RE messages to risk profiles, insufficient supporting assessments of activities, geographical context, contamination type, and needs of the at-risk groups were available in 2007. Materials specific to each location and context were not available. However, RE programs had the capacity to respond to changes by redeploying teams where needed, including in response to recent mine/ERW incidents. [152]

Strategic framework and capacity

In Sudan, RE is coordinated by UNICEF through UNMAO. UNMAO, through the regional mine action offices, is in charge of tasking and monitoring. UNICEF also provides technical and financial support to RE activities.[153] RE is part of the 2006–2010 mine action strategy aiming to continue to “prioritize mine risk education for at-risk communities, and expand national capacity.”[154]

In 2007, the RE program’s annual workplan priorities were: to continue coordination and technical support to partners; to focus on IDPs and returnees (450,000 people in the north); to initiate community-based RE and integration into existing social services; to support casualty data collection; to train and build capacity; and to train 1,050 teachers in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.[155] UNMAO reported that the target populations were reached but that delays were experienced in achieving the teacher-training objectives. UNICEF started implementation of its long-term plan to integrate RE into existing structures and social services in 2007.[156] Teacher training is one component of a scheduled transition from emergency RE conducted by NGOs to long-term sustainable RE integrated into existing structures, such as schools and community centers.[157] UNICEF/UNMAO planned to reduce the number of NGO teams to a rapid response capacity for emergency situations; it was not known when this was likely to occur.[158] In Southern Sudan, RE was conducted during campaigns on cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS and healthcare.[159]

The regional mine action offices had RE working groups to coordinate RE at the local level. Regular coordination meetings including all stakeholders were held to adjust RE activities according to emerging needs. However, the entry of new implementers caused challenges for coordination; coordinating with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was also a challenge.[160] Quality control, accreditation, and monitoring were conducted by UNMAS, and national standards exist.[161]

Priority-setting continued to be hampered by a lack of adequate casualty data.[162] Other challenges were the vast terrain, restricted population movements, inaccessibility during rainy seasons, and limited national and NGO capacity.[163]

The main areas of progress in 2007 were increased government involvement and increased coordination between community liaison and clearance staff. [164]

No RE evaluations were conducted during 2007.[165] In April 2008, UNMAO completed a small survey in Southern Sudan which addressed concerns raised in 2007 that the local population misunderstood mine/ERW warning signs. The survey found that the shapes and some colors used were not understood as referring to danger. One-third of 141 interviewees perceived signs on vehicles or buildings to mean a threat to their life. Survey recommendations included better explanation about the meaning of the signs, removing unnecessary warning signs, and more intensive RE in Southern Sudan. It was noted that survey results were influenced by unclear questions. Interviewers lacked training and responses were steered by ongoing RE activities among the six surveying organizations.[166]

Sudan reported on RE in its latest (updated) Article 7 report, stating that 889,500 people received RE.[167] This does not correspond with the totals provided by UNMAO and operators.

Coverage and response

According to the partial LIS results, 89% of impacted communities with 97% of the impacted population and 95% of recorded casualties from the last two years are located in four states: Blue Nile, Kassala, Central, and Eastern Equatoria.[168] MAG covered all high-impact areas in Western Equatoria while conducting the LIS.[169] In a response to these results, most RE was conducted in Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria states in 2007–2008 as this is a priority area for IDP/refugee return.[170] In Blue Nile state, efforts were made to provide RE in refugee camps and to at-risk communities along the Ethiopian border. Two national NGOs conducted RE for IDPs and at-risk communities in Kassala state.[171] Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrab, Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Jonglei states were also covered.[172] In 2007, Darfur region remained under-served due to security constraints and increasing contamination.[173]

In 2007, MAG increased RE in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal, in response to a lack of RE in 2006 caused by security concerns and logistics. In 2007, parts of Yei, Central Equatoria, were over-served with RE, as several organizations conducted overlapping activities.[174] There was also disproportionate RE capacity in Khartoum, as less repatriation efforts originated from there. One of the Khartoum teams was redeployed elsewhere and the same was planned for Yei.[175]

A variety of RE techniques were used in Sudan, including public information dissemination, school-based RE and, increasingly, community liaison integrated with mine action activities. The most used technique is direct presentations in affected communities. In 2008, RE will include mobile theatre activities and peer-to-peer education.[176] Community liaison is used where appropriate in varying levels by all RE operators.[177] However, the effectiveness of this in practice was not reported by implementers, nor evidenced by the number of clearance requests received and handled.

RE materials did not adequately support the flexibility of the RE implementers and the same materials were used for different target groups and circumstances. In 2008, UNICEF, UNMAO and stakeholders were reviewing existing materials to make them more context-specific.[178] Clearance tasks and casualty data indicate that most areas are contaminated with ERW and not with mines,[179] yet ERW-specific materials and activities do not exist in most parts of the country. In 2008, MineTech started conducting ERW-specific RE in Darfur region. ERW-specific materials were under development for Darfur and other regions.[180]

Most RE implementers in northern Sudan were national organizations, while RE activities in Southern Sudan were conducted by international NGOs who supervised national staff.[181] Trainings and refresher courses were conducted on request. External UNMAO quality assurance also evaluated if implementing agencies needed refresher courses. In 2007, one organization underwent refresher training because of external quality assurance findings.[182]

In total, 19 NGOs implemented RE activities including nine international NGOs[183] and 10 national implementers, of whom Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO) and JASMAR reached almost one-third of the beneficiaries in 2007.[184] UNICEF supported eight international NGOs and seven of the national operators. In 2007, two international organizations started operations: Agency for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan), in partnership with FPDO in Southern Kordofan and MineTech (a commercial company) in Darfur region.[185]

At the end of 2007, UNMAO reported there were 31 RE teams with 96 trainers;[186] of these 25 were working in Southern Sudan. At the beginning of 2008, 22 teams were working in Southern Sudan but more teams were scheduled to start; it was not known when.[187] On 30 April 2008, HI ended its RE and community liaison program which it had started in Upper Nile state in February 2007.[188]

In 2007, 783,726 people received RE, almost 65% more than in 2006.[189] This increase was mainly due to more capacity in Southern Sudan, where 302,169 people were reached (50,000 more than planned). Further contributing factors were an expansion of activities in Darfur region, increased repatriations both internally and from neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya) and more effective deployment of RE teams. Sudanese receiving RE in neighboring countries and returning to Southern Sudan were also included in the totals.[190]

Victim Assistance

Years of conflict have damaged health and social services and the increased refugee and IDP influx put a greater strain on services in 2007–2008. GONU and state governments were increasingly involved in disability issues due to more concerted VA efforts and activities implemented by national NGOs.[191] However, the government still largely depended on NGOs and international organizations for VA implementation. A lack of accurate disability data impeded effective project design.[192] VA was increasingly integrated into the general disability sector, but services remained spread unevenly, with most services located in Khartoum or Juba.[193]

While there is a general lack of health services throughout the country, Southern Sudan remained without adequate health services in most states.[194] Disabled patients without appropriate treatment resulted in high levels of permanent disability.[195] Health services were carried out both by the government and NGOs, but relied heavily on international assistance. Hospitals are understaffed and ill-equipped, primary health posts do not coordinate and it is unknown how many are operational. Emergency care is provided free of charge, but casualties need to travel long distances,[196] resulting in many mine/ERW casualties dying on the way.[197] Follow-up care and referral systems were virtually non-existent.[198]

Up to 80,000 people need physical rehabilitation in Sudan, including some 20,000 conflict-injured amputees. Northern Sudan had rehabilitation centers in most state capitals. In Southern Sudan, physical rehabilitation was mainly provided in Juba, Central Equatoria state. The centers were operated largely by governmental bodies in cooperation with the ICRC; NGO-run centers lacked qualified staff, materials and good-quality assistive devices. There is said to be a need for a total of up to 10 rehabilitation centers in Southern Sudan.[199]

Among amputees, one of the most important demands was improved transportation to access services.[200] Several NGOs conducted community-based rehabilitation (CBR) activities. In northern Sudan mobile workshops were scheduled to be operational in 2008. Most raw materials and components were imported due to a lack of local production capacity. Many repatriated refugees and IDPs had to leave their mobility devices behind before returning.[201]

Psychosocial support and socio-economic reintegration are lacking throughout the country.[202] Moreover, most existing socio-economic and employment programs did not target mine/ERW survivors or persons with disabilities. They often did not have access to these programs and were discriminated against.[203] Lack of awareness among employers and high general unemployment further hampered prospects.[204] Education and vocational training opportunities were also lacking, with only an estimated 15% of disabled children in Southern Sudan receiving schooling.[205]

Sudan has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but this is not consistently implemented or monitored.[206] In 2008, the Cabinet of Ministers in Khartoum approved a new disability policy addressing access to services, education and employment, including for mine/ERW survivors. Existing legislation did not appear to completely apply to Southern Sudan, due to the creation of a semi-autonomous GOSS.[207] The South Sudan War Disabled Widows and Orphans Commission (“the War Disabled Commission”) was in the process of approving a bill on persons with disabilities drafted in 2007; the GOSS Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs was also planning to develop a disability policy which would better fit into the context of the southern states.[208]

Sudan stated that further disability legislation would be based on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Sudan signed the convention but not its Optional Protocol on 30 March 2007; the ratification process was said to be close to finalization in June 2008.[209]

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Sudan is one of 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.[210] Sudan presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November 2005,[211] and revised them considerably in 2007. At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Sudan stated that, “All objectives and targets have been designed to be achievable, measurable, time-bound and to be incorporated into the work and financial plans of the relevant ministries and commissions.”[212]

The objectives informed Sudan’s 2007 Victim Assistance National Strategic Framework and subsequent Victim Assistance Work Plan September 2007–August 2009. Additional objectives on increased survivor inclusion, resource mobilization and strengthening coordination mechanisms were added to the six VA pillars.[213]

The objectives/workplan have been elaborated in consultation with most relevant stakeholders, including survivors. This resulted in more detailed objectives than before the elaboration of the strategic framework, clearly defined responsibilities, and involvement of governmental bodies. Under the workplan, deadlines have been pushed forward to better fit the 2005–2009 framework.[214]

This resulted in progress, especially in establishing coordination mechanisms, government involvement, information provision, and advocacy. However, the objectives for the component on economic reintegration remained weak. In 2007–2008, data on mine/ERW survivors was improved though the LIS and the survivor needs assessment. Progress in the rehabilitation sector was evidenced by the graduation of prosthetic-orthotic technicians who received an internationally recognized diploma and the start of the first physiotherapy course in Sudan. The CBR network was strengthened and technical advice was provided to improve the quality of mobility devices.

In addition, national NGOs working within the framework of the Human Security Trust Fund (HSTF), focused on socio-economic reintegration through small-scale community-based projects. Survivor networks were created in three locations, and disabled people’s organizations are more actively involved in VA/disability planning and implementation. The main area of progress in 2007–2008 was the increased interest and involvement of government authorities in VA.

While it appears that significant progress will be made in 2008–2009, many objectives were drawn from earlier workplans and have been postponed continuously since early 2005, such as the establishment of a nationwide data collection mechanism by December 2005, a needs assessment by December 2006, and implementation of the VA strategy no more than six months after signing the CPA (signed on 9 January 2005).[215] A first revision of the workplan will be conducted in September or October 2008.

Between the seventh and eighth meetings of States Parties, Sudan was one of the co-chairs for the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Sudan’s VA expert reported progress on several objectives, but not systematically.

Victim assistance strategic framework

Under the NMAA, NMAC coordinates VA activities in the north of the country. In Southern Sudan, a government team including the Ministry of Religion, Gender and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Health and the War Disabled Commission coordinate VA and disability issues. A workshop was scheduled in July 2008 to decide which government agency would take the lead coordination role in Southern Sudan. UNMAO provides technical assistance to both coordination platforms.[216]

The National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007–2011 was developed and approved by the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and NMAC in July 2007.[217] It has six main lines of action: improving information management; ensuring medical and physical rehabilitation assistance; developing programs for social reintegration and economic empowerment; strengthening advocacy and policy programs; mobilizing resources; and streamlining coordination mechanisms at various levels.[218] The framework will operate within the overall social welfare, healthcare and legislation systems for persons with disabilities and vulnerable people and will support capacity development and resource diversification in VA.[219]

The subsequent workplan was finalized in September 2007 after revision at the second National Workshop on Victim Assistance in Khartoum (28–29 August 2007). The Victim Assistance Work Plan September 2007–August 2009 was developed through a consultative process between GONU including relevant ministries, the NMAC, UNMAO, NGOs, mine/ERW survivors, and persons with disabilities.[220] The workplan elaborated clear objectives, targets, indicators, lead and supporting agencies, locations, timeframes, and budget. The strategic framework would be evaluated and, if needed, revised after implementation of the 2007–2009 workplan.[221]

To facilitate implementation of the workplan, two VA working groups were established in Khartoum (chaired by NMAC and co-chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Women and Children’s Care) and in Juba (chaired by the Ministry of Religion Gender Social Welfare and co-chaired by the Ministry of Health).[222] However, the War Disabled Commission would also like to play a lead role due to its significant capacity. Both groups include some 16 national and international NGOs and the ICRC and meet monthly. Additional meetings between operators were also organized if needed.[223]

Progress on the 2007–2009 workplan was slowed by insufficient funding, lack of reliable data, and the need for more training in planning, project management, and proposal writing.[224] While the lead coordination role still remains to be identified, the southern coordination platform has been more active in 2007–2008 and more projects have taken place in Southern Sudan.[225] As of 2008, VA was funded more consistently through the Canadian International Development Agency through UNMAO and direct donor funding to national NGOs. Priorities for 2008 were further streamlining of coordination mechanisms with the government and other partners, as well as continuing direct support to mine/ERW survivors.[226]

The strategic framework and the workplan are integrated into the Transitional Plan towards National Ownership for Mine Action and are in accordance with national disability legislation and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.[227]

The National Council for Disability is in charge of implementing and monitoring disability legislation with assistance from the federal and state unions for persons with disabilities.[228] UNMAO is a member of the High Council for Disability.[229]

Assistance activities

Under the HSTF project, Sudan received $1.7 million from Japan for VA and RE to be implemented over 18 months from mid-2007. Five projects in the north and six in the south focusing on direct VA, but also on capacity-building of relevant stakeholders, were carried out in 2007–2008.[230] The projects all included a psychosocial support and socio-economic reintegration component. By June 2008, 648 of 719 projected beneficiaries had been reached.[231]

Under the HSTF, several of the “historic” VA organizations were not awarded funds due to stricter selection criteria, a lack of capacity, transitions, and an increased number of players. While the project was due to finish by July and a final evaluation would be ready by the end of September, it seemed that only three of 11 organizations did not fully reach their target. Several of the organizations included in the HSTF had been able to secure funding to continue their activities by 2008.[232]

In addition to the HSTF project, in 2007, UNMAO provided three small grants to the Juba Rehabilitation Center and the Organization for Care of War Disabled and Protection from Landmines, as well as for training for two technicians from Juba and Khartoum at the Tanzania Training Center for Orthopaedic Technologists.

In Southern Sudan, the Ministry of Religion, Gender and Social Welfare took over management of the Juba Teaching Hospital (JTH) from the ICRC in 2008. The JTH treated 133 weapon-injured in 2007, including 37 mine/ERW survivors. In 2007, an ICRC surgical team conducted medical missions for 345 conflict-injured in inaccessible areas of Darfur region; trauma management courses were also provided to 250 medical staff and 97 combatants in Darfur region.[233]

The construction of the ICRC rehabilitation center in Juba, needed to fill the gap caused by the closure of the ICRC Lopiding rehabilitation center in Kenya in June 2006, started in 2007. The center was expected to be operational at the end of 2008.[234] The ICRC also continued to support the six centers run by NAPO in the north and the JRC with raw materials and components, as well as transportation and accommodation costs for patients. In 2007, 3,945 patients attended the centers, 1,440 prostheses (135 for mine/ERW survivors) and 1,159 orthoses (one for a mine/ERW survivor) were produced with ICRC support. The ICRC also sponsored training abroad for 17 technicians.[235]

From February to April 2007, HI conducted a disability assessment in Jonglei which identified a clear need for VA/disability activities in this state as few actors were present. Based on the survey, HI started implementing a VA/disability program in June 2007. The program included training on rehabilitation, disability prevention and social support, two mobile clinics, and provision of rehabilitation equipment. HI also conducted a disability prevention campaign.[236] The long-term goal was to build government capacity. HI does not distinguish mine/ERW survivors from other persons with disabilities.[237]

USRATUNA/OVCI (Our Family), Italian-run rehabilitation centers in Juba and Khartoum targeting children, started a course for 40 physiotherapy assistants in Juba in July 2007 and were scheduled to start CBR in 2008.[238] Medical Care Development International provided physical and socio-economic rehabilitation for disabled war victims through the Rumbek Rehabilitation Center, and extended its operations to Western Bahr El Ghazal in 2007.[239]

Other national and international organizations carrying out VA/disability activities can be found in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling mine action needs in Sudan. The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework, covering the period 2006–2011, includes a detailed resource mobilization component.[240] The framework does not set annual or long-term funding targets.

The National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework also includes resource mobilization goals among its strategic objectives.[241] The framework calls on NMAC and UN agencies to jointly develop a resource mobilization plan for VA by the end of 2007. As of June 2008, no such plan had been reported. It requires ministries and government bodies with VA obligations to ensure that VA programs are included in work and financial plans by the end of 2008, and calls on members of the VA coordination group and other stakeholders to contribute to the national mine action work plan, the UN Mine Action Portfolio and other resource mobilization mechanisms.[242]

The UN 2007 Work Plan for Sudan included mine action sector programs for 2007 costed at $56,107,837 (€40,921,769).[243] The workplan for mine action included broad strategic goals aimed at promoting national funding and managing resource mobilization and allocation.[244] The NMAA and NMAC, along with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, are responsible for reviewing and updating resource mobilization strategies on behalf of GONU.[245] GONU and GOSS coordinate with each other and with UNDP to develop resource mobilization strategy and raise funds for mine action, as well as to allocate resources for mine action from the national budgets.[246]

In June 2008, NMAC reported a resource mobilization strategy based on lobbying efforts to include mine action within the government’s budget, provision of funds for mine action programs, operational support to NMAC, and capacity-building. Funds required in 2007 were estimated to total SDG22million ($11.3 million); shortfalls in funding to NMAC resulted in the cancellation of some projects and reportedly had an impact on NMAC’s operating efficiency.[247]

National support for mine action

NMAC reported national funding to mine action in 2007 totaling SDG13,223,025 ($6,792,139), including SDG5,926,190 ($3,044,284) in monetary contributions to mine action center staff and running costs, training, salaries, and related mine action costs, and to cover various VA costs; and SDG7,296,835 ($3,748,384) in-kind support consisting of mine action center equipment, logistical support to mine action, and in-kind support to RE. NMAC was funded solely from national funds.[248] The SSDC did not provide an overview of national funding to Landmine Monitor, however, GOSS was reported by UNDP to have contributed roughly $700,000 to mine action in 2007.[249]

In 2007, total national funding for mine action in Sudan was reported by UNDP to be approximately $4 million. GONU was reported to have provided approximately $3.3 million, covering the cost of office and field personnel, as well as equipment and operations of mine/ERW clearance activities. As stated above, GOSS was reported to have contributed roughly $700,000.[250]

In 2007, UNDP reported that national funds to mine action were increasing alongside the continued consolidation of NMAC and SSDC functions. As of June 2008, a draft plan had reportedly been completed to effect the transition of mine action management from the UN to national agencies. As part of the planning process, a national mine action capacity development plan was reportedly under development, which would oversee the process of shifting mine action to “full national ownership and responsibility.” Sudan did not state whether its definition of full ownership required full national funding, nor did it report a time limit for the transition to national ownership; however, the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework includes the strategic aim of implementing the transitional plan, which should take place within the 2006–2011 timeline of the overall framework.[251]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, 12 countries and the European Commission (EC) reported providing $29,201,406 (€21,297,794) to mine action in Sudan. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was virtually equal to funds reported in 2006, but represents a continued decline from approximately $47 million donated in 2005. No funds were dedicated in 2007 specifically to VA, although the beneficiaries of some funds were either unspecified or undifferentiated within funds for integrated mine action. Although the full extent of contamination remains unknown, funding at 2007 levels appears insufficient to meet mine action needs in Sudan, and does not specifically address the country’s VA needs.

As of June 2007, UNMAO had reported funding gaps in all areas of mine action in Sudan, with coordination, RE, VA, and capacity-building most in need of support. Additional funds for mine action in eastern Sudan were reportedly needed as a result of the end of mine action within the peacekeeping mandate. Delays in mine action resulting from absence of funds were reported to impact the development of other assistance activities relying on mine action.[252]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Sudan: Monetary[253]

Donor

Implementing Agencies/Organizations

Project Details

Amount

EC

DDG, MAG, GOSS

Survey, EOD, support to repatriation, mine clearance

$7,987,561(€5,825,659)

Netherlands

NPA, UNMAS

Unspecified mine action

$4,303,472(€3,138,700)

Canada

DDG, iMMAP, MAG, UNDP, UNMAS

RE, survey, integrated mine action

$3,694,886(C$3,966,172)

Norway

PRIO, NPA

Unspecified mine action

$3,362,589 (NOK19,687,290)

US

MAG, NPA, UNDP/UNMAO

Mine/UXO clearance, RE, other mine action

$3,400,000

Sweden

SRSA

Integrated mine action

$1,651,783 (SEK11,160,697)

United Kingdom

MAG

Mine/UXO clearance

$1,436,327 (£717,446)

Germany

NPA

Mine/UXO clearance

$1,103,826 (€805,066)

Denmark

DCA

Integrated mine action

$919,000 (DKK5,000,000)

Italy

UNMAS

Mine/UXO clearance

$499,080 (€364,000)

Austria

FSD, DDG

Integrated mine action, emergency survey, EOD, support to repatriation

$324,079 (€236,364)

Switzerland

FSD

Mine clearance

$280,856 (CHF337,000)

Japan

MAG, UNMAS

Maintenance of demining equipment, RE

$237,947 (¥27,993,773)

Total

$29,201,406 (€21,297,794)


[1] UNAMID was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

[2] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 652. Under a previous memorandum of understanding on cessation of hostilities reached in October 2002, both parties agreed to “cease laying of landmines.” The government and SPLM/A also agreed to stop using mines in the January 2002 Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement. Prior to these agreements, the SPLM/A signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001.

[3] Sudan has not reported any national implementation measures specific to the treaty, though it has cited various mine action structures and other steps taken to address Sudan’s mine problem. See for example, Article 7 Report, Form A, 20 May 2006.

[4] Statement of Sudan, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 18 November 2007.

[5] Interview with Abdelatie Abdelkheir Eid, Coordinator, Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Khartoum, 25 March 2008.

[6] Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2008.

[7] Sudan prepared an initial Article 7 report, dated 1 October 2004; the period covered was not stated. The Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit received this initial report, but Sudan apparently never officially submitted it to the UN. Sudan submitted a second Article 7 report dated 30 April 2005, but date of submission is listed by the UN as 17 February 2006, covering the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 April 2005. Sudan submitted a third, undated, Article 7 report, listed by the UN as submitted on 20 May 2006, covering the period 1 May 2005 to 31 December 2005. Sudan submitted a fourth Article 7 report, dated 30 April 2007, after August 2007 covering calendar year 2006.

[8] Past editions of Landmine Monitor have noted no evidence of production of antipersonnel mines by Sudan, but have cited allegations of transfer to militant groups in neighboring countries prior to Sudan becoming a State Party. See, for example, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 223.

[9] Landmine Monitor received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government-supported militias in Upper Nile state as late as April 2004. A Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) commander in Northern Darfur state said the SLA had captured a Sudanese government cache of landmines when it overran a government army position in early 2004. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 753–755. For descriptions of past use and denials of use, see earlier editions of Landmine Monitor.

[10] Interview with Christina Greene, Programme Officer, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 March 2008. She provided a set of fact sheets to Landmine Monitor.

[11] Darfur Peace Agreement, Abuja, 5 May 2006, www.unmis.org. Other factions and non-state armed groups have rejected the Abuja agreement. Previously, SLA/M and the Justice and Equality Movement signed a humanitarian cease-fire for Darfur with the Government of Sudan in April 2004. This agreement required a halt in mine use and required the marking of any mined areas. “Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur,” (N’Djamena Agreement), Articles 2, 4, and 6, N’Djamena, Chad, 8 April 2004. The UN has identified 30 armed parties, classified into different groups. Email from Ida Margarita Hyllested, Assistant Project Officer, UNICEF, 30 March 2008.

[12] Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 February 2006.

[13] Article 7 Reports, Form B, 20 May 2006; and Form B, 30 April 2007; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 621–622.

[14] UNDP, “Brief Report on the Official Ceremony of the Destruction of the First Batch of Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mine–Sudan,” 20 April 2007.

[15] Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008. Listed as destroyed were: 1,780 MA (Iran); 300 BMN (US); 200 Type 14 (USA); 100 Desert (Egypt); 100 Type 35 (Belgium); 83 Jump (China); 300 Valmara (Italy); 772 Abumise 2 (Russia); 853 PPM (USA). Listed as retained were: 176 BMN (US); 130 Type 14 (US); 85 Desert (Egypt); 61 Type 35 (Belgium); 46 Valmara (Italy); 307 PPM (US). The nomenclature used for many of these mines does not correspond to standard designations.

[16] Article 7 Report (for calendar year), Form G.

[17] Ibid. Sudan also reported destroying a total of 109 antivehicle mines of five types (TM-57, TM-46, TMA-5, Type 72, and MK-4) at the March 2008 destruction event. UNDP, “Brief Report on the Official Ceremony of the Destruction of the Second Batch of Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mine–Sudan,” 31 March 2008.

[18] Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008.

[19] UNDP, “Brief Report on the Official Ceremony of the Destruction of the First Batch of Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mine–Sudan,” 20 April 2007.

[20] Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008; and UNDP, “Brief Report on the Official Ceremony of the Destruction of the Second Batch of Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mine–Sudan,” 31 March 2008.

[21] Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2008.

[22] Statement by Mayom Aketch, Minster of Interior and Representative of the President, GOSS, Stockpile destruction ceremony central demolition site, Luri Area, Juba, 31 March 2008.

[23] Interview with Paul Eldred, Regional Operations Coordinator, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008.

[24] Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2008.

[25] Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008.

[26] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D.

[27] Article 7 Reports, Form B, 20 May 2006; and Form B, 30 April 2007; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 621–622.

[28] Interview with Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, Chairperson, SSDA, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.

[29] See, for example, Amber Henshaw, “Sudan to deploy troops in Abyei,” BBC News, 15 June 2008, news.bbc.co.uk.

[30] Interview with Christina Greene, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 March 2008.

[31] Ibid; interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, Director, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 623.

[32] Email from Qadeem Khan Tariq, Senior Technical Advisor, UNDP, 30 April 2008.

[33] Interview with Christina Greene, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 March 2008.

[34] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 1.

[35] Email from Vladimir Jankola, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 8 August 2008.

[36] Interview with Jacobus Nieuwoudt, Regional Operations Coordinator for Darfur, UNAMID, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[37] UNMAO information sheet on Darfur, provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[38] Interview with Jacobus Nieuwoudt, UNAMID, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[39] UNMAO information sheet on Darfur, provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[40] Interview with Jacobus Nieuwoudt, UNAMID, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[41] Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[42] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[43] Survey Action Center (SAC), “Surveys–Ongoing Survey–Sudan,” www.sac-na.org.

[44] Emails from Damien Vallette, Program Director, SAC, 13 June and 6 July 2008.

[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 624–625.

[46] The NMAA was established by Presidential Decree No. 299 of 24 December 2005 in accordance with Article 58(1) of the Interim Constitution for the year 2005, and Chapter VI (8.6.6) of the CPA.

[47] For details of this structure, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 658–660.

[48] Presidential Decree No. 299, 24 December 2005.

[49] Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Juba, 1 April 2008. Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 issued by the Government of Southern Sudan, which appoints the chairperson and members of the SSDA, states: “The Authority shall collaborate with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitution Development in the formulation of its Draft Act and determination of the terms and conditions of service and the regulations that shall govern its work.”

[50] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 659–660.

[51] Interview with Karin McLennan, Transition Coordinator, UNMAO, Khartoum, 27 March 2008.

[52] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[53] Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Juba, 1 April 2008.

[54] Interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008.

[55] Interview with Jacobus Nieuwoudt, UNAMID, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[56] Interview with Jim Pansegrouw, Programme Manager, UNMAO, Khartoum, 9 April 2008.

[57] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[58] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 625. The Darfur Peace Agreement includes demining in its definition of disarmament, however, while it makes detailed reference to securing and decommissioning other types of weaponry it makes no such references to antipersonnel mines, does not make clear how demining relates to broader disarmament provisions, nor how long-term demining programs might be implemented or under what authority. UNMIS, “Darfur Peace Agreement,” www.unmis.org.

[59] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[60] NMAA, “Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006–2011,” Version 1.0, May 2006, pp. 5–11.

[61] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[62] Interview with Christina Greene, UNMAO, Khartoum, 26 March 2008.

[63] NMAA,“Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006–2011,” Version 1.0, May 2006, pp. 5–11.

[64] UNMAO information sheet on Southern Sudan provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[65] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[66] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 223.

[67] UNMAO information sheets, provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[68] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[69] Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Juba, 1 April 2008.

[70] Ted Paterson and Vera Bohle, “Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project,” GICHD, Geneva, February 2008, p. 35.

[71] Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Juba, 1 April 2008.

[72] Ted Paterson and Vera Bohle, “Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project,” GICHD, Geneva, February 2008, pp. 35, 36.

[73] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 626.

[74] Interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008; and email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[75] Interview with Jacobus Nieuwoudt, UNAMID, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[76] Interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008; and email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[77] UNMAO information sheets provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[78] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 627.

[79] Ted Paterson and Vera Bohle, “Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project,” GICHD, Geneva, February 2008, pp. 43, 44.

[80] Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

[81] UNMAO information sheets provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[82] Interviews with Chris Bath, Programme Manager, DDG, Juba, 3 April 2008; and Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008.

[83] NPA, “Norwegian People’s Aid Mine Action Sudan, LFA Matrix–2008,” 31 March 2008.

[84] MAG, “Eliminating the legacy of conflict, Annual Review 2008,” 30 April 2008, p. 27.

[85] “Where we work: Sudan,” www.mag.org.uk; and email from Rob White, Director of Operations, MAG, 6 August 2008.

[86] “Past Operations in Sudan,” www.fsd.ch; and “Census in danger as people stay away for fear of mines,” The Citizen (UK), 28 November 2007.

[87] Interview with Paul Eldred, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008; and email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[88] UNMAO information sheet for Northern Regional Mine Action Office provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[89] “Emergency Road Repair and Mine Clearance of Key Transport Routes in Sudan,” www.mineaction.org; and “Resourcing Update: Sudan,” www.wfp.org.

[90] ArmorGroup, “ArmorGroup International plc awarded $5.6 million mine action contract in Sudan,” Press release, 4 September 2007, www.armorgroup.com.

[91] “Mine clearance firm in 10m Sudan contract,” The Citizen (UK), 10 March 2008.

[92] “China launches demining training course for Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 8 April 2008; and see also the report on China in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[93] LIS findings provided during interview with Mohammad Kabir, Head of Information Department, UNMAO, Khartoum, 9 April 2008.

[94] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form J.

[95] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 7.

[96] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” February 2008, p. 7.

[97] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 3. As with previous years, the figures reported do not match those provided individually by operators and appear to include destruction of stockpiled mines in certain cases. For example, NPA has reported that a total of 398 antipersonnel and 240 antivehicle mines were destroyed in 2007, of which 76 antipersonnel and 82 antivehicle mines were abandoned items. Email from Charles Frisby, Program Manager, NPA, 1 September 2008.

[98] “2nd batch of Cambodian deminers return from UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan,” China View, news.xinhuanet.com.

[99] Email from Vladimir Jankola, UNMAS, 6 August 2008.

[100] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, pp. 3–4, 7.

[101] Statement of Sudan presented by Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, SSDA, on behalf of the NMAA, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 18 November 2007; and email from Vladimir Jankola, UNMAS, 11 August 2008.

[102] Statement of Sudan presented by Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007.

[103] NPA, “Mine Action Sudan–Monthly Report December 2007 (and year end),” 10 December 2007, p. 1.

[104] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 15.

[105] Ibid, February 2008, p. 15.

[106] Ibid, December 2007; and email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[107] Statement of Sudan presented by Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, SSDA, on behalf of the NMAA, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 18 November 2007.

[108] Statement of Sudan presented by Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Unless noted otherwise, Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data for 2006–2008 was provided by Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 June 2008.

[111] Further casualties occurred in the following states: Southern Darfur (nine), Southern Kordofan (seven), Western Darfur (four), Kassala (three), Eastern Equatoria, Gedaref and Upper Nile (two each), and Blue Nile and Upper Nile (one each).

[112] However, for 36 and 52 casualties respectively this information was not completed.

[113] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[114] Landmine Monitor Report 2007 reported 135 casualties in 2006; new casualties for 2006 were identified by June 2008.

[115] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 633.

[116] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[117] Interview with Davide Naggi, Victim Assistance Specialist, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008

[118] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 633; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 544.

[119] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[120] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 634.

[121] Interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[122] Interview with Bojan Vukovic, MRE/VA Coordinator, UNMAO, Juba, 5 April 2008.

[123] Telephone interview with Per Engstrom, Medical Coordinator, UNMAO, 5 June 2008.

[124] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[125] UNMAO, “Monthly Activity Report May 2008,” Khartoum, 3 June 2008, p. 4.

[126] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[127] Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008.

[128] Interview with Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 9 April 2008.

[129] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 635.

[130] Interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008.

[131] Interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 5 April 2008; and interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008

[132] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 636.

[133] Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[134] Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data for 2006–2008 provided by Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 June 2008.

[135] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 13.

[136] Interview with Abdul Latif Matin, Operations Analyst, UNMAO, Kassala, 28 January 2007; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 June 2008.

[137] Interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Email from Insaf Nizam, MRE Coordinator, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[140] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 5 June 2008.

[141] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” May 2008, pp. 8–9.

[142] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 5 June 2008.

[143] UNMAO, “Victim Assistance Sudan Summary Report,” Khartoum, January 2008, p. vii, viii.

[144] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[145]“Slow start to census,” IRIN (Malakal), 24 April 2008; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 4 June 2008.

[146] Email from Moses Idoru, State Coordinator, Central Equatoria state, 11 April 2008.

[147] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 4 June 2008.

[148] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Chris Bath, DDG, Juba, 23 June 2008.

[149] Interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 5 April 2008.

[150] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 631.

[151] See Casualties section.

[152] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Chris Bath, DDG, 23 June 2008.

[153] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 7 August 2008.

[154] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 671.

[155] Sudan Mine Action Program (MAP), “Mine Risk Education in Sudan,” www.sudan-map.org.

[156] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[157] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 632.

[158] Sudan MAP, “Mine Risk Education in Sudan,” www.sudan-map.org.

[159] Telephone interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 June 2008. RE is recognized as a cross-cutting issue (like HIV/AIDS and healthcare) within the curriculum of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Government of Southern Sudan. Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 8 August 2008.

[160] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Chris Bath, DDG, 23 June 2008.

[161] Interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 5 April 2008.

[162] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[163] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Chris Bath, DDG, 23 June 2008.

[164] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Chris Bath, DDG, 23 June 2008.

[165] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[166] UNMAO, “Survey on use of mines/UXO signs–Analysis and report,” Juba, 22 April 2008, www.sudan-map.org.

[167] Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form I.

[168] Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2008.

[169] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[170] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Chris Bath, DDG, 23 June 2008.

[171] UNMAO information sheets provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[172] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 1 May 2008.

[173] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[174] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 1 May 2008.

[175] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[176] Telephone interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 16 June 2008.

[177] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[178] Ibid.

[179] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 1.

[180] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[181] Ibid.

[182] Telephone interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 June 2008.

[183] DCA, MAG, HI, AAR Japan, Save the Children US, DDG, AVSI, MineTech and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

[184] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 13. Others are: NMAC, SSDC, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Sudan Landmine Response, OSIL, ABRAR, and Sudanese Red Crescent Society.

[185] Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 11 June 2008.

[186] UNMAO information sheets provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

[187] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 1 May 2008.

[188] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Claire Debard, Head of Mission, HI, 18 June 2008.

[189] UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2007, p. 15.

[190] Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 24 June 2008.

[191] Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[192] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Claire Debard, HI, 25 June 2008.

[193] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, pp. 4–27.

[194] Interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008; and interview with Aleema Shivji, Project Manager, HI, Juba, 28 March 2008.

[195] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 13

[196] Ibid.

[197] Interview with Shaza Nagm Eldin, Victim Assistance Coordinator, UNMAO, Khartoum, 11 April 2007.

[198] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 16.

[199] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sulafa Abdel Razek, VA/Development Officer; and Luai Mohammed Osman, Kassala Branch Coordinator, JASMAR, 26 June 2008.

[200] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 17; and responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sulafa Abdel Razek; and Luai Mohammed Osman, JASMAR, 26 June 2008.

[201] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 17.

[202] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gaffar Ahmed Abdallah, General Director, CORD, 25 June 2008; and email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[203] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 17; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gaffar Ahmed Abdallah, CORD, 25 June 2008

[204] Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, p. 11.

[205] HI, “Needs Assessment on Disability Programming, Presentation of Results, Jonglei State, South Sudan,” Jonglei, April 2007, p. 17.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid, p. 15.

[208] Email from Aleema Shivji, HI, 25 April 2008; and email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[209] Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[210] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99. Jordan declared responsibility for significant numbers of survivors at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties and thus became the 25th state in the so-called VA25.

[211] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/ Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November–2 December 2005, APLC/MSP.6/2005/5, 5 April 2006, pp. 191–199.

[212] Statement of Sudan, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.

[213] Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, pp. 13–16; and “Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,” Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, pp. 38–44.

[214] Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, pp. 13–16; and “Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,” Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, pp. 38–44.

[215] NMAA,“Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, 27 August 2004, pp. 6–7; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 546.

[216] Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[217] Response to Landmine Monitor letter on VA25 strategic frameworks and progress by Yousif Osman, Victim Assistance Officer, NMAC, 14 April 2008; interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 639–640.

[218] Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, p. 6.

[219] Interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 1 April 2008.

[220] Ibid.

[221] Response to Landmine Monitor letter on VA25 strategic frameworks and progress by Yousif Osman, NMAC, 14 April 2008.

[222] Statement of Sudan, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.

[223] UNMAO, “Sudan Victim Assistance, Summary Report,” Khartoum, January 2008, p. vi.

[224] Response to Landmine Monitor letter on VA25 strategic frameworks and progress by Yousif Osman, NMAC, 14 April 2008.

[225] Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[226] Ibid and 7 August 2008.

[227] Response to Landmine Monitor letter on VA25 strategic frameworks and progress by Yousif Osman, NMAC, 14 April 2008.

[228] Ibid.

[229] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 683.

[230] UNMAO, “Sudan Victim Assistance, Summary Report,” Khartoum, January 2008, p. 9.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Emails from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008 and 7 August 2008.

[233] ICRC, “Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, 27 May 2008, p. 139.

[234] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 26.

[235] Ibid; and ICRC, “Special Report: Mine Action 2007,” Geneva, April 2008, p. 25.

[236] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Claire Debard, HI, 25 June 2008; and interview with Aleema Shivji, HI, Juba, 29 March 2008.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

[239] Ibid.

[240] NMAA, “Sudan National Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework for 2006–2011,” p. 2.

[241] Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, p. 6.

[242] Ibid, pp. 15, 16.

[243] UN, “2007 Work Plan for Sudan,” ochaonline.un.org.

[244] UNMAO, “2007 Work Plan: Mine Action Sector Plan,” September 2006, www.mineaction.org.

[245] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, 15 June 2008.

[246] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[247] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, 15 June 2008.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

[250] Ibid.

[251] Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 2 June 2008; and NMAA, “Sudan National Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework for 2006–2011,” p. 8.

[252] UNMAS, “Mid-Year Review of the Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007,” undated.

[253] Emails from Laura Liguori, Desk Officer, Directorate-General for External Relations, 19 March 2008; Niek de Regt, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2008; Carly Volkes, Program Officer, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 20 May 2008; and Yngvild Berggrav, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2008; USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2007, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 22 May 2008; emails from Stacy Davis, Public Affairs, US Department of State, 8 August 2008; Sven Malmberg, Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2008; Tayo Nwaubani, Program Officer, DfID, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, 29 April 2008; Johannes Dirscherl, Desk Officer, Federal Foreign Office, 1 February 2008; Hanne B. Elmelund Gam, Head of Humanitarian Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 May 2008; Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 February 2008; Alexander Benedict, Minister, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2008; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2008; and Yasuhiro Kitagawa, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 22 May 2008, with translated information provided by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and from the Conventional Arms Division, Non-Proliferation and Science Department.