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Country Reports
Georgia

Georgia

Georgia has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It participated in two of the Oslo Process meetings to develop the convention—the regional conference in Brussels in October 2007 and the international conference in Vienna in December 2007—as well as the signing conference in Oslo on 3 December 2008 as an observer, but did not make any interventions.

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 22 December 2008. It has participated in CCW work on cluster munitions in recent years.

Both Georgian and Russian forces used cluster munitions during their conflict in August 2008, which occurred only three months after 107 states had formally adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which comprehensively bans the weapon, at the end of negotiations in May.

At first, Georgia repeatedly blamed Russia for using cluster munitions, but failed to acknowledge its own use. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on 15 August 2008 that said, “It must be especially stressed, that the use of cluster munitions against civilian populations is especially cynical next to the background of the efforts applied by the international community to restrict and even ban such types of weaponry.”[1] The same day, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, in a press conference with United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, described cluster munitions as “an inhuman weapon” and the Russians as “21st century barbarians” and “cold-blooded killers” for using them against civilians.[2]

During the CCW discussions on a future instrument on cluster munitions on 1 September 2008, Georgia and Russia accused each other of using cluster munitions. Georgia, while not acknowledging its own use of the weapon, called Russia’s use of cluster munitions “barbaric” and appealed to the international community to draw conclusions about Russia’s denial that it used cluster munitions during the conflict.[3]

Shortly thereafter, Georgia publicly admitted its own use of the weapon, but claimed that its cluster munitions “were never used against civilians, civilian targets and civilian populated or nearby areas.”[4]

In September 2008, the CMC launched an extensive letter writing action targeting Georgian President Saakashvili and Georgian missions around the world to urge Georgia to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] While condemning Georgia’s decision to use the weapon, the CMC welcomed Georgia’s public acknowledgment of its use and hoped that it could be encouraged to take steps toward joining the convention.[6] During the October 2008 Global Week of Action on cluster munitions, campaigners in Georgia organized a roundtable with representatives from the ministries of foreign affairs, education, defense, and health, labor, and social protection in the Georgian National Museum. The meeting received extensive media coverage. Public outreach activities included social forums and online campaigns to collect signatures for the People’s Treaty.[7]

In October 2008, then-First Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia said that Georgia’s cluster munitions had important military utility, helping Georgia “contain the Russians for two days.”[8] He added that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asking the Ministry of Defense for its opinion on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Kutelia said, “As an agency, the Ministry of Defense in principle supports this type of convention to help us diminish civilian casualties and indiscriminate attacks on populated areas. We are ready to start reviewing, but we are not ready to make a commitment to abolish them from our arsenal.... Since Georgia is still under the occupation of a foreign military [referring to Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia], it is very sensitive for us.”[9]

In January 2009, Minister of Defense Vasil Sikharelidze told Human Rights Watch that the Ministry of Defense had recommended that Georgia not sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions at this point. He said that Georgia was considering replacing cluster munitions with an alternative, but had immediate concerns about cost and security. The Minister said, “We need something more effective and need to be able to defend ourselves.... Technically cluster munitions should be possible to replace. How quickly and what would we replace them with? We don’t know.”[10]

Later in January, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Giga Bokeria said Georgia would consider joining the convention if one of three conditions is met: the Russian military withdraw, the government received some other guarantee of security, or if it could find a way economically to replace the weapons.[11]

Use, Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer

Georgia is not known to have produced or transferred cluster munitions, or used them prior to the August 2008 conflict. It was thought to stockpile only cluster munitions inherited from the Soviet Union: RBK cluster bombs and KMG-U aircraft dispensers that deploy submunitions.[12]

After Georgia initially strongly criticized Russia for using cluster munitions in the conflict,[13] the Ministry of Defense in early September acknowledged that Georgian Armed Forces used cluster munitions against the Russian military just south of the Roki tunnel, in the area north of Tskhinvali, from 8–11 August.[14]

However, remnants of Georgian cluster munitions were found by Human Rights Watch south of the South Ossetian administrative border in or near a band of nine villages in the north of the Gori district: Brotsleti, Ditsi, Kvemo Khviti, Meghvrekisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, Zemo Khviti, and Zemo Nikozi. Georgian cluster munitions caused at least four civilian deaths and eight injuries, and caused longer-term socio-economic harm in many locations.[15] Civilians remain at risk as deminers expect to be clearing submunitions from 15 million m2 of land contaminated by Georgian and Russian submunitions until at least August 2009.[16]

The Ministry of Defense could not explain why its cluster munitions landed in these civilian areas. It stated in October 2008 that it had opened an investigation into the situation. In February 2009, it said that the investigation was ongoing with a focus on the possibility of a “failure of the weapons system.”[17]

Georgian forces used M85 submunitions delivered by Mk.-4 160mm unguided surface-to-surface rockets, weapons that it bought pre-packaged from Israel. The Ministry of Defense said Georgia launched 24 volleys of 13 Mk.-4 rockets each.[18] The rockets would have carried 32,448 M85 submunitions.

In October 2009, then-First Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia said that M85s are the only submunitions that Georgia stockpiles for active use.[19] Human Rights Watch found many unexploded M85s in Georgia and all were of the non-self-destruct variety. Kutelia said that Georgian military deminers also found primarily non-self-destruct models, but he could not explain their presence since he claimed Georgia bought M85s exclusively with self-destruct mechanisms from Israel.

In 2004, Jane’s Information Group reported that the Georgian Air Force also had KMG-U dispensers and RBK-500 cluster bombs, both of which can carry a variety of submunitions.[20] The Georgian Ministry of Defense told Human Rights Watch in February 2009 that it still has RBK-500 cluster munitions and BKF blocks of submunitions that are delivered by KMG-Us, but that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated for destruction.[21]


[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Russians Use Cluster Munitions Against Civilians,” Press release, 15 August 2008, georgiamfa.blogspot.com; See “The War in Georgia: A Caucasian journey,” The Economist, 21 August 2008, www.economist.com; “Georgia Demands EU, NATO to confirm Use of Cluster Bombs by Russia,” Trend News Agency, 16 August 2008, trend.smart.az; and Neil Cavuto, “Interview With Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili,” FOX News Network LLC, 18 August 2008.

[2] “Remarks with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, US Department of State, 15 August 2008.

[3] Statement of Georgia, Fourth 2008 Session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 1 September 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response to Human Rights Watch Inquiry about the use of M85 bomblets,” Press release, 2 September 2008, georgiamfa.blogspot.com.

[5] CMC, “CMC Actions on Georgia Against the Use of Cluster Bombs,” 8 September 2008, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

[6] CMC, “CMC Condemns Georgian Use of Cluster Bombs: After admitting use, Georgia must sign global treaty banning weapon,” Press release, 2 September 2008, www.stopclustermunitions.org.

[7] CMC, “Global Week of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, 27 October – 2 November 2008,” www.stopclustermunitions.org/gwoa.

[8] Interview with Batu Kutelia, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 21 October 2008. High-level officials from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated Kutelia’s assessment that cluster munitions had slowed the Russian advance and described the weapons as a deterrent. Interview with Vasil Sikharelidze, Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 26 January 2009; and Interview with Giga Bokeria, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 24 January 2009.

[9] Interview with Batu Kutelia, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 21 October 2008.

[10] Interview with Vasil Sikharelidze, Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 26 January 2009.

[11] Interview with Giga Bokeria, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 24 January 2009.

[12] Human Rights Watch, “Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice,” February 2007, p. 28, www.hrw.org.

[13] Human Rights Watch, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 64, www.hrw.org.

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response to Human Rights Watch Inquiry about the use of M85 bomblets,” Press release, 2 September 2008, georgiamfa.blogspot.com; Interview with Batu Kutelia, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 21 October 2008; and Response of the Georgian Ministry of Defense to Human Rights Watch Questionnaire, 12 February 2009.

[15] Human Rights Watch, “A Dying Practice,” pp. 56–57.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Ibid, pp. 64–67. The rockets apparently landed short of their minimum range. There were more M85 duds than M85s that exploded on impact, and many of these duds were in an unarmed state. Witnesses did not report Russian troops in the area of the Georgian strikes. Widespread failure of the munitions, due to technical or human error, is one possible explanation of these factors.

[18] “Some Facts,” attachment to email from David Nardaia, Head of Analytical Department, Ministry of Defense, 18 November 2008.

[19] Interview with Batu Kutelia, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 21 October 2008.

[20] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 839.

[21] Response of the Ministry of Defense to Human Rights Watch Questionnaire, 12 February 2009. Then-First Deputy Minister of Defense Kutelia previously told Human Rights Watch that Georgian Air Force planes are not fitted for delivering these air-dropped cluster weapons. Interview with Batu Kutelia, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, 21 October 2008.