Colombia

2008 Key Data

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Colombia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2001. National implementation legislation took effect on 25 July 2002. Colombia dismantled its antipersonnel mine production facilities in November 1999 and completed destruction of its stockpile on 24 October 2004. Colombia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2001 to 2003. During the past decade, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have increased use and production of antipersonnel mines in many parts of the country. Other armed groups have also used mines, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), and in the past the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Colombia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of 40 years of internal conflict. Incidents involving landmines or improvised explosive devices have been reported in 31 of the 32 departments, with approximately half of these recorded in Antioquia, Bolívar, Caquetá, Meta, and Santander. The precise extent of the problem remains unclear, although an impact survey was planned to begin in September 2009. Despite starting clearance only in 2005, Colombia has since made steady progress in clearing its 35 mined military bases. Lack of control of certain areas of the country means that clearance of mined areas laid by non-state armed groups will probably not occur in time to meet Colombia’s Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011. Mine action is overseen by the Presidential Program for Mine Action.

Between 1999 and 2008, at least 6,696 casualties of explosive devices occurred in Colombia. Casualties have increased rapidly due to intensified conflict since 2002, making Colombia one of the countries with the most annual casualties in the world. The vast majority of casualties were military, but under-reporting of civilian casualties was certain.

As of 2009, mine/ERW risk education had improved yet it remained insufficient to cover all affected communities. Although capacity and the number of activities increased every year since 1999, no systematic program exists to develop a sustainable risk education capacity. Activities were hampered by ongoing conflict and a lack of demining.

Most civilian survivors in Colombia live in rural areas where services are spread unevenly and of variable quality. In urban centers, sufficient capacity exists to provide the necessary assistance, but distances are long and further hampered by complicated bureaucratic procedures. In principle, a legal framework for comprehensive assistance to survivors (and other victims of conflict) exists, but most survivors are not aware of their rights, not all services are covered, and application procedures are difficult. Services for military survivors are far more comprehensive.

Mine Ban Policy

Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.^[1]

Colombia submitted its ninth Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 March 2009.^[2]

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, Colombia made statements during the general exchange of views, as well as during the sessions on mine clearance and victim assistance.

At the meeting, States Parties agreed to hold the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia, from 30 November to 4 December 2009 and named Norwegian Ambassador Susan Eckey as President-Designate of the “Cartagena Summit.” Colombia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Bermúdez Merizalde made a statement welcoming the decision to hold the Second Review Conference in Colombia. Colombian Ambassador Clara Inés Vargas was named as Secretary-General-Designate of the Second Review Conference.

In early March 2009, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombian officials helped launch the “Road to Cartagena” during events held in Bogotá, Geneva, New York, and elsewhere.^[3] An ICBL delegation visited Colombia in March 2009, where it met with government officials, NGO representatives, and mine survivors to plan for the Second Review Conference.

Several meetings were held in 2009 to prepare for the Second Review Conference. On 2 March, Colombia’s Vice President Francisco Santos Calderón addressed an informal preparatory meeting in Geneva. A formal preparatory meeting was held in Geneva on 29 May 2009, and another was scheduled for 3–4 September 2009.

Colombian officials attended regional meetings scheduled in 2009 in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference. Colombian officials, including Ambassador Vargas, attended the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas from 24–26 February 2009, where they made a presentation on mine clearance (Article 5) and a statement on the preparations for the Second Review Conference. Colombia also made a statement on victim assistance and participated in the parallel program for victim assistance experts. Colombian officials also attended the Bangkok Workshop on 1–3 April 2009.

During the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Colombia made statements on mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.

With respect to key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty, Colombia stated in 2004 that any mine that is victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and is banned.^[4] It has not stated its views on the prohibition on “assistance” during joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, on foreign transit or stockpiling, or on mines retained for training.

Colombia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Colombia has never submitted an annual Article 13 national measures report. Colombia is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.^[5]

The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) has a network of local coordinators in 22 departments. The CCCM works in cooperation with other national initiatives and organizations aimed at banning mines, helping affected communities, and ending the internal armed conflict. The CCCM continues to promote the end of the use of landmines by Colombian non-state armed groups (NSAGs). At its 2009 national meeting, the CCCM decided to be involved in a new project on humanitarian demining.^[6]

Production and transfer

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998, and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999. As of 2001, INDUMIL was still producing Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.^[7] Colombia has stated that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Colombia has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode.

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but Landmine Monitor knows of no reports since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are expert in the production of explosive devices. Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content, and include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.^[8]

Stockpile destruction and retention

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its 18,531 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.^[9]

Colombia’s latest Article 7 report indicates that it retained 586 MAP-1 mines for training purposes as of March 2009, the same number as reported in 2007 and 2008.^[10] In March 2007, the coordinator of the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) told Landmine Monitor that Colombia had made a decision in 2006 to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training.^[11] It destroyed 300 mines in three separate events in 2006, but has not destroyed any, or consumed any in training activities, since that time.^[12] Colombia has never reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

Use

In this reporting period, since May 2008, there has been one allegation of possible use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, in Valle del Cauca’s municipality of La Florida on 9 June 2008.^[13] The Ombudsperson’s office (Defensoria del Pueblo) made a formal complaint to the military, but had not received a response as of June 2009. On 27 August 2009, the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA) informed Landmine Monitor that according to data from the Governor’s Office of El Valle and El País (Cali newspaper), the incident involved a mine planted by the FARC and not the Colombian Armed Forces.^[14]

Use by Non-State Armed Groups

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) possess and manufacture antipersonnel mines and IEDs, and use them on a regular basis. In the past decade, paramilitary forces have also used antipersonnel mines, most notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) until its disbandment in 2006.^[15]

In 2008 and 2009, conflict escalated between the army and armed groups, especially in the southwest and east of the country, with an apparent increase in NSAG use of mines. The Colombian army has frequently reported on the use of antipersonnel mines by and the recovery of antipersonnel mines from FARC and ELN, as well as the destruction of explosives factories. Studies have claimed 50,000–100,000 mines have been laid by NSAGs but the precise number is not known.^[16]

In September 2008, the army reported that three FARC members and five ELN members turned in 106 antipersonnel mines along with other weapons when they surrendered to the army for demobilization.^[17] The report did not indicate which armed group possessed the mines.

FARC

FARC is probably the most prolific current user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world.

In late 2008, FARC Commander Alfonso Cano is reported to have stated in an email to his secretariat intercepted by the Colombian military and made public:

“Minefields are the best way to stop the advance of military operations. We know that they are the only thing that stops and intimidates them, for this reason it is requested to increase the training of ‘explosivistas’ [experts in explosives] and to execute as soon as possible plans to instill terror that will avoid an environment of the progressive defeat of the FARC.”^[18]

FARC has been increasing its recruitment of child soldiers, who are known to carry and deploy antipersonnel mines. Many civilians are injured by these mines, including many children.^[19]

Since May 2008, the army reported encountering mines in military operations against FARC forces in Antioquia, Bolívar, Caldas, Caquetá, Cundinamarca, Guaviare, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo. The date of placement is often not known.^[20]

In November 2008, the army encountered newly laid FARC mines near La Florida in the municipality of San Carlos, near El Porvenir in the municipality of San Francisco, and in La Selva and La Quiebra in the municipality of Argelia, all in Antioquia department.^[21] Also in January 2009, it was reported that the army discovered and destroyed a FARC landmine production facility in La Holanda, in the municipality and department of Arauca, and that the facility contained 124 IEDs, 450kg of explosives, and 150kg of shrapnel.^[22]

In March 2009, FARC’s 36th Front was accused by the government of laying mines near Highway 25 in the municipality of Yarumal, in the north of Antioquia. Five members of the Colombian military died trying to clear the mines. It is not known when the minefield was laid.^[23] In April 2009, the army encountered three explosive booby-traps near the municipality of San Pablo, Bolívar department.^[24]

ELN

In May 2008, the army reported discovering an ELN weapons cache containing 12 antipersonnel mines among other weapons near Sopagá in the municipality of Paya, Boyacá department.^[25] In June 2008, the army reported discovering another ELN weapons cache containing 12 antipersonnel mines near Guacal in the municipality of Paya, Boyacá department.^[26] Also in June 2008, the army discovered and destroyed a mine production facility belonging to the ELN near Barranco Ceiba in the municipality of San José del Guaviare, Guaviare department.^[27]

In April 2009, the army encountered an antipersonnel mine and explosive booby-traps while raiding and destroying a clandestine radio station and ELN explosive weapons factory near the municipality of Támara, Casanare department.^[28] In June 2009, the army blamed the ELN for a civilian mine casualty in the municipality of Samaniego, Nariño department, near the border with Ecuador.^[29]

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and ERW problem remains unclear. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), since at least 1990 mines, IEDs, and other explosive ordnance have been used in Colombia during the conflict involving the armed forces, NSAGs, and paramilitary forces.^[30] It is reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines laid by NSAGs are found along routes used by government forces and around NSAG bases, in rural areas, around schools, houses, national parks, indigenous communities’ land, and coca production sites.^[31]

Analysis of mined areas by the Organization of American States (OAS) shows that NSAGs place activation devices in separate locations approximately five meters apart and connected by wires that cannot be detected by conventional mine detection equipment.^[32] PAICMA has claimed that NSAGs have made mines and IEDs from cans and plastic bottles and “hung” mines in trees to avoid detection as well as covering them in feces to cause wounds to become infected.^[33]

Although Colombia maintains a database that includes information from as far back as 1990, the database is more of a conflict monitoring system than an accurate appraisal of Colombia’s mine problem.^[34] So-called “events”—a generic term specific to mine action in Colombia that encompasses “incidents,” “accidents,” “suspected hazardous areas,” “UXO,” “deactivation” of devices, and “military demining”—have occurred in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments, the only exception being the Caribbean archipelago department of Providencia, San Andrés, and Santa Catalina.^[35]

According to PAICMA, most mined areas are only identified after an incident occurs. There are no records, or even reliable estimates, of the number and exact location of mined areas laid by NSAGs. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are generally in isolated locations scattered across the affected departments, and the security situation is so precarious that there is no guarantee that cleared areas can be released as safe areas.^[36] As of 31 March 2009, Colombia had recorded 13,822 events involving mines, UXO, and IEDs, of which 9,668 were considered danger areas and 4,154 where incidents occurred. Since 2006, however, the number of reports has decreased each year. Of all the events, 57% have occurred in six of the 32 departments: Antioquia, Bolívar, Caquetá, Meta, Norte de Santander, and Santander,^[37] and 70% of events are in just 90 of the 1,098 municipalities.^[38]

In 2008, the number of “events” was down by one-third compared to 2007.^[39] A possible reason for the sharp decline is military setbacks suffered by the two main NSAGs—the FARC and the ELN—since the beginning of 2008.^[40]

In addition, 34 military bases are affected by mines laid by the government, of which 18 had been cleared by December 2008. Of the 10 released in 2008, four were cancelled after the technical surveys were completed and no mines were found, and full clearance operations in two other mined areas found no mines either. As of 31 March 2009, therefore, a total of 14 military bases were suspected to be mined.^[41] In May 2009, the Monitoring and Evaluation Office of the Government Planning Office reported 22 of the 34 mined military bases had been cleared.^[42] According to the OAS, one previously unknown minefield was identified at the military base at Cerro Curva in 2009 and Colombia planned to include in its next Article 7 report.^[43]

According to PAICMA, no civilians are impacted by the mines protecting military bases as the mined areas are inside the perimeters of the bases.^[44] However, it was reported on 5 July 2009 that one child was killed and another was injured in a mine incident in the municipality of Granada, Meta, in an unmarked area the military uses for training for explosives and munitions.^[45]

In December 2008, the European Commission (EC) awarded a contract to an international consortium led by the University of Brussels and the National University of Colombia to a conduct a landmine impact survey (LIS) in Colombia.^[46] As of May 2009, however, the areas the survey would cover had not been decided (see Identification of hazardous areas section below).^[47]

Military bases suspected to be mined as of 30 April 2009^[48]

According to the British Royal Engineers, the main problem in Colombia is nuisance mining and IEDs planted by NSAGs.^[49] In an interview with Landmine Monitor, Colonel Alexander Carmona, the Commander of the Colombian Engineers School, said army troops are the primary target of mines and IEDs, and incidents occur during military engagements as well as during military clearance, when mines are detonated by remote control, “The intent and effect of the mines is massive with multiple casualties for each incident.”^[50] For example, on 17 July 2009 the Colombian army reported that during military operations in the village of Gualanday, in municipality of San José del Guaviare, Guaviare department, they found four IEDs and a gas cylinder bomb, and in the same village while conducting “search and control” operations they found five gas cylinder bombs in what the army called a minefield. In similar operations in the municipality of Sabana de Torres, Santander, in a place known as Las Delicias, the army reported finding and destroying two antipersonnel mines laid by the FARC’s 20th squad. The army also reported finding mines in Santa Rosa, Cauca, and in the village of Alto Cartagena, in the municipality of Samaniego, Nariño department.^[51]

Casualties^[52]

In 2008, Landmine Monitor recorded at least 777 new casualties due to explosive devices^[53] in Colombia, including 160 killed and 617 injured. Although there was a 15% reduction in the total number of victims (civilian and military) between 2007 and 2008, the proportion of civilian casualties actually increased during this period from 24% to 35%.^[54] PAICMA recorded at least 904 casualties for 2007, which was significantly lower than the 1,172 recorded in 2006.^[55] The main reason for this decrease would appear to be due to increased government territorial control, but PAICMA also noted that risk education and demining could have played a role.^[56] The CCCM noted that no systematic examination into reasons for decreased casualties has taken place.^[57]

PAICMA recorded 763 of the 777 casualties, and Landmine Monitor identified at least 14 additional casualties.^[58] Of these casualties, 266 were civilian, 507 were security forces, and the status of the remaining four was unknown. No NSAG casualties were recorded in 2008 by PAICMA. In the data provided to Landmine Monitor, PAICMA recorded 264 civilian casualties.

However, the ICRC noted that there was substantial under-reporting of civilian casualties, adding that, “the officially quoted figures should be viewed as a minimum number, rather than an exact figure…”^[59] When examining PAICMA data for 2008, the ICRC found that it had registered 103 civilian casualties that were not included in the PAICMA statistics. PAICMA recorded 181 civilian casualties at the time of ICRC examination, which means that there would be at least 284 civilian casualties, and under-reporting “of approximately 56%.”^[60] In May 2009, the ICRC provided PAICMA with details of 842 civilians injured between 1998 and 2009 for inclusion in their database.^[61]

While PAICMA appears to have included some of these casualties identified by the ICRC in the data it provided to Landmine Monitor, under-reporting of civilian casualties remains certain. In previous years, Landmine Monitor frequently reported that many civilians do not report incidents for fear of being suspected of belonging to NSAGs or of being threatened by NSAGs, and that the majority of mine/ERW casualties are only recorded once they seek government assistance. Additionally, most casualties occur in remote rural areas or areas where conflict is ongoing, and there is a lack of data collection capacity.^[62] In 2008, Handicap International (HI) noted that 80% of survivors interviewed for its victim assistance study were not recorded by PAICMA.^[63]

Of the civilian casualties in 2008, 54 were killed and 212 injured, including 202 men, 37 boys, 18 women, and nine girls. The majority of casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines (263) and three by ERW. For 115 casualties, the activity at the time of the incident was unknown or “other.” When recorded, by far the most common activity was coca eradication (68, or 45% of known activities), followed by travel (39, or 26%). All but five casualties occurred in rural areas. Casualties occurred in 20 departments, mostly in Nariño (54), Putumayo (44), Antioquia (38), and Meta (34). In Nariño, most casualties happened in conflict-ridden Samaniego (19), and in Meta, most casualties occurred in Vista Hermosa (20), the site of large-scale coca eradication.

The remaining 507 casualties were security forces (105 killed and 402 injured), including one woman, all involved in antipersonnel mine incidents. Casualties occurred in 22 departments, particularly in Meta (96), Antioquia (95), and Caquetá (50). As in previous years, there were more civilian casualties in Nariño among security forces (26); civilians also outnumbered military casualties in Putumayo (14 military). Reportedly, five military casualties occurred during demining in 2008,^[64] but this was not recorded as such in the PAICMA database as for 306 casualties the activity was unknown and for 199 it was “security.”^[65]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, albeit at an apparently decreased rate, with 240 casualties to 10 June 2009 (36 killed and 204 injured). Of these, PAICMA recorded 214 to 30 April 2009 and Landmine Monitor identified the remaining 26 casualties. Civilians accounted for 67 casualties (28%). The remaining 173 were security forces. All casualties were due to antipersonnel mines, and all but one occurred in rural areas. Most casualties occurred in the departments of Antioquia (47) and Meta (34). For January–April 2008, PAICMA recorded 327 casualties.

Since 2002, PAICMA has recorded 7,945 casualties (1,782 killed and 6,163 injured) between 1990 and July 2009. At least 6,696 casualties (1,483 killed and 5,213 injured) occurred between 1999 and 2008, with the vast majority of casualties starting from 2002 (6,218 or 93%) when the conflict escalated. Between 1999 and 2008, 35% of casualties were civilian (2,323), including 1,507 men, 475 boys, 177 women, and 127 girls (28 adults and nine children of unknown gender). The military accounted for 4,373 casualties, including 1,025 killed and 3,348 injured; all but one were men. NSAG casualties reported previously were not included in this data. For example, PAICMA data provided in June 2008 contained information on 42 NSAG members (including four children).^[66] Nearly all casualties (6,566) occurred in rural areas. Some 96% of casualties (6,397) were caused by antipersonnel mines and 299 were caused by ERW. PAICMA did not provide activity information for the vast majority of casualties (6,165 or 92%). The most common activities recorded for civilians were coca eradication (102) and travel (79). Casualties happened in 31 departments with most casualties recorded in Antioquia (1,473), Meta (754), Caquetá (519), and Norte de Santander (504).

Of all casualties with detailed information (7,715), 696 (both civilian and military) received assistance under the ruta de atención (“route of assistance,” see Plans section below) including 484 civilians who received social security coverage. However, this data was still under revision as of mid-June 2009,^[67] and figures were incomplete.^[68]

The ICRC reported that it had recorded at least 2,420 civilian casualties between January 2002 and 31 December 2008, and that the statistics from PAICMA it had at its disposal at the time only included 1,960 casualties for the same time period. ICRC analysis showed that the ICRC had assisted an additional 458 casualties who were not in the PAICMA database. The ICRC added that “This indicates that there is a substantial under reporting of civilian victims, of approximately 23%. It is also highly probable that there are other civilian victims not known either to the ICRC or to PAICMA.”^[69] Some of these casualties have been included in the meantime, as data obtained by Landmine Monitor contained information on 2,075 civilians between January 2002 and the end of 2008.

Risk profile

The casualty rate from landmines, UXO, and IEDs in Colombia is one of the highest in the world. The extent of the problem is unknown, and there is a lack of clearance activities, all of which make risk education an important activity. The most affected department is Antioquia and secondly Nariño. Of Colombia’s 32 departments, 31 have a problem with landmines.

Military personnel make up the largest number of casualties, followed by civilians working in forests and traveling.^[70] An ICRC knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) survey in the departments of Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño in 2007 revealed a disappointing level of awareness.^[71]

Socio-economic impact

Due to the inaccessibility of the rural areas where mine and IED incidents are reported, evidence of the socio-economic impact from mines is scant.^[72] In July 2009, the World Food Program reported violence and conflict in several departments and, in response, were implementing the “Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Other Highly Food-Insecure Groups Affected by Violence” program, which included food aid to families and communities impacted by mines in Samaniego municipality in Nariño department.^[73]

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonnel, CINAMA), established on 8 October 2001, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, established in 2002, operated as the technical secretariat of CINAMA until June 2007, when Presidential Decree 2150 created PAICMA. The decree transferred all functions previously held by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory to PAICMA.^[74]

Risk education

PAICMA is responsible for coordinating and monitoring risk education (RE) activities and accrediting organizations, and has four RE staff members.^[75] In 2008, it moved towards a greater coordination role, and away from direct implementation of RE. However, PAICMA had to complete some obligations to deliver RE activities for some local government authorities in 2008. RE coordination meetings are held every two months in Bogotá, and NGOs from the regions travel there for the meeting. UNICEF and the ICRC participate in the meetings. National standards based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) were developed and there is an accreditation process.^[76]

Victim assistance

Victim assistance (VA) is coordinated by PAICMA, which until July 2008 was in the process of reorganizing its VA department. Throughout 2008, PAICMA focused on liaising with government bodies, NGOs, and the private sector involved in VA to improve data collection, to strengthen links between VA service providers, and to examine remaining gaps in VA service provision, as well as awareness-raising.^[77] PAICMA also coordinated the Sub-committee for Integral Assistance to Victims.

Significant responsibility is delegated to departmental authorities, some of which included mine action in their development plans or created mine action committees. The level of attention dedicated to VA was variable.^[78]

The Presidential Program for Human Rights is responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Social Protection has a disability unit, which develops and coordinates disability strategies, pays disability pensions, and funds activities. The ministry also runs the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, FOSYGA), one of the main assistance funds reimbursing services for conflict victims, through which survivors are most often assisted. The other main assistance fund for victims of violence, including survivors, is operated by the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, Acción Social).^[79]

Data collection and management

Colombia has used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to store its mine action data since 2002. Collecting this information and assessing its accuracy has been difficult. The sources of information in the IMSMA database in Bogota are the Armed Forces, Department of Security Administration (Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad, DAS) and other police and military sources.^[80] Estimates of the number of SHAs are based on incidents involving landmines, IEDs, and UXO, clearance operations by the military, and SHAs registered in the national database.^[81]

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory and PAICMA have registered casualty data in IMSMA since 2002. Information is obtained from departmental and municipal authorities, the civil defense, national park guards, daily secret service bulletins, military sources, occasional meetings with survivors, civilians, and the media.^[82] In 2009, PAICMA was reviewing existing data and comparing it with that of service and compensation providers to obtain more information about assistance provided to survivors. This effort is hampered by the fact that operators all use their own databases, which have gaps but also overlap.^[83] Also, it was reported that some service providers do not record the cause of disability/incident in their registries.^[84]

In 2008, PAICMA reported improving its data collection and follow-up of information on casualties for whom little information is available. PAICMA focused on areas it did not prioritize for other VA activities (Caldas and Quindío departments) and identified 45 survivors, some of whom were not previously recorded. PAICMA also organized meetings with survivors to obtain more information.^[85] Although casualty data collection has improved, verification is hindered by conflict and military sources only provide the strict minimum of information.

The ICRC collects casualty and other weapon-contamination data for its own operational purposes and, as of mid-2008, was sharing this data regularly with PAICMA. ICRC data was included in PAICMA information.^[86] PAICMA exchanges information with other organizations such as the OAS, CCCM, Handicap International (HI), and Pastoral Social. Information exchange between the Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC) and Mi Sangre Foundation has also improved.^[87]

Preparations for the LIS started in 2009, but it is unclear what kind of information will be collected on casualties.^[88] The CCCM and other organizations give reports of their activities to PAICMA; PAICMA intended to start entering the data into IMSMA in 2009.^[89]

Mine action program operators

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Colombia’s National Strategic Plan for 2004–2009, approved by the government on 10 August 2004, included four goals:

1. capacity-building and implementing state policy against landmines;
2. reducing casualties and providing assistance;
3. meeting treaty obligations by demining military bases, destroying stockpiles, and “universalizing the fulfillment of the Treaty;” and
4. promoting changes in perception and practice of the population towards mines.

The strategy did not set timelines for each goal.^[90]

In February 2009, the National Economic and Social Policy Council (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, CONPES), which is responsible for all government planning, approved the “National policy for comprehensive action against antipersonnel mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices 2009–2019” (Aprobación de la Política de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal 2009–2019). ^[91] The plan has four main elements, namely to:

1. coordinate mine action at the national and regional level with appropriate and sustainable interventions;
2. contain contamination from antipersonnel mines and reduce their impact on communities;
3. reduce the level of risk from mines; and
4. ensure mine victims access rehabilitation and social and economic activities.^[92]

The purpose of the 10-year plan, according to PAICMA’s director, is to assist communities and people who live in mine-affected areas. He has stated that it is not a plan to meet Colombia’s Article 5 obligations, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[93] The overall strategy of the policy is to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in mine-affected communities.^[94]

In addition to conducting the LIS, priorities for 2009 were the clearance of 10 military bases and of other mined areas in Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño departments. It was also planned to conduct technical surveys in San Carlos in Antioquia, El Dorado in Meta, and Samaniego in Nariño department.^[95] Colombia planned to clear all its military bases before 1 March 2011, its Article 5 deadline.^[96]

VA is included in the 10-year plan with the same aim as the National Development Plan 2006–2010, namely to ensure “integral and retroactive attention” to survivors.

The main goals of the 2009−2019 strategy are: providing opportune and complete access to comprehensive rehabilitation and socio-economic inclusion; integrated service provision by government and non-governmental service providers; and complete development and implementation of the VA scheme. Activities, timeframes, and indicators were also included, but PAICMA’s role remained largely limited to improving data collection, establishing information exchange conventions, information dissemination and awareness-raising, liaison and facilitation among service providers, stimulating capacity-building, and developing plans.^[97] Implementation of actual assistance activities is embedded in existing state programs for vulnerable groups or conflict victims.

The main program benefiting mine/ERW/IED survivors as part of a larger group of conflict victims is the ruta de atención (“route of assistance”), a legal framework specifying assistance, ranging from first-aid to socio-economic reintegration, which has been in place since 1997.^[98] In principle, assistance under the framework is free of charge for civilian mine/ERW/IED survivors once they are recognized as victims of conflict, violence, or “terrorism” victims; they have one year to complete the administrative procedure. But services are not complete, coordination between sectors fragmented, awareness lacking among service providers and survivors, and bureaucracy complex.^[99] One of the main gaps in the ruta de atención is the lack of transport and accommodation for survivors seeking treatment. PAICMA acknowledged this, but in its 2009–2019 plan, PAICMA limited its role to lobbying for the inclusion of transport and accommodation.^[100]

PAICMA had a VA workplan for 2008, which focused on capacity-building, awareness-raising, and better follow-up of VA activities and data collection, socio-economic reintegration, and channeling resources to RE implementers.^[101] The measurable objectives for 2008 were 100% of civilian casualties to be reported in 2006–2007, and 50% of older casualties to receive information about their rights and about their progress in the ruta de atención. These objectives have not been reached; in total, PAICMA reached 105 survivors (recent and not recent) and for 86 people administrative procedures for their compensation were started.^[102]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The National Development Plan 2006–2010, approved by Congress with Law 1151 of 24 July 2007, refers to assisting victims of landmines as required by Law 418 passed in 1997, but does not make any mention of demining.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Colombia has demonstrated an uneven commitment to mine action. It began demining the army bases only in 2005, while criticizing NSAGs for their continued use of mines. It has committed significant funding to the mine action program (see Support for mine action section below).

Through the ruta de atención, Colombia manages a large part of assistance to survivors with national resources. It has largely sufficient infrastructure and technical capacities to deal with VA, although its assistance network is mostly centralized in urban areas and access can depend on territorial control. While the assistance framework was, in principle, comprehensive, NGOs still had to cover significant gaps and were crucial in facilitating access to services for survivors.^[103] In 2008, PAICMA acknowledged that VA was its weakest component and that several gaps, particularly in coordination and monitoring, needed to be addressed.^[104] NGOs noted that the government’s commitment to disability issues was low and that PAICMA did not make any “visible interventions” on the broader issue of disability to advance the situation of survivors.^[105]

From 2007–2009, Colombia attracted an increasing number of international operators and funding for VA. Some NGO operators saw an improvement in coordination with PAICMA, but also stated that this improvement was mainly due to efforts of NGOs influencing authorities and making more concerted efforts in accompanying survivors to access assistance.^[106] While PAICMA noted that it worked on improving coordination with the Ministry of Social Protection,^[107] NGOs noted that coordination between PAICMA and relevant ministries was unclear and that coordination between NGOs, ministries, and Acción Social was limited.^[108]

The CCCM found that the main progress in VA since 1999 was increased awareness, better geographic coverage, and increased survivor participation; the latter two, however, remained insufficient. HI added that significant improvements had been made in the framework and organization of VA, and that more socio-economic reintegration projects were emerging. However, continued revision according to the emerging needs and improved field implementation was required. HI added that there was no real involvement of survivors in the implementation and monitoring of assistance.^[109]

National management

Colombia’s mine action program has been nationally managed since its inception, with some international support, as detailed below.

External advisors

The role of the OAS is bound by the March 2003 Agreement of Cooperation and Technical Assistance between the General Secretariat of the OAS and the government of Colombia. Under this agreement, the OAS, with the Inter-American Defense Board, has assisted the Colombian army in strengthening its capacity for humanitarian demining. In 2008, the OAS used five international monitors as part of the quality management process for mine clearance at the military sites.^[110]

Colombia has a UN Mine Action Portfolio Country Team that includes representation from the government, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and the International Organization for Migration. Each year, through a series of multilateral consultations with stakeholders, priorities are determined and a list of projects requiring funding are identified.^[111]

Between 2003 and 2005, UNDP provided two technical advisors to the Antipersonnel Landmines Observatory, but neither held the post for more than a few months.^[112] In May 2009, the European Commission (EC) hired a technical advisor based at PAICMA. The main tasks of the advisor are to organize three seminars on RE, VA, and humanitarian demining and to monitor the EC-funded LIS.^[113]

National mine action legislation

In 2002, Law 751 created CINAMA, and Decree No. 3787 in 2003 established the Antipersonnel Landmine Observatory and authorized funding for it. In June 2007, Presidential Decree 2150 created PAICMA to replace the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory.^[114]

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

To meet its responsibilities under the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia developed two National Protocols on Humanitarian Demining: one for military bases and one for mines laid by NSAGs. Both are based on IMAS. The two protocols, akin to standing operating procedures, cover safety, procedures for impact and technical survey, marking, the destruction of UXO, and internal quality assurance, and were updated in 2007 based on lessons learned from demining activities.

Program evaluations

In January 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an evaluation of the 2005–2007 EC Mine Action Strategy in Latin America, including a case study on Colombia. The focus of the case study was assessing the value of EC funding in contributing to mine action in Colombia. The evaluation concluded that mine clearance in Colombia is heavily politicized and under the control of the Colombian army. One indication of the politicization, the evaluation observed, was the lack of distinction between civilian casualties and casualties among the armed forces engaged in combat, a practice the evaluation considered as a “departure from standard practice which is not justified.” The evaluation recommended that Colombia disaggregate the casualty data. The evaluation concluded the real impact of mines on the civilian population was difficult to assess and would remain so until a systematic survey was conducted. Nevertheless, it concluded that “By any measure, Colombia has a very severe mine problem.”^[115]

The Canadian Landmine Fund, as part of a global evaluation of the mine action programs it has funded, conducted field work for the evaluation in Colombia in March 2008.^[116] The findings of the evaluation were not available as of August 2009.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The Colombian Armed Forces is the sole demining operator. The army conducts military counter mine operations to protect government troops and to facilitate the mobility of tactical units. As of September 2009, three platoons were clearing minefields under military jurisdiction and three platoons were conducting “emergency humanitarian demining.”^[117]

Two of the platoons have been assigned to clear mined areas around military bases and the remaining two teams were conducting “emergency humanitarian demining” in areas where NSAGs operate.^[118] Criteria for determining emergency demining for any given site include: the absence of conflict for one year; the army is in control of the area to ensure security; mines are impacting the population; there is a known landmine problem; and part of the population is displaced.^[119] PAICMA admits, however, that sometimes political considerations are the primary basis for clearing a village in order to show the government is in control of the area.^[120]

At the beginning of 2009, Colombia began assessing how international NGOs could operate in the country to clear mines. HALO Trust had been conducting a mines assessment since September 2008 and has assessed six priority departments (of Colombia’s 32 departments) and made detailed field missions to municipalities and villages in Bolívar and eastern Antioquia from June–August 2009. The Colombian government asked HALO to initiate a large-scale civilian demining program as a pilot project for international NGO assistance. Subsequently, HALO recruited and trained senior Colombian staff, and planned to start clearance operations in Antioquia in late 2009.^[121] However, new legislation and revised coordination structures were needed before they could be allowed to operate.^[122]

In June 2009, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted exploratory missions to Colombia, and the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement within the US Department of State conducted a workshop in Bogotá on planning and humanitarian demining.^[123] In July, MAG was in the process of recruiting a community liaison manager to work with the CCCM to strengthen the capacity of their field teams and local partners, and to implement community liaison and risk reduction education activities, as well as assess other mine action opportunities in Colombia.^[124]

Identification of hazardous areas

The EC issued a call for tender on 24 April 2008 to conduct an LIS in Colombia over a 15-month period beginning in September 2008.^[125] In December 2008, a consortium led by the University of Brussels and the National University of Colombia, including Sistemas de Información S.A. (Spain), Humanitarian Technology Consulting (UK), and RK Consulting Ltd. (UK), was awarded the contract for the survey, which officially began in March 2009.^[126]

The protocols that guided the global LIS process will be adapted to the situation in Colombia, where there is still active combat in some regions. The consortium will use both paper and electronic means to collect and store data. In July 2009, PAICMA identified Antioquia department, Catatumbo in Norte de Santander department close to the Venezuelan border, Montes de María (a mountainous region on the Caribbean coast), and Nariño department as the four areas where the survey would begin in September 2009.^[127]

The survey will be conducted in locations based on safe working conditions, the number of casualties, and the level of suspected contamination.^[128] Affected communities are fearful of reprisals from NSAGs, which impedes the flow of information about dangerous areas and SHAs. If this fear is pervasive in mine-affected communities, it could affect the comprehensiveness of the planned LIS.

It was planned to begin the LIS in September 2009 in Antioquia, Catatumbo, Nariño, and the Montes de María region.^[129] The project was scheduled to take one year, but PAICMA believed an extension might be required.^[130]

Mine clearance in 2008

In 2008, the army’s humanitarian demining teams cleared 10 military bases bringing the number of cleared bases to 18 of the 34 believed to be mined. As noted above, on six of the bases (Cerro Luna, El Hobo, Fortaleza, La Argelia, and La Riqueza, and Yatacue) no mines were found during technical surveys and clearance operations.^[131] According to Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator for the OAS mine action program, it is likely the mines were never laid in these locations and indicated it was possible that during future technical surveys in the remaining mined military bases no landmines will be found.^[132] Pablo Parra, PAICMA’s Mine Action Advisor, thought no landmines were found in these six locations because years ago the base commanders had ordered that the mines be removed but never reported it.^[133]

In 2008, a total of 28,423m² of SHA was cleared around military bases, resulting in the destruction of 316 antipersonnel mines and 13 items of UXO.^[134]

Demining of 10 military bases in 2008^[135]

Technical surveys, or impact surveys as they are called in Colombia, have been conducted on nine SHAs mined by NSAGs in five departments. The nine SHAs range in size from an estimated 5,000m² to 360,000m², with all nine calculated to cover 457,900m². The army’s humanitarian demining teams have cleared three of the nine areas. Two were located in San Francisco municipality in Antioquia and one in San Jacinto municipality in Bolívar.

Bajo Grande is an abandoned village in the municipality of San Jacinto in the department of Bolívar, 200km from the city of Cartagena in northern Colombia. Manual clearance of the 360,000m² SHA began in December 2007 with one army platoon of 40 deminers. Houses, yards, roads, and agricultural land were targeted for clearance.^[136] As of August 2009, however, eight months after clearance was completed, and despite promises of development projects such as roads, agricultural land, and new housing, little more than ground breaking for a road had been achieved, according to La Silla Vacía, an online news service in Colombia.

There is reportedly no electricity, drinking water, or other public services in the village. During a visit in June 2009, US Department of State official Ed Trimakas said it would be difficult for people to live in the village in these conditions. Apart from 50 men who have occasionally farmed in Bajo Grande since 2007, only five families have returned to the village. With no public services available, the poor condition of the cleared land, and debt among displaced families, some of the cleared land has been sold to a company for 300,000 pesos per hectare (US$150) for agricultural production and cattle-raising. The local government in San Jacinto municipality has received 128 requests to sell land owned by internally displaced persons (IDPs). The government was said to be investigating whether the IDPs were pressured into selling their land or were threatened by potential buyers.^[137]

Elsewhere, in San Francisco department, at San Isidro and Alto El Aguacate, mined areas blocking farmland and a frequently used trail were cleared. During the clearance operations, 100 improvised mines and six items of UXO were destroyed. Clearance of the SHAs in Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño departments continued into 2009.^[138]

Humanitarian demining in 2008^[139]

Under the responsibility of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces, a National Demining School at the Colombian Engineers School is responsible for training army deminers. The OAS, Inter-American Defense Board, British Royal Engineers, and Salamandra Foundation (Fundación Salamandra) provide technical assistance to the training.^[140] Demining capacity in January 2009 was 240 deminers.^[141]

It was planned to add three humanitarian demining teams (120 people) in 2009 and by the end of 2011 to have 14 demining teams including mine detection dog and mechanical clearance teams deployed.^[142] Mine clearance operations in areas mined by NSAGs are said to be hindered by poor roads, inclement weather, and vegetation.^[143]

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory in 2005 said that the government plans to meet the Article 5 deadline in terms of clearance of the minefields under the jurisdiction of the armed forces, but “there is no guarantee that Colombia will be able to declare itself mine-free in 2011, especially if non-State actors do not embrace the principles in the Convention. However, the Government will not ask for any extension until evaluating the possibility to completely fulfill what is established in the Treaty.”^[144]

In June 2007, the Chief of the Joint Command told Landmine Monitor that Colombia would clear “all mined areas under its control.”^[145] At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, Colombia said it would probably request an extension of its Article 5 deadline to address the types of mines manufactured by NSAGs. In the same statement, Colombia reiterated it would clear all mines from its military bases by 1 March 2011.^[146]

Colombia is making steady progress in clearing the 34 mined military bases. As of May 2009, 14 remained to be cleared. Nevertheless, true progress towards meeting its Article 5 obligations cannot be measured until the full extent of the problem is known. While it was planned to commence an LIS in a limited number of departments in 2009, ongoing security concerns in the rural areas where thousands of events have been recorded will severely limit its coverage. A nationwide survey is needed to ensure that Colombia has made every effort to identify all mined areas, as required by the treaty.

Risk Education

RE in Colombia aims to provide information to enable communities to manage risk themselves. Local government staff, health workers, and teachers are trained in RE, but no systematic program exists to develop a sustainable RE capacity. Some operators deliver RE directly to households, as community gatherings are not possible in remote areas. There are also community liaison clearance activities led by the OAS.^[147]

RE is insufficient as operators are unable to cover all affected communities. Nariño department has the greatest number of operators but, as it is a large department, the level of activity is inadequate. According to the CCCM, the most important issue is promoting and sustaining the RE program because there are many regions and areas where it is impossible to start demining, hence the focus on RE.^[148]

A needs assessment was conducted in 2005, and each year the information is updated, based on casualty data, indigenous communities in priority areas, IDPs and returnees, coca eradication activities, and recent conflict.^[149] The ICRC conducted a KAP survey in three departments (Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño) in 2007.

The CCCM is funded by Spain and receives technical support from UNICEF.^[150] The EC funded RE projects by Pastoral Social and the Gobernación de Antioquia (Antioquia departmental government).^[151] The National Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA) implemented a training course based on its curriculum for “community mine action agents,” which was developed in 2007. However, these were vocational training courses for people who wanted to gain qualifications to increase employment opportunities, and who would not necessarily use the training provided to deliver RE.^[152] The department of Antioquia government is the only department that has taken an active role in RE: it has contributed funding to RE projects and has produced materials, including a comic book for children.^[153]

The ICRC and Colombian Red Cross (CRC) work together to conduct risk reduction activities and RE. According to the ICRC, “Risk reduction seeks to ensure that weapon contamination-affected communities have safe access to important resources such as water points, schools and agricultural land or undertake other interventions to mitigate the impact of weapon contamination.”^[154] In 2008, risk reduction activities included agricultural projects, the provision of accommodation near hospitals to reduce excessive movements on roads, and liaison on prioritization of clearance activities.^[155] The ICRC and CRC provide basic safety messages, reaching rural areas that are inaccessible to most other operators, and “while the ICRC seeks to negotiate and facilitate CRC access to affected areas, the ICRC has developed a capacity to undertake risk education in areas where this is not possible, or where CRC capacity does not exist.”^[156]

A four-day international seminar on RE funded by the EC to build the capacity of Colombian mine action was held in May 2009. Almost 20 organizations and more than 100 people participated.^[157]

Risk education activities in 2008^[158]

In 2008, materials were developed by a committee consisting of UNICEF, PAICMA, CCCM, and other organizations. In the initial stages, there was coordination with NGOs, but not through to the completion of the materials.^[159]

UNICEF conducted an evaluation in 2008 of the CCCM RE and VA project in the departments of Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño, and La Mojana region. It found that the messages and methods of delivery were appropriate and, although it was difficult to measure the impact in a short period of time, it concluded that the project had resulted in behavior change. UNICEF identified a need to improve sustainability, and recommended linking with municipal development plans, implementing RE through schools, and linking with public institutions.^[160]

RE has been conducted over the last 10 years with the support of UNICEF by department governments, national NGOs, the CRC with the support of ICRC, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (from 2001 to 2007), and then PAICMA from 2007. Although the level of activity has increased each year, geographic coverage has remained inadequate. A desk needs assessment in 2005 prioritized 100 municipalities in 12 departments, but as of July 2006, most of these had not received RE. Methods have included: seminars, presentations, mass media campaigns, field projects, training of community leaders, RE to children, and in 2005 a project was launched to include RE in the school curriculum. Emergency RE was conducted in 2005 following heavy fighting in Cauca. Lack of coordination was reported to be a problem. The ongoing conflict also hampered RE.

In March 2003, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory published an RE handbook. In March 2005, a workshop was held to develop best practices, which brought all RE actors together for the first time. In May 2005, a second workshop with GICHD was held to develop an action plan. A national strategic plan for 2005–2009 was developed with technical and financial support from GICHD and Switzerland. In 2005, UNICEF produced two new tools: a fieldwork manual for facilitators and an interactive game for community members. In 2006, the IMAS for RE was translated into Spanish.

Victim Assistance

The number of mine/ERW survivors in Colombia is not known, but is estimated to be at least 6,163. In its 2009–2019 strategy, PAICMA noted that “despite the achievements in providing assistance to victims, there is no certainty that survivors of APs [antipersonnel mines], IEDs and UXO effectively receive integral rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion…” because of a lack of management capacity by service providers, inflexible systems, and the lack of a clear framework for certain types of services.^[161]

The ICRC noted that government and NGOs often have “extremely limited” access in most conflict-affected parts of the country, resulting in a limited capacity to respond and restricted access for civilians to services. It was added that the government has the capacity to manage health and other services, but not in all parts of the country, and capacity varies over time and location due to conflict.^[162]

Colombia possesses an extensive, but unequally distributed, network of hospitals with well-trained staff. Mine/ERW survivors usually receive emergency care, which is free of charge. However, the timeliness and quality remained variable due to a lack of capacity at the community health level.^[163] Departmental capitals have the capacity to carry out comprehensive surgical and rehabilitation assistance. The Colombian Association for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation was cited as stating that only some 15% of persons with disabilities received medical care adequate to their condition.^[164] According to the ICRC, follow-up assistance is more difficult, as “a significant minority are often refused treatment by hospitals, who are either unaware of their obligations or are worried about the financial implications….”^[165] Referral is not systematic and a lack of financial means, long distances, and ongoing conflict hamper civilian access to these follow-up services. Service providers are strained by the decreased budget allocated by the government for those without private insurance, and reimbursement delays occasionally disrupted service provision.

Rehabilitation centers are usually of good quality, but only available in major cities and few outreach services are available. Services are provided by the government, private centers, and NGOs. In 2008, the Ministry of Social Protection worked on draft standards for prosthetic-orthotic services and on establishing a training program with support from the ICRC,^[166] and within the framework of the 2008–2012 program to strengthen the integral rehabilitation system, supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and PAICMA. This program—working with departmental health secretaries in Valle del Cauca and Antioquia, two university hospitals, service providers, and rural health promoters—was in the planning stage in 2008, and implementation and study visits started in February 2009.^[167]

Mine/ERW survivors are entitled to psychosocial assistance for one year after the incident, but services are virtually non-existent. According to PAICMA, however, psychosocial services were not fully developed or implemented.^[168] Psychosocial services do not exist at community-level hospitals.^[169] Survivors can access free vocational training at SENA, but these courses are not adapted to the needs or education levels of the mostly rural survivors. Reportedly, only 7,000 of Bogotá’s 100,000 persons with disabilities had access to public education.^[170] Economic reintegration opportunities for mine/ERW survivors are limited, even though these are, in principle, included in the ruta de atención. It was said in 2009 that “only a negligible percentage of weapon contamination victims are currently benefiting from government or other projects to help them become economically self sufficient.”^[171] This is partly because of a lack of expertise and partly because of a lack of awareness.^[172] PAICMA noted the lack of any systematic income-generating activities, and stated that although the local authorities are crucial in these activities, they do not know what role they are expected to play.^[173]

Mine/ERW survivors and the families of those killed by these devices can claim one-time government compensation and reimbursement of treatment costs within one year of the incident under various legislative frameworks. The most recent decree is Decree 3990 of October 2007, which meant to streamline procedures].^[174] However, the complexity of procedures “often hinder[s], rather than improve[s], access to services.”^[175] Both PAICMA and operators noted that Decree 3990 encountered problems since its implementation started in 2008.^[176] The most common problems were: the stricter definition of who is eligible; more documentary proof needed; shorter timeframes in which documents need to be furnished by authorities; and a reduction of time for rehabilitation. In addition, the same awareness problems remained, as did gaps for transport and accommodation. Service provision was extended to cover more medical services and to make the provision of mobility devices to children less time-bound,^[177] but gaps remained, particularly for psychosocial support and economic reintegration.^[178]

The military provides health and rehabilitation services to its personnel, but the level of services differs between professional soldiers and those performing military service. The military is not able to provide sufficient socio-economic reintegration or pensions to professional soldiers who then often need to turn to charities and civilian services.

Colombia has specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but its implementation is limited due to a lack of capacity, coordination, and leadership. On 30 March 2007, Colombia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol. As of 1 July 2009, Colombia had not ratified the convention.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Colombia is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.^[179] Colombia presented its four 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. The objectives have not been updated since;^[180] four equally broad objectives have been elaborated in the 2009–2019 strategy. PAICMA stated in 2009 that the objectives reflect the actions taken under the ruta de atención and PAICMA’s activities.^[181]

Most of Colombia’s objectives related to data collection and the development of strategies. Progress was made on all objectives, but the actual benefits for survivors remain to be seen. In 2008, PAICMA acknowledged that the objectives were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound), but also said VA was incorporated into larger programs for conflict victims or poor people, such as the ruta de atención.^[182]

A VA expert from Colombia was present at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2006–2009 and at meetings of States Parties from 2006–2008. VA experts also participated in workshops held in Managua, Nicaragua in February 2009 and April 2005. Colombia included detailed information on plans in the statements it made at all intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties between 2005 and 2009 and in Form J of its Article 7 reports from 2005–2009.

Victim assistance activities

There are many assistance providers in Colombia; only those providing updated information have been included below.^[183]

In 2008, PAICMA worked on increasing awareness about VA services for service providers, authorities, and survivors through workshops and meetings; some 105 survivors in Santander and 150 local authority service providers in Huila and Caquetá were reached. PAICMA also stimulated training on the ruta de atención through other channels and supported some survivors identified during meetings or through data collection in accessing assistance (see above).^[184]

Of the 139 survivors monitored by PAICMA in the first half of 2008, only 86 received medical assistance covered by FOSYGA and 62 received compensation through Acción Social.^[185]

Within the framework of EC funding for RE and VA in 2008, the departmental government of Antioquia monitored assistance and referral of 247 survivors, cooperated on psychosocial support in five municipalities with the University of Antioquia, visited 15 municipalities to promote the establishment of survivor organizations, and organized awareness-raising workshops in 59 municipalities.^[186]

No formal prosthetic-orthotic curriculum exists in Colombia, and in 2008–2009 work was undertaken to establish a course by the Ministry of Social Protection, SENA, and the ICRC. Additionally in 2009, three technicians started courses at the Don Bosco University in El Salvador, and several others started distant learning courses.^[187]

In 2008, the CCCM ended its cooperation with the Spanish NGO Moviment Per la Pau (Movement for Peace) and in 2009 entered a partnership with Mercy Corps (with funding from the US Agency for International Development, USAID) for a three-year VA project. In 2008, the CCCM opened a farm in Girón (Santander department) where survivors can live and work during their rehabilitation.^[188] After winning a USAID tender, Mercy Corps started VA activities in 2009. The work includes construction of a rehabilitation facility in the departmental hospital of Nariño.^[189] In 2008 and 2009, US Department of State funded the CCCM RE projects in Antioquia.^[190]

CIREC continued to provide physical rehabilitation (center-based and through “rehabilitation brigades”), socio-economic assistance to survivors, as well as capacity-building and peer support through its Seeds of Hope groups. Some 513 prostheses and 3,478 orthoses were produced; the rehabilitation brigades assisted 624 people; and peer support groups operated in 42 municipalities. CIREC also organized awareness-raising workshops on disability and the ruta de atención. In 2008, CIREC organized a patient evaluation of its services: some 81% were satisfied with the treatment they had received, 92% with the staff competencies, and 71% with the quality of mobility devices provided.^[191] The US Department of State has partnered with CIREC’s Seeds of Hope project since 2006 supporting medical brigades and association development in 10 municipalities.^[192]

In 2008, the national secretariat of Pastoral Social provided individual psychosocial support for survivors and their families in five southern departments and organized workshops for the affected communities. It assisted 93 survivors and another 171 family or community members. Pastoral Social also assisted 97 survivors and 64 family members with the administrative process to apply for assistance.^[193]

In 2009, the ICRC reported that of the 2,420 civilian casualties recorded between 2000 and 2008, the ICRC had provided economic support and/or medical support to 936 (39%).^[194] In 2008, the ICRC continued its awareness training on the ruta de atención for community leaders, teachers, and local and departmental authorities, combined with RE messages, in some 32 municipalities. First-aid refreshers and trauma care training were provided to more than 400 health staff. The ICRC paid for transport and accommodation during medical or physical rehabilitation for some 331 weapon-injured people.^[195] In 2008, the ICRC supported five physical rehabilitation centers, assisting 14,370 persons with disabilities, including assisting 152 mine/ERW/IED survivors with prostheses and 18 with orthoses. It covered the full cost of treatment for 103 of these survivors. Training and facility upgrades were also supported.^[196]

In 2008, HI continued to expand and diversify its VA activities to provide more comprehensive assistance. It developed quality guidelines for integral assistance, facilitated access to services, and raised awareness among service providers. HI also built the capacity of survivors and persons with disabilities to participate in community coordination/representation and increased their involvement in the management of assistance provision. It also continued its community-based rehabilitation for persons with disabilities and technical advice to the Fundación REI rehabilitation center. In 2008, 124 survivors, including 14 injured in 2008, received multiple services: all received psychosocial support, 90 received physical rehabilitation, 40 peer support, and three economic reintegration assistance; 217 medical care services and 96 mobility devices were covered. An additional 480 persons with disabilities received physical rehabilitation (and 150 of these also received psychosocial support).^[197]

During 2008, the OAS facilitated the assistance of and covered the treatment, accommodation, and transport costs for 77 mine/ERW survivors at CIREC. In coordination with PAICMA, the OAS also supported vocational training for 35 survivors at SENA. Of those 35, five had found employment by July 2009 and 11 had received financial assistance to start their business.^[198]

Support for Mine Action

In April 2009, Colombia reported that it would cost an estimated $78 million to cover mine action needs for the period 2009–2012, with $66.3 million projected to come from national funding sources—42% of the total requirement from the Ministry of Defense, and 23% from the Ministry of Welfare—and $11.7 million from other sources, including international assistance.^[199]

National support for mine action

In official budget reporting, Colombia reported contributing COP1.884 billion ($942,000) to national mine action programs in 2008, as reported by the National System for Evaluation of Public Sector Performance (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Resultados de la Gestión Pública), the Department of Planning’s monitoring and evaluation division.^[200] PAICMA reported contributions of COP2.771 billion ($1,385,500) in national funds for mine action in 2008, but did not provide details to compare to Department of Planning figures.^[201] National funds are allocated under the project entitled “Implantación del Programa Nacional de Prevención de Accidentes por Minas Antipersonales y Atención a Víctimas” (“Implementation of the National Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and for the Care of Victims”). In its Article 7 report covering 1 January 2007 to 31 March 2008, Colombia reported a government commitment of COP2.665 billion (about $1,327,500) for the national mine action program for July 2007–June 2008.^[202] As of August 2009, the Department of Planning reported a national commitment of COP2.937 billion ($1,468,500) for 2009.^[203]

For the implementation of VA between 2009 and 2012, some COP63.991 million ($31,996) in national resources was budgeted, mostly coming from the Ministry of Social Protection.^[204] In its 2009–2019 strategy, PAICMA mentioned that from 2008 to 2019, Colombia would spend COP155.110 million ($77,555) on 1,682 civilian survivors (this equals less than $50 per person). Additionally, COP258.194 million ($129,097) was allocated to psychosocial and economic support for 2,799 military and civilian survivors during the same period.^[205]

National funding as reported by the Department of Planning evidently does not include funds directed through other budget sources such as the ministries of defense and foreign affairs. As a result, it is not possible to assess national funding levels against the levels called for in Colombia’s Article 7 report for 2008. These average $16.6 million per year based on a total requirement of $66.3 million for the four-year period. In its Article 7 report for 2007, Colombia reported a commitment of $41 million in national funding over four years. It has not since reported on further contributions to make up shortfalls in reported national funding.^[206]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, nine countries and the EC reported providing $9,139,472 (€6,206,351) to mine action in Colombia. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 4% more than reported in 2007.^[207] Past statements by Colombia have suggested that the lack of effective control of mine-affected areas, rather than international funding levels, is the main hindrance to meeting its Article 5 deadline.

Funding to Colombia at 2008 levels appears adequate for supporting clearance of areas under military control. No estimates have been provided on what is needed to clear the other mined areas where incidents occur. Funding to RE and VA appear insufficient to meet needs in these areas.

2008 International Mine Action Support to Colombia: In-Kind^[208]

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Colombia: Monetary^[209]

In addition to the above, HALO reported $200,000 in funding from the Reid Lawlor Foundation in 2008 to support impact assessment projects.^[210]