While France was not
one of the first countries to fully embrace a ban and the Ottawa Process, it was
an early leader in taking steps to deal with the global landmine crisis, and
French nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were the catalyst to French action
and ultimately for the government’s shift to a pro-ban policy.
One of the first measures taken by France at the request of NGOs, as part of
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, was the announcement in February
1993 by President François Mitterrand, during a state visit to Cambodia,
of a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel
landmines.[1] Not long after,
France officially requested of the Secretary General of the United Nations that
a review conference be held to amend the Convention on Conventional Weapons
(CCW) and its Protocol II dealing with landmines. The review process, which
spanned two and a half years, was the platform on which momentum was built that
ultimately lead to the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty.
During the review conference in Vienna in September of 1995, France announced
that it would ban the production and trade but not use of APMs. The French
Campaign immediately began to lobby for public debate of the policy, that it be
reinforced as law and for the establishment of a special commission to monitor
the destruction of
stocks.[2]
While France attended the October 1996 ban strategy meeting in Ottawa as a
full participant, it had not taken part in meetings organized by the ICBL during
the final sessions of the review conference to help forge a like-minded block of
pro-ban countries. In Ottawa, it announced new steps toward a ban that it would
outlaw the use of APMs, unless French soldiers are in danger. It also argued
that ban negotiations should take place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
To the confusion and dismay of government representatives, these positions were
not enthusiastically embraced by the ICBL, which was participating in the Ottawa
meetings and voiced its disagreement with French policies.
France did not fully embrace the Ottawa Process until the Brussels Conference
in June of 1997. It continued to maintain the view that only the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) could negotiate a total ban on antipersonnel mines, but once
France came on board the Ottawa Process, it became a strong advocate of the
Process and a member of the expanded core group. When French Secretary of State
for Overseas Cooperation, Mr. Charles Josselin signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3
December 1997, in Ottawa, he declared, “You can count on our unflagging
determination, both to enforce the Treaty and to ensure its universal
acceptance.”
The Mine Ban Treaty was ratified unanimously by the French Parliament on 25
June 1998.[3] At the time of the
vote, the Minister of Defense declared: “This law authorizing
ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty will make France the first permanent member
of the U.N. Security Council to adhere to these standards. It indicates our
determined willingness to arrive at a total and universal ban on antipersonnel
mines. This same determination to see a total mine ban recently led France to
declare before the Atlantic Alliance that it would unreservedly enforce the
Ottawa Treaty. France will prohibit the planned or actual use of antipersonnel
mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military personnel.
Furthermore, France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in any military
operation calling for the use of antipersonnel
mines.”[4]
At the same time it voted to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, the French
Parliament, after a second reading, unanimously passed implementing legislation
with the intent of eliminating antipersonnel mines, in accordance with Article 9
of the Treaty. This Law was published in the Official Journal on 8 July
1998.[5] France and Germany
simultaneously deposited their respective documents of ratification with the
United Nations on 23 July 1998.
The law authorizes the French Government to retain existing antipersonnel
mine stockpiles until their destruction, at the latest by 31 December 2000;
transfer antipersonnel mines with the intent to destroy them; retain or transfer
a certain number of antipersonnel mines for the development of mine detection,
demining, or destruction techniques, and for training in these techniques, the
number of these retained mines not to exceed 5,000 as of 31 December
2000.[6] The law provides for
criminal sanctions as required under Article 9 of the Treaty. Violations of the
key prohibitions of the treaty will be punishable by ten years of imprisonment
and by a fine of 1,000,000 francs. The French Law went into force on 1 March
1999, and applies equally in French overseas territories and in the collective
territory of Mayotte.
A National Committee For the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines shall be
created, to be composed of Government representatives, two Deputies and two
Senators, representatives from humanitarian organizations, and representatives
from corporate management and organized
labor.[7] The National Committee
shall ensure monitoring and enforcement of the present Law, and of international
actions by France in the field of victim assistance and humanitarian mine
clearance.[8]
The establishment of a National Committee undoubtedly represents one of the
main innovations of the French law. Indeed, such a body is without precedent, as
this is the first time the French Government has ever officially allowed NGOs to
participate in the monitoring of its political processes. The very existence of
the Committee demonstrates that the partnerships between NGOs and governments
developed in many other countries throughout the anti-landmine campaign are
gradually being created here in France.
From 1992 to 1998, loud calls to successive French governments from both
NGOs and the French public brought about cooperation and exchange of information
with the ministries involved in the landmine issue, a development which served
to advance the cause of a total landmine ban and the signing of the Ottawa
Treaty. The French Ban Campaign has undoubtedly helped to improve relations
between NGOs and those government ministries involved in issues previously
restricted to the public sector, e.g. matters of disarmament.
Actions by French deputies and senators were also of critical importance in
the passage of the Law. Legislators were largely responsible for relaying NGO
requests for a monitoring committee during the drafting of the bill. French
parliamentarians will sit on the new Committee, which is not the case for the
commission in charge of monitoring French enforcement of the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention, whose only members are ministerial
representatives.[9]
The creation of a National Committee for the Elimination of Antipersonnel
Mines has brought new hope for greater transparency in French disarmament
policy. Nevertheless, many questions remain about the Committee's method of
functioning and the means it will have at its disposal. As of this date, the
decrees authorizing the Committee to begin work have still not been published in
the Official Journal. Despite the fact that the Law has already gone into
effect, the Committee has never met.
Although French NGOs have widely applauded the establishment of the National
Committee, these same organizations are now speaking out on the principles that
must be put into place by France to ensure complete transparency in the
monitoring and verification of the commitments it has undertaken.
One study commissioned by Handicap International, the lead NGO in the French
Campaign and a co-founder of the ICBL, put forward recommendations as early as
September 1998 for maximum transparency in monitoring and verification of
compliance with the French law. While outlining French obligations under the
provisions of the Treaty and/or law, and describing the state of affairs in
France, the study makes a series of recommendations which can be summed up as
follows :
1 - At the beginning of its work, the National Committee must have available
every means allowing it to make a complete inventory of antipersonnel mines
manufactured by French firms : the different types and quantities produced. This
inventory will serve as a baseline to evaluate progress in eliminating mines,
which constitutes the mandate of the Committee.
2 - The National Committee must possess every means to enable the drawing up
of a complete report on antipersonnel mine stockpiles available to armies, both
on the mainland and in overseas territories, as well as inventories of
authorized transfers of French-made antipersonnel mines.
3 - The destruction of France’s antipersonnel mine stockpiles should be
the subject of a precise inventory and timetable. The method of destruction
should be spelled out and elimination verified by the National Committee.
4 - The National Committee should be able to establish a report on the
industrial conversion of companies and facilities which have served to produce
antipersonnel mines.
5 - The National Committee should pay special attention to the transfer of
non-specific antipersonnel mine components. A specific Registry for these
transfers should be set up jointly between the National Committee and the
Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Materiel Exports (CIEEMG).
6 - In order to facilitate mine clearance operations, French authorities
should be able to confirm or deny allegations of the presence of French mines in
foreign countries.
7 - The National Committee must give particular attention to booby-trapping
systems adapted for antitank mines. Reports should be carried out by independent
experts in order to ensure that there is no contravention of the antipersonnel
mine ban.
8 - The National Committee should become an intermediary for satisfying the
needs and preoccupations of organizations in charge of humanitarian demining,
particularly concerning the technologies to be developed.
9 - The National Committee should be able to check and verify that
replacement systems for antipersonnel mines do not circumvent the French Law or
the Ottawa Convention.
10 - The monitoring and verification which form part of the National
Committee’s mandate do not imply a special role for the Committee in the
process of choice or approval for weapons systems designed to replace
antipersonnel mines.[10]
Among many other issues to be studied closely by NGOs is the case of
anti-vehicle mines or other weapons systems which do not conform to the
definition used for the Mine Ban Treaty or subsequent French Law, but which can
have the same deadly effects as antipersonnel
mines.[11] This was raised by
some legislators during the debate leading to the passage of the French law.
Said one, “If this is indeed our objective, then let's go all the way.
Firstly, let's adopt a wider definition, since the one used in Ottawa was only a
compromise, let's widen the antipersonnel mine definition to include all
comparable devices to antitank mine booby-traps that use anti-handling devices,
inasmuch as the treaty negotiators in Oslo recognized that if these mines can be
triggered by an involuntary act, they may be considered as antipersonnel
mines.”[12]
CCW and CD
France ratified original Protocol II of the CCW on 4 March 1988; it ratified
the May 1996 revised Protocol II on 8 July 1998. Decrees concerning the
application of this most recent Protocol were published in the Official Journal
of 5 March 1999.
On 25 February 1999, the Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly reaffirmed
that France supports establishing an antipersonnel mine transfer ban in the CD.
“In order to be truly effective, the ban decreed in Ottawa must be made
universal. The fact that some major players, i.e., the United States, Russia,
China, and India, have adopted a wait-and-see attitude is cause for concern. We
feel that the opening of further negotiations at the Disarmament Conference, to
deal first with the issue of mine transfers, would mark a definite step in the
right direction and would help dry up supply markets for antipersonnel
mines.”[13]
Production
Until the official announcement of a moratorium on
the manufacture of antipersonnel mines on 26 September 1995 by Xavier
Emmanuelli, Secretary of State for Humanitarian and Emergency Actions during the
opening session of the First Review Conference for Protocol II of the 1980 CCW,
France manufactured antipersonnel mines. The production ban has henceforth been
rendered official through the law of 8 July, which prohibits all production of
antipersonnel mines in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty. It has thus far been
impossible to obtain information from the companies involved on the actual
cessation of APM production or on programs for decommissioning of assembly
lines, or to verify the real situation on the ground.
In a study published in February
1997[14] on behalf of Handicap
International, the Observatoire Des Transferts d'Armements made a thorough
analysis of French landmine production and related systems. Included in the
study is a list of mine types and French manufacturers, but also a wider
description of materials displaying antipersonnel features, along with a number
of companies listed because of their willingness to introduce certain products
designed to circumvent a possible landmine ban, notably in the form of munitions
or machines said to be for the protection of equipment or sites.
Antipersonnel Mines
Directional antipersonnel mine (MI AP EFDR F1)
Manufacturer: SAE ALSETEX
Scatters 500 shrapnel pieces at 60 degree angle and produces fatal wounds up
to 30 or 40 meters.
Type of mine produced in series. Pressure or traction detonated (5kg) and
detectable-at-will through addition of metallic ring. MAPDV 59 has been found in
Mozambique and Angola.
Undetectable antipersonnel mine(MI AP ID 51)
SAE ALSETEX
Developed during Algerian War and designed to avoid demining by enemy forces.
Appears not to be in service in French Army.
Bounding metallic antipersonnel mine (MI AP MT BON 51/55)
Manufacturer: SAE ALSETEX
Explodes one meter above the ground, projecting horizontal circle of shrapnel
which is fatal up to 10 meters and still dangerous as far as 100 meters. Appears
not to be in service in French Army.
Antipersonnel mine (NR 409/PRB 409)
Manufacturer: PRB (Giat Industries)
Difficult-to-detect antipersonnel mine due to low metal content. Mine has not
been produced since PRB bankruptcy in
1990.[15]
Antipersonnel mine (NR-413)
Manufacturer: PRB (Giat Industries)
Detectable antipersonnel fragmentation mine, pressure detonated by 2 to 5 kg.
Manufactured until 1990 in
Belgium.[16]
Antipersonnel mine (PRB M966)
Manufacturer: PRB (Giat Industries)
Antipersonnel fragmentation mine, copy of American M2 mine. Also produced in
Portugal. Detonated by 4.5 to 9 kg. of pressure. Manufactured in Belgium up to
1990.[17]
Munitions with AP Effects
Within the range of French-manufactured mines and comparable devices can be
found products requiring especially close monitoring, i.e. so-called
counter-clearance mines, certain antitank mine ignitions, and some booby-trap
systems for these mines.
Counter Clearance Mines
Made by GIAT INDUSTRIES, mines of this type are used, notably in the Minotaur
system, to prevent manual demining operations and are comparable to
"booby-traps." This counter-clearance mine is presented as such in the 1994
GICAT catalog: "Double-sided counter clearance mine, homogenous with antitank
mine, has 4 trip wire booby-trap deployment systems on each side, functions on
ground by breakage or disturbance of booby-trap trip wires, radius of detection
and efficacy
(6m).”[18]
The 1992 GICAT catalog presents the Minotaur mine dispenser system, which
allows the instant creation of large antitank, antipersonnel, or mixed
minefields.[19] Two years
later in 1994, and probably because of François Mitterrand’s export
moratorium declaration, Giat Industires modified the description of its
Minotaur, as a system which could then instantly create large antitank,
counter-clearance, or mixed
minefields.[20] Obviously, the
expression antipersonnel mine had been replaced by the counter-clearance mine,
which has all the characteristics of an antipersonnel mine.
In the 1996 catalog, the Minotaur is described as dispenses only antitank
mines.
In the opinion of some demining experts, these counter-clearance devices
enable antitank mines to function like antipersonnel mines. The 1998 edition of
the French Terrestrial Defense Matériel catalog makes no reference
to the counter-clearance mine. However, the Minotaur System and associated
antitank mines are still presented therein. The Minotaur and its antitank mines
were on display at the 1998 EuroSatory Armaments Exhibition.
Numerous French antitank mine models are presented as able to be
booby-trapped. A military publication describes an antitank booby-trapping
system in these terms: the anti-lifting ignitors are designed to explode if the
AT mine is handled by army
engineers.[22]
The undetectable pull-ignitor (model 1951) is presented in the Army
Instruction Manual TTA 10. According to the technical data sheet, this
booby-trap igniter is used on the ATM MACI 51 from Alstex Co. Traction pressure
(between 1 kg and 2,5 kg on a straight axis and from 1 kg to 3.5 kg at 45) on
the booby-trap tripwire is sufficient to explode this AT
mine.[23]
Another magazine describes the ACPM antitank mine (mechanically emplaced
antitank) from Lacroix Co.- offered for export at the time- which it is said can
be incorporated in a booby-trapping
device.[24]
An important problem has been reported concerning ACPM and HPD mines, to the
effect that they are not significantly different from models which cannot be
booby-trapped. During mine clearance operations, it is easy visually to confuse
these two mine types with unbooby-trapped versions. This problem is not specific
to French-made antitank mines: foreign-made ATM models possess the same features
designated under the name “look-alike
mines.”[25]
The latest French Terrestrial Defense Matériel catalog presents two
antitank mines from Alstex, able to be
booby-trapped.[26] The antitank
mine ACPR has a “ booby-trap cavity.” The English language
presentation of ACPR specifies that it “resists demining by explosive
charge.”[27] The
programmable antitank mine ACPR also includes an “anti-lifting
device.”[28] And the
Ages-MACPED antitank mine from Giat Industries can also be user-programmed for
life-cycle and for “anti-lifting
mode.”[29]
At this point, it would be useful to emphasize the unambiguous nature of the
French position, stated during the debate on widening the definition of
anti-handling systems : “A tank is a tool of war. There is no connection
between antitank and antipersonnel mines. The removal of an antitank mine from
the battlefield is obviously a military
action.”[30] For the
Ministry of Defense, such an extension of the definition would be tantamount to
the decommissioning of antitank mines. The Minister did not bring up post-war
issues nor the real danger posed by these systems for demining crews and
civilian populations.
Site Protection Systems
Such systems, used to secure military facilities and equipment, include a
firing chamber for launching munitions of various types and may be potentially
antipersonnel in function. “Officially, these devices may only be
activated by an operator and cannot therefore be considered as antipersonnel
mines, even though they use the same wounding technologies, particularly the
dispersion of
shrapnel.”[31] Despite
guarantees in manufacturers’ catalogs that none of these munitions remain
on the ground after launch, site protection devices constitute one of the
weapons systems to be monitored by NGOs. It will be particularly important to
verify that they cannot be indiscriminately detonated by sensor.
Société Lacroix's SPHINX system falls into this category. One
version of this device, called the SPHINX MODER, is designed to fire wounding,
warning, or practice
munitions.[32] It is being
produced in series and has been adopted by the French Army to take the place of
antipersonnel mines.
Mine Delivery Systems
Giat Industries’ French Minotaur, which possesses characteristics
required for future combat, is part of a new generation of systems. The Minotaur
may be adapted to various types of platforms. It has been mounted on British
Alvis Stormer armoured vehicles, EGB vehicles (armoured machines from Giat
Industries engineering), the 6-wheeled French ACMAT, and 4-wheeled
mine-dispensers from the French firm
Matenin.[33] Giat Industries, in
joint-venture with the American company Alkan, has designed a Minotaur model
capable of dispersing 270 antitank mines (8060 Pod Dispenser), which can be
delivered by helicopter.[34]
Another variant is the “Remote Controlled Mining Model” (Mitra),
which can be transported by two men and can disperse 30 antitank mines (AC DISP
LU 981).[35]
Finally, the Leclerc tank-repair vehicle from Giat Industries can be rapidly
converted into a mine dispenser by using an adaptation of the Minotaur system,
and it can also be equipped with a mine-clearance
system.[36] One version of this
Leclerc tank-repair vehicle, equipped with both a K2D demining kit and a
Minotaur mine dispenser, was in fact on display at the EuroSatory Terrestrial
Armaments Exhibition in June 1998.
The transport vehicle may have six or eight “modules,” be
direction-oriented, and contain 20 mine launcher containers (MLC). Each
container can hold five antitank mines, 10 antipersonnel mines, or according to
certain Giat Industries documents, counter-clearance mines. Mines can be
dispersed over a maximum radius of 250 meters on each side of the vehicle and 90
meters to the rear, and over a distance of 2,400 meters.
A control panel allows the driver to program, directly from the vehicle
cabin, minefield characteristics such as direction of dispersion (to the right,
to the left, or toward the rear of the moving or stationary vehicle), dimensions
and density of mining, and the duration of mine activation (from 1 to 96
hours).[37] Antitank mines used
are standard French artillery issue, AC DISP F1 mines from Giat Industires.
The British Army tested the Minotaur system during the Gulf War. Several
Minotaur systems (including 6 modules of 20-tube launchers) were adapted at the
time to British Stormer armored track
vehicles.[38]
The Minotaur System is currently in the process of being adopted by the
French Army, which should receive approximately thirty systems. In May 1995,
Giat Industires started delivery of the first 2,500 mine launch containers
(MLC), as well as 12,500 AC DISP LU antitank mines, ordered by the French
Army.[39]
Military units also use mechanical mine-layers or “mine buriers,”
which enable rapid mechanical laying, so avoiding the hazards of manual
handling. These machines are mainly used to lay antitank mines, but
documentation describing them, particularly from Jane’s Information Group,
indicates that they can be adapted to all types of mines. This is the case of
GIAT ARE SOC-type mine-laying system, which although specially designed to
“bury” HPD-type antitank mines from TRT Défense, can be
adapted to other types of
mines.[40]
Similarly, the Matenin mine-burier is capable of laying mines while leaving
the terrain looking the same as before (vegetation is carefully put back in
place after the laying operation). While this Matenin burier is presented as
being designed to lay HPD antitank mines from TRT, the description provided by
Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance leads one to suppose that other
types of mines can be used.[41]
The 1998 edition of the catalog French Terrestrial Defense
Matériel presents two models from Matenin being used by the French
Army: the “limited-operation antitank mine burier,” and the
“antitank mine
distributor.”[42]
Transfer
One of the first measures taken by France after
pressure by NGOs, as part of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, was
the announcemnt in 1993 by President François Mitterrand, during a state
visit to Cambodia, of a moratorium on the export of such weapons.
France is, however, on the list of those countries which exported landmines
up to that date, despite the Minister of Defense's recent reaffirmation that
France had stopped exporting mines in 1986: “On a unilateral basis, France
stopped exporting landmines in 1986, and announced an absolute export ban in
1993.”[43]
Indeed, the recent declassification of a document from the Interministerial
Commission for the Study of War Matériel Exports (CIEEMG) shows that on
16 April 1992, the Ministry of Defense authorized the export to Rwanda of 20,000
APMs and 600 igniters.[44] It is
not known whether these mines actually reached their destination.
As required for any arms sale, the Interministerial Commission for the Study
of War Matériel Exports (CIEEMG) should have available accurate
information on exports of French-manufactured landmines. The CIEEMG’s
archives are certainly the most important source of information on this
officially authorized trade, and should also allow verification of compliance
with the end-user certificates required by French
legislation.[45]
If the mines were not sold, or handed over in the context of military
cooperation, they may have been emplaced by French troops sent on overseas
operations, which has been a fairly frequent occurrence over the past fifty
years. The Ministry of Defense should be in a position to supply information on
the presence of mines where French military units have been deployed.
The following list of countries where mines of French origin are deployed or
stockpiled is certainly not exhaustive. It simply serves to point out that
French-manufactured mines have been transferred (sold, transferred within the
framework of military cooperation, or left on the ground by French troops
engaged in combat).
The antipersonnel mine MI AP DV 59, found in Angola and in Mozambique, is a
product of the Alsetex Company. The MI AP ED F1 Claymore type, and fixed types
M61 and M63 from Alsetex, are presented as being “in service in the French
Army and in other
armies.”[46] The US
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has reported French-manufactured landmines on
the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and in Iraqi
Kurdistan,[47] implying France
supplied these mines to Iraq.
Old mines of the MI AP ID 48 type are reported by the U.S. Department of
Defense as being in use in Nigeria and Iceland. In the past, some
French-manufactured mines (NR 15, NR 18, NR 22, NR 22C1) have been transferred
to the Netherlands in the context of licensing
agreements.[48]
According to information from the U.S. Department of State, French-made
landmines can be found in the following countries: Algeria (from the 1950s);
Belgium (from WWII and before); Korea (from the Korean War); Iraq (antitank
mines MIACAH F1); Lebanon ( M-35 AP, D-4, F1 AP, MAPS AP); Morocco; Mauritania;
Syria; Tunisia (from
WWII).[49]
Another document of American origin points out the presence of antipersonnel
mines in the following countries: Iceland (AP mines MI AP ID 48); Netherlands
(AP Mines NR 15, NR 18, NR 22, NR 22C1); Nigeria (AP mines MI AP ID
48).[50] According to
Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance: Angola (French Mine MAPDV 59);
Mozambique (French Mine MAPDV
59).[51] According to Trends
in Land Mine Warfare from Jane’s Information Group, mines of French
origin have also been used in
Somalia.[52]
Stockpiling
France has reported that it has 1.4 million
antipersonnel mines in stockpile; it has not been forthcoming with additional
details, as will be required by the
treaty.[53] It is not known
whether landmine stockpiles are located in French overseas departments and
territories or on French military bases in foreign countries, particularly in
Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon, where there are technical services for naval
infantry battalions which rely on matériel.
Destruction
In compliance with French legislation and with the Mine Ban Treaty, France
has announced that it will destroy its stockpile of 1.4 million antipersonnel
mines. The destruction of French mines is normally carried out on French soil.
Reports have also indicated that the
Netherlands[54] and
Spain[55] have handed over
landmines for destruction by France.
Declarations from the Ministry of Defense at the time of the National
Assembly debate on the proposed bill provide a precise
timetable:[56] from September
1996 to April 1998, approximately 50,000 mines were destroyed by specialized
army services. In order to speed up the process, a public invitation to tender
was issued at the end of October 1997. The bids of three firms were accepted,
and 50% of stockpiles should have been destroyed by the end of 1998. The
remainder of stockpiles are to be destroyed in 1999 and
2000.[57] No precise information
has been provided on categories of mines intended for destruction. Projected
cost of the destruction is also unknown.
It should be pointed out that deadlines on stockpile destruction previously
announced by the Ministry of Defense have not been met. In 1995, France
effectively committed itself “to set about reducing stockpiles, with the
ultimate aim of completely eliminating this type of
weapon.”[58] Several
months later, the country once again committed itself to “reduce its
landmine stockpiles by destruction, undertaken in September
1996.”[59] Between 1995
and 1998, however, it appears that landmine destruction did not really meet
published targets.
According to figures published by the Ministry, 650,000 mines remain to be
destroyed in six months, if targets are to be met. This represents quite a
challenge, considering the mere 50,000 mines destroyed by the army over nearly
two years.
All three companies selected to carry out French APM stockpile destruction
are specialists in the decommissioning of munitions. It would therefore appear
that such a procedure has been opted for, as evidenced by a statement made
during a 5 December 1998 television program by the Manager of Operations at AF
DEMIL.[60] The designated
companies are AF Démil, Formétal, and
Sotradex,[61] which are all
familiar with contracts for the elimination of out-dated
munitions.[62] However, two of
these companies, AF Démil and Formétal, have connections with the
major French landmine manufacturer, Alsetex, raising the question if it is
appropriate, from an ethical point of view, for mine manufacturers to profit as
well from their destruction.
During the National Assembly debate of 24 April 1998, the Minister of Defense
justified awarding the French mine stockpile destruction contact to private
firms “in order to speed up the pace of operations” and “in
order to initiate industrial-scale
destruction.”[63]
Unfortunately, this move to the private sector has so far failed to foster the
kind of transparency about French stockpile destruction that the Minister evoked
during the same debate, where he affirmed that “the provisions on
transparency and verification hold particular importance for this
government.”
Transparency was paradoxically lacking in statements made by the Manager of
Operations for one of these companies: “Here we have had to destroy around
300-, 350-, or 400,000 mines for the French government. As far as the deadline
is concerned, I would venture to say that we were even too quick for the
legislators. Between the time we were asked if we could receive a parliamentary
delegation and the announcement of their arrival, we were already supposed to
have completed the decommissioning, according to the terms of the contract, and
we did just that.”[64]
The Ministry of Defense has announced that 5,000 mines will be retained by
the Army for the training of its specialized demining units. This provision, in
compliance with the treaty (Article 3), has been taken up in the French law,
which stipulates that their number may not exceed 5,000 as of December
2000.[65] French NGOs have
asked, if a limited number of antipersonnel mines may be kept for training
purposes, would it not be advisable to use practice mines, which are identical
to operational mines, only less dangerous?
Use
Although there is apparently no evidence of new
uses of antipersonnel mines on French territory, there are several questions
concerning past uses of these weapons by French armed forces. Following
allegations in the press in March
1998,[66] Defense Ministry
officials admitted that Solenzara Air Base in south Corsica was protected by
antipersonnel mines. Although the Ministry had announced more than a year
before, on 10 October 1996, that the base would be demined “in the near
future,” it seems that the “mine scheme” was upset by
flooding, which may explain the difficulty in carrying out demining operations.
According to the daily newspaper Libération, mine clearance work
around the Solenzara base was finally completed on 28 May 1998, despite a
statement made by the French Minister of Defense, on 4 June, saying that
clearance of those mines would be completed by the end of the
year.[67]
In 1996 however, the Defense Minister was fairly vague about mined areas in
France. In fact, following questions in the press, a Ministry spokesperson
responded that “if there should be other military installations, where
such passive protection might exist, the antipersonnel mines would be
removed.”[68] Even though
no more specific information has been produced since that date by the Defense
Ministry, published remarks allow us to entertain the idea that other military
installations might have been protected by landmines during the same period.
The possible use of landmines by French troops recently engaged in overseas
operations will also have to be verified in missions of peace-keeping,
peace-restoring, and peace-imposition. This hypothesis is not without basis. A
Senate report dating from 1997, in fact, mentions that “static protection
of personnel is ensured by antipersonnel mines” in the context of overseas
operations.[69] If this is the
case, it is important to find out under what conditions the mines were laid and
if they have been cleared.
Mine Action Funding
Contributions to Multilateral
Funds:[70] (1 US$ = 6 FF)
UNMAS - 2 million francs (MF) ($U.S. 333,340)
1996-1997: For mine clearance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and assignment of two
officers.
UNOPS - 2.9 MF ($U.S. 483,440)
Cost of providing 10 military instructors to Angola (on detachment from
INAROE)
UNDP - 350,000 FF/$US 59,000
Cost of financing a mission of experts to Laos- Assignment of 6 officers to
Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNHCR - 1 MF/$US 166,670 plus an undetermined percentage of a 20 MF ($US
3,333,340)
French contribution to special programs for geographical zones or countries
of the HCR, including anti-mine actions. Cost of financing programs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Detachment of two military officers to an antimine facility
in Sarajevo.
Aid program in favor of lNAROE (National Angolan Institute For Clearance of
Explosive Devices). Program consists of providing technical, administrative, and
financial aid, of leading programs for prevention and awareness-raising in the
province of HUILA, and of putting a technical assistant at the disposal of the
Ministry for Social Assistance and Rehabilitation.
1996-1997 - 4.6 MF/$US 766,666
Intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action of which 3.5 MF (US$
58,330) is to support Handicap International's projects (logistical backup,
supply of equipment, and definition of a rural mine-clearance strategy in local
areas).
570,000 FF/$US 95,000
Financing of two studies dealing respectively with the retraining of former
Angolan military personnel, the institutional reinforcement of INAROE, the
rehabilitation of farm land, and the establishment of a mine-clearance training
facility.
CAMBODIA
1995-1996 - 4 MF ($U.S. 666,667)
Financial aid for demining in the Angkor region.
1996 - 1.64 MF/$US 273,334
Intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action.
1997 - 0.4 MF ($U.S. 66,667)
Intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action.
HONDURAS
1999 - ?
After Hurricane Mitch, the French Minister of Defense dispatched a team of 6
demining experts (mines displaced by flooding).
MOZAMBIQUE
1996 - 8.9 MF ($U.S. 1,483,330)
Program for training and equipping local demining crews in the province of
Maputo-Moamba.
1997/1998 - 18 MF ($U.S. 3 M)
Financing of a project to demine electric cables.
1997 - 0.3 MF ($U.S. 50,000)
Intervention of the Service for Humanitarian Action.
1998 - 1 MF ($U.S. 166,667)
Co-financing of Handicap International's NGO project for prevention of mine
accidents.
NICARAGUA:
1997 - 1 MF ($U.S. 166,667)
Aid given through the Organization of American States.
CHAD:
1995 - 2.3 MF ($U.S. 383,334)
Training project for 100 deminers from the Chad Army Corps of Engineers.
1996-1998 - 2 MF ($U.S. 333,340)
Cost of providing a mine-clearance advisor to the Chad Army Corps of
Engineers.
This information was outlined by Ambassador Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais
during a symposium held in Paris on February 25, 1999. “As the European
Union is obviously the number one financial contributor in this field, with 120M
ECU paid out between 1995 and 1998, and taking into account the size of France's
budget share within the community, it is this which we must first consider :
some 142 MF ($US 27 M), or practically double the amount of our bilateral
operations over the same period, aside from research costs, which means a total
of 214 MF ($US 37 M).[72]
This body of data requires further commentary. France's anti-mine activities
were for many years led by different departments or individuals connected with
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, and Defense. Such a situation
did nothing to facilitate things, as evidenced by the difficulty in drawing up a
first quantitative report on these activities.
Study of these tables reveals that a certain percentage of French
contributions to the UNHCR, for example, was manifestly used for anti-mine
projects, without revealing how much of the funds were used or for what. The
fields of intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action are equally vague.
A budget of $US1,483,330, approved in 1996 for the training and equipping of
local demining crews in Maputo-Moamba province of Mozambique, has still not been
spent.[73] The $US3 million,
allocated to finance a private company’s (CIDEV) mine clearance project
for electric cables, has allowed only a limited number of the original
objectives to be met. On the other hand, a demining project co-financed to the
tune of 1 MF ($US 166,667) in 1998, by France and the APM Association of Bihac
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does not even appear in the Ministry's official data.
Hopefully the Ambassador In Charge of Coordinating French Anti-Mine
Activities, appointed in January 1999, will bring some focus and coordination to
French policy in this area.
For obvious reasons, the efforts of our military should be concentrated on
training and passing on know-how; though their resources may be among the best
qualitatively speaking, they are limited from a quantitative point of view: this
will require making geographic choices or interventions by our European partners
or others. NGOs have a different approach, which complements that of our armed
forces. The realization has gradually dawned that cleaning up economically
deprived rural areas, severely affected by the presence of mines and often
difficult to reach, will require long-term programs and budgets, in which the
notion of commercial profitability has no sense. Local mine-clearance is an
ineluctable necessity if we are truly to take to heart the immediate rescue and
future development of these populations, too often forgotten or ignored. It is
within the context of the National Committee, where the entire ensemble of
actors will meet in a new and balanced way, that truly national options will be
put forward.[74]
Such a program appears sufficiently ambitious to make one hope that the
Committee for the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines gets to work as quickly as
possible.
[1]On the occasion of
Mitterrand’s announcement, he had been presented with 22,000 signatures
which had been collected in support of Handicap International’s call to
end the “Coward’s War” and stop the use of APMs.
[2]Vietnam Veterans of
America Foundation, Landmine Update, No. 12, December 1995.
[4]Extract from speech by
French Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Debate, Official Journal of the French
Republic, unabridged report of Parliamentary sessions of Thursday, 25 June 1998,
pp. 5402 and 5403.
[9]Decree No. 98-36 of 16
January 1993, relative to the sharing out of administrative tasks for the
application of the Convention of 13 January 1993, on the banning of the
development, manufacture, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their
destruction. Official Journal of January 1998, pp. 813 to 815.
[10]Belkhacem Elomari, Bruno
Barillot; The Elimination of antipersonnel mines, principles for Control and
Verification, the case of France, (Lyon, Observatoire des Transferts
d’Armements, September 1998).
[12]Speech by Deputy
Marie-Hélène Aubert during the 24 April Session of the National
Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, Official Journal of the French Republic, pp.
3051-3057. The Oslo diplomatic record shows that antitank mines with
anti-handling devices which explode in the carrying out of an innocent act by an
individual function as APMs and thus are illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty. See
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the
Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18
September 1997.
[13]Contribution by Mrs.
Bujon-Barre, Sub-Department For Chemical and Biological Disarmament and Control
of Conventional Weapons, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at symposium "For a World
Without Mines," organized by Handicap International, Paris, 25 February
1999.
[14]Belkacem Elomari, Bruno
Barillot, "The French Manufacuring Complex For Landmines and Related Systems,
Lyon, February, 1997.
[23]The Elimination of
Antipersonnel Mines, p. 48.
[24]International Defense
and Armaments, January 1990, p. 65.
[25]DIA-US Foreign Science
and Technology Center, Landmine Warfare Trends & Projections,
December 1992, pp. 3-34 to 3-37.
[26]French Terrestrial
Defense Matériel, 1998 Edition, Volume A
[27]Alsetex SAE document,
handed out at 1998 Eurosatory Exhibition.
[28]According to information
provided by Alsetex Co. in French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998,
Volume A, p. 376, these mines are fitted with a battery giving them a lifespan
of 1 to 365 days.
[32]French Terrestrial
Defense Matériel, 1998 edition, Volume A, p. 360.
[33]Jane’s Mines and
Mine Clearance, 1996-1997, p. 399.
[34]84 1994 GICAT Catalog, p.
1-10-0-10 and Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 1996-1997, p.
399.
[35]Jane’s Mine and
Mine Clearance, 1996-1997, p. 399. The Matenin mine launcher equipped with
Minotaur is also presented in French Terrestrial Defense Matériel,
1998 Edition, Volume B, p. 156.
[36]Defence Industry
Report (Jane’s Defence Weekly), May 1998, p. 3. See also French
Terrestrial DefenseMatériel, 1998 Edition, Volume B, p.
150.
[42]French Terrestrial
Defense Matériel, 1998 Edition, Volume B, pp. 154 and 158.
[43]Response by the Minister
of Defense to a written question from Deputy Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, 13 April
1998.
[44]Investigation of the
Rwandan Tragedy (1990-1994), Volume 2, appendices, National Assembly Report
N 1271 by Paul Quilés, 15 December 1998.
[45]The decree of 2 October
1992, in respect of procedures for the import and export of war matériel,
arms, munitions, and associated equipment, provides that export authorization
may be subordinated to a commitment by qualified authorities in the importing
country not to allow, without prior permission from French authorities, the
resale or transfer in any form whatsoever to a third country, all or part of the
equipment planned for shipment (Article 12). In concrete terms, this provision
takes the form of an end-user certificate attached to all arms-export contract
files.
[58]Official Journal,
National Assembly, Questions, No. 34827, 4 March 1996.
[59]Notice NA No. 3032,
Volume VII, "Emergency Humanitarian Action," by Michel Fromet, 10 October
1996.
[60]Interview with Jean Marc
Pelletier, Manager of Operations at AF DEMIL, for the program “One More
Year,” broadcast over Canal Plus on 5 December 1998.
[72]Contribution by Samuel Le
Caruyer de Beauvais, Roving Ambassador, Action for Mine-Clearance and Aid to
Victims of Antipersonnel Mines, at a symposium “For A World Without
Mines,” organized by Handicap International, French Senate, Paris, 25
February 1999.
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