One of the major
producers and exporters of landmines in the world in the
past,[1] Italy began to change
its landmine policy in 1993. Factors influencing the change included the looming
economic crisis in this specific sector, the comparatively new and much stricter
Italian legislation on arms trade (law 185/90), and the impact of the newly born
international movement to ban landmines.
The policy shift is marked by the following three steps: 1) in November 1993
the Italian Government stopped authorizing the export of antipersonnel
landmines; 2) on 2 August 1994 a unilateral moratorium on the production and
trade of antipersonnel landmines was adopted; 3) on 20 January 1995 Italy
deposited its instrument of ratification of the Convention on Conventional
Weapons and it Protocol II on mines.
Since 1995, the Italian Parliament has worked closely with the Italian
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ItCBL) on national legislation aimed at a
comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines. The debate in Parliament became
particularly intense throughout 1995-1996, with seven bills introduced by
different political groups in this
period.[2]
However, it was only with the disappointing outcome of the CCW Review
Conference in May 1996 that the Italian government finally intensified its
diplomatic efforts inside the EU, the G7 and the UN to promote more drastic
measures against this weapon. Public pressure at this time was crucial in
shaping a new Italian landmine policy.
Although initially with some degree of scepticism, Italy participated in the
“International Strategy Conference: Towards a Ban on Antipersonnel
Mines,” in October 1996, which launched the Ottawa Process. Prior to that
first Ottawa conference, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini had announced
Italy’s decision to give up the production, trade, and stockpiling of
antipersonnel mines at the United Nations General Assembly. The Italian
government also sought to “promote further restrictions, in the hope that
such measures will contribute to reaching a solid international understanding
and a definitive ban.”[3]
Toward that end, Italy wanted to “propose the prompt opening of
international negotiations at the Disarmament Conference (CD) in
Geneva,”[4] because it
viewed the elimination of an entire category of weapons as not just a
humanitarian issue, but also as part of larger disarmament and security
concerns.
When it became clear that movement in the CD was blocked indefinitely, Italy
became convinced that the Ottawa Process was the only effective way to negotiate
a binding agreement to ban antipersonnel landmines. On 13 June 1997, just before
the Brussels Conference, the Government announced that Italy would completely
renounce antipersonnel landmines, including their
use.[5] In that respect, the
Brussels Conference was a watershed for Italian participation in the
Process.[6]
Law 374/97
The most significant commitment toward the total ban on landmines came on 29
October 1997 with the approval of domestic legislation banning these weapons -
Law 374/97. The Italian legislation, though far from perfect, contains some
valuable provisions. First and foremost, it has a very broad definition of APMs
which include dual-use mines and mines equipped with anti-handling devices, as
well as any such anti-manipulation devices in
general.[7] This definition has
created problems for Italy as a member of NATO. Because the law applies to the
Italian territory and any other territory under Italian jurisdiction and
control, it follows that all landmines covered by the above mentioned
definition, even those on Nato bases should be subject to the same clauses.
The law also provides for a comprehensive ban on landmine research; for
strong sanctions, both civil and
penal;[8] requires the
government to produce a report every six months on the status of implementation;
the abolition of any secrecy regime (military or state) on landmines; and the
destruction of stockpiles within five years.
The ItCBL has maintained that the law also contains significant flaws: the
lack of any formal mechanism to carry out inspections and for ongoing monitoring
of the law’s
implementation,[9] no provision
requiring any type of commitment in mine clearance programs; nor provisions for
technological research for mine detection and removal.
This national ban legislation will serve as the implementing legislation for
the Mine Ban Treaty.
Ratification
With the domestic ban already firmly in place, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lamberto Dini signed the Mine Ban Treaty for the Italian Government in Ottawa on
3 December 1997. The understanding at that time was that both government and
Parliament would work for the rapid ratification of the Ottawa Convention. This
was underscored by Dini in his address for the signing ceremony not that
“to ensure that the Convention is brought rapidly into force, national
parliaments must use ‘fast track’ methods to hasten the enactment of
the ratification
bills.”[10]
Italy, however, was not quick to ratify the treaty. One of the major problems
was reconciling some clauses of the domestic ban legislation and the text of the
Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty had to be ratified without jeopardizing the national
legislation. The ratification bill had to set up a minimum standard of
prohibitions, and where there is a need for interpretation between the two
norms, on mine related issues the stricter standard should
prevail.[11]
A Government ratification bill was presented in Parliament on 18 June
1998.[12] The original version
threatened to weaken provisions of the national legislation 374/97, including
the definition of an APM and sanctioning mechanism, among other things. The
ratification bill would have introduced exceptions and reservations with regards
to the Nato bases in the country, all of which are under Italian
jurisdiction.[13]
The negotiation among government, parliament, military and ItCBL actors on
the ratification bill proved more complex and time consuming than initially
expected. On 10 February 1999, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously approved an
amended bill, and so did the Senate on 11 March. At the time of writing, the
formal deposit of the instrument of ratification at the United Nations had not
occurred.
The Convention on Conventional Weapons
Italy signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons in 1980, but 14 years
passed before it was ratified on 6 December 1994. With considerably more speed,
Italy deposited its instrument of ratification of revised Protocol II on
landmines on 13 January 1999.
Among the various interpretative statements annexed to the instrument of
ratification, the one concerning article 2 of the Amended Protocol seems worth
mentioning. It is Italy’s understanding that the word
“primarily” was inserted in the revised definition of an
antipersonnel mine only in order to insure that anti-vehicle mines equipped with
antihandling are NOT part of the APM definition, and thus restrictions in the
revised Protocol II would not apply to them The Italian interpretation is an
attempt to reduce the ambiguity of the controversial word
“primarily” adopted in Protocol II and reconcile it with the Mine
Ban Treaty definition of antipersonnel
mines.[14] (The Italian ban
includes these anti-vehicle mines.)
The Conference on Disarmament
Along with France, Germany and others, Italy has long held that there is
complementarity between the CD and the Mine Ban Treaty which could contribute to
the effectiveness of the
agreement.[15] In January
1997, prior to Italy’s full commitment to the ban treaty, Foreign Minister
Dini said, “Italy considers that the whole complex issue of antipersonnel
landmines, imposing a total ban on their production, destroying existing
stockpiles, and verifying their destruction is essentially a disarmament problem
....This Conference has the experience, the facilities and the personnel to
handle these negotiations. We also know that various political initiatives are
being taken, whose aims we wholly endorse, and which are also designed to
rapidly define an international agreement. But we maintain that for such an
agreement to be credible it must attract the largest possible number of
countries, and avoid setting up a narrowly based regime that excludes the most
important countries.”[16]
More recently, Italy has backed efforts to attempt to begin negotiations on a
ban on AP mine transfers in the CD, with the caveat that the definition of
antipersonnel mines used in any CD negotiations must be the one given in the
Mine Ban Treaty.[17]
Production and Transfer
Valsella, Tecnovar and Misar
In the past, Italy was one of the major producers and exporters of APMs. Its
mine industry revolved around three small companies: Valsella and Misar, based
in Brescia in the north, and Tecnovar, in Bari in Southern Italy. All three
specialized in landmines and mine-related products and were involved in direct
exports and licensed overseas production. Favored by major banking support,
public financing of much weapons development and a permissive Italian export
regime, these companies quickly achieved remarkable sales and profits through
the late 1980s.
But in the late 1980s, this began to change. Factors contributing to the
companies’ decline included a) progressively strict arms export laws in
Italy, culminating in law no. 185 in 1990; b) the end of some major conflicts
that had provided the main market for Italian mines, first and foremost the
Iran-Iraq war; and c) the beginning of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, with an important and active Italian national campaign.
The public pressure generated by the Campaign resulted in the final blow to
the industry: the Italian government’s decision to halt and then renounce
the production of these weapons. It remains difficult to evaluate how much
Italian know-how and productive capacity were transferred to developing
countries prior to the ban, and its impact on the proliferation of antipersonnel
mines today.
Valsella was the first of the three -- founded in 1969 by a group of
Brescia-based entrepreneurs closely linked with the Ministry of Defense. In its
early years, it supplied the Italian Defense Ministry, working on existing mines
(such as the Valmara 59) and then expanding into development of new mines,
particularly amagnetic landmines. Both Tecnovar, founded on 5 October 1971, and
Misar, on 25 January 1977, were established by former employees of Valsella.
As the national market was small, these companies developed an
export-orientated approach for production. Valsella focused on customers in
“hot spots” such as Iraq, Morocco, perhaps Somalia, exporting both
antipersonnel and antitank mines. From 1976 to 1979, with an average of 50
workers, Valsella’s overall profits were close to 3 billion
lire.[18]
During the 1970s, Tecnovar focused on the domestic market, producing
1,420,000 VAR 40 mines for the Italian Army in 1971-72 ; their last military
contract was dated 1977.[19]
Only later on did it produce for export to customers in North Africa and the
Middle East, in particular in conjunction with an assembly plant in Egypt (see
below).
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, Valsella began
receiving government authorizations for exports to Iraq. A total of seven were
granted, the last one issued in 1982 and expiring in January of 1984. The
overall value of the exports amounted to more than US $110
million.[20] But political
pressures resulted in increasing restrictions on exports to Iraq. To skirt these
restrictions, the company set up a new branch abroad in Singapore.
In 1981 Valsella signed its first agreement with the state-owned Chartered
Industries of Singapore (CIS) to buy fully-assembled mines from
Valsella.[21] Then in 1982, a
new partnership was forged with the founding of Valsella Pte Ltd. From
1982-1986, Valsella VS 50, VS 2.2 and Valmara mines were assembled in Singapore,
using explosives from the Swedish company, Bofors, for shipment to Iraq.
It is not known exactly when the Singapore-based Valsella Pte Ltd. (later
named Valmetec Trading pte
Ltd[22]) halted its activity.
However, in 1986 a new company, Valsella International Pte Ltd., was set up. It
is currently registered under the category “wholesale trade in other
machinery &
equipment.”[23] It is a
trading company, therefore the owners are not named.
In 1984, Fiat, through a second company, Gilardini, gradually gained control
over Valsella and Misar.[24] By
this time Valsella mainly focused on the R&D of increasingly sophisticated
landmines (like electronic mines and mines with remote control activation, with
radio crypto-coded signals), while Misar carried out considerable research and
development of naval mines, though not to the exclusion of land systems, such as
its SB-33 scatterable mine.
Also, while Valsella only seemed peripherally interested in selling its
know-how abroad, Misar was especially active in foreign licensing and
coproduction, becoming an influential player in global production of small,
detection-resistant antipersonnel mines. Many Misar landmines reached the global
market via the following factories :
- Expal, Explosivos Alaveses, belonging to the Spanish group Explosivos Rio
Tinto, probably controlled by the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) during the
Iran-Iraq war. License n. 493409, dated 16 March 1981.
- Elviemek, Hellenic Explosives and Ammunition Industry, Greece. License n.
9328 dated 17 May 1982. In the early ‘80s, Elviemek agreed on a production
contract in South Africa with the local Armscor Holding, a company having close
connections with the Israeli state-owned weapons manufacturer Israel Military
Industries (IMI), based in Tel Aviv.
The years immediately following Fiat’s take over of the Italian
landmine industry did not prove uniformly successful. While Misar’s growth
continued, Valsella’s sales shrank, showing a negative balance by 1986.
Its exports, previously tolerated by the Italian authorities, according to
Valsella’s top agent Mario
Fallani,[25] were interrupted in
1987, when an investigation by Swedish Customs police leaked in Italy, resulting
in Italian investigations into the company’s dealings. Valsella’s
managers were arrested on a charge of illegal trading with Iraq. Plea-bargaining
in their 1991 trial, they acknowledged having committed irregularities; in
December 1991 the Supreme Court acquitted the managers of the serious crimes of
illegal arms trade and violation of the currency regulations.
Mine Types and Sales
Valsella produced ten types of APMs. Its VS 50 has been one of the
most common blast mines, capable of being scattered by ground vehicles or
helicopters. VS 50 mines have been sold to different countries, including
Morocco, (1976, 1977, 1978), Gabon (1981), and Iraq (1980, 1981, 1982, 1983).
The VS-50 AR and VS-MK 2 are basically derivations of the VS 50.
Valsella began courting one of the then-rare prohibited customers, South
Africa. The company supplied the Pretoria Government with technical information
for its Valmara 69 antipersonnel mine. A patent for the mine was registered in
South Africa on 5 December
1979.[26] In the same year,
90,000 VS MK 2 antipersonnel mines were loaded on the Danish ship Pia Frem, at
the small port of Talamone, in Tuscany. The official destination was Paraguay,
via Buenos Aires, but its real destination was South Africa, then under
international embargo.[27] VS
MK 2 mines were also sold to Angola.
Valsella exported both complete mines and c-k-d (complete knock down)
components from 1982 to 1986 to Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS). Between
1982 and 1986, Italian authorities issued Valsella 6 export authorizations to
Singapore, concerning disassembled mines, components and detonators, for a total
value of US$37 million. In those years, more than 3,800 metric tons of weapons,
primarily landmines,[28] were
exported to Singapore. Valsella’s profits soared from 10 billion lire in
1981, to 80 billion lire in 1982 and up to 107 billion lire in 1983.
Another popular Valsella model has been the Valmara V 69, a large plastic
bounding fragmentation mine. The V 69 was sold to Iran (1976), to Somalia
(1979), to South Africa (1980), and to Iraq (1981, 1982 and 1983). In 1983 they
were exported to Singapore, their supposed final destination being Cambodia. The
VS JAP was developed from the basic V 69 and was produced in unknown
quantities by the Singapore based Chartered Industries Ltd., which sold it to
third countries.
Valsella also produced a number of mine-laying systems including the Istrice,
a vehicle-mounted system introduced in 1987; the Grillo; and the VS MD for use
in helicopters and designed to carry 2,080 VS 50 or VS MK2 antipersonnel mines,
or 200 VS 1.6 antitank mines. Valsella supplied Morocco with these
helicopter-borne dispensers.
Misar’s round SB 33 scatterable antipersonnel blast mine,
developed in 1977, was its most successful model, being simple, reliable, and
cheap. The SB 33 mine was sold to Argentina (1981, during the Falklands war),
to Spain (to Expal, the final destination being Iraq, in 1982), to the Greek
company Elviemek (also, with destination Iraq) and to Zaire (1982). The mine was
also sold to the Netherlands and possibly other NATO counties as well. In 1984,
when the Fiat Group entered the company, the mine was sold to Iran. In Portugal
the licensed production of SB 33 started in 1984.
The SB 33AR is a modification of the basic SB 33, the main difference being
the anti-removal device (AR). It was sold to Iran, Kuwait and Pakistan. Samples
of this mine were exported to Jordan (1982) and to Pakistan (1983). Later on
Pakistan, through the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories P.O.F., produced
some mines and components similar to the Misar models.
Misar also produced bounding fragmentation mines, the P 25 and P 40. The P 25
mines were sold to Iraq (1980), to Iran (1984), and to Australia, where in 1986,
the Fiat group signed a licensing contract to transfer production technologies
to that country. The P 40 was sold to Kuwait, to Iraq through Spel Portugal
(1980), and to Australia (licensed production - 1986) .
Tecnovar focused more on domestic military production. But in 1979,
Tecnovar began to export to customers in North Africa and the Middle East,
primarily Egypt. Vito Alfieri Fontana, the company’s owner, offered
information about supplies to
Egypt[29] where some 1,242,000
TS 50 antipersonnel mines were assembled from 1979 onwards:
The assembling (and therefore the transfer of know-how) took place at the
Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries, owned by the Egyptian Ministry for
Military Production. The firm sold the Italian APM model as the renamed
T-79[30]. Through Egypt,
Tecnovar mines are to be found in several countries, including
Afghanistan[31] and Rwanda.
Between 1990 and 1992, the Italian Government also authorized the export of more
than 200,000 antipersonnel and antitank mines to Egypt.
On 17 September 1996, a member of the UN International Commission of Inquiry
on Rwanda found TS 50 AP mines in a stock of weapons confiscated from armed Hutu
groups. After communications between the UN Secretary General and the Italian
authorities, Italy’s Representative to the UN confirmed that Tecnovar
“manufactured the plastic parts of the yellow TS 50 type APMs in the
period from 1980 to 1993, when the company stopped producing such items.”
He also revealed that “the Tecnovar company did not supply Ts-50 type APMs
to Zaire, Kenya or the United Republic of
Tanzania,”[32] while
noting that the company had supplied plastic parts for TS 50 mines to Brazil,
Egypt, Spain and the United States. According to the owner of Tecnovar, the
landmines found in Rwanda were part of the weapons supply that Egypt delivered
to Kigali in 1992. This included 200,000 T-79
APMs[33]. As for the supplies to
Brazil, Spain and the US, Fontana claims the mines were demonstration samples
[34]
Tecnovar also produced a helicopter dispenser, DATS, with a capacity of 1,536
TS 50 AP mines or 128 MATS/2 antitank mines, or a mix of both.
Landmine exports by Italian manufacturers,
1976-1994[35]
The Italian Government adopted a moratorium on antipersonnel mine production
and trade on 2 August 1994. By 1995, Valsella was barely involved in
military production (less than 7% of its sales); in 1996 and 1997, its
production collapsed, with losses amounting to 16 billion lire. The crisis
brought the company to the verge of bankruptcy, prior to its transfer and
conversion to civil production (engineering and vehicle-projects).Before abandoning the sinking ship, however, the company tried the
rejuvenate production with military orders, including antitank mines and mine
scattering systems, but with little success. Between June and October 1997, the
possible sale of the various production lines was under discussion, with some
interest in the military and landmine productions by Austria’s Dynamit
Nobel and Spain’s Expal, but it is not known if any of the discussions
concerning individual products may have ended successfully.
In accordance to Law 374/97, and upon the Ministry of Industry’s
request, Valsella has valued the overall costs relating its antipersonnel
stock-taking handover and destruction at 12 billion lire.
Tecnovar’s budgets are available only until 1995. Since then, no
exports have been recorded and it was closed down in 1998.
Misar‘s land and sea mine production line was sold to Societa
Esplosivi Industriali (SEI), which is now controlled by the Paris-based Societe
Anonyme d’Explosifs de Produit Chimique (SAEPC).
Components
The Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines has expressed concern about adequate
controls on the possible sale of landmine components. The export of mine
components, basically, can be disguised under three custom items. Within chapter
36 of the Harmonized System (HS 36) titled “Explosives, Matches and Other
Miscellaneous Combustible Preparations,” mine components could be hidden
in the two items “Prepared explosives (other than propellant
powders)” (HS 360200) and “Safety or detonating fuses; percussion or
detonating caps; ignitors; electric detonators” (HS 360300) respectively;
and within Chapter 93 (HS 93) titled “Arms and Ammunitions and Parts
Thereof,” in item “Other ammunitions n.e.s. (including bombs,
grenades, torpedoes, mines, etc.)” (HS 930690).
The ItCBL notes that, in looking at the figures concerning Italian exports of
explosive material and detonators to non EU countries in the period from 1993
to 1998, there were three countries to which Italy has exported more than US$1
million of such products: Slovenia - U.S. $1.33 million; Sierra Leone U.S.
$1.32 million and Guinea U.S. $1.22
million.[42] The explosive
material could have eluded controls and the procedures of Law 185/90 (on arms
trade) and Law 374/97 (banning landmines) for the simple reason that it may
have been categorized as an “industrial” and “non
military” component.
Stockpiling
In compliance with Art. 6 of Law 374/97, a
Government decree and report on stockpile destruction were presented on 19 May
1998, and finally approved in Parliament on 2 October
1998.[43] The explanatory report
accompanying the decree, which provides most of the information below, is the
first official account as to the numbers and types of antipersonnel landmines
stocked both in military warehouses and in landmine producing companies. The
figures given are vague and inadequate, and raise more questions than they
answer. The first report was delivered on time, but the second, due in November
1998, has not been released as of March 1999. Despite the fact that the secrecy
traditionally surrounding the issue of landmines (like most other weapons) has
been abolished, it is still extremely hard to get any direct and credible
information from the military officials in charge of the destruction
process.
Nevertheless, for the very first time, landmines are being counted.
According to the Government report, the stock of landmines owned by the Italian
Armed Forces includes antipersonnel mines, antitank mines equipped with
anti-handling devices,[44] and
certain submunitions (i.e. the scatterable munitions designed not to
immediately explode upon contact with the ground).
Pressure mines (no longer used in service)2,000,000
Wide range mines450,000
Mines used for training purposes 700,000
Other types of landmines, submunitions - no available figure
Total landmine units (Approx.)7,500,000
Component and spare parts 700,000
Total spare parts units 700,000
Current information does not show Claymore mines in the stockpiles. Having
said that, it still needs verifying whether Claymore(-type) mines have been
imported, even if only for training purposes, given the widespread use of this
type of landmine.
There is also information reported on the stock of landmine materials that
producing companies and/or any other holder of landmines, in compliance with Law
374/97, must have delivered to appropriate collection sites as indicated by the
local Carabinieri headquarters: approximately 30,000 mines and approximately 1.5
million pieces (“material of different nature and
typology”).[45]Specific
figures for Valsella, Technovar, and SEI were not available.
This incomplete list of both the military and commercial stocks triggers a
series of uneasy questions:
- Why are many mines, such as the VS 50, Valmara 69, SB 33 and so on not
specified in either list?
-What sort of mines are the 700,000 devices for training purposes listed in
the military stocks? Has this figure simply not been adjusted to reflect the
much lower figure of training mines allowed in the Italian ban legislation and
Mine Ban Ratification law?
- What are the submunitions that are required to be destroyed, according to
Law 374/97?
- How are antitank mines’ igniters categorized, which can be turned
into effective antipersonnel mines with slight modifications (for example, the
so called PMC buttons)?[46]
Concerned by the lack of real transparency and completeness regarding the
Italian stockpile and its future dismantling, the ItCBL is making serious
inquiries and demanding a more participatory role in the destruction
process.
Destruction
According to sources from the Ministry of Defense, Italy started the
destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines last December 1998, and
30,000 AUPS pressure mines are said to have been
destroyed.[47] The timetable
for destruction of all APMs is five years from the entry into force of Law
374/97. As the Government report states, “because we believe it possible
to start the activities within the current year, it is expected to conclude them
by year 2001.”[48]
Article 3 of the Government decree provides that the General Direction of
Terrestrial Weapons is responsible for the stockpile elimination. This is
basically carried out in two ways:
1. All pressure antipersonnel mines (AUPS, MAUS/1, VAR/40, MK2) and their
components, excluding detonators, are to be destroyed at the only Italian Army
facility capable of such operations at Baiano di Spoleto.
2. Other mine destruction is to be contracted to private companies through
the demilitarisation program managed by the Nato Maintenance and Supply Agency
(NAMSA), or a national bidding process. The commercial companies, selected from
those with NATO AQAP-110 certification, will destroy all remaining materials
(through decomposition of mines, grinding of inert materials, fusion of the
explosive material) in compliance with security and environmental constraints of
Law 374/97.
Technical and administrative procedures for the destruction of these stocks
are being developed, along with the monitoring procedures by the military
supervision officers.[49] The
Government report states that “the financial commitment will to a great
extent depend upon the bidding’s outcome, and on the possibility of
stipulating an active contract concerning the remaining material which companies
dealing with explosives could be interested in. For the moment, the estimated
burden amounts to around 20 billion
lire.”[50]
Mines for Training
According to the national ban law, the number of mines being retained for
training purposes cannot exceed 10,000 units, “which can be renewed by
means of importation.”[51]
In the Mine Ban Treaty ratification bill, this number has been reduced to 8,000
mines, also in response to international criticism.
Foreign Stockpiles
Another matter of serious concern is foreign AP mines stocked in Italy,
particularly those on Nato bases. The issue is extremely sensitive, and liable
to give way to different implementing interpretations. Following a strict
reading of the Italian legislation, all Nato antipersonnel landmines stocked in
the country should have been disclosed in quantity and category by 17 March
1998, to be handed over to specially designated local sites by 14 June 1998
There are, however, some controversial implications:
- Will Nato, and particularly US Armed Forces, surrender stocks of
antipersonnel landmines as well as, according to the Italian law, antitank and
anti-vehicle mines?
- How can Italy, on a unilateral basis, force and monitor the compliance of
its domestic law? - And would it have the political will to do so?
Very little is known about locations, quantities and types of Nato landmines
in Italy - or what Nato Forces have done regarding the provisions of Law 374/97.
(See U.S. country report). In the accounting of stocks in Italy, there is no
mention of Nato landmines. Interviews with various Staff officers clearly
indicated that the Italian Government will not press queries with its Nato
allies on these matters.
Given the complexity of the matter, the Government has tried to find a way
out through the treaty ratification bill. Article 5 of the amended text states
that “the provisions of the Convention are applied to foreign Armed
Forces based in Italy, in accordance with international treaties,”
meaning that Nato armed forces would be exempted from the national law’s
obligation for good.
An additional answer to the problem is found in Article 6 of the ratification
bill, which provides that “The stocks of antipersonnel mines kept by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Armed Forces and located in the
national territory at the time of the entry into force of the present bill, will
remain under the control of pertaining commands until the term fixed for their
destruction by Article 5 of Law 29 October 1997, n. 374. If need be, these
authorities can transfer the mines to any other suitable place, for their
custody”
Use
At the end of WW II the Italian Army received
landmines mainly from the U.S. and UK. As a defeated nation, it was forbidden at
that time to develop and produce new military equipment. Mines were used to
defend the border from potential Warsaw Pact invaders. mainly in mountain passes
and valleys along the northeastern border. The alert situation along what was
called ‘the first defense line’, intersecting the regions of
Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto and Friuli, was maintained until the collapse of the
Soviet Bloc.
Until 1996, APMs were used by the Italian Armed Forces in peacekeeping
operations (like Somalia, or Bosnia). Only non-active mines are being used for
training in mine clearance operations by the Italian Army. The Army claims to
not use Claymore mines and, in compliance with Law 374/97, Italy can not use
ANY munitions or device which might function as an antipersonnel landmine (see
the definition of antipersonnel landmine given in art. 2 of Law 374/97
mentioned above).
Landmine Problem
Italy was one of the most mine-affected countries
in Europe after World War II. But because resources were dedicated to its
clearance, between August 1944 - June 1948, 1 billion sqm of land was surveyed
of which 200 million sqm were cleared. Some 120 officers ; 60 Non Commissioned
Officers; 1,500 auxiliary and office personnel were involved in the operations
at a cost of 6 billion lire (3.6 million USD). There were 915 casualties, of
which 390 were fatal. In the same period, 6,721 municipalities were cleared of
over 13 million UXOs, at a cost of 2 billion lire (1.2 million
USD).[52]
Today there are no mined areas in Italy but explosive devices left over from
World War I and World War II can still be
found.[53] Italy still has
rather strict legislation, which requires systematic clearance by private
companies, before any infrastructure work can begin. Once the clearance work is
over, the Army Engineering Corps certifies the results according to the fixed
security standards. This law has recently been enforced for the construction of
a new high-speed railway system, and before the construction of the new
international airport in Milan.
Italian Military Involved in Demining Activities
The Army Engineering Corps carries out military demining in war operations,
or at the end of an armed conflict, in peace-keeping
operations.[54] With 150 men,
its mandate is to deal with mine/UXO neutralization, demolitions, mobility
restoration and bridge building activities. Particularly important is the
activity of BOE (Bonifica Ordigni Esplosivi) teams, which supervise mine removal
and are engaged in mine awareness campaigns for schoolchildren. The Corps’
Operative Demining Center (COB) is responsible for the exchange of information
and coordination with similar structures in other countries. COB also trains all
Italian deminers working in the Army Engineering Corps. Italian EOD (Explosive
Ordnance Disposal) teams regularly offer training courses for Italian personnel
due to work in mined areas abroad.
From 1989 to the present, Italian Army Engineers have mainly been involved
demining operations through United Nations and NATO
operations.[55] Under the UN,
engineers were in Pakistan from 1989-91 for Operation SALAM, training Afghani
refugees in Peshawar and in Quetta. For one year two teams of twenty people
total trained around 1,500 local
deminers.[56] From 1995-96, two
Italian teams trained the local population in demining operations in Angola.
For NATO, eight officials of the Engineering Corps trained members of the
Kuwaitian Army and Police in various demining operations techniques from August
1991-December 1991.[57] Since
December 1995, Italian military have been involved in operations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to guarantee the security of Italian personnel and to train
the local population. They have also carried out some monitoring activities
during the demining programs carried out by Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. The
Italian EOD team carried out the destruction of landmines, identified 14,500
minefields, and recovered 1,134 UXO, 373 landmines; 76 antitank landmines, 600
projectiles and bombs.[58]
Finally, EOD specialists have been training the Albanian Army since 1997 and are
involved in the monitoring and coordination of demining
operations.[59]
Private Commercial Companies
In Italy there are 32 commercial companies involved in UXO clearance. Among
them, only the Florence-based company ABC (Appalti, Bonifiche, Costruzioni) has
recognized international experience in UXO/mine clearance in heavily
contaminated countries. In 1996 in Croatia, the company cleared some 20 Km of a
strategic stretch of railway line between the Sisak and Una river on behalf of
IFOR-International Armed Forces. The 3-month program was funded by the European
Commission. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997, it cleared 500,000 sq meters on the
banks of the River Sava with the financial support of the World Bank, amounting
to 2 billion lire (US$1.20
million).[60]
Working in Angola in 1997, ABC began the clearance of 1,300 km along the
railway line “Caminho de Ferro de Benguela,” including 58 bridges,
under contract with the Angolan government for 40 billion lire (US$24 million).
The demining program in Angola was interrupted with the resumption of the war.
To that time, ABC had carried out mine clearance activities valued at 2 billion
lire (US$1.2 million).[61]
Non-Governmental Organizations
Only one Italian NGO, INTERSOS, carries out humanitarian demining activities.
Its Humanitarian Demining Unit was begun in 1995 with military personnel retired
from the Army Engineering Corps. Since then, it has been involved in mine
awareness programs, reconstruction projects for mine-affected communities, as
well as training courses of EOD experts for humanitarian demining programs.
Intersos identifies priority areas for mine action with the local authorities,
and in coordination with other ongoing programs of rehabilitation and
sustainable human development.
Working in Bosnia, INTERSOS cleared residential areas on the Serbian side of
Sarajevo for a rehabilitation project, funded by the Italian government, which
resulted in the resettlement of 400 families. A similar project in Mumbasci
Village, in the Tuzla Province, funded by the European Commission, resulted in
the resettlement of 42 families. Finally, booby-traps were cleared in Hassan
Kamija school in Sarajevo, funded through the Italian Railways and the Lombardia
Trade Union Federation of the Railway Personnel for a total amount of 1 billion
lire (US$600,000). As a result of the clearance and subsequent rehabilitation
effort, 1,200 students were able to return to school.
[62]
In Angola,[63] two
Intersos HDU experts supervised a White Helmets/UNDP project to clear territory
in the Cuando Cubango Province with the 7th Deminer Brigade (50 operators) of
the INAROEE. This clearance priority had been identified by INAROEE, in
agreement with the provincial governor. The program, between August 1997 and
April 1998, cleared 280,000 sqm, at a total cost of about US$700,000 (unit cost
for cleared sqm= $2.5/sqm). Clearance included 6 minefields, 2 stretches of
road, a railway bridge and 4 rural areas and a logistical area, along with
emergency actions.[64] In
January 1999, INTERSOS began an 18 month demining project in the Huila Province,
sponsored by the European Union and the Italian Government, for a total amount
of 1.7 MECU.
Mine Action Funding
Between 1995 and 1997, Italy funded 18 billion
lire (U.S.$10.45 million) through bilateral and multilateral programmes
including the UN Voluntary Trust Fund, World Bank, NGOs, the Ministry Defence
and Local Authorities. Fund were allocated for mine clearance of priority areas
(schools, hospitals and villages, mine awareness programmes, training of local
deminers). The broader context for this funding activity is humanitarian relief
assistance, peace processes and sustainable human development.
Italy funded 500 million lire (approx. US$300,000) in 1997 and 17 billion
lire (U.S.$9.6 million) in 1998 for victim assistance, including emergency aid,
surgery, prostheses, rehabilitation, social and economic reintegration,
training, prevention. Recipients included the ICRC, WHO, NGOs, local
authorities. The funds were spent in countries including Angola, Mozambique,
Bosnia, Afghanistan. The beneficiaries are war victims, disabled people,
families at risk and the broader context of this funding activity is
humanitarian relief assistance, peace process, sustainable human
development.
From 1995 to 1998 Italy’s contribution to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund
amounted to U.S. $1,205,284.[65]
In the 1995-1997 period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Development
Cooperation Department contributed to mine action activities through the
following multilateral and bilateral programs:
1995 - 1 billion lire (U.S.$ 598,800);
Angola: To UNICEF (AGAIN, DEFN COUNTERPART) for demining activities,
identification of safety areas, social-educational programmes.
1995 - 1 billion lire (U.S.$598,800);
Afghanistan: To WHO for mine awareness, victim/survivor assistance
Bosnia-Herzegovina: To AVSI (an NGO) assistance to local initiatives, mine
awareness.[66]
In 1998, the Italian Government pledged a contribution of about 20 billion
lire (US$11.97 million) for demining operations and victim assistance to support
the following programs.[67]
- 2.5 billion lire (U.S. $1.5 million): ICRC activities in Afghanistan
,Cambodia and south Caucasus.
- 10 billion lire[68] (U.S.
$5.9 million): Angola for training of local deminers, demining activities and
mapping.
- 2.5 billion lire (U.S. $1.5 million): UNDP in Mozambique for demining
actions and mapping.
- 500 million lire (U.S. $299,400): Somalia for victim assistance and surgery
programmes at Mogadiscio North Hospital.
- 8 billion lire (U.S. $1.07 million) 600 million lire (approx U.S.
$359,300): Bosnia-Herzegovina for WB, EU, (UN) MAC demining actions to the
municipality of Stup,
aimed at reinforcing the local institutions.
- 500 million lire (U.S. $299,400): Croatia: MAC (UN) for demining activities
and training of deminers.
Mine Awareness
The Italian Government supports mine awareness
programs run by international NGOs in collaboration with local NGOs. In
Sarajevo, Intersos produced and distributed about 10,000 T-shirts for a mine
awareness program funded by the Italian Government, the Canadian Government, the
European Commission and other private donors. The T-shirts had drawings of
different kinds of APM used in the area and were distributed through the
schools. Children (and their families) were of course the target group of the
program, with the collaboration of the teachers. This project was financed by
ECHO for a total amount of 700.000 ECU and by USAID for a total amount of
US$50.000. Although initially conceived for students only, the T-shirt awareness
program was later extended to several displaced groups, which Intersos had come
to support from March to December 1996 by means of food aid programs. Food
parcels were distributed to 2,500 displaced families, for a period of six
months, on the Serb side of Sarajevo, and the T-shirt was part of the
parcel.
The Rome-based NGO CIES was involved in mine awareness activities and
information initiatives in the district of Mossurize, Manica province, in
Mozambique, in 1993-94. Mine awareness was organized in the schools of the area,
and at village/community level.
Reconstruction & Development Of Cleared Areas
In April 1993, CIES was involved in a socioeconomic reconstruction and
resettlement project for refugees and displaced persons in the central and
northern areas in the District of Mossurize, Province of Manica, in
Mozambique.[69] The target area
of the district was infested with mines and totally isolated from the rest of
the province. The only access to the capital Espungabera was through the
Zimbabwe-Mount Selinda border post. A number of the project activities planned
were based on the assumption that the main roads, and in particular the
provincial road like Espungabera to Chimoio, were to be cleared in a relatively
short period of time, as the plan of the UN Mine Clearance Committee suggested.
Demining operations along the crucial road were only completed in December
1994. The widespread presence of mines hampered access to rural areas and safe
paths leading to settlements had to be identified, and only then could work be
undertaken to make the sites accessible to vehicles. The opening of roads was
considered an absolute priority both by the district authorities and by the
population. So, the survey of demining and the opening of provincial roads had
been included in the plan of the government/UN program.
Subsequently, the presence of overlooked mines was confirmed, making it
necessary to demine the area again. For that purpose a demining squad from the
Mozambican Army was contracted. Ultimately the project achievements include
survey and demining of 85 Km of road; survey and demining of 5 surrounding areas
(including old schools and commercial centers); destruction of 56 explosive
devices (2 antitank mines, 12 antipersonnel mines, 44 mortar explosives or
bazookas); opening and rehabilitation of 95 km of roads,
rehabilitation/reconstruction of 5 bridges on small rivers.
The project was funded by the European Union, for a total value of US$597,744
and by UNOHAC, with a contribution of US$459,915. The overall costs for demining
activities and road reconstruction was around US$40,000. Contracts were signed
with EC in January 1994 and with UNOHAC in February 1994. Priority was given to
the construction or rehabilitation of service infrastructures, invaluable to the
promotion of agricultural development. All activities were planned and organized
with the DDA (Directao Distrital de Agricoltura), whose personnel and extension
agents carried out the relevant field work.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
ASAL is a small Italian NGO and a member of the
ItCBL. It is involved in one training project named after an Angolan child
“Joao Antonio,” which consists of sending Angolan rehabilitation
technical personnel to Italy for 2 months training at the Centro Protesi di
Vigorso di Budrio, near Bologna. The project started in 1996 and is entirely
based on private donations.
Intersos is currently carrying out a 1997-1999 technical orthopedic project
funded by the European Commission (ECHO) in Burundi, amounting to 500,000 ECU.
The program has been divided into three phases, each one lasting six months.
This program promotes orthopedic surgery in Muyinga, Gitega e Bujumbura
provinces.[70] During the first
phase, 142 surgery programs for prostheses and rehabilitation were implemented,
and 174 during the second phase. This activity has been accomplished by
specialized local structures like CNAR (national specialized organization of
Burundi).
The Italian NGO Emergency, involved in life support for civilian war
victims, has refused to give any information for this report on its activities
in Kurdistan and Cambodia.
The Italian Red Cross is currently working with ICRC on two projects
concerning victim assistance and rehabilitation programmes in
Kabul[71] and in Addis
Abeba.[72] There is an internal
administrative agreement between the Italian Red Cross and ICRC, by which Italy
collects funds for prosthetic/rehabilitation facilities in the two centers
mentioned above. This project has been extended until the year 2000.
From 1995, the regional Italian Red Cross section of Venice and some doctors
have decided to undertake victim assistance initiatives for children from
Bosnia, who have come to Italy for surgery and rehabilitation. This initiative
has been funded through voluntary contributions, as well as through media
subscriptions (eg, the newspaper Gazzettino of Venice, which raised 600 million
lire).[73] Around 100 patients
have been rehabilitated, thanks to the cooperation of the local public health
services and the involvement of the entire local community.
Responding to repeated requests from the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines,
and in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in the Mine Ban Treaty,
the Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
recently convened the first meeting aimed at setting up a joint ‘working
group” focused on humanitarian mine action. The underlying principle is
institutions and civil society working together to identify the guidelines for
an Italian policy on mine action and victim assistance, involving all national
actors which through their own varied experiences have acquired significant
expertise on various aspects of the landmine issue. The first meeting was held
on 22 February 1999.
[1]The Arms Project of Human
Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy
(New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1993), p. 36.
[2]Dossier Provvedimento,
Messa al Bando delle Mine Antipersona (AA.CC. 826, 1737,2290), n. 151, XIII
Legislature, October 1996 (Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studi); Dossier
Provvedimento, Messa al Bando delle Mine Antipersona (AACC 826 e abb.-B), n.
151/4, XIII Legislature, October 1997 (Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studi).
[3]Statement by H.E. Mr.
Lamberto Dini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy to the Fifty-First Session
of the General Assembly, New York, 26 September 1996. APM use was not banned
until June 1997.
[5]“To integrate the
measures already adopted in terms of renouncing production and export of such
weapons, and of starting their destruction, the Cabinet has agreed on the need
to renounce completely the operational use of antipersonnel landmines. This
decision, while responding to the strong call of national and international
public opinion, has been adopted to help achieve a solid international
understanding and a definite solution to the plight posed by antipersonnel
landmines,” Cabinet Communique, Rome, 13 June 1997.
[6]Interview with Roberto
Liotto, Direction of Political Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 26
January 1999.
[7]Article 2 of the Law
defines AP mine as “any munition or device that can be placed on, under,
inside or near the ground or any surface area, and designed or adaptable - by
means of specific mechanisms - so as to explode, cause an explosion or release
incapacitating substances as a consequence of the presence, proximity or contact
of a person.”
[8]Article 7 of Law 374/97
provides the sanctioning regime: “1.Whoever may use, with the exception of
the provisions included in Article 5, Par. 1, manufacture, sell, transfer for
whatever purpose, export, import, hold antipersonnel mines or their components,
and whoever may use or transfer, directly or indirectly, patent rights, or
relevant technologies for the manufacturing, in Italy or abroad, of
antipersonnel mines and their components, will be punished with a 3 to 12 year
imprisonment, and with a 500 million to 1,000 million lire fine.”
Paragraph 2) of the same article provides 3 to 6 years of imprisonment and a
fine from 200 to 500 million lire for whoever violates the obligations
concerning the disclosing and delivering of landmine stock to the Carabinieri,
and the disclosing and delivering of antipersonnel mines patent rights and
technologies to the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
[9]The establishment and
mandate of a parliamentary committee for monitoring the bill was provided in
Art. 10 of the original ban bill. Among other things, this parliamentary
committee was allowed to summon experts to carry out the verification work, and
this would have allowed civil society some important involvement in the
monitoring of the implementation of the ban law. Unfortunately, in the course of
the political debate in Parliament, this article was rejected. The ItCBL
unsuccessfully advocated its reintroduction in the Mine Ban Treaty ratification
bill.
[10]Ministero degli Affari
Esteri, “Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs The Hon. Lamberto Dini
at the Ottawa Conference for the Signing of the Convention on the Total
Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines,” Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997, p.
3.
[11]Due to the complexity of
the issue, both the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Foreign Affairs
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies have required technical assistance from
legal experts, whose statements have been presented to the Parliament and
annexed to the ratification dossier.
[12]A parliamentary
ratification bill had been presented one month earlier, on 14 May 1998, by Chair
of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies Achille Occhetto.
In the press communique released for the occasion, Occhetto openly criticised
the delay of the government’s initiative. “The decision to resort to
the unusual....procedure of the parliamentary initiative for the ratification of
an international convention was made after several months waiting for the
Government to present its ratification bill.... At the signing of the
Convention, both Minister Dini and President Occhetto committed to being among
the first countries to ratify in front of more than 100 States, the target being
the enactment of the Convention by the end of the year. Hence, the need for us
to ratify within the coming month of June,” Foreign Affairs Commission,
Comunicato Stampa, “Avviata con Iniziativa Parlamentare la Ratifica della
Convenzione sulle Mine Antipersona,” 14 May 1998.
[13]Interview with Colonel
Cornacchia, Staff Officer, Ministry of Defence, Rome, 11 November 1998.
[14]Interview with Roberto
Liotto, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 25 January 1999.
[15]“Consistent with
the targets set by the United Nations resolutions and by the EU, Italy will
continue to actively work in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference,
and to follow the so called ‘Ottawa Process’ to ensure that - by
means of these complementary actions carried out in both contexts - the
international community may be provided with a mechanism of effective rules
binding the greatest number of States,” Government Press Communique,
Rome, 13 June 1997.
[16] “Italy considers
that the whole complex issue of antipersonnel landmines, imposing a total ban on
their production, destroying existing stockpiles, and verifying their
destruction is essentially a disarmament problem ....This Conference has the
experience, the facilities and the personnel to handle these negotiations. We
also know that various political initiatives are being taken, whose aims we
wholly endorse, and which are also designed to rapidly define an international
agreement. But we maintain that for such an agreement to be credible it must
attract the largest possible number of countries, and avoid setting up a
narrowly based regime that excludes the most important countries”,
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Address by H.E. Lamberto Dini, Italian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament,
Geneva, 21 January 1997.
[17]Interview with Roberto
Liotto, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 29 January 1999.
[18]Quaderni
dell’Osservatorio Economico Fiom Cgil Brescia, Il settore armiero,
Brescia, Fiom Cgil, 1991, p. 47.
[19]Interview with Vito
Alfieri Fontana, Rome, 23 February 1999.
[20]Mauro Suttora, La Mina
Sbagliata, Europeo, 5 September 1987. Suttora notes that to handle the
contracts Valsella imported 573 metric tons of explosive material for landmines
from the Swedish company Bofors, from November 1981 to December 1982.
[21]Gaetano Agnini, written
statement issued to Nicoletta Dentico and John Head, 19 February 1999.
[22]Registry of Companies and
Businesses, Singapore, http://wwwdb1. Gov.sg/reb, Department of Statistics,
Singapore, Basic Data for the Index of Singapore Businesses,
http://sgconnect.asia1.com.sg.
[24]Francesco Terreri,
Produzione, Commercio ed Uso delle Mine Terrestri: Il Ruolo dell’Italia,
Edizioni Comune Aperto, Comune di Firenze, pp. 33-34.
[25]Brescia Tribunal, Ufficio
Istruzione, Procedimento Penale n. 928/89-B, interrogation of defendant Mario
Fellani, 1 March 1988.
[26]Istituto Affari
Internazionali, L’Italia nella politica Internazionale 1980-81, Milano,
Edizioni di Comunità, 1982, p. 206. The patent is also quoted in the
Valsella 1980 stock-taking, relating the merger with Meccanotecnica.
[27]Giancarlo Summa, Mina a
scoppio ritardato, Il Mondo, 8 November 1993.
[28]Ocse, Statistics of
Foreign Trade, figures of the statistic position 951, Arms and Ammunitions,
Italy.
[29]Alberto Chiara, Io non
sono un trafficante, interview with Alfieri Fontana, Famiglia Cristiana,
n. 47, 27 November 1996.
[31]Nicoletta Dentico, A
Caccia di Farfalle in Afghanistan: interview with Sayed Aqa, Mani Tese,
June 1994. Also, OSCAR Report, 9 November 1995, p. 7.
[32]Letter dated 22 January
1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, Annex: Addendum to the third report of the International Commission of
Inquiry (Rwanda), United Nations, S/1998/63.
[33]Frank Smyth, Soldi,
Sangue e politica Internazionale, Internazionale, n. 27, 14 May 1994,
article dervied from, The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda:
The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, Vol. 6, Issue 1,
January 1994.
[34]Phone interview with Vito
Alfieri Fontana, Trento, 24 and 28 January 1999.
[35]Numerous sources were
used to compile the data in the tables in this section. These include
provincial and federal customs data, Jane’s Yearbooks,
Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, export authorization data, figures from the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and various Italian journals. Details available upon
request.
[36]The figures quoted in
this and the following tables are to be considered the equivalent in the
current value: 1 USD = 1,700 It. lire
[37]Alfieri Fontana, the
owner of Tecnovar, denies this export figure, which was quoted in the
Jane’s annual reports: “Probably we are dealing here with a
Valsella export referring to similar material.”
[38]In our previous tables
concerning 1980 exports of landmines to Iraq, we had mentioned Misar as one of
the companies involved. We have tentatively removed the name of Misar in this
table, because according to Umberto Lucio Valentini, Misar’s former
marketing director, the company exported to Iraq “probably a few
samples,” and likely sea mines.
[39]This figure was given
by Umberto Lucio Valentini, who has also provided valuable information on the
selling of the know-how concerning such AP mines as SB-33, SB-81, SY-AT to
Spain, Greece and Portugal.
[40]Both Valentini from
Misar and Fontana from Tecnovar deny any landmine export to Iran, in contrast to
the available figure of bank transfers from Iran to Bari and Brescia
respectively, made in 1984, relating to that customs item. The issue evidently
needs further explaining. According to Valentini, the transfers to Brescia could
relate to export operations carried out by Breda Meccanica Bresciana.
[41]Misar denies any export
operation to Cyprus. According to Valentini, it could be instead an export
operation carried out by Breda Meccanica Bresciana.
[42]The source of this
information is the Database Eurostat/Comext.
[43]Ministero della Difesa,
Gabinetto del Ministro, “Schema di decreto interministeriale concernente
la disciplina della distruzione delle scorte di mine antipersona (articolo 6
della legge 29 ottobre 1997, n.374, recante norme per la messa al bando delle
mine antipersona”, 19 May 1998. The Ministries concerned are respectively:
Ministry of Defense, Industry and Foreign Affairs.
[44]Despite the fact that
antitank mines equipped with anti-handling devices are listed among the items in
the military stocks to be dismantled, the explanatory report does not count any
numbers or types such landmines in the information released so far. It is likely
that more details will appear in the following reports.
[45]All the landmines
collected at the appropriate local sites in accordance with the provisions of
the national law were to be delivered to the Ministry of Defense, Deposito
Munizioni at Noceto di Parma, by 18 June 1998. There is no official evidence,
however, that such transfer has actually taken place. As the government report
underlines, at the time of its writing it was possible to provide only an
approximate estimation about the numbers in industrial stocks.
[46]The existence of two
million such ‘buttons’ was disclosed to the ItCBL for the first time
by the owner of Tecnovar, Alfieri Fontana, during the Oslo Conference in
September 1997. Immediately after the Oslo Conference, the rapporteur of the
pro-ban law, Achille Occhetto, made this issue the subject of a parliamentary
motion compelling the Government to identify and destroy these de facto
antipersonnel devices.
[47]Interview with Colonel
Ruggeri, Segredifesa, Rome, 22 November 1999.
[48]Ministero della Difesa,
“Schema di decreto interministeriale concernente la disciplina della
distruzione delle scorte di mine antipersona,” explanatory report.
[49]Information gathered from
the Ministry of Defence’s Secretary General Office.
[50]Ministero della Difesa,
“Schema di decreto interministeriale,” explanatory report.
[52]Landmine Monitor
interview with Major-General Francesco Giannatiempo, General Staff , Logistical
Support Section, Tactical Mobility Office, Ministry of Defence, Rome, 13 January
1999.
[53]Interview with Col.
Fernando Termentini , Italian Army Engineering Officer, Rome, 15 January
1999.
[54]Interview with Col.
Fernando Termentini, Rome, 15 January 1999.; Also, Gianni Botondi and Fernando
Termentini, Le mine antiuomo: come mitridatizzarle, Rivista Militare, n. 5,
September-October 1997, p. 94.
[55]Gianluca Scagnetti,
Terrore cieco, Italiani, n.10, December 1997-January 1998, pp. 30-31.
[56]For more details about
“Operation Salam” in Pakistan, Ferdinando Termentini, Ufficiali
Italiani del Genio in Pakistan, Rivista Militare, n. 3, March-April 1990.
[60]Document dated 8 December
1997, Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment, Government of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[61]Interview with Gianfranco
Mela, ABC head-office in Florence, 26 January 1999.
[62]Intersos Report,
L’impegno di Intersos contro le mine, issue n.11/12, April 1998, pp.
13-14.
[63]Intersos Report,
Intersos: Unità di sminamento umanitario, n.13/14 , November 1998, pp.
81-82.
[64]Interview with Stefano
Cabretta, Intersos, Rome, 12 January 1999.
[65] UN General Assembly,
“Report of the Secretary General: Assistance in Mine Clearance,”
A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29.
[66]Interview with Vincenzo
Oddo, Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 15
December 1998.
[67]Interview with Leonardo
Baroncelli, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office IV, Development Cooperation
Department, Rome, 25 January 1999. For further details about Italy’s
commitment, it is necessary to wait for the fiscal year 1998 final
budget’s approval.
[68]The EU cofinancing of
this project, amounting to 700 million lire (US$419,160) is aimed at granting
access to the priority areas in the UILE Province. Another EU contribution,
amounting to 700 million lire (US$419,160) as well, is targeted to orthopedic
activities and social rehabilitation projects in the MENONGUE Province.
[69]CIES Final Report dated
February 1996, Resettlement and Socio-Economic Reconstruction in the District of
Mossurize, Province of Manica.
[70]Intersos Report, Burundi.
Il Problema dei Rifugiati oltre frontiera e degli sfollati interni, Intersos
report, n.11/12, April 1998, pp. 30-32.
[71]ICRC, ICRC Physical
Rehabilitation Programmes, March 1997.
[72]Interview with Maria
Letizia Zamparelli, Italian Red Cross, Rome, 25 January 1999.
[73]For more details about
Francesca Chemollo, Il cammino della solidarietà, Emira come Aladin, Il
Gazzettino, n.223, 26 September 1995.
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