Sri Lanka

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Government representatives have stated that Sri Lanka’s accession is dependent on progress in the peace process. It has linked its position on accession to agreement by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to foreswear use of the weapon.^[1]

On 6 December 2006 Sri Lanka voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 61/84, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has for every annual pro-ban UNGA resolution since 1996. It said, “Sri Lanka has always acknowledged the humanitarian objectives of the Ottawa Convention by supporting the implementation of the resolution on this subject at the UN General Assembly, every year.”^[2]

Sri Lanka sent an observer to the Seventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2006.^[3] At the meeting of States Parties, Sri Lanka stated that it would soon provide an update to its 2005 voluntary Article 7 transparency report.^[4]

Sri Lanka is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II. It did not attend the Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in Geneva on 6 November 2006, and it did not submit an annual Article 13 report for 2006.

In September 2006 the European Parliament passed a resolution on Sri Lanka which “[r]eiterates its call, as an immediate gesture of goodwill, for both sides to cease the use of anti-personnel landmines and to assist in their removal and, to this end, calls on the Government of Sri Lanka to set an example by signing the Ottawa Convention banning the use of such mines and on the LTTE to sign the Geneva Call ‘Deed of Commitment.’”^[5]

The Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum (LBAF) issued press statements urging the government to sign the Mine Ban Treaty and the LTTE to sign the Deed of Commitment, and urging the parties to address the mine issue in the peace talks.^[6] On 13 September 2006 the ICBL and LBAF organized a press conference to release Landmine Monitor Report 2006, with Sinhala and Tamil language versions of the Sri Lanka country report.^[7] On 3 December 2006, a 30-minute television program was broadcast on the topic, “Is a Ban on Landmines a Possibility in Sri Lanka?”^[8]

Despite these advocacy efforts, the marked increase in armed confrontation in 2006-2007 and credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines have derailed discussions with the LTTE on a ban on antipersonnel mines. Previously, LTTE representatives participated in events organized by the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call to engage non-state armed groups in a mine ban.

Use, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears that it imported antipersonnel mines from Pakistan, Portugal, China, Italy (and/or Singapore), and perhaps Belgium, the United States and others.^[9] Since the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), Landmine Monitor has received no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces.

From the signing of the CFA until mid-2006, Landmine Monitor received no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LTTE, other than command-detonated Claymore-type mines.^[10] In May 2006, the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) accused the LTTE of planting antipersonnel mines for the first time since the ceasefire: it said a soldier was injured by an LTTE mine in Trincomalee on 16 May, another soldier was injured by an LTTE antipersonnel mine in Nagarkovil on 17 May, and a third in Kilaly on 1 June. The army also reported that it recovered an LTTE antipersonnel mine planted on the roadside in Thunnalai on 5 June.^[11] In July 2006 it displayed an antivehicle mine fuzed with three antipersonnel landmines reportedly seized from an LTTE cache.^[12] In August 2006 a Sri Lankan military deminer told Landmine Monitor that since July the army had encountered newly laid mines in the eastern province, and had recovered newly manufactured landmines containing a high explosive charge and a battery mechanism.^[13]

At its presentation to the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006 Sri Lanka stated: “During their on-going efforts to facilitate voluntary resettlement of IDPs [internally displaced persons], the security forces have [been] confronted with new minefields laid by the LTTE.”^[14]

In March 2007 a media account said that “fresh minefields have been laid,” and cited military estimates that the rebels had laid around 6,000 mines to slow an army offensive.^[15]

In June 2007 the Sri Lankan military said that it seized 685 antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines and bombs, during a search of three former LTTE-held villages in eastern Sri Lanka.^[16]

Geneva Call asked the government and the LTTE to consider giving permission for an independent mission to investigate allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines; both replied that they would not agree at the time. The LTTE denied it had engaged in any new use of mines.^[17]

In December 2006 the Sri Lankan Air Force claimed to have destroyed an LTTE antipersonnel landmine factory.^[18] The current status of the LTTE’s landmine production facilities is unknown. In the past, the LTTE has produced three types of antipersonnel mine: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine) and SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine).^[19] The LTTE has also manufactured antivehicle mines, including the Amman 2000. It is considered expert in making improvised explosive devices.

Landmine and ERW Problem

Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) resulting from two decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam seeking a separate homeland in the north and east. The 2002 ceasefire agreement collapsed in mid-2006, although never formally renounced, and conflict intensified, resulting in additional (and unsurveyed) mine/ERW contamination.

Sri Lanka’s voluntary Article 7 report submitted in June 2005 identified 12.6 square kilometers of land (308 mined areas in eight regions) known to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 136 square kilometers of suspected hazardous areas (2,341 SHAs in 10 regions).^[20] The Article 7 report pointed out that this was a rough estimate, partly based on 3,008 SLA maps of minefields, and technical survey may identify much smaller areas of actual contamination.^[21]

In early 2006 the government estimated some 99 square kilometers of land were affected by ERW. Of 730 villages contaminated with landmines, it reported 173 had been cleared, 250 were in the process of being demined and the remainder would be tasked after technical survey.^[22] Contamination included belts of Pakistani-made P-4 mines laid by the SLA and nuisance minefields placed by the LTTE. However, the government acknowledges that it does not have precise knowledge of the extent of contamination.^[23]

Sri Lanka has some 62 square kilometers of military-occupied High Security Zones, which are areas near military emplacements, camps, barracks or checkpoints, often protected by a defensive perimeter of mines. High Security Zones are not accessible to demining agencies.^[24] The SLA also put other clearance tasks off-limits to operators after the flare-up in fighting between LTTE and government forces after August 2006, because of their proximity to SLA positions.^[25] Government allegations that the LTTE emplaced new landmines, although yet to be confirmed independently, suggest the mine problem may have worsened.^[26] Recent government use of air and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery has also increased contamination by unexploded ordnance (UXO).^[27]

Mines and UXO pose a serious long-term challenge to economic reconstruction and an immediate obstacle to resettlement of people displaced both by conflict and the 2005 tsunami; in March 2007 UN agencies estimated that there were over 425,000 displaced people.^[28] The northern Jaffna peninsula, a focal point of fighting, is the most severely affected area. About half of all landmines laid in Sri Lanka are estimated to be in the peninsula and to affect some 228 villages, excluding High Security Zones.^[29] The emergency mine/UXO clearance operation to facilitate resettlement in areas of eastern Sri Lanka, the scene of renewed fighting in late 2006, has been the foremost priority for the Sri Lankan government in the first six months of 2007.^[30]

Mine Action Program

A National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA) established in August 2002 is responsible for setting mine action policy and priorities and coordinating mine action, mine risk education and victim assistance.^[31] In June 2007, the NSCMA was placed under the authority of a Resettlement Authority set up by an act of parliament in March 2007.^[32] In late June a presidential decree reversed that decision, returning the NSCMA to the Ministry of Nation Building and Development and its former chairperson.^[33]

The NSCMA aims to achieve national ownership of mine action in Sri Lanka by setting up a national humanitarian mine action center.^[34] In 2006-2007, however, demining operations continued to be coordinated by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) through its office in Colombo and regional mine action offices in Jaffna and Vavuniya. Under a three-year agreement with the government that ended in 2006 but was extended to April 2008, UNDP has provided three technical advisors and a database. UNDP sets demining priorities, assigning operators tasks requested by government agents who head provincial administrations.^[35]

The UNDP Mine Action Project has suffered from turnover of international staff. Its Colombo-based technical advisor (who acted as program manager and also as technical advisor for Vavuniya) left in November 2006 and had not been replaced as of end-June 2007. The technical advisor stationed in Jaffna also left in November 2006 and was expected to take up the job in early July. In June 2007, at the request of NSCMA, UNDP decided to set up a third mine action office in the eastern town of Trincomalee, to expedite humanitarian mine action in the districts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara.^[36]

Sri Lanka has not enacted any national mine action legislation. UNDP drafted national standards in 2003 that were approved by the Ministry of Nation Building and Development in 2005 and published on 4 April 2006. UNDP manages the Sri Lanka Mined Area Database, which uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).^[37]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

In February 2004 Sri Lanka declared that it had embarked on a comprehensive humanitarian mine action program with the objective of becoming mine-free by the end of 2006.^[38] A senior ministry official subsequently stated that, “all the landmines in Sri Lanka will be cleared by the end of 2008.”^[39]

The NSCMA continues to identify this as the objective of mine action in Sri Lanka.^[40] However, mine action operators consider it implausible in view of the revival of hostilities from mid-2006, the extent of known contamination, reports of new use, and the refusal of the military to allow clearance of minefields in High Security Zones.^[41]

Integration of Mine Action with Reconstruction and Development

Mine action prioritizes clearance that supports the resettlement of displaced people, reconstruction of infrastructure such as roads, power lines and drinking water supply, and community needs such as schools and hospitals.^[42] Tasks and local priorities are selected by government agents in each district, who draw up a task list from clearance needs identified by divisional secretaries, in consultation with mine action operators.^[43]

Demining

Eleven organizations carried out demining operations in Sri Lanka in 2006: the SLA’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization’s (TRO) HDU, the national NGO Milinda Moragoda Institute for People’s Empowerment (MMIPE), the Indian NGOs Horizon and Sarvatra, and six international NGOs―Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP). Some operators worked jointly.

Identification of Affected Areas

No comprehensive national survey of mine/UXO contamination has been conducted; some operators have conducted surveys within their area of operation.^[44] As a result, estimates of the extent of contamination vary.

As of June 2007 the technical survey of all mine affected areas planned by the NSCMA in 2006 had not been implemented due to the renewed conflict inhibiting access to many areas.^[45] The survey was to be carried out by UNDP to establish the extent of mine contamination and “to remove or replace all SHA by identifying, confirming and quantifying all minefields in Sri Lanka excluding high security zones.”^[46] The outcome was expected to provide a basis for planning and prioritization and also for preparing for an exit strategy by international NGOs.^[47]

Landmine/ERW Clearance

In 2006 a total of 7 square kilometers of land was demined. This was 64 percent less than in 2005 (19.5 square kilometers, achieved by increased manual and mechanical capacity).^[48] Demining was sharply curtailed by hostilities between the government and the LTTE which started escalating in December 2005.^[49] Intensification of fighting from 11 August 2006 brought demining operations to a standstill for about six weeks, and had a number of other effects on operational capacity. Operators faced other threats to the security of their deminers, who include a majority of Tamils; there were staff abductions; many deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory left to join “local security forces;” operators faced tight restrictions on moving Tamil deminers to tasks in different districts; and access to explosives for destroying mines and ERW was denied. ^[50]

The SLA, trained in humanitarian demining by RONCO and with four field engineer regiments comprising 505 deminers, was particularly affected by the new security environment.

It conducted only sporadic demining in Vavuniya and Trincomalee districts and ceased all demining after the outbreak of large-scale hostilities on 11 August 2006.^[52]

In 2005 the SLA had conducted demining for most of the year and cleared more land than any other operator, using manual methods and mine detection dogs.^[53]

The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization’s Humanitarian Demining Unit received support in the first seven months of 2006 from NPA, MAG, DDG and FSD. After the August hostilities, only NPA continued to receive clearance from the authorities to operate in LTTE-controlled areas.^[54] In September the government impounded TRO’s financial resources, forcing the HDU to halt demining operations.^[55]

NPA/HDU operated mainly in the Vanni region.^[56] In September 2006 NPA took on the deminers who had previously worked in the Vanni region for FSD, DDG and MAG.^[57]

MAG suspended demining operations on 22 February 2006 because of security concerns. After a security assessment in May 2006 it resumed operations in government-held territory until November 2006, when it had completed all tasks to which it could gain access and suspended operations.^[58]

HALO, working in government-controlled areas of Jaffna peninsula, conducted manual and mechanical mine clearance, marking, area reduction, survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). Although the conflict allowed demining in only 11 months of 2006, HALO increased its clearance by 22.5 percent from 2005.^[59]

FSD worked in Mannar and Vavuniya during 2006, undertaking manual and battle area clearance, EOD, impact and technical surveys. FSD/HDU also deployed one mine action team in an LTTE-controlled area in Mannar.^[60]

DDG operated in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Vanni, undertaking technical survey, manual demining, battle area clearance and EOD. DDG temporarily halted demining in Trincomalee on 17 April 2006 because of insecurity but restarted on 8 May after reassigning two teams from the Mutur area to a more trouble-free area. ^[61]

JCCP discontinued its operation in Sri Lanka in March 2006 mainly because of a lack of funds.^[62]

MMIPE, in collaboration with Horizon and Sarvatra, conducted mine clearance in government-controlled areas.^[63]

Demining Progress in 2007

Despite the ongoing fighting, demining continued in 2007. UNDP reported that in the first four months demining operators cleared 529,421 square meters of mined areas and 6.5 square kilometers of battle areas.^[65]

The SLA, NSCMA and district authorities gave highest priority to emergency demining in areas taken back from the LTTE to facilitate resettlement, especially in eastern areas between Batticaloa and Trincomalee where the army had recovered control from the LTTE.^[66] By June 2007, the SLA’s Humanitarian Demining Unit had undertaken the first two phases of a three-phase operation. In Phase I (Vakarai to Verugal), the SLA cleared 32 square kilometers of battle area and recovered three antipersonnel mines, four antivehicle mines and 80 items of UXO. In Phase II (Kirimichchi) it cleared 23.7 square kilometers of battle area, recovering 23 items of UXO. In Phase III, as of May 2007, it had covered an estimated 16 square kilometers of battle area (Kajuwatte to Pannichchankerni),^[67] recovering 33 items of UXO, and conducted manual clearance of 10,404 square meters of mined areas, removing three antipersonnel mines and 22 items of UXO.^[68]

MAG expected to resume operations at the end of June 2007 on sites linked to resettlement in the Batticaloa area.^[69] FSD, after conducting a security assessment, started operations around Trincomalee and DDG, and as of April, had started training deminers in Trincomalee.^[70] In the northern LTTE-controlled areas of Vanni and Kilinochchi, NPA continued to conduct demining and EOD, working with the Solidar consortium of 19 humanitarian aid agencies, although LTTE targets in the vicinity came under artillery shelling and aerial bombardment by government forces.^[71]

The approach of military and political leaders to eastern areas has proved controversial. Demining operators expressed serious concerns over the security of their deminers, in view of continuing abduction and murder of NGO workers by militias in government-controlled areas. There were also misgivings that operators were under government pressure to conduct mine clearance in areas vulnerable to LTTE counterattack.^[72]

Mine Risk Education

Due to renewed conflict in 2006, there was diminished mine risk education (MRE) capacity in some areas, particularly where MRE volunteers themselves became IDPs. Conflict which led to population displacements also had the effect of making those areas more inaccessible for MRE teams (as well as aid workers) and increased the risk from new mine/ERW contamination. UNICEF and its partner organizations sought to balance established MRE priorities with the need for emergency MRE. The dissemination of MRE also became more difficult as people remaining in conflict areas avoided traveling and any other exposure to the risk of being caught up in conflict between security forces and the LTTE.^[73] MRE organizations working in the field have been the main source of information on new dangerous areas and isolated ERW.

Nevertheless, UNICEF reported that it had been able to respond adequately, with its local partners, to emergency needs for MRE arising from the intensified conflict since mid-2006. At the end of 2006, 75,024 people were displaced from Batticaloa district alone.^[74] Overall, an estimated three million people have been affected by the conflict; over 500,000 have fled their homes and more than half of them have been displaced for over a year.^[75]

During 2006, 568,388 people (49 percent were children) received MRE sessions in the 10 most affected districts, mostly in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, compared to 686,274 in 2005. The decrease in 2006 is attributed to the escalation of conflict in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.^[76] UNICEF estimates that since 2003 about 1,818,000 people have received “direct” MRE; this excludes people reached through mass media campaigns.^[77]

UNICEF partners conducting MRE in 2006 included the local NGOs Sarvodaya, White Pigeon, Community Trust Fund and, for the first time, Kachcheri Child Focus Unit (Kachcheri CFU) based in Trincomalee. Mines Advisory Group continued working with White Pigeon. School-based MRE was provided by more than 10,000 trained teachers in mine-affected and neighboring districts in the north and east, where MRE is integrated into the school curricula.^[78] Community liaison was undertaken in all areas where there were mine clearance operations. But MRE is not conducted in areas where the government security forces are working.^[79] When MAG completed its clearance operations in Batticaloa in November 2006, MRE activities were maintained there by Sarvodaya.^[80] MAG planned to resume activities in Batticaloa by mid-July 2007.^[81]

UNICEF employed one expatriate, one national officer and five project assistants working in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Vanni, Trincomalee and Baticoloa districts. After the expatriate directly responsible for MRE left in February 2007 the program has been administered by national staff.^[82] Sarvodaya, White Pigeon, Community Trust Fund and Kachcheri CFU had 124 MRE field officers, 504 MRE volunteers and 219 MRE child presenters working in 10 districts.^[83]

MRE strategies used in Sri Lanka include community-based initiatives, mass media campaigns and school-based programs. In 2006, the Sri Lanka MRE program developed an emergency strategy, reprioritizing its response to meet the needs of thousands of newly displaced people and humanitarian workers. UNICEF arranged with the UN Department of Safety and Security and international NGO RedR to include landmine safety in briefings for local and international aid workers; 1,258 aid workers were briefed in 2006.^[84]

Although MRE for IDPs was prioritized in 2006, the standard priorities remained in effect. People are most at risk in September when harvesting and planting begins. Most at-risk groups are men aged 18 to 45 years, and people displaced by the conflict. MRE in Sri Lanka also targets people undertaking risky activities including collectors (of scrap metal, honey, forest fruits, firewood), fishermen, hunters and children. ERW poses the greatest threat to children and was a primary focus of MRE in 2006-2007.^[85]

As of May 2007 national coordination meetings were occurring on schedule but district coordination meetings had been disrupted by conflict and displacement of the local population, including district officials and MRE volunteers; about half of the district offices did not conduct meetings.^[86] The National Steering Committee for Mine Action coordinates MRE based on reports provided by UNICEF and through the district-based IMSMA maintained by UNDP. At the district level, government agents decide on MRE priorities and methodologies.^[87]

In Jaffna during 2006 White Pigeon covered 75 mine/ERW affected communities in eight divisions,^[88] and Sarvodaya covered 98 communities in six divisions,^[89] with a mixture of community liaison and MRE activities. In total, there were 2,836 house visits, 1,236 group discussions, 676 community briefings, 91 community mapping exercises, 507 safety briefings for local service providers and 256 follow-up activities. Child-oriented MRE undertaken by the NGO community included 772 lectures/classroom sessions, 188 games, 97 child-to-child sessions and 95 child-to-adult sessions provided by over 10,000 teachers. In 2006, 2,785 teachers and 903 principals were newly trained in MRE.^[90]

To reach out-of-school children, UNICEF has established around 140 children’s clubs with an average of 60 members each in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts since 2004.^[91]

UNICEF’s five-year MRE program ends in December 2007. For 2008, UNICEF anticipates structural changes, primarily in program structure at all levels.^[92] A mid-term evaluation of MRE and survivor assistance contracted by the European Union for May-August 2007 was postponed due to the security situation.^[93]

Landmine/ERW Casualties^[94]

UNICEF recorded 64 casualties in 2006 in 23 incidents, a large increase from 2005 (38 casualties).^[95] Casualties in 2006 included 27 killed and 37 injured: 48 were males (33 men and 15 boys) and 16 were female (12 women and four girls). Antivehicle mines caused 31 causalities, antipersonnel mines caused 14 and ERW caused 16 casualties; the cause of three casualties was unknown. There were no reports of deminer casualties during clearance operations in 2006 or January-May 2007. One soldier was injured by a mine when he came to the aid to an injured civilian.

Casualties continued to occur in 2007, at a lower rate than in 2006: two women had been reported injured by ERW by 13 June.

Casualty rates declined steadily from 2000 (223 casualties) until 2006; the increased number of casualties in 2006 is attributed mainly to three antivehicle mine incidents in Putlam, Batticoloa and Trincomalee districts which caused 31 casualties (16 killed, 15 injured). There were fewer casualties due to antipersonnel mines (14) than in 2005 (17), while casualties due to ERW increased only to 16 from 15 in 2005; the number of antivehicle mine casualties in 2005 was not reported.

Most of the total 64 casualties in 2006 occurred in Batticoloa (29; 21 from antivehicle mines, six by ERW, two unknown), followed by Jaffna (nine) and Puttalam and Trincomalee (seven each), Killinochchi (four), Ampara and Vavuniya (three each) and Mullaitivu (two casualties). Only six of these causalities were reported from the LTTE-controlled Vanni region, which includes Killinochchi and Mullaitivu. Children were 30 percent (19) of all casualties (20 percent in previous years) and 44 percent of casualties were caused by ERW.

Data Collection

Casualty surveillance in Sri Lanka is coordinated through the six district mine action offices, UNICEF and the UNDP IMSMA database, which is considered to be the most reliable source of information on mine/ERW casualties.^[96] New reports of casualties are collected by district mine action office staff from MRE field officers, mine action focal points, hospitals and local media. Several NGOs providing services to people with disabilities differentiate mine/ERW survivors in their service data. In December 2006, UNDP and UNICEF provided training to 27 MRE volunteers on data collection methodologies.^[97]

The renewed conflict from mid-2006 has had negative effects on the reliability and completeness of casualty surveillance and data collection in Sri Lanka. A “lack of coordination and information sharing” has prevented information from reaching Colombo or from being verified by UNDP, as some of the data collectors are among the conflict displaced in the north and east.^[98]

IMSMA recorded 1,349 civilian mine/ERW casualties (217 killed and 1,132 injured) from 1985 to December 2006; children accounted for 20 percent (275) and women for nine (119). UNDP believes that the actual number of casualties is higher than currently recorded.^[99]

A national census in 2001 identified 274,711 people with disabilities (1.6 percent of the total population), of which 158,448 were males and 116,263 females.^[100] Experts believed this figure does not reflect the actual number of people with disabilities, as most households did not complete the disability questions due to social stigma.^[101]

Survivor Assistance

Due to the renewed conflict, civilian movement was routinely scrutinized by security forces. One effect of this has been that people with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, who do not have a “police report” stating the cause of their disability were reluctant to travel to obtain assistance.^[102] Handicap International (HI) expressed concern about the need for mine action, including survivor assistance, in Batticaloa. There are over 5,000 people with disabilities, including many amputees and mine/ERW survivors, in Batticaloa alone; many have been displaced by the conflict.^[103]

Medical facilities are reportedly adequate to provide medical care to mine/ERW survivors in Sri Lanka, but services are likely to be less adequate in LTTE-controlled areas and conflict areas.^[104] The Jaffna Teaching Hospital and the Point Pedro Hospital provide secondary surgical treatment. Despite the renewed conflict, UNICEF was of the view that it had adequately addressed physical rehabilitation needs and strengthened the capacity of technicians in areas where it operates.^[105]

Psychosocial and economic rehabilitation services for mine/ERW survivors and their families were available in most mine-affected districts, particularly in Kilinochchi and Jaffna, but services remained limited in 2006.^[106] The Department of Social Services operated eight vocational training schools for people with disabilities and sponsored job training and placement programs. The government also provided some financial support to NGOs providing mobility devices, education and capacity-building for people with disabilities.^[107]

Military war victims including mine/ERW survivors receive full rehabilitation, compensation, pension benefits and free public transport.^[108] Civilian mine/ERW survivors receive a one-time grant of $75-$250, depending on the degree of disability, from the Emergency Relief Fund.^[109]

Sri Lanka has legislation and policy protecting the rights of people with regard to non-discrimination in employment and education. There is a National Council for Persons with Disabilities. However, people with disabilities continued to face difficulties due to negative attitudes and discrimination.^[110] On 20 March 2007 a new disability regulation required all existing buildings to be made accessible for people with disabilities within seven years.^[111]

On 30 March 2007 Sri Lanka signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities but not the Optional Protocol which allows the monitoring of implementation. On the same day, Sri Lanka declared 2007 as the Year of Accessibility to create an enabling environment for persons with disabilities.

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework

The national policy on survivor assistance, which the government’s January 2006 Strategy for Mine Action called for, had not been developed as of June 2007, due to ongoing conflict and adjusted mine action priorities.^[112] Six district mine action offices and focal points coordinate survivor assistance and MRE, and provide technical assistance through five district coordinators. In 2006 two survivor assistance officers were seconded to Vavunyia and Jaffna to monitor projects, conduct survivor needs assessments and identify available services. Coordination for survivor assistance in Sri Lanka is not considered to be as strong as that for MRE.^[113]

At least 5,380 people with disabilities received services during 2006, including 1,494 mine/ERW survivors. This included 321 people receiving medical care, 3,812 receiving physical rehabilitation (1,367 survivors), 371 receiving psychosocial support (42 survivors), 501 receiving socioeconomic reintegration and educational support (10 survivors), and 375 others receiving other services (75 survivors).  Within this total, Handicap International (HI) provided physical rehabilitation to at least 1,609 people with disabilities.  White Pigeon provided physical rehabilitation to 1,788 people (1,283 survivors) and loans to 86 people. Jaipur Jaffna Center for Disability Rehabilitation provided physical rehabilitation to 309 people (78 survivors), 118 referrals (72 survivors) and psychosocial support to 209 people (unknown number of survivors). Valvuthayam Mannar Rehabilitation Center provided physical rehabilitation to 106 people (six survivors).  Kilinochchi Association for Rehabilitation of Displaced provided medical care to 383 children with disabilities and educational support to 321. Sarvodaya Jaffna provided loans to 10 mine/ERW survivors. Community Trust Fund provided referral for 28 children with disabilities to other services. Jaffna Family Rehabilitation Center provided counseling to 162 and referral for 149 (42 survivors received both services) and loans to 22. Organization for the Rehabilitation of Handicapped provided disability awareness training for 291 community members that resulted in referrals to services for 80 people (three mine/ERW survivors). Capacity-building training was provided to 964 people (including 47 technicians and 518 professionals).^[114]

In 2006 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to work with the Sri Lankan Red Cross to provide basic health services in remote areas by supporting public health centers, particularly in conflict-impacted areas; 150 doctors and surgeons attended war-surgery workshops in Batticaloa, Jaffna and Kilinochchi.^[115]

In 2006 UNICEF supported 10 projects and six disability partnerships working on survivor assistance, and developed an emergency strategy including survivor assistance and disability advocacy activities for IDPs.^[116] UNICEF also supported four rehabilitation centers, run by NGOs, in the north and east.^[117]

In July 2006 HI began an emergency response in IDP camps to assess the needs of people with disabilities in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. HI worked through six “disability focal points” at local partner organizations until April 2007, but due to concern for the safety of national partners HI trained international aid workers in the camps to refer people with disabilities to services in Batticaloa, in partnership with the ICRC. HI plans to continue its support to the Batticaloa Rehabilitation Center until 2008.^[118]

Funding and Assistance

In 2006, donations totaling $9,932,574 (€7,906,212) for mine action in Sri Lanka were reported by eight countries and the European Commission (EC), a decrease of 48 percent from 2005 ($19,045,929 provided by 10 countries and the EC).^[119] Donor countries reporting funding in 2006 were:

• Australia: A$350,000 ($263,725) consisting of A$250,000 to FSD for mine action, and A$100,000 to UNDP for integrated mine action;^[120]
• EC: €675,593 ($848,747) consisting of €266,220 to UNDP for mine action, and €409,373 to UNICEF for victim assistance;^[121]
• Japan: ¥252,168,246 ($2,168,646) consisting of ¥25,363,61 to FSD for clearance in Vavuniya and Mannar, ¥70,604,325 to NPA for mine action in the Vanni region, ¥77,264,214 to HALO for clearance in Jaffna and ¥78,936,096 to DDG for clearance in Jaffna;^[122]
• New Zealand: NZ$159,628 ($103,630) to UNDP for mine action;^[123]
• Norway: NOK26,420,700 ($4,121,629) consisting of NOK8,700,000 for mine clearance in Vavuniya, Trinkomalee and Mannar, NOK150,000 to MMIPE for mine clearance, and NOK16 million, NOK1,400,000 and NOK171,700 NPA for mine action, clearance and training;^[124]
• Sweden: SEK5 million ($678,500) to MAG for unspecified mine action;^[125]
• Switzerland: CHF230,000 ($183,540) to FSD for mine action;^[126]
• UK: £57,587 ($106,156) to MAG for mine/UXO clearance;^[127]
• US: $1,458,000, consisting of $1,108,000 from the Department of State for the SLA HDU, and $350,000 from USAID/Leahy War Victims Fund.^[128]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Sri Lanka received $10,343,130 in mine action funding - 74 percent of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006. The review also reported the EC’s funding for mine action in Sri Lanka in 2006 was suspended due to the deteriorating security situation.^[129]

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects includes nine projects for Sri Lanka with budgets totaling $11,051,132, of which $3,325,633 had been funded by November 2006.^[130]

National Contribution to Mine Action

Sri Lanka has not reported its national contribution to mine action in 2006. Funding requested through the UN Portfolio process included operations carried out by the Sri Lankan Army.^[131]