Angola
signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has yet to ratify. As the
country returned to war in 1998, both government troops and UNITA forces have
been using antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL has condemned both sides for use
of AP mines, but is particularly appalled at the Angolan government’s
disregard for its international commitments. Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not
entered into force for Angola, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a
breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a state is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the
treaty.” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.
The renewed use of mines flies in the face of Angola’s rhetorical
support for an AP mine ban. The government first publicly stated its support
for a total prohibition of antipersonnel mines in 1996 at the end of the CCW
review conference when Angolan Ambassador Parreira announced in the final
plenary session that “the Government of Angola supports a total
prohibition of all types of antipersonnel mines.” Angola was active in
the Ottawa Process. It endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration and
participated in the Oslo negotiations. It voted for the pro-ban UN General
Assembly resolution in 1996, and the pro-treaty UNGA resolution in 1998.
In Ottawa during the treaty signing ceremony, Angola's then vice-Foreign
Minister Georges Chikoti said:
Coming from Angola, a victim country of landmines, and being present at this
important day for the signing ceremony, is not only a logical accomplishment for
my government but also an opportunity to underline the expectations of the
thousands of Angolan children, men and women, victims of this deadly,
destructive and coward weapon.... It is mainly in the name of all these people
that my government has taken a strong commitment to achieve a global ban on
antipersonnel landmines... Before I conclude I wish to reiterate that the
Angolan government is ready to cooperate as it has always done with the
international community and all partners of this treaty who really want it to be
implemented over all the Angolan territory including those areas under UNITA
control, in order to achieve total
peace.[1]
These words ring hollow in light of the government's continued use of
antipersonnel landmines. It is clear the government is in no hurry to ratify or
implement the Mine Ban Treaty. At a Red Cross meeting, Minister for Social
Assistance Albino Malungo was asked by Landmine Monitor about Angolan plans for
ratification. The Minister warned that article one could not be ratified, even
if the rest of the Treaty might be. Quite obviously, such
“ratification” would not be
valid.[2]
While one Angolan minister was admitting his country had no intention to give
up the use of landmines, another had just touted Angola’s having signed
the Mine Ban Treaty in calling for more international aid for mine clearance.
In July of 1998, Angola and Zambia reached agreement to demine their common
border areas. And in announcing the agreement after five days in Zambia,
Foreign Affairs Minister Keli Walubita told reporters that the landmines
continue to be a “major source of insecurity.” The Minister added
that both countries are signatories to the Treaty and “will approach
donors to help them put their demining program in
place.”[3] Angola is a
non-signatory of the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Landmine
Protocol.
Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Approximately sixty
types of antipersonnel mines from nineteen different countries have been
identified in Angola.[4] Little
is known about landmine stockpiles in
Angola.[5]
On 28 November 1996 a group of Angolan NGOs formed the Angolan Campaign to
Ban Landmines (CABM), which is supported by some twenty NGOs. A petition
campaign gathered 60,000 signatures by December 1997, including that of Henrik
Vaal Neto, the Minister of Information.
Landmine Use Since the Mine Ban Treaty
Although the Angolan government signed the Mine Ban
Treaty in December 1997 it has since been responsible for systematically laying
new mines and minefields. A researcher for the Landmine Monitor has been an
eyewitness to this gross disrespect of the Treaty in 1998 and has received
numerous reports in 1999 of renewed landmine warfare in central and northern
Angola.[6] These included: (1)
seeing new minefields being prepared in Luena in August 1998, and also
establishing that the provincial authorities had refused to allow mine clearance
operations in these areas;[7] (2)
interviewing newly-arrived refugees in Zambia who said that the Angolan National
Police had protected their police station in Cazombo by putting landmines in
their roof;[8] and (3) speaking
with Angolan soldiers who admitted to planting landmines under orders in August
1998 during operations in Piri and in
Uige.[9]
On 2 December 1998, the Jesuit Refugee Service, Mines Advisory Group, Medico
International and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation published an open
letter to the government and UNITA calling upon both sides to stop using
landmines, noting that in Moxico province landmines had maimed or killed
sixty-six persons since June 1998. The organizations wrote: “Demining is
forbidden. Even to mark minefields is forbidden! This is the primary cause for
many to step on mines in areas formerly safe—civilians as well as
military.” The letter also stated that in this period, UNITA was laying
mines along roads and the government relaid a defensive mine belt around the
town.[10]
The European Union, in a 28 December 1998 declaration, expressed its
“grave concern” about the impasse in the peace process which has
resulted in “a serious deterioration of the overall political, military,
security, social and economic situation in Angola?.Against this background, the
EU regrets the increase in mine laying activity in Angola, a country that so far
has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU
calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory of the Ottawa Convention and
particularly on UNITA to cease mine laying activity immediately and to ensure
that valid records exist so that these weapons can be
removed.[11] Additionally, South
Africa suspended its assistance to Angolan demining operations in January 1999
because of the new laying of
mines.[12]
In 1999, each side has blamed the other for laying new mines; some twenty
reports are on file with Landmine Monitor. Following are three examples: (1)
Vice-Governor Simeao Dembo said on 10 December 1998 that UNITA had laid 7,000
news mines in areas of Uige
province;[13] (2) UNITA reported
that ten of its troops had been killed and twenty-five injured in a government
minefield near Kunge (Bie) on 16 December
1998;[14] and (3) in January 1999,
a Portuguese journalist was shown evidence by government soldiers of what they
called new mining at Vila Nova (Huambo), which had just been retaken from UNITA
rebels.[15]
Angola has been almost continuously at war since 1961. Landmines were first
used in mid-1961 with the beginning of the struggle for independence from
Portugal. Landmine warfare became more widespread among nationalist guerrillas
beginning in 1968, reflecting growing external support for their struggle. The
FNLA, UNITA and in particular the MPLA favored their
use.[17] In 1970-71, the
Portuguese laid some minefields along the Zambian border in an attempt to stop
MPLA infiltration.[18]
Following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, the colonial government
precipitously announced its withdrawal from Angola. In January 1975, the three
movements that had fought for independence signed the Alvor Accord providing for
a joint interim government and an integrated national army. However, as the
date for military integration neared, the agreement broke down, and by mid-1975,
the fronts were at war. The United States, Soviet Union and Cuba, and regional
powers became involved in the
conflict.[19]
Between September 1987 and March 1988, there were major battles in the Cuito
Cuanavale area between some 3-5,000 South African troops and UNITA auxiliaries
attempting to stop a larger joint Angolan-Cuban force advance on Mavinga and
eventually UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. During these operations the South
Africans laid a number of phony and real minefields along their positions. South
African forces also laid antipersonnel mines behind Angolan government lines as
these forces advanced in May 1987 and laid antipersonnel mines. Sometimes South
African units suffered casualties from antipersonnel mines laid by the MPLA to
ambush their operations.
Cuito Cuanavale marked the beginning of new diplomatic attempts to end the
conflict. The following eighteen months saw simultaneously the most sustained
efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and some of the fiercest fighting of
the entire war. Between April 1990 and May 1991, six rounds of peace talks took
place between UNITA and the government, resulting in a peace agreement, the
Bicesse Accords, which temporarily ended a conflict that had already taken
between 100,000 and 350,000 lives. Under the accords the MPLA remained the
legitimate government during an interim period in preparation for elections.
Monitoring this interim period was a small United Nations Angola Verification
Mission (UNAVEM II).
This peace was short-lived. UNITA rejected the results of the September 1992
elections and returned the country to war. Mine warfare also intensified in
this third war, with thousands of new mines being laid by both government and
UNITA forces to obstruct roads and bridges, to encircle besieged towns with mine
belts up to three kilometers wide, and to despoil agricultural land. In
1993-94, the government surrounded the cities it held with large defensive
minefields. UNITA then laid additional mines at the edges of the government
minefields in an attempt to deny those in the besieged towns access to food,
water and firewood. In March 1993 the government also used air-scatterable
mines in Huambo to protect its retreating forces from UNITA advances.
Throughout 1993-94, battlefield victories and setbacks determined the pace of
international mediation attempts. A series of government offensives in
September 1994 pushed UNITA back from many of its territorial gains. On 20
November 1994, the two sides signed the Lusaka cease-fire protocol although it
took until February 1995 for most of the fighting to stop. As late as August
1995, the FAA chief of staff, questioning whether there was true peace, stated,
“We do not want peace only for Luanda, we want peace for all Angola.
Twenty-five kilometers from the capital there are peasants who die. The roads
are mined. There is no freedom of circulation. Ask these peasants whether this
is peace.”[20]
The Lusaka Protocol envisaged the deployment of over 7,000 UN troops (UNAVEM
III) for a period of up to fifteen months. In late 1996, it became a UN
priority to reduce UNAVEM's 7,000-strong military component, and the withdrawal,
which began in earnest in February 1997, was scheduled to be complete by July.
A successor UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), consisting of military
observers, police observers, a political component and human rights monitors was
formed in April 1997.
The ongoing, sporadic hostilities were marked by the continued use of
landmines in violation of the Lusaka Protocol. Government and UNITA forces,
Cabindan factions, and criminals were all responsible for new mine laying. In
May 1995, Care International temporally suspended its humanitarian operations in
Bie province because of newly mined
roads.[21] UN Security Council
Resolution 1008 of August 1995 “Urges the two parties to put an immediate
and definitive end to the renewed laying of
mines.”[22] The UN reported
in December 1995, “Recently, there had been several accidents caused by
mine explosions in the provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Malange and Lunda Norte on
roads that had already been in use for several months. The possibility cannot
be ruled out that fresh mines are being laid in some areas, though the demining
that took place prior to the opening of many access routes was not
systematic.”
The director of the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive
Ordnance (INAROEE), the official coordinating body for mine clearance, said in
1997 that “there were problems in 1996 with mines laid on roads we
believed were clear, especially in government zones. There have been official
investigations, but these have been inconclusive. This tendency is declining in
1997.” However, incidents continued in 1997 and into 1998.
Relaying of landmines was particularly bad in the Lunda provinces were UNITA
forces, government forces and criminal groups are defending their diamond
interests. A number of antitank mines in 1995 and 1996 killed diamond workers.
But it was not only on roads that new mines were used. At Cafunfo in Lunda
Norte on 18 September 1996 twelve children between six and thirteen years of age
were killed by a POMZ fragmentation mine when they were going to school from
their homes in Bairro Maqueneno. This incident was not reported in the Angolan
media because government forces routinely mined the center of town between 6:00
pm and 6:00 am—to provide an early warning system against UNITA or bandit
incursions —and they sometimes forgot to remove all the
mines.[23] In October 1998, the
UN once again reported that humanitarian work was being hampered by “newly
laid landmines.”[24] In
December, Angola plunged back into a fourth war and the UN’s peacekeeping
mission was not renewed in February 1999. Landmines once more feature
prominently in this renewed Angolan conflict.
Landmine Problem
Long cited as one of the most heavily mined
countries in the world, the early UN estimate of 10 to 15 million landmines
contaminating Angolan soil is widely still cited. While no comprehensive
landmine survey has been completed, estimates have been revised downward, with
the 1998 U.S. State Department report stating “The source of the original
baseline data remains unknown and the actual number of landmines may never be
determined, although 6 million appears to be a more reasonable
figure.”[25] There are six
to eight heavily mined provinces in Angola covering roughly 50 percent of the
country. Existing records on the locations of landmines are extremely scanty.
And new mine laying with the renewal of the war only complicates things further.
According to statistics from the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive
Obstacles (INAROEE), mine types most commonly found in Angola are from Italy,
China, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and
Romania.[26]
As already noted, mines have been used by all parties to the various
conflicts in Angola. They have been used offensively and defensively, in rural
areas and cities. Provincial towns and cities were particularly affected by mine
warfare when the fierce fighting resumed after the 1992 elections.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) had been contracted by the UN to conduct a
nation-wide survey of the landmine problem in the northern eleven provinces, to
map the existence of mines, consequences for local trade and the extent of
damage. After a series of delays, work began on the survey in June 1995, but
progress has been slow. Both sides have been reluctant to give real information
about landmines and access has been difficult. Nevertheless by the end of
1998, NPA had completed an initial survey to identify mined or suspected mined
areas in nine provinces, where about 80 percent of the population lives.
Substantial progress had been achieved in five other provinces.
While, in October 1998, INAROEE reported that 2.4 square kilometers of high
priority areas and 4,429 km of road had been cleared, removing 17,000 landmines,
and that 6,000 minefields identified since
1995,[27] the reports of renewed
mine use in the conflict present a “one step forward, two steps
back” situation for mine survey, marking and clearance efforts.
Additionally, renewed clashes once again force people to flee the fighting and
relocate, resulting in mine accidents and changing priorities for mine action.
Although mine clearance operations have encountered obstacles over the five
years of unsteady peace under the Lusaka Protocol, recent developments have
hindered or in some cases terminated mine action in various parts of the
country. Suspensions of operations are solely dependent on security and once
areas are again deemed safe for operations, most organizations plan to return to
the work they left unfinished.
Mine Action Funding
As described below, attempts to address the
landmine problem through the UNAVEM operation and the creation of the UN’s
Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) and the separate Angolan national body to
coordinate clearance, INAROEE, did not begin until 1994/1995. Through its 1994
Consolidated Appeal, issued by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs,
$584,000 was raised for mine action by the beginning of 1995— slightly
more than the requested
amount.[28]
A report for the United Nations notes “Funding for mine action was
cobbled together from assessed budgets through UNAVEM III, voluntary
contributions through the UNDHA-administered trust fund, the Government of
Angola and direct bilateral contributions to specific projects or NGOs. In the
absence of central coordination, comprehensive figures are not available. The
year 1995 is indicative; the interagency humanitarian appeal included $12.4 for
mine action. UNAVEM III’s budget request for mine action in 1995 included
$8.25 million from the assessed contributions of member states.” The
report also indicated that Angola had pledged $1.5 million for INAROEE at the
end of 1995, but it was unclear if the pledge was ever made available. In
mid-1995, the U.S. pledged $7.5 million for mine action as in-kind and cash
support to NGOs and the
UN.[29]
A compilation of donor support for Angola through the end of 1998 shows the
following contributions: Australia, $7,687,506; Belgium, $1,126,959; Denmark,
$3,989,312; the EU, $6,851,162; Finland, $500,000; Ireland, $252,791;
Luxembourg, $143,000; the Netherlands, $3,883,531; Norway, $1,425,000; Sweden,
$3,762,500; and the U.S., $23,344,000. These contributions total $50,943,011,
and while helpful as an overview, the compilation does not indicate the years
corresponding to various contributions or other “measurable”
parameters.[30] Countries which
have also contributed to mine action projects in Angola in 1994-1996, but did
not appear in this compilation include Canada, South Africa, Switzerland and the
UK.
Mine Clearance
During the period of relative peace prior to the
elections in September 1992, there was a remarkable contrast between the
recognition of the serious threat landmines present to Angola, and the actual
response to the challenge of eradicating the mines. A UN report notes,
“While there was a general understanding at the time of the Bicesse
Accords that mines had been used extensively, there was no specific reference to
the way in which they were likely to impact on the peace process nor how the
problem would be addressed. Bicesse clauses concerned with cease-fire
modalities stipulated that observance of the cease-fire would entail the
cessation of ‘the planting of new mines and action aimed at impeding
activities to deactivate
mines.’”[31] Before
mid-1994, there had been no systematic assessment of the extent of the landmine
problem, nor any real attempt to coordinate or plan eradication in an organized
fashion. Since the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol, there have been efforts to
seriously confront the landmine problem.
Several separate initiatives were underway prior to the resumption of
hostilities in 1992. FAPLA/FALA teams consisted of soldiers from both armies
and during the pre-election period, they were working throughout the country
with varying success. The teams were using manual clearance methods, partly
because of the lack of heavy equipment, and partly because they considered it
the most effective. The priorities were to demine the major roads and railways,
and the interiors of towns and
villages.[32] However, it was
questionable as to how systematically the major roads were cleared. This
demining effort had a limited impact, largely due to lack of organization,
resources, and support. These problems persisted despite the involvement of
British military teams in assisting FAPLA/FALA efforts and by mid-1992 most
mine-clearance had stopped.
The South African Defense Forces also provided technical assistance and
training to the FAPLA/FALA teams in the south of the country up to mid-1992.
These operations cleared some 300,000 mines. In mid-1992, most sources agreed
that the South African contribution was a well-motivated project based on a good
knowledge of the general problems and the specific devices, many of which had
been laid by the SADF itself.[33]
All the Angolan parties responded positively to the South African initiative.
South Africa has since provided training for Angolans in mine clearance in South
Africa and two courses took place in 1998. However, in January 1999, this
assistance was suspended because of the new laying of
mines.[34]
UN and Angolan Mine Action Offices
In March of 1994, the UN Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination Unit (UCAH) began plans to set up a Central Mine Action Office
(CMAO. Its mine action plan called for an integrated, prioritized approach,
with UCAH/CMAO as the focal point. There were problems in 1995 in obtaining
funding for this project because of overall UNAVEM control and CMAO found itself
in a lengthy battles for the release of funds. Although CMAO submitted its
first procurement package to UNAVEM in May 1995, it was not until November that
equipment was made available.
UNAVEM III itself was also engaged in mine-clearance. In May 1995, an
engineering company of 206 Indian troops arrived in Angola as part of 1,200 men
joining UNAVEM III. The Indian engineers engaged in mine clearing and the
repair of bridges and roads, among other tasks. An advance party of British
engineers which arrived in April also cleared priority roads and cantonment
areas for demobilizing troops. Namibia and Brazil also provided 200 troops with
mine clearing experience.
Because of the infighting, in November 1995 a senior Department of
Humanitarian Affairs New York staff member visited Angola in an effort to
resolve the delays. The visit produced a new document which redefined the roles
and responsibilities of the key
players.[35] The entire senior
staff left CMAO and a new team took over in early 1996 but there remained a lack
of continuity and a paucity of Lusophone speakers in the CMAO. By March 1997,
the top six posts were all
empty.[36] After the termination
of UNAVEM III in 1997, responsibility for UN demining activities was transferred
to the UNDP and CMAO became the UN Demining Program-Angola
(UNDPA).[37]
In 1995, the Angolan government established its own mine action office,
INAROEE, and by the end of the year the government pledged to fund the office
with US$1.5 million. Essentially CMAO and Angola’s INAROEE were to work
side-by-side in a joint operations center in Luanda. There was little initial
co-ordination with the UN although INAROEE was to be the national body to take
over CMAO mine action work once the UN mandate
expired.[38] INAROEE was made up
of an integrated UNITA and FAA team with forty staff members provided by CMAO,
and in its original plan, was to be headquartered in Luanda and have one brigade
in each of the eighteen provinces. In 1998, INAROEE was operating with seven
demining brigades; the remainder had not been formed due to a lack of funds.
Also, in late 1995, there were plans to establish a joint government-UN
funded institute, CMATS, to train and equip Angolan demining
teams.[39] Its plan to train 500
Angolan deminers by the end of 1996 failed because of “internecine control
disputes among UN entities, lost time and resources and the exclusion of certain
prospective students because of factional differences between UNITA and
FAA.”[40] By December 1996,
350 Angolan nationals had been trained and six brigades had been deployed to
four of the country’s eighteen provinces; only three of the brigades are
fully operational in Cuando Cubango, Uige, and Moxico provinces. CMATS was
handed over to INAROEE in February 1997, but it continues to receive support
from UNDP, notably technical advisors.
There is no shortage of criticism about INAROEE’s work regarding poor
safety standards, and that its brigades are not working, and there has been a
strike of deminers over lack of
pay.[41] Co-ordination with
INAROEE has not always been good, and remains a problem among various mine
clearance programs in the country. Some NGO programs had been operational prior
to INAROEE, and are not willing to change their priorities. Some problems have
resulted from the multiplicity of actors, others were because of priorities.
One provincial governor wanted a motor-cross track demined as a high
priority—before the scheduled clearance of a water point in a city which
had no other access to
water.[42]
But criticism is not restricted to the Angolan government and INAROEE. A
multi-country study for the UN noted that the UN and Angolan government
initiatives were “doomed” from the beginning. The report cites
complete lack of communication and cooperation, byzantine bureaucratic
procedures slowing down or blocking almost completely mine action, a lack of
professionalism within the UN itself and infighting over control over the
program in Angola among the many problems. Its assessment states that the
“utter failure of the UN and Government to cooperate effectively through
their respectively chosen instruments, CMAO and INAROEE, discouraged donors in
general.” The study concluded that since it is a relatively
“young” mine action program,
In theory, it was in a strong position to benefit from the experiences of
other programs. In reality, the Angolan program has proved the most
problematical of the four [countries in the study]. Some of the difficulties
can be attributed to the political environment and the many obstacles which have
slowed the peace process. Also, since Angola is a country rich with diamonds
and oil which produce a high annual revenue, donors and others wanted to see the
government make a strong commitment to tackle the problem of mines before
soliciting support from the international community?.Angola is a text-book case
of how not to initiate a mine action
program.[43]
Commercial Demining
Because of the lack of capacity to clear mines
quickly in this period, the UN contracted out for demining operations, awarding
the South African firm, Mechem, $6.5 million in June 1995 to clear mines along
more than 7,000 kilometers of priority roads and to offer quality assessment of
other road clearance operations. Thirteen priority roads in the north, center
and south of country had been drawn up for clearance. Although scheduled to
start in September 1995, a mixture of bureaucratic delays, Mechem’s
refusal to pay bribes and suspicion of Mechem by military officials resulted in
a delay in off-loading its equipment in Luanda
harbor.[44] (In June 1994 the
director of Mechem had boasted that, “There are some mines in Angola which
no one will be able to find without our
help.”[45]) Although the
government gave Mechem permission in early December to become operational, the
project only got underway on 11 January 1996. The German government has also
provided a couple of quality assessment officials for this project.
Mechem’s operations were based upon twenty-five air-sensing,
armor-plated Caspir vehicles working in tandem with dog demining teams and other
manual methods. Mechem deployed two teams, one in the north and the other in
the south of Angola. The teams of seventy-five deminers included sub-contracted
personnel of other demining companies, such as Ronco, Gurkha Security Guards and
Mine-Tech. Eleven Angolan deminers also worked with the Ronco team. Mechem
completed its clearance contract in the southern sector in August, and by
December 1996 had cleared over 4,000 kilometers of roads. UNITA never allowed
it to clear the Malange-Andulo-Kuito route.
Other commercial firms are clearing mines around the Soyo oil installations,
employed by FINA and SONANGOL. The Executive Outcomes-linked firm Saracen
worked in Soyo, replacing the French firm Cofras, and its successor CIDEV. The
South African firm Shibata Security and the British firm, Defence Systems
Limited, have also engaged in small-scale demining exercises in the Soyo area.
CIDEV has distributed a proposal for a mechanized demining operation of Huila
province but has failed to attract funding to
date.[46] The Italian firm Apalte
Bonificação e Construção (ABC) employed four
brigades of twenty deminers on a demining exercise along the Benguela railway
from early 1998.[47] With renewed
conflict it is unclear what happened to this project.
NGO Mine Action Initiatives
Kap Anamur: The Kap Anamur Committee is a
German humanitarian NGO founded in 1979. Kap Anamur set up a mine clearance
project in Angola in May 1992 and clearance began in August. Through agreement
with the Angolan government the town of Xangongo (Cunene province) was chosen as
a starting point for the operation. The German government loaned gratis former
East German military equipment, including a number of T-55 tanks with KMT-5
rollers and off-road trucks.[48]
FAPLA and FALA sent a group of well trained sappers to work jointly on the
project, but the FALA members left after the 1992 elections. In 1993 the
operation had five Germans, twenty-five local sappers from FAA and twenty
mechanics attached to the project at a running cost of $20,000 a month. Between
mid 1992 and 1994 Kap Anamur cleared minefields and mine clusters in Cunene
province and claims to have removed 50,626 AT mines and 25,338 AP mines.
In early 1995, Kap Anamur attempted to move its operations from Cunene to
Benguela province with fatal consequences. On 1 March 1995, five people,
including one German attached to the project were killed by unidentified gunmen
at Solo, 100km from Benguela. The attack appears to have been aimed at keeping
the road closed because the clearance team had received several indirect
warnings about work in the area prior to the incident. Cap Anamur was also
involved in controversy because one of its expatriate staff was arrested in 1995
for his involvement in the illegal export of munitions to Namibia. Kap Anamur
ceased operating in Angola in
1996.[49]
Mines Advisory Group: MAG's presence in Angola dates back to mid-1992
with the start of a mine awareness poster campaign in cooperation with UNHCR.
Following a specialist mission by MAG to Angola in November 1993, MAG began
operations in April 1994 setting up a base in Luena, Moxico Province. Luena was
chosen because of its critical location for returning refugees following a
cease-fire. Additionally there is a shortage of land both for the communities
and for agricultural projects of relief agencies because of
mines.[50]
By October 1994 the construction of its demining school was finished and
within two years, 134 deminers were operational and thirty more had just been
trained. Nine minefields had been prioritized for initial clearance operations.
Several UN officials criticized MAG's focus of resources on this one area as
being extravagant and that MAG should be working on clearing priority routes in
the short term. Mine-clearance operations in Moxico province were suspended in
mid-January 1995 until late March because of a dispute with the Governor
although none of the minefields prioritized for clearance served a military
role. This problem was eventually resolved with the intervention of the
Minister of Social Assistance, Albino Malungo. In October 1996, MAG also
expanded its clearance operations to Lumeje, UNITA’s “capital”
in Moxico province.
By 1998, MAG had expanded operations beyond Lumege to Luau, which has a
severe mine problem and will be a focal point for repatriation from
Zaire.[51] MAG employs over 200
deminers and seven MATs, which are mine awareness staff and minefield survey
personnel who work together in gathering information and marking mined sites in
order to assess what are the local priorities for
clearance.[52] However, MAG has
been the most affected by the deteriorating situation in Angola, closing
operations there in mid-1998 due to the worsening tension in the area. MAG
operations in Luau were hit by mortar fire during a clash between government and
UNITA troops.[53] The staff had
to evacuate and the project's equipment in Luau was lost. Other areas in MAG's
area of operation were subsequently the scene of battles and new mine laying,
which led to its decision to leave
Moxico.[54]
MAG maintained an administrative presence in Luanda while it assessed the
situation in Angola. It decided not to return to Moxico province, but did
recommenced activities in Angola at the end of 1998 in Cunene province in the
south of the country.[55] MAG is
working south and west of Ondjiva and continues exclusively with its MAT format
from Luena, which consists of small mixed teams of survey, clearance, mine
awareness and community liaison
personnel.[56] Two MATs are being
formed, with two more to be trained by the end of the year. In Luena, Medico
International restarted the mine awareness component of MAG's Luena program with
some assistance from other mine action NGOs in November 1998, and its work is
directed at the some 36,000 internally displaced people who have settled in
Luena due to the increased clashes in surrounding
areas.[57] Since March 1999, the
mine awareness program has been run exclusively by Medico.
Halo Trust: The British NGO Halo Trust began operating in Kuito in
late 1994. In January 1995, the government through the Ministry of Defense and
the Ministry of Cooperation issued a permit to the Halo Trust for demining
operations in Kuito, Benguela and Huambo provinces. Britain's ODA has provided
funds for mine clearance in Benguela. Halo Trust's initial work was in the city
of Kuito itself with a team of twenty-six Angolans and twelve expatriates.
Between November 1994 and February 1995, Halo destroyed 1,200 mines in
central Kuito, but in May 1995 Halo Trust faced a crisis over its operations,
following a dispute with the Governor of Kuito, who indicated that he wanted the
team removed from Bie province. The Halo Trust Manager in Luanda said that the
government's confidence in them has improved, but that UNITA is still
distrustful, and refuses to share information about where UNITA mines are
located. Halo claimed to have cleared 3,000 mines in
1995.[58] Operating from a base
in Huambo, with another field office in Kuito, Halo has also conducted limited
local surveys in Benguela and Huambo and began clearing mines in Huambo in
January 1996. In early 1998, Halo received its first mechanical equipment, an
armored front loader.
Although Halo operated a team of de-miners who were former UNITA combatants,
the organization had been plagued with access problems. While they were able to
demine certain UNITA areas easily, they have been stopped from clearing other
areas and have had cleared areas re-mined
repeatedly.[59] Despite the
changing security situation, Halo continues to maintain its bases in Kuito and
Huambo.[60] Halo considers the
security situation in the area to be not much different from when it originally
began its program there in 1994 and 1995 shortly after the Lusaka peace
agreement. The increased security threat from military activities in the two
provinces has turned Halo's focus to clearance of areas closer to the two
centers where there is still considerable debris to be
cleared.[61] The concentration on
areas close to the two towns also coincides with priorities to assist internally
displaced people who have relocated nearer to both Kuito and Huambo. In
addition to mine clearance, Halo continues to perform survey and UXO clearance
tasks and monitors the location of antitank mines on routes around its areas of
operation to inform aid agencies to avoid accidents when delivery of
humanitarian aid is again a priority.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): The demining operation of NPA is the
largest in Angola. Like Halo Trust, NPA in January 1995 obtained a government
permit to clear mines in Malanje province. In early 1995, NPA found starting up
difficult, indeed witnessing in some instances government forces continuing to
plant mines and blocking NPA's attempt to become fully operational. In February
1995, NPA began to deploy its first team of deminer graduates in platoons in two
locations along the Malanje-Luanda corridor as part of an agreement with the
World Food Program and SwedRelief. In 1996, NPA gradually starting clearing
land around Malanje.[62] And, on
3 October 1996, NPA announced the start of its clearance operations in Cuanza
Norte province.[63]
In 1997, NPA received its first two mechanical de-mining machines, Scottish
Aradvarks. In 1998, NPA acquired two Danish Hydrema flails. It also introduced
dogs in 1996, although initially these suffered from sickness. According to NPA
figures in 1998 it employed 650 people in Angola, including 350 manual de-miners
and over thirty dogs and handlers. NPA had operations in Luanda, Lobito,
Malanje and Ndalatando.[64] The
organization continues to conduct survey, marking and clearance using dogs,
machines and manual methods in Angola as well as providing technical assistance
to the national demining organ INAROEE. On 24 February 1998, NPA announced that
1,800 areas had been identified as suspected of being mined in Zaire, Uige,
Luanda, Malanje, Namibe and Cunene
provinces.[65]
NPA has called for mine action to continue now in the face of deteriorating
security in certain areas of the country when it is most needed to assist
dislocated civilians.[66]
However, its operations in Malange province were stopped in January after
military clashes escalated. Mine verification and road clearance in Cuando
Cubango province were also curtailed in December when military actions increased
in the province. Operations in other areas were also affected to some extent,
but NPA was able to re-deploy teams to areas where security was not a problem
and priorities for operations identified. Another factor that hampered
operations was the limitations on air transport and cargo, since almost all NGOs
working in the interior of Angola depend on air transport and after the shooting
down of two UN airplanes the frequency of flights has
declined.[67]
Save the Children Fund (USA): Save the Children Fund (USA) won a mine
clearance contract from USAID in 1995. SCF initially funded expanded NPA teams
to clear mines in Cuanza Sul and Bengo and Moxico provinces to make agricultural
land accessible to the internally displaced, refugees, demobilized soldiers and
residents. SCF-USA has established a demining school near Sumbe and commenced
in January 1996 to train 170 deminers through NPA. A total of 250 deminers were
trained and SCF took over management of the operations from NPA. However, in
late 1996, SCF’s clearance operation ran into problems following a serious
accident and its mine clearance operations were suspended pending a review.
When one of its teams was clearing a pylon in Cunene province, a group of
deminers was at the site of a recently uncovered mine, when it exploded injuring
several of them. The medical evacuation was described by UN official as a
“comedy of errors” with the vehicle carrying the injured crashing
and no senior supervisory staff on location at the time of
accident.[68]
Care International (USA): Care International (USA) is funding
Greenfield Consultants, a new commercial firm based in the UK and run by the
former Halo Trust manager in Mozambique. Greenfield signed a twelve month
contract with Care which calls for two clearance teams operating in Cuando
Cubango province, plus mine awareness programs in Bie, Cunene, Huila and Cuando
Cubango provinces. The clearance teams were deployed in December
1995,[69] and cleared mines in
Huambo in late 1996. CARE/Greenfields Inc. was also working in Bie province but
terminated mine-related work and evacuated its staff from the province in
mid-March due to the increased conflict between the government and
UNITA.[70] Up until its departure,
the CARE program was performing demining and UXO
clearance.[71] The staff is in
Luanda and hopes to return to work in Kuito as early as May 1999 depending on
improvements in the security
situation.[72]
Menschen gegn Minen (MgM): MGM is a German based NGO which is run by
former members of Kap Anamur who left that organization because of increasing
controversy over its safety and ethical record. MgM, funded mainly by the
German government, was awarded a contract from the World Food Program in August
1996 to clear roads for the internally displaced in Caxito, Bengo province. The
first clearance operations commenced in November around Dange bridge and quickly
progressed.[73] MgM, continued to
clear mines on roads and bridges in Bengo province in December and January
1999.[74] The clearance
facilitated the resettlement of 7,000 internally displaced people from the
“Boa Esperança” camp near Caxito, and the camp has now been
officially closed. Currently MgM is training mechanics, operators and dog
handlers for its integrated clearance method at the INAROEE training center in
Viana outside Luanda. In May, MgM plans to begin demining in Caxito in an area
where Save the Children formerly had attempted mine clearance.
Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara is also a German based mine clearance
organization, run by Gerhart Bornman. Like MGM, Santa Barbara became
operational in Angola in late 1996, is funded by the German government, and has
been awarded a contract by the WFP to clear routes that will be used by
internally displaced persons resettling in Benguela province. It reports that
the increased tension has not affected its mine clearance operations to
date.[75]
HMD: HMD, a British organization, was to begin operations in Saurimo
in Lunda Sul Province in 1998, but to date, they are not known to have begun
operations.
Mine Awareness
Coordinated by the CMAO, a national mine awareness
program was started in 1994 by UNICEF and Angolan NGOs, using media and messages
printed on bags and clothing. At the same time, UNHCR began plans with other
humanitarian organizations to start a repatriation program. The campaign was
led by NPA in co-ordination with Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Norwegian Refugee
Council.[76] It was originally
planned to train 390 local mine awareness instructors in eleven cities in nine
provinces between 1 May 1995 and 1 May 1996, but this was extended to September
1996 and a further 240 local mine awareness instructors were trained. According
to the CMAO by September 1996 an estimated 920,000 people have received mine
awareness training and eighty-two supervisors and more than 620 instructors had
been trained in thirteen provinces. MAG discontinued mine awareness programs in
refugee camps in Zambia and in the Congo as their was no repatriation, due to
increased hostilities.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Angolan Red Cross also
supported mine awareness training for their national staff and districts in 1997
and 1998.. UNHCR and UNICEF supported mine awareness campaigns by MAG, Handicap
International and NPA. The Catholic Relief Services and World Vision
International also engaged in mine awareness
work.[77]
Like with the mine clearance itself, there have been problems of
co-ordination in mine awareness operations. MAG criticized NPA efforts in Luena
and NPA has complained about CARE International efforts in Menongue which they
allege duplicate existing services; they also say that CARE pays three times NPA
wages, destroying local salary structures and undermining confidence and
momentum in the NPA
program.[78]
Landmine Casualties
Angola has one of the highest rates of landmine
injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it
has many thousands of amputees, the great majority of them injured by landmines.
The government claims that there are 100,000 amputees in the country although
the more widely used figure is 70,000. However in general an estimated one in
every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury, and the proportion of child
casualties ranged from 41 percent to 76 percent in the heavily mined provinces
of Moxico, Huila, Bie and Huambo.
The government has produced figures only for mine fatalities among FAPLA
soldiers in the “Second War:” between 1975 and 1991, 6,728 were
killed by mine explosions.[79] In
reality, however, there are no reliable estimates for the total number of people
killed by landmines. Because of the scarcity of medical care for the civilian
population, the true figure probably is very high. Lack of a national-level
victim database hampers casualty estimation, but the ICRC and UNICEF believe
that there are at least 120 new landmine victims per month in
Angola.[80]
It appears that the provinces of Bie and Huambo have suffered a
disproportionate share of landmine injuries. However, the landmine problem is
also very severe in the south and east, particularly in Moxico Province. The
great majority of victims are young men, a fact which has contributed to the
militancy of many amputees in demanding their rights.
Among the civilians, men and women of all ages are affected. Children are an
important minority of those affected by landmines. A needs assessment by UNICEF
in December 1997 concluded that over a two year period in Bie there was a 70
percent decline of mine-related accidents and a 82 percent decrease in Huambo.
This was due to mine awareness campaigns, on-going demining operations and
knowledge acquired by
IDPs.[81]
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Care and rehabilitation for FAPLA, and later FAA,
soldiers is the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Medica-Militar
(SAMM) of FAA. It functions well, in part because the government and military
attract good people by offering benefits and access to goods. In its Jamba
headquarters, UNITA's Special Department for War Wounded was set up in 1989. Up
to 1992 it had at least three units caring for was amputees. One of these
produced twenty artificial legs per month. The center collapsed in late 1994
due to a lack of resources.[82]
For soldiers, assistance was usually more rapid, with immediate evacuation often
by helicopter or vehicle. The first-aid provided was usually extremely
rudimentary, consisting of no more than bandaging the wound and providing
comfort and perhaps some painkilling drugs.
For most civilians injured by landmines, transport to the nearest first-aid
post usually involved being carried manually or by cart; onward transport to a
hospital was usually by car or sometimes by airplane. Civilians had to wait on
average for about thirty-six hours before arriving at a hospital. One man
interviewed for this report believed that it had been six days before he
received hospital treatment. Adequate treatment is scarce. Drugs are often in
short supply, and the staff are less qualified and motivated than in government-
run hospitals. The variable quality of medical care means that hospitals can be
dangerous for amputees. Wounds may become affected and secondary or even
tertiary amputations often are needed. There has also been a high incidence of
osteomyelitides, a bone-wasting disease, which may set in after a poorly-done
amputation.
Civilian victim assistance in Angola consists mostly of physical
rehabilitation provided by several international NGOs, but the provision of
rehabilitation services outside Luanda has also been significantly affected by
the recent increase in conflict in Angola. The existing facilities for landmine
victims are grossly inadequate. A prosthesis can only be expected to last two
to three years, and children require new ones at least every year, as they
outgrow the one they have. This means that a total of over 5,000 new prostheses
is required every year, merely to cope with the existing number of amputees.
This is more than twice the number currently being manufactured.
The ICRC ran a center at Bombo Alto, near Huambofrom 1980 to 1992. It
included eleven technicians working solely on the manufacture of artificial
limbs and seventy-eight workers in all. In 1996, with a fragile peace restored,
the ICRC reopened a renovated Bombo Alto orthopedic center in Huambo and also
opened a new center in Kuito. An agreement was also signed with the Ministry of
Health regarding the provision of orthopedic services. The center in Kuito was
closed for two weeks in December due to clashes between the government and
UNITA, and Huambo was also closed for a lesser period of time in December around
Christmas. Patients who would usually come from some distance and stay in the
centers' dormitories were reluctant to leave their homes and ICRC was likewise
reluctant to have patients from outside the urban centers housed in its
dormitories during periods of shelling. Since the re-opening of the centers,
ICRC reports that operations and patient numbers have almost completely returned
to levels prior to the latest round of fighting. ICRC has recently expanded
operations in Luanda to take full responsibility of the prosthetics workshop and
components production at the Neves
Bendinha.[83]
The Swedish Red Cross had run an orthopedic center at Neves Bendinha. The
orthopedic components unit was completely refurbished in 1995. The ICRC and the
Swedish Red Cross had also signed a cooperation agreement for the center. The
Dutch Red Cross also has a center at Viana, Luanda Province.
Handicap International (HI) visited Angola in February 1995 to assess
possible participation in mine action programs. HI already has a rehabilitation
program for disabled persons in Benguela including an orthopaedic workshop,
physical rehabilitation and an information campaign on the prevention of
disabilities. By late 1998, it was operating four clinics outside Luanda in
Benguela, Lobito, Negage and Bailundo, but closed the center in Bailundo, the
headquarters of UNITA, in September 1998, due to increased military clashes in
the area. The center in Negage in Uige province was scheduled to be turned over
to the Ministry of Health later this year, but the increased breakdown in
security, hastened the turn over and HI left Negage in November 1998. The
center continues to function to some extent. The two centers in Benguela and
Lobito have not directly been affected, but have experienced a deficit in
patients of some ten to twenty a month due to the inability of patients to
safely reach the workshops.[84]
HI plans to start general social reintegration projects related to both
workshops, but limit its activities to the urban centers until the security
situation improves in surrounding areas. HI continues to work at the Viana
Center outside Luanda producing feet for all the physical rehabilitation
programs in Angola.
Medico International and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, under the
name Veterans International, continue to provide physical and social
rehabilitation to mine victims in Luena in Moxico Province. Tensions in the
region coincided with the end of year holidays and leave time for expatriate
staff, which caused the center and social programs to stop from the second week
in December until the beginning of February. Since restarting, the program has
been limited to working with mine victims within a five to eight kilometer
radius of the city of Luena. All registered below the knee amputees have been
fitted in Luena and the workshop is now concentrating on above the knee amputees
and any recent mine victims. The social teams that had been working with a
variety of groups in surrounding areas are now concentrating on specific areas
of the city and the recent displaced population that has settled in Luena.
[85]
Angola remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities are
available for the physically disabled. Most amputees are reluctant to leave the
relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their future will consist of being
cared for by their families, or attempting to earn a living in one of the few
occupations open to them, such as the street trading or—for those with
education—secretarial work. The majority who come from farming
backgrounds are likely to remain a burden on their families for the foreseeable
future. Many have been reduced to begging; amputee beggars are already a common
sight in Angolan towns. Angola will have to live with the human cost of the
landmine wars for many years to come.
[1]Statement Made by H.E.
Vice-Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.
[2]Interview with Albino
Malungo, London, July 1998.
[3]Zambia, Angola Seal
Landmines Pact,” Xinhua, Lusaka, 17 June 1998.
[4]Belgium: M409; China: Type
72a; Type 72b; Egypt: T78; Italy: VS-69; VS MK-2; South Africa: USK; USA: M16A1;
M16A2; M14; M18A1 (also widely copied); Soviet: PMN; PMN-2; PMD-6; POMZ-2;
POMZ-2M; MON-50; MON-100; Czechoslovakia: PP-MI-SR; West Germany: DM-11; DM-31;
Romania: MAI 75; MAIGR 1; East Germany: PPM-2; Hungry: Gyata 64; Italy: VS-50;
Spain: PS-1; South Africa: R2M1; R2M2; Shrapnel No.2 R1M1; Shrapnel No.2; MIM
MS-803 (Mini-Claymore); SA Non-Metallic AP; Sweden: FFV 013; AP-12; Yugoslavia:
PMA 1; PMA 1A; PMA 2; China: T69; Soviet: OZM-3; OZM-4; MON-200; OZM-72;
OZM-160; PMD-7.
[5]U.S. Army Foreign Science
and Technology Center(S&T) Intelligence Report, “Landmine Warfare -
Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa (U),” May 1993, reports
that South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) maintained training bases in
Angola for many years where weapons for its military operations in South Africa
were stockpiled. According to their inventories, the ANC held 19, 442 AT mines,
13,908 AP mines and 5,443 limpet mines in Angola and it is not known what
happened to these stocks.
[6]Landmine Monitor field work
in Angola in August 1998.
[8]Landmine Monitor field work
in Zambia in July 1998.
[9]Landmine Monitor field work
in Angola in August 1998.
[10]JRS, MAG, MI, VVAF,
“Landmines in Moxico Kill and Maim 66 Persons since June: Open Letter to
the Angolan Government and UNITA,” Luena, November 1998.
[11]European Union,
“Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on
Angola,” Vienna, 28 December 1998. The Declaration noted that “The
Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the
associated country Cyprus and the EFTA countries, members of the European
Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.”
[12]Radio Nacional Angola,
Luanda, 1900 GMT, 11 January 1999.
[14]UNITA Standing Committee of
Political Commission, Bailundo, 17 December 1998, www.kwacha.com.
[15]Jornal de Noticias,
(Lisbon), 21 January 1999.
[16]The
following section is taken from, Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines
in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) pp.16-28.
[17]FNLA is the Frente Nacional
de Liberacão de Angola, UNITA is the União Nacional para a
Independencia Total de Angola, and MPLA is the Movemeto Popular de
Liberacão de Angola.
[18]The Portuguese themselves
suffered their worst landmines casualties in 1970, when landmines accounted for
half the casualties suffered by Portugal's forces in Angola: 355 dead, 2,655
missing and 1,242 injured. See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile
Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, (1962-1976) vol.2 (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1978), p.214.
[19]The U.S. waged a covert war
against Angola for many years refused to recognize the MPLA government until
1993. U.S. covert aid totaled about $250 million between 1986 and 1991, making
it the second largest U.S. covert program, exceeded only by aid to the mujahidin
in Afghanistan.
[24]Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, S/1998/93, 8
October 1998, www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998931.html.
[25]U.S. Department of State,
Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, 1998) p.19. The report also notes that HALO Trust
estimated the problem to be 500,000 in 1997.
[32]In the 1980s in Cunene
according to ex FAPLA deminer Albano Costa, “ We used to drive cows out in
front of us. If one was blown up - food for us. Excellent de-Mining equipment.
Heavy enough to blow up an antitank mine, too,” cited by Reuters,
28 June 1994.
[33]Independent,
(London), 6 June 1994. The newspaper reported that a South African mine
specialist had told it that the SADF put 27,000 mines, 9,000 with anti-lift
devices in one minefield alone outside the south-eastern Angolan town of
Mavinga.
[34]Radio Nacional Angola,
Luanda, 1900 GMT, 11 January 1999.
[35]CMAO documents:
“Review of Mine action Plan for Angola,” cable 3764 dated, 6
December, 1995; “Implementation Plan for Establishing a National Mine
Clearance Capacity in Angola,” Cable 3764, 6 December 1995.
[36]UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, Angola: The Development of Indigenous Capacities,
(New York: DHA, February 1998) p.22.
[38]INAROEE was formed by
government decree of law No.14/95 on 26 May 1995.
[39]In January 1995, Chipapa
meeting between the UNITA and government military both sides agreed for the
first time to form Joint Mine Clearing Teams and provide the UN with all
necessary assistance in terms of mine information, reconnaissance, survey and
clearance. Both sides also appointed Mine Liaison officers to the Joint
Commission. By April, UNAVEM had received limited information from FAA and
UNITA concerning minefields, as well as confirmation that the parties will make
available the necessary mine-clearance personnel. Both sides believed, however,
that the UN should equip and train the personnel. The government had allocated
US$3 million for the procurement of mine-clearing equipment. The UN reported in
December 1995 that, “the government/UNITA mine sweeping operation is still
limited, owing mainly to mistrust between the two parties.”
[40]U.S. Department of State,
Hidden Killers, 1998, p.22.
[41]Laurie Boulden and Martin
Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa,
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs),
pp.138-139.
[42]Eddie Banks, “Current
Mines Situation in Angola,” CMAO, Luanda, September 1996.
[51]The 180,000 Angolan
refugees in Zaire are fearful of returning home because of landmines. See,
Berthuel Kasamwa-Tuseko, “Les Réfugiés angolais ne veulent
pas rentrer sur des champs de mines,” Propeace (Kigali), no.1,
January 1996, pp.47-48.
[52] Initial funding for these
MAG clearance operations was contributed by CAFOD, OXFAM and Christian Aid. The
British ODA funded a mine survey and marking project in the second half of 1994.
In 1996, MAG funding came from USAID, DanChurchAID and the UN DHA Mine Clearance
Trust Fund.
[53]Dave Turner, Former Senior
Technical Specialist, MAG Angola, email communication, 23 March 1999.
[69]Human Rights Watch
telephone interview with David Hewitson of Greenfield Consultants, London, 30
January 1996.
[70]CARE 1999 News Stories:
March, “CARE Evacuates Staff in Wake of Fighting in Bie Province,
Angola,” www.care.org.
[71]Telephone interview with
Bob MacPherson, Assistant Director of Emergency Programs for Security and
Landmines, CARE, 23 March 1999.
[72]Telephone interview with
Cynthia Glocker, Press Officer, CARE, 23 March 1999.
[73]Interview with Hendrik
Ehlers, Luanda, 1 September 1998.
[74]Hendrik Ehlers, MGM, email
communication with Ulrich Tietze, Medico International, 18 March 1999.
[75]Telephone interview with
Norbert Rossa, Executive Director. Santa Barbara, telephone interview, 23 March
1999.
[76]The original plan had been
for the training of 300 local mine awareness instructors in cooperation with
World Vision and CARE International but CARE International pulled out of this
project in April 1995.
[77]U.S. Department of State,
Hidden Killers, 1998, p. 23.
[79] David Sogge,
Sustainable Peace: Angola's Recovery, (Harare: Southern African Research
and Documentation Centre, 1992), p. 89.
[80]ICRC, Antipersonnel
Mines: An Overview, 1 August 1997, p. 1.
[81]Tehnaz Dastoor and Jane
Mocellin, Mine Related Problems in Angola: A Needs Assessment, UNICEF
Office of Emergency Programs Working Paper Series, December 1997, p. 5.