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Country Reports
ANGOLA, Landmine Monitor Report 1999


Mine Ban Policy

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has yet to ratify. As the country returned to war in 1998, both government troops and UNITA forces have been using antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL has condemned both sides for use of AP mines, but is particularly appalled at the Angolan government’s disregard for its international commitments. Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Angola, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty.” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.

The renewed use of mines flies in the face of Angola’s rhetorical support for an AP mine ban. The government first publicly stated its support for a total prohibition of antipersonnel mines in 1996 at the end of the CCW review conference when Angolan Ambassador Parreira announced in the final plenary session that “the Government of Angola supports a total prohibition of all types of antipersonnel mines.” Angola was active in the Ottawa Process. It endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration and participated in the Oslo negotiations. It voted for the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution in 1996, and the pro-treaty UNGA resolution in 1998.

In Ottawa during the treaty signing ceremony, Angola's then vice-Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti said:

Coming from Angola, a victim country of landmines, and being present at this important day for the signing ceremony, is not only a logical accomplishment for my government but also an opportunity to underline the expectations of the thousands of Angolan children, men and women, victims of this deadly, destructive and coward weapon.... It is mainly in the name of all these people that my government has taken a strong commitment to achieve a global ban on antipersonnel landmines... Before I conclude I wish to reiterate that the Angolan government is ready to cooperate as it has always done with the international community and all partners of this treaty who really want it to be implemented over all the Angolan territory including those areas under UNITA control, in order to achieve total peace.[1]

These words ring hollow in light of the government's continued use of antipersonnel landmines. It is clear the government is in no hurry to ratify or implement the Mine Ban Treaty. At a Red Cross meeting, Minister for Social Assistance Albino Malungo was asked by Landmine Monitor about Angolan plans for ratification. The Minister warned that article one could not be ratified, even if the rest of the Treaty might be. Quite obviously, such “ratification” would not be valid.[2]

While one Angolan minister was admitting his country had no intention to give up the use of landmines, another had just touted Angola’s having signed the Mine Ban Treaty in calling for more international aid for mine clearance. In July of 1998, Angola and Zambia reached agreement to demine their common border areas. And in announcing the agreement after five days in Zambia, Foreign Affairs Minister Keli Walubita told reporters that the landmines continue to be a “major source of insecurity.” The Minister added that both countries are signatories to the Treaty and “will approach donors to help them put their demining program in place.”[3] Angola is a non-signatory of the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Landmine Protocol.

Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Approximately sixty types of antipersonnel mines from nineteen different countries have been identified in Angola.[4] Little is known about landmine stockpiles in Angola.[5]

On 28 November 1996 a group of Angolan NGOs formed the Angolan Campaign to Ban Landmines (CABM), which is supported by some twenty NGOs. A petition campaign gathered 60,000 signatures by December 1997, including that of Henrik Vaal Neto, the Minister of Information.

Landmine Use Since the Mine Ban Treaty

Although the Angolan government signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997 it has since been responsible for systematically laying new mines and minefields. A researcher for the Landmine Monitor has been an eyewitness to this gross disrespect of the Treaty in 1998 and has received numerous reports in 1999 of renewed landmine warfare in central and northern Angola.[6] These included: (1) seeing new minefields being prepared in Luena in August 1998, and also establishing that the provincial authorities had refused to allow mine clearance operations in these areas;[7] (2) interviewing newly-arrived refugees in Zambia who said that the Angolan National Police had protected their police station in Cazombo by putting landmines in their roof;[8] and (3) speaking with Angolan soldiers who admitted to planting landmines under orders in August 1998 during operations in Piri and in Uige.[9]

On 2 December 1998, the Jesuit Refugee Service, Mines Advisory Group, Medico International and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation published an open letter to the government and UNITA calling upon both sides to stop using landmines, noting that in Moxico province landmines had maimed or killed sixty-six persons since June 1998. The organizations wrote: “Demining is forbidden. Even to mark minefields is forbidden! This is the primary cause for many to step on mines in areas formerly safe—civilians as well as military.” The letter also stated that in this period, UNITA was laying mines along roads and the government relaid a defensive mine belt around the town.[10]

The European Union, in a 28 December 1998 declaration, expressed its “grave concern” about the impasse in the peace process which has resulted in “a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola?.Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory of the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed.[11] Additionally, South Africa suspended its assistance to Angolan demining operations in January 1999 because of the new laying of mines.[12]

In 1999, each side has blamed the other for laying new mines; some twenty reports are on file with Landmine Monitor. Following are three examples: (1) Vice-Governor Simeao Dembo said on 10 December 1998 that UNITA had laid 7,000 news mines in areas of Uige province;[13] (2) UNITA reported that ten of its troops had been killed and twenty-five injured in a government minefield near Kunge (Bie) on 16 December 1998;[14] and (3) in January 1999, a Portuguese journalist was shown evidence by government soldiers of what they called new mining at Vila Nova (Huambo), which had just been retaken from UNITA rebels.[15]

Past Use[16]

Angola has been almost continuously at war since 1961. Landmines were first used in mid-1961 with the beginning of the struggle for independence from Portugal. Landmine warfare became more widespread among nationalist guerrillas beginning in 1968, reflecting growing external support for their struggle. The FNLA, UNITA and in particular the MPLA favored their use.[17] In 1970-71, the Portuguese laid some minefields along the Zambian border in an attempt to stop MPLA infiltration.[18]

Following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, the colonial government precipitously announced its withdrawal from Angola. In January 1975, the three movements that had fought for independence signed the Alvor Accord providing for a joint interim government and an integrated national army. However, as the date for military integration neared, the agreement broke down, and by mid-1975, the fronts were at war. The United States, Soviet Union and Cuba, and regional powers became involved in the conflict.[19]

Between September 1987 and March 1988, there were major battles in the Cuito Cuanavale area between some 3-5,000 South African troops and UNITA auxiliaries attempting to stop a larger joint Angolan-Cuban force advance on Mavinga and eventually UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. During these operations the South Africans laid a number of phony and real minefields along their positions. South African forces also laid antipersonnel mines behind Angolan government lines as these forces advanced in May 1987 and laid antipersonnel mines. Sometimes South African units suffered casualties from antipersonnel mines laid by the MPLA to ambush their operations.

Cuito Cuanavale marked the beginning of new diplomatic attempts to end the conflict. The following eighteen months saw simultaneously the most sustained efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war. Between April 1990 and May 1991, six rounds of peace talks took place between UNITA and the government, resulting in a peace agreement, the Bicesse Accords, which temporarily ended a conflict that had already taken between 100,000 and 350,000 lives. Under the accords the MPLA remained the legitimate government during an interim period in preparation for elections. Monitoring this interim period was a small United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II).

This peace was short-lived. UNITA rejected the results of the September 1992 elections and returned the country to war. Mine warfare also intensified in this third war, with thousands of new mines being laid by both government and UNITA forces to obstruct roads and bridges, to encircle besieged towns with mine belts up to three kilometers wide, and to despoil agricultural land. In 1993-94, the government surrounded the cities it held with large defensive minefields. UNITA then laid additional mines at the edges of the government minefields in an attempt to deny those in the besieged towns access to food, water and firewood. In March 1993 the government also used air-scatterable mines in Huambo to protect its retreating forces from UNITA advances.

Throughout 1993-94, battlefield victories and setbacks determined the pace of international mediation attempts. A series of government offensives in September 1994 pushed UNITA back from many of its territorial gains. On 20 November 1994, the two sides signed the Lusaka cease-fire protocol although it took until February 1995 for most of the fighting to stop. As late as August 1995, the FAA chief of staff, questioning whether there was true peace, stated, “We do not want peace only for Luanda, we want peace for all Angola. Twenty-five kilometers from the capital there are peasants who die. The roads are mined. There is no freedom of circulation. Ask these peasants whether this is peace.”[20]

The Lusaka Protocol envisaged the deployment of over 7,000 UN troops (UNAVEM III) for a period of up to fifteen months. In late 1996, it became a UN priority to reduce UNAVEM's 7,000-strong military component, and the withdrawal, which began in earnest in February 1997, was scheduled to be complete by July. A successor UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), consisting of military observers, police observers, a political component and human rights monitors was formed in April 1997.

The ongoing, sporadic hostilities were marked by the continued use of landmines in violation of the Lusaka Protocol. Government and UNITA forces, Cabindan factions, and criminals were all responsible for new mine laying. In May 1995, Care International temporally suspended its humanitarian operations in Bie province because of newly mined roads.[21] UN Security Council Resolution 1008 of August 1995 “Urges the two parties to put an immediate and definitive end to the renewed laying of mines.”[22] The UN reported in December 1995, “Recently, there had been several accidents caused by mine explosions in the provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Malange and Lunda Norte on roads that had already been in use for several months. The possibility cannot be ruled out that fresh mines are being laid in some areas, though the demining that took place prior to the opening of many access routes was not systematic.”

The director of the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Ordnance (INAROEE), the official coordinating body for mine clearance, said in 1997 that “there were problems in 1996 with mines laid on roads we believed were clear, especially in government zones. There have been official investigations, but these have been inconclusive. This tendency is declining in 1997.” However, incidents continued in 1997 and into 1998.

Relaying of landmines was particularly bad in the Lunda provinces were UNITA forces, government forces and criminal groups are defending their diamond interests. A number of antitank mines in 1995 and 1996 killed diamond workers. But it was not only on roads that new mines were used. At Cafunfo in Lunda Norte on 18 September 1996 twelve children between six and thirteen years of age were killed by a POMZ fragmentation mine when they were going to school from their homes in Bairro Maqueneno. This incident was not reported in the Angolan media because government forces routinely mined the center of town between 6:00 pm and 6:00 am—to provide an early warning system against UNITA or bandit incursions —and they sometimes forgot to remove all the mines.[23] In October 1998, the UN once again reported that humanitarian work was being hampered by “newly laid landmines.”[24] In December, Angola plunged back into a fourth war and the UN’s peacekeeping mission was not renewed in February 1999. Landmines once more feature prominently in this renewed Angolan conflict.

Landmine Problem

Long cited as one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, the early UN estimate of 10 to 15 million landmines contaminating Angolan soil is widely still cited. While no comprehensive landmine survey has been completed, estimates have been revised downward, with the 1998 U.S. State Department report stating “The source of the original baseline data remains unknown and the actual number of landmines may never be determined, although 6 million appears to be a more reasonable figure.”[25] There are six to eight heavily mined provinces in Angola covering roughly 50 percent of the country. Existing records on the locations of landmines are extremely scanty. And new mine laying with the renewal of the war only complicates things further. According to statistics from the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles (INAROEE), mine types most commonly found in Angola are from Italy, China, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and Romania.[26]

As already noted, mines have been used by all parties to the various conflicts in Angola. They have been used offensively and defensively, in rural areas and cities. Provincial towns and cities were particularly affected by mine warfare when the fierce fighting resumed after the 1992 elections.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) had been contracted by the UN to conduct a nation-wide survey of the landmine problem in the northern eleven provinces, to map the existence of mines, consequences for local trade and the extent of damage. After a series of delays, work began on the survey in June 1995, but progress has been slow. Both sides have been reluctant to give real information about landmines and access has been difficult. Nevertheless by the end of 1998, NPA had completed an initial survey to identify mined or suspected mined areas in nine provinces, where about 80 percent of the population lives. Substantial progress had been achieved in five other provinces.

While, in October 1998, INAROEE reported that 2.4 square kilometers of high priority areas and 4,429 km of road had been cleared, removing 17,000 landmines, and that 6,000 minefields identified since 1995,[27] the reports of renewed mine use in the conflict present a “one step forward, two steps back” situation for mine survey, marking and clearance efforts. Additionally, renewed clashes once again force people to flee the fighting and relocate, resulting in mine accidents and changing priorities for mine action. Although mine clearance operations have encountered obstacles over the five years of unsteady peace under the Lusaka Protocol, recent developments have hindered or in some cases terminated mine action in various parts of the country. Suspensions of operations are solely dependent on security and once areas are again deemed safe for operations, most organizations plan to return to the work they left unfinished.

Mine Action Funding

As described below, attempts to address the landmine problem through the UNAVEM operation and the creation of the UN’s Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) and the separate Angolan national body to coordinate clearance, INAROEE, did not begin until 1994/1995. Through its 1994 Consolidated Appeal, issued by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, $584,000 was raised for mine action by the beginning of 1995— slightly more than the requested amount.[28]

A report for the United Nations notes “Funding for mine action was cobbled together from assessed budgets through UNAVEM III, voluntary contributions through the UNDHA-administered trust fund, the Government of Angola and direct bilateral contributions to specific projects or NGOs. In the absence of central coordination, comprehensive figures are not available. The year 1995 is indicative; the interagency humanitarian appeal included $12.4 for mine action. UNAVEM III’s budget request for mine action in 1995 included $8.25 million from the assessed contributions of member states.” The report also indicated that Angola had pledged $1.5 million for INAROEE at the end of 1995, but it was unclear if the pledge was ever made available. In mid-1995, the U.S. pledged $7.5 million for mine action as in-kind and cash support to NGOs and the UN.[29]

A compilation of donor support for Angola through the end of 1998 shows the following contributions: Australia, $7,687,506; Belgium, $1,126,959; Denmark, $3,989,312; the EU, $6,851,162; Finland, $500,000; Ireland, $252,791; Luxembourg, $143,000; the Netherlands, $3,883,531; Norway, $1,425,000; Sweden, $3,762,500; and the U.S., $23,344,000. These contributions total $50,943,011, and while helpful as an overview, the compilation does not indicate the years corresponding to various contributions or other “measurable” parameters.[30] Countries which have also contributed to mine action projects in Angola in 1994-1996, but did not appear in this compilation include Canada, South Africa, Switzerland and the UK.

Mine Clearance

During the period of relative peace prior to the elections in September 1992, there was a remarkable contrast between the recognition of the serious threat landmines present to Angola, and the actual response to the challenge of eradicating the mines. A UN report notes, “While there was a general understanding at the time of the Bicesse Accords that mines had been used extensively, there was no specific reference to the way in which they were likely to impact on the peace process nor how the problem would be addressed. Bicesse clauses concerned with cease-fire modalities stipulated that observance of the cease-fire would entail the cessation of ‘the planting of new mines and action aimed at impeding activities to deactivate mines.’”[31] Before mid-1994, there had been no systematic assessment of the extent of the landmine problem, nor any real attempt to coordinate or plan eradication in an organized fashion. Since the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol, there have been efforts to seriously confront the landmine problem.

Several separate initiatives were underway prior to the resumption of hostilities in 1992. FAPLA/FALA teams consisted of soldiers from both armies and during the pre-election period, they were working throughout the country with varying success. The teams were using manual clearance methods, partly because of the lack of heavy equipment, and partly because they considered it the most effective. The priorities were to demine the major roads and railways, and the interiors of towns and villages.[32] However, it was questionable as to how systematically the major roads were cleared. This demining effort had a limited impact, largely due to lack of organization, resources, and support. These problems persisted despite the involvement of British military teams in assisting FAPLA/FALA efforts and by mid-1992 most mine-clearance had stopped.

The South African Defense Forces also provided technical assistance and training to the FAPLA/FALA teams in the south of the country up to mid-1992. These operations cleared some 300,000 mines. In mid-1992, most sources agreed that the South African contribution was a well-motivated project based on a good knowledge of the general problems and the specific devices, many of which had been laid by the SADF itself.[33] All the Angolan parties responded positively to the South African initiative. South Africa has since provided training for Angolans in mine clearance in South Africa and two courses took place in 1998. However, in January 1999, this assistance was suspended because of the new laying of mines.[34]

UN and Angolan Mine Action Offices

In March of 1994, the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) began plans to set up a Central Mine Action Office (CMAO. Its mine action plan called for an integrated, prioritized approach, with UCAH/CMAO as the focal point. There were problems in 1995 in obtaining funding for this project because of overall UNAVEM control and CMAO found itself in a lengthy battles for the release of funds. Although CMAO submitted its first procurement package to UNAVEM in May 1995, it was not until November that equipment was made available.

UNAVEM III itself was also engaged in mine-clearance. In May 1995, an engineering company of 206 Indian troops arrived in Angola as part of 1,200 men joining UNAVEM III. The Indian engineers engaged in mine clearing and the repair of bridges and roads, among other tasks. An advance party of British engineers which arrived in April also cleared priority roads and cantonment areas for demobilizing troops. Namibia and Brazil also provided 200 troops with mine clearing experience.

Because of the infighting, in November 1995 a senior Department of Humanitarian Affairs New York staff member visited Angola in an effort to resolve the delays. The visit produced a new document which redefined the roles and responsibilities of the key players.[35] The entire senior staff left CMAO and a new team took over in early 1996 but there remained a lack of continuity and a paucity of Lusophone speakers in the CMAO. By March 1997, the top six posts were all empty.[36] After the termination of UNAVEM III in 1997, responsibility for UN demining activities was transferred to the UNDP and CMAO became the UN Demining Program-Angola (UNDPA).[37]

In 1995, the Angolan government established its own mine action office, INAROEE, and by the end of the year the government pledged to fund the office with US$1.5 million. Essentially CMAO and Angola’s INAROEE were to work side-by-side in a joint operations center in Luanda. There was little initial co-ordination with the UN although INAROEE was to be the national body to take over CMAO mine action work once the UN mandate expired.[38] INAROEE was made up of an integrated UNITA and FAA team with forty staff members provided by CMAO, and in its original plan, was to be headquartered in Luanda and have one brigade in each of the eighteen provinces. In 1998, INAROEE was operating with seven demining brigades; the remainder had not been formed due to a lack of funds.

Also, in late 1995, there were plans to establish a joint government-UN funded institute, CMATS, to train and equip Angolan demining teams.[39] Its plan to train 500 Angolan deminers by the end of 1996 failed because of “internecine control disputes among UN entities, lost time and resources and the exclusion of certain prospective students because of factional differences between UNITA and FAA.”[40] By December 1996, 350 Angolan nationals had been trained and six brigades had been deployed to four of the country’s eighteen provinces; only three of the brigades are fully operational in Cuando Cubango, Uige, and Moxico provinces. CMATS was handed over to INAROEE in February 1997, but it continues to receive support from UNDP, notably technical advisors.

There is no shortage of criticism about INAROEE’s work regarding poor safety standards, and that its brigades are not working, and there has been a strike of deminers over lack of pay.[41] Co-ordination with INAROEE has not always been good, and remains a problem among various mine clearance programs in the country. Some NGO programs had been operational prior to INAROEE, and are not willing to change their priorities. Some problems have resulted from the multiplicity of actors, others were because of priorities. One provincial governor wanted a motor-cross track demined as a high priority—before the scheduled clearance of a water point in a city which had no other access to water.[42]

But criticism is not restricted to the Angolan government and INAROEE. A multi-country study for the UN noted that the UN and Angolan government initiatives were “doomed” from the beginning. The report cites complete lack of communication and cooperation, byzantine bureaucratic procedures slowing down or blocking almost completely mine action, a lack of professionalism within the UN itself and infighting over control over the program in Angola among the many problems. Its assessment states that the “utter failure of the UN and Government to cooperate effectively through their respectively chosen instruments, CMAO and INAROEE, discouraged donors in general.” The study concluded that since it is a relatively “young” mine action program,

In theory, it was in a strong position to benefit from the experiences of other programs. In reality, the Angolan program has proved the most problematical of the four [countries in the study]. Some of the difficulties can be attributed to the political environment and the many obstacles which have slowed the peace process. Also, since Angola is a country rich with diamonds and oil which produce a high annual revenue, donors and others wanted to see the government make a strong commitment to tackle the problem of mines before soliciting support from the international community?.Angola is a text-book case of how not to initiate a mine action program.[43]

Commercial Demining

Because of the lack of capacity to clear mines quickly in this period, the UN contracted out for demining operations, awarding the South African firm, Mechem, $6.5 million in June 1995 to clear mines along more than 7,000 kilometers of priority roads and to offer quality assessment of other road clearance operations. Thirteen priority roads in the north, center and south of country had been drawn up for clearance. Although scheduled to start in September 1995, a mixture of bureaucratic delays, Mechem’s refusal to pay bribes and suspicion of Mechem by military officials resulted in a delay in off-loading its equipment in Luanda harbor.[44] (In June 1994 the director of Mechem had boasted that, “There are some mines in Angola which no one will be able to find without our help.”[45]) Although the government gave Mechem permission in early December to become operational, the project only got underway on 11 January 1996. The German government has also provided a couple of quality assessment officials for this project.

Mechem’s operations were based upon twenty-five air-sensing, armor-plated Caspir vehicles working in tandem with dog demining teams and other manual methods. Mechem deployed two teams, one in the north and the other in the south of Angola. The teams of seventy-five deminers included sub-contracted personnel of other demining companies, such as Ronco, Gurkha Security Guards and Mine-Tech. Eleven Angolan deminers also worked with the Ronco team. Mechem completed its clearance contract in the southern sector in August, and by December 1996 had cleared over 4,000 kilometers of roads. UNITA never allowed it to clear the Malange-Andulo-Kuito route.

Other commercial firms are clearing mines around the Soyo oil installations, employed by FINA and SONANGOL. The Executive Outcomes-linked firm Saracen worked in Soyo, replacing the French firm Cofras, and its successor CIDEV. The South African firm Shibata Security and the British firm, Defence Systems Limited, have also engaged in small-scale demining exercises in the Soyo area. CIDEV has distributed a proposal for a mechanized demining operation of Huila province but has failed to attract funding to date.[46] The Italian firm Apalte Bonificação e Construção (ABC) employed four brigades of twenty deminers on a demining exercise along the Benguela railway from early 1998.[47] With renewed conflict it is unclear what happened to this project.

NGO Mine Action Initiatives

Kap Anamur: The Kap Anamur Committee is a German humanitarian NGO founded in 1979. Kap Anamur set up a mine clearance project in Angola in May 1992 and clearance began in August. Through agreement with the Angolan government the town of Xangongo (Cunene province) was chosen as a starting point for the operation. The German government loaned gratis former East German military equipment, including a number of T-55 tanks with KMT-5 rollers and off-road trucks.[48] FAPLA and FALA sent a group of well trained sappers to work jointly on the project, but the FALA members left after the 1992 elections. In 1993 the operation had five Germans, twenty-five local sappers from FAA and twenty mechanics attached to the project at a running cost of $20,000 a month. Between mid 1992 and 1994 Kap Anamur cleared minefields and mine clusters in Cunene province and claims to have removed 50,626 AT mines and 25,338 AP mines.

In early 1995, Kap Anamur attempted to move its operations from Cunene to Benguela province with fatal consequences. On 1 March 1995, five people, including one German attached to the project were killed by unidentified gunmen at Solo, 100km from Benguela. The attack appears to have been aimed at keeping the road closed because the clearance team had received several indirect warnings about work in the area prior to the incident. Cap Anamur was also involved in controversy because one of its expatriate staff was arrested in 1995 for his involvement in the illegal export of munitions to Namibia. Kap Anamur ceased operating in Angola in 1996.[49]

Mines Advisory Group: MAG's presence in Angola dates back to mid-1992 with the start of a mine awareness poster campaign in cooperation with UNHCR. Following a specialist mission by MAG to Angola in November 1993, MAG began operations in April 1994 setting up a base in Luena, Moxico Province. Luena was chosen because of its critical location for returning refugees following a cease-fire. Additionally there is a shortage of land both for the communities and for agricultural projects of relief agencies because of mines.[50]

By October 1994 the construction of its demining school was finished and within two years, 134 deminers were operational and thirty more had just been trained. Nine minefields had been prioritized for initial clearance operations. Several UN officials criticized MAG's focus of resources on this one area as being extravagant and that MAG should be working on clearing priority routes in the short term. Mine-clearance operations in Moxico province were suspended in mid-January 1995 until late March because of a dispute with the Governor although none of the minefields prioritized for clearance served a military role. This problem was eventually resolved with the intervention of the Minister of Social Assistance, Albino Malungo. In October 1996, MAG also expanded its clearance operations to Lumeje, UNITA’s “capital” in Moxico province.

By 1998, MAG had expanded operations beyond Lumege to Luau, which has a severe mine problem and will be a focal point for repatriation from Zaire.[51] MAG employs over 200 deminers and seven MATs, which are mine awareness staff and minefield survey personnel who work together in gathering information and marking mined sites in order to assess what are the local priorities for clearance.[52] However, MAG has been the most affected by the deteriorating situation in Angola, closing operations there in mid-1998 due to the worsening tension in the area. MAG operations in Luau were hit by mortar fire during a clash between government and UNITA troops.[53] The staff had to evacuate and the project's equipment in Luau was lost. Other areas in MAG's area of operation were subsequently the scene of battles and new mine laying, which led to its decision to leave Moxico.[54]

MAG maintained an administrative presence in Luanda while it assessed the situation in Angola. It decided not to return to Moxico province, but did recommenced activities in Angola at the end of 1998 in Cunene province in the south of the country.[55] MAG is working south and west of Ondjiva and continues exclusively with its MAT format from Luena, which consists of small mixed teams of survey, clearance, mine awareness and community liaison personnel.[56] Two MATs are being formed, with two more to be trained by the end of the year. In Luena, Medico International restarted the mine awareness component of MAG's Luena program with some assistance from other mine action NGOs in November 1998, and its work is directed at the some 36,000 internally displaced people who have settled in Luena due to the increased clashes in surrounding areas.[57] Since March 1999, the mine awareness program has been run exclusively by Medico.

Halo Trust: The British NGO Halo Trust began operating in Kuito in late 1994. In January 1995, the government through the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Cooperation issued a permit to the Halo Trust for demining operations in Kuito, Benguela and Huambo provinces. Britain's ODA has provided funds for mine clearance in Benguela. Halo Trust's initial work was in the city of Kuito itself with a team of twenty-six Angolans and twelve expatriates.

Between November 1994 and February 1995, Halo destroyed 1,200 mines in central Kuito, but in May 1995 Halo Trust faced a crisis over its operations, following a dispute with the Governor of Kuito, who indicated that he wanted the team removed from Bie province. The Halo Trust Manager in Luanda said that the government's confidence in them has improved, but that UNITA is still distrustful, and refuses to share information about where UNITA mines are located. Halo claimed to have cleared 3,000 mines in 1995.[58] Operating from a base in Huambo, with another field office in Kuito, Halo has also conducted limited local surveys in Benguela and Huambo and began clearing mines in Huambo in January 1996. In early 1998, Halo received its first mechanical equipment, an armored front loader.

Although Halo operated a team of de-miners who were former UNITA combatants, the organization had been plagued with access problems. While they were able to demine certain UNITA areas easily, they have been stopped from clearing other areas and have had cleared areas re-mined repeatedly.[59] Despite the changing security situation, Halo continues to maintain its bases in Kuito and Huambo.[60] Halo considers the security situation in the area to be not much different from when it originally began its program there in 1994 and 1995 shortly after the Lusaka peace agreement. The increased security threat from military activities in the two provinces has turned Halo's focus to clearance of areas closer to the two centers where there is still considerable debris to be cleared.[61] The concentration on areas close to the two towns also coincides with priorities to assist internally displaced people who have relocated nearer to both Kuito and Huambo. In addition to mine clearance, Halo continues to perform survey and UXO clearance tasks and monitors the location of antitank mines on routes around its areas of operation to inform aid agencies to avoid accidents when delivery of humanitarian aid is again a priority.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): The demining operation of NPA is the largest in Angola. Like Halo Trust, NPA in January 1995 obtained a government permit to clear mines in Malanje province. In early 1995, NPA found starting up difficult, indeed witnessing in some instances government forces continuing to plant mines and blocking NPA's attempt to become fully operational. In February 1995, NPA began to deploy its first team of deminer graduates in platoons in two locations along the Malanje-Luanda corridor as part of an agreement with the World Food Program and SwedRelief. In 1996, NPA gradually starting clearing land around Malanje.[62] And, on 3 October 1996, NPA announced the start of its clearance operations in Cuanza Norte province.[63]

In 1997, NPA received its first two mechanical de-mining machines, Scottish Aradvarks. In 1998, NPA acquired two Danish Hydrema flails. It also introduced dogs in 1996, although initially these suffered from sickness. According to NPA figures in 1998 it employed 650 people in Angola, including 350 manual de-miners and over thirty dogs and handlers. NPA had operations in Luanda, Lobito, Malanje and Ndalatando.[64] The organization continues to conduct survey, marking and clearance using dogs, machines and manual methods in Angola as well as providing technical assistance to the national demining organ INAROEE. On 24 February 1998, NPA announced that 1,800 areas had been identified as suspected of being mined in Zaire, Uige, Luanda, Malanje, Namibe and Cunene provinces.[65]

NPA has called for mine action to continue now in the face of deteriorating security in certain areas of the country when it is most needed to assist dislocated civilians.[66] However, its operations in Malange province were stopped in January after military clashes escalated. Mine verification and road clearance in Cuando Cubango province were also curtailed in December when military actions increased in the province. Operations in other areas were also affected to some extent, but NPA was able to re-deploy teams to areas where security was not a problem and priorities for operations identified. Another factor that hampered operations was the limitations on air transport and cargo, since almost all NGOs working in the interior of Angola depend on air transport and after the shooting down of two UN airplanes the frequency of flights has declined.[67]

Save the Children Fund (USA): Save the Children Fund (USA) won a mine clearance contract from USAID in 1995. SCF initially funded expanded NPA teams to clear mines in Cuanza Sul and Bengo and Moxico provinces to make agricultural land accessible to the internally displaced, refugees, demobilized soldiers and residents. SCF-USA has established a demining school near Sumbe and commenced in January 1996 to train 170 deminers through NPA. A total of 250 deminers were trained and SCF took over management of the operations from NPA. However, in late 1996, SCF’s clearance operation ran into problems following a serious accident and its mine clearance operations were suspended pending a review. When one of its teams was clearing a pylon in Cunene province, a group of deminers was at the site of a recently uncovered mine, when it exploded injuring several of them. The medical evacuation was described by UN official as a “comedy of errors” with the vehicle carrying the injured crashing and no senior supervisory staff on location at the time of accident.[68]

Care International (USA): Care International (USA) is funding Greenfield Consultants, a new commercial firm based in the UK and run by the former Halo Trust manager in Mozambique. Greenfield signed a twelve month contract with Care which calls for two clearance teams operating in Cuando Cubango province, plus mine awareness programs in Bie, Cunene, Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces. The clearance teams were deployed in December 1995,[69] and cleared mines in Huambo in late 1996. CARE/Greenfields Inc. was also working in Bie province but terminated mine-related work and evacuated its staff from the province in mid-March due to the increased conflict between the government and UNITA.[70] Up until its departure, the CARE program was performing demining and UXO clearance.[71] The staff is in Luanda and hopes to return to work in Kuito as early as May 1999 depending on improvements in the security situation.[72]

Menschen gegn Minen (MgM): MGM is a German based NGO which is run by former members of Kap Anamur who left that organization because of increasing controversy over its safety and ethical record. MgM, funded mainly by the German government, was awarded a contract from the World Food Program in August 1996 to clear roads for the internally displaced in Caxito, Bengo province. The first clearance operations commenced in November around Dange bridge and quickly progressed.[73] MgM, continued to clear mines on roads and bridges in Bengo province in December and January 1999.[74] The clearance facilitated the resettlement of 7,000 internally displaced people from the “Boa Esperança” camp near Caxito, and the camp has now been officially closed. Currently MgM is training mechanics, operators and dog handlers for its integrated clearance method at the INAROEE training center in Viana outside Luanda. In May, MgM plans to begin demining in Caxito in an area where Save the Children formerly had attempted mine clearance.

Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara is also a German based mine clearance organization, run by Gerhart Bornman. Like MGM, Santa Barbara became operational in Angola in late 1996, is funded by the German government, and has been awarded a contract by the WFP to clear routes that will be used by internally displaced persons resettling in Benguela province. It reports that the increased tension has not affected its mine clearance operations to date.[75]

HMD: HMD, a British organization, was to begin operations in Saurimo in Lunda Sul Province in 1998, but to date, they are not known to have begun operations.

Mine Awareness

Coordinated by the CMAO, a national mine awareness program was started in 1994 by UNICEF and Angolan NGOs, using media and messages printed on bags and clothing. At the same time, UNHCR began plans with other humanitarian organizations to start a repatriation program. The campaign was led by NPA in co-ordination with Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Norwegian Refugee Council.[76] It was originally planned to train 390 local mine awareness instructors in eleven cities in nine provinces between 1 May 1995 and 1 May 1996, but this was extended to September 1996 and a further 240 local mine awareness instructors were trained. According to the CMAO by September 1996 an estimated 920,000 people have received mine awareness training and eighty-two supervisors and more than 620 instructors had been trained in thirteen provinces. MAG discontinued mine awareness programs in refugee camps in Zambia and in the Congo as their was no repatriation, due to increased hostilities.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Angolan Red Cross also supported mine awareness training for their national staff and districts in 1997 and 1998.. UNHCR and UNICEF supported mine awareness campaigns by MAG, Handicap International and NPA. The Catholic Relief Services and World Vision International also engaged in mine awareness work.[77]

Like with the mine clearance itself, there have been problems of co-ordination in mine awareness operations. MAG criticized NPA efforts in Luena and NPA has complained about CARE International efforts in Menongue which they allege duplicate existing services; they also say that CARE pays three times NPA wages, destroying local salary structures and undermining confidence and momentum in the NPA program.[78]

Landmine Casualties

Angola has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it has many thousands of amputees, the great majority of them injured by landmines. The government claims that there are 100,000 amputees in the country although the more widely used figure is 70,000. However in general an estimated one in every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury, and the proportion of child casualties ranged from 41 percent to 76 percent in the heavily mined provinces of Moxico, Huila, Bie and Huambo.

The government has produced figures only for mine fatalities among FAPLA soldiers in the “Second War:” between 1975 and 1991, 6,728 were killed by mine explosions.[79] In reality, however, there are no reliable estimates for the total number of people killed by landmines. Because of the scarcity of medical care for the civilian population, the true figure probably is very high. Lack of a national-level victim database hampers casualty estimation, but the ICRC and UNICEF believe that there are at least 120 new landmine victims per month in Angola.[80]

It appears that the provinces of Bie and Huambo have suffered a disproportionate share of landmine injuries. However, the landmine problem is also very severe in the south and east, particularly in Moxico Province. The great majority of victims are young men, a fact which has contributed to the militancy of many amputees in demanding their rights.

Among the civilians, men and women of all ages are affected. Children are an important minority of those affected by landmines. A needs assessment by UNICEF in December 1997 concluded that over a two year period in Bie there was a 70 percent decline of mine-related accidents and a 82 percent decrease in Huambo. This was due to mine awareness campaigns, on-going demining operations and knowledge acquired by IDPs.[81]

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Care and rehabilitation for FAPLA, and later FAA, soldiers is the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Medica-Militar (SAMM) of FAA. It functions well, in part because the government and military attract good people by offering benefits and access to goods. In its Jamba headquarters, UNITA's Special Department for War Wounded was set up in 1989. Up to 1992 it had at least three units caring for was amputees. One of these produced twenty artificial legs per month. The center collapsed in late 1994 due to a lack of resources.[82] For soldiers, assistance was usually more rapid, with immediate evacuation often by helicopter or vehicle. The first-aid provided was usually extremely rudimentary, consisting of no more than bandaging the wound and providing comfort and perhaps some painkilling drugs.

For most civilians injured by landmines, transport to the nearest first-aid post usually involved being carried manually or by cart; onward transport to a hospital was usually by car or sometimes by airplane. Civilians had to wait on average for about thirty-six hours before arriving at a hospital. One man interviewed for this report believed that it had been six days before he received hospital treatment. Adequate treatment is scarce. Drugs are often in short supply, and the staff are less qualified and motivated than in government- run hospitals. The variable quality of medical care means that hospitals can be dangerous for amputees. Wounds may become affected and secondary or even tertiary amputations often are needed. There has also been a high incidence of osteomyelitides, a bone-wasting disease, which may set in after a poorly-done amputation.

Civilian victim assistance in Angola consists mostly of physical rehabilitation provided by several international NGOs, but the provision of rehabilitation services outside Luanda has also been significantly affected by the recent increase in conflict in Angola. The existing facilities for landmine victims are grossly inadequate. A prosthesis can only be expected to last two to three years, and children require new ones at least every year, as they outgrow the one they have. This means that a total of over 5,000 new prostheses is required every year, merely to cope with the existing number of amputees. This is more than twice the number currently being manufactured.

The ICRC ran a center at Bombo Alto, near Huambofrom 1980 to 1992. It included eleven technicians working solely on the manufacture of artificial limbs and seventy-eight workers in all. In 1996, with a fragile peace restored, the ICRC reopened a renovated Bombo Alto orthopedic center in Huambo and also opened a new center in Kuito. An agreement was also signed with the Ministry of Health regarding the provision of orthopedic services. The center in Kuito was closed for two weeks in December due to clashes between the government and UNITA, and Huambo was also closed for a lesser period of time in December around Christmas. Patients who would usually come from some distance and stay in the centers' dormitories were reluctant to leave their homes and ICRC was likewise reluctant to have patients from outside the urban centers housed in its dormitories during periods of shelling. Since the re-opening of the centers, ICRC reports that operations and patient numbers have almost completely returned to levels prior to the latest round of fighting. ICRC has recently expanded operations in Luanda to take full responsibility of the prosthetics workshop and components production at the Neves Bendinha.[83]

The Swedish Red Cross had run an orthopedic center at Neves Bendinha. The orthopedic components unit was completely refurbished in 1995. The ICRC and the Swedish Red Cross had also signed a cooperation agreement for the center. The Dutch Red Cross also has a center at Viana, Luanda Province.

Handicap International (HI) visited Angola in February 1995 to assess possible participation in mine action programs. HI already has a rehabilitation program for disabled persons in Benguela including an orthopaedic workshop, physical rehabilitation and an information campaign on the prevention of disabilities. By late 1998, it was operating four clinics outside Luanda in Benguela, Lobito, Negage and Bailundo, but closed the center in Bailundo, the headquarters of UNITA, in September 1998, due to increased military clashes in the area. The center in Negage in Uige province was scheduled to be turned over to the Ministry of Health later this year, but the increased breakdown in security, hastened the turn over and HI left Negage in November 1998. The center continues to function to some extent. The two centers in Benguela and Lobito have not directly been affected, but have experienced a deficit in patients of some ten to twenty a month due to the inability of patients to safely reach the workshops.[84] HI plans to start general social reintegration projects related to both workshops, but limit its activities to the urban centers until the security situation improves in surrounding areas. HI continues to work at the Viana Center outside Luanda producing feet for all the physical rehabilitation programs in Angola.

Medico International and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, under the name Veterans International, continue to provide physical and social rehabilitation to mine victims in Luena in Moxico Province. Tensions in the region coincided with the end of year holidays and leave time for expatriate staff, which caused the center and social programs to stop from the second week in December until the beginning of February. Since restarting, the program has been limited to working with mine victims within a five to eight kilometer radius of the city of Luena. All registered below the knee amputees have been fitted in Luena and the workshop is now concentrating on above the knee amputees and any recent mine victims. The social teams that had been working with a variety of groups in surrounding areas are now concentrating on specific areas of the city and the recent displaced population that has settled in Luena. [85]

Angola remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities are available for the physically disabled. Most amputees are reluctant to leave the relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their future will consist of being cared for by their families, or attempting to earn a living in one of the few occupations open to them, such as the street trading or—for those with education—secretarial work. The majority who come from farming backgrounds are likely to remain a burden on their families for the foreseeable future. Many have been reduced to begging; amputee beggars are already a common sight in Angolan towns. Angola will have to live with the human cost of the landmine wars for many years to come.


[1]Statement Made by H.E. Vice-Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

[2]Interview with Albino Malungo, London, July 1998.

[3]Zambia, Angola Seal Landmines Pact,” Xinhua, Lusaka, 17 June 1998.

[4]Belgium: M409; China: Type 72a; Type 72b; Egypt: T78; Italy: VS-69; VS MK-2; South Africa: USK; USA: M16A1; M16A2; M14; M18A1 (also widely copied); Soviet: PMN; PMN-2; PMD-6; POMZ-2; POMZ-2M; MON-50; MON-100; Czechoslovakia: PP-MI-SR; West Germany: DM-11; DM-31; Romania: MAI 75; MAIGR 1; East Germany: PPM-2; Hungry: Gyata 64; Italy: VS-50; Spain: PS-1; South Africa: R2M1; R2M2; Shrapnel No.2 R1M1; Shrapnel No.2; MIM MS-803 (Mini-Claymore); SA Non-Metallic AP; Sweden: FFV 013; AP-12; Yugoslavia: PMA 1; PMA 1A; PMA 2; China: T69; Soviet: OZM-3; OZM-4; MON-200; OZM-72; OZM-160; PMD-7.

[5]U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center(S&T) Intelligence Report, “Landmine Warfare - Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa (U),” May 1993, reports that South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) maintained training bases in Angola for many years where weapons for its military operations in South Africa were stockpiled. According to their inventories, the ANC held 19, 442 AT mines, 13,908 AP mines and 5,443 limpet mines in Angola and it is not known what happened to these stocks.

[6]Landmine Monitor field work in Angola in August 1998.


[8]Landmine Monitor field work in Zambia in July 1998.

[9]Landmine Monitor field work in Angola in August 1998.

[10]JRS, MAG, MI, VVAF, “Landmines in Moxico Kill and Maim 66 Persons since June: Open Letter to the Angolan Government and UNITA,” Luena, November 1998.

[11]European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Angola,” Vienna, 28 December 1998. The Declaration noted that “The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the EFTA countries, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.”

[12]Radio Nacional Angola, Luanda, 1900 GMT, 11 January 1999.

[13]Lusa newsagency, 10 December 1998.

[14]UNITA Standing Committee of Political Commission, Bailundo, 17 December 1998, www.kwacha.com.

[15]Jornal de Noticias, (Lisbon), 21 January 1999.

[16]The following section is taken from, Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) pp.16-28.

[17]FNLA is the Frente Nacional de Liberacão de Angola, UNITA is the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, and MPLA is the Movemeto Popular de Liberacão de Angola.

[18]The Portuguese themselves suffered their worst landmines casualties in 1970, when landmines accounted for half the casualties suffered by Portugal's forces in Angola: 355 dead, 2,655 missing and 1,242 injured. See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, (1962-1976) vol.2 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), p.214.

[19]The U.S. waged a covert war against Angola for many years refused to recognize the MPLA government until 1993. U.S. covert aid totaled about $250 million between 1986 and 1991, making it the second largest U.S. covert program, exceeded only by aid to the mujahidin in Afghanistan.

[20]Público, (Lisbon), 4 August 1995.

[21]Chris Simpson, “Of Mines, Roads and Bridges,” IPS Africa, 3 May 1995.

[22]United Nations Security Council S/1995/1012, “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission,” December 1995.

[23]Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p.27.

[24]Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, S/1998/93, 8 October 1998, www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998931.html.

[25]U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998) p.19. The report also notes that HALO Trust estimated the problem to be 500,000 in 1997.

[26]Jornal de Angola, (Luanda), 8 October 1996.

[27]ANGOP News, (Luanda), 9 October 1998.

[28]United Nations Demining Database, “Multi-Country Mine Action Study,” available at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine.


[30]“Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support,” 4th Edition, 6 November 1998. Information provided by the UN Mission of Norway.

[31]UN, “Multi-Country Mine Action Study.”

[32]In the 1980s in Cunene according to ex FAPLA deminer Albano Costa, “ We used to drive cows out in front of us. If one was blown up - food for us. Excellent de-Mining equipment. Heavy enough to blow up an antitank mine, too,” cited by Reuters, 28 June 1994.

[33]Independent, (London), 6 June 1994. The newspaper reported that a South African mine specialist had told it that the SADF put 27,000 mines, 9,000 with anti-lift devices in one minefield alone outside the south-eastern Angolan town of Mavinga.

[34]Radio Nacional Angola, Luanda, 1900 GMT, 11 January 1999.

[35]CMAO documents: “Review of Mine action Plan for Angola,” cable 3764 dated, 6 December, 1995; “Implementation Plan for Establishing a National Mine Clearance Capacity in Angola,” Cable 3764, 6 December 1995.

[36]UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Angola: The Development of Indigenous Capacities, (New York: DHA, February 1998) p.22.

[37]Ibid, p.24.

[38]INAROEE was formed by government decree of law No.14/95 on 26 May 1995.

[39]In January 1995, Chipapa meeting between the UNITA and government military both sides agreed for the first time to form Joint Mine Clearing Teams and provide the UN with all necessary assistance in terms of mine information, reconnaissance, survey and clearance. Both sides also appointed Mine Liaison officers to the Joint Commission. By April, UNAVEM had received limited information from FAA and UNITA concerning minefields, as well as confirmation that the parties will make available the necessary mine-clearance personnel. Both sides believed, however, that the UN should equip and train the personnel. The government had allocated US$3 million for the procurement of mine-clearing equipment. The UN reported in December 1995 that, “the government/UNITA mine sweeping operation is still limited, owing mainly to mistrust between the two parties.”

[40]U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, 1998, p.22.

[41]Laurie Boulden and Martin Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs), pp.138-139.

[42]Eddie Banks, “Current Mines Situation in Angola,” CMAO, Luanda, September 1996.

[43]UN, “Multi-Country Mine Action Study.”

[44]Star, (Johannesburg), 21 October 1995.


[46]Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p.49.

[47]Jornal de Angola, (Luanda), 26 February 1998.

[48]Committee Cap Anamur German Emergency Doctors, “Field Activity Report,” April 1994.

[49]Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p.51.

[50]Mines Advisory Group, Annual Report 1994/95.

[51]The 180,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire are fearful of returning home because of landmines. See, Berthuel Kasamwa-Tuseko, “Les Réfugiés angolais ne veulent pas rentrer sur des champs de mines,” Propeace (Kigali), no.1, January 1996, pp.47-48.

[52] Initial funding for these MAG clearance operations was contributed by CAFOD, OXFAM and Christian Aid. The British ODA funded a mine survey and marking project in the second half of 1994. In 1996, MAG funding came from USAID, DanChurchAID and the UN DHA Mine Clearance Trust Fund.

[53]Dave Turner, Former Senior Technical Specialist, MAG Angola, email communication, 23 March 1999.


[55]Telephone interview with Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 23 March 1999.

[56]Steve Priestly, Manager. MAG Angola, email communication, 22 March, 1999.

[57]Telephone interview with Ulrich Tietze, Angola Program Officer, Medico International (Frankfurt), 22 March 1999.

[58]Jornal de Angola, (Luanda), 11 November 1996.

[59]Boulden and Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining, p.142.

[60]Guy Willoughby, Director, The Halo Trust, fax communication, 23 March, 1999.


[62]Norwegian People’s Aid, Mines: The Silent Killers, (Oslo: NPA, 1996) p.16.

[63]Noticias, (Maputo), 3 October 1996.

[64]Boulden and Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining, p.143.

[65]Jornal de Angola, (Luanda), 24 February 1998.

[66]Norwegian People's Aid, “Angola: Security, remining and demining operations,” Public statement, 1999.

[67]Norwegian People's Aid. “Section 3.2 Security for NPA Staff and Implications on our Operations,” NPA Angola Fourth Quarterly Report 1998, early-1999.

[68]Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, pp.54-55

[69]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with David Hewitson of Greenfield Consultants, London, 30 January 1996.

[70]CARE 1999 News Stories: March, “CARE Evacuates Staff in Wake of Fighting in Bie Province, Angola,” www.care.org.

[71]Telephone interview with Bob MacPherson, Assistant Director of Emergency Programs for Security and Landmines, CARE, 23 March 1999.

[72]Telephone interview with Cynthia Glocker, Press Officer, CARE, 23 March 1999.

[73]Interview with Hendrik Ehlers, Luanda, 1 September 1998.

[74]Hendrik Ehlers, MGM, email communication with Ulrich Tietze, Medico International, 18 March 1999.

[75]Telephone interview with Norbert Rossa, Executive Director. Santa Barbara, telephone interview, 23 March 1999.

[76]The original plan had been for the training of 300 local mine awareness instructors in cooperation with World Vision and CARE International but CARE International pulled out of this project in April 1995.

[77]U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, 1998, p. 23.

[78]Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p. 57.

[79] David Sogge, Sustainable Peace: Angola's Recovery, (Harare: Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1992), p. 89.

[80]ICRC, Antipersonnel Mines: An Overview, 1 August 1997, p. 1.

[81]Tehnaz Dastoor and Jane Mocellin, Mine Related Problems in Angola: A Needs Assessment, UNICEF Office of Emergency Programs Working Paper Series, December 1997, p. 5.

[82]Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p. 33.

[83]Telephone interview with Patrick L'Hote, Southern Africa Desk Officer, ICRC (Geneva), 22 March1999.

[84]Telephone interview with Pierra Hublet, Angola Program Officer, Handicap International (Brussels), 22 March 1999.

[85]Tietze, 22 March 1999.