Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December
1997 but has not yet ratified. Cameroon is concerned by the landmine problem
even though it is not directly affected by this
weapon.[1] It was a key player in
the Ottawa Process, participating in key meetings, including the October 1996
International Strategy meeting which launched the Ottawa Process and the Kempton
Park Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting on landmines in June 1997.
Cameroon endorsed the Brussels Declaration, and participated actively in the
Oslo negotiations, where it worked together with Belgium to modify the deadline
for entry-into-force, reducing it from the proposed one year to six
months.[2] It also spoke strongly
against amendments put forward by the United States that, if accepted, would
have seriously weakened the treaty. Cameroon voted in support of key 1996 and
1997 UN General Assembly resolutions but was absent from the 1998 resolution
urging universalization and ratification of the ban treaty.
Cameroon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. According
to government representatives, “Cameroon has signed the essential by
signing the Ottawa Convention. There are now obligations to take concrete
measures and adopt a national implementation law soon or later, the essential
objective being the total
ban.“[3]
Cameroon does not use, produce or export AP mines but it possesses AP mine
stockpiles for training purposes. According to officials, these are tightly
controlled. The precise number or types of retained AP mines are unknown.
Previously, military training was provided by French, American, and Chinese
Academy Schools. Under domestic legislation, Cameroon does not allow mines to
transit its national territory, in any
direction.[4]
Cameroon is riven by socio- and ethno-political tensions, opposing North and
South, Anglophone and Francophone populations and—above all—the
Bamiléké of the north-west and the Béti-Bulu ethnic complex
of the South but no evidence of landmine use has been found. Cameroon’s
Extreme Nord province—a major security concern—is a narrow corridor
separating Nigeria and Chad. Neglected by the capital Yaoundé, it is
logistically vital for neighboring Chad, being the transport channel between
Chadian capital Ndjamena and the ports of the Cameroonian coast at Douala and
Limbe. Since the early 1990s, the security situation in Extreme Nord has
worsened sharply, due largely to politico-military unrest in Chad. In
particular, political bandits and armed robbers from Chad, Nigeria and other
parts of Cameroon have rendered the province insecure. So called "road cutters"
(coupeurs de route) frequently use military armaments in attacks but
landmines have not, as yet, figured in their arsenal.
Another potential conflict situation concerns the Nigeria-Cameroon border,
particularly the Bakassi peninsula, throughout to be rich in
petrocarbons.[5] Tensions broke
out into low-level war in 1994, although the situation has since stabilized
slightly, and the election in February 1998 of retired general Olusegun Obasanjo
as Nigerian president may improve matters further.
While Cameroon is currently unable to take part in cross border financial
cooperation for demining work, due to the depth of the economic crisis in the
country since the mid-1980s, it is ready to work with other countries in the
region on mines clearance, if demining personnel become available. Deminers may
be trained in Cameroon in future, depending upon planned restructuring of the
armed forces.
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