The People’s
Republic of China (PRC), one of the world’s biggest producers and
exporters of antipersonnel landmines, has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It
has been one of the governments most opposed to a ban on antipersonnel mines,
and most insistent on the military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel
mines.
China was one of very few governments that did not participate--even as an
observer--in any of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process or the ban
treaty negotiations.[1] China
was one of only ten governments that abstained on United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to
vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines.
It was also among the small number of states to abstain on the 1997 UNGA
Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA
Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging
its full realization and inviting state parties to the First Meeting of State
Parties in Mozambique. China did, however, send a representative to the ban
treaty signing conference in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997.
China has stated that it supports “the ultimate objective of
comprehensive prohibition” of antipersonnel mines. The 1998 Defense White
Paper says:
China has all along attached great importance to the problem of threat to
innocent people caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines
(APLs). It is in favor of imposing proper and rational restrictions on the use
and transfer of APLs in a bid to achieve the ultimate objective of comprehensive
prohibition of such landmines through a phased approach. In the meantime, the
Chinese government maintains that, in addressing the problem of APLs,
consideration should be given to both humanitarian concern and the legitimate
defense requirements of sovereign
states.[2]
Chinese officials have said that China will not sign the ban treaty because
they view antipersonnel mines as an effective defensive weapon necessary to
protect China’s very long land borders and because China, as a developing
country, lacks the resources and technology to replace mines with more advanced
defensive weapons. China cannot agree to a ban unless alternative weapons are
available.[3] The Chinese
position is that while China attaches importance to the humanitarian concerns
about the landmine issue, it believes what causes today’s landmine problem
is not the weapon itself but the indiscriminate use of it. In addressing the
problem of AP mines, consideration should be given to both humanitarian concern
and the legitimate defense requirements of sovereign states. As a country with
long land borders, China must reserve the right to use antipersonnel mines on
its territory. The Mine Ban Treaty addresses only the humanitarian concerns of
the issue, thus China is not able to
sign.[4]
The 1998 Defense White Paper has a section on “The Issue of
Anti-Personnel Landmines,” with the following statement:
The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has always exercised strict control
over the use of APLs and prohibited the indiscriminate use and laying of such
landmines while actively studying the possible alternatives to APLs. China has
also actively participated in the revision of the Landmine Protocol (Protocol
II) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the discussions
on the question of APLs at the UN Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese
government has all along adopted a very prudent and responsible attitude toward
landmine export.[5]
On the positive side, China has:
* announced in April 1996 a moratorium on export of AP mines which are
prohibited by the revised Protocol II of
CCW;[6]
* announced a donation of U.S.$100,000 to the U.N. demining fund and support
for mine clearance of mine affected
countries;[7]
* intensified mine clearance operations on the Sino-Vietnamese
border;[8]
* sent observers to participate in the ban treaty signing conference and
international Mine Action Forum held from 2-4 December 1997 in
Ottawa;[9]
* sent a diplomat from the Chinese Embassy in Japan to the 3rd NGO
Tokyo Conference on AP mines organized by a Japanese NGO in November
1998.[10]
While treaty advocates might see these as encouraging developments, Chinese
officials state that there has been no pro-ban evolution in Chinese policy, and
that the Chinese position has always been
consistent.[11]
China supports the Convention on Conventional Weapons as a proper forum and
approach to controlling antipersonnel mines. China ratified the CCW and its
original Protocol II on mines on 7 April
1982.[12] On 4 November 1998,
China ratified the revised Protocol II, surprising some observers by doing so
before the U.S. and Russia, which have yet to
ratify.[13] In ratifying, China
also decided to exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for compliance
with key restrictions.[14]
China is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and has supported
the CD as an appropriate forum to deal with the landmine
issue.[15] It has indicated its
willingness to negotiate a transfer ban in the
CD.[16]
Production
China is known as one of the world’s largest
producers of AP mines. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Chinese
State Arsenals have been producing about twenty-two types of AP mines, six of
which are based on Soviet designs and the rest of Chinese
origin.[17] Chinese
conventional AP mines are among the cheapest in the world. China’s widely
distributed Type 72 sometimes sell for less than $3 each according to a U.S.
State Department
official.[18]
Among the Chinese mines are the Type 72 blast mine (and its variants), PMN
blast mine, PPM-2 blast mine, POMZ-2 and -2M fragmentation stake mines, Type
58 fragmentation stake mine, Type 59 wooden box mine, Type 68 and Type 69
bounding fragmentation mines, and Type 66 Claymore-type directed fragmentation
mine.[19]
China also produces four “scatterable” antipersonnel mines (those
that can be delivered by aircraft, artillery or vehicles, not just
hand-emplaced). They are the GLD 112 and three unnamed versions, two of which
have self-destruct
mechanisms.[20] China began
developing scatterable mines in the 1970s. The first were manually dropped from
the air by parachute, but China soon progressed to mechanized placement via
rocket and from ground vehicles, as well as fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. The
Technical Equipment Research Institute of Wuxi is China’s primary center
for research and development related to mine fuzes, sensors, scatterable mines,
delivery systems, and other combat engineer
equipment.[21]
China may begin production of new antipersonnel mines that are compliant with
revised Protocol II of the CCW, particularly scatterable mines that have
self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms meeting the new technical
requirements of the Protocol. There is little doubt they have the technological
capability to make such
mines.[22]
China must stop producing its most common mine, the Type 72, to be compliant
with the CCW revised Protocol II, unless it adds enough metallic content to meet
CCW standards. The treaty prohibits production after 1 January 1997 of mines
with less than eight grams of metallic
content.[23] Also under the
terms of the treaty, China can no longer export the mine, and will have to stop
using it within nine years, unless metal is added.
Transfer
China has been one of the world’s biggest
exporters of AP mines. The Type 72 may be the most frequently encountered mine
in the world. It has been used in at least fifteen other countries, including
Iraq, Kuwait, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Angola, Rwanda,
Zambia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Africa and Mozambique. The Type 69
has been found in Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea
and South Africa.[24]
On 22 April 1996 at the CCW Review Conference, the Chinese representative Mr.
Wang Jon said the Chinese government would implement a moratorium on the export
of those mines which are not in conformity with the Amended Landmine Protocol to
the CCW, and would exercise the utmost restraint and strict control on the
export of all AP mines.[25]
In practical terms, the moratorium means China has stopped export of the
non-detectable Type 72 and of all remotely-delivered AP mines which do not have
self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms. The Chinese Government has not
declared a moratorium on the export of detectable “dumb”AP
mines.
In January 1996, a senior Chinese diplomat told the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines that China had suspended antipersonnel mine exports in 1993 after
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for export moratoria by
all states. “We respect the will of the majority,” said Mr. Fu
Cong, Deputy Director of the Disarmament Division of the Foreign Ministry. He
aslo stressed, though, that China must retain the option of exporting to nations
which need mines for
self-defense.[26]
There is no evidence that China has exported antipersonnel mines in any
significant number in recent
years.[27] However, Chinese
officials have stressed that China’s moratorium applies only to
non-detectable mines and remotely-delivered mines not in accordance with the
CCW.[28]
The 1998 Defense White Paper states, “The Chinese government has all
along adopted a very prudent and responsible attitude toward landmine export. In
December 1994, China joined in the UN General Assembly's consultation on its
resolution concerning the moratorium on the export of APLs. In April 1996, the
Chinese government solemnly declared its suspension of export of APLs that are
not compatible with those APLs provided for in the Amended Landmine Protocol to
the CCW.”[29]
While not a vigorous proponent of discussions on a mine transfer ban in the
Conference on Disarmament, China has indicated its willingness to do so. The
June 1998 Sino-U.S. Joint Presidential Statement on landmines stated,
“China and the United States agree to actively pursue at the Conference on
Disarmament the commencement of negotiations on an antipersonnel landmines
transfer/export ban by supporting the prompt establishment of an Ad Hoc
Committee.”[30] Such as
committee was not established in 1998, but attempts are again being made in
1999.
Stockpiling
China is believed to have the largest antipersonnel
landmine stockpile in the world. While no hard evidence is available, several
experts contacted by Landmine Monitor have concluded that a plausible estimate
of the Chinese APM stockpile is some 110 million, including perhaps 100 million
Type 72 alone.[31]
The amended Protocol II of the CCW, which China ratified on 4 November 1998,
prohibits use of antipersonnel mines which are not detectable after a transition
period of nine years after its entry into force. Thus, China will be prohibited
from using the Type 72 in its present form after 2007. There are three options
for the Chinese government to take: (1) destroy them; (2) replace them; or (3)
add eight grams of metal to them so that they will comply with CCW
specifications. Adding metal is the most probable since it is the cheapest
option,[32] but Chinese
officials have made no public statement on the matter.
Use
According to a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
document, “The PLA tactics call for employing mines in traditional roles:
attacking enemy command and logistics nodes through area denial operations;
channelizing attacking enemy forces; disrupting enemy lines of communication;
delaying enemy armor; and forming hasty
defenses.”[33]
Chinese has used antipersonnel landmines to block access to military and
strategic targets along its borders with Russia, India, and especially
Vietnam.[34] It is estimated
that as many as 10 million mines are planted along the borders with those three
nations,[35] including four
million antipersonnel and six million antitank
mines.[36] During the conflict
between China and Vietnam in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at least 800,000
mines and UXOs were laid in Yunnan Province and Guangxi National Autonomous
Region.[37]
Landmine Problem
Landmines pose a threat to civilians mainly in the
border areas with Vietnam. According to a Chinese military magazine, 161
minefields were laid during the twelve years of conflict between these two
countries. The total size of minefields deployed in seven prefectures of Yunnan
Province amounts to 270 square
kilometers.[38]
The danger of mines laid along China’s borders with Vietnam, India and
Russia is reportedly relatively minimal due to the sparsely populated,
mountainous terrain.[39]
According to the United Nations, civilian casualties have been reported,
especially in the Vietnamese border area known as “the region of
death.”[40] The Chinese
government has admitted that there is a “threat to civilian’s life
caused by the landmines in
China.”[41]
Mine Action Funding
On 29 November 1997, in Ottawa, President Jiang
Zemin stated that China will support international humanitarian efforts
regarding mine clearance. China’s plan for providing aid for
international mine clearance includes: donating $100,000 to the UN demining
fund, earmarked for mine clearance operations in Bosnia; co-sponsoring with the
UN in China two training courses for deminers from nine affected countries; and,
donating equipment for mine detection and clearance to those countries that
participate in these training courses through the
UN.[42]
Mine Clearance
At the roundtable on mine clearance, held in Ottawa
at the time of the ban treaty signing in December 1997, Mr. Li Song, the
representative of the Chinese government, made a statement entitled
“China: Views and Experience of Mine-Clearance” which discussed
major ways and means for mine clearance, China’s mine clearance practice
and China’s mine clearance experience. He called for the establishment of
an international demining mechanism, and for further enhancement of
international cooperation in
demining.[43]
Mine clearance in China has been systematically conducted by the
People’s Liberation Army as a military activity. The PLA has an
excellent mine clearance capacity according to the United
Nations.[44] China has hailed
its mine clearance operations on the Vietnamese border as “an
unprecedented operation in the military history of China or even of the
world.”[45] China's
National Defense White Paper describes its mine clearance operations as
follows:
From the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1994, the PLA conducted its first
large-scale demining operation in the border areas of Yunnan Province and the
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, cleared a total of over one million landmines
and explosive devices and destroyed nearly 200 tons of disused or de-activated
ammunitions and explosive devices, covering an area of 108 square kilometers
with over 170 border trade passes and ports re-opened, and over 30,000 hectares
of farmland, pasture and mountain forests restored. At the end of 1997, the
Chinese government decided to conduct its second large-scale demining operation
in the above areas starting from November 1997 up to December
1999.[46]
In December 1998 a Chinese official said this second demining operation is
expected to clear more than 100 square kilometers and “permanently seal
off more than 50 square kilometers in an effort to protect civilians from
danger.”[47] As of 22
February 1999, soldiers had cleared 65,500 mines from 120 square kilometers in
the above mentioned area.[48]
According to one news account, the rate of clearance has been among the
world’s fastest.[49]
Noting that the demining force consists of several hundred soldiers, a
Chinese official said, “In the coming years, China is expected to remove
completely threats of leftover landmines to civilians within its
territory.”[50]
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
There is no information on the number of landmine
casualties or on survivor assistance in China.
A request for information for Landmine Monitor was submitted to the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, in
January 1999. In February, however, the request was declined on the grounds
that China is not a State Party of the Mine Ban
Treaty.[51]
[1] Most other nations
opposed to the treaty participated in the process as observers, including
Russia, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Egypt, Israel, Libya, Iran, Belarus, and
Finland.
[2] “White Paper:
China's National Defense,” Information Office of the State Council,
People’s Republic of China, 27 July 1998.
[3] “China’s
Position on APL,” Statement submitted by Mr. Song Rong Hua, Second
Secretary of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Japan at the
3rd NGO Tokyo Conference on AP mines organized by Association to Aid
Refugees, Japan held on 28-29 November 1998 in Tokyo.
[4] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interview with a Chinese official, 26 February 1999.
[5] “White Paper:
China's National Defense,” Information Office of the State Council,
People’s Republic of China, 27 July 1998.
[7] Statement to the Press by
Ambassador Qin Huasun on the Occasion of Depositing Instrument of Ratification
to the Amended Landmine Protocol of CCW (4 November 1998).
[8] Song Rong Hua,
“China’s Position on APL,” 28-29 November 1998 in Tokyo.
[9] “White Paper:
China's National Defense,” 27 July 1998.
[10] Association to Aid
Refugees, Japan, “The 3rd NGO Tokyo Conference on
Anti-personnel Landmines – Post Ottawa, What Should We Do Next?”
28 November 1998, p.115.
[11] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interview with a Chinese official, 26 February 1999.
[12]United Nations Demining
Database, Country Overview (http: //www.un.org/Depts/Landmine). See also,
Statement to the Press by Ambassador Qin.
[13]
Song,”China’s position on APL,” and Beijing Xinhua Domestic
Service on 5 November 1998.
[14] Declarations and
Reservations on CCW Protocol II entry into force 3 December 1998, at
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xxvi_boo/xxvi_2.html
[15] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interview, 25 February 1999 with a Chinese official.
[16] See for example,
“Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement,” Beijing, 27 June 1998.
[17] Mine Web, United States
Department of State, at http://www.mineweb.org/mfacts. See also, Human Rights
Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines : A Deadly Legacy (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 103.
[18] Human Rights Watch,
Landmines : A Deadly Legacy, p. 56.
[19] Technical descriptions
of Chinese mines are available at Mine Web, United States Department of State at
http://www.mineweb.org/mfacts.
[27] Other Chinese officials
have said that China has not exported any antipersonnel mines since 1995. See,
Human Rights Watch, “The Mine Ban Treaty and Members of APEC,”
October 1998.
[28] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interviews with officials from Department of Arms Control and
Disarmament, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and two Chinese embassies,
24, 25, and 26 February 1999.
[29] “White Paper:
China's National Defense,” 1998.
[30]“Sino-U.S.
Presidential Joint Statement,” Beijing, 27 June 1998. See also,
“White Paper: China’s National Defense,” 1998.
[31] Based on interviews with
governmental officials.
[32] Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
e-mail interview with a government expert on China and mines, 26 February
1999.
[33] U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center,
“Combat Engineer Capabilities--China (U),” DST-1150S-320-93, March
1993, p. 19. Obtained by Human Rights Watch under the Freedom of Information
Act.
[34] Humanitarian Demining
Website, U.S. Department of Defense, at
http://www.demining.brtrc.com/maps/china.
[35] Humanitarian Demining
Website, U.S. Department of Defense.
[36] United Nations Demining
Database, Country Overview.
[43] “China: Views and
Experience of Mine-Clearance,” Statement by Representative of Chinese
Observer Delegation at the Roundtable on Mine-Clearance, 2 December 1997. See
also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada, “An Agenda for Mine Action: A
Global Ban on Landmines, 2-4 December 1997,” p. 21.
[44] United Nations Demining
Database, Country Overview.
[45] “China: Views and
Experience of Mine-Clearance,” Statement by Representative of Chinese
Observer Delegation at the Roundtable on Mine-Clearance, 2 December 1997.
[46] “White Paper:
China's National Defense,” 1998.
[47] Li Song, in Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Canada, “An Agenda for Mine Action: A Global Ban on
Landmines, 2-4 December 1997,” p. 21.
[50] “China: Views and
Experience on Mine Clearance,” 2 December 1997.
[51]Landmine Monitor/Tokyo
telephone interview, with an official of the Department of Arms Control and
Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, February 1999.
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