Congo-Brazzaville has not
signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It was not an active participant in the Ottawa
Process, though it endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration of June 1997,
and voted for pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996 and 1997.
Diplomats explain that the politico-military crisis which began with the 1997
civil war has pushed the issue down the political
agenda.[1] In addition, it is
possible that current head of state Denis Sassou Nguesso is reluctant to give up
the weapon under present tense circumstances.
In the months after his defeat of elected predecessor Pascal Lissouba, Sassou
has steadily lost control of areas of the country and has become increasingly
reliant upon the support of Angolan forces from across the border in the Cabinda
enclave. Other military forces present on Congolese territory are thought to
include Rwandan army units, exiled Rwandan Hutu Interahamwe, fighters from the
Democratic Republic of Congo, including former members of late Zairian president
Mobutu Sese Seko’s feared Division Spéciale Presidentielle, and
possibly even Chadian
elements.[2]
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
While Congo-Brazzaville is not known to have
produced or exported antipersonnel mines, it has them in its arsenal and has
used them, most recently in the 1997 civil war. It is highly likely that not
only the formally constituted national armed forces—now in a state of
considerable disorganization—but also the various militia aligned with
major political players have access to stocks of
landmines.[3]
Use
Landmines were used widely by both sides during the
1997 civil war. In Brazzaville itself, the strategically sensitive areas around
the airport and the city’s main power station were heavily mined,
reportedly with both AT mines and AP mines. Other utilities had unmarked
minefields laid around them.[4]
The residential quarters of Poto-Poto and Mikalou were also affected, although
it is thought this was more by contagion and carelessness than by concerted
deployment.[5] Information is
considerably thinner where provincial regions are concerned.
Before and during the 1997 civil war, both Lissouba and Sassou reportedly
constituted major weapons dumps in their respective strongholds of Dolisie (in
the Nibolek region of the south) and Oyo. Although it is near-certain that
landmines figured in these caches, there is no documentary proof. The French
government became sufficiently alarmed by both sides’ use of AP mines in
September 1997 to warn publicly against the use of the
devices.[6]
Although the front lines in Brazzaville were heavily mined during the battle
for the city, the problem is thought to have been relatively minor in and around
Pointe Noire, the port city and oil capital. The sheer speed of the Angolan
advance out of the Cabinda enclave led the Lissoubaiste garrison to surrender
virtually before a shot was fired. It is thought unlikely that they had time to
lay mines, even if they possessed them.
In the recent revival of conflict in southern Brazzaville and the Pool and
Nibolek areas, there is as yet little hard information on the possible use of
landmines, due in part to the sheer danger of field research. However,
international representatives who remain in Brazzaville do not at present regard
mine-laying as a significant
problem.[7] The nature of the war
has changed since the involvement in strength of Angolan forces: artillery
barrages appear more central to their thinking than the use of
mines.[8]
There are indications that major protagonists might consider deploying
landmines if possible, however. On 8 March 1999, the U.K. daily newspaper
the Mirror reported that ex-President Pascal Lissouba, in exile in London
since his defeat by Sassou in late 1997, was shopping for armaments to launch
attacks against his successor, and reproduced apparently convincing
documentation for the assertion. Among the materiel being sought on the
international arms market were 100 mines and accessories for what was described
as a “Camp in Africa” and 1,000 mines for
“Headquarters.” Interviewed by the Mirror, Lissouba
“says he needs enough arms for a force of 2,000 men led by
mercenaries.”[9]
The way the list was leaked raised the possibility that someone intended to
damage Lissouba’s standing in the
U.K.,[10] and it is not impossible
that the publication of the episode was a calculated entrapment exercise mounted
by anti-Lissouba interests in Paris or elsewhere. Sources close to Lissouba
insist that he had no personal connection with the list and that, having decided
to start equipping a force to secure Congo’s borders in the event of any
future return to power, he merely delegated aides to canvass international
equipment dealers as to what materiel was hypothetically available and at what
price.[11] However, the
‘shopping list’ sits potentially uneasily with the declaration by
Lissouba’s own government in June 1996 that Congo “has never
produced” and “does not want to use” AP mines, and was in
favor of a global ban on the
devices.[12] Specified on the
list are identifiable AP mine
products.[13]
Mine Clearance
There is no overall survey of the mine problem in
Congo-Brazzaville, although anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem is at
its worst in Brazzaville itself. Many of the mines laid in 1997 have now been
cleared with French assistance, but isolated mine incidents still reportedly
occur.[14] Army engineers began
clearing mines, with French assistance, immediately after Sassou Nguesso’s
victory in October 1997. They began with emergency clearance work around the
major ministries in the capital. In the words of one, “We had to carry
out a big operation fairly quickly?before people returned to
work.”[15] In late 1998,
further clearance work was carried out around the airport, and civilian access
to mined areas was carefully controlled.
The Sassou Nguesso government embarked on a series of announcements and
public appeals to Brazzavillois by radio shortly after coming to power. In late
1998, Colonel Leonce Kabi, head of the army’s engineering corps, confirmed
that he was receiving a weekly average of twenty notifications of the existence
of AT and AP mines from members of the
public.[16] Although clearance
work after 1997 appears to have been relatively thorough in Central Brazzaville,
the revival of hostilities in 1998 probably prevented more constructive efforts
to repair damage and develop affected areas.
There are no available records on mine-related injuries during or the after
the civil wars of 1993 or 1997. Neither is it possible to assess the impact of
mines in the most recent phase of the conflict from late 1998
onwards.[17] Repeated fighting
and artillery damage has wrecked Brazzaville’s medical infrastructure and
has damaged national capacity for the treatment of landmine-related
injuries.
[1]Telephone interview, U.S.
diplomat, Brazzaville, 25 March 1999.
[2]Telephone interviews,
political and military strategists, London, Paris, and Kinshasa, 25-31 March
1999.
[3]Telephone interview, defence
analyst, Centre d’Analyse et Prévision, Paris, 29 March 1999.
[4]Congo: finding landmines
proves tougher than laying them,” Inter Press Service, 22 August
1998.
[5]Telephone interview, Remy
Bazenguissa, Paris, 31 March 1999. Bazenguissa is the foremost analyst of the
various recent battles for Brazzaville and surroundings.
[6]France warns against the use
of landmines in Congo,” Agence France Presse, 11 September
1997.
[7]Telephone interviews, U.S.
and European diplomatic representatives, Brazzaville and Kinshasa, 26 March
1999.
[8]Telephone interview with
Remy Bazenguissa, 31 March 1999.
[9]Gary Jones, “£40m
list of death”, the Mirror, (London), 8 March 1999, pp.4-5.
[10]Look in The
Mirror”, Africa Confidential, vol. 40, no. 6, 19 March 1999,
p.8.
[11]Telephone interviews,
representatives of exiled President Pascal Lissouba, London, 31 March 1999.
[12]Daniel Mouellet,
chargé d’affaires, Embassy of the Republic of Congo, Washington
D.C., Letter to Stephen Goose, Program Director, Human Rights Watch Arms
Project, 11 April 1996, Letter number 0568/ARC/WDC.
[13]The list includes “50
training mines .Mon 50”, “50 mines .Mon 50,” “all
accessories for Mon 100 like electrical wires-detonators-cord”,
“blasting cap-pull fuze-foxhole,” “50 anti-pers training mines
PMN,” and “50 Anti-tank training mines TM-46.” The relevant
part of the list was supplied to Human Rights Watch by the Mirror on 1
April 1999. In the Mirror’s story, Lissouba’s
representatives were linked to Labayfar, a well-known Belgian equipment
supplier, which Mirror journalist Gary Jones alleges was potentially
prepared to act as the clearing house for weapons of predominantly Russian
origin. Contacted by Human Rights Watch in Brussels (telephone interview, 31
March 1999) Labayfar’s chairman, André Lafosse replied
“certainly not” to a request for clarification on the nature and
provenance of the shopping list.
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