It is of little
surprise that Finland has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Finland has been
one of the more vocal countries in support of the legitimate right of a
government to self defense, including the use of APMs. While it did attend
various of the Ottawa Process meetings as an observer, it was often outspoken in
its opposition to a ban. Currently, Finland is the only country in the European
Union that stands outside the Treaty and seems increasingly uncomfortable to be
in that position.
In one analysis of the Finnish position, it was noted that the government had
never expected that 122 countries would sign the Mine Ban Treaty and that it has
become politically very difficult for the country. Finland does not want to be
seen as an irresponsible member of the international community but continues to
view APMs as vital for its defense. Finland fears signing the Treaty when
potential aggressors have not, which it would see as harmful to its security.
“The worst scenario for Finland would be to commit itself to a convention,
1) which prohibits defensive antipersonnel landmines but, 2) outside of which a
number of militarily strong states decide to remain, and 3) which does not
prohibit technologically advanced, remotely delivered mines, capable of being
used for aggressive
purposes.”[1]
In 1997 a governmental working group was created to examine the landmine
question. In December of that year the group, comprised of officials from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, declared that Finland
is in the process of moving toward a total ban of antipersonnel mines and will
be prepared to replace APMs with other methods of independent and reliable
defense. At the same time, the governmental working group insisted that Finland
needs additional money (several million US dollars) for such alternatives to
APMs and that the time for the transitional period will be at least ten years.
In the future Finland will allocate more money for the mine clearance programs
and programs of mine
awareness.[2]
According to the coordinator of the Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines, an
explanation for why APMS are regarded as being so important for Finland and why
the country has found it impossible to join the Ottawa process is bound up with
perceptions concerning threats it has faced in the past and the notion of what
sort of defense it can pursue:
“Finland has a relatively big area with a small population and is a
smaller nation with limited resources. Finland has a big neighbor, Russia, with
whom it has fought two wars less than 60 years ago. Finland wants to have, and
to give the signal that it has, a ‘strong, credible, independent
defense,’ but because of its limited resources Finland has to depend more
on the ‘psychological’ side; on all levels are strong patriotic
feelings, a conscript army involving all men from 18 years etc. Due to limited
resources Finland has not had the chance to build a ‘high-tech’ and
‘professional’ army even if developments are pushing it in that
direction. Finland has one of the biggest European reserves when you look at the
population number. The conscription-based reserve does not possess very
developed weapons. If the military were to admit that APMS are an out-dated
form of defense, they would risk a discussion on the relevance of the whole
current defense doctrine and the ‘realism’ of current defense plans.
It is a discussion the Finnish defense establishment is unready to take
up.”[3]
Finland has also had major difficulties accepting the Ottawa process itself.
Being situated between what is traditionally seen as the East and West it has
always strongly underlined “realism” in its foreign political
thinking, and this is something which it has been much respected for during the
Cold War. The Ottawa Process did not seek the approval of the superpowers; the
negotiation process has been very open (NGO-friendly and responsive) and based
on a strongly optimistic vision that smaller and medium-size powers can make a
difference. This new, changed approach and the fast timetable of the Process has
been too hard for Finnish foreign politics to follow.
Between 1995 and 1999, however, the attitude of official Finland toward the
total ban of APMs has evolved quite a lot. At first, its position was firmly
against a ban because of Finland's “legitimate defense needs.”
Finland argued that it could not accept a ban unilaterally because it does not
believe that all the countries in the world would adhere to the
ban.[4]
At a seminar on landmines held in the European Parliament in 1995, Mr. Pasi
Patokallio, director of the unit on Non-proliferation and Arms Control at the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, made the following remarks: “We know that
many argue for a total ban on antipersonnel landmines. We don't agree, the
reason being our legitimate defense needs, and I will come back on that. But
even if a total ban were the best solution, the beast could once again turn out
to be the enemy of the good. We certainly feel that it is better to gain a broad
support for effective albeit limited steps (restrictions on use instead of a
ban) than to end up with a situation where the total ban is adhered to by a very
small group of Western countries while the rest of the world keeps its
distance.”[5]
In August 1996 Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen admitted that in all
probability an international ban would come about. The Minister voiced support
for the European Union's joint efforts on the landmine question, but at the same
time she stated that Finland could not unilaterally get rid of its APMs, which
are so important for the country. The Minister also said that the
“normal” way to negotiate would be through the Conference on
Disarmament (CD). What was new here is that the Minister stated that the Ottawa
and Geneva processes could be
complementary.[6]
During the Ottawa Process, Finland's position softened a little, but its
statements still strongly underlined the fact that if the country were to join
a ban on APMs it would have to be “legally binding,”
“global” and “verifiable.” Speaking at an event in
Helsinki in August of 1996, the Foreign Minister offered the following comment:
"But it is increasingly clear that in the end, only a prohibition of inhumane
and indiscriminate landmines use can bring a real solution. To be effective,
such a solution must be legally binding, global and verifiable. As the first
step, all states should adhere to and abide by the significantly strengthened
landmine protocol to the CCW. I find it very hard to understand why two out of
three UN member states continue to remain outside the Convention. As concurrent
step, Finland proposes the initiation of global negotiations on a treaty banning
antipersonnel landmines altogether...The natural forum for such negotiations
would be the single negotiating body for disarmament that the international
community has at its disposal, namely the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva."[7]
In September 1997 during the Mine Ban Treaty negotiations in Oslo the
(observer) Finnish delegation expressed support for a verifiable treaty:
“Finland believes that through a global and effective treaty it is
possible to stop the further spread of APMs and hold those who use APMs against
civilians population to account. This is why Finland has pronounced her support
for a global, verifiable treaty banning APMs. This is not an easy commitment for
us, given the fact that APMs continue to have an important role in our national
defense, but we are ready to follow through that commitment provided that the
treaty will truly affect the landmine crisis?.
“We also believe that there have to be effective mechanisms within the
treaty to ensure that parties comply with the treaty commitments and that anyone
not complying can be held accountable. Any future conflict will be the moment
when credibility of the total ban treaty will be at stake; given the kind of
conflicts where APMs have been used, mostly internal conflicts, one should not
expect that the international community will be able to receive reliable
information of violation of a total ban unless the treaty provides a mechanism
for that. If it is possible to verify what is happening out in the field in
conflict areas, the international community can have a credible norm. Efforts to
water down the provision concerning verification of compliance through various
filters and veto right for the suspected country only pave the way for the
violation of the treaty commitment and are in flagrant contradiction with the
humanitarian objectives of the process toward a total
ban.”[8]
But on the time frame for the destruction of stockpiled APMs as compared to
the clearance of minefields, Finland argued:
“Isn't there something wrong with the priorities from a humanitarian
perspective? No limit is established for destruction of mines that are the most
dangerous for civilians - those mines that are the scattered outside marked
minefields. Marked minefields also kill civilians, if poorly marked or poorly
guarded, or both. On the other hand, APMs in stockpiles do not per se pose a
threat to civilians unless taken out for use in the field. Under the total ban
treaty, stockpiles should not be the most urgent priority. Indeed, one could
argue that, from the humanitarian perspective, the first thing to ask ought to
be to ask that all APMs be withdrawn into military storage...One could even
wonder whether the inadvertent message is that countries should deploy their
stockpiled APMs in the field in the order to gain time for their destruction and
replacement with other means. Surely that is not the message this conference
should send. For us, stockpiles are the key issue because all of our APMs are in
storage.”[9]
But even as the delegation in Oslo was expressing some support, eventually,
for a ban, the contradictions within policy remained evident. On 4 September
1997, Finland’s Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen spelled out clear
reservations to a unilateral ban on landmines. ”Why aren’t they
proposing a ban on Kalasnikows? They are killing more people - have killed more
people,” Lipponen told Reuters in an
interview.[10]
Finland did send an observer delegation to Ottawa in December of 1997 for the
signing of the Mine Ban Treaty. The day before the Treaty opened for signature
in Ottawa, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating that
“Finland takes part in the Ottawa Meeting as a observer. A group of
officers are to present a report for a total ban of APMs. It is researching how
to replace the use of APMs in Finland's
defense.”[11]
Current Finnish policy is to voice support for the total ban of
APMs[12] and the government has
indicated its “readiness” to ban antipersonnel landmines at some
future date. “It is a process which will become true maybe in ten years
time,” according to Lt. Col. Kukko from the Main
Headquarters.[13]
Finland has signed and ratified both the original and the revised Protocol 2
of the CCW.[14]
As already noted, Finland has always supported the possibility of landmine
negotiations in the CD and has been in the core of CD supporters, even after
softening its position toward the Ottawa Process. In a statement to the First
Committee of the United Nations in November of 1996, Counselor for Foreign
Affairs Iivo Salmi outlined the Finnish position:
“The CD is an established forum which is available for new negotiations
after the conclusion of CTBT?Provided that the political will is there. The only
other credible alternative is the CCW process but it may not have an other
review conference until 2001. We believe that the work at the CD could start
faster and that the negotiations could be more intensive?.The CD would not be
unaffected by the political momentum that largely thanks within the CD, the
momentum would increase and, we believe, expand into countries which are not yet
committed to the goal of total ban. Accusations that the support for the CD as
the forum would be a delaying tactic are totally unfounded. The momentum is
there and it will remain....It is clear that the CD route would bring into the
process countries that are not able to commit themselves here and now to an APL
ban. This would be a more painful road to follow compared with a ‘quick
fix.’ But through such a process, the commitment of most, if not all,
those participating in the negotiations, would grow.?if a process could be
started within in the CD, we believe that a treaty is achievable within a couple
of years.”[15]
Finland believed then and continues to believe that the way forward within
the CD was through the appointment of a special coordinator to help establish an
ad hoc committee to deal with issues related to antipersonnel mines:
“In order to obtain an effective ban, all the relevant countries
should, from the outset, participate in the negotiations: as my minister
announced at UN general Assembly last September Finland regards the CD as the
most suitable forum for the negotiations on APLs [antipersonnel landmines]. With
its members and observers, the Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating body
of more than 90 countries. To reach concrete and notable results soon, a
step-by-step approach could be considered as away forward. Now we are facing a
procedural challenge: how to respond to this global call? The Conference on
Disarmament should establish an ad-hoc committee on antipersonnel landmines and
start serious negotiations. Therefore as an immediate task we would kindly
invite you, Mr. President, to seek an urgent agreement on the appointment of a
special coordinator to consult the way in which the issue of antipersonnel
landmines could best be moved
forward."[16]
Even though a special coordinator was appointed (Australian Ambassador
Campbell), the CD has not proved capable of any agreement on discussions on
landmines. Various countries oppose such discussions for a variety of reasons,
not all of which are related to the concern of some that to negotiate anything
related to APMs in the CD would undercut the establishment of the international
norm provided by the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty. Finland continues to support,
along with others, negotiations on a transfer ban of APMs in the CD. In
February of 1999, the Bulgarian Ambassador to the CD issued a statement,
co-sponsored by 21 other governments including Finland, calling upon the CD to
begin negotiations of an antipersonnel landmine transfer ban.
Production
The Finnish government has stated that it does not
produce antipersonnel mines and has not done so since
1981.[17] Almost all APMs in
stock are Finnish-made mines. The capability and the know-how to produce APMs
exists and it is, in principle, possible that while there is no legislation
which forbids production, it could begin if and when the government were to
decide to do so.[18]
Until 1981 several Finnish companies produced components for simple mines
which the army assembled as blast
mines,[19] fragmentation
mines,[20] and also some
Claymore mines.[21] Finland
will not give details of the costs of producing and/or acquiring its mines. But
as one army officer noted, “We do not give this information to the public,
but they are more advantageous to produce in the large
amounts.”[22]
Information about APMs is not secret but neither is it easily available.
Because the mines are Finnish-made it is quite difficult to compare them with
international types and codes. Some known types include the SM 65-98 blast mine;
the PM 68 stake mine,[23]which
according to a Defense Staff official is only used in command-detonation mode
although it is possible to use them with
tripwires;[24] and the VM 88
directional fragmentation
explosive,[25] which like the PM
68 is to be used in command detonation mode although it can be used with a
tripwire.[26]
According to the Defense Staff: “Antipersonnel mines are all produced
by the Defense Force. Some components are may be bought from outside but never
explosives.”[27] Nor has
Finland licensed production of APMs in another
country.[28] An official of the
Ministry of Defense said that "Finland does not transfer APM production
technology to any other country. This concerns the CCW obligation which came
into force on 3 December
1998.”[29]
Finland does not produce Claymore mines and now classifies all Claymore mines
as munitions, to be used in command-detonation mode
only.[30] But they have not been
modified to make it impossible to trigger them by
tripwires.[31]
According to the Defense Staff, “Finland does not produce or conduct
research on munitions which could function as APMs. The Pohjamiina is an
antitank mine which is of no danger to civilians. We follow CCW obligations very
seriously and all the equipment is adjusted to CCW
specifications.”[32] On
the other hand researcher Arto Nokkala notes that APM technology is very simple
and from that perspective it is easy for any country to resume production of
such weapons in the event of a change in policy. Finland, with its advanced
electronics industry, has the basic capacity to develop devices which are
allowed in treaties.[33]
Lieutenant-colonel Jaakko Martikainen from the Defense Staff affirms that
Finland does not produce APM components, nor delivery systems that can be used
for APMs.[34] And the military
is monitoring the development of alternatives being researched in other
countries.[35] Arto Nokkala says
that it is difficult to assess such development, but Finland probably does
research on systems which can replace APMs and which are in accordance with
different treaties it has
signed.[36]
Transfer
Finland does not export
APMs.[37] According to a senior
government official in the Ministry of Defense, Finland has never exported
APMs.[38] Additionally, Finland
has announced that it “seeks to end the export and production of
antipersonnel landmines worldwide. Finland has never itself exported
antipersonnel landmines, nor has there been any antipersonnel landmine
production in Finland since
1981.”[39] Finland has
made political declarations regarding exports but made no legally-binding
decisions.[40] However
Lieutenant-colonel Yrjö Kukko of the Defense Force stated, “Finland
has exported components of mines but never whole
APMs.”[41]
Finland has imported Claymore mines. The name of the model is VM 88, which
probably means that the import year was1988. No other information is
available.
Information also exists that bounding fragmentation mines had been bought
from Germany in the 1940's, but the government denies that they are still in
stockpiles and the Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines has been told that the army
no longer trains troops to use bounding fragmentation
mines.[42]
The transit of APMs is not possible except with the permission of the
Ministry of Defense or Council of the State. If APMs come from a country which
is the member of the European Union, Finland considers that another member
country has prepared the documents needed before transiting any munitions
through Finland. The transit of components and technology is also forbidden
without permission.[43]
Lieutenant Colonel Kukko says that the transit of APMs is speculative anyway as
such a situation would not come about very easily given that Finland's attitude
is quite negative.[44]
Stockpiling
Finland does not release precise information on
the total number of mines in
stock.[45] The official
statement is that they number in the hundreds of thousands but less than a
million.[46] The Finnish
national daily, Helsingin Sanomat, has estimated quantities of APMs as more than
the official range given: “The military does not want to tell how many
APMs Finland has in stock. When the Ministry of Defense says
‘enough’ and the Defense Staff says ‘plenty,’ it is
possible to estimate that there are millions of APMs in stock. There are
probably fewer Claymore mines because they are more expensive than
APMs.”[47]
The Finnish Campaign has doubts that range of numbers of mines made public is
close to accurate. “The stated amount is in clear contradiction with
statements that APMs are an essential part of Finland's defense, and especially
in consideration of Finland's long land border [with Russia] and with the
statement that it would be very expensive to consider alternatives and destroy
the stocks because Finland has more landmines on average than other European
countries.”[48]
Finland is not going to destroy stockpiles before it finds alternatives to
APMs for its defense and signs the Mine Ban Treaty. A press release of 28 August
1998 from the Council of State announced that: “Research on Finland's
possibilities to join to the total ban of APMs and to find replacing methods and
arrangements will be continued. The aim is that first time the use of
alternative methods and arrangements...is considered to happen by the year
2001.”[49] Even so, the
government working group on landmines has suggested that if Finland finds
alternatives to APMs for its defense, plus the money to acquire them, and then
if Finland were to sign the Treaty in 2006, it would destroy all the APMs by the
year 2010.[50]
But in compliance with the CCW’s revised Protocol 2, Finland has had to
adapt some of its existing mines and also destroy others. Finland has destroyed
its old SM 57 and SM 61 blast mines. “We started to destroy old blast
mines already before the end of last year (1998) and they are already all
destroyed,” according to Lieutenant Colonel Heikki
Bäckström.[51]
The Defense Force is also obliged to make changes to SM 65
blast-mines,[52] which are still
part of Finland's defense but do not contain enough metal to make them
detectable – a requirement under revised Protocol II. After these changes
these mines will be renamed Sakaramiina 65-98s. As noted above, Claymore mines
are no longer defined as antipersonnel mines; as of 3 December 1998, they were
classified as directional fragmentation
explosives.[53] All these old
mines have been destroyed in Lapland or parts have been recycled. For example
all the copper has been collected for re-use.
[54]
Use
Finland continues to reserve the right to use
APMs, Claymore mines and other weapons that might function as APMs. Thus, the
statement from a Defense Force Brigadier General that “antipersonnel
landmines are still an essential part of the Finnish defense doctrine.”
However, the General also adds that “There are no minefields in peacetime
in Finland.”[55] Many
people believe that there are minefields in the guarded and closed border zone
between Finland and Russia. All official statements refute this common
belief.[56]
For various humanitarian mine action programs, Finland has spent
US$14,445,000 between 1991-1998. The first country to receive support was
Afghanistan, which received a total of US$1.5 million. between 1991-1994. During
1995 Finland allocated US$715,000 for mine programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Angola and Mozambique. That same year, the government spent US$715,000 to send
mine clearance specialists on a fact-finding mission to Angola and Mozambique,
in conjunction with UNDHA to assess the possibility of Finnish in-kind
assistance and expertise for DHA demining operations.
In 1996 the total amount spent was US$1,306,000 US, including in-kind
contributions and mine clearance equipment worth US$196,000 for Angola and
Mozambique; US$435,000 through the Finnish Red Cross and WHO for prostheses for
mine victims in Bosnia; US$22,000 for a rehabilitation program of Save the
Children in Bosnia; and direct contributions of US$218,000 and US$435,000 for
Cambodia and Afghanistan respectively for mine clearance operations.
Finnish allocations more than tripled in 1997 to US$4,478,000 for mine-action
programs in Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Cambodia and Laos. Of those funds,
US$163,000 was allocated to establish a Finnish stand-by unit for humanitarian
demining.
In 1998, the last year for which a breakdown of figures is available, Finland
allocated US$6,565,000 mostly for mine action programs in Angola, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and Mozambique. Of the total, US$196,000 was channeled through the
Finnish Red Cross to produce prostheses in Bosnia, and finally, US$1,620,000 was
spent to purchase demining vehicles for the Finnish stand-by unit.
Between 1998-2001, Finland will allocate US$22.56 million for mine action
programs.[58]
[1]Lauri Hannikainen,
Correspondents’ Reports, Comments on Finland’s Position on
Anti-Personnel Landmines: Fact Sheet of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Political Department, 26 August 1997, Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law, Volume 1, T.M.C. Asser Press, 1998, pp. 436-437.
[2]Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, press release No 352, 16 December, 1997;
Jalkaväkimiinatyöryhmän raportti (Report of the APM Working
Group), Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 December, 1997.
[4]Newspapers:
Kansanuutiset, 29 June, 1995 and Helsingin Sanomat, 27 July
1995.
[5]Pasi Patokallio, Director
of the Unit on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
at a seminar of The European Parliament on Finland's position towards a ban, 22
March 1995.
[6]Minister for Foreign
Affairs Tarja Halonen, speech at Hiroshima event in Helsinki, 6 August 1996.
[7]Minister for Foreign
Affairs Tarja Halonen, United Nations, 27 September 1996.
[8]Ambassador Pasi
Patokallio, head of the Finnish observer delegation, Diplomatic Conference on an
International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Oslo, Norway, 2 September
1997.
[10]Newspaper Helsingin
Sanomat, 5 September 1997.
[11]Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Press Release, 2 December 1997.
[12]Council of State, Report
to the Parliament, 17 March 1997.
[13]Interview with Lieutenant
Colonel Yrjö Kukko, Main Headquarters, Defense Force, 12 December 1998.
[14]Finland signed the CCW
treaty 10 April 1981 and ratified it 8 May 1982. Finland signed the revised
protocol 2 and ratified it 3 April, 1998, Defense Forces, Press Release 200, 2
December 1998.
[15]Counselor for Foreign
Affairs Iivo Salmi, First Committee of the United Nations, 4 November 1996.
[16]Ambassador Markku Reimaa,
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, January 1997.
[17]Defense Staff, Press
Release, 3 December 1998; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel, Jaakko
Martikainen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.
[18]Laura Lodenius, Finnish
Campaign Coordinator, 31 January 1999.
[25]“Sirpale
viuhkaräjähdepanos” in Finnish; a Claymore-type mine.
[26]Mikkonen, 18 February,
1999;. Miinojen käyttö Suomen puolustuksessa (Using Mines in Finland's
Defense), Ministry of Defense, Seminar on Landmines, 1 October 1997.
[27]Interview with Lieutenant
Colonel Jaakko Martikainen, Defense Staff, 5 February 1999.
[57]Finnish
assistance on mine action in 1991-1998, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department
for International Development Cooperation, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, 25
January 1999.
[58]Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Department for International Development Cooperation, Press Release, 18
December 1998.
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